This research paper has been written with the express intention of contributing ideas to this emerging SDG reset, both at forthcoming events in the autumn of 2024 – most notably, the UN’s Summit of the Future – and in continuing discussions into 2025 and beyond. We make the case for accelerating and deepening the shift to circular economic models, taking into account the potential trade-offs and unintended consequences that disruptive innovations may bring. The paper underlines the vital role that expansion of the circular economy could play in supporting the SDGs and in shaping what comes after them. On the latter, specifically, we present a policy blueprint for development of the circular economy to 2050.

At the heart of our argument is the idea that the circular economy and the SDGs are naturally complementary. Prominence in the SDG framework could help the circular economy to reach a critical scale and breadth, which in turn would improve prospects for achieving many of the SDGs’ targets. Linking the two offers mutual benefits. The circular economy needs the imprimatur of the UN system and other multilateral institutions to establish itself globally. At the
same time, the circular economy offers the prospect of vastly more effective action on the triple planetary crisis of pollution, climate change and biodiversity loss – precisely the sort of catalyst the UN’s ailing 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development could use.

A ‘circular economy’ can be thought of as a system designed to deliver social and economic prosperity without requiring unsustainable levels of raw material extraction, consumption or pollution. In simplified terms, a circular economy combines three design principles: eliminating waste and pollution; extending the lifetime of products and materials for as long as possible; and regenerating natural systems. It can entail many different types of activity – ecodesign of goods, ‘product-as-a-service’ alternatives to product ownership, regenerative and restorative farming, and the use of refurbished and second-hand goods are just a few examples. Achieving a circular economy is not simply about recycling more: it requires reorienting and redesigning the fundamental goals and structures of societal provisioning systems (food, transport, energy, shelter) in ways that dramatically reduce raw material and energy consumption.

The story of the circular economy so far has often been one of modest ambition, localized initiatives, and small-scale or experimental projects implemented incoherently.

A robust scientific literature underlines the advantages of circular economic models over today’s predominantly extractive, resource-intensive ones (often described as ‘linear’ by researchers). By some estimates, moving to a circular economy could unlock up to $1.5 trillion in value in just three sectors of the US economy alone. It could help achieve 45 per cent of the global greenhouse gas emissions reductions needed to mitigate climate change by transforming the way products and materials are made and used. It could also restore global biodiversity to its 2000 levels within little more than a decade. Yet without introduction of the circular economy at scale, in contrast, resource consumption could increase by 60 per cent from 2020 levels by 2060, while over half of the 169 targets within the 17 SDGs may be unachievable. Put another way, the circular economy is becoming too important for policymakers to ignore, all the more so amid mounting concerns about rising global temperatures, the lack of progress on the SDGs, and the world’s failure to meet many environmental targets.

Yet the story of the circular economy so far has often been one of modest ambition, localized initiatives, and small-scale or experimental projects implemented incoherently. As we argue in this paper, the circular economy needs to be both scaled up and globally coordinated. One of the most basic challenges is that not enough circular economy activity is going on: according to one estimate, the global economy is just 7.2 per cent ‘circular’, if measured by the percentage of secondary (i.e. cycled) materials it consumes. A second problem is the lack of dedicated institutional representation. Whereas the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) exists for global climate policy coordination, and the International Energy Agency (IEA) provides a coordinating structure for the energy sector, no equivalent exists for the circular economy. What is needed is a kind of IEA for the circular economy, so to speak: a multilateral body that can champion the circular economy with policymakers and in the UN system, and that can coordinate policy, regulation and standards.

