The global issue of deforestation and its environmental consequences stand at the forefront of Brazil’s agenda as it directs a critical crossroads. In this context, the Brazilian Ecological Transition Plan, an initiative by the Ministry of Economy, emerges as a vital step towards positioning Brazil as a leader in sustainability and environmental responsibility. This plan, currently in progress, addresses urgent ecological challenges and sets the course for a more sustainable and resilient future.

However, Brazil’s path towards sustainability faces challenges, particularly concerning the EU-Mercosur Agreement. This agreement, designed at bolstering cooperation and economic growth, has been met with concerns. Increased trade in agricultural products between Mercosur countries and the EU could potentially aggravate deforestation, raising questions about the compatibility of the agreement with environmental goals.

Therefore, International Law serves as a guiding force in promoting responsible environmental practices. The interrelation of ecosystems transcends national boundaries, necessitating collaborative efforts among countries to mitigate environmental degradation. In this context, Brazil’s ambitious plan aligns with the principles outlined in international agreements such as the Paris Agreement. By adhering to these agreements, Brazil can signal its commitment to global efforts to combat climate change.

As negotiations proceed, finding common ground on environmental commitments is essential for successful ratification and the realization of mutual benefits. Brazil’s Ecological Transition Plan and the EU-Mercosur Agreement offer opportunities to demonstrate global responsibility and sustainability. By navigating these challenges, Brazil can emerge as a steward of the environment, contributing to a greener, more sustainable future.

Context

The Brazilian Ecological Transition Plan, announced by the Ministry of Economy, represents an initiative that seeks to position Brazil as a global leader in sustainability and environmental responsibility. This plan is still in progress and is set to tackle pressing ecological challenges and pave the way for a more sustainable and resilient future.

The Ecological Transition Plan, consisting of six major pillars, presents a comprehensive approach to address key environmental concerns in Brazil. These pillars include sustainable finance, technological densification, bioeconomy, energy transition, circular economy, and climate adaptation infrastructure. Each pillar aims to tackle critical challenges and foster a more sustainable and environmentally responsible future for the country.

The Plan also encompasses a wide range of measures to address key environmental concerns in Brazil. It includes initiatives such as establishing a regulated carbon market, implementing carbon taxes, and launching sustainable bonds to promote sustainable finance. In addition, the plan emphasizes a circular economy model that promotes resource efficiency, waste reduction, and innovation.

The implementation of the Ecological Transition Plan will be executed over the course of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s period, with some initiatives already starting this semester. Therefore, it is a testament to the government’s commitment to embracing sustainability and transitioning towards a greener and more ecologically responsible economy.

EU-Mercosur Agreement in the Context of Brazil

The EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement stands as a testament to the strengthening ties between the European Union and the Mercosur states, which include Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. This landmark agreement was politically finalized on 28 June 2019, marking a significant step towards fostering mutual growth, sustainable development, and increased trade and investment between the two regions.

Key components of the agreement include the reduction or elimination of tariffs on various goods and services, improved access to government procurement opportunities, protection of intellectual property rights, and facilitation of investment flows. By streamlining trade procedures and reducing barriers, the agreement aims to boost economic growth and create new opportunities for businesses in both the EU and Mercosur countries.

The agreement holds strategic importance for both parties. For the EU, it represents an opportunity to expand its market access in the dynamic economies of the Mercosur bloc and gain a competitive edge in sectors like machinery, chemicals, and automotive. On the other hand, Mercosur countries, especially Brazil, stand to benefit from increased export opportunities for their agricultural products, such as beef, soybeans, and poultry, which are vital components of their economies.

From Deforestation to Protection

The EU-Mercosur agreement, while aimed at fostering economic cooperation and trade between the two regions, has been marred by significant concerns surrounding logging in recent years in Brazil. Due to the intensified trade in agricultural commodities, from Brazil to the EU, there is a threat of deforestation being exacerbated. The expansion of agribusiness and the demand for these products could lead to further devastation, as agricultural land is cleared to meet the export demands.

