India Archives - WITA http://www.wita.org/atp-research-topics/india/ Tue, 29 Mar 2022 19:41:36 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.6.1 /wp-content/uploads/2018/08/android-chrome-256x256-80x80.png India Archives - WITA http://www.wita.org/atp-research-topics/india/ 32 32 The African Continental Free Trade Area: Opportunities for India /atp-research/african-free-trade-opportunities/ Mon, 07 Feb 2022 20:04:49 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=32195 Unlike in other regions of the world, the value of intra-Africa trade has remained low over the years. Moreover, Africa accounts for just 2 percent of global trade. In 2021,...

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Unlike in other regions of the world, the value of intra-Africa trade has remained low over the years. Moreover, Africa accounts for just 2 percent of global trade. In 2021, African countries launched the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which aims to create a single African market for the free movement of goods, services, labour, and capital, and increase intra-African trade. AfCFTA may be able to provide Indian firms and investors certain opportunities to tap into a larger, unified, and robust African market. This paper outlines those opportunities, and the concomitant challenges that need to be addressed in order for India to integrate with the African economy.

A free trade agreement allows for duty-free trade within a specified area, and members set their own tariffs on imports from non-members. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopts a broader notion that includes non-tariff barriers as well, defining a free trade area as “a grouping of countries within which tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers between the members are generally abolished but with no common trade policy toward non-members.” Countries in geographical proximity often enter into preferential trade agreements that allow member countries outside the boundaries of sovereign nations both market access and non-discriminatory treatment, among other facilities.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example, is a free trade area between the United States (US), Mexico, and Canada; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area is an arrangement between the ten ASEAN member states; the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) is the free trade arrangement of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC); and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is an agreement between 54 out of 55 African Union members.

This paper focuses on the AfCFTA. It outlines the benefits of the AfCFTA and weighs such potential against the challenges. It then discusses how India can harness the potential of the agreement.

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To read the full report by the Observer Research Foundation, please click here.

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EU-India trade relations: assessment and perspectives /atp-research/eu-india-trade-relations/ Fri, 10 Sep 2021 13:31:14 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=30257 Following the EU-India summit in May 2021, talks on both an EU-India trade and an investment agreement have resumed. This analysis provides background on where EU India economic relations stand...

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Following the EU-India summit in May 2021, talks on both an EU-India trade and an investment agreement have resumed. This analysis provides background on where EU India economic relations stand and why it is important to maintain momentum following this breakthrough, despite a somewhat unpromising domestic political environment in India.

This new impetus largely reflects a transformed geopolitical landscape since the last round of EU-India talks were abandoned in 2013. The increased tension between India and China, as well as the EU’s intent to reduce its reliance on Chinese manufacturing have created the conditions for changes in policy by both parties. However, many of the issues that bedeviled the 2007-2013 negotiations remain unresolved. In this analysis, we provide an overview of EU-India trade and investment relations as well as the major topics in these negotiations. The impact of key global initiatives on climate change and WTO reform that will shape the negotiations is also briefly discussed.

Based on this analysis, we discuss three potential ways forward for EU-India trade and investment negotiations: a comprehensive agreement similar to that reached between the EU and Vietnam; a limited investment deal primarily focused on manufacturing; and a reinforced status quo with trade and investment relations growing organically under the existing multilateral umbrella.

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To read the full report from Brugel, please click here.

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Reimagining the US-India trade relationship /atp-research/reimagining-us-india-relationship/ Tue, 06 Jul 2021 22:31:34 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=28864 The United States and India have long striven to maintain and deepen bilateral ties, weathering Cold War tensions and antagonisms over India’s nuclear tests to reinvigorate linkages and strengthen cooperation....

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The United States and India have long striven to maintain and deepen bilateral ties, weathering Cold War tensions and antagonisms over India’s nuclear tests to reinvigorate linkages and strengthen cooperation. Today’s modern US-India relationship continues to develop under a broad-based and multisectoral framework nurtured by common strategic interests and an engaged Indian diaspora in the United States, yet advancements in trade relations have faltered in comparison: though US-India trade has grown steadily, from a mere $16 billion in 1999 to a more robust $146 billion in 2019, long-standing disagreements over critical issues and the lack of structural trade agreements between both countries mar attempts to achieve the full perceived potential of the relationship. Most recent, last year’s failure to conclude even a mini trade deal, in spite of much rhetoric emphasizing its importance, highlights the gulf between trade orientations and negotiating postures in New Delhi and Washington, and is a stark reminder of the challenges and limitations of the present relationship.

