Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_AI can often spot subtle /blog-topics/supply-chains/ Thu, 26 Sep 2024 22:42:59 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.6.1 /wp-content/uploads/2018/08/android-chrome-256x256-80x80.png Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_AI can often spot subtle /blog-topics/supply-chains/ 32 32 Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_AI can often spot subtle /blogs/building-resilient-supply-chains/ Fri, 30 Aug 2024 20:06:26 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=50242 1. Introduction After decades of globalization and relative stability, the world is at a turning point. Amidst rising geopolitical tensions, shifting supply chains and states’ embrace of national industrial strategies,...

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After decades of globalization and relative stability, the world is at a turning point. Amidst rising geopolitical tensions, shifting supply chains and states’ embrace of national industrial strategies, policy and corporate decision makers are facing a host of new, challenging questions concerning technologies, markets, and supply chains crucial to economic and national security. These critical and emerging technologies are increasingly and intimately intertwined with geopolitical frictions, if not at their core. Thus, it is important to recognize today’s unique challenges that require innovative thinking and approaches in technology governance to strengthen and build resilient supply chains that are prepared to withstand and can adapt to new geopolitical dynamics.

Interconnected global supply chains based around comparative advantage and lower labor costs linked through complex logistics have proven to be a key component of globalization. However, the interdependence between economies, and the reliance on even geopolitical rivals, has revealed downsides that go beyond pure economic and efficiency considerations. Disruptions, especially during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, have reinforced the need for states to assess risks across a variety of national industries and global market sectors. These domains range from critical food and medical supplies, to automotive, raw materials and other commodity markets, and especially high-tech supply chains, like in the semiconductor ecosystem. To address the issue of supply chain resilience, this assessment evaluates semiconductors as a case study and discusses the risks of disruptions to the supply chain and the measures governments across the globe have taken individually and collectively to strengthen this crucial industry.

Semiconductors, which underpin nearly all current and near-future technology applications in the commercial and military realms, are a key concern for nations’ economic, security, and foreign policies. Governments have chosen to manage dual-use technologies and their supply chains, including semiconductors, comprehensively through new export controls, tariffs, investment screening, and de-risking through investments, subsidies and international cooperation to mitigate risk from growing geopolitical friction. These efforts are primarily driven unilaterally, but collective action and cooperation will be pivotal to ensuring supply chain resilience moving forward for the United States and its allies and partners.

2. Semiconductor Ecosystem Primer

Designed for efficient operations rather than resiliency, semiconductor supply chains can be prone to disruption. To take advantage of massive economies of scale, clustering effects, and regional talent, components of chips can travel more than 25,000 miles and can cross more than 70 borders before reaching their final destination. At its heart, the semiconductor ecosystem consists of three primary phases – (1) design, (2) front-end fabrication, and (3) back-end assembly, testing and packaging. This is followed by systems integration of chips into products such as televisions, video game consoles, personal computers, and cell phones by adjacent industries for consumer goods, industrial goods, as well as defense and space industries. These phases are supported by core intellectual property (IP), electronic design automation (EDA) tools, and raw and processed material inputs, built with a series of sophisticated tools, and incorporate crucial subcomponents.

The semiconductor industry is diverse. It includes some firms that control every aspect of chip production, i.e., integrated device manufacturers (IDMs) such as Intel, Samsung, SK Hynix, or Micron, versus some that leverage the fabless-foundry model. Fabless companies such as AMD, NVIDIA, MediaTek, Huawei/HiSilicon, or Qualcomm design chips, and then partner with foundries such as TSMC in Taiwan, Samsung in South Korea, Global Foundries in the United States, or SMIC in China to fabricate chips to spec on a contract basis. And then for assembly, packaging, and testing the fabless companies leverage those same foundries or outsource to other parties such as Amkor or ASE to complete production. The industry is highly capital intensive and new fabs cost billions of dollars to build and require extensive supporting infrastructure.

The type of chips produced vary based on the role they play in computational processes, with heavy specialization in the industry. Notable variants are logic chips, including CPUs and GPUs, memory chips, including DRAM and storage drives, and power and analog chips, such as capacitors and voltage regulators. In addition, there are supporting components such as printed circuit boards that connect chips.

The primary players for design and fabrication in the industry are concentrated in the Pacific Ocean region. Firms based in the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan play essential roles in the semiconductor industry. U.S. firms lead in advanced logic chip design (namely Intel, NVIDIA, and AMD) and equipment manufacturing (KLA, LAM, and Applied Materials), Taiwan leads in advanced foundry services and advanced packaging (principally TSMC), Japanese firms (such as Tokyo Electron) lead in materials and equipment manufacturing, while South Korea leads in memory design and fabrication (Samsung and SK Hynix). China leads in legacy ATP and systems integration. The Dutch firm ASML produces the most advanced extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines used in fabrication, which are essential for advanced chips. Japanese and the aforementioned U.S. firms produce deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography tools (Nikon and Canon) or other essential leading chip manufacturing materials, tools, and equipment (such as Tokyo Electron, KLA, LAM, and Applied Materials) or EDA tools (Synopsys and Cadence), respectively. These firms are, in turn supported by facilities, equipment manufacturers, and assembly in countries ranging from Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam in Southeast Asia, to mainland China in Northeast Asia, to Ireland, Germany, and the Netherlands in Europe, to Israel in the Middle East.

A trade analysis prepared by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory demonstrates the high level of concentration in Northeast Asia for the semiconductor industry for U.S. imports for 97 key commodities. This is limited to a relatively small group of suppliers for key inputs like photographic plates and goods — used in lithography — and components for tools in semiconductor manufacturing such as dicing machines and polish grinders to the United States and suggests that greater diversification throughout the semiconductor supply chain will be a challenge in some areas. Fortunately, many come from companies in allied countries like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. However, a few specific chokepoints controlled by China exist for critical minerals that will require effort to establish viable alternatives. This conundrum of concentration and dispersed inputs provides insight into the fragility of many modern advanced technology supply chains.

3. Risks Abound: Disrupting Global Supply Chains

Along the chain, threats of disruption abound. In recent years, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the resumption of the Israel-Palestine conflict, the ongoing risk of armed conflict in Northeast Asia, terrorist attacks on vessels in key shipping arteries, maritime accidents, the continuation of  U.S.-China trade friction, and the recognition of the exposure of tech linchpins to natural disasters, coupled with potential future pandemics — have all highlighted the necessity to strengthen and diversify chip supply chains. Typologies of supply chain disruptions vary, with some experts focusing on nature of the event while others concentrate on the impact to suppliers and distributor, the frequency of the event, or the scope. States are mostly concerned about the following types of supply chain disruptions: trade remedies, weaponization of supply chains, armed conflict, natural disasters, pandemics, transportation and logistical accidents, and financial crises.

Certain states’ anticompetitive practices and illicit coercion to help domestic firms and undermine foreign competitors present important challenges to the industry. The People’s Republic of China, for example, holds significant control over the mining and processing of critical semiconductor minerals and has retaliated against U.S. export controls by imposing restrictions on the export of antimony, gallium, germanium, and graphite — the latter three are important components in a range of industries, including electronic commodities such as batteries for electric vehicles, but also utilized as semiconductor materials for optics and photonics (gallium nitride semiconductors are superior to silicon chips in some applications) or in semiconductor manufacturing. When coupled with years of IP theft and China’s civil-military fusion policies, considerable risks to supply chains and global trade have accumulated.

Furthermore, U.S.-China trade frictions continue, including over U.S. government export control efforts announced in October 2022 and October 2023 to restrict China’s access to specific advanced semiconductors, including graphics processing units (GPUs) utilized for artificial intelligence (AI) computation, supercomputer components, and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, to prevent the development of chips for use by the People’s Liberation Army. The same measures may also hold back Chinese technology firms in competing and innovating and have further fractured the global market. China has redoubled long-standing efforts to develop semiconductor self-sufficiency with a focus on indigenous tools. Export controls can also harm U.S. companies’ ability to retain their technological edge. This has short- and long-term implications. In the short-term, their inability to sell their most advanced chips or manufacturing tools to China cuts into revenue that is reinvested in research and development to maintain American leadership. And this loss of revenue is not limited to chips or chip manufacturing equipment. A recent study estimated the total cost of export controls targeting China across all suppliers/industries at $130 billion. In addition, the long-term consequences of foreign firms “designing out” U.S. licensed architectures, components, manufacturing equipment or personnel will further increase fragmentation and undermine U.S. firms position in the market.

Supply chains themselves are also a tool of geopolitical competition, which have been weaponized by China and even the United States. The risks of weaponization are essential drivers for de-risking efforts and efforts to reduce or mitigate dependencies. For example, China’s control over critical minerals and rare earth elements contributes to U.S. concerns that Beijing may weaponize inputs, as they have signaled with antimony, gallium, graphite, and germanium. In addition, technology bans, such as the Chinese government’s restrictions on Micron memory products, limitations on the use of Apple iPhones for Chinese government and party officials, and blocking operations of Tesla cars near sensitive facilities, add to the risks for firms. Even U.S. bans on Huawei base stations and rip and replace policies are justified largely through national security concerns. The Japanese government’s 2019 export control policy shift to remove leading South Korean semiconductor firms from whitelists for export licenses of high purity chemicals used in semiconductor manufacturing, including hydrogen fluoride, fluoride polyimide, and photoresists disrupted South Korean firms’ operations and compelled them to develop greater levels of indigenous sourcing. The controls were later lifted and whitelisting restored in 2023. Renewed emphasis on economic security has accompanied this shift in the landscape in technology competition and national economic security.

Yet other more traditional risks are still present. The risks of armed conflict and natural disasters are other significant drivers behind supply chain resilience efforts. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, for example, disrupted the global supply of neon gas used for semiconductor manufacturing. Prior to war with Russia, two Ukrainian companies produced over fifty percent of purified neon gas used for semiconductor manufacturing, forcing firms such as SK Hynix and TSMC to seek alternative suppliers. Armed conflict also remains a risk on both the Korean peninsula and in Taiwan. The lack of access to chips produced at TSMC in Taiwan due to a contingency in the Taiwan Strait, could cost the United States as much as five to ten percent of current gross domestic product, exceeding the cost of the COVID-19 pandemic or the 2008 global financial crisis.

