Foreign Aid Archives - WITA /atp-research-topics/foreign-aid/ Tue, 08 Dec 2020 19:49:59 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.6.1 /wp-content/uploads/2018/08/android-chrome-256x256-80x80.png Foreign Aid Archives - WITA /atp-research-topics/foreign-aid/ 32 32 DFC’s Roadmap for Impact /atp-research/dfcs-roadmap-for-impact/ Thu, 22 Oct 2020 14:43:13 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=24295 Through the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the U.S. Government (USG) accelerates the flow of private capital to less developed countries by supporting private sector investments that cannot obtain...

The post DFC’s Roadmap for Impact appeared first on WITA.

]]>
Through the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the U.S. Government (USG) accelerates the flow of private capital to less developed countries by supporting private sector investments that cannot obtain financing from other sources. This support is essential to advancing key sectors, such as infrastructure, agriculture, and health, which improve the quality of life for millions and lay the groundwork for modern, inclusive, and sustainable economies. Equipped with new financial tools, DFC has the flexibility to catalyze private capital to spur development, advance U.S. foreign policy, and generate returns for the American taxpayer—a triple impact.

DFC’s Roadmap for Impact (Roadmap) takes into account global development needs to establish portfolio-wide development priorities. The Roadmap identifies opportunities to increase private investment in low-income countries (LIC) and lower middle-income countries (LMIC)—targeting 60 percent of total portfolio projects in LICs, LMICs or fragile states. It also recognizes the importance of supporting projects that are significantly developmental or that target the most vulnerable populations in upper middle-income countries (UMICs). In addition, the Roadmap defines priority cross-cutting development themes and sectors, and it establishes investment goals and development metrics in order to focus DFC’s investment activities and measure our progress.

The Roadmap outlines capabilities and resources that are required to achieve these development goals, with an emphasis on enhanced coordination within DFC and across USG initiatives, departments and agencies, development finance institutions (DFIs), international financial institutions (IFIs), and other members of the development community. It also emphasizes the importance of transparency and enhanced social and environmental standards in the design and sustainable execution of DFC-supported projects in order to demonstrate that the U.S.-led model of development advances the best interests of Americans, host countries, and the planet whenever we invest.

The Roadmap does not reflect an exhaustive list of the sectors where DFC invests; rather, it focuses on sectors where DFC investments and technical assistance can have the greatest, measurable development impact over the next five years. Working closely with newly created U.S. Embassy deal teams, particularly with the Departments of State’s and Commerce’s DC Central Deal Team, as well as with DFC liaisons at U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) missions worldwide, DFC can expand its client base and broaden the markets it serves. It will not be easy; and it will require additional resources, private capital to invest alongside, changes to processes, and patience. But DFC is committed to prioritizing the most highly developmental projects in the most underserved communities worldwide.

To download the full report, please click here.

DFC's Roadmap for Impact

The post DFC’s Roadmap for Impact appeared first on WITA.

]]>
Should the United States Create a West Bank/Gaza Enterprise Fund (WGEF)? /atp-research/should-the-united-states-create-a-west-bank-gaza-enterprise-fund-wgef/ Thu, 30 Jul 2020 17:08:12 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=22344 It is in the interest of the United States to explore the creation of an enterprise fund for the West Bank and Gaza as part of its continuing efforts to...

The post Should the United States Create a West Bank/Gaza Enterprise Fund (WGEF)? appeared first on WITA.

]]>
It is in the interest of the United States to explore the creation of an enterprise fund for the West Bank and Gaza as part of its continuing efforts to foster peace and prosperity in the Middle East. With the growth of joint Israeli-Palestinian ventures and people-to-people exchanges facilitated by an enterprise fund, the United States can create the common entrepreneurial ground on which a more robust peace process can stand. The spread of Covid-19 has shuttered schools and businesses and limited public gatherings in places such as markets, increasing the financial stress felt by many in the region. The pandemic has also exacerbated youth unemployment, which now stands at 42 percent, illustrating there is an acute need for social and economic opportunities. Post-COVID-19, employment prospects may more easily improve if, alongside a lightening of the political climate, there is greater access to capital. The deployment of innovative financial instruments to spur private sector growth can prompt dramatic socioeconomic changes in the West Bank and Gaza.

