Rising from the ashes of three disastrous decades of deglobalization, extremism, and world war, our two institutions were built on the idea that thriving international trade goes hand in hand with global prosperity and stability. On balance, the post–World War II record has been impressive. Today fewer than 1 in 10 of the world’s people are poor, a fourfold reduction since 1990, as low- and middle-income countries have doubled their share of global trade. Pivotal to this leap in global income is a twentyfold increase in international trade since 1960.

Yet the tide is turning against economic interdependence and international trade. Trade restrictions and subsidies increased after the global financial crisis, and tensions escalated further as governments responded to the pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine by scrambling to secure strategic supply chains and rushing into trade-distorting policies. Taken too far, these measures may open the door to alliance-oriented policies that reduce economic efficiency and fragment the global trading system. They could backfire if short supply chains end up more vulnerable to localized shocks. Foreign direct investment is already increasingly concentrated among geopolitically aligned countries.

Should we abandon the idea of trade as a transformative force for good? Our answer is a resounding “No!” Despite all the talk, trade has continued to deliver even during recent crises. It has great potential to keep contributing to higher living standards and greater economic opportunities for decades to come.

There are at least three reasons international trade is crucial for global prosperity. First, it increases productivity by expanding the international division of labor. Second, it enables export-led economic growth by providing access to foreign markets. And third, it bolsters economic security by giving firms and households valuable outside options when negative shocks hit.

During the pandemic, trade and supply chains became vital to ramping up production and distribution of medical supplies, including vaccines. The power of international trade as a source of resilience has become evident again during the war in Ukraine. Deep and diversified international markets for grain enabled economies traditionally reliant on imports from Ukraine and Russia to make up shortfalls. Ethiopia, for example, lost all its wheat imports from Ukraine but now sources 20 percent of its wheat shipments from Argentina—a country from which it had not imported any wheat before.

Fragmentation’s costs

In this context, fragmentation could be costly for the global economy. A scenario in which the world divides into two separate trading blocs could lead to a 5 percent drop in global GDP, World Trade Organization (WTO) research shows. The IMF, meanwhile, reckons global losses from trade fragmentation could range from 0.2 to 7 percent of GDP. The costs may be higher when accounting for technological decoupling. Emerging market economies and low-income countries would be most at risk due to the loss of knowledge transfer.

Reinforcing the trading system to safeguard the benefits and prevent losses is important. But there is also an exciting forward-looking trade policy agenda that responds to the future of international trade, which we envision to be inclusive, green, and increasingly digitally and services driven.

Trade has done a lot to reduce poverty and inequality between countries. Yet we must acknowledge that it has left too many people behind—people in rich countries have been hurt by import competition, and people in poor countries have been unable to tap into global value chains and are often on the front line of environmental degradation and conflict over resources. As we told Group of Twenty officials in a joint paper our institutions wrote with the World Bank, it need not be this way. With the right domestic policies, countries can benefit from free trade’s great opportunities and lift those that have been left behind.

Addressing these underlying causes of discontent would solve people’s problems more effectively than the trade interventions we see today. Well-designed social safety nets, greater investment in training, and policies in areas like credit, housing, and infrastructure that help, not hinder, workers to move across industries, occupations, and companies could all play a part.

The current push toward more diversified supply chains presents great opportunities for countries and communities that have struggled to integrate into global value chains: bringing more of them into production networks—what we call “re-globalization”—would be good for supply resilience, growth, and development.

Many of today’s most pressing global problems will not be solved without international trade. We cannot overcome the climate crisis and get to net zero greenhouse gas emissions without trade. We need trade to get low-carbon technology and services to everywhere they are needed. Open and predictable trade lowers the cost of decarbonization by expanding market size, enabling scale economies, and learning by doing.

To provide one example, the price of solar power has fallen by almost 90 percent since 2010. Forty percent of this decline has come from scale economies made possible partly by trade and cross-border value chains, the WTO has estimated.

Cooperation’s possibilities

By updating global trade rules, governments can help trade thrive in new areas that would expand opportunities, for emerging market economies especially. Even as goods trade stalls, trade in services continues to expand rapidly. Global exports of digital services such as consulting delivered by video calls reached $3.8 trillion in 2022, or 54 percent of total services exports. 

Some efforts are already underway. A group of nearly 90 WTO members, including China, the EU, and the US, are currently negotiating basic rules on digital trade. Shared rules would make trade more predictable, reduce duplication, and cut the compliance costs that typically weigh heaviest on the smallest businesses.

Similarly, multilateral cooperation and common standards could speed the green transition while preventing market fragmentation and minimizing negative policy spillovers to other countries. Bringing more small and women-owned businesses into global production networks—digital and otherwise—would spread the gains from trade more broadly across societies.

Despite geopolitical tensions, meaningful cooperation on trade remains possible. We saw this last June when all WTO members came together to deliver agreements on curbing harmful fisheries subsidies, removing barriers to food aid, and enhancing access to the intellectual property behind COVID vaccines. Governments can build on those successes at the WTO’s next ministerial meeting in February 2024. And recent work by our institutions points to a way to defuse tensions in sensitive areas such as subsidies through data, analysis, and common perspectives on policy design.

Navigating trade policies through the current turbulent period is challenging. But keeping trade open and looking for new opportunities for closer cooperation will be essential to build on existing gains and to help deliver solutions to climate change and other global challenges.

The IMF, WTO, and other leading international institutions have a critical role in charting a way forward that is in the collective interest. We must cooperate tirelessly to strengthen the multilateral trading system and demonstrate that our own institutions can adapt to a fast-changing world. The IMF has a mandate to support the balanced growth of international trade. The WTO remains the only forum that brings all economies together to advance trade reform. We cannot afford to stand still. 

KRISTALINA GEORGIEVA is the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

NGOZI OKONJO-IWEALA is director-general of the World Trade Organization.

To read the full blog, please click here.

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“The dangerous divergence in economic prospects across countries remains a major concern.”

Compared to our July forecast, the global growth projection for 2021 has been revised down marginally to 5.9 percent and is unchanged for 2022 at 4.9 percent. However, this modest headline revision masks large downgrades for some countries. The outlook for the low-income developing country group has darkened considerably due to worsening pandemic dynamics. The downgrade also reflects more difficult near-term prospects for the advanced economy group, in part due to supply disruptions. Partially offsetting these changes, projections for some commodity exporters have been upgraded on the back of rising commodity prices. Pandemic-related disruptions to contact-intensive sectors have caused the labor market recovery to significantly lag the output recovery in most countries.

The dangerous divergence in economic prospects across countries remains a major concern. Aggregate output for the advanced economy group is expected to regain its pre-pandemic trend path in 2022 and exceed it by 0.9 percent in 2024. By contrast, aggregate output for the emerging market and developing economy group (excluding China) is expected to remain 5.5 percent below the pre-pandemic forecast in 2024, resulting in a larger setback to improvements in their living standards.

These divergences are a consequence of the “great vaccine divide” and large disparities in policy support. While almost 60 percent of the population in advanced economies are fully vaccinated and some are now receiving booster shots, about 96 percent of the population in low-income countries remain unvaccinated. Furthermore, many emerging market and developing economies, faced with tighter financing conditions and a greater risk of de-anchoring inflation expectations, are withdrawing policy support more quickly despite larger shortfalls in output.

Supply disruptions pose another policy challenge. On the one hand, pandemic outbreaks and climate disruptions have resulted in shortages of key inputs and lowered manufacturing activity in several countries. On the other hand, these supply shortages, alongside the release of pent-up demand and the rebound in commodity prices, have caused consumer price inflation to increase rapidly in, for example, the United States, Germany, and many emerging market and developing economies. Food prices have increased the most in low-income countries where food insecurity is most acute, adding to the burdens of poorer households and raising the risk of social unrest.

The October 2021 Global Financial Stability Report highlights another challenge to monetary policy from increased risk-taking in financial markets and rising fragilities in the nonbank financial institutions sector.

Policy priorities

A principal common factor behind these complex challenges is the continued grip of the pandemic on global society. The foremost policy priority is therefore to vaccinate at least 40 percent of the population in every country by end-2021 and 70 percent by mid-2022. This will require high-income countries to fulfill existing vaccine dose donation pledges, coordinate with manufacturers to prioritize deliveries to COVAX in the near-term and remove trade restrictions on the flow of vaccines and their inputs. At the same time, closing the $20 billion residual grant funding gap for testing, therapeutics and genomic surveillance will save lives now and keep vaccines fit for purpose. Looking ahead, vaccine manufacturers and high-income countries should support the expansion of regional production of COVID-19 vaccines in developing countries through financing and technology transfers.

Another urgent global priority is the need to slow the rise in global temperatures and contain the growing adverse effects of climate change. This will require more ambitious commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at the upcoming United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26). A policy strategy that includes an international carbon price floor adjusted to country circumstances, a green public investment and research subsidy push, and compensatory, targeted transfers to households can help advance the energy transition in an equitable way. Just as importantly, advanced countries need to deliver on their earlier promises of mobilizing $100 billion of annual climate financing for developing countries.

