Barriers to U.S. agricultural exports. The NTE Report highlights cross-cutting barriers affecting U.S. agricultural trade, including opaque and burdensome facility registration requirements, such as Indonesia’s facility registration requirements for dairy, meat, and rendered products, and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) requirements across a wide range of food and agricultural products; sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures that are not based on science, are maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, or are applied beyond the extent necessary to address SPS issues, such as India and Turkey’s procedures and requirements for agricultural biotechnology approvals, Mexico’s policies regarding products of agricultural biotechnology, and the European Union’s non-science-based policies affecting innovative crop protection technologies; and lack of adherence to science- and risk-based standards and commitments related to trade in poultry products from regions impacted by highly pathogenic avian influenza, including by the PRC. USTR is determined to use all available tools to ensure that U.S. agricultural producers are provided fair access to compete on a level playing field globally, and to ensure safe, wholesome food and agricultural products to consumers worldwide.

Failure to recognize U.S. motor vehicle standards. Certain countries effectively exclude U.S. vehicles built to conform to the U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). These standards provide a high level of protection that matches or exceeds that of other countries. Over the coming year, USTR will continue its engagement with foreign government and authorities on this issue, to ensure that U.S. exports of FMVSS-compliant vehicles are able to access these markets, including Colombia, Egypt, Laos, Morocco, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan.

Lack of uniformity in the European Union. U.S. stakeholders continue to face challenges in the European Union in having to address disparate policies or procedures across Member States. Areas of concern include customs, labeling, agricultural biotechnology, packaging and packing waste, government procurement, investment, and intellectual property protection and enforcement.

Non-Market Policies and Practices. The PRC’s state-led, non-market approach to the economy and trade continues to shape the industrial policies that the PRC pursues, and provide unfair competitive advantages to PRC companies. This includes massive financial support and regulatory and other preferences and formal and informal policies and practices that seek to disadvantage foreign competitors. This behavior is heavily distorting and disrupting markets, which has led to severe and persistent excess capacity, as evidenced by the ongoing situations in the steel, aluminum, and solar industries, among others. The PRC is focused on numerous industries in advanced manufacturing, high technology, and other key economic sectors, where the PRC is setting and pursuing production and market share targets that can only be achieved through non-market means. USTR is determined to pursue all available domestic trade tools to protect the competitiveness of U.S. workers and businesses and will continue to work closely with like-minded allies and trading partners to address the PRC’s harmful policies and practices.

Data policies in furtherance of state intrusion. The United States is aware that data localization policies can be use by government to surveil their populations, interfere with labor rights, and otherwise compromise civil and political liberties. There are also circumstances in which data policies lack clarity and pose compliance challenges. USTR has identified problematic data policies across a range of countries, including the PRC and Russia.

To read the full report, click here.

To read the full press release as it appears the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative’s website, click here.

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Video 1: U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai testifies before the Senate Finance Committee about US trade policy.

To watch the full hearing, please click here.

Video 2: U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai testifies before the House Committee on Ways and Means about US trade policy.

To watch the full hearing, please click here.

The post Ambassador Katherine Tai’s Testimonies on the President’s 2023 Trade Policy Agenda appeared first on WITA.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Biden Administration promised to build the economy from the bottom up and the middle out, and we are doing just that. Unemployment is at its lowest rate in over 50 years. This Administration has seen more jobs created in two years than any other Administration has seen in four. Manufacturing is rebounding faster than it has in almost 40 years, while wages are rising, and rising even faster for lower- and middle-income workers. The American Rescue Plan, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act were historic investments in America, and they are working.

The Biden Administration continues to believe that trade can—and should—be a force for good. Done right, and in coordination with other policy disciplines, it can grow the middle class, address inequality, tackle the climate crisis, and level the playing field by promoting fair competition. We remain committed to upholding a fair and open global trading system—one that puts working families first, raises living standards, ensures full employment, and promotes sustainable development.