In addition, natural disasters, including earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, and violent storms, have also impacted the semiconductor ecosystem in the past and are part of future considerations. The 1999 Taiwan earthquake, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and the March 2011 triple disaster in Japan all had significant impacts on electronics and semiconductor supply chains. The recent April 2024 earthquake in Taiwan resulted in a few fatalities but was notable for the minimal damage and speed at which TSMC’s operations were fully restored.

Finally, global logistics networks on land, sea, and air make global supply chains seamless. Ships blocking maritime arteries or colliding with bridges, rebels attacking vessels on international trade routes, crumbling rail and highway infrastructure, or inefficient customs clearance can undermine and disrupt supply chains, leading to significant delays and costs.

In this context, firms anticipate supply chain risks growing. According to one study, companies should expect supply chain disruptions to occur, even with mitigation strategies in place – with disruptions of one-two weeks occurring every two years, and with disruptions of two months or more every five years. Ongoing practice and resilience investments will allow companies to stay more agile and better positioned to withstand supply chain disruptions but will not totally insulate firms from risks. Geographic position is another factor and firms’ intentions across many sectors are shifting operations out of China as part of diversification strategies. This is reflected in the battery of data assembled about firms’ intentions in China and reshoring generally. The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai released a member survey which indicated that, “40 percent of respondents are redirecting or planning to redirect investment originally planned for China, with most looking towards Southeast Asia.” Another recent assessment found that over 70 percent of U.S. companies with manufacturing in China are now either in the process of or planning to shift operations to other countries – which has increased from 60 percent in April 2023 and 57 percent in 2022. Certain firms are not just following a China+1 strategy, but recognizing the risk of concentration in Taiwan, and henceforth are pursuing Taiwan+1 strategies to ensure advanced semiconductor manufacturing is more geographically distributed to mitigate against local and regional shocks.

4. State Responses: Right-Shoring and Resilience

States have responded to the risk of disruption by incorporating advanced bodog poker review technology manufacturing into their national economic security strategies, by providing incentives and grants to attract investments, and by seeking to foster talent development in key industries. 

Like-minded states, including the United States, European Union (EU) members, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India, have individually and collectively recognized the challenges and chosen to tackle them in several different ways. First, many have undertakeneffortstoassesstheir dependencies, vulnerabilities, and relevantchokepointsin specific areas, such as semiconductors or critical minerals, in response to specific risks. Second, leaders have pushed for policies of “right-shoring” to reduce reliance on any single region or country for manufacturing and also begun to grapple with establishing national economic security frameworks suited to their national contexts. Third, some governments have established incentivization policies including subsidies, tax credits, and talent development to better attract or diversify private investment in advanced tech manufacturing to ensure constant access to essential links in the supply chain.  

Most notable is the last point on incentivization. The impetus is for governments to attract advanced fabrication facilities or fabs, assembly, packaging and testing facilities, mature-node chip fabrication for defense applications, and systems integration to strengthen semiconductor resilience, especially focused on domestic efforts and investments. The United States, the EU, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, India, Singapore, and other governments have appropriated funding for subsidies and/or tax incentives to compete for investments from leading technology firms through various “Chips Acts.” State or provincial governments are complementing these efforts with local incentives to build or expand clusters and innovative hubs in their respective region. On the corporate side, leading players such as Taiwan’s TSMC, South Korea’s Samsung, and U.S. firms Intel, Global Foundries, and Micron have announced new investments to diversify their operations in Japan, Germany, the United States, Southeast Asia, and India.

In the United States, Congress has appropriated $52.7 billion for the CHIPS & Science Act, including $39 billion for grants. By December 2023, the first tentative funding notice for a mature-node chip manufacture for defense applicationswas announced. Subsequent preliminary awards and agreements have included focus on advanced and mature node fabrication for logic, memory fabrication, and packaging, including a mix of foreign and domestic firms (See Table 2). These new synergistic policies are not only well-furnished with significant financial incentives but also backed by political will. Nevertheless, administering these programs and getting the funds to the industry is a complex and time-consuming endeavor. Uncertainties may derail promising projects along the way. 

Ultimately, these investment decisions are taken by private sector companies and must make economic sense to them. For example, Micron’s announcement of an investment in a back-end facility for memory chips in India and TSMC’s investments and construction of new chip fabrication facilities in the United States and Japan were both in response to new policies and their anticipated financial returns.

Given growing investments in semiconductors and China’s extensive market subsidization, some voices have expressed concern about overcapacity of mature or legacy node chips, which in the past had negative effects on some players as lower prices led to large losses and inhibited R&D investment due to boom and bust cycles in the semiconductor industry. These concerns are not limited to China (although those are the most concerning) – as chips act investments get stood up around the world, the question remains whether sufficient demand will emerge to drive contracts for all the new fabrication capacity, even with projections showing that due to AI and IoT, demand and markets for chips will continue to rise. Nevertheless, industry analysts expect semiconductors to become a trillion-dollar industry by 2030 or shortly after.

5. Building a Collective Supply Chain Raft

Complementing domestic efforts, many like-minded states have chosen to collaborate through bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral technology partnerships to monitor crucial supply chains and to communicate on ways to collectively ensure supply chain resilience in the future, including to coordinate to avoid a subsidy race. States clearly recognize, while extensive domestic efforts are necessary, that globally interconnected supply chains mean they cannot go it alone. Whilemuch of the effort to protect against shocks is national and local, collaboration and coordination with international partners stands as a crucial line to ensure resilience of supply chains. In the case of the United States and its partners, supply chain specific initiatives have been established in response to disruptions. For example, members of the Quadhave established early warning systems, and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council has institutionalized information sharing — both of which are aimed at monitoring semiconductor shortages. The U.S.-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) commissioned an independent assessment of feasibility for India’s readiness to play a supporting role in the semiconductor supply chain. On critical materials, the U.S.-led Mineral Security Partnership with 14 countries and the European Union intends to target strategic projects in the value chain for crucial minerals and elements used in advanced bodog poker review technology manufacturing. Enabling Southeast Asian states like Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia to scale up exports of key commodities, particularly raw materials essential for chip manufacturing is also a priority. The United States, Japan, and South Korea are also cooperating trilaterally on semiconductor supply chain resilience and critical minerals, and quantum computing.  

Moreover, a number of chip related efforts through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) were included in a recent supply chain agreement to build a crisis response network, including simulations, a council to coordinate response actions, and pilot programs to enhance resilience in semiconductors and critical minerals. The IPEF provides a larger aperture for collaboration on salient areas connected to chip supply chains in a key region, but the lack of a market access pillar in the framework remains a drawback for participants. In the Americas, the National Leaders Summit, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, and the Americas Partnership have all included announcements for collaborative initiatives to bolster and monitor trade flows and supply chains for semiconductors, critical minerals, and medical supplies in emergency situations. India, Australia, and Japan have established the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative to share best practices and promote investment matching to mitigate political and economic risk.

With a history of U.S. semiconductor investment in Central America, the role of Mexico and Costa Rica could be crucial moving forward for back-end investments in particular. The U.S. government and industry players also have other options to consider for right shoring close to home for key inputs in the chain including printed circuit boards – such as the Dominican Republic. Both the Trump and Biden administrations have aimed to locate some functions in the supply chain closer to home, which is why there has been renewed interest in building capacity for chips in North America and Latin America. Critically, this is supported by the International Technology Security Innovation (ITSI) fund through the Chips Act, which has $500 million over five years administered by the State Department. Expanding the ITSI fund and widening its scope of projects should be a bipartisan priority for the U.S. government.

At the traditional multilateral level, members of theG7, theG20, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, have also reached agreements to intensify monitoring of critical minerals or semiconductors, share risk assessments, or facilitate financial support for supply chain resilience. The United States during the Biden administration has been relatively successful in building up what it calls a “latticework” of partners with a vision for a more integrated approach to manage technology, economics, and security cooperating with allies and like-minded partners when it comes to semiconductors and beyond.

6. CONCLUSION

The ability of states to coordinate and secure supply chains domestically and internationally has taken on new importance. This is especially the case for critical and emerging technologies, yet in times of growing geopolitical tensions all types of goods and commodities with limited suppliers and high concentration can be weaponized for foreign policy objectives. There are considerable challenges governments are facing in building resilient supply chains for semiconductors, including frequent misalignment between partners due to conflicting economic and national security objectives. While many of these new initiatives are nascent, and some may fail, they will contribute at a fundamental level to each nation’s security and economic independence and strengthen the collective.

ORFAmerica_BP26_Chips_Supply_Chain

To read the background paper as it was published on the Observer Research Foundation America webpage, click here.

To view the full report as posted by the Observer Research Foundation America, click here.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_AI can often spot subtle /blogs/mex-and-us-ch/ Thu, 11 Jul 2024 11:41:55 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=48059 The strategic shift toward utilizing Mexico as a manufacturing hub for Chinese goods destined for the U.S. underscores the evolving dynamics of global supply chains.   The global supply chain...

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The strategic shift toward utilizing Mexico as a manufacturing hub for Chinese goods destined for the U.S. underscores the evolving dynamics of global supply chains.

 

The global supply chain is an ever-changing landscape, always looking to implement the most efficient and effective means to ensure products are sourced, manufactured and delivered as quickly and safely as possible. Many companies have relied on specific regions for sourcing and manufacturing over the decades, but a new survey indicates that the interest is at unprecedented levels. According to a QIMA survey, the appeal of shortened supply chains has reached a record high, with more than 64% of businesses globally expressing interest in nearshoring and reshoring strategies for 2024.

In 2023, a significant shift was already underway, with more than half of the surveyed participants reporting increased purchases from domestic and regional suppliers. This trend, driven by a desire to reduce disruptions, ensure greater supply chain resilience and underscore ESG initiatives, is set to gain even more momentum in the coming year.

While the United States has long relied on Chinese imports driven primarily by cost considerations, access to a large manufacturing base, the wide range of products available to manufacture/develop in the region, geopolitical tensions and trade uncertainties have prompted a reevaluation of this dependency, leading to a significant shift in supply chain dynamics. Even more so, the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the massive dependency the West had on China and other South Eastern Asia countries.

