China has taken full advantage of its WTO rights. It has also largely ignored the responsibilities and commitments through its embrace of state-directed capitalism predicated upon an aggressive innovation mercantilism. This mercantilism denies foreign enterprises access to Chinese markets on reciprocal terms; distorts global markets, including for advanced-technology goods; and deprives nations of the benefits they believed they would receive when granting China accession into the community of trading nations.

In this report, China’s accession to the WTO is recounted along with the trade rules with which it fails to comply. The report also describes the economic benefits China has accrued in part by not complying with its WTO commitments. Lastly, it offers policy recommendations for policymakers from the United States and like-minded nations to address the continuing China trade challenge. Our initial 2015 Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) report on this topic, on which this report is based, is premised on China’s false promises to the WTO. Even with a full-scale Section 301 investigation initiated by the Trump administration, China has made little progress in fulfilling a wide range of its WTO commitments over the past two decades.

Stephen Ezell is vice president, global innovation policy, at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF). He focuses on science and technology policy, international competitiveness, trade, manufacturing, and services issues.

To read the original report from the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, please visit here

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New evidence from Chinese government documents and media reports shows that hundreds of thousands of ethnic minority laborers in Xinjiang are being forced to pick cotton by hand through a coercive state-mandated labor transfer and “poverty alleviation” scheme, with potentially drastic consequences for global supply chains. Xinjiang produces 85 percent of China’s and 20 percent of the world’s cotton. Chinese cotton products, in turn, constitute an important basis for garment production in numerous other Asian countries. Previously, evidence for forced labor in Xinjiang pertained only to low-skilled manufacturing, including the production of textiles and apparel. This report provides new evidence for coercion specifically related to cotton picking. These findings have much wider implications, affecting all supply chains that involve Xinjiang cotton as a raw material. On Dec. 2, 2020, the United States placed a Withhold Release Order on cotton produced by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. However, this entity only produces 33 percent of Xinjiang’s cotton and only 0.4 percent of its highest-quality long-staple cotton. This report provides evidence for coercive labor related to all cotton produced in Xinjiang.

The evidence shows that in 2018, three Uyghur regions alone mobilized at least 570,000 persons into cotton-picking operations through the government’s coercive labor training and transfer scheme. Xinjiang’s total labor transfer of ethnic minorities into cotton picking likely exceeds that figure by several hundred thousand. Despite increased mechanization, cotton picking in Xinjiang continues to rely strongly on manual labor. In 2019, about 70 percent of the region’s cotton fields had to be picked by hand – especially the high-quality long-staple cotton predominantly grown in southern Xinjiang’s Uyghur regions, where mechanized picking shares are low. State policies have greatly increased the numbers of local ethnic minority pickers, reducing reliance on outside Han Chinese migrant laborers. The intensive two- to three-month period of cotton picking represents a strategic opportunity to boost rural incomes, and therefore plays a key role in achieving the state’s poverty alleviation targets. These targets are mainly achieved through coercive labor transfers. Cotton picking is grueling and typically poorly paid work. Labor transfers involve coercive mobilization through local work teams, transfers of pickers in tightly supervised groups, and intrusive on-site surveillance by government officials and (in at least some cases) police officers. Government supervision teams monitor pickers, checking that they have a “stable” state of mind, and administer political indoctrination sessions. Some regions put Uyghur children and elderly persons into centralized care while working-age adults are away on state-assigned cotton-picking work assignments. While not directly related to the campaign of mass internment, these labor transfers can include persons who have been released from internment camps. The data presented in this report provides strong evidence that the production of the majority of Xinjiang’s cotton involves a coercive, state-run program targeting ethnic minority groups.

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Coercive Labor in Xinjiang

Dr. Adrian Zenz is a Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, Washington, D.C. (non-resident), and supervises Ph.D. students at the European School of Culture and Theology, Korntal, Germany.

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The U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL or the Department) has produced this ninth edition of the List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor in accordance with the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), as amended. The TVPRA requires USDOL’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB or the Bureau) to “develop and make available to the public a list of goods from countries that [ILAB] has reason to believe are produced by forced labor or child labor in violation of international standards” (TVPRA List or the List; 22 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(2)(C)). It also requires submission of the TVPRA List to the United States Congress not later than December 1, 2014, and every 2 years thereafter (22 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(3)).