We are continuing to rewrite the story on trade by bringing more people into the process and developing policies and initiatives that are resilient and sustainable and create broad-based growth. In 2023, our trade agenda will continue to focus on unlocking new opportunities for American workers and families—while also supporting and strengthening the middle class, driving decarbonization, and creating good-paying jobs across the American economy. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s brutal, illegal attack on Ukraine, it also means fortifying relationships with our partners and allies and strengthening critical supply chains to withstand shocks and disruptions to the system and to defend democratic values.

To realize this vision, we are continuing to forge the partnerships necessary to update and enforce the rules governing the global economy and trade.

In the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere, the United States is leading with a positive economic vision through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity and the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity. With the European Union, we continue to deepen our relationship and intensify cooperation on pressing challenges, such as the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) non-market policies and practices. Further, we are intensifying negotiations on a first-of-its-kind trade arrangement to address non-market excess capacity and the greenhouse gas emissions of imported steel and aluminum. We are also continuing to build out the Trade and Technology Council, and the Trade and Labor Dialogue under its umbrella, to pursue shared priorities, including supply chain resilience, challenges posed by non-market economies, inclusive digital trade, and the elimination of forced labor.

Additionally, in 2022, we kicked off ambitious initiatives with Taiwan and Kenya to deepen our trade and economic relationships with both partners, and we aim to make rapid progress on both initiatives in 2023. At the World Trade Organization (WTO), after working with WTO Members to deliver key outcomes during the Twelfth Ministerial Conference, the United States is driving the conversation on transforming the institution to be more responsive to the rapidly changing global economic environment and to the needs of everyday people.

Moreover, following the successful U.S. Africa Leaders Summit last year, the Administration will continue to strengthen our partnerships with the African continent and to support regional and continental integration efforts, with the well-being of workers, women, and youth to inform our work.

Our Administration is also fully committed to continued enforcement of our existing trade agreements to hold our trading partners accountable. This includes utilizing the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement’s Rapid Response Mechanism to raise labor standards across North America and drive a race to the top. We are also using other mechanisms to open, maintain, and enhance access to markets and address unfair trade practices that harm our workers and businesses and ensure that they enjoy the benefits that they were promised.

Finally, a vital element of our effort to build an inclusive trade policy agenda is understanding the effects of our policies on underrepresented and underserved workers and communities, and ensuring that they have a say in how our policies are designed and implemented going forward. We know that an important part of making trade work for all Americans is having a better understanding of the effects of past trade policies.

At the Administration’s request, the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) conducted a first-of-its-kind study of the distributional effects of goods and services trade and trade policy on U.S. workers. Through an extensive information gathering process, the investigation brought to light what many already knew: while trade has benefited many, devastating effects have been concentrated in certain communities. The report also illustrated the gaps around data, and particularly disaggregated data, that can further inform a more equitable trade policy. USTR will continue working with the USITC and other partners to design trade policy that addresses inequality and supports the goals and aspirations of all Americans. USTR will also continue to implement its Equity Action Plan to ensure that racial and gender equity is embedded in its ecosystem.

By placing workers and everyday people at the center of our trade policy, the Biden Administration will continue to use trade as a force for good, to build a durable and fair tomorrow by pursuing resilience, sustainability, and inclusive prosperity.

To read the full trade policy agenda, please click here. 

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To read the full report from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, please click here.

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In Part One of this report, we provide an assessment of China’s WTO membership, including the unique and very serious challenges that China’s state-led, non-market approach to the economy and trade continue to pose for the multilateral trading system. In Part Two, we review the effectiveness of the various strategies that have been pursued over the years to address the unique problems posed by China. In Part Three, we emphasize the critical need for new and more effective strategies – including taking actions outside the WTO where necessary – to address those problems. Finally, in Part Four, we catalogue the numerous problematic policies and practices that currently stem from China’s state-led, non-market approach to the economy and trade.

PART ONE

Part One explains that when China acceded to the WTO, it voluntarily agreed to embrace the WTO’s open, market-oriented approach and to embed it in China’s trading system and institutions. China also agreed to take on the obligations set forth in existing WTO rules, while also making numerous China- specific commitments. As we previously documented, and as remains true today, China’s record of compliance with these terms has been poor.