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Concerns over trade disputes, tariffs and geopolitical risks continue to intensify, especially as the U.S. enters another high-profile election year. U.S.-based businesses continue to seek alternative sourcing destinations to diversify their supply chains and mitigate potential disruptions.

While some may view nearshoring and reshoring as protectionist measures, they present real opportunities to foster additional global economic growth, job creation and sustainability initiatives. Mexico has emerged as a preferred destination for these nearshoring and reshoring efforts, especially for U.S. companies seeking to optimize their supply chains.

In fact, the U.S. Commerce Department released data that reinforced Mexico as the top source for goods to the U.S., ahead of China for the first time in two decades.

The Chinese manufacturing industry has also recognized the importance of reshoring and the continued growth of Mexico’s manufacturing sector for U.S. companies. Mexico offers several advantages, including proximity to the U.S. market, favorable trade agreements like the USMCA (United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement), and a skilled labor force at competitive costs.

Leveraging Mexico as an intermediary for Chinese manufacturing provides a buffer against escalating disputes and tariffs, ensuring continuity in supply chains and preserving market access for both exporters and importers. This strategic alignment fosters stability and facilitates smoother trade relations amidst geopolitical uncertainties.

From a supply chain perspective, this strategic shift holds several implications. For one, it reduces reliance on a single source of supply, enhancing resilience and risk management capabilities. By diversifying manufacturing locations, companies in all countries can better navigate geopolitical uncertainties, trade disruptions and unexpected events, such as natural disasters or political instability.

Additionally, the proximity of Mexico to the U.S. market offers logistical advantages, including shorter lead times, reduced transportation costs and increased agility in responding to changing consumer demand. This geographical strategy aligns with the growing trend toward nearshoring and regionalization of supply chains, driven by the need for speed, flexibility and responsiveness in today’s competitive business environment.

The strategic shift toward utilizing Mexico as a manufacturing hub for Chinese goods destined for the U.S. underscores the evolving dynamics of global supply chains. By diversifying sourcing destinations, businesses can enhance supply chain resilience and efficacy, navigate geopolitical unease and maintain seamless trade relationships amidst an increasingly complex and uncertain landscape.

Ivan Hernandez is managing director, Mexico, for QIMA, which provides quality control solutions for supply chains.

To read the full article as it was published by Supply Chain Management Review, click here.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_AI can often spot subtle /blogs/supply-chains-trade/ Sun, 23 Jun 2024 13:48:37 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=47009 Much ink is being spilled on predictions of ‘deglobalisation’ and restructuring of supply chains, but frenzied commentary over trends such as ‘re-shoring’ and ‘near-shoring’ tends to obscure the reality that...

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Much ink is being spilled on predictions of ‘deglobalisation’ and restructuring of supply chains, but frenzied commentary over trends such as ‘re-shoring’ and ‘near-shoring’ tends to obscure the reality that trade flows have always been fluid and that global trade is back to pre-pandemic levels.

Global trade recovery remains fragile. Geopolitical tensions, spillover from regional conflicts, rising populism and protectionist policies are putting unprecedented pressure on globalisation.

The prospect of a complete breakdown in relations between the United States and China adds weight to any pessimism. Each day brings further threat — or the reality — of unilateral trade measures. While legitimate concerns may undergird these measures, such as climate considerations, the net effect is chipping away at governments’ faith in the global rules-based trading system. This is creating a vicious cycle of more barriers and more protectionism.

Global business priorities have not shifted since the WTO was founded 30 years ago. Cohesive, multilaterally agreed rules for international trade that provide certainty and predictability remain a fundamental demand from traders around the world.

The WTO, despite its flaws, has proven to be the single cohesive vehicle able to attract multilateral participation — from countries across the world at every stage of development — to address global trade challenges. The need for such an institution has grown with time. For example, effective multilateral dialogue at the WTO level bodog poker review is required to resolve the unintended consequences of novel environmental legislation, such as the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism and new rules on deforestation, particularly as they affect small businesses in developing countries.

Against growing threats to the system, the urgency of reforming the WTO grows each day. Its rulebook must be updated to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century — its rules enforced and its agreements effectively monitored. Reform must be tackled consistently with an eye towards lowering trade barriers and upholding current commitments. And this must be done in cooperation with the private sector.

The alternative to holistic reform is almost too awful to contemplate. An April 2024 an International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)-commissioned study found that WTO dissolution would have dire consequences for developing economies, decimating their exports by 33 per cent and lowering GDP by 5.1 per cent by 2030.

In that scenario, the trade-led convergence that has enabled developing countries to grow their economies would disappear. This would also hit producers in advanced economies by reducing supplier access, exposing developed countries to increasing volatility and higher consumer prices.

Countries that do not enjoy elevated levels of integration into global supply chains would be further disadvantaged by any erosion of the multilateral trading system. Given the catalytic role of trade in job creation, the implications for global poverty reduction perspective would be profound.

In this age of digital innovation, the world has never been technically better placed to conduct trade more efficiently. Technology underpins all modern supply chains, including the internet of things, big data, machine learning and artificial intelligence. This shift to digital technology calls for the movement of data and information across borders, with all stakeholders depending on seamless and uninterrupted information flows across companies and countries.

To secure supply chain resilience and efficiency, governments must promote policy coherence and harmonised digital rules, increasing the urgency for robust WTO action. As a start, an agreement containing disciplines that will address digital trade barriers and facilitate digital trade must be reached and implemented at the WTO.

Work is already going into accelerating the development of a globally harmonised, digitalised trade environment. The ICC Digital Standards Initiative is engaging the public sector to progress regulatory and institutional reform, and mobilising the private sector on standards harmonisation, adoption and capacity building.

Trade facilitation remains key to functioning supply chains. Delays at borders hinder cross-border trade at every level, both regional and international. Full implementation of the 2017 WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement — which has already increased trade by over US$230 billion — is more relevant than ever.

Low and middle-income countries have come a long way in fulfilling their trade facilitation agreement commitments, but many still require assistance to finish the job. A failure to connect developing economies to global markets threatens to cut them further adrift, stifling economic opportunity and reversing previous gains. Likewise, lack of implementation undermines supply chain optimisation in these countries, hindering competitiveness.

To support low and middle-income countries in this endeavour, the ICC co-leads the Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation with the World Economic Forum and the Center for International Private Enterprise. With the support of the governments of the United States, Germany and Canada, this entity uses the trade facilitation agreement to address obstacles to trade in an inclusive, sustainable way through public–private partnership. The alliance approach to meaningful trade facilitation initiatives involves buy-in and ongoing engagement from both government and business, from project inception through to post-completion, recognising a shared responsibility in promoting frictionless trade.

This spirit of public­–private cooperation must be brought to bear against today’s drift away from agreement and adherence to international rules and regulations. The WTO remains the best conduit for multilateral trade cooperation and future initiatives hinge on its reform and strengthening. Business as the real engine of economic growth and innovation needs to be engaged as a genuine partner — one that delivers on the concept of multi-stakeholder cooperation.

John WH Denton AO is Secretary General of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Paris.

To read the full article as it was published by East Asia Forum, click here.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_AI can often spot subtle /blogs/ai-supply-chains/ Mon, 05 Feb 2024 21:46:36 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=41818 The term artificial intelligence (AI) was first introduced in the 1950s, but it wasn’t until the launch of ChatGPT, which amassed over 100 million users within just two months in...

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The term artificial intelligence (AI) was first introduced in the 1950s, but it wasn’t until the launch of ChatGPT, which amassed over 100 million users within just two months in late 2022, that the public began to take notice. Similarly, the importance of “supply chain management,” a term coined in the 1980s, was largely overlooked until the COVID-19 pandemic led to prolonged shortages of various products, from personal protective equipment to semiconductors. Today, an increasing number of companies are turning to AI to manage their global supply chains. Two questions arise: can AI enhance supply chain resilience? What impact will AI have on employment in supply chain management?

The missing link between AI and supply chain in Biden’s executive orders

The Biden administration has paid considerable attention to both global supply chains and AI. In 2023, President Biden signed two executive orders: one regarding governance and responsibility in AI development and another to improve supply chain resilience. In June 2023, the White House released a progress report to build resilient supply chains for four critical products: semiconductors, large-capacity batteries, critical minerals and materials, and active pharmaceutical ingredients. The development of resilient supply chains is a key component of Bidenomics. For this endeavor, Biden attained $52.7 billion from Congress through the CHIPS and Science Act. Later, in October 2023, the White House released a report summarizing President Biden’s executive order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy AI. The order requires developers of powerful AI systems to meet certain safety standards before publicly releasing their solutions. Finally, President Biden announced in November 2023 the establishment of the new White House Council on Supply Chain Resilience to develop new capabilities to monitor existing and emerging risks and to detect and respond to supply chain disruptions in critical sectors with supply chain partners. Although these policies are promising, American policymakers have yet to address the inherent connection between AI development and supply chain resilience.

This trend is not limited to the United States. First proposed in 2021, the EU Parliament reached a provisional agreement with the Council on the EU AI Act in December 2023. The policy provides guidance for high-risk AI systems and breaks down responsibilities throughout the AI supply chain with requirements for importers, distributors, and other supply chain stakeholders.

The benefits of AI-enabled supply chain planning

AI has the potential to revolutionize supply chain operations by improving decision-making and efficiency. According to a 2022 McKinsey survey, respondents reported that the highest cost savings from AI are in supply chain management. Specifically, AI can add value to supply chain planning, including production, inventory management, and product distribution. Companies can also leverage AI-powered tools to process vast amounts of real-time data and improve the accuracy of demand forecasting. With more precise demand forecasts, AI-enabled tools can help firms optimize production and inventory plans across various locations and select the most cost-effective logistics solutions.

Early adopters of AI-enabled supply chain management have reduced logistics costs by 15 percent, improved inventory levels by 35 percent, and enhanced service levels by 65 percent. Adopting AI tools to manage manufacturing operations can be costly, but 70 percent of the respondents from a survey of CEOs of over 150 firms agreed that AI is delivering a “strong ROI.” Despite the potential of AI in supply chains, AI should not decrease employment in supply chain management. Rather, it should create new opportunities to mitigate potential risks associated with adopting new technologies.