In addition, concerted multilateral efforts to ensure adequate international liquidity for constrained economies, and faster implementation of the G20 common framework to restructure unsustainable debt, would help limit divergences across countries. Building on the historic $650 billion Special Drawing Right (SDR) allocation, the IMF is calling on countries with strong external positions to voluntarily channel their SDRs into the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. Furthermore, it is exploring the establishment of a Resilience and Sustainability Trust, which would provide long-term funding to support countries’ investment in sustainable growth.

At the national level, the overall policy mix should be calibrated to local pandemic and economic conditions, aiming for maximum sustainable employment while protecting the credibility of policy frameworks. With fiscal space becoming more limited in many economies, health care spending should continue to be prioritized, while lifelines and transfers will need to become increasingly targeted, reinforced by retraining and support for reallocation. As health outcomes improve, policy emphasis should increasingly focus on long-term structural goals.

With public debt levels at record highs, all initiatives should be rooted in credible medium-term frameworks, backed by feasible revenue and spending measures. The October 2021 Fiscal Monitor demonstrates that such credibility can lower financing costs for countries and increase fiscal space in the near-term.

Monetary policy will need to walk a fine line between tackling inflation and financial risks and supporting the economic recovery. We project, amidst high uncertainty, that headline inflation will likely return to pre-pandemic levels by mid-2022 for the group of advanced economies and emerging and developing economies. There is, however, considerable heterogeneity across countries with upside risks for some, like the United States, United Kingdom, and some emerging market and developing economies. While monetary policy can generally look through transitory increases in inflation, central bodog sportsbook review banks should be prepared to act quickly if the risks of rising inflation expectations become more material in this uncharted recovery. Central banks should chart contingent actions, announce clear triggers, and act in line with that communication.

More generally, clarity and consistent actions can go a long way toward avoiding unnecessary policy accidents that roil financial markets and set back the global recovery—ranging from a failure to lift the US debt ceiling in a timely fashion to disorderly debt restructurings in China’s property sector to escalating cross-border trade and technology tensions.

Recent developments have made it abundantly clear that we are all in this together and the pandemic is not over anywhere until it is over everywhere. If COVID-19 were to have a prolonged impact—into the medium-term—it could reduce global GDP by a cumulative $5.3 trillion over the next five years relative to our current projection. It does not have to be this way. The global community must step up efforts to ensure equitable vaccine access for every country, overcome vaccine hesitancy where there is adequate supply, and secure better economic prospects for all.

Gita Gopinath is the Economic Counsellor and Director of the Research Department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). She is on leave of public service from Harvard University’s Economics department where she is the John Zwaanstra Professor of International Studies and of Economics.

To read the full commentary from the International Monetary Fund, please click here.

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Tragically, the COVID-19 pandemic hit the United States hard. More than 600,000 Americans have died and average life expectancy has fallen. However, diligent work over the past year to develop vaccines and the rollout of vaccination programs over the past several months have begun to bring the pandemic under control. By mid-June, over one-half of the eligible population has been fully vaccinated and both new cases and the test positivity rate have fallen markedly.

The unprecedented fiscal and monetary support, combined with the receding COVID-19 case numbers, should provide a substantial boost to activity in the coming months. Savings will be drawn down, demand will return for in-person services, and depleted inventories will be rebuilt. Growth in 2021 is expected to be around 7 percent, the fastest pace in a generation, with modest risks to the upside. This strong economic performance should continue into 2022, with growth of around 5 percent. It is worth noting that these forecasts are based upon an assumption that the American Jobs Plan and American Families Plan will be legislated during the course of 2021 with a size and composition that is similar to that proposed by the administration. The U.S. external position is judged to be modestly weaker than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.

Indicators suggest significant labor market slack remains which should serve as a safety valve to dampen underlying wage and price pressures. Inflation expectations are also expected to remain well-anchored. However, underlying inflation trends will be obscured in the coming months by significant, transitory movements in relative prices which could lead core personal consumption expenditure (PCE) inflation to temporarily peak later in the year at close to 4 percent. Once these temporary price realignments have passed through the system, PCE inflation is forecasted at around 2½ percent by end-2022.

United States: Selected Economic Indicators

Source: IMF staff forecasts

Fiscal Policies

The changes being proposed to federal tax and spending are aligned with past IMF policy advice. Multi‑year investments in power, transportation, telecommunications, and water will all help remove bottlenecks and increase productivity. There is solid empirical evidence also of the societal payoffs—in the form of lower poverty, better health and education outcomes, reduced crime, increased labor force participation, and better productivity—from providing high-quality childcare, creating a national paid family leave program, investing in pre-school, expanding access to college for low income students, increasing healthcare coverage, and improving college retention. Instituting a permanent increase in taxes on corporate profits and on high income households is warranted as a means to finance the permanent increase in spending obligations. Proposals helpfully include:

· A globally coordinated minimum corporate tax, applied on a country-by-country basis, which will be a crucial step forward in countering the incentives for profit shifting and base erosion.

· The elimination of loopholes that allow high income individuals to recharacterize labor income and escape tax on capital gains.

· A permanent expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit to childless workers and an extension of the higher, refundable child tax credit which together will be instrumental in reducing poverty.

· Increased funding for the Internal Revenue Service which will have potentially large payoffs both in terms of revenues and in increasing the equity of the U.S. tax system.

It is worth highlighting that many of these tax and spending changes will directly support working mothers (who have long made up a large share of the poor and were hard hit by the pandemic ) and disproportionately help black and Hispanic families.

The size and ambition of the proposed fiscal packages is admirable. However, a better targeting of policies would further strengthen their impact on macroeconomic and distributional outcomes. Specifically, as the appropriations process moves ahead, more could be done to:

· Phase out tax credits at lower levels of household income.

· Prioritize spending toward programs that have the biggest impact on productivity, labor force participation, reducing poverty, and facilitating the shift to a low-carbon economy.

· Fully eliminate step-up basis, lower the threshold for paying the estate tax, eliminate the 199A passthrough deduction, and reformulate the business tax as a cashflow tax.

Reorienting the administration’s tax and spending proposals in this way would likely imply a slower (but more sustained) demand impulse, create a bigger boost to aggregate supply, and, in so doing, lessen the near-term risks posed by a sustained upswing in inflation. In this regard, the administration’s commitment not to raise taxes on households earning under US$400,000 per year represents an important constraint (98 percent of households are below this level of income). Without this limitation, further policy changes could be considered including:

· Increasing the U.S. reliance on indirect taxes by introducing a carbon tax and/or raising federal fuel taxes.

· Scaling back poorly targeted tax expenditures such as the income tax exemption for employer-provided health care, the capital gains tax exemptions for individuals selling their principal residence, and the deductibility of mortgage interest and state and local taxes.

· Aligning the combined (i.e., corporate plus personal) top statutory rate on capital income with the top marginal rate on labor income (which would imply taxing dividends and capital gains received by taxable entities at around 20–25 percent). Doing so would also help lessen the extent to which pass-through entities face a preferential tax rate.

Monetary Policy

The Federal Reserve’s actions have been highly effective both in the depths of the crisis and in supporting the recovery. While there were risks to introducing the new monetary framework in the midst of COVID-related uncertainty, the low neutral rate of interest and the asymmetries posed by the effective lower bound called for a new approach to policy. The Federal Reserve’s new policy framework has helped support a more rapid recovery from the pandemic and rightly commits to a near-term overshooting of the 2 percent longer-run inflation goal (in line with past IMF advice). Given the complexity of the U.S. economy and the uncertainties in implementing the new framework, it is appropriate to eschew closely parameterizing this new policy framework (e.g. by providing a formulaic time horizon over which inflation will be averaged or specific limits on the amount that inflation will be allowed to overshoot). Instead, the size and duration of the intended overshoot should be data dependent.

The combination of the new monetary policy framework and the economic boost from fiscal stimulus should be self-reinforcing. The flexible average inflation targeting helps increase the demand impact of the fiscal support by providing more accommodation. At the same time, the large fiscal boost increases the likelihood that inflation gathers enough momentum to sustainably exceed 2 percent (something that the U.S. and other advanced economies have struggled to achieve in the post-global financial crisis period).

In the coming months, the ongoing rapid pace of recovery and expectations of additional fiscal support will necessitate a shift in monetary policy. As discussed above, the reopening of the economy will create considerable unpredictability in PCE inflation during the next several months, making it very difficult to divine underlying inflationary trends. At the same time, presuming staff’s baseline outlook and fiscal policy assumptions are realized, policy rates would likely need to start rising in late-2022 or early-2023 (with asset purchases starting to be scaled back in the first half of 2022).

Managing this transition—from providing reassurance that monetary policy will continue to deliver powerful support to the economy to preparing for an eventual scaling back of asset purchases and a withdrawal of monetary accommodation—will require deft communications under a potentially tight timeline. Mitigating the risks of market misunderstandings, volatility in market pricing, and/or an unwarranted tightening of financial conditions (with all the negative spillovers to the global economy that such outcomes would entail) will require the Federal Open Market Committee to continue clearly telegraphing its interpretation of incoming data and articulating what those economic developments mean for policies. The Federal Reserve’s commitment—to communicate well in advance its thinking and to ensure that the eventual withdrawal of monetary accommodation is orderly, methodical, and transparent—is very welcome.