After 20 years of WTO membership, China still embraces a state-led, non-market approach to the economy and trade, despite other WTO members’ expectations – and China’s own representations – that China would transform its economy and pursue the open, market-oriented policies endorsed by the WTO. In fact, China’s embrace of a state-led, non- market approach to the economy and trade has increased rather than decreased over time, and the mercantilism that it generates has harmed and disadvantaged U.S. companies and workers, often severely.

To read the full report from the United States Trade Representative, please click here. 

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You asked us to review how USTR decided to exclude products from China from tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (Section 301).2 In this report, we examine what processes USTR used to review exclusion requests and extensions and describe how USTR evaluated tariff exclusion requests and extensions, and the outcomes of its decisions.

To examine USTR’s processes to review exclusion requests and extensions, we reviewed the agency’s internal training materials, as well as external guidance, such as Federal Register notices and USTR’s “Frequently Asked Questions” documents published on its website. We interviewed officials at USTR, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) about their roles in this process. We analyzed a non-generalizable selection of 16 case files as illustrative examples to determine how USTR documents and follows its processes. We randomly selected the cases from 31,664 exclusion requests and extension public comments submitted between June 2019 and August 2020 based on the various reasons USTR cited in deciding exclusion requests and extensions. For more details on our case file selection, see appendix I.

Results from nongeneralizable samples cannot be used to make inferences about a population, but can be used as illustrative examples. We assessed USTR’s implementation of the exclusion and extension processes against federal internal control standards related to documenting organizational responsibilities in policies.

To describe how USTR evaluated exclusion requests and extensions, and the outcomes of these decisions, we reviewed internal and external documentation about the factors USTR considered for these decisions. We reviewed case file examples to understand how USTR applied these factors. We also calculated relevant summary statistics on exclusion decisions using application and decision data from Regulations.gov and USTR’s exclusion portal. We also examined trade statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau (Census) and collected data on the requests and decisions for exclusions to examine how different product category characteristics, such as in end-use types, are associated with exclusion approval rates. We found the data to be reliable for our purposes by conducting several validity and sensibility checks before conducting our analysis. For more details on our objectives, scope, and methodology, see appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2020 to July 2021 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

To read the original report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, please visit here

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In 2000, Congress established this Commission to monitor and report on the national security implications of the U.S.-China economic relationship. Over the years, we have tracked the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) accountability to its global commitments, including those made in its accession to the World Trade Organization. Two decades later, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) selectively adheres to its global economic, trade, and political obligations and has abandoned any concern for international opinion. Now the CCP envisions itself atop a new hierarchical global order in which the world acquiesces to China’s worldview while supplying it with markets, capital, resources, and talent.

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has focused public attention on China, but the PRC’s ambitions are neither new nor secret. For decades, the CCP has made its ambitions clear through industrial policy and planning documents, leadership speeches, and military directives. Under General Secretary Xi Jinping, however, the CCP is aggressively asserting its interests both domestically and globally.

In the past, the CCP focused its attempts at economic dominance on legacy sectors of steel, aluminum, and transportation, among others. Its current goals are to dominate the world’s newest and most cutting-edge industries, including biotechnology, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and clean energy. Though the focus of China’s industrial policies is changing, the government’s strategy and objectives retain the same mercantilist and coercive tools: compelling foreign entrants to transfer technology to their domestic competitors for limited market access, lavishing generous subsidies on state-owned enterprises and domestic national champions, and leveraging illicit methods, including cyber-enabled theft, to obtain valuable intellectual property and mountains of data.

China’s security laws threaten the arrest of anyone who criticizes China, its leaders, or its policies. This threat now extends to Americans inside China as well as those who live in or travel to countries that have an extradition treaty with China. Foreign journalists live in fear of detention or expulsion.

The CCP claims to protect the interests of the Chinese people. Its true purpose, however, is to protect its own existence and grow its power, no matter the costs. Party leaders judge any sign of criticism to be too great a risk to CCP rule. The CCP’s response is harsh and swift whether reacting to the single voice of a doctor raising health alarms about the emergence of COVID-19, to internal criticism, or to millions of peaceful prodemocracy demonstrators in Hong Kong. This year, the CCP undertook new levels of effort to silence critics and prevent the flow of information.

COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF THE COMMISSION’S RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter 1: U.S.-China Global Competition

Section 1: A Global Contest for Power and Influence: China’s View of Strategic Competition with the United States

The Commission recommends:

1. Congress adopt the principle of reciprocity as foundational in all legislation bearing on U.S.-China relations. Issues to be considered in applying this principle should include but are not limited to the following:

• The ability of journalists and online media to operate without undue restriction;

• The ability of nongovernmental organizations to conduct meaningful engagement with civil society;

• Access to information, including but not limited to financial and research data; • Access for social media and mobile apps from U.S. companies;

• Access for diplomatic personnel, including but not limited to diplomats’ freedom of travel and ability to meaningfully exchange views with the host country public; and

• Market access and regulatory parity, including but not limited to companies’ ability to participate in trade, investment, and financial market transactions, cross-border capital transfer, and protections of intellectual property.

2. Congress direct the U.S. Department of State to produce an annual report detailing China’s actions in the United Nations and its subordinate agencies that subvert the principles and purposes of the United Nations. Such a report would at a minimum document the following:

• China’s actions violating United Nations treaties to which it is a party;

• China’s actions to influence the votes of United Nations members, including through coercive means;

• China’s actions to nominate or support candidates for United Nations leadership positions that do not adhere to United Nations standards for impartiality or are subject to the influence of the Chinese government;

• Actions by nationals of the People’s Republic of China and others currently holding United Nations leadership positions that appear to support the interests of the Chinese government in violation of United Nations impartiality standards;

• Actions by nationals of the People’s Republic of China serving in functional positions in United Nations organizations impacting hiring practices, internal policies, and other functions that appear to support the interests of the Chinese government in violation of United Nations impartiality standards;

• Actions by Chinese military and support personnel engaged in United Nations peacekeeping operations that are inconsistent with the principles governing these missions, including China’s deployment of these personnel to protect its economic interests and improve the power projection capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army; and

• The number and positions of United States personnel employed by the United Nations and its agencies.

3. Congress expand the authority of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to monitor and take foreign government subsidies into account in premerger notification processes.

• The FTC shall develop a process to determine to what extent proposed transactions are facilitated by the support of foreign government subsidies.

• The definition of foreign government subsidies shall encompass direct subsidies, grants, loans, below-market loans, loan guarantees, tax concessions, governmental procurement policies, and other forms of government support.

• Companies operating in the United States that benefit from the financial support of a foreign government must provide the FTC with a detailed accounting of these subsidies when undergoing FTC premerger procedures.

• If the FTC finds foreign subsidies have facilitated the transaction, the FTC can either propose a modification to remedy the distortion or prohibit the transaction under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions where the effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”

4. Congress direct the Administration, when sanctioning an entity in the People’s Republic of China for actions contrary to the economic and national security interests of the United States or for violations of human rights, to also sanction the parent entity.

5. Congress amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to clarify that association with a foreign government’s technology transfer programs may be considered grounds to deny a nonimmigrant visa if the foreign government in question is deemed a strategic competitor of the United States, or if the applicant has engaged in violations of U.S. laws relating to espionage, sabotage, or export controls. Association with a foreign government’s technology transfer programs can include any of the following:

• Participation in a foreign government-sponsored program designed to incentivize participants to transfer fundamental research to a foreign country via a talent recruitment program or in a foreign government-sponsored startup competition;

• Acceptance of a government scholarship that requires recipients to study specific strategic scientific and technological fields, to return to the foreign country for a government work requirement after the scholarship term ends, or facilitates coordination with talent programs;

• Association with a university or a department of a university that the U.S. government has designated as a participant in the foreign government’s military-civil fusion efforts; or

• Status (current or past) as a scientist, technician, or officer for a foreign military, if the applicant does not disclose such information when applying for a visa.