A third problem, partly stemming from the above, is that action on the circular economy remains fragmented at a global level. All countries depend to varying degrees on foreign trade for the materials, goods and services associated with circular activities. Equally, ‘ecodesign’ standards requiring products to meet strict circularity criteria will affect global supply chains, with implications potentially beyond the jurisdictions where such standards are enacted. However, the basic interconnectedness of the circular economy is not fully reflected in policy. More than 75 national circular economy action plans, roadmaps and strategies have been launched to date (another 14 are in development). These documents have been drafted unilaterally by the countries in question, resulting in a kaleidoscope of around 3,000 rapidly evolving commitments spanning 135 policy areas and 17 sectors. While the amount of activity is a positive sign of rising interest in the circular economy, fragmentation of its operating and regulatory environments risks increasing barriers to trade (for example, when regulations on the export of industrial waste or recycled electronics are incompatible between one country and another).

A fourth concern is that current government practice on the circular economy risks encouraging counterproductive resource nationalism and zero-sum economic competition, hurting resource-poor developing countries in particular and undermining the SDGs. In some cases, the national action plans and roadmaps mentioned above have narrow domestic goals, such as boosting competitiveness against trade partners, supporting the (often politically motivated) reshoring of industry and jobs, and reducing dependence on imported critical materials. Trends towards deglobalization and nationalism increase the temptation for governments to treat the circular economy as an opportunity to assert, or contest, control over supplies of critical raw materials.

Summary of recommendations

To address these challenges, this paper proposes solutions and ideas in two parts. The first part covers the period to 2030, the UN’s currently envisioned deadline for achieving the SDGs. The second focuses on 2030–50, a period during which the SDGs may be extended (most likely in modified form) or replaced with new goals as part of a refreshed sustainable development agenda.

In terms of immediate action on salvaging the SDGs between now and 2030, we have identified five priority areas for international collaboration on the circular economy. These proposed actions draw on input from stakeholder workshops and consultations with participants from Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America, and are intended for a varied audience of multilateral institutions, governments and businesses. With the 2030 SDG deadline approaching, work on implementing these recommendations would need to begin immediately.

The five priorities are as follows:

1. Embed principles of justice and inclusivity in circular economy development.

This is more than a moral imperative; it is a pragmatic necessity both for engagement with the UN system, where such values already underpin the SDGs, and for achieving political and popular support around the world for the economic reforms implied by the circular economy. Key tasks include rectifying environmental injustices such as illegal dumping of waste in low- and middle-income countries, providing decent work and meaningful employment, and consulting a wide range of countries and stakeholders on the design of circular economy policies. Other recommendations include establishing UN guidelines on social equity in the circular economy; setting up a platform under the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to facilitate sharing of expertise and best practices of Indigenous communities; and launching a global information campaign on the benefits of the circular economy.

2. Enhance global policy coordination on the circular economy.

A multilateral or intergovernmental policy coordination mechanism is needed to help governments develop and implement national circular economy roadmaps. One option would be to establish a cross-sectoral circular economy alliance between UN development agencies. Such an alliance could work with national governments, multilateral development banks (MDBs), the private sector and civil society to offer guidelines, best-practice examples and technical knowledge. The Global Alliance on Circular Economy and Resource Efficiency (GACERE) – which currently consists of just 16 countries plus the EU – could conceivably be repurposed and expanded for this role. Another option would be to set up an international resource agency, akin to the International Energy Agency (IEA) in some respects but with a mandate specific to material resources and the circular economy. Additionally, the G7 and G20 should be encouraged to increase their ambition on the circular economy and to align policy in areas such as product and producer standards. International coordination between environmental agendas could also be improved by applying circular economy principles to achieve the targets set in multilateral environmental agreements such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Paris Agreement on climate change.

3. Reform the global financial architecture.

Scaling up the circular economy will require significant investment. At present, the circular economy is poorly integrated into the global financial architecture, and thus largely off the radar of many investors or perceived as too risky. Creating a circular economy-specific framework for international financial institutions could facilitate development of investment taxonomies, financial benchmarks and technical criteria that would underpin the funding of projects, technologies and business models at scale. Multilateral development finance – though historically focused on ‘linear’ economic models – also has a role to play in de-risking circular economy investments. The ongoing reform of MDBs presents an opportunity to embed circularity principles in international public finance. Most fundamentally, MDBs will need to increase their lending capacity and adjust their mandates to allow the financing of global public goods. A Global Circular Economy Fund, financed through public sources and modelled on the Green Climate Fund, could also be set up to mobilize private capital, concentrating on low- and middle-income countries that might otherwise struggle to attract financing for their circular economy transitions.