Risks to the Outlook

The principal risk facing the U.S. economy continues to emanate from the pandemic. The nature of the pandemic has changed globally, new variants are circulating widely, and there has been a shift in hospitalization and mortality toward younger Americans. Furthermore, while vaccines are widely available in the U.S., individual decisions on whether to take the vaccine have become a more binding constraint. Public health efforts in the U.S. will need to continue being applied rigorously, including by targeting populations where vaccination rates are low and by undertaking robust contingency planning to handle another surge of infections. Consideration should also be given to establishing a “standing army” for public health to create idle capacity in testing and medical supplies as well as build a rapid-response unit that could be deployed for testing, tracking, and treatment of viruses.

The U.S. has an important role to play in helping other countries contend with the public health crises, particularly in the developing world. This is not only for humanitarian reasons. Prompt international assistance—in the form of vaccines, medical supplies, and public health expertise—will pay dividends for the U.S. itself, lessening the COVID-19 risks ahead. In this regard, recent announcements by the administration of their intent to provide significant quantities of vaccines to other countries are highly commendable.

There are downside risks to the outlook from the potential that Congress will legislate a fiscal package that is smaller, or less comprehensive, than the one proposed by the administration. Staff forecasts anticipate an increase in discretionary spending and tax expenditures of US$4.3 trillion over the next decade which translates into a cumulative 5¼ percent increase in GDP during 2022–24. The fiscal plans will also have a meaningful, longer-run effect on aggregate supply. Approval of a smaller and/or less effective package of tax and spending would imply less of a boost to both supply and demand.

A surge in underlying inflation in the U.S. is not a likely outcome. However, it does represent an important risk to both the U.S. recovery and to global prospects. A slower rebound in labor force participation—due to public health concerns, retirements, incentive effects from unemployment benefits, or delays in reopening schools and childcare—could create a larger mismatch in the labor market and push wages and prices higher. Supply chain disruptions could prove to be more persistent. The demand impact of the fiscal stimulus could be larger and more front-loaded than currently assessed (especially given the accommodative monetary stance). The expected supply effects (e.g. on labor force participation, new capital formation, and productivity) could be smaller or slower to materialize. All these possibilities add to the risk that inflation expectations move upwards, creating self-fulfilling wage and price pressures.

In the event that these upside risks to inflation are realized, monetary policy will need to adapt quickly. If realized inflation moves higher but medium-term inflation expectations are well-anchored, the premium will be on communicating clearly that the changing environment calls for a withdrawal of monetary accommodation. However, the anchored inflation expectations will provide room for maneuver, allowing these policy adjustments to take place along an orderly timeline (i.e., similar to that already incorporated into staff’s baseline outlook). While this would imply a somewhat larger, more prolonged inflation overshoot, inflation should still return to the longer-run target relatively quickly. On the other hand, if there are unambiguous signs that inflation expectations have become de-anchored, monetary policy would quickly need to change tack, accelerating the reduction in asset purchases and even having to consider raising policy rates before net purchases have been brought to zero. This would likely create an abrupt shift in financial conditions and risk premia with negative implications at home and abroad. Clearly, it will be difficult to distinguish, in real time, between these two potential out-of-baseline risk scenarios, especially when there is substantial noise from the expected idiosyncratic and transitory shifts in a range of prices.

Spillovers

The impact on global activity from the rapid U.S. rebound is expected to be positive, particularly for Mexico and Canada. bodog online casino Although the Treasury yield curve has moved in anticipation of larger fiscal support, countries are generally benefiting from still-loose global financial conditions. Looking forward, some countries could face greater pressure in the coming months especially if dollar funding costs rise abruptly. This is particularly of concern for leveraged emerging market and developing economies with weak fundamentals, for commodity importers, and/or for those with an exchange rate pegged to the U.S. dollar.

Gaining From Trade

The administration has underscored the need for a “worker-centric” trade agenda that ensures that global trade benefits Americans as workers and wage-earners, not just as consumers. In pursuing these objectives, a removal of the obstacles to free trade would help support U.S. workers and create more and better U.S. jobs (particularly in light of the domestic efforts that are being proposed to increase productivity, labor supply, and the competitiveness of U.S. producers).

It is of significant concern, therefore, that many of the trade distortions introduced over the past four years remain in place. In particular, tariffs have been kept on imported steel and aluminum, washing machines, solar panels, as well as a range of goods imported from China. The administration has also committed to prioritizing U.S. producers in public procurement, strengthening “Buy American” requirements put in place by the previous administration. These policies should be reconsidered. Trade restrictions and tariff increases should be rolled back and “Buy American” provisions should be tightly circumscribed and made consistent with the U.S. international obligations. Doing so would underscore the U.S. traditional commitment to an open, stable, and transparent international trade regime.

The entanglement of trade and currency issues over the last four years—including investigations into currency-based countervailing duties on China and Vietnam and the inclusion of currency provisions in trade agreements—represents a significant risk to the multilateral trade and international monetary systems. Treating currency undervaluation as a subsidy to be countervailed raises concerns both in the finance and trade spheres and risks increased trade tensions and retaliation (with other countries replicating a similar approach, perhaps using their own standards and methodologies). Currency-related trade responses should be avoided. Enforceable provisions on currency policy should not be attached to U.S. trade agreements. Instead, the U.S. should work constructively with its trading partners to better address the underlying macro-structural distortions that are affecting external positions.

Finally, there is a clear need to address longstanding global trade and investment distortions in areas such as tariffs, farm subsidies, industrial subsidies, and services trade. The U.S. should work actively with international partners to strengthen the rules-based multilateral trading system and address these longstanding global trade and investment distortions. Renewed engagement at the World Trade Organization—including restoring the proper functioning of the dispute settlement system—could help facilitate progress on these topics.

Financial Stability Concerns

Systemic financial stability risks appear close to the historical average. However, the very accommodative financial conditions are encouraging continued risk taking and facilitating rising leverage in the nonbanks and corporates. The banking system appears to be in a strong position but leverage in nonbanks has increased and life insurance companies and hedge funds are exposed to lower-rated corporate debt. Fundamental shifts in the U.S. economy are increasing the risks associated with exposures to commercial real estate. There is, therefore, the potential for systemic problems to emerge from, or be propagated by, stresses in corporates or the nonbanks. These concerns are not lessened by recent episodes that highlight the incompleteness of the available information on nonbanks’ risk profile (including for family offices). In the absence of well-targeted macroprudential tools to manage such risks, consideration should be given to building larger buffers in the more regulated part of the financial system as a second-best substitute.

The housing market appears to be on a vigorous upward path which could raise financial stability concerns in the event of a reversal. Mortgage debt, though, has grown by a modest amount (around 5 percent year-on-year) and lending has been concentrated in households with high credit scores. Nonetheless, given the importance of housing for the broader economy, the buoyancy of the residential real estate market bears careful watching.

The unfolding pandemic revealed important shortcomings in the functioning-under-stress of systemically important U.S. markets and institutions (notably the Treasury market). Preventing a recurrence of those vulnerabilities that manifested in March 2020 will require a range of changes across markets and institutions. Possible changes that could be considered include central clearing of Treasury market transactions; the introduction of a standing repo facility to create greater certainty about the availability of market liquidity in times of stress; requiring retail prime and tax-exempt money market funds to move to a floating net asset value structure; subjecting funds to an annual liquidity stress test; and steps to require more liquidity protections from funds (e.g. more binding liquid asset requirements, pre-determined arrangements to lock-in a proportion of an investor’s shares, use of in-kind redemptions, swing pricing, and temporary gates on outflows).

The Challenge of Building Back Better

As the pandemic effects recede, policymakers will have to cope with simultaneous, ongoing transitions that include:

· A pandemic recovery that likely creates lasting shifts (in the U.S. and abroad) in consumer preferences and in the modalities by which the economy operates.

· A move to a low-carbon economy that will necessitate a significant reallocation of labor and capital (e.g. away from fossil fuels and heavy industry and toward renewables) and, potentially, a very different set of skills.

· A demographic transition whereby 22 percent of the population will be over-65 by 2040, the number of Americans over-85 will double by 2035, and the population will be increasingly racially diverse.

· Digitalization and other evolving technologies that will remake both production and consumption in unpredictable ways.

The longstanding flexibility and innovativeness of the U.S. system puts it in a good place to manage these transitions. However, great care should be taken to ensure that these multi-faceted changes do not increase income polarization, further hollow out the middle class, and leave behind a material share of the population (particularly lower-skilled, lower-income workers). It would be a mistake to assume the social and economic impact of these deep-rooted transitions can simply be left to market forces and the hope that a vibrant U.S. economy will lift all boats.

Instead, a multi-dimensional policy approach will need to be developed to support rising living standards for all Americans and prevent workers from becoming disenfranchised or detached from the labor force. A more effective social safety net and broader healthcare coverage will help. So too will increased investments in vocational and academic education. Greater spending on public investment can raise labor productivity and help improve living standards. However, other strategies may well be needed. These could include regional development initiatives to facilitate the transition. There may be a need to subsidize labor mobility (especially if newly created jobs are in areas where the cost of living and housing is higher). Efforts will be needed to ensure schools and colleges are equipped to provide students with the basic technical and critical thinking skills needed for a fast-changing economy. Also, immigration policies will need to be re-examined to ensure there is the right supply of skills needed to meet the demands of the newly created jobs.