Section 2: The China Model: Return of the Middle Kingdom

The Commission recommends:

6. Congress hold hearings to consider the creation of an interagency executive Committee on Technical Standards that would be responsible for coordinating U.S. government policy and priorities on international standards. This Committee would consist of high-level political appointees from executive departments with equities relating to international technical standards, including the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and other agencies or government stakeholders with relevant jurisdiction. The Committee’s mandate would be to ensure common purpose and coordination within the executive branch on international standards. Specifically, the Committee would:

• Identify the technical standards with the greatest potential impact on American national security and economic competitiveness;

• Coordinate government efforts relating to those standards;

• Act as a liaison between government, academia, and the private sector to coordinate and enhance joint efforts in relation to standards;

• Manage outreach to counterpart agencies among U.S. allies and partners;

• Set funding priorities and recommendations to Congress; and

• Produce annual reports to Congress on the status of technical standards issues and their impact on U.S. national security and economic competitiveness.

Section 3: China’s Strategic Aims in Africa

The Commission recommends:

7. Congress require the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, within 180 days, to prepare a report on China’s use of rules of origin intended to benefit countries eligible for the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to ensure AGOA countries obtain the benefit of favorable trade policies and China is not using them to circumvent U.S. trade policies.

Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations

Section 2: Vulnerabilities in China’s Financial System and Risks for the United States

The Commission recommends:

8. Congress enact legislation establishing a China Economic Data Coordination Center (CEDCC) at the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the U.S. Department of Commerce. The Center would be mandated to collect and synthesize official and unofficial Chinese economic data on developments in China’s financial markets and U.S. exposure to risks and vulnerabilities in China’s financial system, including:

• Data on baseline economic statistics (e.g., gross domestic product [GDP]) and other indicators of economic health;

• Data on national and local government debt;

• Data on nonperforming loan amounts;

• Data on the composition of shadow banking assets;

• Data on the composition of China’s foreign exchange reserves; and

• Data on bank loan interest rates.

9. Congress request that the Administration prepare a report on the research and development activities of the affiliates of U.S. multinational enterprises operating in China and the implications of such activities for U.S. production, employment, and the economy.

Section 3: U.S.-China Links in Healthcare and Biotechnology

The Commission recommends:

10. Congress enact legislation to require ancestry and health testing services to (1) require explicit consent from customers to provide, sell, lease, or rent to any party individual data that is aggregated for the purposes of research; and (2) disclose to customers any parent company or subsidiary relationship.

11. Congress establish a new U.S. national laboratory focusing on biotechnology or designate an existing U.S. national laboratory to focus on biotechnology.

12. Congress consider establishing a “Manhattan Project”-like effort to ensure that the American public has access to safe and secure supplies of critical lifesaving and life-sustaining drugs and medical equipment, and to ensure that these supplies are available from domestic sources or, where necessary, trusted allies. Such a project would supplement the recommendation the Commission made in its 2019 Annual Report that Congress hold hearings with a view toward enacting legislation requiring the U.S. government to procure medicines only from U.S. production facilities or from facilities that have been certified compliant with U.S. standards.

To read the full report, please click here.

Alexander A. Bowe is a Policy Analyst on Security and Foreign Affairs at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Kendra Brock is a Research Assistant on Economics and Trade at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Erik Castillo is an Operations Support Specialist at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Jameson Cunningham is the Director of Congressional Affairs and Communications at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Kevin Fashola is a Congressional Fellow at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Christopher P. Fioravante is the Director of Operations and Administration at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Benjamin B. Frohman is the Director of Security and Foreign Affairs Will Green, and a Policy Analyst in Security and Foreign Affairs at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Charles Horne is a Research Coordinator and Policy Analyst in Economics and Trade at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Sierra Janik is a Policy Analyst in Security and Foreign Affairs at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic is a Policy Analyst in Security and Foreign Affairs at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Kaj Malden is a Policy Analyst in Economics and Trade at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Leyton Nelson is a Policy Analyst in Economics and Trade at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Emma Rafaelof is a Policy Analyst in Economics and Trade at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Nargiza Salidjanova is the Director of Economics and Trade at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Howard Wang is a Policy Analyst in Security and Foreign Affairs at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Daniel W. Peck is the Executive Director of the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

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Climate change is unique among the issues facing the President, because both the effects and the policy solutions to the challenge defy neat categorization. Climate change is already or will soon affect every sector of the economy, every community in the nation, and every nation in the world. Reducing the greenhouse gas emissions that drive climate change and helping communities adapt to the unavoidable impacts already baked into the system requires domestic investment, rulemakings, and policy changes, as well as robust international diplomacy to incentivize other countries to also raise their ambitions. That means that every agency in the federal government has some degree of responsibility in addressing climate change—and so does every policy council in the White House.