In response to the growing concerns, the EU has sought to impose environmental requirements on Mercosur countries, including Brazil, to ensure adherence to sustainable practices and the Paris Agreement’s environmental goals. However, Brazil has been resistant to these proposals, raising concerns about the agreement’s compatibility with climate and environmental objectives.

Nonetheless, a striking contradiction reveals itself when inspecting the EU’s stance on deforestation. While the EU actively urges Mercosur nations to halt deforestation and embrace sustainable measures, it concurrently remains a potent catalyst for this very degradation due to its robust appetite for agricultural imports. Products like Brazilian soybeans and beef, in high demand in European markets, are frequently associated with the expansive clearing of forests for cultivation.

The EU’s consumption habits, marked by their significant imports, inadvertently fuel the deforestation they are keen to diminish. This juxtaposition not only muddies the agreement’s narrative but also casts a shadow on the EU’s true dedication to sustainability, given their prevailing consumption patterns.

As described by Knox in his exploration of “Imperialism, Hypocrisy and the Politics of International Law,” the contradictions and accusations of hypocrisy are not mere anomalies but rather intrinsic facets of international relations and policy-making. This framework can be aptly applied to the EU’s stance on deforestation. 

While on one hand, the EU guardian environmental sustainability and urges Mercosur nations to halt deforestation, its consumption patterns reveal a contrasting narrative. This duality in the EU’s actions mirrors the broader theme Knox emphasizes: the tension between proclaimed values and actual practices in the realm of international law and relations. 

Additionally, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s recent speech at the Power Our Planet event in Paris served as a poignant reminder of the complex interplay between environmental responsibility, global consumption, and historical accountability. With resounding applause, Lula stated, “It is not the African people who pollute the world, it is not the Latin American people who pollute the world… they must pay the historical debt they have with planet Earth.” These words resonate as an echo of the concerns arising from the EU’s demand on Brazil to address deforestation while European consumption drives it.

With the return of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to the presidency, there has been a significant shift in Brazil’s approach to the Amazon. Data from various sources indicate a substantial decline in deforestation rates since Lula assumed office. According to government satellite data, deforestation in the Amazon dropped by 33.6% during the first six months of Lula’s term. This decline is even more noteworthy when compared to the same period in the previous year.

Several factors contribute to this positive trend. The new administration has emphasized the importance of environmental conservation and has taken proactive measures to protect the Amazon. The government’s efforts, combined with international pressure and increased global awareness about Amazon’s significance, have played a critical role in this decline.

Challenges and Perspectives

The EU-Mercosur Agreement has faced several complications in the ratification process. Some EU member states have expressed objections regarding the environmental aspects of the deal. As of the current context, the agreement remains pending final approval and ratification from all the EU member states.

However, the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, is determined to conclude the long-delayed trade deal between the European Union (EU) and Mercosur countries. With the geopolitical landscape evolving, the EU recognizes the importance of strengthening ties with Latin America and is eager to avoid neglecting the region any further.

During her tour of Latin American countries, von der Leyen, alongside Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, emphasized the urgency of accelerating negotiations and finalizing the EU-Mercosur agreement. Both leaders expressed their ambition to reach a conclusion as soon as possible, aiming to achieve this milestone by the end of the year.

Nevertheless, even though both European and South American leaders are excited to sign the agreement and tout its potential benefits, authors such as Jason Hickel present a thought-provoking perspective that challenges the conventional notion of sustainable economic growth. 

His argument centers on the assertion that the pursuit of never-ending economic expansion is incompatible with the finite nature of Earth’s resources and the urgent need to mitigate environmental crises. According to this view, achieving genuine sustainability requires more than mere tweaks to existing systems—it demands a profound reevaluation of our societal values and consumption patterns.

At the heart of this perspective is the notion that true environmental resilience necessitates a departure from the relentless cycle of production and consumption that has characterized modern economies. Proponents of this viewpoint argue that focusing solely on increasing GDP and material accumulation exacerbates resource depletion, pollution, and ecological degradation. Instead, they suggest that by reining in production and consumption, we can reduce our collective ecological footprint, allowing ecosystems to regenerate and reducing the strain on vital resources.