The role of AI in mapping supply chains

AI can certainly make internal operations more efficient; this starts with achieving supply chain visibility (i.e., the ability to view and track inventory levels as goods move along the supply chain). Visibility would allow firms to respond to disruptions in real time. A 2021 survey revealed that only 2 percent of companies claimed to have visibility beyond their second-tier suppliers–those who supply materials and parts to their direct suppliers. Without strong visibility, company supply chains are susceptible to disruptions caused by issues such as natural disasters, pandemics, geopolitical issues, trade barriers, and product recalls. Therefore, firms should seek to leverage AI to enhance supply chain visibility.

Mapping the supply chain is a crucial step towards enhancing its resilience, and AI tools can provide substantial assistance in this regard. These tools can gather records like product orders, customs declarations, and freight bookings, which are often represented in various formats and languages. AI algorithms can extract relevant data from both structured and unstructured documents with high precision. AI tools can compile and synthesize this raw data, enabling a firm to map out its different supply chain tiers. For instance, Altana, an AI startup that creates dynamic maps of global supply chains, has developed a generative AI tool that utilizes both public and private data to map a company’s supply chain. This tool is complemented by a large language model (LLM)-informed assistant that responds to employees’ queries posed in plain language. Using document processing systems to capture, analyze, and share documents, such as invoices, bills of lading, and purchase orders, Altana can enhance efficiency and accuracy in logistics and improve communication among supply chain partners.

Using AI to detect changes in demand and supply

AI can also help firms gauge market demand and customer sentiment. Utilizing scanner data collected at point-of-sale locations, along with vast data from customer reviews and blog posts on social media, AI-based tools, such as Google’s Video AI can gather and analyze text, images, and videos. Google Video AI can then develop a real-time, end-to-end supply chain dashboard that can generate alerts for abnormal demand changes due to competition or product issues. The AI can even detect early signs of panic buying using large data sources. The Google Video AI dashboard can then pinpoint the underlying causes for such abnormalities.

In addition to real-time detection of demand changes, AI tools can compile and analyze data on traffic conditions at different supply chain tiers such as ports and warehouses. These tools can detect supply disruptions caused by supply and worker shortages, factory shutdowns, and shipping delays, among other issues. For instance, when ports on the West Coast faced unprecedented delays in September 2021, the US Department of Transportation developed a national transportation supply chain dashboard that tracked three key indicators of goods moving from ports to retail stores: the number of imported containers, US retail inventory levels, and the on-shelf availability of consumer goods. Tracking these indicators in real time offered the ability to detect and react to anomalous patterns as they occurred.

Using AI to design effective responses to supply chain disruption

A supply chain becomes more resilient when it can quickly detect and respond to disruptions, thereby minimizing the impact. According to the supply chain risk management literature, three capabilities are necessary to build resilience: (1) detecting a disruption quickly, (2) designing an effective solution in response to the disruption, and (3) deploying the solution swiftly. Traditionally, firms have ensured supply chain resilience by developing advanced systems to enhance detection, setting up proactive contingency plans, and conducting stress tests for rapid deployment. However, AI and Industry 4.0 technologies, such as sensors, blockchains, and data analytics, can amplify these resilience capabilities manyfold.

With the ability to detect abnormal changes in supply and demand, AI tools can help companies evaluate and compare the effectiveness of different response strategies by conducting simulations. These simulations assess the impact of each possible response on demand and supply as well as the recovery time from disruptions. By analyzing the simulated results and examining the effects of different responses on various supply chain partners, a firm can swiftly develop a well-informed strategy in response to a sudden change. Response strategies may involve modifications to product design, adjusting prices, and switching upstream suppliers. In terms of potential use cases, AI could help a government agency design a supply chain for medical countermeasures to defend against bio-attacks. Retail companies could use AI to simulate and predict the impact of implementing rationing policies in retail stores. More broadly, the goal is to evaluate alternative scenarios to ensure resilience against potential unforeseen disturbances and understand how mitigation strategies affect each part of the supply chain.

AI can help firms respond to crises, but importantly, it can also help companies strengthen supply chains before they are strained. AI can recommend changes to a company’s supply chain policies based on a multitude of factors, such as seasonality and macroeconomic trends. For instance, AI can identify the best supply chain configuration, the optimal number of suppliers (and their locations), and the most favorable terms of the supply chain contracts.

AI implications for employment and public policy

While AI holds immense potential for developing resilient supply chains, the Biden administration can coordinate with the European Union to mitigate various risks arising from AI-enabled global supply chains. Similar to how Biden has pursued responsible AI development in the United States, he should work with European regulators to ensure that the data with which LLMs are trained is sourced ethically and avoids copyright violations. Responsible AI development is key to the stability of supply chains, as AI becomes increasingly engrained in supply chain management.

Even with the help of American and European regulators, firms must manage certain risks through human involvement. AI-enabled supply chains will transform the role of supply chain professionals, eliminating jobs in clerical and data entry, but they will also create new jobs. The data used to train AI and AI-produced insights can be biased. Hence, humans must identify the most relevant data on which to train LLMs and ensure adherence to ethical guidelines. AI also does not always comprehend the contexts and nuances of global supply chains; humans must interpret and examine the appropriateness of AI-generated recommendations. Thus, new personnel, including research scientists, chatbot developers, AI ethics, and bias analysts, are necessary to develop resilient supply chains. Additionally, to manage increasingly complex supply chain operations amidst exceedingly complex geopolitical issues, the role of supply chain managers has never been more critical.

AI promises to disrupt industries, including justice, retail, marketing, transportation, media, and biosciences. Indeed, the World Economic Forum commented that the future of work is changing with bodog casino machines and AI likely to take on an increasing share of work. The interplay between AI and supply chain management, two critical sectors, is more important than ever to create economic stability and resiliency. However, the future is not as pessimistic as Elon Musk’s claim that AI will take most jobs away–at least not in supply chain management for the foreseeable future.

 

Maxime C. Cohen is the Scale AI Chair Professor of Retail and Operations Management at McGill University and a Visiting Professor at Yale School of Management.

Christopher S. Tang is a UCLA distinguished professor and the Edward W Carter Chair in business administration.

To read the full article published by Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, click here

 

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_AI can often spot subtle /blogs/implications-weather-global-market/ Tue, 05 Dec 2023 17:00:05 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=41294 Climate change is an issue that is felt on both a human and economic level. Environmental changes affect the global food supply, individual health, and the job market. Sudden and...

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Climate change is an issue that is felt on both a human and economic level. Environmental changes affect the global food supply, individual health, and the job market. Sudden and long-term changes can affect the production of much-needed resources, leading to a delay in delivery or the elimination of an essential product or service. Let’s examine how weather conditions can cause significant changes in the global market and what efforts are being made to regulate them.

The Effects of Weather Disruptions on the Supply Chain

For many businesses, the supply chain is an international issue. Domestic interactions can be costly, so outsourcing labor and resources across the sea is often an unavoidable task. For example, flood-related damage in China has a huge effect on crop yield, forcing the country to face a hefty $25 billion economic blow. This means businesses in the Western Hemisphere that rely on Chinese agricultural exports may not be able to produce necessary items for grocery stores or, say, create holistic wellness items.

These types of events force businesses to look elsewhere for the materials, labor, and other areas of the supply chain they need to amend. For reference, let’s take a look at the restaurant industry. Climate change, among other factors like COVID-19, has given way to increased food costs. Essential items, like grain and meat, have risen in price. Avian flu and temporary price increases at the beginning of 2023 caused restaurants to eliminate a good portion of meat-based meals from their menus.

Supply issues like these mean employees are also not being offered wages in alignment with recent inflation and the rising demands of their jobs. This gives way to larger economic issues that can potentially restructure the way we do business globally.

How Extreme Weather Events Affect Transportation Costs

Climate change and extreme weather events don’t only affect things like food production. It plays a huge role in the cost of transportation. Transportation is a necessary part of doing business. You need a method of transferring resources to a processing plant and then the completed product to a warehouse where it is shipped to yet another location.

Ultimately, climate change affects multiple areas of transportation in the global market. Since burning fossil fuels contributes to climate change, it causes a cyclic effect on transportation costs. Extremely hot weather can affect the performance of oil refineries, which then causes a delay in fuel production, making gas prices higher.

Also, there is the matter of delivery fees, which affects both businesses and consumers. Consumers tend to foot the bill for delivery fees since it can be a huge financial blow for businesses to take care of this fee themselves. Unpredictable weather can affect air freight schedules, and unusual snowfall can prevent trucks from making deliveries in a timely manner. Evolving climate conditions force consumers to eventually pay more in delivery fees.

To lower transportation costs, businesses should consider using energy-efficient vehicles to stave off the growing fuel costs. Should this not be an option, you can also consider using a diesel delivery service, which ensures all trucks are receiving high-quality fuel on a set schedule.

Combating Climate Change

Though climate change isn’t something that can be altered by a single person or entity, businesses can still do their part to create a more sustainable global market through several strategies and innovative technologies.

First, consider optimizing your supply chain by staying local. Use local vendors to create a reserve inventory and try not to outsource a large portion of your business operations overseas. This will reduce fuel costs and benefit the local economy at the same time. Second, invest in sustainable technological practices. Using solar power for warehouses can have a significant impact on energy costs and lower greenhouse gas emissions.

Agricultural industries can make adjustments to livestock handling as well to reduce negative environmental impact. Exploring lab-grown meat or creating an emphasis on plant-based meat alternatives for the restaurant and food industry can make a huge difference in issues like water pollution as well as toxic emissions.

Reducing your carbon footprint may not seem like the most cost-effective solution at first, but doing your part to combat climate change will only fare your business well in the long term. Consumers will be more apt to purchase your products or services if they see your practices are environmentally friendly. You will also end up financially benefiting from stable supply chain costs as climate change efforts increase.

The Big Picture

Eco-friendly business strategies are essential for increased performance and keeping costs stable across the board. Staying well-informed about sustainable supply chain practices and the location and environment of all areas of your business cannot be understated. At the end of the day, switching over to energy-efficient transportation options and investing in climate-friendly tech is just good for business – it provides a chance for future generations and industries to thrive.

