bodog poker review The international condemnation was followed quickly by the imposition of wide-ranging economic sanctions on Russia, and the provision of military support to Ukraine, by most OECD and European Union countries. Trade-related sanctions have included prohibitions of exports to Russia of strategic goods, including high-tech goods and components for use in electronics, telecommunications, aerospace and oil refining, among other sectors. Sanctions imposed by the United States apply not only to goods exported by US companies, but also to goods produced elsewhere using US technologies. The extraterritorial nature of US sanctions has likely impacted exports to Russia even from countries that have not applied sanctions.The EU, United Kingdom and US have also announced plans to phase out imports of Russian energy.

The war hit the global bodog poker review economy by creating new geopolitical and economic uncertainties, soaring energy prices, and disruptions to global value chains in which Russian and Ukrainian companies were involved. Economic sanctions exerted adverse effects not only on Russia, but also on countries that imposed them and, more generally, on other economies because of higher energy and commodity prices.

Isolating the impact on the global economy and trade of Russia’s war is difficult because global inflation pressures were building up already before the war, along with the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic resulted in shortages of various materials and machinery, and in increased transportation costs and times. The fiscal stimulus implemented by most countries around the world in 2020-2021 supported household incomes, but the uncertainty and bodog online casino lockdown restrictions boosted household savings in several countries, creating pent-up demand. Sandbu (2022) argued that one of the reasons for the global surge in inflation, which came earlier than the energy price shock, was the strong rebound in US consumer goods demand, leading to a global scarcity of goods, with spill-over effects on the rest of the world. As pandemic-related restrictions were eased and largely eliminated from 2021 or early 2022, demand for contact-intensive services has also resumed 2. These developments would have exerted upward pressure on various prices even without the war.

Zsolt Darvas (zsolt.darvas@bruegel.org) is a Senior Fellow at Bruegel and Senior Research Fellow at Corvinus University of Budapest. Catarina Martins (catarina.martins@bruegel.org) is a Research Analyst at Bruegel.

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In sum, there is little that can be exported or reexported that involves Russia or Belarus, or Russian or Belarusian entities, directly or indirectly, without requiring an analysis of complex and novel U.S. and allied and partner country export controls. To ensure compliance, one will need to determine, at a minimum, (i) which items of interest are identified on the EAR’s Commerce Control List as controlled for “AntiTerrorism” reasons; and (ii) which foreign-made items are produced using technology, software or equipment that is subject to the EAR.

A simplistic, imprecise, but nonetheless helpful way of thinking about the new controls is the following:

• If the item at issue is of a type described on the Commerce Control List, whether U.S.- or foreign-produced, then it generally cannot be shipped from anywhere to anyone in Russia or Belarus for any reason without a license or other authorization.
• If the item at issue is of a type not described on the Commerce Control List (i.e., an EAR99 item), whether U.S.- or foreign-produced, then it generally can be shipped to Russia or Belarus, so long as it would not be for a military end use, a military end user or involving an entity on the Entity List.

The purpose of the new controls is “to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests by restricting Russia’s access to items that it needs to project power and fulfill its strategic ambitions.” The rule does this by leveraging the “global dominance of U.S.-origin software, technology, and equipment (including tooling)” to largely block the export and reexport of U.S.- and foreign-produced items that are essential inputs for sectors important to the Russia and Belarusian economies, primarily their defense, aerospace and maritime sectors. The related purpose of the parallel controls against Belarus is to restrict its access to items “it needs to support its military capabilities and preventing such items from being diverted through Belarus to Russia.”

The rules reflect an extraordinary amount of export control cooperation and coordination among close allies and partner countries that has not been seen since the end of the Cold War. In particular:

• The allies and partner countries have agreed to a common licensing policy of denial for exports of controlled items to Russia and Belarus. Until these rules, the standard had been one of “national discretion,” which allows each country to make its own licensing decisions without a need to coordinate with other countries.
• The allies and partner countries have each agreed to impose their own unilateral controls on items that only the United States has historically controlled, namely AntiTerrorism-controlled items. Until these rules, allies and partner countries have been reluctant to, or did not have the legal authority to, impose controls on items that were not identified in one of the four primary multilateral export control regimes.
• The rules’ extraterritorial controls on foreign-produced items do not apply if the items are produced in countries that commit to imposing substantially similar controls to those of the United States. This creates an incentive for other countries to cooperate, reduces the negative impacts of unilateral controls on U.S. industry and reduces the incentive to design out U.S.-origin content or items produced with U.S. technology or tools.

