Introduction

In 2019, Congressional Democrats announced the creation of a new tool—the facility-specific Rapid Response Labor Mechanism (RRM)—in the revised North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), known in the United States as the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). The tool allows a government to take action against a worksite in the territory of another if it believes that workers are being denied their right to organize and bargain collectively. Proponents saw its inclusion as the primary reason for the broad bipartisan support the USMCA garnered. They proclaimed the commencement of a new era for trade and an important step forward for progressives—who had been increasingly critical of US trade agreements—as even organized labor in the United States supported the USMCA.

This paper investigates the RRM and is organized as follows. Section 2 begins with the perfect storm of political-economic events in the United States and Mexico that allowed the countries to agree to this unique tool. It describes the importance of the North American automotive supply chain, a sector that largely drove the Trump administration’s renegotiation of the NAFTA—over the sector’s protests—and that became the target for almost all early uses of the RRM.

Section 3 reviews the underlying problem the RRM is purportedly designed to tackle: the inability of Mexican workers to unionize and bargain collectively to overcome monopsony power. It explains the importance of Mexico’s labor reform to the renegotiation of the NAFTA and to the first few years of the USMCA, a reform process that policymakers could ultimately use the RRM to support.

Section 4 describes how the RRM works and analyzes the penalties the RRM sets out that may incentivize actors in Mexico that otherwise may be reluctant to go along with the labor reforms. It also documents the considerable financial and human resources the US and Mexican governments have deployed to operationalize the RRM and complement the Mexican government’s own efforts on labor reform. To the extent that the RRM improves political support for open trade between the two countries, the tool and these expenditures share some similarities with policies of trade facilitation.

Section 5 presents some stylized facts on the RRM during its first three years. The RRM started slowly, with the US government investigating situations at just 10 different facilities in Mexico in this period. Unsurprisingly, most of these investigations were of the automotive sector. Nevertheless, there were some interesting and important differences across the situations.

The last two sections look to the future. Section 6 turns to the political-economic literature on trade agreements and issue linkages and proposes additional research needed to understand the implications of the RRM, including the need to assess its impact on workers and Mexican suppliers at facilities affected and unaffected by RRM situations. Section 7 draws lessons learned so far and examines the potential for transposing facility-specific RRM– like structures for labor or other areas, such as the environment, into future economic agreements.

Chad P. Bown is Reginald Jones Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Kathleen Claussen is Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center.

To read the full summary as it was published by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, click here.

To read the full paper, click here. 

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Mexico’s emergence followed fractious U.S. relations with China, which had moved past Canada to claim the top trading spot in 2014. The dynamic changed in 2018 when the U.S. imposed tariffs on China’s goods and with subsequent pandemic-era supply-chain disruptions that altered international trade and investment flows worldwide.

Mexico’s gains mirror its rise in manufacturing, a key component of goods moving between it and the U.S. During the first four months of 2023, total trade of manufactured goods between Mexico and the U.S. reached $234.2 billion.

Overall, Mexican imports to the U.S. totaled $157 billion; U.S. exports to Mexico reached $107 billion.

Mexico–U.S. trade during the first four months of 2023 represented 15.4 percent of all the goods exported and imported by the U.S.; the Canada–U.S. share followed at 15.2 percent and then the China–U.S. share at 12.0 percent.

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China’s share of U.S trade had steadily increased since it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. WTO member nations enjoy preferential tariffs when trading with one another and are protected from nontariff barriers such as quotas and currency restrictions—an incentive for foreign direct investment. They also participate in the development of bodog poker review new international trade rules.

Once in the WTO, China’s access to the world’s premier consumer markets, combined with its own economic prowess and ability to marshal resources for growth, quickly transformed the country into a leading manufacturing hub.

Within a decade of its admission, critics increasingly accused China of flooding the world with cheap exports while limiting foreign access to its market. China’s trade growth coincided with sharp declines in U.S. manufacturing employment. Sectors and regions especially exposed to China’s trade tended to experience higher unemployment, lower labor force participation and reduced wage growth.

U.S. imposes tariffs of China’s exports

U.S.–China trade began trending lower in 2018 after the Trump administration imposed new tariffs on imports from China, whose government responded with a similar action on imports from the U.S. China subsequently lost its position as top trading partner later that year.