This diffusion of responsibility can all too easily lead to confusion, turf battles, and inaction. When everyone is partially responsible, no one is ultimately in charge. And despite the increasing political salience of climate change to voters—particularly young people—the long time horizon for seeing results from many climate policies, not to mention the political and technical complexity of many climate solutions, means that the issue can all too easily be put on the back burner when a White House is faced with multiple urgent crises, like a global pandemic and a historic recession.

That is why the single most important thing a new White House must do is commission as Assistant to the President (AP) an experienced, respected Counselor or Senior Advisor who is 1) a credible leader on climate policy, 2) who sits in the West Wing and 3) who has direct access to and is trusted by the President of the United States, to lead the Administration’s domestic and international efforts on climate change. When there has been a single, forceful actor with the mandate to lead the President’s climate agenda, the White House has historically been able to organize the federal government to effectively address climate change. When that position has not been filled or has not been appropriately empowered, it has been appreciably harder to make progress. 

While it is necessary to appoint and empower an AP to lead on the climate agenda, it is not sufficient. There are other important White House organizational changes needed to create an integrated domestic and international vision and provide sufficient staff resources. In addition to being led by an AP for Climate, as described above, a new administration must ensure that the White House structure meets the following criteria:

1. Staff resourcing. The White House must have the staff capacity and credibility to manage a whole-of-government climate effort. In addition to the AP position, the White House should have at least one Deputy Assistant to the President for Climate and Energy (DAP); three Special Assistants to the President for various climate functions, including one SAP dual-hatted to the National Economic Council, one dual-hatted to the National Security Council, and one dual-hatted to the Council on Environmental Quality; and further non-commissioned FTE climate staff to support the President’s climate agenda.
2. Policy council buy-in. The White House climate structure must create buy-in and serious engagement on climate across all White House policy councils, and facilitate effective collaboration, including through the dual-hatted SAPs.
3. Robust non-policy support. The White House must integrate the ongoing work of the climate team across non-policy offices, including Legislative Affairs, the White House Counsel’s Office, Communications and Digital, Cabinet Affairs, and the Presidential Personnel Office.
4. Regular interagency engagement. The White House climate structure must formalize an all-of-government approach to climate change, with senior White House staff engaging regularly with senior agency leadership to develop an ambitious climate agenda, monitor implementation, and continually identify opportunities to increase ambition.

To meet these essential criteria, the President should:

• Issue an Executive Order to create a National Climate Council that is co-equal to the Domestic Policy Council and the National Economic Council to organize and drive White House and Administration actions. (Day 1)

For too long, climate policy has been sidelined as solely an environmental issue in the minds of many political operatives and elected officials. In the past, the core White House staff dedicated to domestic emissions reduction and energy transition policies have been grouped in the Domestic Policy Council, with additional support from CEQ and small numbers of domestic climate and energy staff at NEC and OSTP. In the absence of strong AP level leadership outside the DPC, it can be challenging for the DPC staff to coordinate activities with other policy councils or to get the leadership-level attention necessary for Presidential approval of policy initiatives or decisions. A DPC-led climate team can also struggle to plug in effectively to international climate policy led by the NSC, hamstringing both domestic and international progress.

