In using the removal of Section 232 ‘national security’ tariffs on steel and aluminium imports as a bargaining chip, the United States demands that the European Union engage in negotiations on “global steel and aluminium arrangements to restore market-oriented conditions and address carbon intensity”. The US demand has reportedly been inspired by a blueprint that would establish an international institutional arrangement – labelled a ‘climate club’ – which would externalise market-access restrictions afforded by US Section 232 tariffs to the customs borders of club members. While the declared objective is to incentivise non-members to adopt low-carbon steel (and aluminium) production methods the US blueprint suffers from various design flaws including inefficient incentives, WTO inconsistency and incompatibility with the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.

The effectiveness of the proposed US scheme is severely compromised by the plethora of policy objectives it pursues, which go far beyond the goal of incentivising industrial decarbonisation in third countries, including secondary (ie protectionism) and tertiary (ie global power competition with China) objectives. The initial negotiation proposal submitted by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to European Commission trade negotiators incorporates many if not all the problematic elements of this blueprint, setting the US on a collision course with the negotiation proposal put forward by the European Commission. This paper concludes that the adoption of the scheme proposed by USTR would result in a step backwards for international climate and trade cooperation, whereas not adopting the EU proposal would make for a missed opportunity. Given the sharply diverging negotiation positions and associated respective domestic constraints on both sides, however, policymakers should start to engage stakeholders now to manage expectations towards a low-ambition negotiation result, if any.

Introduction

On 31 October 2021, the European Union and the United States agreed on temporary measures to settle their dispute over US Section 232 ‘national security’ tariffs on EU steel and aluminium products. In addition to opening tariff rate quotas for historical EU export volumes, the joint EU-US statement mandates negotiations on a “global steel and aluminium arrangements to restore market oriented conditions and address carbon intensity”, with a deadline of 31 October 2023. The relevant paragraphs are an eclectic mix of transatlantic policy objectives in the areas of steel and aluminium decarbonisation, sectoral overcapacity, non-market practices and inbound investment screening:

“Compatible with international obligations and the multilateral rules, including potential rules to be jointly developed in the coming years, each participant in the arrangements would undertake the following actions: (i) restrict market access for non-participants that do not meet conditions of market orientation and that contribute to non-market excess capacity, through application of appropriate measures including trade defence instruments; (ii) restrict market access for non-participants that do not meet standards for low-carbon intensity; (iii) ensure that domestic policies support the objectives of the arrangements and support lowering carbon intensity across all modes of production; (iv) refrain from non-market practices that contribute to carbon-intensive, non-market oriented capacity; (v) consult on government investment in
decarbonization; and (vi) screen inward investments from non-market-oriented actors in accordance with their respective domestic legal frameworks.

“To enhance their cooperation and facilitate negotiations on a global sustainable steel and aluminum arrangements, the United States and the EU agree to form a technical working group. Through the working group, the United States and the EU will, among other things, confer on methodologies for calculating steel and aluminum carbon-intensity and share relevant data”.

At the time of writing – 20 months after the formal launch of negotiations and four months prior to the deadline, negotiators have set up two technical working groups – one covering the carbon intensity element and one covering the overcapacity element of the negotiations. They have also exchanged negotiation positions in the form of concept notes in December 2022 and January 2023 respectively.

On 10 March 2023, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and US President Joe Biden declared, as part of a further joint statement (The White House, 2023), that they were “committed to achieving an ambitious outcome in the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum negotiations by October 2023. The arrangement will ensure the long-term viability of our industries, encourage low-carbon intensity steel and aluminum production and trade, and restore marketoriented conditions globally and bilaterally. Together, we will incentivize emission reductions in these carbon-intensive sectors and level the playing field for our workers. The arrangement will be open to all partners demonstrating commitment to countering non-market excess capacity and reducing carbonintensity in these sectors”.

But beyond this declaration of joint ambition, US and EU perspectives and their initial negotiation proposals diverge sharply in terms of both policy design features and the overall approach, objectives and vision of transatlantic and international climate and trade cooperation. This paper sets out the EU and US perspectives on the ongoing negotiations and evaluates US and EU initial negotiation proposals as the transatlantic talks slowly but surely approach the 31 October 2023, deadline. The October deadline could mark either a breakdown of negotiations and automatic reinstatement of US Section 232 tariffs on imports of steel and aluminium from the EU, or a transatlantic agreement on a ‘Global Steel and Aluminium Arrangement’. An agreement could follow either the US or the EU’s vision for climate and trade cooperation, with all of the imaginable scenarios having considerable economic and climate policy implications for the US, the EU and the rest of the world.

