Here in America, real average weekly earnings of all U.S. workers fell 3.1 percent in 2022. A central policy challenge in the year ahead is not just creating jobs. It is creating good jobs, i.e., jobs with high and rising incomes.

How to meet this challenge? Just before the winter holidays, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis released new data that show the way forward. In 2020, a certain set of U.S. companies employed 28.4 million workers in America at an average annual compensation of $84,925—about 20 percent higher than the average for the rest of the U.S. private sector.

Which companies? The U.S. parents of U.S.-headquartered multinational companies. U.S. multinationals have long been among America’s strongest firms. Although they comprise far less than 1 percent of U.S. companies, in 2020 their U.S. parents accounted for 23.1 percent of all private-sector jobs, 38.5 percent of investment in plant and equipment, 46.4 percent of exports of goods, and a remarkable 72 percent of business spending on research and development.

Despite the common allegation that multinationals simply “export jobs” out of America, research consistently shows that expansion abroad by these firms has tended to complement—not substitute for—their U.S. operations. More investment and employment abroad have tended to create more American investment and jobs as well. From 1988 to 2020, employment in foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals rose from 4.8 million to 14 million. Over that same period, employment in U.S. parents rose from 17.7 million to 28.4 million—a slightly larger increase at home than abroad.

Thanks to all their global dynamism, for decades U.S. multinationals have driven an outsized share of U.S. productivity growth, the foundation of rising standards of living for everyone. They accounted for about 40 percent of the increase in U.S. business labor productivity since 1990. For workers, the bottom line of all this is high and rising incomes. Globally connected jobs tend to pay more because global engagement fosters—and is fostered by—innovation and growth.

There is vast potential for creating more good jobs in America that are connected to the world. From 2000 to 2020, U.S. output expanded by $10 trillion—but over that generation the rest of the world grew by over $40 trillion, such that by 2020 America’s share of global output had fallen to just 24.8 percent, down from about 30 percent in 2000. Growth in labor forces and productivity around the world has boosted the purchasing power of millions of companies and billions of consumers. U.S. multinational companies have harnessed this growth through their exports from America and, even more, through the local sales of their foreign affiliates. And in the postpandemic years ahead, forecasts of continued faster growth in the rest of the world mean even greater potential for U.S. multinationals to build more jobs and opportunity in America connected to that global growth.

But realizing this potential is not a foregone conclusion, because global growth has also spawned new competitors for U.S. multinationals. The McKinsey Global Institute recently documented and analyzed the world’s “superstar” companies that generate the largest economic profits thanks to features including high productivity. From 1995 to 2016, the U.S. share of global superstar companies fell from nearly 50 percent to 38 percent. Particularly ascendant are superstars from fast-growing Asian countries, including China, India, and South Korea. There is no guarantee that past global strength of U.S. multinationals will be prologue.

And unfortunately, the sobering reality is that the United States has become largely adrift in its policy engagement with the global economy. America’s many post–World War II decades of liberalizing trade, investment, and immigration—all to the benefit of American companies, as well as to the American economy overall—have largely stalled out.

Consider trade. America has stopped pursuing new trade agreements and instead has launched and maintained a trade war. From 2010 to 2020, the United States implemented just four new free-trade agreements—three of which (Colombia, Peru, and South Korea) had been negotiated and ratified before 2010, and the fourth of which, the USMCA, was largely refining the NAFTA that had been negotiated decades earlier. Meanwhile, so many other nations have maintained and even accelerated their efforts at trade liberalization. Free-trade agreements that exclude the United States are agreements that impede the growth of U.S. companies both abroad and at home.

bodog casino To support American workers, the White House and the new Congress need to turn their attention away from pandemic ad hockery. High-productivity, high-wage jobs tend to be global jobs. We should recommit to investing in creating them.

Matthew J. Slaughter is the Paul Danos Dean of the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth, where in addition he is the Earl C. Daum 1924 Professor of International Business.

Matthew Rees is the founder of Geonomica, an editorial consulting firm that has worked with clients across a number of industries, and a senior fellow at Tuck’s Center for Business, Government & Society.

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A false narrative has gone mainstream in America. It claims that trade agreements the United States entered into over the last 40 years, perhaps for nearly a century, were a mistake.

There is no nuance to this narrative. “I have visited the laid-off factory workers and communities crushed by our horrible and unfair trade deals,” said Donald Trump when he accepted the Republican nomination for president in July 2016. On his first full day in office, he canceled the last trade agreement the United States had signed—the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Six years later, US Trade Representative Katherine Tai targeted other free trade agreements. On October 7, 2022, she claimed that they impose “significant costs: concentration of wealth, fragile supply chains, deindustrialization, offshoring, and the decimation of manufacturing communities.” If she saw benefits from trade agreements—or trade itself for that matter—she did not cite them.