4. Rewire the global trade system.

Changes in policy and regulation are needed to support circular economy-enabling trade while preventing problems such as the illegal dumping of waste and trade in goods that inhibit the circular economy. Reconfiguring global supply chains to be circular in nature will require policies and regulations to streamline trade in many kinds of goods and services, including: remanufacturing and recycling equipment; second-hand goods; secondary raw materials; non-hazardous scrap and industrial residues; and design, rental and repair services. ‘Trusted circular trader’ schemes could be established to reduce red tape, pre-certifying circular economy-compliant exporters. ‘Resource recovery lanes’ similar to customs green lanes could expedite documentation for shipments of secondary raw materials. Technical cooperation to make circular trade compatible with the World Customs Organization’s Harmonized System (HS) codes is also needed. Finally, the informal circular economy working group hosted by the WTO’s Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD) would benefit from more formal status.

5. Develop shared standards and metrics.

Common standards and metrics will be crucial to expanding the circular economy worldwide, and to reducing policy and regulatory fragmentation. In addition to supporting disclosures by businesses and organizations, new metrics will be needed for monitoring and reporting the circular economy’s aggregate impact on other multilateral environmental agreements, such as the Paris Agreement on climate change and the upcoming binding instrument to end plastic pollution by 2040. A circular economy-specific taxonomy of standards will need to cover many different areas, including product design, procurement, cleaner production, supply-chain transparency and traceability, and financial performance. The recent publication of the first tranche of ISO 59000 standards on the circular economy is a step forward, but micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in particular may need support on compliance costs. The new voluntary Global Circularity Protocol (GCP), launched in 2023, could drive the development of universal metrics for assessing circularity.

After the SDGs – 2030 to 2050

Most of the SDGs will not be achieved by 2030. Only 17 per cent of the SDG targets are on track to be met globally by 2030. Some prominent voices propose that, instead of abandoning or replacing the SDGs, the UN should revise the current set of targets and extend the SDG framework to 2050. To provide ideas in this area, Chapter 4 presents an indicative, longer-term policy blueprint to be considered in the context of a possible extended or revised SDG framework post-2030.

Specifically, we propose a set of circularity targets in 17 categories for 2050, and corresponding levers and actions for achieving them. Each category of target is mapped to one of the 17 SDGs. For example, for SDG 1 (‘No poverty’), our proposed targets envisage the circular economy providing affordable basic services to the poor, and sustaining local businesses that can help make communities resilient to economic shocks and environmental disasters. For SDG 7 (‘Affordable and clean energy’), we propose actions that would enable societies to achieve full, affordable access to renewable and circular energy systems. Under this target, most critical materials would be supplied through secondary sources or substituted with alternative materials – highlighting the importance of circularity in ensuring that the resource demands of the energy transition are reduced as much as possible.

To enshrine circular economy principles more prominently in the next set of goals post-2030, we recommend several steps:

1. Introduce a specific high-level objective, within the extended post-2030 SDG framework, that recognizes the transformative potential of the circular economy for global development and for addressing the triple planetary crisis.

2. Explicitly outline ambitious but achievable global targets related to reducing unsustainable resource use, reducing global waste generation, and enhancing circularity rates for key resources and materials.

3. Ensure that circular economy targets are integrated across all SDGs, emphasizing the interconnectedness of sustainable resource management with economic, social and environmental objectives.

4. Align the post-2030 framework and circular economy targets with the ‘Beyond GDP’ initiative that forms part of the UN secretary-general’s ‘Our Common Agenda’ vision.

5. Develop clear, measurable indicators for inclusive circular economy practices with specific relevant targets for 2050.

To read the Research paper as it was published on the Chatham webpage, click here.

To read the full Research paper, click here.