This report, each chapter curated by a leading expert and South Asia Center nonresident senior fellow, examines US and Indian trade relations, both bilateral and global, and offers forward-thinking policies to help governments in both countries achieve a deeper trade relationship. The various views and ideas expressed by both Indian and US trade-policy experts and industry leaders present a comprehensive analysis to resolve disagreements and establish a short-, medium-, and long-term framework for cooperation. The first and second sections analyze Indian and US trade negotiations and dialogues, respectively, from the recent past to identify strategies moving forward; the third section offers an overview of the last decade in US-India trade negotiations, illuminating concrete achievements and obstinate hurdles; and the final section identifies low-hanging fruit that negotiations often lose sight of and that offer immediate opportunity to secure wins that could reanimate trade negotiations now that there’s a new US administration in place.

The two governments should: Take an incremental approach focusing on low-hanging fruit and gradually build up to more significant areas of contention; address trade issues head on rather than defer them to prioritize strategic cooperation; recommit to a free trade agreement; and establish the institutional architecture to ensure successful negotiations.

Reimagining-the-US-India-Trade-Relationship

To read the full report from the Atlantic Council, please visit here

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The hard work ahead in improving US-India agricultural trade /atp-research/us-india-ag-trade/ Thu, 14 Jan 2021 19:55:27 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=25853 The United States and India have taken important steps forward in recent years to devote more attention to their trade relationship, which has generally lagged behind the much bigger steps...

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The United States and India have taken important steps forward in recent years to devote more attention to their trade relationship, which has generally lagged behind the much bigger steps pursued in developing their strategic relationship. However, as both countries know well, an alignment of strategic interests does not always translate into comity in trade interests. One might even argue that a mature and healthy strategic relationship should be able to readily weather the storms arising from occasional trade tensions.

Trade in agricultural products is replete with such examples, and might even be the best crucible for pressing national interests while simultaneously cementing and reinforcing shared strategic ones. Simply consider the history of trade disputes over many years between the United States and its European allies. A large number of these involve agricultural trade—from canned peaches in the 1980s to poultry and corn products today. The same is true with Canada, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, and the list goes on.

One should expect that the United States and India are no different. Their strategic relationship blossoms anew with each successive US and Indian administration, yet challenges on trade—specifically agricultural trade—persist and, unfortunately, even fester. Both countries are global agricultural powerhouses, and their respective political sensitivities regarding the economic well-being of farm families are well matched.

That said, one should not conclude that trade tensions over agriculture are necessarily perpetual, or immune to efforts to resolve them. Progress can be made, and achievements, even if hard won, can be infectious by inspiring ambition to do bigger things in the trade relationship. One can even point to prospects for new successes. Although US and Indian trade negotiators did not conclude a “mini-deal” during the Donald Trump administration, they got very close. This was unprecedented, and this progress bodes well for negotiations to resume—and soon be concluded—during the Joe Biden administration. Agricultural trade is a key component of this potential deal, and success can offer an important step forward in increasing bilateral agriculture trade that offers mutual and reciprocal benefits.

However, not all engagement on agriculture trade necessarily requires transactional negotiations. While negotiations (and sometimes dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO)) may be unavoidable for the most intractable problems, there can also be plenty of opportunities for more cooperative approaches. In fact, this issue paper sets out arguments for this kind of approach—to complement the short-, medium-, and long-term efforts to negotiate bigger and more comprehensive trade deals in the future—and a brief roadmap of recommendations for pursuing cooperative successes. While trade negotiators will continue to be stuck with the hard, dirty work of hammering out trade agreements that can help better integrate national economies and provide economic ballast to broader strategic relationships, technical experts can accomplish quite a lot in parallel to encourage and facilitate increased agricultural trade; again, this is in the mutual interests of both countries.

To read the rest of the report by the Atlantic Council, please click here

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NATURE AND NURTURE: HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION CAN ADVANCE TIES WITH INDIA /atp-research/biden-india/ Tue, 05 Jan 2021 19:08:03 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=25804 SUMMARY The state of the U.S.-India relationship is strong, but two critical developments in 2020 have created a new inflection point for the relationship. Growing apprehension in both New Delhi...

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SUMMARY

The state of the U.S.-India relationship is strong, but two critical developments in 2020 have created a new inflection point for the relationship. Growing apprehension in both New Delhi and Washington about Chinese aggression has created the strategic convergence long sought by a U.S. defense establishment eager to enlist India to balance China. On the other hand, devastated by the Covid-19 global pandemic, the United States and India face challenging economic recoveries amid growing protectionist sentiments at home that could diminish the relationship’s promise. Having won the U.S. presidential election, Joe Biden has an opportunity to consolidate and accelerate the relationship by creating a substantive and broad partnership with India, which can undergird U.S. policy in Asia and support U.S. global interests for decades to come. This paper provides a blueprint for how the Biden administration can actualize what previous presidents have deemed a “natural partnership.”

