The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated these trends. According to one estimate, COVID has accelerated the digitalisation of business operations by up to a decade. The move towards more digital governance is also becoming more widespread with many recent free trade agreements (FTAs) including “e-commerce” chapters and provisions. Six months into the pandemic, however, a new kind of digital trade agreement was ratified with, very fittingly, the electronic signatures of three small, open, Asia-Pacific economies: New Zealand, Singapore, and Chile. Since that virtual signing ceremony, several similar agreements have followed or are in prospect.

In this paper, former New Zealand trade negotiator Stephanie Honey explores several policy options for digital trade governance. It outlines the innovative features of the DEPA approach and details its goal to realise the full potential of digital trade for businesses, while also safeguarding policy space for governments. The paper also reflects on the DEPA’s scope of impact, given that many of its provisions are “soft law” rather than legally binding rules – and whether flexibility might in fact be an advantage in this fast-moving area.

To read the original report from the Hinrich Foundation, please visit here

The post Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_Washington International appeared first on bodog.

1. The COVID-19 crisis has had an enormous social and economic impact, with more than 1.1 million deaths and more than 43 million confirmed cases, resulting in a huge strain on the health care sector and the largest economic shock the world has experienced in decades. The recent WTO forecast suggests that world trade in 2020 will contract by 9.2% compared to 2019. The World Bank estimates that in a pessimistic scenario, where COVID-19 outbreak persists, the global GDP could shrink by almost 8% in 2020.
2. Desiring to make international trade a powerful tool to help contain the pandemic and contribute to economic recovery, the signatories of this communication invite all WTO Members to start working on a Trade and Health Initiative, draft elements of which are presented in the Annex.
3. The WTO Secretariat reports that, since the beginning of the crisis, 88 WTO Members have taken trade measures that had either restrictive or facilitating character. It appears that today still over 70 WTO Members have measures in place that restrict exports of medicaments, medical supplies or food. At the same time, Members that implemented liberalizing measures such as temporary tariff suspension, expedited regulatory approvals and streamlined customs procedures, were able to facilitate trade to their benefit and thus strengthen supply chains.
4. Notwithstanding positive unilateral actions taken by Members, a global health crisis requires a coordinated global response. Public health emergencies will not be effectively addressed without resilient, robust and well-diversified supply chains that operate in a predictable trading environment. If we are to meet the unprecedented challenge of ensuring availability of essential medical goods, including vaccines, in these turbulent times, we must enhance our cooperation.
5. In this context, the WTO, as the cornerstone of the international trading system, can help deliver an effective global response to crisis situations. Through seeking multilateral solutions, we can be better prepared to fight both COVID-19 and future pandemics.
6. With this objective in mind, we call on WTO Members to make their utmost efforts to prevent further disruptions in the supply chains of essential medical goods. As set out in the Annex to this Communication, we propose specific actions relating to export restrictions, trade facilitation, technical regulations, tariffs, transparency and review, and call for the WTO to enhance its cooperation with other relevant international organizations, such as WHO, WCO, OECD as well as G20, given the context of the on-going evaluations of the global response to COVID-19. These proposed actions are not intended to be prescriptive and do not cover the universe of possible measures that could support trade in essential medical goods. Rather, they reflect emerging best practices and should provide sufficient flexibility to be adapted to differing national circumstances.
7. Recognizing that multilateral outcomes generate the greatest possible common good, we strongly encourage all Members to undertake actions set out in the Annex and join us in the work on a WTO Trade and Health Initiative.
8. The first step in the work on the Trade and Health Initiative could take the form of a joint statement of all Members, which should be adopted in early 2021. In addition to helping fight the pandemic in the short-term, such a statement would be intended to serve as a confidence-building measure. The short-term actions under the Trade and Health Initiative could also serve as a starting point for negotiations on new WTO commitments, which, ideally, could be concluded at the 12th Ministerial Conference. Some signatories to this communication have also signalled an interest in exploring commitments relating to tariffs in the healthcare sector and liberalization of relevant logistics, distribution and transport services, among others.
9. We realize that the challenges related to the scarcity of essential medical goods, now alleviated to some extent by the response on the supply side, may be repeated at the moment of the development of a vaccine or new medical treatments. In this context, we welcome the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility (COVAX), a global pooled procurement mechanism for COVID-19 vaccines, managed by Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and WHO. This mechanism is critical in securing an equitable share of vaccines for all Members of the international community. As we strongly support the objective of this facility, we call on WTO Members to ensure that any export-restricting measures do not pose a barrier to the delivery of necessary supplies under the COVAX facility.
10. We recognize the collaborative efforts of private and public stakeholders in the research and development of COVID-19 diagnostics, vaccines and treatments. We encourage the industry to take actions to ensure access at affordable prices to COVID-19 diagnostics, vaccines and treatments for vulnerable populations and support voluntary pooling and licensing of IP rights to accelerate the development of such diagnostics, treatments and vaccines and scaling up their production. We recognize the importance of the IP system in promoting R&D and innovation for access to effective treatments. We note that the flexibilities provided by the TRIPS Agreement and reaffirmed in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health remain available to protect public health and to promote access to medicines for all.

Bodog Poker

A successful fight against COVID-19 and any future pandemic requires increased cooperation of WTO Members. In order to ensure accessibility of essential goods during a pandemic, disruptions in the functioning of supply chains must be minimized, and efforts must be made to support their resilience and robustness.

In response to pandemic-related challenges in international trade, Members could agree on a joint statement on a new Trade and Health Initiative. The objectives of such an initiative would be to enhance the capacity of the trading system to respond to the public health emergencies and to support improvements in the resilience of supply chains.

The initiative could include the following immediate actions in response to the current COVID-19 crisis, which reflect emerging best practices, and which could pave the way for new WTO commitments.