A Greener Economy

The administration’s new impetus to reduce greenhouse gases represents a critical, and very positive, change of direction. While many of the steps that will be needed to achieve the administration’s climate goals have yet to be defined, the broad scope of the plans that have already been articulated (and the significant investments that are expected to be made), if realized, will jump-start the transition to a low carbon economy. However, it will be costly and difficult to achieve the administration’s climate objectives without a greater focus on carbon pricing. In particular, a new federal carbon tax would need to be an indispensable component of the administration’s climate strategy. Such a carbon tax could be combined with sectoral-based policies to tilt incentives away from carbon intensive activities. As political support is being built for a carbon tax, regulatory actions could be strengthened to increase disincentives for greenhouse gas emissions.

Announced efforts to reduce implicit subsidies for the fossil fuel industry are important. However, a similar approach is needed for the agro-industrial sector (which accounts for 10 percent of total U.S. emissions, approximately equal to the CO2-equivalent emissions of France and Italy combined). Policies in this area could include a phase-out of agricultural subsidies that incentivize high-emission farming activities, designing tax and subsidy schemes based on farm output and their relative emissions intensity, conditioning crop insurance subsidies to meeting benchmarks for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, targeting support to fishing and marine farming practices that are compatible with marine biodiversity conservation, and researching lower-carbon agricultural practices.

A More Equitable Society

The U.S. has long faced high rates of poverty. Furthermore, the U.S. has long struggled with racial disparities in economic and social outcomes. Data suggests that minority households continue to be more likely to live in poorer neighborhoods, send their children to under-resourced schools, lack basic health care coverage, face lower socio-economic mobility, be more impacted by climate change, and be the victims of violent crime. The pandemic has worsened these disparities in outcomes, increased poverty, and added to wealth inequality.

The U.S. has important scope to strengthen its social safety nets and increase the progressivity of its tax system. Many of the administration’s proposed policies to mitigate poverty and increase social mobility have been argued for in past consultations. In addition to these proposals, greater attention could be paid to simplifying the multitude of federal, state, and local programs to aid the poor and to redesign social programs to remove “cliffs” (i.e., where programs phase-out abruptly as household income rises). To help ensure the benefits of federal tax credits and other assistance are incident on the working poor, there is scope to raise the federal minimum wage. Finally, it will be important for the administration to build into its policy design an increased focus on supporting those communities that have been historically underserved, marginalized, or adversely affected by persistent poverty.

To read the full mission concluding statement from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), please click here. 

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Climate change presents huge risks to the functioning of the world’s economies.

This matters to the IMF because climate change presents huge risks to the functioning of the world’s economies. The right climate policies can address these risks and also bring tremendous opportunities for transformative investments, economic growth, and green jobs—so much so that our Board recently approved proposals to include climate change in our regular country economic surveillance and our financial stability assessment program.

At the heart of our policy discussions with member countries is carbon pricing—now widely accepted as the most important policy tool to achieve the drastic cuts to emissions we need. By making polluting energy sources more expensive than clean sources, carbon pricing provides incentives to improve energy efficiency and to re-direct innovation efforts towards green technologies. Carbon pricing needs to be supported by a broader package of measures to enhance its effectiveness and acceptability including public investment in clean technology networks (like grid upgrades to accommodate renewables) and measures to assist vulnerable households, workers, and regions. Nonetheless, at the global level, additional measures equivalent to a carbon price of $75 per ton or more are required by 2030.

Ahead of the United Nations’ 26th annual climate change conference (COP26) in November—the most important climate conference since Paris 2015—we see promising signs of growing climate ambition. Many countries have stated new climate objectives—60 countries have already pledged to be emissions-neutral by midcentury and some, including the European Union and United States, have offered stronger near-term pledges. Importantly, carbon pricing schemes are proliferating—more than 60 have been implemented globally, including key initiatives this year in China and Germany.

Yet stronger and more coordinated action in the decade ahead is critical.

While some countries are moving ahead aggressively, ambition varies country-by-country such that four-fifthsof global emissions remain unpriced and the global average emissions price is only $3 per ton. As a knock-on effect, some countries and regions with high or rising carbon prices are considering placing charges on the carbon content of imports from places without similar schemes. From a global climate perspective, however, such border carbon adjustments are insufficient instruments as carbon embodied in trade flows is typically less than 10 percent of countries’ total emissions.

In part, the slower progress reflects how hard it can be for countries to unilaterally scale up mitigation policies to meet their Paris Agreement commitments—not least because of concerns about how it may affect their competitiveness and worries that others may not match their policy actions. The near-universal country participation in the Paris Agreement, so critical for its legitimacy, does not make for easy negotiation.

So how do we get carbon pricing to where it needs to be within ten years? A new paper from IMF staff, still under discussion with the IMF Board and membership, proposes the creation of an international carbon price floor arrangement that complements the Paris Agreement and is:

1. Launched by the largest emitters. The chart shows, that China, India, the US and the EU will account for nearly two-thirds of projected global CO2emissions in 2030 (if no new mitigation actions are taken). Including the full G20 takes this to 85 percent. Once launched, the scheme could gradually expand to encompass other countries.

2. Anchored on a minimum carbon price. This is an efficient, concrete, and easily understood policy instrument. Simultaneous action among large emitters to scale up carbon pricing would deliver collective action against climate change while decisively addressing competitiveness concerns. The focus on a minimum carbon price parallels the current discussion on a minimum for the tax rate in international corporate taxation. More broadly, international harmonization through tax rate floors has a long tradition in Europe.

3. Designed pragmatically. The arrangement needs to be equitable, flexible and account for the differentiated responsibilities of countries given, among other factors, historical emissions and development levels. One way to do this is to have, say, two or three different price levels in the agreement that vary according to accepted measures of a country’s development. The arrangement could also accommodate countries where carbon pricing is not currently feasible for domestic political reasons, so long as they achieve equivalent emissions reductions through other policy instruments.

An illustrative example shows that reinforcing Paris Agreement pledges with a three-tier price floor among just six participants (Canada, China, European Union, India, United Kingdom, United States) with prices of $75, $50, and $25 for advanced, high, and low-income emerging markets, respectively and in addition to current policies, could help achieve a 23 percent reduction in global emissions below baseline by 2030. This is enough to bring emissions in line with keeping global warming below 2°C.

The application of carbon pricing across Canadian provinces gives a good prototype for how a price floor could translate to the international level. The federal government requires provinces and territories to implement a minimum carbon price rising progressively from CAN$10 per ton in 2018 to CAN$50 in 2022 and CAN$170 in 2030. Jurisdictions are free to meet this requirement through carbon taxes or emissions trading systems.

At the international level, a well-designed carbon price floor agreement would yield benefits to individual countries as well as to the collective. All participants would be better off from stabilizing the global climate system, and countries would enjoy domestic environmental benefits from curbing fossil fuel combustion—most importantly, fewer deaths from local air pollution.

There is no time to waste in putting in place such an arrangement. Imagine us in 2030. Let us make sure that we will not look back at 2021 just to regret the missed opportunity for effective action. Let us instead look back with pride at global progress towards keeping global warming below the 2oC threshold. We need coordinated action now—and it should be centered on an international carbon price floor.

Vitor Gaspar, a Portuguese national, is Director of the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department. Prior to joining the IMF, he held a variety of senior policy positions in Banco de Portugal, including most recently as Special Adviser. He served as Minister of State and Finance of Portugal during 2011–2013. He was head of the European Commission’s Bureau of European Policy Advisers during 2007–2010, and director-general of research at the European Central Bank from 1998 to 2004. Mr. Gaspar holds a PhD and a post-doctoral agregado in Economics from Universidade Nova de Lisboa. He has also studied at Universidade Católica Portuguesa.

Ian Parry is Principal Environmental Fiscal Policy Expert in the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, specializing in fiscal analysis of climate change, environment, and energy issues. Before joining the Fund in 2010, Ian held the Allen V. Kneese Chair in Environmental Economics at Resources for the Future.

To read the full commentary from the International Monetary Fund, please click here.

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“Global prospects remain highly uncertain one year into the pandemic. New virus mutations and the accumulating human toll raise concerns, even as growing vaccine coverage lifts sentiment. Economic recoveries are diverging across countries and sectors, reflecting variation in pandemic-induced disruptions and the extent of policy support. The outlook depends not just on the outcome of the battle between the virus and vaccines—it also hinges on how effectively economic policies deployed under high uncertainty can limit lasting damage from this unprecedented crisis.

“Global growth is projected at 6 percent in 2021, moderating to 4.4 percent in 2022. The projections for 2021 and 2022 are stronger than in the October 2020 WEO. The upward revision reflects additional fiscal support in a few large economies, the anticipated vaccine-powered recovery in the second half of 2021, and continued adaptation of economic activity to subdued mobility. High uncertainty surrounds this outlook, related to the path of the pandemic, the effectiveness of policy support to provide a bridge to vaccine-powered normalization, and the evolution of financial conditions.”