The idea isn’t to strip away comforts or advancements, but rather to challenge the prevailing assumption that continual material accumulation equates to progress. By reimagining prosperity and embracing a more holistic perspective, societies can allocate resources more efficiently, reduce waste, and cultivate lifestyles that are both environmentally regenerative and personally fulfilling.

To address the pressing environmental crises, the reevaluation of growth becomes imperative. The view that sustainable economic growth is an oxymoron suggests that we must be willing to question the status quo and explore alternative pathways that prioritize harmony with the planet over unchecked expansion. This approach invites us to consider innovative economic models that prioritize well-being, foster resource equity, and champion ecological restoration.

Despite these issues, analysts remain optimistic about the agreement’s prospects. Trade between the EU and Mercosur countries has been steadily growing over the past two decades, even without a formal agreement. The conclusion of the EU-Mercosur agreement holds immense potential for enhancing trade, economic collaboration, and sustainability between the regions. As the negotiations progress, finding common ground on environmental commitments will be crucial in securing the deal’s successful ratification and realizing the mutual benefits for all parties involved.

Conclusion

The discourse surrounding Brazil’s Ecological Transition Plan, the EU-Mercosur Agreement, and global environmental concerns reveals a nexus of economic interests, sustainability goals, and geopolitical maneuvers. Brazil’s commendable efforts to position itself as an environmental steward are evident in its Ecological Transition Plan, aiming for a sustainable and resilient future. Also, the return of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to Brazil’s presidency signals a promising shift in environmental protection, supported by data indicating a reduction in deforestation.

Yet, challenges arise in aligning these intentions with the potential environmental implications of the EU-Mercosur Agreement, especially concerning deforestation. While the EU demands sustainable measures from Mercosur countries, notably Brazil, there exists a dichotomy in its actions, evident in the consumption habits that inadvertently spur deforestation. This discrepancy, exemplified through the EU’s simultaneous advocacy for environmental preservation and its consumption patterns, underscores the complex dynamics of international relations, as highlighted by Knox’s insights.

The arguments presented by thinkers like Jason Hickel provide an alternate perspective, suggesting that true sustainability might necessitate a departure from the traditional economic growth paradigm. Instead, a reconceptualization of prosperity, pivoting towards ecological harmony and well-being, might be the path forward.

The current global landscape, characterized by a heightened awareness of climate change and its ramifications, offers an unprecedented opportunity. Nevertheless, this shared vision for a prosperous and sustainable future requires not just agreements on paper but real-world actions, informed policymaking, and a steadfast commitment from all participants. 

Furthermore, as nations come together in this effort, they also have a single opportunity to lead by example. By successfully navigating these challenges, Brazil, the EU, and Mercosur nations could set a precedent for the world – illustrating how global collaborations can be rooted in both economic ambitions and an unwavering dedication to the environment. The path ahead may be complex, but with unity, innovation, and a shared ethos, they can illuminate the route for others, showcasing a harmonious blend of progress and preservation.

Pedro Serodio holds an LL.M in International and European Law at the Universität des Saarlandes and a Legal Assistant at MarketVector Indexes, in Frankfurt am Main, Germany

To read the article as it was published on the OpinioJuris webpage, click here.

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EU CBAM
The EU CBAM is designed to work hand in glove with the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), a carbon pricing workhorse policy for the decarbonization of EU industry and of the European Union in general. In addition, the EU CBAM incentivizes other trading nations to adopt carbon pricing as a foundational decarbonization policy tool.

CCA
The CCA is also a BAM designed to work seamlessly with a domestic regulatory program intended to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the industrial sector. The CCA introduces a performance standard to achieve the reductions desired within the industrial sector. The performance standard within the CAA is defined as tons of GHGs per ton of product. Producers with a GHG intensity above the benchmark pay a fee while producers below the benchmark pay no fee. To ensure a rapid decline in GHG intensity over time, the benchmark declines year over year and the fee increases year over year. Revenues from fees are used to further incentivize investments in low-carbon technologies and other activities designed to reduce industrial emissions.