EXPORT RESTRICTIONS

Members will:

• review and promptly eliminate unnecessary existing restrictions on exports of essential medical goods necessary to combat the COVID-19 pandemic;1 and
• exercise restraint in the imposition of any new export restrictions, including export taxes, on essential medical goods and on any prospective vaccine or vaccine materials.

In doing so, Members will:

• ensure that any measures deemed necessary to prevent or relieve critical shortages are implemented in a manner that is targeted, transparent, proportionate and temporary and consistent with WTO obligations;
• give particular consideration to the interest of the least developed and developing countries, many of which have scarce manufacturing capacities and are highly dependent on imports, in order to avoid a negative impact of such measures on their access to essential medical goods; and,
• ensure that any trade measures, including export restrictions, do not disrupt the provision of humanitarian shipments of essential medical goods, nor the work of the COVAX facility in distributing vaccines.

Any export restrictions should be promptly notified to the WTO and published on a domestic website. The notification should include justification of the measures and an explanation of how the measure is consistent with the WTO agreements and why it was considered targeted and proportionate to the objective pursued. Equally, if following the review referred to above, Members decide to continue to maintain export restrictions, upon request, they will provide justification for the continuation of the measures and an explanation as above.

The period of validity of such measures should be as limited as possible and ideally, it should not exceed 3 months, subject to a possible extension. In any event, the duration of export restrictions should not exceed the duration of the state of public health emergency.

The above actions would help ensure equitable distribution of scarce essential medical goods and vaccines amongst WTO bodog casino Members, in particular the most vulnerable ones.

CUSTOMS, SERVICES AND TECHNICAL REGULATIONS

Members will:

• share experiences as regards the trade facilitating measures that have been put in place in response to the COVID-19 crisis with a view to establishing best practices in the context of a crisis. Members will consider to what extent they can be made permanent. Such measures may include digital customs procedures, and services such as freight, logistics, distribution and transport, which have proven an effective tool for members to facilitate the frictionless movement of essential medical goods across borders.
• cooperate in the exchange and implementation of best practices in the area of standards and technical requirements and, through collaboration within relevant international organisations, work towards enhanced regulatory alignment with the aim of facilitating trade and reducing adaptation costs for manufacturers of essential medical goods.

To this end, Members will fully engage in the work of the relevant WTO bodies, including the TFA and TBT Committees as well as the Council for Trade in Goods and Council for Trade in Services.

TARIFFS

Members will make best endeavours to temporarily remove or reduce tariffs on goods that are considered essential to fighting COVID-19 pandemic, as far as possible, taking into account national circumstances. Members may choose the method of implementation of such a temporary tariff removal or reduction, which could take the form of emergency duty relief programs. The indicative list of COVID-19 related goods, established by the WCO and WHO2 could be helpful in the determination of the product scope.

TRANSPARENCY AND REVIEW

Members will respond swiftly to requests for information on trade measures adopted during the present health crisis, including on measures undertaken to implement this initiative, from any other Members.

Members will engage fully with the trade monitoring exercises done on a regular or an ad hoc basis in the WTO, including the bi-annual Trade Monitoring Report, and pay particular attention to complying with all WTO notification requirements during the Covid-19 crisis. The monitoring and notification of measures should allow for a quick identification of disruptions in the supply chains and allow Members to enter into consultations with a view to avoiding such disruptions in the shortest possible timelines.

The WTO Secretariat shall make a summary report on the actions implemented by Members under the Initiative which should be made available by the date of the 12th Ministerial Conference. Members will provide any requested information or clarification to the WTO Secretariat for the purpose of the preparation of such a report.

COOPERATION OF THE WTO WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Members commend the work of the WTO Secretariat resulting in an extensive database of measures related to COVID-19 and a range of dedicated studies and reports allowing them to have a comprehensive and accessible overview of the situation. WTO Secretariat is encouraged to continue that work, focusing on the causes and effects of the disruptions in the supply chains of essential goods and drawing on research of other international organizations.

Given the need to enhance pandemic preparedness and respond to current and future pandemics, WTO Director-General is strongly encouraged to intensify cooperation with other relevant international organizations such as the WHO, WCO, WIPO, OECD, UN as well as the G20 with the aim of improving the analytical capacity of Members to monitor market developments in trade and production of essential medical goods. This would enhance Members’ preparedness for a health crisis and contribute to the creation of an early warning mechanism in the event of critical shortages of essential medical goods.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE 12TH MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE

As a next step under the Trade and Health Initiative, Members will take stock of the effectiveness of the above actions at the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference with a view to adopting possible commitments regarding trade in essential medical goods.

To download the document, please click here.

The post bodog online casino|Welcome Bonus_shock appeared first on bodog.

1. Negotiations: The negotiations creating the WTO were a major success, leading to a broad range of new rules that prohibit members from raising tariffs beyond agreed-upon levels, restrict non-tariff barriers, and ban discriminatory trade measures. Since then, a few negotiations have helped further lower barriers, including the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and Information Technology Agreement (ITA). Today, average applied tariffs are approximately half of what they were when the WTO was created, and numerous unfair trade practices have been discontinued.2
2. Implementation and Monitoring: The WTO recognizes that the implementation and monitoring of commitments are essential to maintaining the integrity of an effective rules-based system. Accordingly, the WTO includes mechanisms to track implementation and rules that require members to notify it of changes in trade policies and share information on trade-distorting practices (e.g., subsidies). Transparency and information sharing promote business predictability, while the discussion of trade-distorting policies often leads to their modification or abandonment before adoption.
3. Dispute Settlement: The WTO dispute-settlement system helps resolve trade disputes to minimize unilateral action and cycles of retaliation. Many countries use the dispute-settlement system to challenge adverse measures. In most cases, the member losing the dispute changes the offending measure. In other cases, that member exercises its sovereignty and chooses not to change the policy, freely accepting the consequences (retaliatory tariffs). Additionally, many disputes are settled before litigation commences.

