The Dangers of Trade Fragmentation

At the end of World War II, policy architects sought to reduce the incentives for armed conflict by creating a web of economic interdependencies that would render supply-chain disruptions too expensive to contemplate. By the 21st century, however, new challenges have emerged. Geopolitical tensions stoked by authoritarian countries such as China and Russia have highlighted the risk: Economic interdependence also creates vulnerabilities to autocratic regimes.

Efforts to diversify supply chains away from authoritarian regimes are rational from a national-security perspective. But the resulting protectionism and the fragmentation of trade flows can also incur risks by increasing economic costs, dampening growth prospects, reducing real incomes, and weakening international cooperation. A World Trade Organization (WTO) riven by deep geopolitical divisions has been unable to address these challenges.

A Realigned US Trade Policy

The United States can face these challenges by realigning its trade policy with two major steps.

(1) Recommit to first principles by seeking to

• treat imported goods the same as domestically produced goods,
• treat other countries as “most favored nations,” and
• find the least trade-restrictive ways to pursue domestic policy goals.

(2) Engage in plurilateral agreements to

• find agreement where unanimous consensus cannot be reached,
• eliminate tariffs and costly trade distortions,
• promote trade creation and minimize trade diversion, and
• tackle policy challenges in the energy, fisheries, and other sectors.

The Status Quo Is Stunting Economic Growth

To continue with the status quo means to accept a paralyzed WTO and a steady stream of trade initiatives that can only impair economic growth. Prioritizing pragmatic policies that promote cross-border economic cooperation can revitalize economic growth. A realignment in US trade policy around first principles and plurilateralism can provide a positive way forward and an example for other nations to follow.

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To read the Research Summary published by the Mercatus Center, click here.

To read the full Special Study, click here.

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Today, a new chapter may have opened. In the wake of financial crises unprecedented since the Great Depression, persistent economic inequality, migratory pressures on Europe and the United States intensifying in the mid-2010s, Brexit, the norm-breaking U.S. Trump administration of 2017-21, the first global pandemic in a century, an accelerating climate crisis, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the newest Israel-Gaza war, the world looks to have moved into a distinct era echoing many of the interwar tensions that the post-World War II settlement sought to overcome. And unlike in the 1920s and 1930s when radio first became widely available, modern media display global stresses to everyone visually and in real time and amplify them in a way undreamed of then. How much reversion toward the troubled past is likely, and to what extent will that reversion undermine the global community’s ability to address common challenges, some inconceivable before World War II?

As an economist, I will focus mainly on issues related to commerce and finance, but the nature of the current malaise underscores the inherent inseparability of geopolitics, domestic politics, and economics. The destabilizing potential of this interplay was less salient for parts of the postwar period, especially in the quarter-century or so from the collapse of the Soviet bloc over 1989-91 to the mid-2010s. After that brief belle époque, however, history has indeed returned, with a vengeance.

In this paper, I start by briefly summarizing challenges the Bretton Woods system’s monetary, financial, and commercial arrangements were meant to overcome, and factors that led to the system’s unraveling by 1973. I then describe how economic globalization exploded under the newer floating exchange rate arrangements, and how the Global Financial Crisis years 2008-09 appear under various metrics to be a watershed for global economic integration. Geopolitical developments in recent years may have accentuated the disintegrative forces in the global economy—it is still early days. I therefore turn to the links between geopolitics, domestic politics, and economics and the prospects for future multilateral global cooperation on a range of macro-critical common threats.

Maurice Obstfeld, C. Fred Bergsten Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, is the Class of 1958 Professor of Economics emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley, where he taught between 1991 and 2023.

To read the abstract published by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, click here.

To read the full working paper, click here.