Indeed, the rules create a whole new paradigm, structure and purpose for coordinated export controls. That is, traditional multilateral export controls since the end of the Cold War have been focused on regulating weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, and the bespoke and dual-use commodities, software and technologies necessary for their development, production or use. In contrast, these rules have a much broader purpose, which is the plurilateral 1 control over exports to specific end users and the types of items important to a country’s strategic economic and military objectives. In particular, the White House stated that these “actions will ensure that the military as well as the aerospace, maritime and high-technology sectors do not obtain U.S. technology goods and technology that can be used to support Russian technical maintenance and innovation.” Export controls are being used as, and to enhance, economic sanctions tools.

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Initially, debates waged as to the scope, severity, and efficacy of the first round of sanctions on Russia. However, with the latest round of actions—selected banks being removed from the global financial messaging system SWIFT and restrictive measures being imposed on the Russian Central Bank (CBR)—the commitment of members of the international community is clear. Understanding the impact of these actions, however, is key. The bottom line is that these sanctions will have a significant impact on Russia’s overall economy, and average Russians are already feeling the cost. The sanctions target Russia’s domestic financial system, causing bank runs and forcing Russia’s central bank to continue hiking rates and/or to use its foreign exchange reserves. Furthermore, we believe that the CBR will have to institute strict capital controls and possibly declare a bank holiday as bank runs accelerate and demand for foreign exchange continues to rise sharply. As a result, we anticipate seeing negative growth in an economy that has already been hindered by increasing isolationism.

Even though we are seeing some of the most serious sanctions imposed on a country in recent history, there is still an escalation ladder and, if necessary, the United States and others can continue scaling up sanctions. These could include removing energy transactions-related exceptions from sanctions against the Russian banking system, shutting down further Euro-based transactions, and prohibiting transactions in the secondary market for existing Russian debt.

This paper will systematically look at additional sanctions that have been or could be imposed on Russia in several key areas: global payments systems, access to the U.S. Dollar, sovereign debt, hydrocarbon exports, and export controls. Equally important, it will not only analyze the effects of these latest sanctions on the Russian economy but also the broader implications for international financial markets. For example, one of the biggest impacts on the global economy is likely to be on trade. While details on how the new sanctions affect energy are still emerging, we do know that sanctions on its central bank will make it more difficult for Russia to export energy and other commodities. As a result, we may see commodity prices surge.

Sanctions are the pre-eminent tool of economic statecraft, and President Biden and other world leaders have made it clear that these sanctions were only a first step, leaving the door open for further escalation should Russian aggression continue. In the coming days we will see limits placed on so called “golden passports,” the launch of a transatlantic task force so that today’s financial sanctions are enforced and not circumvented, and a battle will be waged against “disinformation and other forms of hybrid warfare.” In other words, we have yet to reach the top of the ladder.

To read the full report by the Institute of International Finance, please click here.

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China has taken full advantage of its WTO rights. It has also largely ignored the responsibilities and commitments through its embrace of state-directed capitalism predicated upon an aggressive innovation mercantilism. This mercantilism denies foreign enterprises access to Chinese markets on reciprocal terms; distorts global markets, including for advanced-technology goods; and deprives nations of the benefits they believed they would receive when granting China accession into the community of trading nations.

In this report, China’s accession to the WTO is recounted along with the trade rules with which it fails to comply. The report also describes the economic benefits China has accrued in part by not complying with its WTO commitments. Lastly, it offers policy recommendations for policymakers from the United States and like-minded nations to address the continuing China trade challenge. Our initial 2015 Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) report on this topic, on which this report is based, is premised on China’s false promises to the WTO. Even with a full-scale Section 301 investigation initiated by the Trump administration, China has made little progress in fulfilling a wide range of its WTO commitments over the past two decades.

Stephen Ezell is vice president, global innovation policy, at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF). He focuses on science and technology policy, international competitiveness, trade, manufacturing, and services issues.

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China’s policies in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea and its ongoing support for Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela pose major challenges for the United States, where bipartisan pressure is growing to ramp up punitive sanctions against leading Chinese firms and financial institutions. Financial sanctions freeze the US assets or bar US entry of the targeted individuals and firms and prohibit US financial firms from doing business with them. Schott explains why US officials should carefully weigh the risks to international financial markets and US economic interests before imposing punitive sanctions on major financial institutions engaged with China. The collateral costs of such sanctions would be sizable, damaging US producers, financial institutions, and US alliances. By restricting access of major banks to international payments in US dollars and barring use of messaging systems like SWIFT, tougher US financial sanctions would effectively “weaponize” the dollar; friends and foes alike would be pushed to seek alternatives to dollar transactions that, over time, would weaken the international role of the dollar. Instead of doubling down on current unilateral financial sanctions, US policy should deploy sanctions in collaboration with allies and calibrate trade and financial controls to match the expected policy achievements.

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