The following tables from the IMF webpage taken from the new report show first the global, advanced economies and developing economy outlook for 2020, 2021, 2022 and then for various major countries and regions for the same periods.

Much has been written about the need for debt relief and greater access to vaccines for many low-income countries to help them get through the pandemic and back on track for economic expansion. The IMFBlog from April 5, 2021 provides an overview of the serious challenges faced by low income countries and the potential sources of financial support available through the IMF if supported by member countries. See IMFBlog, Funding the Recovery of Low-income Countries After COVID, April 5, 2021, https://blogs.imf.org/2021/04/05/funding-the-recovery-of-low-income-countries-after-covid/.

“Several factors hamper the economic recovery of low-income countries. First, they face uneven access to vaccines. Most of these countries rely almost entirely on the multilateral COVAX facility—a global initiative aimed at equitable access to vaccines led by a consortium of international organizations. COVAX is currently set to procure vaccines for just 20 percent of the population in low-income countries. Second, low-income countries have had limited policy space to respond to the crisis—in particular, they have lacked the means for extra spending * * *.

“Third, pre-existing vulnerabilities, including high levels of public debt in many low-income countries, and weak, sometimes negative, total factor productivity performance in some low-income countries continue to act as a drag on growth.”

The blog post reviews estimated financial needs over the next five years. The estimated needs are $200 billion to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic (including adequate vaccinations), an additional $250 billion to speed convergence with advanced economies, and an additional $100 billion if various risks materialized. Potentially $550 billion — obviously a huge number.

The blog identifies various potential sources of funds to address these needs that can be available through the IMF.

“- Expanding access to concessional resources under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, including extending access to emergency financing. From March 2020 to March 2021, about $13 billion has been approved to more than 50 low-income countries. The IMF is also currently reviewing its lending framework to low-income countries, beyond the temporary increase in access limits.

“- Proposal for a new allocation of Special Drawing Rights . Support is building among the IMF’s membership for a possible SDR allocation of $650 billion. This would help address the long-term global need for reserve assets, and would provide a substantial liquidity boost to all members.

“- Debt service relief through the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust to 29 eligible countries. The recently-approved third tranche covering the period April-October 2021 brings total debt service relief up to $740 million since April 2020. Such relief provides space for poor countries to scale up spending on priority areas during the pandemic.

“- Supporting a further extension of the G-20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) until end-December 2021. The DSSI delivered US$5.7 billion in debt service relief for 43 countries in 2020 and is expected to deliver up to US$7.3 billion of additional debt service suspension through June 2021 for 45 countries.

“The needs of the poorest countries over the next five years are acute. But they are not out of reach. A strong, coordinated, comprehensive package is needed. This will secure a rapid recovery and transition to a green, digital, and inclusive growth that will accelerate convergence of low-income countries to their advanced economy counterparts.”

The IMF Spring meeting this week is taking up various issues designed to ensure assistance to the world’s low income countries. See, e.g., IMF, PRESS RELEASE NO. 21/99, IMF Executive Board Extends Debt Service Relief for 28 Eligible Low-Income Countries through October 15, 2021, April 5, 2021, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/04/05/pr2199-imf-executive-board-extends-debt-service-relief-28-eligible-lics-october-15-2021.

The Rockefeller Foundation released a paper recently arguing that funding from the Special Drawing Rights could be used to help procure vaccines for low- and middle-income countries to enable 70% vaccination rates by the end of 2022. See PR Newswire, The Rockefeller Foundation Releases New Financing Roadmap to End Pandemic by End of 2022, April 6, 2021, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-rockefeller-foundation-releases-new-financing-roadmap-to-end-pandemic-by-end-of-2022-301262501.html; Rockefeller Foundation, One for All: An Action Plan for Financing Global Vaccination and Sustainable Growth, https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/One-for-All-An-Action-Plan-for-Financing-Global-Vaccination-and-Sustainable-Growth-Final.pdf.

Other multilateral organizations such as the World Bank have been actively involved helping developing countries including using billions for vaccine procurement. See World Bank Group, WBG Vaccine Announcement – Key Facts, March 30, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2020/10/15/world-bank-group-vaccine-announcement—key-facts

“COVID-19 vaccines, alongside widespread testing, improved treatment and strong health systems are critical to save lives and strengthen the global economic recovery. To provide relief for vulnerable populations, low- and middle-income countries need fair, broad, and fast access to effective and safe vaccines.

“That’s why the World Bank (WB) is building on its initial COVID-19 response with $12 billion to help poor countries purchase and distribute vaccines, tests, and treatments. The first WB-financed operation to support vaccine rollout was approved in January 2021. 

“By March 31, 2021, the WB had already committed $1.6 billion in vaccine financing in 10 countries including Afghanistan, Cabo Verde, Bangladesh, Lebanon, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, Tajikistan, and Tunisia. More than 40 additional projects are in the pipeline and will be approved in the coming weeks and months.”

The World Banks’s Spring meeting is also occurring this week and addressing the COVID-19 pandemic remains a critical part of the World Bank’s agenda.

U.S. announced larger role in global vaccine rollout

President Biden has had as his first priority to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States while committing to greater involvement in multilateral organizations. He has rejoined the World Health Organization, contributed $2 billion to the COVAX facility to obtain vaccines for low- and middle-income countries, with an additional $2 billion to be contributed as other countries fulfill their pledges, agreed to a fund raising event for COVAX later in April, loaned four million vaccine doses to Canada (1.5 million) and Mexico (2.5 million) and agreed with Japan, India and Australia to produce one billion doses of a vaccine (2021-2022) in India with funding from the US and Japan and distribution by Australia to countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

On April 5, 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced the Biden Administration’s intention to be more actively involved internationally as it gets the U.S. population vaccinated. See U.S. Department of State, Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks to the Press on the COVID Response, April 5, 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-remarks-to-the-press-on-the-covid-response/. The portion of Secretary Blinken’s remarks dealing with greater international engagement and the appointment of the U.S. coordinator for global COVID response and health security is copied below.

“There’s another major element to stopping COVID, and that’s what we’re here to talk about today.

“This pandemic won’t end at home until it ends worldwide.

“And I want to spend a minute on this, because it’s critical to understand.  Even if we vaccinate all 332 million people in the United States tomorrow, we would still not be fully safe from the virus, not while it’s still replicating around the world and turning into new variants that could easily come here and spread across our communities again.  And not if we want to fully reopen our economy or start traveling again.  Plus, if other countries’ economies aren’t rebounding because they’re still afflicted with COVID, that’ll hurt our recovery too.

“The world has to come together to bring the COVID pandemic to an end everywhere.  And for that to happen, the United States must act and we must lead.

“There is no country on Earth that can do what we can do, both in terms of developing breakthrough vaccines and bringing governments, businesses, and international institutions together to organize the massive, sustained public health effort it’ll take to fully end the pandemic.  This will be an unprecedented global operation, involving logistics, financing, supply chain management, manufacturing, and coordinating with community health workers who handle the vital last mile of health care delivery.  All of that will take intensive diplomacy.

“The world has never done anything quite like this before.  This is a moment that calls for American leadership.

“Now, the Biden-Harris administration’s main focus to date has been to vaccinate Americans – to slow and ultimately stop COVID here at home.  We at the State Department have been focused on vaccinating our workforce in the United States and in embassies and consulates around the world.  That’s been the right call.  We serve the American people first and foremost.  Plus, we can’t forget that the United States has had the highest number of COVID cases of any country in the world by a significant margin.  So stopping the spread here has been urgently needed for our people and for the world.  We have a duty to other countries to get the virus under control here in the United States.

“But soon, the United States will need to step up our work and rise to Bodog Poker the occasion worldwide, because again, only by stopping COVID globally will Americans be safe for the long term.

“Moreover, we want to rise to the occasion for the world.  By helping bring to a close one of the deadliest pandemics in human history, we can show the world once again what American leadership and American ingenuity can do.  Let’s make that the story of the end of COVID-19.

“We’ve already taken some important steps.

“On day one of the administration, we rejoined the World Health Organization.  By being at the table, we can push for reforms so that we can prevent, detect, and rapidly respond to the next biological threat.

“Congress recently provided more than $11 billion for America’s global COVID response, which we’ll use in several ways, including to save lives by supporting broad and equitable vaccine access; providing aid to mitigate secondary impacts of COVID, like hunger; and helping countries boost their pandemic preparedness.

“I’d note that this builds on a long tradition of American leadership.  The United States is the world’s largest donor to global health by far, including through international efforts like the Global Fund and the World Health Organization – and through our own outstanding global health programs, like PEPFAR, which has helped bring the world to the cusp of the first AIDS-free generation.

“We’ve also made a $2 billion donation to the COVAX program, which will supply COVID vaccines to low-income and middle-income countries.  We’ve pledged another $2 billion that we’ll provide as other countries fulfill their own pledges.

“We’ve already loaned vaccines to our closest neighbors, Mexico and Canada.

“And we’ll work with global partners on manufacturing and supplies to ensure there will be enough vaccine for everyone, everywhere.

“As we get more confident in our vaccine supply here at home, we are exploring options to share more with other countries going forward.

“We believe that we’ll be in a position to do much more on this front.