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The theme of APTIR 2023/24 is “Unleashing digital trade and investment for sustainable development.” Prepared in collaboration with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the report explores the roles of digital trade and investment in guiding the Asia-Pacific region towards sustainable development. It examines digital trade and investment patterns in the region and provides an overview of the digital trade and investment policy environment, viewed through a sustainable development lens. The report also assesses the potential of unilateral policies on trade and investment, as well as the impact of multilateral and regional cooperation, in maximizing the benefits of digital trade and investment while focusing on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Incorporating a quantitative assessment, this study evaluates the role of digital trade in archiving the SDGs and examines the impact of various policy scenarios. Building on this understanding, the report concludes by offering a series of action-oriented policy recommendations, specifically targeting the trade and investment domains, to ensure that digital and investment policies effectively unlock the potential of digital trade and investment for sustainable development.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

To read the abstract published by United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, click here.

To read the full report, click here.

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DECARBONIZATION STANDARDS AND THE IRON AND STEEL SECTOR: HOW CAN THE WTO SUPPORT GREATER COHERENCE?

1  INTRODUCTION

Decarbonization of the iron and steel industry value chain is of critical importance to achieving net zero targets. Iron and steel are essential inputs in nearly every facet of modern life, from construction to transportation and energy. However, iron and steel are among the most energy and emission-intensive industries globally. Iron and steel production is one of the largest coal consumers, accounting for approximately 8 per cent of annual CO2 emissions.

Global steel production has nearly tripled over the past 50 years, and it is the most used and recycled metal worldwide, with 1,864 million tonnes of crude steel produced in 2020. Global steel exports reached 458 million tonnes in 2021, representing around 25 per cent of global steel production. Emissions from steelmaking are generally difficult to reduce because existing efficiency and abatement options are limited and some alternative technologies are costly. It is therefore critical to accelerate global scale-up and commercialization of low-carbon steelmaking technologies, such as those for replacing carbon-based reduction with renewable electricity or green hydrogen, or the use of carbon capture, storage and usage.

Various public and private initiatives are working on the decarbonization of the sector, measuring emissions, setting targets and verifying reductions. These include steel-specific initiatives and standards at the international, regional, national or company level that address:

• facility-level carbon measurement methodologies;
• upstream verification of embedded emissions of steel products;
• emissions intensity performance thresholds;
• certification and labelling;
• recycling of steel scrap.

Government initiatives have also recently prioritized decarbonization of the sector and the measurement of embedded emissions, for example, the EU–US Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium. There have also been proposals for climate clubs that consider steel as a prime candidate for cooperation. One common challenge is ensuring coherent measurement, verification and traceability across the supply chain.

Numerous standards exist, or are under development, to support these decarbonization efforts. However, it is still unclear which specific measurement methodologies will be used by these various coalitions and initiatives, and how this may impact trade and decarbonization efforts. Moreover, it needs to be clarified how to ensure comparability, transparency and consistency across different methodologies, technologies and countries, and with respect to competing materials such as aluminium or cement. Consistent and transparent measurement, traceability and verification of emission reductions are critical to underpin the spectrum of trade-related climate measures. The right methodologies enable accurate information and comparisons across products, processes and technologies and deliver confidence in net zero claims. It is also important to develop the right methodologies for steel decarbonization standards in situations where governments decide to incorporate them into their domestic regulations.

Concerns about ensuring a level playing field arise as the decarbonization of the steel sector advances at different paces in a world of diverse economies and climate policies. This reflects the bottom-up nature of the global climate policy framework as established by the Paris Agreement. The trade exposure and carbon intensity of the industry mean that under stringent climate policies or pricing first movers can suffer competitiveness losses compared to competitors in other jurisdictions, potentially leading to carbon leakage – including with respect to downstream products.

Applying common global standards can help to avoid first mover problems, but mainly if supported by new markets and demand for these products. Standards also help to create a market for green steel products, facilitate green public procurement support the circular economy, and can be linked to a low-emissions steel mark or label. Global cooperation can contribute to a just transition by ensuring that developing and least-developed countries can be part of the low-emissions steel value chain.

To read the full information brief, please click here.

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Chinese actors have become directly involved in such projects against a backdrop of sharpening debates about sustainability and other consequences of large-scale infrastructure projects. This is especially true in protected areas such as land populated by Indigenous groups and conservation units. A notable example is the Ferrogrão project, a major railway line designed to cross sections of the Amazon and Cerrado to deliver goods to Brazilian ports.