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Achievement of sustainability goals is an epic task for developing economies that still strive to fulfil their basic needs. The availability of limited resources in the developing world vis-à-vis the ever-increasing demand poses further challenges to developing economies willing to transition into circular economies. Reverse logistics (RL) can facilitate this transition towards a circular economy (CE) by maximising resource utilisation and minimising waste, contributing to sustainability goals. This paper contributes to emerging literature by analysing the development and comprehensive potential of reverse logistics as a sustainability tool. It explores the significant barriers to the adoption of reverse logistics towards a circular economy, considering long-term sustainability. In the first phase, thirteen barriers have been identified from the past academic literature. Three barriers with a defuzzification number less than the threshold limit are excluded, and the final ten barriers are then prioritised using the decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory (DEMATEL) method. The findings suggest that a lack of strategic plans for returns is crucial for RL adoption towards a circular economy, followed by a lack of visibility for recycling/reuse. Organisations can increase customer satisfaction, promote environmental sustainability, and gain a competitive edge in the market by creating a strategic plan for reverse logistics. Organisations may lower costs and contribute to a more sustainable and ecologically responsible supply chain by improving visibility across the reverse logistics process. The results serve as a framework for decision-making in RL towards sustainable development. Managers and policymakers can formulate more robust and realistic decisions that align with “maximising profits,” “saving the planet,” “social concerns,” and, most importantly, “consumer concerns” in the circular economy ecosystem. Several implications are derived, leading to increased competitiveness and resilient business strategies. The novelty of this work lies in the identification of barriers to reverse logistics adoption towards a circular economy using an integrated fuzzy Delphi-DEMATEL approach, considering long-term sustainability. This approach is studied for the first time in a developing economy context, proposing social, economic, and environmental effects and actions to be taken by organisations for sustainable development.

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From Words to Action

It is no understatement to say that the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies adopted at the WTO’s Twelfth Ministerial Conference (MC12) is a landmark achievement. The first agreement in the WTO’s legal regime to focus on sustainability and the second multilateral agreement reached in the organization’s almost 3 decades of existence, it establishes for the first time a set of global, binding rules on the support governments provide to their fishing sector. With more than 35% of marine fish stocks considered overfished—a proportion that has grown steadily over the past 5 decades—addressing the contribution of fisheries subsidies to this pressing global environmental problem through international cooperation was long overdue.

In particular, the new disciplines prohibit the provision of fisheries subsidies in the situations where concerns about the sustainability of fishing activities are the clearest: (1) when illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing activities have been identified; (2) when the health of fish stocks is assessed and their biomass is determined to be at alarmingly low levels; and (3) when fishing occurs in unregulated high seas fisheries, meaning that no entity has competence for managing stocks sustainably.

The new rules are thus essential tools to keep at bay the most harmful effects of fisheries subsidies, not only for the marine environment, but also for those who depend on healthy fish resources for their livelihoods and nutrition. At the moment, however, the agreement only consists of words on a few pieces of paper. Its beneficial effects will not materialize—at least not in full—until it enters into force, for which two thirds of the WTO membership (i.e., at least 109 members) must formally accept it. It is only at this stage that the new disciplines will become enforceable by, and against, members that have accepted it. At the time of writing, 52 members had submitted their instrument of acceptance to the WTO.

Meanwhile, members also need to assess what changes will be required domestically to align with the new rules and, in the case of developing country members, identify the types of international assistance they may need to implement these rules. IISD has produced a self-assessment tool they can use to do that as they prepare for implementation.

Toward Further, Broader Rules

Importantly, the agreement’s main disciplines are subsidy prohibitions that focus on specific, particularly alarming situations. But before adopting the agreement at MC12, WTO members were also considering broader rules to curb the subsidies that lead to the overexploitation of fisheries resources more generally. These rules could not be included in the agreement due to a lack of consensus, and members committed to continue negotiations and agree on these additional disciplines later—which they hope to do at the MC13.