“I know that many countries are asking for the United States to do more, some with growing desperation because of the scope and scale of their COVID emergencies.  We hear you.  And I promise, we’re moving as fast as possible.

“We’ll be guided every step by core values.

“We won’t trade shots in arms for political favors.  This is about saving lives.

“We’ll treat our partner countries with respect; we won’t overpromise and underdeliver.

“We’ll maintain high standards for the vaccines that we help to bring to others, only distributing those proven to be safe and effective.

“We’ll insist on an approach built on equity.  COVID has already come down hard on vulnerable and marginalized people.  We cannot allow our COVID response to end up making racial and gender inequality worse.

“We’ll embrace partnership, sharing the burden and combining strengths.  The collaboration we formed a few weeks ago with the Quad countries – India, Japan, Australia – is a good example.  Together, we’re increasing the world’s manufacturing capacity so we can get more shots out the door and into people’s arms as fast as possible.

“And by the way, one of the reasons we work through multilateral collaborations where possible is because they often share and defend these same values.  For example, the COVAX initiative is designed explicitly to ensure that low- and middle-income countries can also get vaccines, because it’s only through broad and equitable vaccination that we’ll end the pandemic.

“Finally, we’ll address the current emergency while also taking the long view.  We can’t just end this pandemic.  We must also leave our country and the world better prepared for the next one.

“To do that, we’ll work with partners to reform and strengthen the institutions and systems that safeguard global health security.  That will require countries to commit to transparency, information sharing, access for international experts in real time.  We’ll need a sustainable approach to financing, surge capacity, and accountability, so all countries can act quickly to stem the next outbreak.  And we’ll keep pushing for a complete and transparent investigation into the origins of this epidemic, to learn what happened – so it doesn’t happen again.

“All told, this work is a key piece of President Biden’s ‘Build Back Better’ agenda.  We’ve got to make sure that we can better detect, prevent, prepare for, and respond to future pandemics and other biological threats.  Otherwise, we’ll be badly letting ourselves and future generations down.

“This is a pivotal moment – a time for us to think big and act boldly.  And the United States will rise to the challenge.

“I’m here today with a remarkable leader who will help us do just that.

“Gayle Smith was the administrator of USAID for President Obama, and served on the National Security Council for both President Obama and President Clinton, where we first got to know each other and worked together.  She has deep experience in responding to public health threats, having helped lead the U.S. response to the Ebola crisis in 2014, having worked for years on the global fights against malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS.  She is joining us from her most recent role as president and CEO of the ONE Campaign, which fights extreme poverty and preventable disease, primarily in Africa.

“She’s tested.  She’s highly respected.  She will hit the ground running.  And I can say from having worked with Gayle and admired her for years that no one will work harder, faster, or more effectively to get us to the finish line.

I”’m grateful she’s agreed to serve as the coordinator for global COVID response and health security.  Gayle Smith, the floor is yours.  Thank you for doing this.

“MS SMITH:  Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  It’s a pleasure to be able to work with you again, and to call you Mr. Secretary.

“I’d also like to thank my friends at the ONE Campaign for making this possible.  And I look forward to working with the men and women of the department and across the federal government, including because I know what you can do.

“I want to thank in particular some really smart scientists, President Biden, and the staff and volunteers at Howard University, where tomorrow I will get my second dose of the COVID vaccine.

“That vaccine is good for the body, but it’s also good for the mind and the soul, because it inspires hope in the future.  And our job is to shape that future.

“I fought some viruses in the past, and I’ve learned two lessons.  The first is that if the virus is moving faster than we are, it’s winning.  The second is that with unity of purpose, science, vigilance, and leadership, we can outpace any virus.

“America’s done it before.  Eighteen years ago, a Republican president launched a bold initiative to take on the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  A Democratic president went on to expand that mission in scope.  In 2014, the Obama-Biden administration, with the strong and generous support of Congress, defeated the world’s first Ebola epidemic.

“Our challenges now are two: first, to shorten the lifespan of a borderless pandemic that is destroying lives and livelihoods all over the world, and the second is to ensure that we can prevent, detect, and respond to those future global health threats we know are coming.

“American leadership is desperately needed, and I’m extremely confident we can rise to the occasion.  I’m honored to be here, and thank you very, very much.”

Conclusion

This is an important week with both the IMF and World Bank Spring meetings and important agenda items on the continued global response to the pandemic and helping countries build back better. The IMF April World Economic Outlook has good news about the direction of global activity although the pace of recoveries will vary significantly among countries and regions. While global production and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines has ramped up enormously in the few months that vaccines have been approved and while there are many additional potential vaccines under development or in trials, the early months have seen some production challenges and distribution skewed to a handful of countries. Many of those countries with the most vaccine doses (U.S., UK, EU, India) have been countries or regions with many of the largest number of infections and deaths. Even so, the effort at equitable and affordable access to all needs additional work.

An article in the New York Times reviews an exciting potential development of a low-cost, easy to produce vaccine that could dramatically expand the ability of developing countries to produce their own vaccines. See New York Times, Researchers Are Hatching a Low-Cost Coronavirus Vaccine , April 5, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/05/health/hexapro-mclellan-vaccine.html (“A new vaccine for Covid-19 that is entering clinical trials in Brazil, Mexico, Thailand and Vietnam could change how the world fights the pandemic. The vaccine, called NVD-HXP-S, is the first in clinical trials to use a new molecular design that is widely expected to create more potent antibodies than the current generation of vaccines. And the new vaccine could be far easier to make.
Existing vaccines from companies like Pfizer and Johnson & Johnson must be produced in specialized factories using hard-to-acquire ingredients. In contrast, the new vaccine can be mass-produced in chicken eggs — the same eggs that produce billions of influenza vaccines every year in factories around the world.”).

Production is ramping up for the various vaccines that have been approved in various countries. Producers continue to explore adding capacity or licensing production to other producers. Governments – like the United States, Japan, India and Australia – are finding creative ways for nations to work together to build up additional capacity to reach countries with needs. COVAX has proven to be an important vehicle for distributing vaccines to low- and middle-income countries. As capacities expand and additional funding is available, COVAX will continue to be a critical part of the solution.

The IMF and World Bank have the ability to address many of the challenges facing developing countries with the support of its member governments. Hopefully, this week’s meetings will make a difference. And individual countries can and are doing more. Secretary Blinken’s remarks show the U.S. will be increasing its role and working with others to ensure global success. For a world fatigued from the pandemic, a path to resolution is needed now. Hopefully, we are close.

• Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, bodog poker review|Most Popular_Congressional

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“Global services trade in the third quarter of 2020 fell 24% compared to the same period in 2019, according to statistics released by the WTO on 26 January. This represents only a small uptick from the 30% year-on-year decline registered in the second quarter, in marked contrast to the much stronger rebound in goods trade.

“Preliminary data further suggest that, in November, services trade was still 16% below 2019 levels. Prospects for recovery remain poor since a second wave of COVID-19 infections necessitated new, stricter lockdown measures in many countries, with tightened restrictions on travel and related services extending into the first quarter of 2021.

“The latest statistics confirm earlier expectations that services trade would be harder hit by the pandemic than goods trade, which was only down 5% year-on-year in the third quarter.  Foregone expenditures on tradeable services could be directed elsewhere, with consumers shifting to goods instead.”

Travel services in the third quarter were down 68% from the third quarter of 2019, a slight improvement from the 2nd quarter (down more than 80%). Transport services were down 24% in the third quarter while other services were down 2%.

As prior posts have reviewed, travel and tourism trade has been destroyed during the pandemic with as many as 100 million people’s jobs at risk. 

With new lockdowns and travel restrictions occurring in the first quarter of 2021, the travel and tourism sector (including air, hotel, restaurant, entertainment sectors) is in for a continued difficult 2021 (at least the first half for some developed countries depending on vaccination staging).

The WTO press release is embedded below.

In an earlier post, I had reviewed a World Bank forecast that tied economic recovery to the speed and breadth of COVID-19 vaccinations that occur in 2021. See January 5, 2021, Global economic rebound in 2021 will be affected by rate of vaccinations against COVID-19 – World Bank’s January 5, 2021 release of its World Economic Prospects report. 

In an update to its World Economic Outlook released earlier this week, the IMF noted that while global economic growth in 2021 and 2022 is expected to be somewhat stronger than previously projected, the level of growth is dependent on vaccine availability and vaccinations and whether there is widespread availability to peoples of the world. See IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2021. The header and first three paragraphs of the update are copied below.

“Policy Support and Vaccines Expected to Lift Activity

“Although recent vaccine approvals have raised hopes of a turnaround in the pandemic later this year, renewed waves and new variants of the virus pose concerns for the outlook. Amid exceptional uncertainty, the global economy is projected to grow 5.5 percent in 2021 and 4.2 percent in 2022. The 2021 forecast is revised up 0.3 percentage point relative to the previous forecast, reflecting expectations of a vaccine-powered strengthening of activity later in the year and additional policy support in a few large economies.

“The projected growth recovery this year follows a severe collapse in 2020 that has had acute adverse impacts on women, youth, the poor, the informally employed, and those who work in contact-intensive sectors. The global growth contraction for 2020 is estimated at -3.5 percent, 0.9 percentage point higher than projected in the previous forecast (reflecting stronger-than-expected momentum in the second half of 2020).