The world has changed considerably since the WTO’s creation. It has experienced the rise of the Internet and other advanced technologies, China’s economic expansion, greater skepticism about the benefits of trade, and greater concern about income inequality. The world has changed, and so must the WTO. At the same time, the WTO itself has not met expectations. WTO negotiations have not readily facilitated new rules or additional market-access openings, the implementation and monitoring pillar has not held countries accountable for ignoring its requirements, and the dispute-settlement system has not strictly applied the rules as negotiated. As a result, the WTO is falling far short of its promise and mandate in different ways.

WTO negotiations have failed to update international trade rules to: account for non-market economies and deal with related unfair trade practices, such as forced technology transfer and massive industrial subsidies; account for new technologies, such as the Internet; improve commitments in key areas covered in detail by free-trade agreements (FTAs), such as intellectual property and services; and fully address politically important policy issues, such as labor and the environment. WTO negotiations have also failed to substantially lower or equalize tariff treatment among major economies.

The ability of large emerging economies to self-declare “developing-country” status and avoid taking on the same commitments as competitors has compounded the challenge. Worse yet, many countries claim that trade liberalization and the WTO rules that promote it are anti-development, undermining the WTO’s core mission.

Compliance with the WTO’s implementation and monitoring function has not been widespread, with many members failing to follow the basic notification requirements necessary to ensure the transparency and predictability of trade.

WTO dispute settlement has drifted from its original design. It has failed to properly adjudicate certain disputes, including by inventing new rules without consensus and improperly applying the rules to non-market economies;  allowed the WTO Secretariat to wield too much power in decision-making; and taken too long, depriving workers and businesses of real-time solutions.

Accordingly, all three pillars require reform to ensure the WTO retains a constructive and central role in resolving disputes before they spiral out of control, and in shaping international trade rules and behavior. When the WTO is functioning properly, it provides a mechanism to enforce agreed-upon rules in a predictable manner and create new rules to protect workers and businesses. When the rules are inadequate and disputes take too long, countries are more inclined to adopt unfair practices, and may be forced to respond unilaterally to protect their interests.

WTO reform provides the quickest and most constructive path to adequately address China’s unfair trade practices. The US-China Phase One trade deal made important progress on certain structural issues, but did not meaningfully address industrial subsidies or state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and it is unlikely that China will ever address these matters bilaterally given the government’s central role in its economy. Therefore, concerted multilateral pressure that paints these policies as a threat to the global trading system as a whole is necessary to effectuate change. In many respects, the WTO provides the ideal forum for countries to work together to persuade China to change its most problematic behavior. The WTO already has a core set of principles, such as non-discrimination, that are critical to countering such practices, and an existing infrastructure for negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing those rules. The WTO’s membership is also critical—it includes many countries impacted by these issues, as well as China itself. The broad reach of the WTO will also help ensure other countries do not adopt similar non-policies.

The United States has been calling for significant WTO reform for years, and many countries have recently joined the chorus. For example, in December 2018, all Group of Twenty (G20) members endorsed the following language in the leaders’ statement: International trade and investment are important engines of growth, productivity, innovation, job creation and development. We recognize the contribution that the multilateral trading system has made to that end. The system is currently falling short of its objectives and there is room for improvement. We therefore support the necessary reform of the WTO to improve its functioning.

Despite these high-level statements, WTO members have struggled to gain momentum toward tangible reform. Some blame the United States for refusing to offer specific proposals on dispute settlement, the European Union (EU) for an unwillingness to meaningfully address US concerns on this issue, China for refusing to engage on proposals related to its practices, and India for leading the fight to preserve preferential developing country status Bodog Poker for large, emerging economies.

Regardless of who is to blame, the WTO is in crisis, and momentum for ambitious reform must be generated before the system loses its relevance. To catalyze momentum, members should quickly resolve ongoing negotiations while “thinking big” about the future and significantly raising their levels of ambition. The successful conclusion of ongoing negotiations, such as those on fisheries subsidies, will create new confidence in the WTO by demonstrating that the system is still capable of solving problems. But, negotiations will not solve the biggest problems facing the system. Therefore, even as members seek to make incremental progress, they increase their ambition with respect to the overall scope of reform needed to create a system fit for purpose in the twenty-first century and on “outside-the-box” ideas to solve some of the more intractable problems before it is too late.

Any successful WTO reform effort requires the United States and the European Union to better cooperate and coordinate. The United States and EU share common values, jointly spearheaded the creation of the original international trading system, and have both used it to promote trade-liberalizing, market-oriented policies around the globe. The economies of the United States and the EU are also equally challenged by China’s policies. If they cannot reach consensus on how to fix the WTO, it is inconceivable that the rest of the world could do so.

To this end, this paper proposes an ambitious WTO reform proposal that both the United States and the European Union should be able to endorse, and ultimately work together to promote. In particular, a joint US-EU WTO reform proposal should

• address problems with all three pillars—negotiations, implementation and monitoring, and dispute settlement; these functions complement each other and reform is needed in all three to make the system work as a whole;
• address the most difficult issues, including China’s unfair trade policies and how to fit a non-market economy into a system built by market economies;
  • create new rules to address issues that have emerged since the WTO was created, such as digital trade, and upgrade existing agreements, such as the intellectual property and services agreements, to the higher standards included in many FTAs;
• include more robust commitments on politically important issues, such as labor and the environment, which are critical to regaining domestic support for trade;
• eliminate the unfairly high tariff rates imposed by certain countries, and bring greater parity in tariff levels among major economic powers;
• promote liberalization by all members, not just “developed” economies, while recognizing the unique challenges faced by least-developed countries (LDCs) and allowing for differential treatment predicated on fact-based need;
• consider novel approaches to rescue the negotiating function, such as the use of plurilateral agreements that only benefit participants (non-most favored nation), or non-binding commitments for LDCs as an initial approach in certain areas;
• increase high-level political engagement from capitals to promote greater ambition in Geneva;
• hold countries accountable for failing to follow fundamental rules related to transparency;
• fully address the underlying shortcomings of the dispute settlement system by
  • ensuring that adjudicators better respect the limited mandate provided by WTO members, and do not create rules to which members never agreed;
  • making institutional reforms to improve the transparency and accountability of the process, and address the imbalance in decision-making between the WTO Secretariat and the appointed adjudicators; and
  • improving the system’s efficiency so it serves as a viable “real-time” alternative to unilateral action; and
• recognize that fixing the negotiating function is critical to fixing dispute settlement in a sustainable manner.