20730_Runde_US_WGEF_V5_FINAL

To view the full report at CSIS, please click here

 

The post Should the United States Create a West Bank/Gaza Enterprise Fund (WGEF)? appeared first on WITA.

]]>
A global strategy for shaping the post-COVID-19 World /atp-research/a-global-strategy-for-shaping-the-post-covid-19-world/ Tue, 07 Jul 2020 21:56:26 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=21801 The COVID-19 pandemic is an acute public health and economic crisis that is further destabilizing an already weakened rules-based international system. With cooperation, determination, and resolve, however, the United States...

The post A global strategy for shaping the post-COVID-19 World appeared first on WITA.

]]>
The COVID-19 pandemic is an acute public health and economic crisis that is further destabilizing an already weakened rules-based international system. With cooperation, determination, and resolve, however, the United States and its allies can recover from the crisis and revitalize an adapted rules-based system to bring about decades of future freedom, peace, and prosperity.

AC-A-Global-Strategy-for-Shaping-the-Post-COVID-19-World

To view the full report, please click here

 

The post A global strategy for shaping the post-COVID-19 World appeared first on WITA.

]]>
Global Trade Update /atp-research/global-trade-update/ Wed, 10 Jun 2020 18:05:19 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=21127 While world trade was already slowing down prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the economic and social disruptions brought by COVID-19 are resulting in a dramatic decline in trade. The value...

The post Global Trade Update appeared first on WITA.

]]>

While world trade was already slowing down prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the economic and social disruptions brought by COVID-19 are resulting in a dramatic decline in trade. The value of international trade in goods has declined by about 5 percent in Q1 2020 and is expected to decline further by 27 percent in Q2 2020.

ditcmisc2020d2_en

To read the original report, click here

The post Global Trade Update appeared first on WITA.

]]>
A Crisis Like No Other, An Uncertain Recovery /atp-research/a-crisis-like-no-other-an-uncertain-recovery/ Mon, 01 Jun 2020 16:20:25 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=21832 Global growth is projected at –4.9 percent in 2020, 1.9 percentage points below the April 2020 World Economic Outlook (WEO) forecast. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a more negative impact...

The post A Crisis Like No Other, An Uncertain Recovery appeared first on WITA.

]]>
Global growth is projected at –4.9 percent in 2020, 1.9 percentage points below the April 2020 World Economic Outlook (WEO) forecast. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a more negative impact on activity in the first half of 2020 than anticipated, and the recovery is projected to be more gradual than previously forecast. In 2021 global growth is projected at 5.4 percent. Overall, this would leave 2021 GDP some 6½ percentage points lower than in the pre-COVID-19 projections of January 2020. The adverse impact on low-income households is particularly acute, imperiling the significant progress made in reducing extreme poverty in the world since the 1990s.

As with the April 2020 WEO projections, there is a higher-than-usual degree of uncertainty around this forecast. The baseline projection rests on key assumptions about the fallout from the pandemic. In economies with declining infection rates, the slower recovery path in the updated forecast reflects persistent social distancing into the second half of 2020; greater scarring (damage to supply potential) from the larger-than-anticipated hit to activity during the lockdown in the first and second quarters of 2020; and a hit to productivity as surviving businesses ramp up necessary workplace safety and hygiene practices. For economies struggling to control infection rates, a lengthier lockdown will inflict an additional toll on activity. Moreover, the forecast assumes that financial conditions—which have eased following the release of the April 2020 WEO—will remain broadly at current levels. Alternative outcomes to those in the baseline are clearly possible, and not just because of how the pandemic is evolving. The extent of the recent rebound in financial market sentiment appears disconnected from shifts in underlying economic prospects—as the June 2020 Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) Update discusses—raising the possibility that financial conditions may tighten more than assumed in the baseline.