This anti-trade-agreement sentiment did not end after Trump left office. The Biden administration has considered no new trade agreements and even allowed the congressional mandate for trade negotiations to expire.

Before Trump and Biden, no administration took the position that the body of prior trade agreements entered into by the United States primarily caused harm to the United States. Today, the people in charge of US trade policy evidently believe that the liberal world order created by trade agreements under American leadership resulted in a new evil—globalization. Even a prominent columnist in the Financial Times, a bastion of the liberal international order, celebrates the demise of “neoliberalism” (and globalization) and a return to localization.

Of course, these statements would have much less currency if they had absolutely no factual basis. Relatively open markets bring international competition, and in all competitions some players come out ahead and some behind; in extreme cases, the losers suffer serious harm. Critics view the quest for efficiency—a motivating force in a market-driven world economy—as cold and inhuman. Just look around, they say. Gross inequality in income and wealth abounds. Factories are staffed by far fewer workers than they used to be. The share of manufacturing employment has plummeted. Communities surrounding closed plants have declined and, in some cases, fallen into despair. It is fair to ask whether trade agreements, designed to open markets further, were to blame for any of these problems.

Alan Wm. Wolff is a distinguished visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. He was deputy director-general of the World Trade Organization.

Robert Z. Lawrence, nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, is the Albert L. Williams Professor of Trade and Investment at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

Gary Clyde Hufbauer is nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. He was the Institute’s Reginald Jones Senior Fellow from 1992 to January 2018.

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Free trade agreements improve trade freedom for American families, individuals, and businesses when the agreements focus on eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which is set to expire on July 1, 2021, is an important tool for advancing trade agreements that Congress should seek to renew. However, Congress must also make some crucial changes to ensure that future trade agreements focus on advancing trade freedom through the elimination of barriers at home and abroad. Congress should seek to strengthen its ability to influence the contents of a trade agreement by authorizing TPA for individual agreements, requiring a vote for all tariff changes, and mandating mock markups. In addition, the next TPA should make it clear that only Congress has the authority to withdraw from trade agreements.

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Tori K. Smith is the Jay Van Andel Trade Economist in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, of the Institute for Economic Freedom, at The Heritage Foundation.

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Before the COVID-19 pandemic erupted, governments’ pledges for sustainable development were flourishing, most notably as countries signed up to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, the devastating health and economic impacts of COVID-19 on the decade-long progress to fight poverty have forced governments to rethink their socioeconomic models so that they do not compromise human health and ecosystems. In this context, voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) are being increasingly recognized as potentially transformative tools for governments to realize their sustainability commitments.

This 4th Flagship Report aims to provide an understanding of the role of government as a vehicle to drive the adoption of VSS. The effectiveness of VSS to contribute to sustainable development partly depends on their degree of adoption by economic operators. In this respect, governments can play a significant role through public procurement and trade policy.

The integration of VSS into public procurement and trade policies is potentially a powerful means to upscale their adoption. Public procurement represents, on average, 12 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and up to 30 per cent of GDP in developing countries. Given the magnitude of such spending, in combination with the pressing need for sustainable production and consumption, sustainable public procurement (SPP) has become imperative. In addition, trade policy is increasingly being used to pursue non-trade objectives, including those relating to sustainability.

This report seeks to answer the following key questions:
• What are the determinants of VSS adoption at country level?
• How can public procurement and trade policy serve to increase VSS uptake, and how do they contribute to the effectiveness of VSS?
• What are the key considerations and implications of VSS integration into SPP and trade policy?

Based on these questions, the report analyses VSS adoption dynamics and trends, and the drivers for their adoption in SPP and trade policy. The following are its major observations.

bodog sportsbook review well-functioning governments and higher levels of development.

The number of VSS, their geographical coverage and the market shares of certified products are, overall, increasing at the global level. However, while VSS are being actively adopted in all countries, their adoption levels vary greatly across countries. VSS adoption scores are more or less aligned with income levels: large developed and middle-income countries tend to have more VSS. Thus, Brazil, China, the United States and many European countries have adopted many VSS;. middle-income countries such as Viet Nam, Indonesia and India also score fairly high on VSS adoption, suggesting that an export-oriented industrialization policy can influence higher VSS activity. Similarly, low-income countries, such as Ethiopia and the United Republic of Tanzania, also score high in VSS adoption due to their export commodities, such as coffee, which tend to be certified by multiple certificates. Generally, it is found that open economies with diversified economic sectors, relatively well-functioning governments and a high of development tend to adopt more VSS.

Increase in VSS adoption is driven by consumer and business demand, and by their integration into public policy.