AMID DISCORD, SEEDS OF A NATURAL PARTNERSHIP

Speaking at the Asia Society’s headquarters in New York in September 1998, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee deemed the United States and India “natural allies.” Both his message and timing were provocative. India’s leader was framing the relationship in lustrous terms at a time when bilateral ties had hit rock bottom. Months earlier, India had scandalized the world by conducting its first nuclear tests since 1974. The international community swiftly denounced the tests, and the United States, which had not been given advance warning by the Vajpayee government, imposed heavy sanctions on India.

While an official alliance had always been out of the question, nuclear policy had become an impediment even to a natural partnership. The previous months had been characterized by acrimony because of India’s nuclear decision and U.S. fears that India’s actions would spark a dangerous nuclear arms race in South Asia – this was borne out within 15 days of India’s tests when Pakistan conducted tests of its own. The two South Asian rivals fought each other the next year in the Kargil War, forcing the United States into intensive shuttle diplomacy to prevent a full-scale conflict.

Strange as they may have seemed at the time, Vajpayee’s words would prove prescient. The prime minister was cognizant of the structural and institutional forces that made a convergence between the United States and India inevitable. One was strategic (China’s rise), the other economic (India’s growth story), and at the base was a foundation of shared democratic values.

A new generation of U.S. policymakers was also receptive to these possibilities. In March 2000, Bill Clinton became the first U.S. president to visit India since Jimmy Carter in 1978. His visit led to the kind of reset in the bilateral relationship that Vajpayee had sought. Twenty years later, the U.S.- India relationship is stronger than it has ever been. Bilateral trade in goods and services has increased from $16 billion in 1999 to $149 billion in 2019 when India was the ninth-largest U.S. trading partner, while India’s Ministry of Commerce deemed the United States its largest trading partner. Cultural and people-to-people ties between the two nations, driven by the vibrant Indian American community in the United States, are multifaceted and deep. For instance, the number of Indian students in the United States has grown from 81,000 in 2008 to “a record high of 202,000 in 2019.” And in an otherwise polarized country, both major U.S. political parties support strengthening ties with India.

Now as the United States is set to embark on the administration of Joseph R. Biden Jr., the relationship is facing new tests. Biden, who deemed India a “natural partner” on the campaign trail, will have the task of upgrading a mature relationship already in robust shape at a time of new global dynamics and challenges. A growing convergence between the views of New Delhi and Washington regarding Beijing will continue to facilitate a strong security partnership. At the same time, the coronavirus pandemic has devastated both economies and strengthened support for economic nationalism, which may impede

stronger commercial cooperation and the two nations’ ability to take on China. Moreover, a further weakening of democratic norms in India could raise difficult questions for the United States.

This paper seeks to outline the competing pressures currently shaping U.S.-India ties and provides a blueprint for how the next U.S. administration can substantially advance the partnership, nurturing what Vajpayee, more than 20 years ago, and Biden today consider “natural.” To advance U.S.-India ties to the next level, a Biden administration will need to

• Expand the scope of the relationship to elevate health, digital, and climate cooperation.

• Turn the page to a positive commercial agenda that emphasizes reform and openness.

• Renew U.S. leadership and regional consultation in the face of China’s rise.

• Emphasize shared values as the foundation of the relationship.

Anubhav Gupta is an associate director with the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) in New York. He develops and coordinates ASPI’s initiatives and research related to South Asia, with a particular focus on India.

To view the full paper, please click here

Nature and Nurture_How the Biden Administration Can Advance Ties with India

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Moving Beyond COVID-19: Vaccines and Other Policy Considerations in Latin America /atp-research/policy-considerations-la/ Fri, 04 Dec 2020 18:00:11 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=25499 Trade For much of the region with limited manufacturing capacity, trade will be the most realistic pathway to meeting domestic vaccine needs during the current crisis. Even for major vaccine...

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Trade

For much of the region with limited manufacturing capacity, trade will be the most realistic pathway to meeting domestic vaccine needs during the current crisis. Even for major vaccine producers in Latin America, trade is of paramount importance. Vaccines are a highly complex compound involving numerous ingredients and stages of production. Few countries in the world possess all the necessary specializations and basic materials to produce a competitive and fully “local” vaccine. A made-in-Latin-America vaccine could entail active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) from China or formulation development in India, as well as adjuvants from Chile processed in Sweden. The import of intermediate goods is critical to the seamless production and assembly of final goods (vaccines) used for domestic consumption or export.