The Frederick Douglass Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act of 2018 expanded ILAB’s mandate to require the TVPRA List to include, “to the extent practicable, goods that are produced with inputs that are produced with forced labor or child labor” (22 U.S.C. 7112(b)(2)(C)).

The TVPRA directs ILAB “to work with persons who are involved in the production of goods on the list … to create a standard set of practices that will reduce the likelihood that such persons will produce goods using [child labor or forced labor],” and “to consult with other departments and agencies of the United States Government to reduce forced and child labor internationally and ensure that products made by forced labor and child labor in violation of international standards are not imported into the United States” (22 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(2)(D)–(E)).

Asking the Right Questions to Trace Labor Abuses in Global Supply Chains

What do product quality control measures have in common with efforts to eliminate child labor? In a word: traceability. In the case of product safetyrelated issues, traceability is crucial as quality control experts and operations managers race to link the faulty product to the source. Just as in identifying the origin of defective products to limit harm, the world also has sought to trace the origins of various goods and products as a way to combat child labor and forced labor in those supply chains by asking the right questions: “Who made this and under what conditions?”

Global supply chains have created tremendous prosperity for our society as a whole, lifting millions out of poverty and providing livelihoods for many more; however, problems remain. Violations such as child labor, forced labor, and human trafficking have persisted as supply networks have continued to grow ever more complex. The latest global estimates highlight that 152 million children remain in child labor and 25 million adults and children toil under conditions of forced labor, including in global supply chains that crisscross our globe. (1) Many businesses at all stages of the supply chain, including major global brands, acknowledge these abuses. Businesses can play a critical role in improving working conditions for workers around the world – and many companies have recognized the economic benefit of doing so. These global conditions and the motivations of companies and governments to rectify these injustices have led to an increasing array of research on global supply chains with ILAB playing a pivotal role. ILAB is a leading voice and advocate through its support of research, tools, and technical assistance to aid those who seek to clean up global supply chains, and partnership with the private sector remains essential to matching these aspirations to reality. 

To read the full report click here. 

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INTRODUCTION

This brief is the first in a series that CSIS’s Human Rights Initiative (HRI) will produce to identify how businesses, governments, multilateral organizations, NGOs, and other actors can work together to address XUAR-linked forced labor. This brief enhances understanding of relevant supply chains and includes a deeper dive into forced labor risk in cotton production and supply chains in the XUAR. HRI’s work has focused less on labor transfers from the XUAR into the rest of China to avoid replicating the ongoing work of others.

The brief does not provide recommendations but rather a starting point for a common understanding of relevant supply chains and labor risks, helping to ground further research and policy solutions. The brief starts with an overview of the current policy environment in China and the XUAR as it pertains to forced labor practices and the products that the XUAR is producing and exporting. Some of the statistics used are drawn from Chinese government sources, which are not necessarily reliable but are often the only available data. The brief then looks more deeply at how the XUAR’s forced labor practices are linked to the textile, apparel, and footwear industries. The third and last section discusses areas that merit more exploration because of their ability, in combination, to provide a path forward to address XUAR-linked forced labor.

Amy K. Lehr is a Director and Senior Fellow at the Human Rights Initiative.

To download the full policy brief, please click here.

CSIS BRIEFS are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

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U.S. customs law has contained prohibitions against importing goods produced by certain categories of labor since the end of the nineteenth century. Beginning in 1890, the United States prohibited imports of goods manufactured with convict labor. In 1930, Congress expanded this prohibition in Section 307 of the Tariff Act to include any (not just manufactured) products of forced labor. Although a few Members of Congress brought up humanitarian concerns during debate, the central legislative concern was with protecting domestic producers from competing with products made with forced labor. As such, Section 307 allowed the admission of products of forced labor if it could be shown that no comparable product was made in the United States or the level of domestic production did not meet domestic demand (“consumptive demand” clause).

Over the decades, lawmakers and civil society became increasingly concerned about forced labor in the context of human trafficking. The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-386), for example, included forced labor in its definition of human trafficking. In 2015, Congress removed the “consumptive demand” clause, as part of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act (reflecting this interest in addressing human rights abuses in the context of forced labor).