Markets with a relatively high level of consumer demand for sustainable products can lead to an increased adoption of VSS. Business demand can bodog casino also increase VSS uptake, as VSS can serve as a means for differentiation and reputational risk management, and as proof of compliance with due diligence requirements or with government regulations. Depending on the structure of the economic sector, and more specifically on its level of concentration, VSS can also spread more or less easily, as business actors with strong bargaining power can influence other actors along the value chain to take up VSS. Lastly, SPP and trade policy play a particularly important role in the integration of VSS into public policy.

SPP can strengthen the design of VSS.

This will depend on how VSS are integrated into legal frameworks, and on the criteria established to recognize VSS in the context of SPP. Considering that procurement is involved in many segments of the value chain (i.e. sourcing of a commodity, purchasing the commodity, and quality control), the integration of VSS into SPP could foster the supply of sustainable products. It would also provide governments with additional enforcement mechanisms, and induce efforts to promote capacity-building. This in turn could create a spillover effect on the community of VSS, both in terms of scaling them up and making them more reliable and credible with regard to how they are designed and how they operate. This report identifies three challenges to enhancing the potential of VSS in SPP. First, procurement policies should strengthen requirements for the recognition of VSS. Currently, the integration of VSS into SPP involves requirements that are related mainly to their standard-setting processes, but rarely to their standards enforcement procedures, such as monitoring, conformity assessment, complaints handling and sanctions. Requirements relating to these other components need to be further developed. Second, there are no, or very few, VSS available for products for public procurement in several prominent sectors (e.g. the health sector). Third, there is a risk that SPP discriminates by excluding products or services of similar environmental and social performance but that do not hold certificates due to the high costs of certification.

Free trade agreements, preferential trade agreements, market access regulations and export promotion measures are relevant instruments to increase VSS uptake.

Between 2010 and 2017, VSS have been increasingly incorporated into some free trade agreements (FTAs), although it may be too early to detect a clear trend. Still, such inclusion tends to be more prominent in FTAs involving the European Union (EU), which reflects the Union’s commitment to promoting fair and ethical trade schemes in its trade policies. In preferential trade agreements (PTAs), and in generalized systems/schemes of Preferences (GSP) in particular, it has been observed that both VSS and GSP schemes aim to foster sustainable development and good governance, and proposals are discussed to integrate VSS into the GSP of the European Union. Moreover, making market access conditional on certification and developing export promotion measures in favour of certification can contribute to further upscaling VSS adoption.

Integrating VSS into SPP and trade policies might also produce several challenges.

A strong increase in demand for VSS could create capacity issues, with some VSS schemes lacking the capacity to deal with the increased demand. Besides, the current lack of availability of VSS for products in the prominent sectors of public procurement might lead to the creation of additional labels, thereby aggravating the problem of a proliferation of VSS. This could increase confusion for consumers and economic actors in distinguishing between credible and non-credible VSS. There is also a possible risk of proliferation of recognition systems with more or less similar requirements but also possible small differences in requirements. This would make it difficult for various VSS schemes to comply with them all. Additionally, if an increase in business demand for VSS does not align with consumer demand for VSS, it might lead to the problem of over-certification. Moreover, there is a possible distributional effect of upscaling VSS related to the “stuck to the bottom” problem, whereby some producers, especially in least developed countries (LDCs), are excluded from the VSS dynamics as they cannot afford high certification costs, which present a significant barrier to their adoption of VSS. This report explores governments’ role in upscaling VSS adoption through SPP and trade policy. It shows that VSS can generate significant impacts on the ground and transform market dynamics. Hence, boosting the uptake of VSS could improve their overall effectiveness in contributing to sustainability on a large scale.

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The longstanding U.S. goals to advance democracy and governance; peace and security; trade and investment; and development in Africa remain valid. However, it is the pursuit of these objectives that has become unfocused and anachronistic. Over the decades, U.S. policy toward the region has become too encompassing, overstuffed with sub-objectives, and fixated with inputs, not outcomes. Moreover, it persistently treats Africa as a “region apart,” divorced from developments in other areas of the world. U.S. policy priorities toward Africa are almost exclusively about local issues on the continent and are often oblivious to Africa’s sway in the international system. A new policy framework must-see African expertise and influence as a critical part of a broader U.S. approach to tackling global challenges.

Judd Devermont, Director, Africa Program CSIS

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UK-US total trade was valued at £220.9 billion in the last year, including 19.8% of all our exports. The Government’s analysis shows a UK-US FTA could increase trade between both countries by £15.3 billion in the long run, in comparison to 2018, and increase UK workers’ wages by £1.8 billion. 

The US is a developed, high-wage economy with high standards and is our top source of investment and the top destination for UK investment. We already have over £700 billion invested in each other’s economies, and every day over a million Britons and over a million Americans work for companies from the other nation. 