This paper examines the diverse ways that Brazilian and Chinese actors have learned from each other as they negotiate the terms of these deals. It also explores how these learning processes have been conditioned by intense domestic political debates over these projects in Brazil. Official documents and secondary sources reveal that, rather than a set Chinese way of doing business or a stock Brazilian response, such projects entail dynamic institutional learning. Such learning is shaped not only by the particulars of the Ferrogrão project but also by Chinese actors’ broader engagement with Brazilian infrastructure projects over the past ten years.

To read the full article from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, please click here. 

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A brighter outlook but recovery will be gradual

Faster vaccine deployment and better cooperation for its distribution would boost confidence and strengthen the pickup but continued uncertainty risks further weakness

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1. Negotiations: The negotiations creating the WTO were a major success, leading to a broad range of new rules that prohibit members from raising tariffs beyond agreed-upon levels, restrict non-tariff barriers, and ban discriminatory trade measures. Since then, a few negotiations have helped further lower barriers, including the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and Information Technology Agreement (ITA). Today, average applied tariffs are approximately half of what they were when the WTO was created, and numerous unfair trade practices have been discontinued.2
2. Implementation and Monitoring: The WTO recognizes that the implementation and monitoring of commitments are essential to maintaining the integrity of an effective rules-based system. Accordingly, the WTO includes mechanisms to track implementation and rules that require members to notify it of changes in trade policies and share information on trade-distorting practices (e.g., subsidies). Transparency and information sharing promote business predictability, while the discussion of trade-distorting policies often leads to their modification or abandonment before adoption.
3. Dispute Settlement: The WTO dispute-settlement system helps resolve trade disputes to minimize unilateral action and cycles of retaliation. Many countries use the dispute-settlement system to challenge adverse measures. In most cases, the member losing the dispute changes the offending measure. In other cases, that member exercises its sovereignty and chooses not to change the policy, freely accepting the consequences (retaliatory tariffs). Additionally, many disputes are settled before litigation commences.

The world has changed considerably since the WTO’s creation. It has experienced the rise of the Internet and other advanced technologies, China’s economic expansion, greater skepticism about the benefits of trade, and greater concern about income inequality. The world has changed, and so must the WTO. At the same time, the WTO itself has not met expectations. WTO negotiations have not readily facilitated new rules or additional market-access openings, the implementation and monitoring pillar has not held countries accountable for ignoring its requirements, and the dispute-settlement system has not strictly applied the rules as negotiated. As a result, the WTO is falling far short of its promise and mandate in different ways.

WTO negotiations have failed to update international trade rules to: account for non-market economies and deal with related unfair trade practices, such as forced technology transfer and massive industrial subsidies; account for new technologies, such as the Internet; improve commitments in key areas covered in detail by free-trade agreements (FTAs), such as intellectual property and services; and fully address politically important policy issues, such as labor and the environment. WTO negotiations have also failed to substantially lower or equalize tariff treatment among major economies.

The ability of large emerging economies to self-declare “developing-country” status and avoid taking on the same commitments as competitors has compounded the challenge. Worse yet, many countries claim that trade liberalization and the WTO rules that promote it are anti-development, undermining the WTO’s core mission.

Compliance with the WTO’s implementation and monitoring function has not been widespread, with many members failing to follow the basic notification requirements necessary to ensure the transparency and predictability of trade.

WTO dispute settlement has drifted from its original design. It has failed to properly adjudicate certain disputes, including by inventing new rules without consensus and improperly applying the rules to non-market economies;  allowed the WTO Secretariat to wield too much power in decision-making; and taken too long, depriving workers and businesses of real-time solutions.

Accordingly, all three pillars require reform to ensure the WTO retains a constructive and central role in resolving disputes before they spiral out of control, and in shaping international trade rules and behavior. When the WTO is functioning properly, it provides a mechanism to enforce agreed-upon rules in a predictable manner and create new rules to protect workers and businesses. When the rules are inadequate and disputes take too long, countries are more inclined to adopt unfair practices, and may be forced to respond unilaterally to protect their interests.