Given the urgency of climate change, a new administration cannot allow these structural challenges to continue inside the White House. Creating a National Climate Council by Executive Order, just as the NEC and DPC were created by Presidents Clinton and Carter, respectively, would elevate climate change as an issue worthy of sustained, national policymaking and communications. It would also create a consistent organizational mechanism for climate change policy in the White House from year to year. In line with the above criteria, the NCC should be led by the Assistant to the President for Climate and staffed by the DAP for Climate Change and Energy, with at least three SAPs, dual-hatted to the NEC, NSC, and CEQ, and at least eight to ten further FTE staff as a starting point. Additional FTE positions on the NCC can be filled using flexible hiring authorities available to the Council on Environmental Quality and the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

It is important to emphasize that creating an NCC is not sufficient to deliver an effective, empowered White House climate team. In particular, an NCC that did not meet the four criteria above—for example, an NCC whose Director sits in the EEOB rather than the West Wing, an NCC without clear authority to drive both domestic and international climate policy, or an NCC that is not directly integrated into the other policy councils via double-hatted senior staff—would be less effective than a more informal structure that meets those criteria. If the President declines to create an NCC, these minimal staffing requirements—including the AP, DAP, and dual-hatted SAPs—are still essential to building a robust climate policy apparatus in the White House. The AP must be empowered to lead the integrated domestic and international climate agenda, and to draw on staff capacity from all the policy councils, along with functional offices like Communications and WHCO.

• Launch a 90-day, Cabinet-level effort to craft a Climate Ambition Plan designed to hold the Administration accountable in meeting the President’s stated goals—and go further. (Day 1)

The next administration will need to set ambitious goals; design and implement policies that will put the United States on a path to achieving net-zero emissions no later than mid-century; and restore the U.S. to a position of global climate leadership that incentivizes increasingly strong climate commitments from other major emitters.

In order to translate those goals and other important policy priorities into a governing plan that will hold the Cabinet accountable for achieving results in a timely manner, the next administration should revive the successful Climate Action Plan approach from the second term of the Obama-Biden Administration. Specifically, at the same time the NCC is created, the President should launch a 90-day Cabinet-level task force to write and publish a new, four-year Climate Ambition Plan, containing within it specific, agency-by-agency actions on greenhouse gas mitigation and the clean energy transition, climate change adaptation and resilience, and international climate diplomacy and development. The AP for Climate should be tasked with driving the 90-day process and, after its completion, with ensuring every responsible Cabinet agency delivers against the policies included in the Climate Ambition Plan. The 90-day process to develop a Climate Ambition Plan should be launched whether or not an NCC is created.

• Embed key aspects of the climate change agenda in other White House policy councils and functions, including CEQ, NSC, OSTP, OMB, CEA, and cross-functional offices like Communications, Cabinet Affairs, Legislative Affairs, OPE, WHCO, and PPO. (Day 1 and ongoing)

Even if a National Climate Council is created, other policymaking councils and cross-functional offices still will play critical roles in furthering an ambitious climate agenda. Appropriate staff from those councils and offices should be consistently included in NCC meetings and policy planning. As detailed later in this memo:

• The Council on Environmental Quality is best suited to elevate environmental justice to the White House and to lead the agenda on climate change resilience, in addition to its statutory responsibilities for NEPA and historic responsibilities for managing conservation and species issues.

• The International Economics deputate should be re-established within the NSC, with a climate-focused directorate led by a senior director (a SAP dual-hatted to the NCC) and team of two to three director-level positions, to work with the State Department and other key agencies on international negotiations and coordinate climate inputs into the President’s bilateral and multilateral engagements.

• The Office of Science and Technology Policy urgently needs to be re-empowered to support federal climate science and clean energy innovation in the U.S. and internationally.

• The Office of Management and Budget can and should be a stronger partner to federal agencies on climate policy. Senior political staff at OMB and its sub-agencies and offices, notably OIRA, should clearly understand that supporting the President’s climate agenda is a central part of their mandate. In terms of budget, OMB must prioritize securing the increased funding for climate and clean energy investments that should be integral to any COVID-19 economic stimulus package, and for implementing the Climate Ambition Plan. The OMB budget process is addressed in more detail in a separate memo.