As a benchmark for evaluation, Falkner et al (2022) noted that a prospective transatlantic climate club must be assessed on the basis of whether it adds or distracts from the multilateral climate regime or diverts resources away from crucial national abatement efforts. Here, we assess both the US and EU proposals for the arrangement against both the multilateral and the national benchmark, among others.

David Kleimann (PhD) is a trade expert with 15 years of experience in law, policy, and institutions governing EU and international trade.

To read full paper, please click here.

The post Section 232 Reloaded: The False Promise of The Transatlantic ‘Climate Club’ For Steel and Aluminum appeared first on WITA.

By its participation in organizations such as the World Trade Organization and the North American Free Trade Agreement, the United States has been a pioneer in advocating free trade. It will be essential for nations to keep cooperating to develop trade policies that are advantageous to all parties as the global economy develops. Dealing with issues related to environmental and labor standards is one of the major difficulties in FTA negotiations. FTAs have the potential to enhance economy, but there is also a chance that they may lead to worsening labor conditions and environmental deterioration. To address these issues, there has been an increasing focus on including labor and environmental measures in recent years. For instance, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) has clauses that protect the environment and the rights of workers by, among other things, mandating Mexico to tighten its labor laws and undertake pollution control measures. By addressing social and environmental issues, these clauses can ensure that FTAs encourage sustainable and equitable growth.

FTAs have emerged as a popular mechanism for enhancing economic growth and fostering closer political ties between countries. While some of these agreements primarily focus on boosting trade and the economy, others are aimed at improving diplomatic relations between nations. Future research on this topic should examine the impact of such agreements both before and after their implementation, taking into account political changes that could affect their success. It is important to assess which industries stand to benefit the most from these agreements, to identify potential areas of growth and expansion. For example, the United States has recently shown an increased interest in executing trade agreements with smaller nations. Such agreements hold promise for the future of economic growth and closer political ties within the United States and its partners. However, the success of these agreements is often contingent upon the prevailing government’s political stance, making it imperative to consider the broader political context when evaluating their impact. To fully understand the effects of these agreements on economic growth and diplomatic relations, more research is necessary to assess their effectiveness in different regions and industries. Policymakers can use these insights to make informed decisions and ensure that free trade agreements promote sustainable economic growth and foster closer political ties between nations.

Naim Islam is a professional science master’s student, pursuing engineering management under the Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering at Minnesota State University, Mankato.

Pawan Bhandari, Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Manufacturing Engineering Technology at Minnesota State University, Mankato, USA.

To read the full paper, click here.

The post Economic and Long-Term Impacts of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the U.S.A. appeared first on WITA.

This report, each chapter curated by a leading expert and South Asia Center nonresident senior fellow, examines US and Indian trade relations, both bilateral and global, and offers forward-thinking policies to help governments in both countries achieve a deeper trade relationship. The various views and ideas expressed by both Indian and US trade-policy experts and industry leaders present a comprehensive analysis to resolve disagreements and establish a short-, medium-, and long-term framework for cooperation. The first and second sections analyze Indian and US trade negotiations and dialogues, respectively, from the recent past to identify strategies moving forward; the third section offers an overview of the last decade in US-India trade negotiations, illuminating concrete achievements and obstinate hurdles; and the final section identifies low-hanging fruit that negotiations often lose sight of and that offer immediate opportunity to secure wins that could reanimate trade negotiations now that there’s a new US administration in place.

The two governments should: Take an incremental approach focusing on low-hanging fruit and gradually build up to more significant areas of contention; address trade issues head on rather than defer them to prioritize strategic cooperation; recommit to a free trade agreement; and establish the institutional architecture to ensure successful negotiations.

To read the full report from the Atlantic Council, please visit here

The post Reimagining the US-India trade relationship appeared first on WITA.

A brighter outlook but recovery will be gradual

Faster vaccine deployment and better cooperation for its distribution would boost confidence and strengthen the pickup but continued uncertainty risks further weakness

The post Turning Hope into Reality: OECD Economic Outlook, December 2020 appeared first on WITA.

LDC exports to Canada in 2017 represented just under $4 billion, around one per cent of total Canadian imports (or, more colloquially, about two hours of Canada-U.S. trade.) Their importance lies in their sector specificity; the majority of manufactured exports are apparel. After the 2003 liberalization, Bangladesh and Cambodia became the second and third largest suppliers of apparel to Canada after China, as much an achievement in import diversification for Canada as in export growth for Bangladesh and Cambodia.