Ongoing talks can be seen as an opportunity to better address the underlying role of subsidies in driving overcapacity in global fishing fleets and incentivizing unsustainable levels of fishing.

It is precisely these additional rules that members are now negotiating. While the agreement reached at MC12 aims to prevent the most damaging impacts of fisheries subsidies, the ongoing talks can be seen as an opportunity to better address the underlying role of subsidies in driving overcapacity in global fishing fleets and incentivizing unsustainable levels of fishing. As such, they are an opportunity to tackle more directly, and more broadly, one of the root causes of overfishing.

The further disciplines that are envisaged rely on three key elements: (1) a main prohibition of subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, including a list of subsidy types that are presumed to do so; (2) an exception allowing subsidies to continue when members can show that they apply fisheries management measures to keep stocks healthy; and (3) special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing country members, in the form of temporary and permanent exemptions from the rule and the management exception for subsidies by these members. The proposed disciplines also include prohibiting subsidies “contingent upon or tied to” fishing beyond the subsidizing member’s waters, as well as additional transparency requirements.

For more than 3 years, negotiations on this part of the disciplines have focused on this “hybrid” approach—the combination of a general prohibition, including a list of subsidy types, with an exception based on fisheries management. Alternative approaches have (re-)appeared in numerous proposals, but none have gathered a level of support that would give them better chances of attracting consensus. The central issue is whether the balance of rights and obligations—between members that would avail themselves of the management exception and those that would avail themselves of SDT—is acceptable. As members have explored options for an outcome, three broad structural questions have shaped discussions, and they are all interrelated.

How Strict Should the Rules Be for the Big Players?

A key question in negotiations has been whether the envisaged rule would be stringent enough to meaningfully discipline the subsidies provided by the largest players in the fisheries sector—especially members with the biggest fishing fleets and those that provide the most subsidies. Looking at the subsidies that could fall in the scope of the new rules, around 72% are provided by the top 10 subsidizers, a number that increases to 86% if one considers the top 20 subsidizers.* The way the disciplines apply to those providing the most subsidies will thus be critically important to ensure the rules are effective.

A key question in negotiations has been whether the envisaged rule would be stringent enough to meaningfully discipline the subsidies provided by the largest players.

Since the hybrid approach emerged as the focus of talks in 2020, some developing country members have raised concerns about the permissiveness of the proposed rules, in particular for the largest subsidizers. Other members, including most of the biggest subsidizers, have generally argued that the proposed rules considered under this approach were stringent enough. These discussions have continued since talks resumed in 2023, with various proposals and ideas tabled by different members to somewhat raise the level of ambition in the envisaged rules, notably by making them stricter for large subsidizers.

What Should Be the Role of Fisheries Management?

Another important, and closely related, question that has generated significant debate is whether and how the rules should be linked to members’ fisheries management. It is widely recognized that, in theory, effective management of fisheries resources can help to mitigate the harmful impacts of fisheries subsidies. Influential analytical work on this topic by United Nations Environment Programme or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has emphasized that point.

Another important, and closely related, question is whether and how the rules should be linked to members’ fisheries management.

But members have shown diverging levels of comfort with the idea of relying on fisheries management as part of the application of WTO subsidy rules. Some developing country members have voiced concern that management-based rules could preserve the status quo by allowing big subsidizers to keep supporting fleets as long as some type of fisheries management measure is implemented, even if such measures are ineffective.

While the link with fisheries management is inherent to the hybrid approach that members have agreed—with varying degrees of enthusiasm—to focus on, some recent discussions have centred on how strict the sustainability and transparency requirements should be for members to use the management exception. Many members have proposed tightening these requirements, for large subsidizers in particular, but others resist the idea of making rules too stringent. The balance that members must strike here will be to ensure that any management-based exemption is strict enough to halt the continuation of unsustainable subsidization, while keeping it accessible to WTO members with different types of fisheries management and levels of capacity.