“The strength of the recovery is projected to vary significantly across countries, depending on access to medical interventions, effectiveness of policy support, exposure to cross-country spillovers, and structural characteristics entering the crisis.”

On the IMF webpage for the update there is a colored chart showing projected growth for certain groupings of countries. The Chart is embedded below.

From press reports it is known that the rollout of vaccines has hit some early snags with both Pfizer/BioNTech and AstraZenaca announcing reduced shipments to some countries. Indeed, the EU is considering steps to monitor and/or restrict exports of vaccines depending on fulfillment of contracts with the EU and member states, raising concerns about vaccine nationalism. 

Similarly, new variants that are apparently more contagious and possibly more deadly are spreading resulting in heightened travel restrictions which will retard any recovery in the travel and tourism sector. There are also concerns about whether initial vaccines will bodog casino be effective against the new variants. 

At the same time, Africa which had recorded relatively few cases and deaths from COVID-19 for much of 2020 is now experiencing significant increases in both which is overwhelming health systems in some areas.

The COVAX facility designed to help many countries (including many poor countries) access vaccines has a significant funding shortfall at present despite the U.S. rescinding its notice of withdrawal from the WHO and its agreement to participate in COVAX. The Secretary-General of the World Health Organization has expressed concern that the world will fail to make vaccines available to all at affordable prices in a timely manner. The WHO Director-General’s speech is embedded below.

The WHO’s Director-General references a report from the International Chamber of Commerce Research Foundation. The press release from the ICC describes the report as follows.

“A study commissioned by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Research Foundation has found that the global economy stands to lose as much as US$9.2 trillion if governments fail to ensure developing economy access to COVID-19 vaccines

“The COVID-19 pandemic had a devastating effect on both lives and livelihoods in 2020. The arrival of effective vaccines can be a major game changer in mitigating the economic, social and health consequences of the virus in the year ahead.

“However, evidence to date suggests that access to these vaccines is likely to be highly uneven across countries. Advanced economies have in recent months pursued a policy of securing the global supply of frontrunner vaccines – as a result severely limiting their availability in emerging markets. Moreover, the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator – the proven global platform to enable equitable access to COVID-19 test, treatments and vaccines – remains underfunded by the world’s largest economies, constraining its ability to procure vaccines at scale for the developing world.

“A new study highlights the major risks to the global economy inherent in this uncoordinated approach to vaccine access. Using a sophisticated model – that builds upon an earlier NBER and IMF Working Paper – to properly the assess the economic toll of a prolonged pandemic, the research shows that no economy can recover fully from the COVID-19 pandemic until vaccines are equally accessible in all countries.

“In short, advanced economies that can vaccinate all of their citizens are shown to remain at risk of a sluggish recovery with a drag on GDP if infection continues to spread unabated in emerging markets. These losses dwarf the donor finance needed to enable vaccines to be procured for everyone, everywhere – making a clear ‘investment case’ for full capitalization of the ACT Accelerator and a coordinated global approach to distribution.”

Conclusion

While the recent releases from the WTO and IMF show somewhat better rebounds from the effects of the pandemic in the third quarter of 2020 (WTO) and into 2021 and 2022 (IMF), the key to global recovery lies in the approval of effective vaccines and the equitable and affordable distribution and vaccinations of populations around the world. Major advanced economies, many suffering from high infection and death rates in 2020, are using their financial muscle to secure contracts to deal with getting the pandemic under control within their borders. While there has been extensive work to create a mechanism to get vaccines to other countries in 2021 and 2022, there remain funding needs and questions about whether vaccines will in fact be available for use for these other countries. A lot depends on the efforts to ensure equitable distribution of vaccines to all those in need. There is a large opportunity for governments, businesses, and private organizations and citizens to help fill the gap. Because the failure to do so carries a likely huge cost, making sure funds are available to get the world vaccinated is in everyone’s interest. The outcome will determine global growth rates and trade flows for the coming years.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, bodog poker review|Most Popular_Congressional

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China’s 2020 boom in exports is beyond a statistical blip, according to analysis by Trade Data Monitor, the world’s top source of export and import statistics. The country is now exporting more goods per month in dollar value than any country in global economic history.

The bonanza is driven by the Covid-19 pandemic. As hundreds of millions of people in the world’s richest economies migrate their work home from the office, they are doing so with China-made computers, phone, routers and data storage units. Overall, exports of high-tech products leapt 21.1% to $86.1 billion.

Hospitals, pharmaceutical companies and public health officials are buying medical equipment they need, such as ventilators, face masks, and now many key ingredients for mass-produced vaccines, from China. Exports of medical devices increased 38.4% to $1.6 billion.

As the rest of the world has had to shut down major sectors of the economy to cope with Covid-19, China has kept its factories open since the spring. China’s top customer: the U.S., which imported $52 billion of goods, up 45.7% from November 2019.

To be sure, China’s hot streak won’t last forever. Markets will get saturated. Countries will slow down their purchases of medical supplies as populations get vaccinated. The yuan has been appreciated in value for much of the decade. Chinese wages have been rising, pushing parts of the supply chains toward other Asian countries, especially Vietnam. China’s widening trade gap will continue to trigger protectionism and tariffs. And the rest of the world will get back to work.

But for now, China is the only rich economy expected to grow in 2020, according to the International Monetary Fund. China’s manufacturing index has been robust, indicating that factories are humming. By comparison, U.S. exports have fallen almost 15% in the first 10 months of 2020. Japan’s are down 11.7%.

Meanwhile, China has blown through all the records, notching its sixth straight month of growth. Thanks to exports, China now appears almost certain to reach its goal of becoming the world’s biggest economy by 2030 ahead of schedule.

The change in consumer habits isn’t just visible in sales of high-tech products. People are buying less stuff they need to move around—and simply more they need to stay at home. Shipments of bags and containers fell 8.3% to $2.1 billion, and shoes, boots and footwear declined 8.8% to $3.2 billion, while China exported $6.9 billion of furniture, up 42.7% from the same month in 2019.

In high-tech goods, China isn’t just exporting finished products. Sales to other countries of integrated circuits grew 26.4% to $11.5 billion.

Economists have looked to Chinese consumers to pick up some of the slackening demand, but imports are not keeping pace with exports. Imports increased 4.5% year-on-year in November, furthering widening China’s massive trade surplus with the rest of the world, to $75.4 billion, around double the number the year before, and up from $58.4 billion in October 2020.

The U.S. isn’t the only country ramping up imports of Chinese goods. Exports to the European Union increased 25.5% to $37.5 billion, shipments to India totaled $7.1 billion, up 20.2% from the same period in 2019, and exports to Latin America totaled $16.2 billion, up 29.3% from November 2019.

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John W. Miller is TDM’s Chief Economic Analyst, in charge of writing TDM Insights, a newsletter analyzing key issues through trade statistics.

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A reduction in imbalances of course could have been the outcome of the pandemic. Less trade, all else equal, should mean smaller deficits and smaller surpluses (that is the math of a symmetric fall in trade). 

But it is not what is in the data. 

Rather, the global data shows a significant increase in both the U.S. external deficit and China’s external surplus in the second quarter.   

That makes the IMF’s forecast that the U.S. external deficit will shrink both in dollar terms and as a share of U.S. GDP in 2020 (see both chapter 1 and the data tables in the statistical appendix [PDF]) all the more maddening.   

The IMF, somehow got the most important part of any global current account forecast wrong (see the General Theorist for an exploration of the IMF’s possible methodology, the WEO production cycle may have fixed the forecast before the U.S. second quarter data was formally released). 

Nothing matters more to the global flow of funds than the U.S. deficit, as the United States is both the world’s largest economy and the necessary counterpart to a rise in the surplus of many surplus countries. So, when the IMF has the U.S. current account deficit falling to 2.1 percent of GDP it matters for the world, not just the United States.      

In practice, the U.S. external deficit in the second quarter was 3.5 percent of U.S. GDP. The deficit in the third quarter is likely to be bigger. 

The IMF’s forecast for the world’s largest economy and the largest single source of balance of payments imbalances is thus likely to be off by more than a percentage point of GDP. 

All it takes to know the IMF’s forecast is off is a quick glance at the monthly U.S. trade data, as the U.S. trade deficit and the broader current account deficit blew out in the second quarter and are poised to widen even further in the third quarter. The August deficit, annualized, is over $800 billion—more than $225 billion greater than the 2019 annual deficit of around $575 billion. 

The reasons for the blowout in the U.S. deficit are by now well known. There has been a shift in the composition of U.S. household demand away from (mostly domestically-produced) services and toward durable goods (mostly imported). The stimulus measures passed back in a brief moment of bipartisan clarity this spring supported U.S. household demand. The dollar remains relatively strong.** 

Still, the gap between the performance of U.S. imports and U.S. exports is extremely large (explained, in part, by the fact that aircraft and vacations that require taking a flight are a major part of the traditional U.S. export base).

There equally has been the gap between the recovery in U.S. consumption of durable goods and U.S. manufacturing output. The stimulus, at least so far, has not done all that much to stimulate increased U.S. production of manufactures.   