All countries—including those that have seemingly passed peaks in infections—should ensure that their health care systems are adequately resourced. The international community must vastly step up its support of national initiatives, including through financial assistance to countries with limited health care capacity and channeling of funding for vaccine production as trials advance, so that adequate, affordable doses are quickly available to all countries. Where lockdowns are required, economic policy should continue to cushion household income losses with sizable, well-targeted measures as well as provide support to firms suffering the consequences of mandated restrictions on activity. Where economies are reopening, targeted support should be gradually unwound as the recovery gets underway, and policies should provide stimulus to lift demand and ease and incentivize the reallocation of resources away from sectors likely to emerge persistently smaller after the pandemic.

Strong multilateral cooperation remains essential on multiple fronts. Liquidity assistance is urgently needed for countries confronting health crises and external funding shortfalls, including through debt relief and financing through the global financial safety net. Beyond the pandemic, policymakers must cooperate to resolve trade and technology tensions that endanger an eventual recovery from the COVID-19 crisis. Furthermore, building on the record drop in greenhouse gas emissions during the pandemic, policymakers should both implement their climate change mitigation commitments and work together to scale up equitably designed carbon taxation or equivalent schemes. The global community must act now to avoid a repeat of this catastrophe by building global stockpiles of essential supplies and protective equipment, funding research and supporting public health systems, and putting in place effective modalities for delivering relief to the neediest.

WEOENG202006

To view the full report at IMF, please click here

The post A Crisis Like No Other, An Uncertain Recovery appeared first on WITA.

]]>
Sudan and Trade Integrity /atp-research/sudan-and-trade-integrity/ Sun, 31 May 2020 00:00:36 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=20740 Global Financial Integrity (GFI) has produced a comprehensive report, estimating the magnitude of trade misinvoicing since 2012 with a particular focus on the crucially important crude oil and gold sectors,...

The post Sudan and Trade Integrity appeared first on WITA.

]]>

Global Financial Integrity (GFI) has produced a comprehensive report, estimating the magnitude of trade misinvoicing since 2012 with a particular focus on the crucially important crude oil and gold sectors, given that these two commodities accounted for nearly half (47 percent) of Sudan’s exports by value in 2017. GFI also completed a regulatory and legal analysis of Sudan’s oil and gold sectors and has provided policy recommendations for all three areas of research.

Findings

1. TRADE MISINVOICING

Using data from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), GFI conducted a value gap analysis to detect trade misinvoicing related to Sudan’s global trade transactions. A value gap is the difference in value between what any two countries report in a bilateral trade exchange. For example, if Sudan reported US$46 million in exports to France in 2018, but France reported US$66 million in imports from Sudan in that same year, this would reflect a mismatch, or a value gap, of US$20 million. Value gaps are indicative of trade misinvoicing, which is used to move money or value out of one country and into another, as well as to evade value-added tax and customs duties.

The GFI trade value gap analysis found:

  • Of the 374 bilateral trade relationships between Sudan and 70 of its trading partners examined between 2012-2018, which had a total reported value of US$65.0 billion (as reported by Sudan), GFI identified an estimated US$30.9 billion in value gaps.
  • These estimated value gaps were equal to nearly 50 percent of Sudan’s total trade during this period with the 70 trading partners.
  • The estimated revenue loss related to the value gaps for this period could potentially be as much as US$5.7 billion.
  • Ethiopia was among the top ten trading countries with the highest value gaps as a percentage of total trade with Sudan in all seven of the years studied, while Japan was among the top ten in six of the seven years examined.
2. SECTOR ANALYSIS – TRADE IN CRUDE OIL

Although petroleum exports have decreased in prominence since the secession of South Sudan
in 2011, oil is still one of Sudan’s primary generators of foreign currency. Post-secession, crude oil exports account for 11 to 64 percent of Sudan’s exports each year and Sudan was the world’s 42nd largest producer of crude oil in 2018. Using data from the Foreign Trade Statistical Digest (issued quarterly by the Central Bank of Sudan) and the United Nations Comtrade database, GFI conducted a trade gap analysis on the Sudanese crude oil sector, finding large discrepancies between reported levels of exported crude oil by Sudan, compared with reported imports of Sudanese oil by its trading partners:

  • Over the seven-year period 2012-2018, Sudan reported exports of 62.3 million barrels, while the country’s trading partners reported imports of 112.2 million barrels; a volume gap of 49.9 million barrels and equivalent to 80.1 percent of Sudan’s declared export volume.
  • In terms of value, Sudan reported exports valued at US$4.8 billion during the seven-year period, while in comparison its trading partners reported imports of US$8.9 billion; a value gap of US$4.1 billion and equal to 85.4 percent of Sudan’s declared exports by value.

Cumulatively, this gap in reported trade is indicative of large revenue losses to the Government of Sudan:

  • Assuming a conservative royalty rate of 12.5 percent along with the country’s corporate income tax rate of 35 percent, the Government could have lost nearly US$2 billion dollars between 2012 and 2018. This represents an average annual loss of US$279.4 million; more than three times the amount (US$89.3 million) the Government spent on social benefits in 2017.
3. REGULATORY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS – SUDANESE CRUDE OIL SECTOR

GFI identified a number of regulatory vacuums in Sudan’s legal and regulatory governance of the crude oil sector:

  • The governance architecture of the oil sector remains problematic, with no clear separation between the commercial and non-commercial roles of the Ministry of Petroleum and Gas and the Sudan Petroleum Company Limited, or Sudapet, the national oil company. This in turn raises the risk of regulatory capture.
  • In awarding oil licenses, there is a marked lack of transparency and clarity in the licensing process and the awarding of concessions. This raises the risk of political interference and involvement of politically-exposed persons (PEPs) in both the national and sub-national levels of the crude oil supply chain.
  • Sudan continues to have problems with accurately reporting export volumes. This is an impediment to understanding the size, scale and loss of revenues through trade misinvoicing from the sector and prescribing policy initiatives for other parts of the economy.
  • There is an absence of any guidelines on corporate board governance for Sudan’s state-owned enterprises, which has adversely affected the independence and oversight authority of its institutions.
  • The absence of any procedure or rules on criteria for entities involved in purchasing commodities from the crude oil sector weakens the integrity of the supply chain.
  • The ownership structure of Sudan’s state-owned enterprises, specifically Sudapet’s subsidiaries, remain unclear, raising legitimate concerns about private ownership with PEP affiliations.

Such regulatory and legal gaps undermine the trade integrity of Sudan’s crude oil sector, resulting in critical revenue and resource losses to the Government of Sudan.

Sudan-Report-2020_FINAL
4. SECTOR ANALYSIS – TRADE IN GOLD

Following the secession of South Sudan – which controls a majority of the oil fields in the region – in 2011, the Government of Sudan turned to gold as a way to diversify its exports. Gold production in Sudan subsequently increased by 141 percent between 2012-2017 and by 2018 Sudan became the twelfth largest producer of gold in the world. Using data from the Central Bank of Sudan’s quarterly Foreign Trade Statistical Digests and Comtrade, GFI conducted a trade volume gap analysis, again finding large discrepancies in the quantity and value of exported gold between Sudan and its trading partners:

  • Between 2012-2018, the Central Bank of Sudan reported 205,446 kilograms of gold exports, whereas the country’s trading partners reported 404,732 kilograms of gold imports, creating a volume gap of 199,286 kilograms (200 tons) of gold, equivalent to 97 percent of Sudan’s declared gold exports by volume.
  • Correspondingly, the total value gap equaled nearly US$4.1 billion, with the Central Bank of Sudan reporting gold exports of US$8.6 billion and its trading partners reporting gold imports from Sudan valued at US$12.7 billion; the value gap is equal to 47.7 percent of Sudan’s reported gold exports by value.