What Flexibilities Should Be Included for Developing Country Members?
A third key question that has been at the centre of discussions is what types of SDT provisions for developing country members should be part of the new rules. Demands for SDT were limited in the context of the rules included in the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, due to their focus on unequivocally alarming situations. But the broader nature of the new disciplines currently under negotiation has led developing country members to be more vocal in calling for exemptions from the main prohibition of subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing.

Many developing country members argue that they must protect the livelihoods and employment of poor fishing communities and develop their fishing fleets to ensure a fairer distribution of the benefits extracted from fishing among nations. Other members insist that if exemptions from the disciplines are excessively broad, they could undermine the effectiveness of the rules, to the detriment of everyone whose livelihoods rely on the sustainability of marine resources.

Among the top 20 subsidizers, 13 are developing country members and, together, they provided about 55% of global subsidies.

One complicating factor regarding SDT in the context of rules on fisheries subsidies is that some of the largest fishing nations and subsidizers in the world are developing countries. Among the top 20 subsidizers, 13 are developing country members and, together, they provided about 55% of global subsidies.** More broadly, however, many developing countries provide very limited amounts of subsidies, if any. SDT provisions thus need to take this high heterogeneity into account.

Generally, the temporary and permanent exemptions from the main prohibition that members are considering remain quite similar to those that were discussed ahead of MC12 in this area. They include a temporary exemption for subsidies that developing country members provide to fishing in their domestic exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or under the competence of a regional fisheries management organization (RFMO), as well as a permanent exemption for subsidies to artisanal fishing—“low-income, resource-poor, and livelihood” fishing, to be precise. Full exemptions from the main prohibition for least developed country (LDC) members and members that are small fishing nations (and/or small subsidizers) are also among the proposed provisions.

This combination of possible exemptions can be seen as an attempt to tailor the flexibilities to members’ different roles in global fishing and to different kinds of fishing activities. The EEZ and RFMO flexibility that covers all developing countries exempts a large share of global catch, fishing effort, and subsidies from the application of the rule, but it is only temporary. On the other hand, exemptions for small-scale fishing, small fishing nations, and LDC members apply permanently, but cover much smaller shares of global catch, effort, and subsidies.

Can WTO Members Do It Again?

WTO members have made progress in defining the broad contours of their collective answer to these questions since negotiations resumed in early 2023. But they must make decisions if they want to conclude this “second wave” of negotiations by adopting additional disciplines on subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing at MC13.

The question is whether members will show the necessary political will and flexibility to converge toward each other and find a landing zone that, by definition, will not be anybody’s ideal solution. To do that, they will need to recall what enabled conclusion of the first part of the agreement: the capital importance of this common endeavour for both the marine environment and the hundreds of millions of people worldwide whose lives directly depend on it. WTO members did it once; there is no reason they cannot do it twice.

To read the full policy analysis as it appears on International Institute for Sustainable Development’s website, click here.

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Today, things are different. People in wealthy countries can order a new outfit for less than a day’s wages. We enjoy new styles and trends that were once reserved for the ultra‐​rich. Even our poorest are rarely lacking sufficient clothes and shoes.

Much of this abundance is owed to globalization. Clothing is so plentiful that unwanted new garments are piling up on the beaches of Ghana. African consumers can no longer absorb the quantities shipped to them by rich ones, so they choose the styles they love and discard the rest.

There are, however, critics of these trends, especially the recent phenomenon labeled “fast fashion,” the rapid production of inexpensive, trendy clothing that is quickly made available to consumers, often resulting in short product life cycles. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe called the fashion industry an “environmental and social emergency” because clothing production has roughly doubled since the year 2000. Their main concerns are fast fashion’s environmental impact and working conditions.

Is apparel a menace? In short, no. Globalization of the clothing industry has been good for the United States and the world.

Clothing Abundance and Globalized Fashion Provide Myriad Benefits

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As we now know, WTO members, supported as always by the Secretariat, made MC12 a resounding success. After nearly six days of negotiations – culminating in a marathon 48 hours of non-stop talks – ministers and delegates adopted a package of multilateral deals that will deliver for people, businesses, and the planet. The scale and scope of the so-called “Geneva Package” of agreements has not been seen at the WTO since the mid-1990s.