Between 2003 and 2017, Bangladesh’s year-over-year exports to Canada grew at an average rate of 22 per cent, Cambodia’s at 58 per cent, Laos at 17 per cent and Nepal at 10 per cent. On the other hand, Canada’s exports to Bangladesh grew six-fold between 2004 and 2018. Bangladesh is now Canada’s fourth largest importer of pulses.

The 2003 market opening was enabled by of a GATT/WTO rule that facilitates preferential arrangements for countries on the United Nations’ Least Developed Countries list; effectively, the world’s poorest countries. Canada’s initiative was a near-impeccable preferential arrangement. It grew trade in both directions between Canada and some low-cost exporters without the bother of negotiations for bilateral free trade agreements, and without significant trade diversion. Together with the EU liberalization (and subsequent liberalizations in several other countries), it contributed to both export-led growth and poverty reduction in some least developed countries.

Canada’s relationship with these LDCs could change shortly. Along with six developing island countries and mineral-rich Angola, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Laos and Nepal are scheduled for graduation from the UN/WTO list of least developed countries (three were eligible as far back as 2018), and Cambodia has begun to meet the criteria for graduation. Graduation could mean the loss of the preferential tariff treatment that contributed to a rapid increase in exports in the last 17 years. Of the countries that are about to graduate, or have been graduated, the developing island countries export very little to Canada. Angola’s mineral exports enter duty free anyway, but the remaining countries – Bangladesh, Myanmar, Laos, Nepal and at some point Cambodia – are now heavily integrated into the Canadian apparel market. Apparel has become the primary manufactured export for most of these countries. Graduation therefore could have consequences for Canadian consumers, and for economic growth and poverty reduction in the countries concerned. Later, we discuss this problem specifically with reference to Bangladesh.

The earliest date for graduation is 2021; the latest date so far is 2024. Canada may agree to Bangladesh’s request for a three-year deferral from 2021, particularly in light of COVID-19’s impact on the economy, or it could follow the EU, which is reportedly considering a phased-in graduation process of three years, 2021-2024. If LDCs graduate, they will be subject to the tariffs and rules of origin of Canada’s General Preferential Tariff (GPT). Graduation is not restricted to Canada and the EU. During the World Trade Organization’s Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations, several WTO members offered similar concessions; graduation from the LDC list will require WTO members to consider whether to extend or terminate preferential treatment for the graduating LDCs.

Canada can continue duty-free treatment – to grandfather the zero tariff and maintain LDC treatment for as long as it deems desirable. It is also in Canada’s interests to do so; the relationship with the Asian LDCs has been a win-win for both sides. Graduation could cost Canadian consumers and exporters alike and if both the EU and Canada graduate these countries, it could stall economic growth and poverty reduction efforts in the LDCs.

This paper maintains that while COVID-19’s impact makes a short-term deferral likely, it makes more sense to look long term at both the trade and development implications of graduation for both Canada and the LDCs. It recommends that Canada continue preferential treatment for an extended period of time or simply leave the low tariffs in place.

Fauzya Moore is an Ottawa-based consultant and writer. She has worked as a Senior
Economic Advisor at the various iterations of Global Affairs Canada, and also as a Senior Advisor on Governance at the Treasury Board of Canada. She is also a graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School (2009) where she held both a Fulbright scholarship and a fellowship from the Ash Centre for Governance and Innovation. She has worked in both the developed and developing world.

To download the full report, please click here.

The post Don’t Graduate – Grandfather: Canada, Trade and the Least Developed Countries appeared first on WITA.

Initially, many countries responded to the pandemic and increased demand for medical goods—such as face masks and ventilators—with trade measures that restricted the free movement of those products. While many of those measures were eventually removed, they undoubtedly made it more difficult for products to go where they were most needed. Economic recovery discussions in the U.S. and around the world are now focusing on how to prevent such a recession in the future.

While countries may be tempted to close themselves off to the world and international supply chains, doing so will make it more difficult and more costly for their citizens to get what they need. The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom has demonstrated for more than 25 years that economic openness yields better results for individuals around the world. The same is true for countries that reduce barriers to trade and allow individuals to exchange freely with the world. Policymakers around the world should work to eliminate barriers to trade as economies recover from the pandemic.

To read the full issue brief, click here.

Tori K. Smith is a Jay Van Andel Trade Economist for The Heritage Foundation.