The reasons for China’s strong export performance are by now also well known (see Dan Alpert on Twitter). It had the broad manufacturing production base needed to scale up output of personal protective equipment (PPE). President Trump’s trade war largely left out laptops and cellphones, so global supply chains for the kind of goods needed to work from home are still Sino-centric. And, well, the yuan has been quite weak (it was close to a ten year low against the dollar during the first part of the year), which has supported Chinese exports of all kinds—in the third quarter, Chinese exports of goods other than medical textiles and computers (including tablets and laptops) were up 5 percent year-over-year (YOY). 

As a result, China has posted a current account surplus of over $100 billion in the second quarter (over $400 billion annualized) and is poised to post another similar surplus in the third quarter. Even with the first quarter deficit, the surplus for the year should check in at close to $300 billion—far more than the $193 billion (1.3 percent of China’s GDP) the IMF forecast in the WEO. 

To put it bluntly, the second quarter balance of payments data—which will be reinforced when the data for the third quarter emerges—shows biggest swing in transpacific imbalances since the global financial crisis. 

Now it is possible that these swings are all temporary and will naturally fade next year. That is certainly the best outcome for the world. My guess is that it will not prove to be politically sustainable for the U.S. stimulus to do more to support Chinese production than U.S. production.***

Right now, Chinese industrial production is up 7 percent YOY, while U.S. manufacturing production is down 6 percent YOY—the biggest gap in relative performance in a very long time. 

But it is possible that the swings will not be temporary. China has not done much to support its own household income—arguably because it has not needed to do so in a world where its exports are doing so well. And given the ongoing reluctance from Chinese policymakers toward broad-based stimulus, China’s fiscal policy response to COVID-19 may be much more tepid than the fiscal response of China’s largest trading partners. Combine that with a still-managed exchange rate that is still weak against both the dollar and the euro even with the modest appreciation in the third quarter and the PBOC’s desire for “basic stability” in the exchange rate and you have the recipe, at least in theory, for a sustained widening of trade imbalances.**** 

Given that balance of payments surveillance remains at the heart of the IMF’s mandate, I would think that risk warrants a bit of attention and analysis. 

The 2009 crisis, thanks to the combination of China’s stimulus and the lagged impact of its 2007-2008 appreciation of the yuan (initially against the dollar, which translated into a broader appreciation when the dollar rallied a bit against the euro) led to a reduction in trade imbalances.     

Without some policy corrections, I fear that there is a real risk that COVID-19 will lead to a sustained, rather than temporary, re-widening of imbalances. 

*/ I make more use of the data tables at the back of the WEO than most—so errors in those tables bother me more than most. The 2020 data will be corrected in the spring WEO. But that is a long time to wait for plausible, globally consistent numbers. 

**/ When looking at the impact of trade on the U.S. economy, I typically focus on the non-petrol goods deficit as that clearly shows the impact of the dollar’s 2014 appreciation—and the dynamics around the U.S. oil sector and other traded goods sectors are very different. And services are not accurately estimated in the monthly data, apart from tourism. But for forecasting the current account balance, the goods and services balance is the most relevant high frequency indicator. 

***/ The Economist has done several columns on this topic. See this “Chaguan” column, and this “Free Exchange” column.

****/ The ongoing management of China’s exchange rate is not seriously debated. The precise mechanics of that management are still a bit of a mystery. The PBOC’s headline reserves has not moved at all for some time, but China’s state banks have added $125 billion to their foreign assets over the last six months. See Matt Klein in Barron’s

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Brad W. Setser is the bodog casino Steven A. Tananbaum senior fellow for international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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Trump announced over the weekend that the G7 summit, which was slated for this month, likely will be held in September — and said he hoped to invite South Korea, Australia, India and Russia as well. None of the four are members of the G7. Trump had hoped to hold an in-person summit in the Washington, DC, area this month but postponed it after German Chancellor Angela Merkel said she would not attend due to the pandemic.

Clete Willems, a partner at Akin Gump, said the countries must remain in touch and work toward an in-person meeting, which he said would be hard to “replicate” virtually. Willems served as the deputy assistant to the president for international economics through March 2019 and was also deputy director of the National Economic Council. He played a key role in the trade talks between the U.S. and China, among others, and was a lead negotiator at G20, G7 and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings.

“I think whether or not they get together virtually now versus in person later — that’s not going to change the fact that these guys are on the phone with each other on a very routine basis,” he told Inside U.S. Trade. “I understand from the White House that they are talking almost daily to each other.”

“As long as the White House and these other countries are able to come up with safety protocols that allow them to travel, I think it’s so much more valuable to have an in-person meeting,” he added. “I think to the extent that it takes them a couple more months for them to figure that out is worth doing. My understanding is that they are all in touch anyway.”

Kelly Ann Shaw, a partner at Hogan Lovells, said postponing the summit was logical given the pandemic. Shaw took over for Willems at the White House last year and left in November.

“A few additional months to prepare and observe will create a better atmosphere for cooperation and creative thinking among Leaders on ways to rebuild the global economy,” she told Inside U.S. Trade in an email.

Wendy Cutler, vice president of the Asia Society Policy Institute and a former acting deputy U.S. Trade Representative, also lauded the administration’s decision to delay the summit.

“Postponement of #G7 meeting is a blessing in disguise,” she tweeted on Monday. “Gives over 4 months to prepare for real, meaningful outcomes instead of just grandstanding and blaming others.”

Trade policy was a focal point of last year’s G7 summit, which was held in Biarritz, France.

Shaw said the G7 “at its core” was a forum to address “global economic growth and related political challenges” and contended that trade will be discussed at this year’s meeting.

“Trade is an indelible component of growth and has been on the agenda since the original Declaration of Rambouillet in 1975 — it certainly will be a part of this year’s G7,” she continued. “There may be a number of trade issues on the table in September, including the proliferation of export restrictions, supply chain vulnerabilities, unfair trade practices, and non-market economies.”

Willems said he was less hopeful that trade would take up as much of this year’s agenda, contending it would likely take a backseat to health and economic issues related to the COVID-19 outbreak.

“I don’t know how much of a focus trade is going to be. My understanding is that there is going to be a lot of focus on coronavirus and the health and economic aspects of that. I think there is going to be a lot of focus on China, some of that may have trade ramifications,” he added. “They will definitely want to have a China focus and that is where you could get much of trade stuff. I don’t know — in terms of an independent trade section — how much I would expect there.”

He also lauded the inclusion of other countries that share G7 ideals, adding, “Australia, India and Spain all went to last year’s [summit].”

“As a neutral matter, it’s not unprecedented for there to be more than just the G7 countries,” he said. “The idea of having certain additional countries attend who share many of the same viewpoints as the other G7 members and who are going to be key allies in working on all of these issues would be important. I would definitely put Australia and South Korea on that list. I’m not so sure whether Russia meets that criteria. I think they want to think long and hard about their inclusion.”

Russia’s membership to the G8 was suspended in 2014 due to its annexation of Crimea.

Trump on Saturday called the G7’s membership “outdated,” adding, “I don’t feel that as a G7 it properly represents what’s going on in the world.”

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said he would not support Russia’s inclusion at the G7 meeting. The United Kingdom took a similar position on Monday. — Isabelle Icso (iicso@iwpnews.com)

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Studies by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and others state that the free trade area has the potential to increase growth, raise welfare and stimulate industrial development on the continent. But there are concerns. Some countries, particularly smaller and more vulnerable states, could be hurt. For example, they could suffer revenue losses and other negative effects from premature liberalization.

Africa is also more vulnerable to the impact of COVID-19 because it is highly dependent on imports for its medicinal and pharmaceutical products and on commodity exports. The latter include oil, which has suffered a severe collapse in price.

Other contributing factors are high public debt due to higher interest rate payments than Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, a weak fiscal tax base, and the negative impact on Africa’s currencies due to huge stimulus measures taken by OECD countries.

The COVID-19 crisis has brought these weaknesses into sharp relief. But it also provides an opportunity for African countries to address them. For example, they could accelerate intra-regional trade by focusing on the products of greatest need during the health crisis. Countries could also start building regional value chains to advance industrialization, improve infrastructure and strengthen good governance and ethical leadership.

These are all vital to guiding African countries through the current crisis.

These goals can be achieved if African states adopt a “developmental regionalism” approach to trade integration. This would include fair trade, building regional value chains, cross-border investment in infrastructure and strengthening democratic governance.

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A number of conditions need to be met for a free trade area to succeed.

Firstly, African states vary widely in size and economic development. As a result some may warrant special attention and specific treatment. In particular, among Africa’s 55 states 34 are classified by the United Nations as least developed countries. These are low income countries that have severe structural problems impeding their development.

Building trade agreements in favour of small and less developed economies will contribute to fairer outcomes of the free trade deal.

Secondly, African governments should include their stakeholders – businesses (both big and small), trade unions and civil society organisations – in the national consultation process. This will require effective institutions that enable the fullest participation.

Additional steps countries should take to cope with the fallout from COVID-19:

• Reduce tariffs on vital pharmaceutical products (such as ventilators), personal protective equipment and food products;

• Stimulate intra-regional trade by prioritizing these products for an immediate or early phase down in the free trade area.

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