To read the full article, click here.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_AI can often spot subtle /blogs/supply-chains-inter-american-relations/ Fri, 10 Nov 2023 20:21:48 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=40569 At the June 2022 Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles, the Biden administration initiated “The Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity” (APEP) in concert with eleven other Western Hemisphere nations....

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At the June 2022 Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles, the Biden administration initiated “The Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity” (APEP) in concert with eleven other Western Hemisphere nations. The APEP initiative was an eleventh-hour addition to an otherwise stormy run-up to the IX Summit of the Americas. Subsequently, APEP lay dormant for over a year, apparently adding to the heap of aspirational inter-American declarations confined to the dustbin of history.

However, out of the blue on November 3, 2023, President Joe Biden convened the other APEP leaders to join him in the East Room of the White House for an inaugural “Leaders’ Summit of the Americas Partnership.”

Despite the manifest lack of progress on APEP, all but two of the invited leaders attended (the president of Panama was ill while Mexico was ably represented by its foreign minister). Remarkably, several left-leaning presidents (Gabriel Boric from Chile, Gustavo Petro from Colombia, and Mia Mottley from Barbados) heeded the last-minute call from the leader of the free world. Whatever may be said about declining U.S. power worldwide, in the Western Hemisphere most leaders still want to be seen with the U.S. president. Some still hope that regional diplomacy can yield beneficial results.

Not wanting to arouse the trade skeptics within the Democratic Party, the Biden White House has carefully steered away from initiatives that would further open U.S. markets to international commerce. But APEP could build upon the foundations of existing free trade agreements—primarily the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Accord (USMCA) and the Central America Trade Accord (CAFTA-DR). For these trading partners, the hot-button topic of trade liberalization had already been addressed. APEP could therefore focus on politically less sensitive but still economically vital matters such as building infrastructure, digitalizing customs, and promoting small-scale private businesses.

APEP could even address regional supply chains, couched less in terms of trade and investment and more in the language of national security and in promises of more secure, diverse, and resilient sources of supplies vital to U.S. industries.

APEP is primarily a sub-regional agreement, targeting the Greater Caribbean Basin. Absent FTAs with the United States, Brazil and Argentina—the two largest countries of South America—do not qualify. And APEP is limited to “friendly, trusted” nations that share democratic values; hence, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba are excluded. The invitation list also omitted the democracy backsliders of Central America’s Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras). Looking forward, however, APEP is open to countries that can meet its standards.

The Resurrection of APEP

In January of this year the United States and its APEP partners released a declaration labeled “The Americas Partnership”. Nevertheless, this disappointing text still lacked focus, action items, negotiating formats and timetables, and implementation guidelines. Within the U.S. government APEP lacked a resolute champion. Biden’s Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) remains in the hands officials who tend to perceive deepening globalization as inimical to the interests of U.S. workers and the middle-class.

Yet pressure was building for a renewed interest in APEP. Several U.S. Senators, including influential Democrats, urged the Biden administration to pay more attention to our neighbors to the South. Biden’s energetic special advisor for the Americas, former Senator Chris Dodd, persistently pressed the White House for greater presidential attention to the region.

And at a time of rising geopolitical tensions, the administration may have decided it would be wise to shore up support in our own near-abroad—much as President Franklin D. Roosevelt had done so successfully with his “Good Neighbor” policies on the eve of World War II.

Furthermore, the administration was intent on refining its early focus on strengthening the resilience of industrial supply chains. The initial thrust was “reshoring,” or building industrial capacity in the United States. But it became increasingly apparent that to be competitive, U.S.-based supply chains would require some components to be sourced overseas, where costs were lower and some necessary inputs including minerals were more abundant.

Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen has become a vocal advocate of “friendshoring.” At a conference on regional investment hosted by the Inter-American Development Bank the day before the November 3 White House meeting, Yellen committed the United States “to support the region’s supply chain integration through comprehensive efforts.”

Regional Supply Chains: A New Glue of Inter-American Relations?

In expanding regional supply chains, the administration has initially focused on three strategic sectors: semiconductors, medical supplies (medical equipment and pharmaceuticals), and renewable sources of clean energy (including electric batteries). Beginning with semiconductors, the administration has certified three regional partners: Mexico, Costa Rica, and Panama, and will likely add other friendly nations to this privileged list. Beyond the occasional ultra-high tech fabrication plant (“fabs”), regional participation in microprocessor supply chains can include design development, manufacturing electrical components, parts assembly and testing, and packaging and shipping.

The foundations for regional supply chains are already in place. Free trade accords (USMCA, CAFTA-DR, U.S. bilateral accords with Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Panama) have removed many barriers to trade and investment flows—the engines of regional “friendshoring”. And some countries are already integrated into select supply chains. For example, both Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic employ tens of thousands of workers producing medical instruments and pharmaceutical products for international brands.

More must be done, however, if nearshoring is to reach its potential to become a new glue of inter-American relations, especially for the Greater Caribbean Basin. Both the Latin American and Caribbean governments grouped in APEP, and the United States, must marshal the political will and financial resources to seize this moment of opportunity in regional development.

For regional partners, that means accelerating reforms across the business ecosystem. International investors seek lower, cleaner energy sources, world-class logistical systems, transparent regulations and standards, the rule of law, and perhaps most importantly, a skilled workforce. The multilateral development banks—the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean (CAF)—have the financial resources and technical know-how to assist in each of these tasks.

In deciding on locations for investment and trade, U.S. corporations will be driven by market forces. But they will also look to signals from the U.S. government. Which commercial partners are considered “friendly and trustworthy”? Where are U.S. government agencies, such as the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the U.S. Export-Import Bank, placing their bets? Which countries are eligible for the new U.S. industrial policy incentives and subsidies orienting supply chain decisions?

The November 3 East Room APEP declaration proclaimed that “we intend to establish the Americas as the home of the world’s most competitive, inclusive, sustainable, and resilient regional value and supply chains.” The APEP partners agreed to meet at the leaders’ level every two years to assess progress, and Costa Rica has volunteered to host that stock-taking conclave in 2025. Establishing such timetables is one step toward transforming APEP from a lofty statement of aspirations into a historic idea that transforms inter-American relations.

Richard E. Feinberg is professor emeritus at UC San Diego, a member of Global Americans’ International Advisory Council, and the book review editor of the Western Hemisphere section of Foreign Affairs magazine. He is the author of Widening the Aperture: Nearshoring in our ‘Near Abroad’ (Latin American Program, Wilson Center, 2021).

To read the full article, click here.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_AI can often spot subtle /blogs/ai-build-adaptive-supply-chain/ Mon, 23 Oct 2023 14:54:01 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=40069 Before the COVID-19 pandemic, many supply chains strove for efficiency at all costs. While this approach lowered costs and shortened lead times, it led to significant disruption at the pandemic’s...

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Before the COVID-19 pandemic, many supply chains strove for efficiency at all costs. While this approach lowered costs and shortened lead times, it led to significant disruption at the pandemic’s onset. Now, organizations favor adaptability and supply chain AI could be the key to achieving it.

Transitioning from a lean business model to more flexible alternatives is a substantial and challenging shift. While it can seem intimidating, new technology — namely, artificial intelligence — provides a path forward. The key lies in using it effectively.

A Global Supply Chain Problem

Supply chain AI’s value is clearer when organizations understand the scope of the problems it solves. Today’s supply chains are in dire need of change. The pandemic has revealed how these networks have too many single dependencies, are too risk-prone, and have too few fallbacks and safeties to mitigate disruption.

A staggering 83% of supply chain organizations have experienced raw material shortages within the past year. These shortages are often disruptive, too, as 45% of companies have no visibility past their first-tier suppliers. Many others rely on just one or two sources for bodog poker review mission-critical resources. If something happens at a single upstream supplier, companies often won’t see it coming and are stuck until the supplier can recover. In light of how frequent disruptions are today from severe weather, geopolitical conflict and worker shortages, something needs to change. Supply chains must become adaptive so they can respond quickly to prevent delays and shortages.

The Promise of AI

Businesses can arrive at adaptive supply chains through different paths. Regardless of the specifics, though, AI makes the journey easier.

Tackling Inventory Management

One of supply chain AI’s biggest areas of impact is inventory management. Adaptive supply chains must be able to keep sufficient safety stocks, and adjust stock levels to meet shifting supply and demand. That’s difficult with conventional approaches, but AI offers more insight.

Businesses can use AI to analyze their sales and shipment history to categorize items based on volatility, criticality, and value. It’ll then be easier to understand which are most important to keep larger safety stocks of.

Similarly, AI can predict demand shifts so supply chains can adjust their inventories to meet these changes without surpluses or shortages. Coca-Cola does this to deliver 500 million beverages at optimal times across Japan. By adapting shipping practices to AI’s predictions, they can prevent waste and stock-outs simultaneously.

Highlighting Weaknesses

Inventory management may be an easy area of improvement to spot, but other issues can be harder to identify. Brands may not know where their weaknesses lie, making it difficult to optimize effectively. AI can clear this up, too.

It starts with creating a digital twin of the supply chain — a virtual model of the network based on real-world data. AI can then analyze the digital twin to find improvement areas. That could be a single dependency for a raw material supply, a warehouse with limited visibility or anything else that hinders flexibility.

Human analysts could theoretically do the same thing, but they’d take longer and be less accurate. AI can often spot subtle connections humans miss, so it’s the ideal tool to identify these supply chain weaknesses. Once companies know where they fall short, they can address those areas to boost adaptability.

Predicting Disruption

Of course, some disruption is inevitable. Even if enterprises optimize their inventories for adaptability and create a stronger supplier network, unexpected problems can still happen. However, these disruptions aren’t so disruptive if organizations see them coming and supply chain AI enables that foresight.

Just as AI models can predict demand shifts based on past trends, they can tell when a disruption is likely. By picking up on early warning signs, these models alert businesses of possible incoming problems. Companies can then react ahead of time to minimize the damage.

If AI predicts a shortage of a certain material, warehouses can increase their safety stocks ahead of time. If it suggests storms will slow transportation, logistics brands can inform downstream partners and schedule more time for deliveries. AI could even predict price shifts, letting enterprises know to save elsewhere to account for higher tax or fee spending.