The will of all WTO members will ultimately be necessary to achieve the broad-based reforms envisioned in this paper, but improving cooperation and coordination between the United States and European Union is a necessary start. Section II of this paper further outlines some of the existing problems with the WTO system, while Section III details a joint US-EU reform agenda.

To download the full report, please click here.

Clete R. Willems is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Mr. Willems is a partner at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, where he advises multinational companies, investors, and trade associations on international economic law and policy matters. Until April 2019, Mr. Willems was Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economics and Deputy Director of the National Economic Council.

The post Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_making institutional appeared first on bodog.

To download the full report, please click here.

Uri Dadush is a non-resident scholar at Bruegel, based in Washington, DC and a Senior Fellow at the Policy Center for the New South in Rabat, Morocco. He is also Principal of Economic Policy International, LLC, providing consulting services to international organizations as well as corporations. 

Abdelaaziz Ait Ali is a resident Economist who joined OCP Policy Center after five years’ experience at The Central Bank of Morocco.

Mohammed Al Doghan is an Associate Professor at King Faisal University

Muhammad Bhatti PhD, MBA, is an assistant professor in the College of Business, King Faisal University, in Hofuf, Saudi Arabia. 

Carlos Braga works in the fields of international economics, macroeconomics scenarios, corporate strategy and international agencies (World bank, IMF, WTO, OCDE, UN).

Abdulelah Darandary is an Economist and researcher at KAPSARC. He primarily works on the KAPSARC Global Energy Macroeconometric Model (KGEMM) project.

Anabel González is host of the Peterson Institute’s Trade Winds virtual event series.

Niclas Poitiers joined Bruegel as a research fellow in September 2019.

2020 © All rights reserved

The post Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_at Bruegel, based in appeared first on bodog.

While there are some country-wide factors at play, such as the quality of governance and corruption, context remains vital. In some countries, high volumes of trade and reduced incentives for customs oversight may create a uniquely enabling environment compared to the rest of the national territory. In others, such as Morocco, FTZs pose lesser criminal risks than many of the country’s other border crossings by virtue of being subject to at least some level of control and security arrangements. Yet, in other countries, like Singapore, the country’s tariff regime is so liberal that the distinction between FTZs and the country’s customs territory is all but obliterated, which reduces incentives for smuggling goods from an FTZ into Singapore’s domestic market but does not affect its position as a prime transhipment node for illicit goods.

But, not everything is relative, and some generalisations are possible. The spotlight on FTZs in recent years has disclosed common vulnerabilities, and the research for this paper has added further depth to the understanding of crime-related challenges that beset multiple FTZs around the world. Of these, the following areas are especially problematic:

• The lack of consistent international standards and incentives in relation to the policing of goods that pass through FTZs in transit.
• Inadequate understanding of FTZ-related criminal risks in general and financial crime risks specifically, including at the stage of planning and approving the establishment of an FTZ.
• Insufficient clarity of FTZ-related responsibilities and lacking coordination among various agencies involved, including limited information sharing and failure to involve customs agencies in FTZ-level risks assessment.
• The absence of credible monitoring of FTZ administrators and users, as well as the resulting gap in enforcement.
• The lack of proportionate AML/CTF supervision of FTZ-based businesses that would take account of the risk profile and volume of FTZ activities.
• Limited cooperation with the private sector.

In a positive development, however, the international conversation on FTZs has now moved beyond cataloguing a litany of real or perceived failings. The OECD’s Code of Conduct for Clean Free Trade Zones and the WFZO’s Safe Zone certification programme hold out the promise of both promoting good governance in FTZs and enabling compliant FTZs to distinguish themselves from those that are not.

These are commendable initiatives with the potential to make a difference. However, voluntary certification programmes for the best in class are not sufficient to address a host of FTZ-related vulnerabilities. This requires a concerted effort bodog poker review from governments, FTZ administrators, users and other private sector actors. Voluntary actions are especially unlikely to succeed in preventing criminal misconduct in those FTZs that are neither alive to criminal risks nor face any tangible pressure to raise their game.

With that in mind, this paper offers the recommendations summarised below as a means of advancing the global effort to strengthen FTZ integrity and further advance the useful work already done in this area.

To download the full report, please click here.

Anton Moiseienko is a Research Fellow at RUSI’s Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies.

Alexandria Reid is a Research Fellow in the Organised Crime and Policing team at RUSI.

Isabella Chase is a Research Fellow at RUSI’s Centre for Financial Crime & Security Studies.

Copyright 2020 RUSI Registered Charity (no. 210639)

The post bodog casino|Welcome Bonus_of Conduct for Clean Free appeared first on bodog.

We are grappling with some of the biggest declines in GDP and trade in decades.