FPFA
A key distinction of the FPFA from the other two approaches is that the FPFA does not include a regulatory program to reduce industrial emissions. This is in line with the FPFA’s objective to reduce the importation of embodied GHGs within US trade flows rather than focus on further reductions in emissions from domestic sources.

Takeaways

The EU CBAM entering into force in October 2023 is clear evidence that the use of international trade as a component of climate policy has left the realm of academia and is now an accepted policy tool. While the European Union argues that the EU CBAM is a straightforward extension of the EU ETS and should not be considered an international trade policy, the introduction of the EU CBAM has provided a rationale that supports the consideration of BAMs in other countries that have the potential to significantly impact global trade.

It is hard to overstate the extensive impact BAMs can have on international trade. While the EU CBAM identifies six categories of internationally traded products, the number of actual products that would be subject to the CBAM can be quite large. In the case of iron and steel alone, the number of products is over 100. Some estimates of the number of products covered by the CCA run into the multiples of hundreds, and the provisions within the FPFA that allow domestic producers and others to add covered products to the existing list leaves the total number of covered products open-ended. The indirect impacts may yet be greater still through the consumption of covered goods in other products.

The cornerstone of any BAM is a measure of the GHG intensity of a covered product. Since BAMs will impact vast numbers of covered products and therefore the producers of those products, it will be in the best interest of those producers to provide measures of GHG intensity for their products. While such producers will have the information and ability necessary to construct those measures, the fact that BAMs do not share a common frame of reference for intensity calculations imposes an additional burden on those producers. At present there is no forum the business community can utilize to reconcile differences across BAMs or develop interoperable definitions and protocols that would allow companies to provide information compliant with individual countries’ BAMs.

The vast number of products subject to BAMs clearly poses complex implementation issues. It also leads to the scope of BAMs affecting large numbers of countries that rely on developed country markets for their exports and economic well-being. Many countries argue that BAMs are inconsistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) multilateral trade rules. While the WTO does have a dispute settlement system (the Appellate Body), that system is in a state of crisis because countries, including the United States, have blocked the appointment of Appellate Body members such that the Body’s current configuration is incapable of hearing appeals and processing disputes. Without a functioning WTO, there is no multilateral institution capable of resolving conflicts that will naturally arise due to the deployment of additional BAMs in the future.

Problems of emissions leakage, lost international competitiveness due ambitious decarbonization policies, and suggestions regarding the use of BAMs are not new. However, until the enactment of the EU CBAM they have been merely suggestions. Now BAMs are a reality, and we are confronted with important questions. Will this policy tool be effective in addressing leakage and competitiveness and spread beyond the European Union to the US and other large industrial nations? What will be the impact of widespread BAM adoption on the global system of international trade, industrial emissions, green investments, and the economic welfare of exporters in countries that enacted BAMs? Will long standing international trade rules embodied in the WTO successfully challenge the spread of BAMs or will trade rules—whether multilateral or plurilateral—adapt to this new reality? Time will tell.

To read the report as it was published by Resources For The Future, click here.

To read the full report, click here.

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1. On the occasion of the 2022 OECD Ministerial Council Meeting, we1 have assembled on 9-10 June 2022 under the leadership of Italy as MCM Chair, and with Mexico and Norway as Vice Chairs, under the theme of “The Future We Want: Better Policies for the Next Generation and a Sustainable Transition”.

2. Russia’s unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine is a flagrant violation of international law that shakes the very foundation of the international order. Any unilateral attempts to change it and redraw internationally recognised borders by force or by other means is unacceptable. Against this tense backdrop, we believe that the OECD has a greater role to play as an international organisation that can unite under our shared values. We are firmly determined to rise resolutely to various geopolitical challenges ahead to preserve and promote our shared values. We condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms. We have suspended Russia’s and Belarus’ participation in OECD bodies. We call on Russia to immediately cease all hostile and provocative actions against Ukraine, withdraw all military and proxy forces from the country, and turn to good-faith diplomacy and dialogue in order to bring a peaceful end to its ongoing war as soon as possible. We call on all partners to refrain from taking export restrictions measures for agricultural products in the context of the rising food insecurity crisis, in coordination with other international partners. We stand in solidarity with Ukraine. Our priority is to help the Ukrainian people, support their democratically elected government, and protect refugees throughout this crisis. We encourage the OECD’s continuing analyses of the economic, environmental and social repercussions of the war, including the needs of women and children, and OECD proposals in support of Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction, together with relevant international partners. In this regard, we welcome the establishment of the OECD Kyiv Office.