Issues for Congress

Trade Policy and Forced Labor Provisions

The treatment of forced labor in U.S. trade policy and free trade agreements (FTAs) has been of long-standing congressional interest and has evolved in recent years. Consistent with negotiating objectives set by Congress in Trade Promotion Authority, recent U.S. FTAs commit countries to maintain laws on core labor rights/principles of the International Labor Organization (ILO). This includes the elimination of forced or compulsory labor.

For the first time in a U.S. FTA, the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) also commits parties to prohibit imports of goods produced by forced labor through “measures it considers appropriate,” and to establish cooperation for identifying such goods. The 116th Congress passed USMCA implementing legislation in early 2020. It created a Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force, chaired by the Secretary of Homeland Security, to monitor enforcement of Section 307, and reporting requirements.

In addition, eligibility criteria for U.S. trade preference programs, such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), includes taking steps to maintain internationally recognized worker rights. Some eligibility reviews by the U.S. Trade Representative have involved concerns over labor practices. Recently, the Administration withdrew GSP benefits for Thailand over forced labor in the fishing sector.

Trade agreements and programs have expanded coverage of trade and labor issues in part because the World Trade Organization (WTO) does not cover such rules. However, Article XX(e) of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), provides exceptions to a country’s obligations for measures related to imports of products of prison labor.

Christopher A. Casey is an Analyst in International Trade and Finance for the Congressional Research Service.

Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs is an Analyst in International Trade and Finance  for the Congressional Research Service.

Katarina C. O’Regan is an Analyst in Foreign Policy for the Congressional Research Service.

To download the full report, please click here.

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The “Karakax List”, named after the county of Karakax (Qaraqash) in Hotan Prefecture, represents the most recent leaked government document from Xinjiang. Over 137 pages, 667 data rows and the personal details of over 3,000 Uyghurs, this remarkable document presents the strongest evidence to date that Beijing is actively persecuting and punishing normal practices of traditional religious beliefs, in direct violation of its own constitution.

Specifically, the Karakax List outlines the reasons why 311 persons were interned and reveals the cognition behind the decision-making processes as to whether individuals can be released or not. Based on the principles of presumed guilt (rather than innocence) and assigning guilt through association, the state has developed a highly fine-tuned yet also very labor-intensive governance system whereby entire family circles are held hostage to their behavioral performance – jointly and as individuals. Ongoing mechanisms of appraisal and evaluation ensure high levels of acquiescence even when most detainees have been released from the camps.

The detailed new information provided by this document also allows us to develop a more fine-grained understanding of the ideological and administrative processes that preceded the internment campaign. In particular, this research paper carefully reviews the sequence and timing of events during Chen Quanguo’s first seven months in the region. It is argued that Chen must have been installed by the central government, possibly during a meeting at the Two Sessions in Beijing in March 2016 where Xi Jinping, Chen, and Chen’s predecessor in Xinjiang, Zhang Chunxian, were all in the same place. It is argued that Chen’s role in Xinjiang has not so much been that of an innovator as it has been that of a highly driven and disciplined administrator, with a focus on drastically upscaling existing mechanisms of investigation, categorization and internment.

More than any other government document pertaining to Beijing’s extralegal campaign of mass internment, the Karakax List lays bare the ideological and administrative micromechanics of a system of targeted cultural genocide that arguably rivals any similar attempt in the history of humanity. Driven by a deeply religio-phobic worldview, Beijing has embarked on a project that, ideologically, isn’t far from a medieval witch-hunt, yet is being executed with administrative perfectionism and iron discipline. Being distrustful of the true intentions of its minority citizens, the state has established a system of governance that fully substitutes trust with control. That, however, is also set to become its greatest long-term liability. Xinjiang’s mechanisms of governance are both labor-intensive and predicated upon highly unequal power structures that often run along and increase ethnic fault lines. The long-term ramifications of this arrangement for social stability and ethnic relations are impossible to predict.

To read the original piece from the Journal of Political Risk, please click here

Dr. Adrian Zenz, senior fellow in China studies, victims of Communism Memorial Foundation 

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