I came to the WTO because I was firmly convinced that trade was part of the solution to the global commons problems, from pandemic disease to climate change, that represent some of the biggest threats to our future prosperity. Speaking to members on my first day in office in March of last year, I recalled the fundamental goals of the WTO, as set out in the preamble to our founding Marrakesh Agreement: using trade as a means to improve living standards, create better jobs and promote sustainable development. These goals are fundamentally about people. But one more reason I came here was that I felt the WTO had the potential to do much more to improve the lives of people around the world.

MC12 is proof that the WTO can deliver results. Members have shown they are capable of reaching multilateral compromises and finding solutions to contemporary challenges – provided they have the political will to do so.

The results achieved at MC12 will enhance the role trade has been playing in helping people cope with the multiple problems we currently confront – economic, environmental, and of course, the COVID-19 pandemic and the more recent food security crisis.

The deal on fisheries subsidies – concluded after nearly 21 years of negotiations – is only the second new agreement WTO members have reached since 1995, and the very first WTO agreement to put environmental sustainability at its core. By banning subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, as well as fishing in the high seas and in overfished stocks, the pact represents a major step forward in protecting ocean health and biodiversity. Importantly, it also means that WTO members have delivered on the mandate given to them in Sustainable Development Goal 14.6.

To read the full report from the WTO, please click here.

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Developing countries and their financing partners are looking to the multilateral trading system to deliver development outcomes. Of the 53 developing countries which responded to the questionnaire accompanying the M&E exercise, 50 (94 per cent) include trade priorities in their development strategies, including 25 least-developed countries (LDCs) (93 per cent). Responses also indicate that 31 donors (86 per cent) include trade priorities in their development strategies. 

To read the full report from the WTO. please click here.

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Aid for trade is needed to help identify the costs and benefits of trade agreements. Amid stalemate at the World Trade Organization (WTO), many countries now lack a benchmark from which to assess the costs and benefits of the new agreements. In many regions, regional trade agreements infamously offer a “noodle bowl” of overlapping rules and regulations. Some agreements liberalize trade rules, others less so; the difference is often in the fine print of the agreements on rules of origin, cumulation, nontariff measures, and a host of other regulatory issues.

Aid for trade can help regional trade grow and develop by using better-evidenced approaches to the design, negotiation, and implementation of trade agreements. Countries enter into trade agreements hoping to participate in the most effective trade regimes. However, new agreements do not always bring additional market access over the existing ones, resulting in low preference uptake. Regulatory convergence, a key element in attracting investment and building digital capacity, is even more opaque, and much more work is needed to determine which agreements improve convergence and coherence and which do not.

Aid for trade should help make trade agreements transparent. Trade agreements should be quantified and assessed for their contribution to growth and development, and their impact on inequality and sustainability. Governments need to have a better idea of best practices in negotiating and implementing trade agreements. Small, medium-sized, and even micro enterprises, so important to Asia and the Pacific, need user-friendly information to take advantage of regional trade agreements. Aid for trade could shift from explaining trade liberalization and trade agreements to a more rigorous, research-based approach. Engaging experts, aid for trade could support activities to (i) quantify and assess costs and benefits of existing and new agreements and their potential for economic growth, (ii) estimate preference utilization, and (iii) assess degrees of regulatory convergence.

To read the full research from the Asian Development Bank. please click here.

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1. On the occasion of the 2022 OECD Ministerial Council Meeting, we1 have assembled on 9-10 June 2022 under the leadership of Italy as MCM Chair, and with Mexico and Norway as Vice Chairs, under the theme of “The Future We Want: Better Policies for the Next Generation and a Sustainable Transition”.