Removing trade barriers with the US could deliver huge gains, especially for the 30,000 Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) across the UK already trading with the US and open opportunities to others. For example, the US currently levies £451 million in tariffs on UK exports each year.

The world-leading agreement the UK wants will also be geared towards maximising the UK’s reach in emerging fields like global data flows and Artificial Intelligence (AI). Professional services, food processing and car manufacturing are among the sectors that could also benefit.

The Government has been clear that when we are negotiating trade agreements, we will protect the National Health Service (NHS). Our objectives reinforce this. The NHS will not be on the table. The price the NHS pays for drugs will not be on the table. The services the NHS provides will not be on the table. The NHS is not, and never will be, for sale to the private sector, whether overseas or domestic.

Any agreement will ensure high standards and protections for consumers and workers, and will not compromise on our high environmental protection, animal welfare and food standards. The Outline Approach published in Chapter 2 sets out the UK’s overall objectives for these negotiations, enabling us to begin substantive discussions with the US.

These objectives are also informed by one of the biggest consultations ever undertaken with the UK public, businesses and civil society, covering trade with the US, Australia, New Zealand, and our potential accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Our response to the US part of this consultation can be found in Chapter 3. 

The US is the world’s largest economy, our closest security and defence partner and one of our oldest friends. We are the biggest bodog casino investors in each other’s economies. We have worked together, from the Bretton Woods Conference to the UN Security Council, to shape the world order since the Second World War. An FTA represents a strategic opportunity to augment and codify our strong trade, investment and economic relationships, bringing us closer to our largest bilateral trading partner and the world’s economic powerhouse.

This agreement should support the further development of a close defence industrial partnership between the UK and the US in the defence sector, recognising that we are already each other’s most important suppliers of imported defence equipment, and that this relationship both supports jobs and investment, and delivers world class capabilities to our armed forces as they fight together in defence of our national interests.

The agreement should reduce barriers to defence sales, in particular by encouraging deeper and faster sharing of technology, and encourage investment in each other’s industrial base.

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The Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), originally agreed in November 2018, and amended in Mexico City last December, represents a significant step back from the three-decade partnership in North America launched with the 1989 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and further developed with the addition of Mexico in the NAFTA.

The CUSMA signals this clearly: the words “North America”, and “free trade” have vanished. Unusually for a modern trade agreement, it has little traditional market access liberalization. Moreover, its modernizing elements, based largely on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) text, contribute little to reducing trade costs or border frictions.

At the same time, the CUSMA introduces more restrictive rules of origin and increases uncertainty about future market access by leaving unchecked protectionist measures dusted off by the Trump administration, including the Section 232 tariff measures that have been used against Canadian steel and aluminum exports and threatened against Canadian exports of automotive products.

While side agreements provide some assurance against the further use of these measures on these products, there is no such guarantee for other products. And the introduction of a sunset clause coupled with rhetorical signals of the intent to use this to revise the deal in favour of the United States, send a warning signal to business: curb your enthusiasm about investing in Canada to make hay in the US market. The new institutional environment works to effectively raise non-tariff barriers to the US market.

The protectionist focus of the agreement comes with a net cost to all three parties. These costs are, however, more severe for Canada and Mexico since North American trade makes a proportionately much larger contribution to our economies. We estimate that the Agreement will lower Canada’s real gross domestic production (GDP) by -0.4 percent and Mexico’s by -0.8 percent on an ongoing basis.

For the United States, the estimated impact is -0.1 percent. The only comparable published study of the agreement – by the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) – arrives at a similar estimate for the United States of -0.12 percent but does not provide estimates for Canada or Mexico.

One element of the USITC study warrants explicit comment: it introduces a large positive impact for reduction of uncertainty about future cross-border data flows and data localization requirements. These uncertainty effects flip the -0.12-percent impact into a 0.35-percent gain or even as much as a 1.21 percent gain. We decline to introduce such an effect into our evaluation for three major reasons which call into question the additional effect of the CUSMA in this area:

• Canada and Mexico have already signed onto similar provisions in the CPTPP and the USMCA changes matters comparatively little.
• The future regulatory regime for data flows in areas ranging from privacy, to competition policy, to taxation, to protection of democratic processes is being actively pursued worldwide; outcomes are highly uncertain and there is little empirical evidence on what restrictions will ultimately be deemed as legitimate as opposed to barriers to digital trade that would be prevented by CUSMA disciplines.
• The United States has articulated an extraordinarily expansive scope for national security, in particular for the emerging Internet of Things (IoT) area, which suggests all three parties will have considerable latitude to develop regulations on data flow to ensure national security in the backbone services sectors (communications, transportation, power, and finance) at least.

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