• Estimates suggest global economic output will shrink by 4.8% this year – the worst drop since the Second World War.
• Earlier this week the WTO updated its forecast for trade in 2020. Our economists now predict that the volume of global merchandise trade will shrink by 9.2% compared to last year.
  • This contraction would be the worst in years – on par with that seen during the 2008-09 global financial crisis. But put into context, it also represents relatively good news – it’s better than the 13% to 32% range of the initial estimate made in April. A 13% fall in trade would already have been the worst drop since the 1930s, had the outbreak and the policy responses had an even more adverse impact.
  • Stronger-than-expected trade growth in June and July helped push the revision upwards.
• This does not mean that the picture for trade is rosy. Services trade has been badly hit, and while the data are not available yet, the recovery from the fall-off in travel and in-person services will be slow. Even the 7.2% rise in merchandise trade volume foreseen for 2021 would not bring us back to the pre-crisis trend. In addition, there are serious downside risks, particularly if there is resurgence of COVID-19 cases in the coming months.
• In the wider economy, beyond the initial rise in spending as lockdowns were relaxed, the road to recovery may be tortuous. Psychological factors, such as a lack of confidence or changed habits, could result in weak consumption and investment by households and businesses, not to mention spikes or just continuation in the course of the disease.

Fixing the global economy requires action at home, complemented by cooperation abroad (not least on trade).

• Unprecedented fiscal and monetary action has helped mitigate the pandemic’s economic impact by providing very substantial support to incomes and consumption and stabilizing financial markets. Without these steps, the contraction in output and trade would have been much worse.
• However, public authorities must be careful not to cut off the flow of funds too soon. The IMF has urged governments in a position to do so to ramp up public investment, funded by borrowing if necessary, to create jobs and lay the foundation for greener growth and higher productivity. By increasing confidence, such spending would catalyze increased private investment, spurring growth and reducing debt burdens.
• Keeping international markets broadly open to trade is an essential part of this recovery-oriented agenda. Trade enables the productivity gains that come from increased specialization and scale.
• An open, transparent and predictable trading system would reduce uncertainty for businesses, encouraging increased investment. This is good not just for the cross-border movement of goods and services, but of ideas and technology.

Trade and trade policy are also playing direct roles in countries’ responses to the pandemic.

• Our new trade data shows that trade in personal protective equipment (PPE) recorded explosive growth, up 92% in the second quarter compared to the year before – 122% if we compare May of this year to May 2019. Trade has contributed to meeting skyrocketing demand for essential goods.
• Early in the outbreak, a number of jurisdictions introduced export bans on medical products and even food. The WTO has been tracking COVID-related trade measures as part of our mandate to promote transparency in international trade.
• Our monitoring efforts showed that the trade restrictions were quickly joined by measures to facilitate imports of key supplies. These included lowering tariffs and other taxes on such as PPE, sanitizers, disinfectants, medical equipment and medicines, as well as simplifying customs procedures and documentation requirements; establishing priority channels; and cooperating on customs and regulatory approval.
• Of the several hundred COVID-specific measures compiled from February through the end of August, nearly two-thirds were trade facilitating.
• Many of the early export bans have been repealed, particularly with respect to food as global supplies of cereals are strong.  About 22% of all of the pandemic-related trade-restrictive measures implemented by G20 economies have been removed.

A functioning trading system is in the interest of countries big and small.

• The pandemic has exposed some of the fragilities inherent to economic interdependence.
• It added further impetus to the debate over on-shoring and near-shoring supply chains.
• Some voices in this debate equate domestic production with supply resilience. This is erroneous. Concentrating industry at home might make it less vulnerable to disruptions elsewhere, but domestic supplies would become more vulnerable to localized disruptions, for example from a natural disaster, or an outbreak of human or animal disease.  Particularly dangerous are zoonotic diseases, which transfer infection from animals to humans. 
• If domestic production faces physical limits or is much more expensive than imports, countries will still be grappling with a constraint on meeting demand – except it will be about affordability instead of availability.
• Countries with the ability to do so may try to increase domestic manufacturing capacity for certain supplies. But there are constraints on their ability to do this. Profitability is one.  Opportunity costs are another. Resources diverted to replicating what was previously done elsewhere will not be available for potentially more productive activities. Taken far enough, this would make for a poorer economy overall.
• Stockpiling is also far from a perfect option.  There is not only the problem of cost, but of anticipating the needs that will have to be met in the future.  We have seen in recent months that when governments turned to stockpiles, they often found them depleted, out of date, or in the case of medical devices, the equipment in the stock was all too often inoperable. Moreover, a serious enough crisis might overwhelm stockpiles, or consist of demands for products that were not foreseen.
• At the level of individual supply chains, it is likely that low-inventory just-in-time production networks will feel the need to build in more buffers, in the shape of bigger inventories.  There will also be diversification of offshore sources of supplies
• While there will likely be a combination of these approaches – efforts to make existing supply networks more resilient, attempts to bolster domestic production of key products, and stockpiling, deep and diversified international markets offer a more promising path to supply resilience. Trade remains the economically optimal response, but countries need to be confident they can rely on imports.

The trading system can and must respond to these changes.

• ​A robust and timely response is needed both for the wider goal WTO reform for a broadly open, rules-based global economy, and for the narrower issue of access to essential products in a time of crisis.
• Several governments have put forward ideas for how agreements at the WTO could help keep supply lines for essential goods open and responsive. The WTO was created to facilitate international cooperation, transparency and rules-based frameworks for international trade.
• A number of members decided early in the pandemic to lead by example:
  • Singapore and New Zealand agreed on measures to facilitate the trade of essential goods, namely by eliminating applied tariffs, refraining from export prohibitions or restrictions, and expediting the movement of crucial goods across borders.
  • In a joint ministerial statement, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Myanmar, New Zealand and Singapore declared their commitment to maintaining connected supply chains and ensuring that the transportation of essential goods remains open.
  • On 15 May 2020, the G20 called on governments imposing COVID-related measures to refrain from creating unnecessary trade barriers and disrupting global supply chains, emphasizing that measures should be “targeted, proportionate, transparent, temporary and consistent with WTO rules.”
  • In June, the Ottawa Group (which includes Canada, Australia, Brazil, Chile, European Union, Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore and Switzerland) committed to ensuring transparency (calling on the WTO Secretariat to provide monitoring and to share best practices), withdrawing trade-restrictive measures as quickly as possible, fostering WTO e-commerce negotiations, and facilitating the trade of medical products.
  • Also in June, a concept paper from the EU proposes a three-pronged approach: 1) permanent and reciprocal tariff elimination on pharmaceutical and medical goods, 2) disciplines relating to essential goods in crisis situations, and 3) other disciplines, such as regulated remanufactured goods for knowledge sharing.  The concept paper:
    • Notes a need to update the Pharmaceutical Agreement’s product coverage and add duty-free treatment to medical goods to existing disciplines.
    • Proposes limitations on the duration and scope of export controls for medical goods in response to health emergencies. and,
    • Recommends the creation of a permanent framework for collaboration and transparency.