WTO reform provides the quickest and most constructive path to adequately address China’s unfair trade practices. The US-China Phase One trade deal made important progress on certain structural issues, but did not meaningfully address industrial subsidies or state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and it is unlikely that China will ever address these matters bilaterally given the government’s central role in its economy. Therefore, concerted multilateral pressure that paints these policies as a threat to the global trading system as a whole is necessary to effectuate change. In many respects, the WTO provides the ideal forum for countries to work together to persuade China to change its most problematic behavior. The WTO already has a core set of principles, such as non-discrimination, that are critical to countering such practices, and an existing infrastructure for negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing those rules. The WTO’s membership is also critical—it includes many countries impacted by these issues, as well as China itself. The broad reach of the WTO will also help ensure other countries do not adopt similar non-policies.

The United States has been calling for significant WTO reform for years, and many countries have recently joined the chorus. For example, in December 2018, all Group of Twenty (G20) members endorsed the following language in the leaders’ statement: International trade and investment are important engines of growth, productivity, innovation, job creation and development. We recognize the contribution that the multilateral trading system has made to that end. The system is currently falling short of its objectives and there is room for improvement. We therefore support the necessary reform of the WTO to improve its functioning.

Despite these high-level statements, WTO members have struggled to gain momentum toward tangible reform. Some blame the United States for refusing to offer specific proposals on dispute settlement, the European Union (EU) for an unwillingness to meaningfully address US concerns on this issue, China for refusing to engage on proposals related to its practices, and India for leading the fight to preserve preferential developing country status for large, emerging economies.

Regardless of who is to blame, the WTO is in crisis, and momentum for ambitious reform must be generated before the system loses its relevance. To catalyze momentum, members should quickly resolve ongoing negotiations while “thinking big” about the future and significantly raising their levels of ambition. The successful conclusion of ongoing negotiations, such as those on fisheries subsidies, will create new confidence in the WTO by demonstrating that the system is still capable of solving problems. But, negotiations will not solve the biggest problems facing the system. Therefore, even as members seek to make incremental progress, they increase their ambition with respect to the overall scope of reform needed to create a system fit for purpose in the twenty-first century and on “outside-the-box” ideas to solve some of the more intractable problems before it is too late.

Any successful WTO reform effort requires the United States and the European Union to better cooperate and coordinate. The United States and EU share common values, jointly spearheaded the creation of the original international trading system, and have both used it to promote trade-liberalizing, market-oriented policies around the globe. The economies of the United States and the EU are also equally challenged by China’s policies. If they cannot reach consensus on how to fix the WTO, it is inconceivable that the rest of the world could do so.

To this end, this paper proposes an ambitious WTO reform proposal that both the United States and the European Union should be able to endorse, and ultimately work together to promote. In particular, a joint US-EU WTO reform proposal should

• address problems with all three pillars—negotiations, implementation and monitoring, and dispute settlement; these functions complement each other and reform is needed in all three to make the system work as a whole;
• address the most difficult issues, including China’s unfair trade policies and how to fit a non-market economy into a system built by market economies;
  • create new rules to address issues that have emerged since the WTO was created, such as digital trade, and upgrade existing agreements, such as the intellectual property and services agreements, to the higher standards included in many FTAs;
• include more robust commitments on politically important issues, such as labor and the environment, which are critical to regaining domestic support for trade;
• eliminate the unfairly high tariff rates imposed by certain countries, and bring greater parity in tariff levels among major economic powers;
• promote liberalization by all members, not just “developed” economies, while recognizing the unique challenges faced by least-developed countries (LDCs) and allowing for differential treatment predicated on fact-based need;
• consider novel approaches to rescue the negotiating function, such as the use of plurilateral agreements that only benefit participants (non-most favored nation), or non-binding commitments for LDCs as an initial approach in certain areas;
• increase high-level political engagement from capitals to promote greater ambition in Geneva;
• hold countries accountable for failing to follow fundamental rules related to transparency;
• fully address the underlying shortcomings of the dispute settlement system by
  • ensuring that adjudicators better respect the limited mandate provided by WTO members, and do not create rules to which members never agreed;
  • making institutional reforms to improve the transparency and accountability of the process, and address the imbalance in decision-making between the WTO Secretariat and the appointed adjudicators; and
  • improving the system’s efficiency so it serves as a viable “real-time” alternative to unilateral action; and
• recognize that fixing the negotiating function is critical to fixing dispute settlement in a sustainable manner.