Given the globalized nature of vaccine manufacturing, governments in Latin America and beyond must ensure unimpeded trade flows across borders. Protectionist temptations can be hard to resist amidst global shortages, especially for countries with greater vaccine self-sufficiency. But these measures rarely pan out as desired and could result in dire regional and global consequences, including an unfortunate scenario of “vaccine nationalism.”

The breakdown of global trade in medical supplies earlier this year provided a fresh reminder of the still-present risks of protectionism. In March and April, for instance, eighty countries imposed export restrictions on medical supplies and equipment. This included at least seven countries in Latin America and the Caribbean region, as well as the world’s top three suppliers [China, the United States, and the European Union (EU)], which collectively account for 68.2 percent of regional imports of these critical goods. To protect lives and livelihoods, vicious cycles of commercial isolationism and retaliation must be avoided at all costs.

Specifically, Latin American and Caribbean policymakers can take actions to tackle shared challenges in trade on at least three levels. First, several viable quick wins exist at the national level. Governments should bring down two-way trade barriers on essential medical products and inputs, including import tariffs and export restrictions. Trade facilitation can reduce additional nontariff barriers through streamlined customs procedures and border crossings, electronic filing, expedited certifications and licensing, etc. Brazil, for instance, suspended anti-dumping and simplified administrative processes for import and export licensing of PPE and medical devices. Similar measures should be upheld to safeguard the trade of vaccines, as well as therapeutics, and other lifesaving products and services.

Second, international coordination between governments can further galvanize and amplify country-level actions. The Joint Ministerial Statement to ensure supply chain connectivity amidst the COVID-19 situation, initiated by Singapore and New Zealand in March, is an example to follow. As of July, ten other countries, including China, have joined the initiative, pledging their commitment to keep trade lines open for essential goods. Two Latin American countries, Chile and Uruguay, have also signed on.

Similarly, multilateral fora such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and regional integration processes such as Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance are other potential avenues to crowd in best trade practices. APEC members, including three Latin American countries, have issued at least three official declarations on trade facilitation. The Pacific Alliance is playing a critical role in trade policy coordination in Latin America and internationally through its COVID-19 Action Plan and ASEAN-Pacific Alliance Work Plan.

Third, collaboration between the public and private sectors is imperative. Delayed arrivals and departures of essential goods can be costly, especially for time-sensitive products like vaccines. Most vaccines are transported in refrigerated (or frozen) conditions and have limited room temperature shelf life, e.g., between two to twelve hours for Pfizer and Moderna’s COVID-19 vaccines. Even before COVID-19 disruptions, in 2019, the average time to clear exports through customs in Latin America and the Caribbean region was eight days; the average time associated with border compliance for imports was 2.3 days. Accelerating clearance can be achieved through efficient prioritization, nonintrusive inspection, digitization, etc. In addition, airports, seaports, and border authorities should work closely with logistics companies, vaccine producers, and various types of Authorized Economic Operators (importers, brokers, warehouses, and others). New requirements, processes, schedules, or contingent plans that may arise during the pandemic must be communicated clearly and promptly.

Another key area of public-private collaboration in trade is “hard” infrastructure. Enhanced interconnectivity can revitalize regional exports and intra-regional trade, benefitting pharmaceutical and many other supply chains in Latin America, making them more competitive. A 1 percent reduction in transport costs—achievable through infrastructure improvements—could boost overall manufacturing exports between 2 percent and 7.8 percent in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, reduced shipping costs and time benefit not only regional vaccine acquisition and production, but in-country distribution of the vaccines and treatments. 

To read the full brief, click here.

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Pepe Zhang is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

© 2020 The Atlantic Council of the United States.

 

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Understanding the Impact of GSP Withdrawal on India’s Top Exports to the US /atp-research/gsp-withdrawal-india-us/ Wed, 12 Aug 2020 22:03:48 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=22692 This brief analyses the impacts of the withdrawal of the United States’ Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programme on India’s exports, domestic production and employment. Until 5 June 2019, when...

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This brief analyses the impacts of the withdrawal of the United States’
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programme on India’s exports, domestic
production and employment. Until 5 June 2019, when the GSP withdrawal came into
effect, India was the largest beneficiary of the GSP of which it had been part since 1974.
A decline in exports to the US was anticipated as items under zero-tariff rate were
subjected to a higher rate after withdrawal of GSP. This brief conducts a sectoral analysis
of the top nine Indian exports to the US and shows that six out of them were unaffected
by the GSP withdrawal. Indeed, exports in the Electrical machinery sector grew. The
brief recommends reinstating GSP foreign trade policies instead of putting retaliatory
tariffs on US products.