The post 2021 Index of Economic Freedom: After Three Years of Worsening Trade Freedom, Countries Should Recommit to Lowering Barriers appeared first on WITA.

If all were as it should be, I would not be joining this virtual meeting via a cell phone as the Wi-Fi is down in our area.

If all were as it should be, the person joining you today would be the first woman Director-General of the WTO since its founding 25 years ago, and for that matter the first woman Director-General of the multilateral trading system, created 73 years ago.

We can conclude, with the first wave of the pandemic having passed for some areas, and the second wave beginning here in Geneva, that the trading system is enduring despite the added stresses placed upon it.

The trading system performed better than expected during the second quarter with respect to merchandise trade, but there is limited comfort to be had in this statement.

• Global trade saw a modest uptick in recent months, a function of extraordinary fiscal and monetary measures as well as the fact that trade restrictions have been confined to a limited number of sectors and products.
• The decline in world merchandise trade – still serious when last forecast at 9% -was better than our most optimistic outlook earlier in the year. 
• However, services trade declined by 30% over the 12 months to the second quarter of 2020, with travel and tourism hit particularly hard, and the present prospects are at best clouded.

So far, the trade recovery has been stronger on the supply side than on the demand side: a strong, sustained global recovery also requires robust demand. While there were some positive signs of this in the September data, the continuation of the incidence of COVID-19 infections and the measures taken to counter risks to health place the strength and timing of recovery of world trade in doubt.

• The global response to the pandemic has not yet succeeded in curbing either the threat to health or the ongoing damage to the global economy.
• It is far from clear that we will return to pre-pandemic trajectory at all, and not in 2021.
• Trade policy decisions, as well as other economic policy choices, will matter.

The bottom line –

• While the pandemic exposed some of the fragilities that come with economic interdependence, it has also revealed considerable strengths. For example, trade has been a key means of ramping up access to medical supplies.
• Value chains have shown a surprising degree of resilience: preliminary data suggest global trade in intermediate goods has fallen less sharply than trade in final goods – implying that value chains now account for a higher share of world merchandise trade than they used to.
• For the large-scale refrigeration capacity needed to roll out a future COVID-19 vaccine, it will not make sense to try to develop new national supply chains for specialized cold chain equipment. It would be more effective to leverage existing supply chains.
• Even the world’s most sophisticated economies rely on others for certain medical goods, not to mention agricultural products.
• While the trading system alone cannot solve the problems facing the world, it can assist in providing solutions.  Functioning well, the WTO can be a forum in which to bridge differences and build trust. 
• More trade, not less, will bring essential medical supplies, drugs, and soon, we earnestly hope, vaccines to where they are needed. 
• More trade, not less, will assure food security in the face of both the pandemic and severe climate events.
• More trade, not less, will play a key role in delivering economic growth as it has over the last seven decades.
• Closing off markets would only make us more vulnerable, and less prosperous.
• Broadly open international markets are essential and must be anchored in cooperatively determined rules.

To view the original post, please click here.

Ambassador Alan Wm. Wolff is Deputy Director-General of the World Trade Organization

The post DDG Wolff Shares Views with International Agency Heads on Future of Multilateral Cooperation appeared first on WITA.

1. Negotiations: The negotiations creating the WTO were a major success, leading to a broad range of new rules that prohibit members from raising tariffs beyond agreed-upon levels, restrict non-tariff barriers, and ban discriminatory trade measures. Since then, a few negotiations have helped further lower barriers, including the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and Information Technology Agreement (ITA). Today, average applied tariffs are approximately half of what they were when the WTO was created, and numerous unfair trade practices have been discontinued.2
2. Implementation and Monitoring: The WTO recognizes that the implementation and monitoring of commitments are essential to maintaining the integrity of an effective rules-based system. Accordingly, the WTO includes mechanisms to track implementation and rules that require members to notify it of changes in trade policies and share information on trade-distorting practices (e.g., subsidies). Transparency and information sharing promote business predictability, while the discussion of trade-distorting policies often leads to their modification or abandonment before adoption.
3. Dispute Settlement: The WTO dispute-settlement system helps resolve trade disputes to minimize unilateral action and cycles of retaliation. Many countries use the dispute-settlement system to challenge adverse measures. In most cases, the member losing the dispute changes the offending measure. In other cases, that member exercises its sovereignty and chooses not to change the policy, freely accepting the consequences (retaliatory tariffs). Additionally, many disputes are settled before litigation commences.