Refining Documentation and Reporting

While pure efficiency over everything is no longer supply chains’ goal, efficiency is still important. Businesses must be able to act quickly if they hope to adapt to incoming disruptions or shifting trends. Once again, supply chain AI provides the solution.

AI can eliminate error-prone manual processes like data entry, billing and other documentation or reporting tasks. This kind of work doesn’t add much value to supply chains but takes a lot of time. Consequently, when companies manage it manually, they lose valuable time and effort they could otherwise spend on more nuanced, critical work like planning to adapt to incoming changes.

By automating back-office administrative tasks, supply chain organizations become more agile. They’ll be able to divert more resources to adaptation and get more done at once. This automation also mitigates labor shortages, enabling even more efficiency, which, in turn, enables adaptability.

The Road Ahead

The benefits of supply chain AI are hard to ignore. However, any seasoned business leader can attest things are often more complicated in real life than they are on paper. If companies want to capitalize on this potential, they must approach AI carefully.

As beneficial as this technology can be, it’s hard to get right. Between 60% and 80% of AI projects fail, mostly because of issues in the application, not the tech itself. Supply chains must understand AI’s weaknesses along with its strengths to use it effectively.

One key weakness to be aware of is the need for sufficient, accurate data. Brands must collect real-time and historical data across their supply chain to give AI enough information to draw correct conclusions. That means implementing data-gathering technologies like the Internet of Things and cleansing data before feeding it to AI models.

Organizations must also recognize this technological transformation is expensive and disruptive. Consequently, going all in on it at once will result in astronomical costs and poor results. Instead, businesses should identify where AI is most useful — typically, data-centric, analytical tasks where manual alternatives are least effective — and start there.

Applying AI to a single use case helps companies spread out the costs. They can then learn what works and what doesn’t to use it more effectively when they expand their AI in the future.

Supply Chain AI Could Be the Key to Adaptability

Supply chains must become more adaptive to meet tomorrow’s demands. To do that, they’ll have to embrace supply chain AI.

Implementing AI can be challenging, but if organizations do it well, it can push them ahead of the competition. They’ll then have the insights and efficiency necessary to adapt to a quickly shifting world.

 

To read the full article, click here.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_AI can often spot subtle /blogs/china-curbs-graphite-ev-supply-chain/ Mon, 23 Oct 2023 14:41:42 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=40064 A move by China that could curtail exports of graphite may throw a wrench into the supply chains of electric vehicle and battery makers that rely on highly processed versions of the...

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A move by China that could curtail exports of graphite may throw a wrench into the supply chains of electric vehicle and battery makers that rely on highly processed versions of the mineral to help power their fleets of plug-in automobiles.

The graphite restrictions followed moves by the U.S. to curb exports of certain semiconductors American companies can sell to China. The U.S. has cited national security concerns for the stiffened export controls, just as China did for its action on graphite.

The trade tit-for-tat shows China is willing to flex its considerable muscle on the EV supply chain as it has outsize influence in the market for key minerals that are vital to battery production.

On Friday, China announced that starting in December it would require export permits for specialized forms of synthetic graphite and natural flake graphite.

China dominates the market for graphite, which is used in the anode of nearly every EV battery. The U.S. sourced roughly a third of its graphite supply from China in 2021. The country is also a major player in other rare earth minerals used in EV production, including lithium.

A Congressional Resource Service report noted last year that the U.S does not have any active graphite mines and has few prospects to develop domestic reserves.

“There’s no way that we can easily decouple ourselves from China,” said Kevin Ketels, an assistant professor of global supply chain management at Wayne State University. “That’s not going to happen.”

Stephanie Valdez Streaty, director of industry insight at Cox Automotive, said the immediate impact of China’s actions are not yet clear, but “it highlights the importance of having a robust and sustainable U.S. supply chain.”

Price is one of the biggest hurdles to EV adoption. China’s actions have the potential to increase the EV prices or put more cost pressures on automakers, she said.

More than 870,000 EVs were sold in the U.S. in the first nine months of the year, and the industry is on pace to surpass 1 million units in a single year for the first time ever in 2023, according to data from Cox Automotive.

For years, EVs have been seen as the future of the auto industry. U.S. companies and the federal government have made it a priority to research new battery chemistry and find alternative sources of raw materials to avoid China and build a domesticsupply chain.

Georgia is a major beneficiary of that push.Since 2018, Georgia has recruited more than $25 billion in EV-related investments and commitments for more than 30,000 jobs, according to Gov. Brian Kemp’s office.

EVs, which produce no tailpipe emissions of greenhouse gases, are central to President Joe Biden’s climate and economic agenda.

At the same time, his administration has passed sweeping legislation encouraging car and battery companies to build their products in the U.S., creating end-to-end domestic supply chains and tens of thousands of jobs. American and foreign brands have responded by announcing new, multi-billion-dollarEV and battery plants in the U.S.

SK Battery America built a massive factory in Jackson County, northeast of Atlanta, supplying Volkswagen and Ford. Anovion, a synthetic graphite maker, has announced a plant in Bainbridge. Copper and mineral recycler Aurubis operates a factory in Augusta, while Ascend Elements recycles lithium-ion batteries in Covington.

In Bryan County, near the coast, Hyundai is building a $7.6 billion EV and battery assembly plant with partner LG Energy Solution. Hyundai is also building a battery plant with an SK subsidiary in Bartow County.

Rivian meanwhile, expects to break ground early next year on its $5 billion factory an hour east of Atlanta. Cox Enterprises, which owns The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, also owns Cox Automotive and holds about a 4% stake in Rivian.

A spokesman for Rivian declined to comment and Hyundai did not respond by press time. In a statement, SK said they do not expect China’s moves to immediately affect graphite supplies, but are “closely monitoring the long-term impact with our partners.”

Pat Wilson, Georgia’s commissioner of economic development, said Kemp tasked his agency to recruit “the jobs of tomorrow” and it’s paid dividends for people across the state while diversifying the U.S supply chain.

But critical and rare earth minerals are key to the technologies that support those jobs, Wilson said, and are controlled by “a few countries, many of which are plagued by unstable and corrupt governments and/or are unfriendly to U.S. interests.”

“When one country controls 90% of processing of one mineral, like China does for graphite, there is an international recognition that we have to diversify supply and invest in technology to alleviate possible pinch points in the system,” he said.

Some of that new technology development is happening here in Georgia.

Matthew McDowell, the co-director of Georgia Tech’s Advanced Battery Center, said one promising alternative is silicon, which is cheaper, more abundant and can store more energy than graphite. Already, it is used in smaller applications, and several major automakers — like GM, Mercedes-Benz and Porsche — are banking on silicon for their next-generation batteries.

Sila Nanotechnologies, which was co-founded by Georgia Tech professor Gleb Yushin, has emerged as a key player, with a $3.3 billion valuation and a deal with Mercedes to produce silicon anodes for its G-Class vehicles.

But the technology needs to mature, and in the meantime, he said the U.S. needs to source its graphite from more reliable trade partners.

“We don’t have a solution right now that can replace it (graphite), even though we’re working on it as fast as we can,” McDowell said.

To read the full article, click here.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_AI can often spot subtle /blogs/breaking-up-is-hard/ Fri, 21 Apr 2023 13:41:13 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=37661 The Biden administration is on a campaign to fundamentally alter the supply chains that feed America’s vast appetite for foreign-made goods. This effort is driven in part by the public’s...

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The Biden administration is on a campaign to fundamentally alter the supply chains that feed America’s vast appetite for foreign-made goods. This effort is driven in part by the public’s demand for protection against the sorts of shortages that made everything from butter to SUVs scarce during the Covid-19 pandemic. Real enthusiasm for reordering supply chains, however, is stoked by perceived military and economic threats to the U.S. from a more assertive China.

On her first visit to India last November, Treasury Secretary Yellen called for “like-minded countries” to work together to reduce the world’s dependence on “risky countries,” taking clear aim at China. Such statements play well on Capitol Hill, where members of Congress outcompete each other to show who is most disgusted by China. But they pose problems for many of America’s trade partners who do not share America’s desires to decouple.

Tangled Webs

The Biden administration inherited Trumpera policies intended to force China to clean up its predatory treatment of American intellectual property — patents, trade secrets and the like. The tariffs, which remain on two thirds of U.S. imports from China, were justified by the Trump administration not only by claims that American companies were forced to share technology as a condition of doing business there, but also as a means of reducing U.S. dependence on China for natural resources and some industrial products, and as payback for past unfair trade practices.

America’s list of China’s economic threats is long, but concern that it will dominate future “chokepoints” — supply nodes that can be used to restrict access to critical materials — drives current policy. And recent Chinese actions have only reinforced fears of economic coercion. Over the past few years, China has used its economic leverage to retaliate against perceived slights from more than a dozen countries, slapping on tariffs and negating long-standing trade relations. Last October, the Biden administration deployed chokepoints of its own to forestall Chinese hightech development, banning exports of advanced semiconductors and the equipment needed to make them.

Although it features prominently in the press, America’s “tech war” with China is only part of the wider effort to reshape U.S.-Sino trade relations. The White House is determined to reduce future dependence on China through “reshoring” and “friend-shoring” of the activities that supply American markets. The goal of moving supply chains away from China now guides U.S. trade and investment policies, its economic relationships with allies, and its refusal to restore the World Trade Organization’s authority to act as an effective arbiter of trade disputes.

As the world’s most innovative economy and its largest importer — American merchandise imports exceeded $3 trillion in 2022 — the United States has many levers to move global supply chains. A review of these tools shows, however, that while some can be used effectively at least in the near term, none comes without substantial economic costs. There are also profound consequences of this campaign for U.S. global leadership.

America’s efforts to restructure global supply chains reflect a fundamental rethinking of how the global trading system should work. No longer willing to abide by WTO treaty norms, especially non-discrimination against other members, the U.S. is leading the formation of exclusive trade and investment networks. Other countries also seek to reduce dependence on China and are eager to capture market share it loses. But they still resist U.S. efforts to force them to decouple from China.