• Cross-functional offices, including the White House Counsel’s Office, the communications shop, and the Presidential Personnel Office, should have staff who are dedicated to working on the climate portfolio and empowered to support ambitious activities.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is unusual among EOP offices, in that it has the strongly outward-facing role of overseeing trade negotiations directly with other countries and working with the World Trade Organization (WTO) system. U.S. leadership of the global trading system has long allowed it to shape the international trade agenda so that it advances U.S. commercial and economic interests. Given the substantial impacts of climate change on the economy, USTR should more fully integrate climate change considerations into its work and encourage other countries and the global trading system to do the same.

USTR has traditionally had a robust structure on trade and environment, with an Assistant USTR for Environment who oversees negotiations on environment chapters in free trade agreements, WTO agenda items and WTO plurilateral agreement negotiations, trade and environment discussions at the UNFCCC and in other forums, and evaluation of trade barriers that arise out of environmental and climate policies. While the office retains a senior professional team on environmental issues, the previous administration had a limited focus on environmental issues, particularly on climate issues. USTR should dedicate greater staff resources with climate and trade expertise, and the U.S. Trade Representative should recognize climate and environment as key aspects of a 21st century trade regime.

USTR regularly coordinates with agency counterparts at the staff level through its Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) and at policy levels through the Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG), works closely with its oversight committees in Congress, and seeks input from stakeholders, affected industries, workers, and NGOs, particularly through its cleared advisors process. USTR can enhance these relationships by adding in climate-specific agendas to better understand opportunities and challenges on the intersection of trade and climate issues.

USTR has a number of programmatic opportunities to advance climate and environmental policy within the context of trade. USTR and U.S. trade agencies—including the Departments of Energy, State, Transportation, Commerce, Treasury, and the EPA—should consider incorporating trade negotiating objectives for emissions mitigation, climate resilience, or other climate objectives in the context of bilateral and regional FTAs under negotiation. Against the backdrop of broader U.S. trade policy, and similar to efforts by the previous administration to negotiate “digital trade” agreements, USTR could also seek to negotiate targeted climate-specific trade agreements or arrangements, rather than comprehensive FTAs, that focus on specific climate concerns, such as trade in climate-related goods, enforcement of relevant multilateral environmental agreement provisions, and border adjustments to level the playing field.

Within the context of the WTO, the new administration could consider plurilateral agreements related to climate goals, e.g., with respect to fossil fuel subsidies, environmental goods, and other achievable trade-related climate objectives, as well as including climate-related consultation provisions in ongoing negotiations on e-commerce or fisheries subsidies. USTR can also work with Congress and within the administration on domestic WTO-consistent measures to ensure a level playing field and prevent cross-border carbon leakage such as border tax adjustments.

USTR can also work internationally with like-minded countries, to develop a consistent and plurilateral approach to prevent carbon leakage.

To view all the recommendations of the Climate 21 Project, please click here. 

Christy Goldfuss is the former Managing Director at CEQ, and former Deputy Director of the National Park Service.

Tim Profeta is a researcher at Duke University’s Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions. 

Kristina Costa is the former Advisor to the Counselor to the President Jeremy Symons and former Climate Policy Advisor at EPA.

Jeremy Symons is the former Climate Policy Advisor at EPA.

To download the full report, please click here.

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All indications are that the substantial increases in China’s agricultural purchases will continue and benefits will redound for years, if not decades, as U.S. farmers and ranchers continue to build strong connections with China’s consumers who can see for themselves that U.S. agricultural products are unmatched in quality and affordability.

America’s farmers and ranchers are the best in the world when it comes to producing safe, high quality foods and agricultural products. For too long, however, unfair trade practices by many of our trading partners prevented our farmers and ranchers from competing fairly and providing their great products to the rest of the world. This was especially the case with China. The Phase One Agreement marks a historic opportunity for U.S. agriculture. In just a few short months, the provisions in the Agreement have yielded a great harvest for our farmers and ranchers. The results are evident in the record sales to China for our farmers in a wide range of important products. Even more importantly, the required structural changes in the Phase One Agreement are being implemented, further opening one of the world’s biggest markets to U.S. farmers and ranchers. With the achievements in place already, and with more to come, the Phase One Agreement will benefit United States agriculture for years and decades in the future.

To download the full report, please click here

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