The world has changed considerably since the WTO’s creation. It has experienced the rise of the Internet and other advanced technologies, China’s economic expansion, greater skepticism about the benefits of trade, and greater concern about income inequality. The world has changed, and so must the WTO. At the same time, the WTO itself has not met expectations. WTO negotiations have not readily facilitated new rules or additional market-access openings, the implementation and monitoring pillar has not held countries accountable for ignoring its requirements, and the dispute-settlement system has not strictly applied the rules as negotiated. As a result, the WTO is falling far short of its promise and mandate in different ways.

WTO negotiations have failed to update international trade rules to: account for non-market economies and deal with related unfair trade practices, such as forced technology transfer and massive industrial subsidies; account for new technologies, such as the Internet; improve commitments in key areas covered in detail by free-trade agreements (FTAs), such as intellectual property and services; and fully address politically important policy issues, such as labor and the environment. WTO negotiations have also failed to substantially lower or equalize tariff treatment among major economies.

The ability of large emerging economies to self-declare “developing-country” status and avoid taking on the same commitments as competitors has compounded the challenge. Worse yet, many countries claim that trade liberalization and the WTO rules that promote it are anti-development, undermining the WTO’s core mission.

Compliance with the WTO’s implementation and monitoring function has not been widespread, with many members failing to follow the basic notification requirements necessary to ensure the transparency and predictability of trade.

WTO dispute settlement has drifted from its original design. It has failed to properly adjudicate certain disputes, including by inventing new rules without consensus and improperly applying the rules to non-market economies;  allowed the WTO Secretariat to wield too much power in decision-making; and taken too long, depriving workers and businesses of real-time solutions.

Accordingly, all three pillars require reform to ensure the WTO retains a constructive and central role in resolving disputes before they spiral out of control, and in shaping international trade rules and behavior. When the WTO is functioning properly, it provides a mechanism to enforce agreed-upon rules in a predictable manner and create new rules to protect workers and businesses. When the rules are inadequate and disputes take too long, countries are more inclined to adopt unfair practices, and may be forced to respond unilaterally to protect their interests.

WTO reform provides the quickest and most constructive path to adequately address China’s unfair trade practices. The US-China Phase One trade deal made important progress on certain structural issues, but did not meaningfully address industrial subsidies or state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and it is unlikely that China will ever address these matters bilaterally given the government’s central role in its economy. Therefore, concerted multilateral pressure that paints these policies as a threat to the global trading system as a whole is necessary to effectuate change. In many respects, the WTO provides the ideal forum for countries to work together to persuade China to change its most problematic behavior. The WTO already has a core set of principles, such as non-discrimination, that are critical to countering such practices, and an existing infrastructure for negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing those rules. The WTO’s membership is also critical—it includes many countries impacted by these issues, as well as China itself. The broad reach of the WTO will also help ensure other countries do not adopt similar non-policies.

The United States has been calling for significant WTO reform for years, and many countries have recently joined the chorus. For example, in December 2018, all Group of Twenty (G20) members endorsed the following language in the leaders’ statement: International trade and investment are important engines of growth, productivity, innovation, job creation and development. We recognize the contribution that the multilateral trading system has made to that end. The system is currently falling short of its objectives and there is room for improvement. We therefore support the necessary reform of the WTO to improve its functioning.

Despite these high-level statements, WTO members have struggled to gain momentum toward tangible reform. Some blame the United States for refusing to offer specific proposals on dispute settlement, the European Union (EU) for an unwillingness to meaningfully address US concerns on this issue, China for refusing to engage on proposals related to its practices, and India for leading the fight to preserve preferential developing country status for large, emerging economies.

Regardless of who is to blame, the WTO is in crisis, and momentum for ambitious reform must be generated before the system loses its relevance. To catalyze momentum, members should quickly resolve ongoing negotiations while “thinking big” about the future and significantly raising their levels of ambition. The successful conclusion of ongoing negotiations, such as those on fisheries subsidies, will create new confidence in the WTO by demonstrating that the system is still capable of solving problems. But, negotiations will not solve the biggest problems facing the system. Therefore, even as members seek to make incremental progress, they increase their ambition with respect to the overall scope of reform needed to create a system fit for purpose in the twenty-first century and on “outside-the-box” ideas to solve some of the more intractable problems before it is too late.