3. In this context, we will work toward consolidating the economic and social foundations of democracy, through realising a sustainable and inclusive growth as well as addressing disparities and inequalities. We will also step up efforts to maintain and strengthen the rules-based international economic order, while preserving our economic security and countering economic coercion. Furthermore, we will bolster our external engagement to promote adherence to OECD standards and to achieve sustainable development all over the world.

4. We want the next generation to inherit a peaceful, prosperous, sustainable and inclusive future. The OECD’s shared values, as reflected in its 60th Anniversary Vision Statement, are the basis for our like-minded action in support of a rule based international order and in pursuit of sustainable growth, while protecting our planet and reducing inequalities. We believe democracy and the rule of law, the promotion of human rights, equality, diversity and inclusion, gender equality, the market-based economic principles, an open, free and fair, and rules-based multilateral trading system, transparency and accountability of governments, and the promotion of environmental sustainability will help improve the lives and prospects of everyone – inside and outside the OECD’s membership, now and in the future. We intend to continue our successful collaboration with non-member countries. We commit to preserving the like-minded nature of the OECD in its enlargement process, and welcome the adoption of Accession Roadmaps for Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Peru and Romania. We reaffirm the openness of the Organisation, the continued importance of all of our regional programmes and the strategic priority of South East Asia as identified in our Global Relations Strategy, and our commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Solid multilateral co-operation and institutions have never been more important. Recognising the challenges to the OECD’s standards and norms by emerging donors, we will reinforce our global engagement through consolidating OECD’s role as a platform for the exchange of experiences and best practices, as well as advancing its standards globally, through membership and partnerships and a sound approach to development. The war in Ukraine, the scarring effects of the pandemic and the climate emergency have critical consequences particularly for developing countries. Extreme poverty, severe food insecurity and forced displacement are intensifying. We recognise the importance of an urgent and coordinated response and of international cooperation to help developing countries manage these shocks. We are committed to supporting developing countries to achieve their development goals through policy dialogue, expert analysis, demand-driven policy support, domestic resource mobilisation and international finance – including Official Development Assistance and other official and private flows – to meet both urgent needs and longer term sustainable development priorities. We will take a positive role in measuring these international financial flows to contribute to the achievement of the SDGs.

To read the full report from the OECD Council, please click here.

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An important question arising in this context is what the implications of reshoring might be for the relative competitiveness of low carbon technology solutions to climate change and industrial upgrading. Although in some markets key technologies such as solar photovoltaics are competing on a non-subsidized basis with traditional fossil fuels, many markets remain policy driven. Data from REN21 (2020), for example, shows that subsidies such as feeding tariffs continue to be used in a large number of jurisdictions to support the deployment of renewable energy technologies. If locational choices—and choices about whether to return productive activities inside the firm, or to continue outsourcing to third-party providers—are determined by cost, then reshoring may lead to an increase in costs that could slow the deployment of low carbon technologies. The extent to which reshoring is occurring in low carbon sectors, therefore, is of immediate relevance to the global low carbon energy transition. It also affects whether supply chains in low carbon tech may continue to deliver economies of scale, high innovation rates, and steep cost declines for globally beneficial outcomes.