The Usefulness of Trump’s Trade-War Tariffs

The Biden administration has left untouched the Trump-era tariffs levied in 2018 and 2019. This failure to reform Trump’s tariff policies, which represented an about-face from decades of U.S. commitment to rules-based open global trade, surprised many who followed the Biden campaign’s cogent criticism of the former president’s approach. However, since rearranging supply chains and making them less vulnerable to geopolitical tides is a priority for the Biden White House, retaining the Section 301 tariffs gives the administration broad bodog online casino discretion in responding to perceived injuries and provides a ready-made tool for altering U.S. trade patterns. Tariffs on China, which still average 19 percent, have helped to reduce its share of U.S. goods imports from 22 percent at the start of the trade war to only 17 percent by the end of 2022.

This reduction in China’s share of the U.S. market has caused considerable economic harm to U.S. interests — costs that now seem to have been forgotten in the rush to remake U.S.-China economic relations. To date, U.S. Customs has collected $167 billion in duties on imports from China subject to Section 301 tariffs, which amounts to a hefty tax on U.S. businesses and consumers, as shown by several detailed studies of U.S. import prices. This sum, it’s worth noting, dwarfs revenue collected under Trump-era scattershot trade actions that also hit targets ranging from Canada to Turkey to the EU as well as China. And, incredibly, Americans continue to pay these import taxes while 2022 U.S. imports from China will exceed the value purchased in 2018, when the trade war began.

Because the largest share of U.S. imports from China are “intermediate goods” — goods, like engine parts, used to make other goods — these tariffs make U.S. businesses that rely on inputs from China less competitive against their foreign rivals at home and abroad. An analysis by Kyle Handley (Michigan), Fariha Kamal (U.S. Census) and Ryan Monarch (Federal Reserve), using detailed information on the activities of American manufacturers, found that Trump-era tariffs lowered export growth for those exposed to them, with an effect equivalent to a 2 percent to 4 percent tariff levied on their foreign sales. And there’s no reason to believe these tariffs are currently less damaging.

While hurting U.S. exports, tariffs do not often result in “reshoring” — that is, returning production (and jobs) to the United States. A recent study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics found that trade subject to the Trump tariffs was diverted away from China toward Mexico and other parts of East Asia, not to Detroit or Seattle or Dallas.

Mr. Biden has made the notion of “democracies versus autocracies” an organizing principle of his foreign policy. Unfortunately, in a world with low barriers to trade, blocking an autocracy from participation in one’s supply chains does not imply that democratically governed economies will take its place. Indeed, one of the ironies of the U.S.-China trade war is the bonus it has provided to Vietnam, an economy guided by the country’s communist party. Vietnam’s share of exports to the U.S. increased markedly after the levy of tariffs on Chinese goods including footwear and apparel. Adding to the irony, the shift was less than what it appears: these Vietnamese- labeled goods undoubtedly contain Chinese content, and some are made in Chinese- owned factories.

Most striking is Vietnam’s emergence as a site for multinational electronics manufacturing. Following the start of the U.S.-China trade war, China’s share of U.S. imports of electronics fell rapidly, losing 10 percentage points in four years (see figure below). Over the same interval, Vietnam’s share of the U.S. electronics import market rose by six points.

The shift of manufacturers to Vietnam is even more dramatic in specific products. Before the trade war, China provided 51 percent of U.S. imports of broadcasting equipment, almost 19 times the share imported from Vietnam. By 2020, China’s share had fallen to 39 percent, while Vietnam’s share had ballooned to 11 percent. An important reason for Vietnam’s success in raising its U.S. presence is its ongoing market reforms and opening to foreign investment. Perhaps the U.S. would do well to focus on whether traded products are made under competitive market conditions rather than under systems of government other than our own.

Strikingly, not one U.S. trade partner joined the American effort to change China’s ways by blanketing China with tariffs. While China’s share of U.S. imports fell, the rest of the world maintained normal trade relations with the export giant. China’s share of world manufacturing exports actually rose, reaching 19 percent in 2020, up from 18 percent in 2017. Clearly, the trade war failed to move the needle on global supplies.

Redirecting Semiconductor Supply Chains

Semiconductors are the poster child for economic chokepoints. The geographic concentration of fabrication plants, or “fabs,” has been identified as a threat to long-term U.S. access to chips. Because about 70 percent are manufactured in Asia — including almost all of the most advanced chips — many fear that conflict in the region would prevent Western access to the semiconductors that have become critical to modern life. Finding this situation untenable, the U.S. passed the CHIPS and Science Act in August 2022 with the aim of increasing investment in domestic semiconductor manufacturing capacity. The bill includes over $50 billion in subsidies for construction of new onshore fabrication facilities, with Micron and Intel among those announcing plans for new U.S. fabs.

While working to reduce U.S. reliance on Asian manufacturing, the U.S. has also made use of its own chokepoints in the semiconductor industry. In October 2022, the Biden administration announced unprecedented controls on sales to China of high-end chips used in artificial intelligence and supercomputing along with chip design software and semiconductor manufacturing equipment. These controls represent a far-reaching effort to alter not only today’s shipments of advanced semiconductors, but to ensure that China is cut off from advanced industrial supply chains for years to come.

There’s no free lunch here, though. Efforts to reduce reliance on Asian chip fabs and to deny China access to American-made chips and equipment come with costs and risks. In addition to the money spent on direct government subsidies to new fabs, the U.S. may pay permanently higher prices for semiconductors made domestically or by non-Asian suppliers. Executives from Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation, which is now tooling a $12 billion semiconductor plant in Arizona, have been clear that the higher cost of building and operating the plant in the U.S. will filter into future chip prices. The Taiwanese market leader is now planning its next Arizona plant, which will produce 3-nanometer chips — the advanced chips export controls now seek to restrict — at an estimated cost of $28 billion.

Not surprisingly, not everyone is eager for initiatives that drive up the costs of advanced computing. America’s unilateral export controls have provoked pushback from allies, some of whom are being blocked in efforts to sell chip-design technology and manufacturing equipment to Chinese customers. The Biden administration continues to persuade the Dutch and the Japanese, makers of key elements in the semiconductor supply chain, to join the control regime, but to date the U.S. must rely on extraterritorial enforcement through sanctions to prevent sales to China.

Europe appears set to oppose the aggressive approach to technology decoupling taken by the United States. At the January 2023 World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in Davos, French Minster for the Economy and Finances Bruno Le Maire pushed back, arguing that “China cannot be out, China must be in.”

U.S. semiconductor subsidies and its new export controls work together to form a “herebut- not-there” strategy for chip manufacturing. In a world of dizzyingly complex supply chains, it’s difficult to see how such a strategy can be successfully applied to more than advanced chips. Major technology-producing countries rely on each other for different stages of production and for different varieties of the same type of good. The United States currently exports high-value chips and imports low-value chips, so removing China from supply chains would require the U.S. to prioritize basic chip production at the same time it is ramping up advanced chip production.

In short, subsidizing new fab plants at home and blocking exports of advanced chips to China will alter America’s semiconductor supply chain — but export controls offer an incomplete template for reordering the lion’s share of global flows of these globally produced commodities. In time, global players that don’t share the Biden administration’s priorities will find a way to work around U.S. technology and markets.

Friend-Shoring: Creating a Future with Exclusive Trading Clubs

Although it is unwilling to negotiate new trade deals, the Biden administration sees economic agreements focused on labor, environment and governance standards as a tool for shaping the future of global supply chains. The newly launched Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is the clearest expression of this strategy, as it aims to build a circle of “friends” who commit to American values on labor and the environment and share American aspirations for greener and fairer economic outcomes.

For the United States, IPEF is a second chance to achieve some of what was lost when Donald Trump pulled the plug on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a Pacific-rim economic alliance whose downside seems to have been the fact that it was an initiative of the Obama administration. The Biden administration wants to bolster American military presence in the region with deeper economic ties. But IPEF has a second utility: it’s a mechanism for an end-run around China’s manufacturing capabilities. Using commitments to high standards for how goods are designed and new rules for how they are produced, the U.S. hopes to build an alternative to the TPP that China will never be allowed to join.

With much of its domestic coalition opposed to new international economic agreements, the Biden Administration hopes that transfer of its domestic priorities to IPEF negotiations will appease those who see anything that smacks of globalization as a loss for the United States. The White House has designed an effort that is free of new market opening, binding commitments, or even a whiff of U.S. concessions. Unfortunately, the lack of any meaningful U.S. concessions makes the IPEF a hard sell in developing Asia.

South and Southeast Asian nations are eager for deeper economic engagement with America. However, without some tangible reward for meeting U.S. demands and no obvious cost of failing to do so, leaders in these countries have little leverage to overcome their own domestic opposition to the “high standards” envisioned for IPEF that are certain to increase production costs. Equally important, U.S. rhetoric and demands for friend-shoring threaten to upset the delicate balance the region has achieved between reliance on the American security umbrella and trade/investment ties to China.

China is the first or second most important trade partner for all IPEF countries, as seen in the figure at right. Indeed, 11 of the 13 countries joining IPEF negotiations with the United States are already members of the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which features a platform for economic cooperation as part of its mandate. Through RCEP, almost all IPEF partners are members of a free-trade agreement with China. Generous rules of origin contained in RCEP encourage development of value chains among its members.

A key question for IPEF, then, is whether the agreement will constrain the partners to source inputs only from other IPEF “friends.” By eliminating China as a source of intermediate goods, participants in IPEF would risk degrading their export competitiveness. If the U.S. were offering preferential market access to those who friend-shore, taking on new obligations that raise production costs to serve U.S. buyers might make economic sense. And the U.S. may ultimately feel obliged to make concessions of this sort — probably not through preferential tariffs but through rules that restrict the products that can be brought into the U.S. market, or through price mechanisms, such as carbon border taxes, that reward “friendly” green producers.

Reordering the Global Order

The rules-based international trade system as we know it is on the endangered list. With China seen as willing to subsize its industries, block imports and steal technology, playing by WTO rules looks like a sucker’s game to many Americans. U.S. diplomats still pay lip service to the importance of the system, but the Biden administration continues to block the appointment of new WTO appellate judges needed to enforce WTO rules — as did Presidents Obama and Trump. The negative U.S. response to the recent WTO ruling on former President Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs — in which national security was found to be inadequate, in this instance, as a basis for trade restrictions — makes clear that America no longer intends to abide by WTO rules that interfere with its geopolitical objectives.