The value gap is most likely due to the unrecorded export of Sudanese gold, representing potentially significant financial losses to the Government of Sudan:

  • With a value gap of US$4.1 billion, and using annual royalty rates paid by gold producers, there was an estimated potential revenue loss of US$575.2 million for the Government of Sudan over the period 2012-2018, which could cover the cost of thousands of additional teachers in a country where the average person receives only eight years of education.
5. REGULATORY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS – SUDANESE GOLD SECTOR

GFI identified a number of regulatory vacuums in Sudan’s legal and regulatory governance of the gold sector:

  • A lack of clear procedures regarding traditional land ownership and the awarding of concession and exploration rights to large (often foreign) mining companies has led to conflict, tension and the development of informal mining sites within the boundaries of awarded concession sites.
  • There is no clear evidence that the Government of Sudan has comprehensive understanding of the amount and location of all of its available natural resources. This puts the Government at a disadvantage in negotiating concession or exploratory contracts with foreign companies.
  • An absence of robust land registry records and ownership information hinders efforts at financial transparency and understanding of who owns what and for how much.
  • A lack of clearly delineated roles between the Ministry of Minerals and the Sudanese Company for Mineral Resources suggests that the investment and profit making role of the government is clearly intertwined with its regulatory and oversight roles. This coupled with the high risk of participation of PEPs in all levels of the supply chain undermines overall trade integrity, and also institutional independence.
  • In awarding mining rights, there is a lack of transparency in negotiations, bidding processes and the awarding of contracts. Political interference and collusion between bidders and government officials is known to take place and there is an absence of an open and competitive bidding process. Additionally, the governance architecture fosters monopolies, collusion and the entry of PEPs.
  • During extraction operations, there are ill-designed local content regulations, poor enforcement of regulations at the national and sub-national levels, insufficient due diligence on intermediaries and consultants, and poor record keeping, among other risk factors.
  • In analyzing trade financing and export processes, there is inadequate enforcement of the customs clearance process, a weak technical capacity to conduct counter trade-based money laundering supervision, weak cross-border exchange of information, poor record keeping regarding production, imports and exports, inadequate financing in the formal financial sector, and a poor enactment of anti-money laundering obligations regarding private entities in export processing.

Altogether, these regulatory and legal gaps undermine the trade integrity of Sudan’s gold sector, resulting in direct revenue and resource losses to the Government of Sudan while illicit trade and mining activity continues unabated.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

GFI recommends that sufficient funding be allocated to implement the following legal, regulatory and policy suggestions to bolster and strengthen the trade integrity of Sudan:

  • Prioritize and dedicate resources to the enforcement of Article 198 and 199 of the Sudan Customs Act, 1986. This is critical to combating the significant revenue leakages from Sudan’s high value export areas of agriculture and minerals.
  • The Sudan Customs Authority should conduct a risk assessment of its free trade zones as a source and conduit of trade misinvoicing and smuggling across different routes and different commodities. This should be done with specific reference to commodities like gold that are high value and high risk.
  • Establish multi-agency teams to address customs fraud, tax evasion and other financial crimes.
  • Implement commercially available risk assessment tools at the Sudan Customs Authority to detect trade misinvoicing of imports.
  • Establish a public beneficial ownership registry.

Additionally, GFI recommends the Government of Sudan implement the following policies to reduce risks in the Sudanese gold and oil sector:

  • Commit Sudan to reforming its extractive industry standards in line with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Africa Mining Vision.
  • Create greater disclosure of information on contracts, bidding, procurements processes and the stake of the Sudanese government in concession agreements.
  • Amend the Petroleum Wealth Act, 1998 (PWA) and the Mineral Wealth and Mining Development Act, 2015 (MWMDA) to require that all legal entities subject to their provisions disclose their beneficial owner.
  • Mandate that all public officials involved in the implementation of the provisions of the PWA and the MWMDA are not permitted to hold any financial or ownership interest in any legal entity involved in the extractives sector.
  • Adopt a whole-of-government approach towards regulating the extractives sector, with participation from all relevant ministries to flag risks of fraud and tax evasion and formulate policy accordingly.
  • Carry out a risk assessment of the extractives sector to identify the threats, vulnerabilities and criminal activities observed and design a risk-based policy mechanism that will enhance the regulatory approach.
  • Involve multi-stakeholder groups, including civil society, in risk assessment and re-formulation of the legislative framework around extractives.