Approximately $335 billion in trade (66.4 percent of China’s exports to the U.S.) remains subject to the tariffs. The average U.S. tariff on Chinese imports is 19.3 percent, while China’s  average tariff on U.S. imports is 21.2 percent, according to the WTO. This exceeded tariffs among WTO members (enjoying most-favored-nation status) of 9 percent.

There was a short-lived rebound in China’s trade share during the pandemic that subsequently gave way following supply-chain disruptions, many involving shipping and manufacturing originating in China.

Mexico and Canada, which are highly interconnected to the U.S. economy, vied for the top spot. The three economies were formally tied together with the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and again in 2020 with the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement that replaced NAFTA.

Mexico positioned as a manufacturing base

Mexico’s expanding manufacturing base has offered an alternative to producing in China. Sourcing or producing goods in a nearby country is sometimes referred to as “nearshoring.” While data on recent nearshoring is thin and evidence of it is largely anecdotal, increased protectionism and related industrial policy are consistent with less global trade, more regional trade, and nearshoring and reshoring (returning production to the home country).

More activity in Mexico would support increased bilateral manufacturing with the U.S. It would also bolster Mexico’s standing as the U.S.’ leading manufacturing trading partner, a ranking it achieved in 2022 (Chart 2).

Bilateral manufacturing trade between Mexico and the U.S. represented 16.5 percent of all U.S. manufacturing trade; the Canada–U.S. share followed at 13.5 percent and then the China–U.S. share at 12.5 percent.

Automotive industry plays key role

The automotive industry is an especially active example of the cross-border manufacturing relationship. A U.S. plant typically produces an intermediate good that is then exported to Mexico where it becomes part of the assembly process before a final good is then imported back into the U.S.

The supply trade linkages are supported by the presence in Mexico of foreign-owned, labor-intensive assembly plants for export—the so-called “maquiladoras” Over the past 20 years, transportation has accounted for about 24.5 percent of total bilateral manufacturing trade, followed by computer and electronic equipment, 22.4 percent; electrical equipment, appliances and components, 8.5 percent; and machinery (excluding electrical), 7.7 percent.

While Mexico benefits from increased trade with the U.S., the impact on U.S. producers and consumers has been mixed. To the extent that frictions with China account for Mexico’s ascension in the trade rankings, the higher profile comes at a cost to U.S. firms and consumers through higher input and purchase prices.

While the principal focus of trade policy was once free trade, greater efficiency and lower prices, that may no longer be the case. Today’s global economic relationships encompass a myriad of concerns, among them national security, climate policy and supply-chain resiliency.

To read the full analysis, please click here.

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For much of the region with limited manufacturing capacity, trade will be the most realistic pathway to meeting domestic vaccine needs during the current crisis. Even for major vaccine producers in Latin America, trade is of paramount importance. Vaccines are a highly complex compound involving numerous ingredients and stages of production. Few countries in the world possess all the necessary specializations and basic materials to produce a competitive and fully “local” vaccine. A made-in-Latin-America vaccine could entail active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) from China or formulation development in India, as well as adjuvants from Chile processed in Sweden. The import of intermediate goods is critical to the seamless production and assembly of final goods (vaccines) used for domestic consumption or export.

Given the globalized nature of vaccine manufacturing, governments in Latin America and beyond must ensure unimpeded trade flows across borders. Protectionist temptations can be hard to resist amidst global shortages, especially for countries with greater vaccine self-sufficiency. But these measures rarely pan out as desired and could result in dire regional and global consequences, including an unfortunate scenario of “vaccine nationalism.”

The breakdown of global trade in medical supplies earlier this year provided a fresh reminder of the still-present risks of protectionism. In March and April, for instance, eighty countries imposed export restrictions on medical supplies and equipment. This included at least seven countries in Latin America and the Caribbean region, as well as the world’s top three suppliers [China, the United States, and the European Union (EU)], which collectively account for 68.2 percent of regional imports of these critical goods. To protect lives and livelihoods, vicious cycles of commercial isolationism and retaliation must be avoided at all costs.