2. Russia’s unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine is a flagrant violation of international law that shakes the very foundation of the international order. Any unilateral attempts to change it and redraw internationally recognised borders by force or by other means is unacceptable. Against this tense backdrop, we believe that the OECD has a greater role to play as an international organisation that can unite under our shared values. We are firmly determined to rise resolutely to various geopolitical challenges ahead to preserve and promote our shared values. We condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms. We have suspended Russia’s and Belarus’ participation in OECD bodies. We call on Russia to immediately cease all hostile and provocative actions against Ukraine, withdraw all military and proxy forces from the country, and turn to good-faith diplomacy and dialogue in order to bring a peaceful end to its ongoing war as soon as possible. We call on all partners to refrain from taking export restrictions measures for agricultural products in the context of the rising food insecurity crisis, in coordination with other international partners. We stand in solidarity with Ukraine. Our priority is to help the Ukrainian people, support their democratically elected government, and protect refugees throughout this crisis. We encourage the OECD’s continuing analyses of the economic, environmental and social repercussions of the war, including the needs of women and children, and OECD proposals in support of Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction, together with relevant international partners. In this regard, we welcome the establishment of the OECD Kyiv Office.

3. In this context, we will work toward consolidating the economic and social foundations of democracy, through realising a sustainable and inclusive growth as well as addressing disparities and inequalities. We will also step up efforts to maintain and strengthen the rules-based international economic order, while preserving our economic security and countering economic coercion. Furthermore, we will bolster our external engagement to promote adherence to OECD standards and to achieve sustainable development all over the world.

4. We want the next generation to inherit a peaceful, prosperous, sustainable and inclusive future. The OECD’s shared values, as reflected in its 60th Anniversary Vision Statement, are the basis for our like-minded action in support of a rule based international order and in pursuit of sustainable growth, while protecting our planet and reducing inequalities. We believe democracy and the rule of law, the promotion of human rights, equality, diversity and inclusion, gender equality, the market-based economic principles, an open, free and fair, and rules-based multilateral trading system, transparency and accountability of governments, and the promotion of environmental sustainability will help improve the lives and prospects of everyone – inside and outside the OECD’s membership, now and in the future. We intend to continue our successful collaboration with non-member countries. We commit to preserving the like-minded nature of the OECD in its enlargement process, and welcome the adoption of Accession Roadmaps for Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Peru and Romania. We reaffirm the openness of the Organisation, the continued importance of all of our regional programmes and the strategic priority of South East Asia as identified in our Global Relations Strategy, and our commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Solid multilateral co-operation and institutions have never been more important. Recognising the challenges to the OECD’s standards and norms by emerging donors, we will reinforce our global engagement through consolidating OECD’s role as a platform for the exchange of experiences and best practices, as well as advancing its standards globally, through membership and partnerships and a sound approach to development. The war in Ukraine, the scarring effects of the pandemic and the climate emergency have critical consequences particularly for developing countries. Extreme poverty, severe food insecurity and forced displacement are intensifying. We recognise the importance of an urgent and coordinated response and of international cooperation to help developing countries manage these shocks. We are committed to supporting developing countries to achieve their development goals through policy dialogue, expert analysis, demand-driven policy support, domestic resource mobilisation and international finance – including Official Development Assistance and other official and private flows – to meet both urgent needs and longer term sustainable development priorities. We will take a positive role in measuring these international financial flows to contribute to the achievement of the SDGs.

To read the full report from the OECD Council, please click here.

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To read the full report from World Intellectual Property Organization, please click here.

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In her opening message, DG Okonjo-Iweala says:

“The multilateral trading system has played an important part in efforts to fight COVID-19. Trade’s resilience represented a lifeline for millions, enabling access to food and other essential supplies. Now, the WTO can and must play a critical role in accelerating COVID-19 vaccine production and in ensuring a strong, sustained and inclusive global economic recovery.

“To live up to its founding objectives of using trade to help people — to raise living standards, create jobs and promote sustainable development — the WTO must deliver results this year. By responding together to a global crisis without precedent in our lifetimes, members can begin to rebuild the trust needed to address future challenges.”

To read the full report from the World Trade Organization (WTO), please click here. 

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