What can be done?

At a minimum, Members can consider adopting for industrial goods the same commitment that exists in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture: require members contemplating export restrictions to “give due consideration” to the effects such measures could have on food security in importing countries, as well as providing advance notice to the WTO and agreement to consult promptly with affected members.  

In addition, a close look can be had at the WTO rules that permit temporary export restrictions to prevent or relieve domestic shortages of critical supplies.  This exception to the rules prohibiting export restrictions, bodog online casino also contains the following language:  In this context, there is also a requirement that

such measures shall be consistent with the principle that all contracting parties are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply of such products, and that any such measures, which are inconsistent with the other provisions of the Agreement shall be discontinued as soon as the conditions giving rise to them have ceased to exist. WTO GATT Art. XX(j).

Consideration can be given to operationalizing the right of WTO Members to have an “equitable share of international supply” of critical medical supplies.

The WTO’s contribution to post-COVID recovery would be substantially enhanced if members take forward the ongoing process of systemic reform.

• Currently, there are a variety of ongoing negotiations that each represent steps in the direction of reform:
  • Multilateral talks on fisheries subsidies.
  • Negotiations on digital trade among a group of Members accounting for over 90% of global trade including the European Union, China, and the United States.

Accomplishing these objectives would mark a return of the WTO to widely acknowledged relevance.  But they are not enough. 

The line must be held against a return to nations going their own way, resorting to protection rather than to international co-operation.  A stand-still is needed on trade restrictive measures, and more: liberalization of trade wherever possible, full implementation of the Trade Facilitation Agreement, with a major increase in capacity building in the least-developed countries, hearing for the first time the pleas from land-locked countries, and generally lowering the cost of moving goods across borders.

The WTO has great convening power.  During the financial crisis it brought together international financial institutions and major banks to restore trade finance.  That job was still unfinished when the pandemic descended upon us. 

Increased efforts are needed by the public and private sectors to ensure that trade finance is available at reasonable cost and in the quantities needed. For many developing countries and smaller businesses, the credit, guarantees and insurance that finance a significant share of global trade were far from abundant even before COVID-19.  When trade-related credit is insufficient, it  prevents businesses from trading and limits the ability of trade to contribute to the wider economic recovery.  By one estimate, financing capacity ranging from $2 to $5 trillion will be needed to meet demand for trade finance.⁽¹⁾

As important as these measures are, the WTO needs to be restored to its intended purpose, its role as a venue:

• where agreements are successfully negotiated to address pressing problems; 
• where disputes are settled within a binding and universally accepted structure; and
• where members are actively served by a strong, dedicated, professional Secretariat. 

We need also to be better prepared for future crises.  While the present will not take care of itself, neither will the future.  Concerted efforts at forward planning are needed to provide fresh thinking in order to:

• Prepare for a world of more simultaneous and system-wide crises; and
• Consider what kind of trade rules would best support people’s well-being, under changing and challenging circumstances.

There are no good excuses for inaction. While the WTO is not isolated from geopolitics, all leading powers have shared interests in the basic framework for international trade that the WTO represents.

In 1934, an answer to the depression was the negotiation of trade liberalizing agreements; in 1948, an answer to the devastation of two world wars was the creation of the multilateral trading system; in1973 an answer to a world divided by nontariff barriers was the launching of the Tokyo Round; and in 1995, the answer to broad areas of international commerce still being devoid of adequate rules, was the creation of the WTO. 

This is yet another time of great challenges, of a resurgence of nationalism, of centrifugal forces.  The policy response must consist of strong new initiatives to open markets, to provide greater fairness, and to re-kindle a spirit of international co-operation.   

We have a strong foundation on which to build. It is now necessary to answer the call for WTO reform.  The times demand action.

To view the original post, please click here. 

© 2020, World Trade Organization

The post bodog casino|Welcome Bonus_the Trade Facilitation appeared first on bodog.

In recent years, the case for U.S. participation in the TPP has only become more compelling as the political and economic importance of the Asia-Pacific region has grown and concerns about Beijing’s economic model have mounted. East Asia is bouncing back from the COVID-19 pandemic before the rest of the world, and deepening economic ties with the engines of global growth will be an even more valuable proposition in the midst of a deep recession. Moreover, the pandemic has revealed serious vulnerabilities in supply chain networks, and the common standards and rules of the TPP can serve as the basis for establishing trusted supply chains in the region. But is there a path for the United States to return to the TPP or to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which the 11 remaining countries finalized without the United States?

This report examines four options that the next administration would have for reengaging the CPTPP countries on trade: returning to the original TPP agreement, formally acceding to the CPTPP, seeking a broader renegotiation with the CPTPP as a baseline, or working on a narrower sectoral deal as an immediate, interim step. It then assesses the feasibility of each option based on domestic considerations and developments, as well as input from the CPTPP countries.