Any successful WTO reform effort requires the United States and the European Union to better cooperate and coordinate. The United States and EU share common values, jointly spearheaded the creation of the original international trading system, and have both used it to promote trade-liberalizing, market-oriented policies around the globe. The economies of the United States and the EU are also equally challenged by China’s policies. If they cannot reach consensus on how to fix the WTO, it is inconceivable that the rest of the world could do so.

To this end, this paper proposes an ambitious WTO reform proposal that both the United States and the European Union should be able to endorse, and ultimately work together to promote. In particular, a joint US-EU WTO reform proposal should

• address problems with all three pillars—negotiations, implementation and monitoring, and dispute settlement; these functions complement each other and reform is needed in all three to make the system work as a whole;
• address the most difficult issues, including China’s unfair trade policies and how to fit a non-market economy into a system built by market economies;
  • create new rules to address issues that have emerged since the WTO was created, such as digital trade, and upgrade existing agreements, such as the intellectual property and services agreements, to the higher standards included in many FTAs;
• include more robust commitments on politically important issues, such as labor and the environment, which are critical to regaining domestic support for trade;
• eliminate the unfairly high tariff rates imposed by certain countries, and bring greater parity in tariff levels among major economic powers;
• promote liberalization by all members, not just “developed” economies, while recognizing the unique challenges faced by least-developed countries (LDCs) and allowing for differential treatment predicated on fact-based need;
• consider novel approaches to rescue the negotiating function, such as the use of plurilateral agreements that only benefit participants (non-most favored nation), or non-binding commitments for LDCs as an initial approach in certain areas;
• increase high-level political engagement from capitals to promote greater ambition in Geneva;
• hold countries accountable for failing to follow fundamental rules related to transparency;
• fully address the underlying shortcomings of the dispute settlement system by
  • ensuring that adjudicators better respect the limited mandate provided by WTO members, and do not create rules to which members never agreed;
  • making institutional reforms to improve the transparency and accountability of the process, and address the imbalance in decision-making between the WTO Secretariat and the appointed adjudicators; and
  • improving the system’s efficiency so it serves as a viable “real-time” alternative to unilateral action; and
• recognize that fixing the negotiating function is critical to fixing dispute settlement in a sustainable manner.

The will of all WTO members will ultimately be necessary to achieve the broad-based reforms envisioned in this paper, but improving cooperation and coordination between the United States and European Union is a necessary start. Section II of this paper further outlines some of the existing problems with the WTO system, while Section III details a joint US-EU reform agenda.

To download the full report, please click here.

Clete R. Willems is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Mr. Willems is a partner at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, where he advises multinational companies, investors, and trade associations on international economic law and policy matters. Until April 2019, Mr. Willems was Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economics and Deputy Director of the National Economic Council.

The post Revitalizing the World Trade Organization appeared first on WITA.

In May 2020, China exported more face masks than any other product. According to China’s customs data, the Asian economy exported more than $14 billion of “not elsewhere classified made up textiles”. This is a few billion more than China’s best monthly exports on its traditionally strongest products: portable computers ($9.9 billion in July 2020) or cellphones ($8.3 billion in July 2020).

The post How COVID-19 has Affected Trade, in 8 Charts appeared first on WITA.

This information note explores trade issues associated with the spread of diseases of animal origin and the international framework in place to address them. It seeks to map actions being taken to control these diseases so as to ensure safe trade in animals and animal products, including in wildlife. The note is not exhaustive, but, rather, is an overview of the current issues and the status of legal frameworks and planned future actions to control the spread of zoonoses through trade

CONCLUSION

The existing guidance for trade in animals and animal products and the international legal framework are built on the recognition that safe trade in animals and animal products is possible, based on the implementation of science-based interventions to manage risk. Implementing existing guidance and developing more detailed standards and guidance for particular risk factors requires engagement at the international level, and investment to ensure that domestic, regional and global public, veterinary and environmental health systems are well prepared and have a solid basis for collaboration.

The SPS Committee provides a forum where WTO members can exchange information and discuss their approaches to the SPS measures adopted to address the risk of COVID-19 and other zoonoses; other WTO committees can serve as discussion fora for related issues. By providing a “peer-review mechanism”, whereby WTO members can comment on other members’ SPS measures and share relevant information on good practices and scientific evidence, these exchanges can help to improve the quality of regulation in this area, thus ensuring that trade measures contribute to enhancing future resilience to diseases of animal origin.

To download the full informational note, please click here.

The post FUTURE RESILIENCE TO DISEASES OF ANIMAL ORIGIN: THE ROLE OF TRADE appeared first on WITA.