To view the full report, please click here

The post Sudan and Trade Integrity appeared first on WITA.

]]>
U.S. Foreign Policy for the Middle Class: Perspectives from Nebraska /atp-research/foreign-policy-middle-class-nebraska/ Thu, 21 May 2020 01:33:51 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=20459 Nebraskans across the state in rural and urban areas alike said international trade is the top U.S. foreign policy area that impacts the state, their communities, and their ability to...

The post U.S. Foreign Policy for the Middle Class: Perspectives from Nebraska appeared first on WITA.

]]>
Nebraskans across the state in rural and urban areas alike said international trade is the top U.S. foreign policy area that impacts the state, their communities, and their ability to earn a living, with immigration policy a close second. The perceptions and economic data summarized in the report reflect more unity than division over trade policy and other foreign policy areas and show what the state has to gain from interacting with the global economy.

USFP_Nebraska_full_final-3

U.S. foreign policy has not come up often in the 2020 presidential campaign. But when it has, candidates on both sides of the aisle frequently have stressed that U.S. foreign policy should not only keep the American people safe but also deliver more tangible economic benefits for the country’s middle class. The debate among the presidential contenders is not if that should happen but how to make it happen.

All too often, this debate takes place within relatively small circles within Washington, DC, without the benefit of input from state and local officials, small business owners, community leaders, local labor representatives, and others on the front lines of addressing the challenges facing middle-class households. That is why the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace convened a bipartisan task force in late 2017 to lift up such voices and inject them into the ongoing debate. The task force partnered with university researchers to study the perceived and measurable economic effects of U.S. foreign policy on three politically and economically different states in the nation’s heartland—Colorado, Nebraska, and Ohio. The first two reports on Ohio and Colorado were published in December 2018 and November 2019, respectively. This third report on Nebraska has been prepared in partnership with a team of researchers at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln (UNL).

To gauge perceptions of how Nebraska’s middle class is faring and the ways in which U.S. foreign policy might fit in, the Carnegie and UNL research teams reviewed household surveys and conducted individual interviews and focus groups, between July and August 2019, with over 130 Nebraskans in Columbus, Scottsbluff/Gering, Kearney, Lincoln, North Platte, and Omaha.

While those interviewed expressed many different opinions on a broad range of topics, several opinions were repeated often in rural and urban areas alike, in strikingly similar terms.

Prior to the outbreak of COVID-19, the disease caused by the new coronavirus, there was widespread confidence about the state of the U.S. and Nebraska economies but also deep anxiety about how hard it is for working families to sustain a middle-class lifestyle. Virtually everyone interviewed for this study welcomed the low rate of unemployment. They stressed that help wanted signs could be seen throughout the state and that anyone who wanted a job likely could find one. However, like people across Colorado and Ohio, Nebraskans also regularly report mounting financial anxieties about the rising costs of healthcare, education, and housing, in addition to other local concerns more specific to Nebraska: high property taxes, the rampant rate at which retail stores are closing, extreme flooding, and farm consolidation.

There is a lack of information about the U.S. role in the world. As in Colorado and Ohio, working families in Nebraska often find it difficult to determine how their economic interests are affected by most U.S. foreign policies, especially if they are not working in an area that is heavily dependent on what happens overseas. They are focused on their day jobs and meeting their daily expenses. And even when they do pay more attention to the country’s foreign policy, it is difficult to know what to believe amid such politically biased and divisive commentary from media outlets.

There is an erosion of trust in foreign policy professionals (and in the federal government generally). Also similar to Colorado and Ohio, doubts abound in Nebraska that foreign policy professionals in Washington, DC, truly understand the economic realities confronting middle-income households or that they prioritize these realities in the development of U.S. foreign policies.