Domestically, a policy window may be opening for CPTPP reentry. Whereas trade was seen as toxic only four years ago, recent polls have found growing bipartisan public support for trade. At the same time, however, the views of the political parties on trade appear to be shifting. Some observers have gone so far as to suggest that the United States is on the precipice of a new trade order, with Republicans more protectionist and Democrats friendlier toward trade. This makes the domestic landscape and the outcome of a congressional trade vote uncertain. The strong bipartisan congressional vote in favor of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) led many to conclude that this agreement should be the new U.S. template for trade agreements. However, there may be factors unique to the USMCA that would not be in play in a negotiation with Asian countries. Another complicating factor is the fate of Trade Promotion Authority, set to expire in July 2021, which is a prerequisite for negotiations in the view of U.S. trading partners.

The prospect of CPTPP reentry also depends on the extent to which its members would be open to revisions proposed by the United States. To take the temperature of capitals in Asia, the Asia Society Policy Institute spoke with a dozen current and former trade officials from a diverse set of CPTPP countries. Those interviewed unanimously affirmed that they would welcome the United States back, but not at any cost. They are wary of being asked to make extensive revisions, having been scarred by the U.S. withdrawal after expending significant political capital during the TPP negotiations. Those countries  were accustomed to the uncertainties of the congressional approval process, but they now also worry about the presidential election cycle.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, the report offers a road map for the next administration to reengage with the CPTPP countries. Recommended steps include the following:

• Launch an interim sectoral agreement: As a first step, pursue a limited, sector-specific Asia-Pacific trade deal with the CPTPP members, and perhaps other countries, to set high standards, rebuild trust, and build momentum. Promising topics include:
  • Digital trade, an area that represents more and more of overall trade, particularly now that the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the digitalization of the global economy.
  • Trade in medical and other essential products, a sector in which COVID-19 has focused attention on trade restrictions and vulnerabilities in global supply chains.
  • Trade and the environment/climate, which may be of particular interest to a Democratic White House.
• Invest in competitiveness and adjustment at home: Build support for trade agreements generally and the CPTPP specifically at home by investing in competitiveness and adjustment policies and programs. Doing so would take the pressure off trade agreements to achieve goals they are not designed to tackle, such as ensuring more equitable income distribution.
• Make the case for trade: Explain to the American public that deeper U.S. trade engagement with Asia-Pacific partners is integral to building an alternative economic model to Chinese state capitalism, diversifying U.S. trade beyond China and, ideally, promoting reforms within China.
• Prioritize negotiating proposals: Develop and prioritize concrete proposals for U.S. reengagement with the CPTPP based on input from business, labor, and civil society groups throughout the country, as well as Congress.
• Consult with trading partners: Consult with the CPTPP members to understand their limits, priorities, and concerns around U.S. reengagement.

These steps would pave the way for U.S. reentry into the CPTPP. Even then, CPTPP reengagement would be a heavy lift that would require flexibility and creativity from both the United States and the CPTPP countries. Returning to the original TPP by signing on to a five-year-old agreement that faced considerable opposition at home is not a realistic proposition in 2021. The approach with the best odds of success would likely fall between formal CPTPP accession and a more extensive renegotiation. For that to work, the United States would need to focus on the most important changes and modernizations needed, while the CPTPP countries would need to be more open to changes than during a typical accession.

Given the domestic and international challenges outlined in this report, it is understandable that many would question whether returning to the CPTPP is worth all the trouble. Despite those concerns, rejoining the CPTPP is one of the most impactful ways in which bodog casino the United States can work with likeminded countries in the region to promote an alternative economic model to state-led capitalism and help shape the economic future of a region that is increasingly the engine of global growth and innovation.

Wendy Cutler is the Vice President and Managing Director of Washington DC Office of the Asia Society Policy Institute and former Deputy USTR.

To download the full report, please click here.

The post bodog poker review|Most Popular_is increasingly the engine appeared first on bodog.

Barriers to food trade in the form of export constraints have already appeared in response to the pandemic; from January to August 2020, a total of 32 jurisdictions had put in place 52 export restrictions. Experts have warned against these measures, which will impact vulnerable economies in particular, calling instead for global collaboration in trade to minimize supply chain disruptions, yet the risk remains that too many countries will choose zero-sum gains in the short term rather than working together to develop a balanced, rules-based approach that can serve the interests of many nations over the long term.

With global food security now intertwined with a global health crisis and massive supply chain shifts, leadership on global food security and trade is needed more than ever before. Signs of hope are emerging in regions like the African continent, which has long been focused on food security, where many countries are now looking to trade as a way out of the pandemic and economic crisis. The United States, which has historically been a global leader in addressing food security and is a significant exporter of food to deficit markets, should continue to play a central role. Below are three avenues for the United States and Africa to lead on trade and food security regionally, bilaterally, and globally.

Within Africa, agricultural development and food security are pressing priorities, particularly in light of Covid-19, and recent innovations in African trade policy have created a viable path for progress. African leadership is moving forward with plans to implement the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), a monumental new trade arrangement that garnered political support from 54 of 55 African Union (AU) states in record time. The AfCFTA holds the potential to expand trade both within the continent and with the rest of the world, including in agriculture where Africa’s exports have been trending upward, and provides a framework for building upon the foundation of market rules established by the African regional economic communities (RECs), including the eight sub-regional bodies that form the building blocks of the AU. It also represents the world’s largest regional trade agreement in terms of country membership, creating a rules-based trade body second in size only to the WTO. With respect to food security, the AfCFTA will include important concessions on market access and will address critical non-tariff issues, including trade facilitation issues and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, with a laudable mechanism for tracking non-tariff measures. However, although the agreement recognizes agricultural development and food security among its objectives, it does not yet incorporate a comprehensive approach to food security. Yet, the AfCFTA, which will move forward in stages, is both flexible and rules-based, and this innovative structure will be instrumental in addressing critical challenges presented by the pandemic. For example, a recent AU decision formally authorized future negotiation of a protocol on e-commerce, given the growing importance of digital trade in light of Covid-19, setting a precedent for food security.