ORF GSP Withdrawal

Shriya Chauhan is a consultant at the World Bank

To view the original report, please click here.

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Assessing Indian digital trade policies: Will they support a $5 trillion economy? /atp-research/assessing-indian-digital-trade-policies/ Tue, 30 Jun 2020 16:19:38 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=21577 The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has forced nearly all public policy questions to be seen through the lens of how to detect and respond to the disease as it spreads rapidly...

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The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has forced nearly all public policy questions to be seen through the lens of how to detect and respond to the disease as it spreads rapidly across the globe. These include obvious questions of national health care policy and whether there is a place for international efforts to coordinate their national responses. Trade policy has come to the fore as a growing number of countries restrict exports of critical medical supplies to ensure sufficient availability for patients in-country. In this crisis, international collaboration to keep trade flowing has been limited and has not prevented many countries from imposing new trade restrictions.

The importance of digital policies has grown as countries seek to harness the tools of big data, artificial intelligence (AI), and vital infrastructure to trace outbreaks of the virus and assist efforts to find cures and vaccines. While digital tools are proving vital in efforts to track outbreaks and trace contacts, legitimate concerns are growing about potentially invasive government surveillance even after the virus retreats.

These policy areas—health, trade, and digital—overlap in the international, national, and local efforts to reduce the duration of the pandemic and mitigate its effects with respect to human lives and economic well-being.

The analysis in this paper, while initially conducted before anyone had ever heard of COVID-19, has been impacted by its sudden emergence and will likely require updating to assess the experiences of this ongoing crisis. The paper, which focuses on the U.S.-India bilateral relationship, concludes with a series of questions, as opposed to policy recommendations. This is due partly to the very complexity that all governments confront in mapping out digital policies given the ubiquitous role digital networks and devices play in our daily lives. But these questions may have even more tangible relevance now that COVID-19 is forcing a reckoning with a severe interruption in global economic growth, which could be on the scale of the Great Depression in the 1930s. Ultimately, the governments of India, the United States, and other nations will determine for themselves what answers are relevant to their individual circumstances.

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Mark Linscott is a Nonresident Senior Fellow in the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council. 

To view the original report, click here.

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RCEP & India: Weighing the benefits of regionalism /atp-research/rcep-india/ Wed, 09 Oct 2019 18:36:59 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=17712 Ongoing discussions on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) include the ASEAN10 bloc (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) together with its six FTA partners –...

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Ongoing discussions on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) include the ASEAN10 bloc (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) together with its six FTA partners – India, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Since the US withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement in 2017, the Asia Pacific bloc has been keen to expedite the RCEP as a viable alternative for global trade with lower trade barriers. Plans were conceptualized in 2012 and found a renewed vigour in the past two years. Trade ministers are due to meet in Bangkok on October 10-12, with plans to conclude negotiations by the ASEAN summit meeting in November.

Push and pull factors to join the RCEP

With trade conflicts and protectionist policies dominating the narrative, multilateral free trade agreements reinforce benefits from a wider market access and enjoy preferential or lower trade barriers. Cumulatively, the bloc accounts for a third of the world GDP, half the world’s population, a quarter of world trade and nominal GDP surpassing the US. Once completed, the agreement is expected to lower trade and non-tariff hurdles, liberalize service trade, ease part of regulatory hurdles in regional trade and improve investor protection, amongst others.

There are also push factors. Better market access to other countries could help offset slowing domestic growth, just as the trade environment gets more challenging. This will a window to deploy excess domestic capacity, improve resource utilization and provide a leg-up for the exporting community.

India’s negotiating position has emerged as a challenge, particularly due to its stance that it has witnessed limited benefits from prior trade agreements.

India’s concerns

Reticence to participate in trade agreements on a broader note has been on three grounds: a) For RCEP, India already runs a trade deficit with all the member countries. China single-handedly makes up ~60% of the total; b) previous FTAs have not materially improved India’s trade math; c) certain unfavourable provisions have turned to be sticking points.

Negotiations are ongoing, challenges but benefits aplenty

While being a part of the RCEP carries challenges but it will also open India and rest of the proposed members to numerous opportunities. The early phase of adjustment will be an uphill task as few import tariffs will have to be dismantled, leading to higher competition from imports and in turn hurting export competitiveness. Opportunity cost of non-participation is significant as multilateral trade agreements will help improve India’s integration to the global supply chains and market access opportunities.

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