The will of all WTO members will ultimately be necessary to achieve the broad-based reforms envisioned in this paper, but improving cooperation and coordination between the United States and European Union is a necessary start. Section II of this paper further outlines some of the existing problems with the WTO system, while Section III details a joint US-EU reform agenda.

To download the full report, please click here.

Clete R. Willems is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Mr. Willems is a partner at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, where he advises multinational companies, investors, and trade associations on international economic law and policy matters. Until April 2019, Mr. Willems was Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economics and Deputy Director of the National Economic Council.

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The question now is whether the pandemic puts that progress in jeopardy. There are those who argue that it does; governments and the private sector are in “survival mode,” making sustainability—at least for the duration of the crisis—far less of a priority. The counter-arguments are that, one, the investor community is continuing to use environmental, social and governance standards to guide their allocation decisions and, two, that the best way to prepare for the next crisis, whenever it comes, is to begin preparations now by bolstering sustainability initiatives.

The Hinrich Foundation Sustainable Trade Index (STI) was originally created for the purpose of stimulating meaningful discussion of the full range of considerations that policymakers, executives and leaders from civil society must take into account when managing and advancing international trade. That purpose remains, but we hope that governments and businesses around the world start to also view it as a tool for building resilience into their international trade policy and their economies, more broadly. This, the third edition of the study, seeks to measure the capacity of 20 economies—19 in Asia along with the US as an external benchmark—to participate in the international trading system in a manner that supports the long-term domestic and global goals of economic growth, environmental protection and strengthened social capital.

The key results and findings from the 2020 STI include:

• For the first time, there is a tie atop the index. Japan and South Korea both receive scores of 75.1 (out of 100), placing them five points clear of Singapore in third place (70.0) and a group of three other economies—Hong Kong, Taiwan and the US—in the high 60s. These six together have been the mainstays at the top of the index throughout the three, slightly different iterations of the STI that have now been published since 2016. But this is also the first time for either Japan or South Korea to rank first in the index; Singapore was number one in 2016 and Hong Kong in 2018.
• The economic pillar is, in this edition, by far the most tightly packed, which was also the case in 2016. The difference in scores between the top-ranked economy, Hong Kong at 69.1, and the economy at the bottom, Laos at 44.6, is just barely over 25 points. The only consequential moves in the top half of the pillar were by China and the Philippines. China continued its ascent up the ranks, although more because of consistency than progress. The Philippines rebounded to 9th, where it began in 2016 before slumping to 15th in 2018.
• To the praise Taiwan already garnered this year for its effective handling of the Covid-19 outbreak, we can add the accolade of being first in the social pillar of the STI, the second time it achieved the rank. It is further recognition that the economy is getting many things right.
• Japan registers the strongest performance in the environmental pillar (80.0), leading the same group of four—Singapore (78.7), Hong Kong (77.4) and South Korea (75.2), being the other three—that has excelled, with a few exceptions, across all three pillars of the STI from the start. Then there’s a considerable drop. China and the US come next in the rankings, but are both 20 points below the top four in scores.
• Pretty much all we can be certain of is that there is going to be another crisis at some point. Preparedness matters. The original intention behind the STI was not necessarily to serve as a tool for crisis preparation. But it has taken on that dimension. We hope that governments and firms around the world, not just in Asia, will use it as such.

To download the full report, please click here.

© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2020

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DFC’s Roadmap for Impact (Roadmap) takes into account global development needs to establish portfolio-wide development priorities. The Roadmap identifies opportunities to increase private investment in low-income countries (LIC) and lower middle-income countries (LMIC)—targeting 60 percent of total portfolio projects in LICs, LMICs or fragile states. It also recognizes the importance of supporting projects that are significantly developmental or that target the most vulnerable populations in upper middle-income countries (UMICs). In addition, the Roadmap defines priority cross-cutting development themes and sectors, and it establishes investment goals and development metrics in order to focus DFC’s investment activities and measure our progress.

The Roadmap outlines capabilities and resources that are required to achieve these development goals, with an emphasis on enhanced coordination within DFC and across USG initiatives, departments and agencies, development finance institutions (DFIs), international financial institutions (IFIs), and other members of the development community. It also emphasizes the importance of transparency and enhanced social and environmental standards in the design and sustainable execution of DFC-supported projects in order to demonstrate that the U.S.-led model of development advances the best interests of Americans, host countries, and the planet whenever we invest.

The Roadmap does not reflect an exhaustive list of the sectors where DFC invests; rather, it focuses on sectors where DFC investments and technical assistance can have the greatest, measurable development impact over the next five years. Working closely with newly created U.S. Embassy deal teams, particularly with the Departments of State’s and Commerce’s DC Central Deal Team, as well as with DFC liaisons at U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) missions worldwide, DFC can expand its client base and broaden the markets it serves. It will not be easy; and it will require additional resources, private capital to invest alongside, changes to processes, and patience. But DFC is committed to prioritizing the most highly developmental projects in the most underserved communities worldwide.

To download the full report, please click here.

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Covid-19 has served as a reminder that we live in a closely interdependent world that brings opportunities but also carries dangers. It has, just as importantly, shed light on a whole series of pre-existing conditions – from heightened inequality, to unsustainable debt and rampant environmental destruction – that were left unaddressed after the Global Financial Crisis. The world at the end of 2019 was, in truth, a good deal more fragile than many were willing to acknowledge.

As a result, Covid-19 obliges us to think carefully about what makes for healthy and resilient communities, at the global level as much as the local level and take to heart the lessons we have learned in the last decade.

This year is shaping up to be a very difficult year for the global economy. With many countries unprepared to respond to a health pandemic, lockdown seemed to be the only plausible way to protect lives and preserve health systems. Doing so triggered an economic crisis that spread as quickly as the virus itself. Data for the first two quarters of this year show output contracted more sharply than in 2008-2009, and in some cases registering the steepest drop on record. Estimates for the year point to a generalized global recession matching the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Next year will likely see a rebound. However, it will be uneven within and across countries and uncertainty will persist. Unemployment will be on an upward trend, more and more companies will be facing the threat of bankruptcy; supply chains will be fragile; confidence will be shaken; demand will be weak. Debt levels across the world, in both the public and private sectors, will have risen significantly from the historically high levels registered before the crisis. In this condition, the wrong policy steps – and ignoring the experience of the last decade – could trigger further shocks which would not only derail recovery but could usher in a lost decade.

These threats are greatest in the developing countries where the ability to respond to the crisis, on both the health and economic fronts, has been hampered by years of austerity combined with massive debt servicing, high levels of informality and policy space constricted by the rules we’ve chosen to manage globalisation.

To date, the international community has not matched its expression of concern with commensurate support and action. Multilateralism was already under stress before the crisis, but Covid-19 has highlighted the need for frank discussion and bold proposals that match the ambition shown when the global system was founded. This year’s Trade and Development Report argues that the global economic crisis caused by Covid-19 throws up a stark choice: continue misguided policy choices or collectively chart a new path that leads from recovery to a more resilient, more equal and more environmentally sustainable world in line with the ambition of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Neither path is preordained. Building a better world is a matter of conviction and collective action. The lives of future generations and of the planet itself will depend on the choices we all take over the coming months.

Mukhisa Kituyi
Secretary-General of UNCTAD

Mukhisa Kituyi, of Kenya, became UNCTAD’s seventh Secretary-General on 1 September 2013. After serving an initial four-year term, he was reappointed by the General Assembly in July 2017 for an additional term that began on 1 September that year.

To download the full report, please click here. 

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