Food security should also be central to the U.S. trade relationship with Africa, and the United States could set itself apart among Africa’s trading partners at this historic time as the AfCFTA gains momentum. To date, the United States is one of the few large economies that has yet to meaningfully engage on trade with the African continent. While it is true that the U.S.-African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which has been in place since 2000, has generated gains in some sectors, the program is unilateral and limited in its potential impact, particularly in the agricultural sector. Although the recently launched U.S.-Kenya Trade Agreement and the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation signal a shift in the U.S. trade and investment relationship with the continent, the United States’ Africa strategy is relatively underdeveloped. The European Union, for example, has an intricate relationship with Africa through the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs); however, the EPAs have been criticized for keeping Africa’s trade potential largely at bay, focusing instead on asymmetrical historical trade arrangements. China, which is now Africa’s largest trading partner, is taking a markedly different approach to trade with Africa, eschewing trade deals for large-scale infrastructure projects through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI stands to strengthen physical market systems, which will be important for making the AfCFTA operational, but it seems to place little emphasis on issues like food security and Africa’s own leadership in determining the rules of trade and investment with and within the continent.

As the pandemic highlights, there is room for a more collaborative approach, and the United States could set a new standard for bilateral engagement. If the U.S.-Kenya Trade Agreement is to be the model for future U.S.-African trade arrangements, however, it should look different than trade agreements of the past. Food security and agriculture would be a natural focal point and would be in the interests of both Kenya (which has prioritized food security due to extreme weather and a severe locust outbreak, among other factors) and the United States (due to both the larger importance of food security and because agricultural products are among top U.S. exports to Kenya). However, focusing mainly on market access and SPS, as many trade agreements do, although important, will likely not be enough to fully address food security challenges.

A deal between the United States and Kenya would also have broader implications and could either establish a new model or represent a significant setback in global food security efforts. National interests and the bilateral relationship should be approached in light of Kenya’s role in African regional integration and the direction in which the continent is heading. In addition, how the agreement is designed and implemented will really matter. If balanced and aligned with Africa’s trade framework, the agreement and the rules it encompasses could not only be a foundation for deeper U.S.-African trade ties, but could also pave the way for a global approach on trade and food security. Ultimately, bilateral, regional, and global approaches will need to reflect a broader range of needs, in particular those of vulnerable economies, and address issues of global priority like export measures, safeguards, public stockholding, and additional commitments on domestic support, while also incorporating other areas like preservation of biodiversity, recognition of Africa’s efforts to improve trade in agricultural inputs, and strengthened transport networks and trade corridors that can deliver on food security.

As countries navigate the Covid-19 pandemic and more frequent climate events, achieving global food security will require innovative approaches, strengthened leadership, and enhanced collaboration. Given the central role that trade will continue to play in food security, a cooperative, rules-based approach presents a promising path to feed a changing world as well as a stronger model for engagement between the United States and African countries.

Katrin Kuhlmann is the president and founder of New Markets Lab (NML), a nonprofit law and development center; a visiting professor at Georgetown Law; and a senior associate with the Global Food Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

To view the original post, please click here.

The post bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_with and within the continent. appeared first on bodog.

One of the most frequently invoked exceptions to MFN treatment are three “trade remedy” laws. These laws are enforced primarily through administrative investigations of two U.S. government agencies: the International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce (ITA) and the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Trade remedy laws enable the United States to impose additional duties aimed at specific producers or countries to remedy unfair trade practices and to help domestic industries adjust to sudden surges of fairly traded goods. The three types of laws traditionally classified as “trade remedies” are:

Antidumping (AD) laws provide relief to domestic industries that have been, or are threatened with, material injury caused by imported goods sold in the U.S. market at Bodog Poker prices that are shown to be less than fair market value. The relief provided is an additional import duty placed on the dumped imports based upon calculations made by the ITA. Antidumping orders are the most frequently used and the most controversial trade remedy.

Countervailing duty (CVD) laws give a similar kind of relief to domestic industries that have been, or are threatened with, material injury caused by imported goods that have been found to have received WTO-inconsistent government subsidies, and can therefore be sold at lower prices than similar goods produced in the United States. The relief provided is an additional import duty placed on the subsidized imports.

Safeguard (also referred to as escape clause) laws give domestic industries relief from surges of imported goods that are fairly traded if serious injury is found or is threatened to the domestic industry. The most frequently applied safeguard law, Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, is designed to give domestic industry the opportunity to adjust to the new competition and remain competitive. The relief provided is generally an additional temporary import duty, a temporary import quota, or a combination of both. Safeguard laws also require presidential action in order for relief to be put into effect.

Economists have generally seen antidumping laws and policies as economically inefficient. Some, however, have acknowledged the role that these economically inefficient policies have played in making trade liberalization more politically feasible by providing protection for industries that might otherwise oppose such measures. In recent years, U.S. exports have increasingly become a target of AD measures by several major emerging economies, including India and China. Antidumping laws and policies have also been at the center of dozens of trade disputes between the United States and its trading partners in the WTO. Reports issued by the WTO’s Appellate Body (AB) on the subject have been one of the primary targets of the U.S. Trade Representative’s criticisms of the AB mechanism in the broader WTO dispute settlement system. If Congress wishes to maintain a functional dispute settlement system at the WTO it may consider either directing the President to seek amendments to underlying WTO agreements such that U.S. practices are internationally compliant or direct the ITA to bring its AD policies into conformity with the AB’s interpretation of the WTO’s Antidumping Agreement.

To download the full report, please click here.

The post bodog casino|Welcome Bonus_duty appeared first on bodog.

Harlan Grant Cohen is a Gabriel M. Wilner/UGA Foundation Professor in International Law & Faculty and the Co-Director of the Dean Rusk International Law Center.

To download the full paper, please click here.

The post Bodog Poker|Welcome appeared first on bodog.