In this paper we focus on public policies aimed at altering clean technology supply chains and the extent to which these policies may impact the low carbon transition and upgrading . The first part of the paper provides the conceptual underpinning of the study. The second part of the paper examines the frequency with which reshoring initiatives are being implemented by governments in countries that are central to the global energy transition—China, the European Union, Japan, and the United States. We then examine key low carbon technologies and consider the extent to which they are vulnerable to reshoring activities. Whilst global supply chains govern the production of many key technologies of importance to climate change, the structure and complexity of these supply chains differ by technology. By extension, the vulnerability of global supply chains to efforts by national governments to encourage reshoring are different, depending on technology and associated supply chain characteristics. We examine the global organization of production for solar photovoltaic modules, wind turbines, and batteries to assess the relative vulnerability to reshoring activities. A final section concludes that any policies facilitating cost reduction in low carbon technologies is desirable from a climate perspective, even if bordering at reshoring. Such measures ideally yield both cost reduction in LTCs and domestic economic benefits. However, they can easily tilt towards less collectively beneficial outcomes. Given China’s central role in some clean tech supply chains, it is most exposed to such a scenario. We conclude with policy recommendations.

To read the full report by the Social Science Research Network, please click here.

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To read the full report by Nature Communications, please click here. 

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These observations are highly pertinent and connect to another major EU commitment: becoming a stronger geopolitical power. Linking these issues, this compilation explores how the EU could—through its external policies—be an effective geopolitical power in dealing with climate change and ecological shifts.

Extensive analytical work has accumulated on climate security and mainly makes the general case for why the EU needs to take climate factors more seriously within its foreign policies. But after more than a decade of policy efforts, the EU already has a dense network of ongoing initiatives that fall to some degree within the scope of climate security. Given this, the priority should no longer be restating the basics of why climate represents a geopolitical challenge. The EU has already moved some distance along this policy curve. Rather, it should be to assess the more precise ways in which the EU is approaching climate security.

The following six chapters here assess different elements of the climate security challenge. Through these different contributions, a core argument emerges: the EU needs a broader understanding of climate geopolitics to extend and improve its already rich array of policy initiatives in this area. It essentially needs to transition from its current conceptualization of climate security to a more ambitious notion of ecological security.

To read the full report from the Carnegie Endowment Europe, please click here.

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The EU wants to introduce a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) to ensure its climate change mitigation measures are effective and do not lead to so-called carbon leakage. Imports would be subject to a carbon-related fee, reflecting the costs that the EU imposes on domestic producers under its emissions trading system (ETS). While the proposal might still change ahead of publication, a leak of the European Commission’s draft CBAM regulation and annexes provides fresh insight into the EU’s approach. It also raises a number of questions on the impact on small and medium sized importers, developing countries, the allocation of free allowances and the UK.

The Commission wants the CBAM to cover importers of electricity, iron and steel, cement, aluminium and some fertilisers in the first instance, but it could be extended to cover additional sectors in the future. The initial list of sectors is fairly narrow, and does not include a number of industries covered by the EU’s ETS such as other chemicals, ceramics and paper. However, as an opening gambit, the choice of industries has a political logic, if the Commission is still hoping for the US to implictly accept the CBAM, and avoid further trade disputes. The US is just 12th in the ranking of countries most exposed to the proposed CBAM regulation.

To read the full report from the Centre for European Reform (CER), please click here. 

Image from the Centre for European Reform. 

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Commercialisation contracts could be implemented as a temporary measure to remove the risk associated with uncertain carbon prices for ambitious low-carbon projects. The aim of the contracts would be to increase private investment to the socially optimal level. Contracts would be allocated through auctions in which fixed prices for abated emissions over a fixed duration would be agreed on a project-by-project basis. On an annual basis, public subsidies amounting to the difference between the agreed carbon price and the actual EU carbon price would be provided to investors, depending on the total carbon emissions abated. As long as EU carbon prices are low, investors would receive larger subsidies to ensure their competitiveness. 

Contracts would be auctioned at EU level. This would generate increased competition compared to national auctions, leading to more efficient outcomes and preventing fragmentation of the single market. From about €3 billion to €6 billion would be provided to the main industrial emitting sectors annually, with the amount reducing as the EU carbon price rises and low-carbon technologies become competitive without subsidy.

To read the full report from Bruegel, please click here. 

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