In its place, the U.S. is building an economic system designed to satisfy its goal of restricting trade with China. Trump-era trade-war tariffs continue to tax U.S. imports. U.S. semiconductor-related exports are now subject to powerful controls, with the promise of additional controls on advanced tech sales to come. And the U.S. has turned to Asia, the region most deeply intertwined with the Chinese economy, to create a future network of “like-minded” friends.

The costs of this pivot away from a multinational trading system built on nondiscrimination have yet to be tallied. For some, China’s authoritarianism at home and bellicose behavior abroad demand that the U.S. develop a new, exclusionary framework. In this view, the price of inaction is too high, so the demise of the WTO should be seen as unavoidable collateral damage. The path forward is thus clear: reduce economic exchange with China as quickly as possible.

The problem here is that even if the U.S. succeeds in dropping China from its supply chains, the latter will almost certainly remain the world’s largest exporter and second largest importer. Without the support of allies and partners, the U.S. cannot be successful in doing more than isolating its own market.

U.S. allies and partners are not prepared to decouple from China under current conditions. Chinese intermediate goods will be built into the products they sell, their exporters will seek to profit from the Chinese market, and their multinationals will continue to invest in China. U.S. production will be burdened by its isolation from least-cost suppliers and thereby hindered in its ability to remain competitive in foreign markets.

The U.S. urgently needs to clarify the extent to which it intends to remove Chinesemade goods from its supply chains (including those that funnel Chinese inputs through the factories of our trading partners). And if the goal is containing an aggressive China, clarification won’t be easy.

For much of what the world buys from China has little connection to high-tech competition and is made in privately owned factories with little connection to the Chinese state. Indeed, a healthy private sector may prove the only effective buffer against increasing authoritarianism from Beijing. Is the U.S. truly better off if it alone turns to higher-cost suppliers for these products?

So far, the Biden administration seems set on its path — trade with trusted partners! — but not how far down the road it wants to go in excluding China. The White House has said that the U.S. does not want to truly decouple economically from China, yet U.S. actions on 5G telecommunications equipment and now semiconductors send a different signal. The result is heightened uncertainty for international businesses as they plan where and how much to invest.

President Biden has made consultation with allies a hallmark of his foreign policy. Such consultation is imperative when the U.S. needs the support of partners who see economic relations with China in a different light.

The U.S. and EU have created the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), a coordinating platform that proved useful in crafting a collective response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But the TTC is also a natural venue for the U.S. to coordinate beyond sanctions and export controls. It could be bodog sportsbook review used as a platform for clarifying where dependence on trade with China puts our economies at risk. The EU and the U.S. could also use the TTC to coordinate the search for alternative suppliers. And if new sources need to be created, the TTC could help the U.S. and the EU avoid a subsidy war with each reaching to grab whatever jobs China-proofing their economies will create.

Lastly, the U.S. would be wise to reconsider the role of standards as a mechanism for keeping China out of new trade arrangements. China will be able to meet many labor and environmental standards, including the “decarbonization” of production, sooner than many developing countries that the U.S. would like to include in its exclusive trade clubs. Better to declare up front that China is not welcome than to pretend that they’re ineligible because they can never measure up to our standards.

By the same token, positioning high standards as an aspirational goal for U.S. supply chains rather than the price of admission would create a setting more welcoming to poorer countries that do not currently meet them. Although developing countries may desire the fair working conditions, clean environments and digitally enabled trade being promoted by the U.S. in its IPEF initiative, they differ in how far and how fast they will be able (or want) to commit to American standards. If the IPEF is to bear fruit, the U.S. must aim at building a trading network that does not yet exist rather than asking potential partners to meet standards that do not fit their current circumstances.

* * *

As the multilateral trading system frays, the United States has begun to build a new system that suits its current priorities. At the top of this list is reducing China’s role in U.S. supply chains. But current rules codified by the WTO hinder the creation of a network reserved for the “like-minded.” And so far, the U.S. is not carrying its friends along on the journey. Unless Washington tempers ambitions for isolating China, the U.S. risks isolating itself instead. This would represent a failure of leadership that would weaken American competitiveness and leave our friends and allies more — not less — dependent on Chinese markets.

Mary Lovely is the Anthony M. Solomon senior fellow at the Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_AI can often spot subtle /blogs/friendshoring-global-supply-chains/ Thu, 30 Mar 2023 20:37:37 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=37408 The Biden administration’s latest geopolitical strategy is to prioritise trading with ‘trusted allies’. But in a highly complex and interconnected world, would such a move even work? Free trade has...

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The Biden administration’s latest geopolitical strategy is to prioritise trading with ‘trusted allies’. But in a highly complex and interconnected world, would such a move even work?

Free trade has never looked so sickly. Geopolitical tensions, including the US-China trade war and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have infected global trade relations. Coupled with the lingering disruption of Brexit and Covid-19, these rows threaten to severely disrupt global supply chains.

The cure? Well, recognising that trade and geopolitics are inextricably linked, the Biden administration has created a new policy to treat the supply chain risk. The diktat, which it has named friendshoring, involves only trading with trusted allies.

But the strategy raises several concerns. Firstly, how does the US propose to differentiate a ‘friendly country’ from an ‘unfriendly’ one? In addition to its traditional allies, the Biden administration has identified Brazil, India, South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia as trustworthy nations.

But there are grey areas. Hungary, for example, is part of the EU, which is regarded as a friendly trading bloc in the US administration’s eyes. Yet US think-tank Freedom House only classes Hungary as being “partly free”, given Viktor Orban and his government’s frequent attacks on democracy, the rule of law, press freedoms and LGBTQ+ rights. What does it mean, then, for the US to indirectly call Hungary a ‘trusted ally’, then?

Finding alternatives to Made in China

Even if the US can fine-tune who it considers a trusted ally, and if its companies embrace the concept of friendshoring, can the emerging industrial powerhouses on the US list prove to be a viable substitute for Chinese manufacturing bases?

Jose Arturo Garza-Reyes, professor of operations management at the University of Derby, says that the aforementioned countries “are rapidly becoming part of the top 15 most competitive nations for labour-intensive commodity products”. In the short- to medium-term, he believes that “supply chain agreements formed with China can be replaced with agreements with these countries”.

But in the long term he worries that friendshoring could create a world divided between free-market democracies and authoritarian regimes. Garza-Reyes is particularly concerned that friendshoring could take the world back to similar trading characteristics last seen during the Cold War, creating ‘trade blocs’ where some countries are aligned to autocratic states such as China and Russia, and others to Western nations.

“This could exacerbate the already high friction between these blocs,” he says, “making the friendshoring policy a dangerous one. From an operational point of view, this would limit the partnerships and relationships that companies can develop, preventing them from being able to procure the best products, services and raw materials at the lowest cost. Once again, from an operational perspective, this makes friendshoring an undesired, but currently politically necessary policy.”

A necessary cost to bear?

If a policy of friendshoring divides the world into separate trading blocs, it is unclear what economic impact it would have. One estimate from the World Trade Organization suggests that GDP could take a hit of up to 5%.

Emily Benson, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), agrees that this is a risk, but says that the policy of friendshoring “does not necessarily preclude deeper market access for non-aligned nations”.

She explains: “The US government is not saying that it will not allow goods into North America. It is affirmatively trying to build more partnerships with countries that have critical inputs for US supply chains.”

But perhaps the most important question of all is that with China being deemed an unfriendly nation by the new policy, will global corporations like Apple, which are heavily reliant on China for manufacturing, up and leave? According to Bloomberg Intelligence, around 98% of iPhones are made in China, and it would take the company about eight years to move just 10% of its production capacity out of China.

So how can the US administration persuade companies with large Chinese manufacturing bases to relocate to ‘friendlier’ climes? Options include offering subsidies or tax breaks to set up in countries which are considered trusted allies, placing tariffs on goods manufactured in China (as it did in the recent US/China trade war), or simply stopping US companies from buying from or selling to unfriendly nations.

Benson, who recently co-authored a report called The Limits of “Friend-Shoring”, says: “It’s much more nuanced than that and very sector-specific. Some industries such as the defence sector, which demand total transparency and visibility across their entire supply chain, will openly embrace friendshoring, while other sectors will find it more difficult to uncouple themselves from their Chinese manufacturing bases.”

Would friendshoring even work?

But will tariffs succeed in encouraging companies to shift to friendlier nations? Dr Heather Skipworth doesn’t think so. Skipworth, an associate professor in supply chain management at the Cranfield School of Management, points to a study she co-wrote two years ago which featured an interviewee from the automotive industry. This interviewee told Skipworth that “tariffs on steel and aluminium would need to be significantly higher than 25% to justify switching from a brake motor supplier in northern China to a domestic US supplier”.

From an operational point of view, friendshoring would limit the relationships that companies can develop

Skipworth adds: “In the end, our research revealed that it wasn’t necessarily tariffs that persuaded companies to move their supply chains away from China. Instead, we identified three factors – institutional pressures (which includes tariffs), supply chain mobility, and the perceived severity of the potential disruption risk – as the keys to supply chain design. In my view these characteristics could prove to be the main determinants of whether the friendshoring policy is followed.”

But for Garza-Reyes, tax breaks and subsidies may indeed have a role to play to “facilitate and support the reconfiguration of supply chains in the short and possibly medium term”. That said, he adds that the opportunity cost will be “an increased cost in the operation of the supply chains and the products, services and raw materials they procure”.

Why a gradual shift is on the cards

In the long term, both Garza-Reyes and Benson expect companies which have invested heavily in China to see the bigger picture and move their supply chains elsewhere.

As Garza-Reyes puts it: “I believe that most companies will still voluntarily follow this option as they know that doing business… with companies from unfriendly nations increases the risk of serious disruptions in their supply chains and operations.”

Benson agrees, adding that “over time the cost of labour in China will become more expensive. It may become more difficult for foreign companies to operate there due to a combination of higher labour costs and a more difficult political environment. It is therefore incumbent upon companies to determine which locations are competitive in terms of lower production costs and other efficiency gains, such as IP protections and overall ease of doing business.”

Such a shift would by no means signal the end of the global supply chain economy, but it underlines the increasingly important role that state-led commercial alliances and regional partnerships will play in future trade discussions.

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