International trade policy is viewed as the most important aspect of U.S. foreign policy for Nebraska’s middle class, particularly due to its impact on the agricultural production complex. The message was remarkably consistent: the more international trade the better. Nebraskans’ interests on trade seem to be largely aligned, in contrast to Ohio, where past trade policies and globalization have produced winners and losers within the state in far greater numbers, particularly for the large manufacturing workforce. While many Nebraskans expressed strong support for President Donald Trump and his administration’s decision to play hardball with China, and even conveyed a willingness to incur some near-term pain to that end, their views diverged on how much pain they could absorb and whether it would be worth it.

Immigration came up almost as often as trade as a “foreign policy” issue that mattered most to Nebraska’s economy and middle class. Those interviewed sounded a common refrain: the United States needs a streamlined, pragmatic approach to permitting more foreigners willing to work in Nebraska’s unfilled jobs. While Coloradans discussed immigration in similar terms, they did not bring it up nearly as frequently or as forcefully as Nebraskans did. Population decline in rural Nebraska makes the area more dependent on international in-migration to offset workforce shortages. Those interviewed also expressed pride that Lincoln and Omaha hosted high rates of refugees per capita relative to most other U.S. metropolitan areas. That said, they made a distinction between legal and illegal immigration, voiced opposition to the concept of open borders, and spoke openly about cultural challenges that arise with growing immigrant and refugee populations.

Those interviewed generally expressed strong support for peacetime defense spending that keeps the U.S. military strong, even if they evinced no enthusiasm for the United States getting into another major war. The need for a strong national defense overrode economic considerations for them. While Offutt Air Force Base contributes significantly to the economy of the greater Omaha area, defense spending in Nebraska does not benefit the state’s economy nearly as much as it does in Colorado or anchor a regional economy as it does in Dayton, Ohio.

When asked about climate change, those interviewed focused on the near-term impacts of regulatory changes on jobs associated with ethanol production, farming, ranching, and rail transport of coal. Unlike in Colorado, only a minority of interviewees argued that the international fight against climate change should be a top U.S. foreign policy priority.

When interviews were conducted, U.S. foreign aid did not come up that frequently in connection with the economic interests of Nebraska’s middle class. But those interviews were conducted in 2019, long before the outbreak of COVID-19, which originated overseas and rapidly spread around the world and across all fifty U.S. states. The spread has resulted in the worst public health crisis that most Americans have experienced in their lifetimes. In addition to threatening individuals’ lives and physical well-being, the measures required to contain the virus’s spread have totally upended Americans’ social interactions and way of life. And the economic consequences have been devastating, especially for middle-income households contending with business closures and lost wages, higher healthcare and childcare costs, and precipitous declines in their retirement savings. One can assume that, in the wake of this crisis, more Americans, including Nebraskans, will see a connection between the economic interests of America’s middle class and U.S. efforts to strengthen global health security systems to prevent the outbreak and spread of pandemic diseases. At the same time, Americans’ anxieties about globalization and economic relations with China may also be exacerbated by this crisis.

Upon reflecting on the findings across these three different states, it becomes clear that foreign policy professionals need to reexamine how they are defining the national economic interests intended to be advanced through U.S. foreign policy. These case studies reveal that rates of economic growth and unemployment are important but incomplete measures of the economic well-being of the country’s middle class. One must also examine the effects of foreign policy on middle-class jobs, standards of living, and the economic viability of local communities. There must be a greater acknowledgment of how these effects diverge in different places. In their upcoming final report, Carnegie’s task force members will evaluate how national economic interests are being defined in the context of what has been learned, as well as propose national-level recommendations.

To read the original research, please click here

Institutions:

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, University of Nebraska Public Policy Center, University of Nebraska Bureau of Business Research, and the Clayton Yeutter Institute of International Trade and Finance.

 

 

 

 

 

The post U.S. Foreign Policy for the Middle Class: Perspectives from Nebraska appeared first on WITA.

]]>