Specifically, Latin American and Caribbean policymakers can take actions to tackle shared challenges in trade on at least three levels. First, several viable quick wins exist at the national level. Governments should bring down two-way trade barriers on essential medical products and inputs, including import tariffs and export restrictions. Trade facilitation can reduce additional nontariff barriers through streamlined customs procedures and border crossings, electronic filing, expedited certifications and licensing, etc. Brazil, for instance, suspended anti-dumping and simplified administrative processes for import and export licensing of PPE and medical devices. Similar measures should be upheld to safeguard the trade of vaccines, as well as therapeutics, and other lifesaving products and services.

bodog sportsbook review Second, international coordination between governments can further galvanize and amplify country-level actions. The Joint Ministerial Statement to ensure supply chain connectivity amidst the COVID-19 situation, initiated by Singapore and New Zealand in March, is an example to follow. As of July, ten other countries, including China, have joined the initiative, pledging their commitment to keep trade lines open for essential goods. Two Latin American countries, Chile and Uruguay, have also signed on.

Similarly, multilateral fora such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and regional integration processes such as Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance are other potential avenues to crowd in best trade practices. APEC members, including three Latin American countries, have issued at least three official declarations on trade facilitation. The Pacific Alliance is playing a critical role in trade policy coordination in Latin America and internationally through its COVID-19 Action Plan and ASEAN-Pacific Alliance Work Plan.

Third, collaboration between the public and private sectors is imperative. Delayed arrivals and departures of essential goods can be costly, especially for time-sensitive products like vaccines. Most vaccines are transported in refrigerated (or frozen) conditions and have limited room temperature shelf life, e.g., between two to twelve hours for Pfizer and Moderna’s COVID-19 vaccines. Even before COVID-19 disruptions, in 2019, the average time to clear exports through customs in Latin America and the Caribbean region was eight days; the average time associated with border compliance for imports was 2.3 days. Accelerating clearance can be achieved through efficient prioritization, nonintrusive inspection, digitization, etc. In addition, airports, seaports, and border authorities should work closely with logistics companies, vaccine producers, and various types of Authorized Economic Operators (importers, brokers, warehouses, and others). New requirements, processes, schedules, or contingent plans that may arise during the pandemic must be communicated clearly and promptly.

Another key area of public-private collaboration in trade is “hard” infrastructure. Enhanced interconnectivity can revitalize regional exports and intra-regional trade, benefitting pharmaceutical and many other supply chains in Latin America, making them more competitive. A 1 percent reduction in transport costs—achievable through infrastructure improvements—could boost overall manufacturing exports between 2 percent and 7.8 percent in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, reduced shipping costs and time benefit not only regional vaccine acquisition and production, but in-country distribution of the vaccines and treatments. 

To read the full brief, click here.

Pepe Zhang is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

© 2020 The Atlantic Council of the United States.

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U.S. agricultural exports in Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 are projected at $152.0 billion, up $11.5 billion from the August forecast, driven by higher soybean and corn export values. The projection for soybean exports is up $5.9 billion to a record $26.3 billion due to higher unit values, strong demand from China, and record volumes. Corn exports are forecast up $4.2 billion to $13.2 billion as a result of reduced competition, higher unit values and record volumes. Cotton exports are forecast up $300 million to $5.3 billion based on higher unit values. Wheat exports are projected at $6.2 billion, up $200 million, on higher unit values and slightly larger volumes. Overall major agricultural bulk commodity exports are forecast to increase 24 percent from the previous projection. Livestock, poultry, and dairy exports are forecast unchanged at $32.3 billion, as lower exports of pork and hides and skins offset increases in beef and poultry. Horticultural exports are forecast down $500 million to $34.5 billion due to expected decreases in miscellaneous products. Agricultural exports to China are forecast at a record $27.0 billion, an increase of $8.5 billion, largely due to strong soybean and corn demand. China is expected to once again become the largest U.S. agricultural market, a position it last held in FY 2017.

U.S. agricultural imports in FY 2021 are forecast at $137.0 billion, up $1.0 billion from the August forecast, led by expected increases in horticultural products. Horticultural imports are forecast up $400 million to $70.2 billion on increases in fresh fruit and vegetable imports.

Economic Recovery and Uncertainty in 2021

The global COVID-19 pandemic has already inflicted major setbacks to countries’ gross domestic product (GDP) around the world. Expectations of real GDP numbers have improved from the initial lockdown contractions, but recovery forecasts are still marked by uncertainty and prone to future setbacks. Several promising vaccine developments have provided increased optimism, pushing global equity markets higher and adding to hopes that GDP growth may return strong in 2021. Overall, global real GDP growth is expected to fall by about 4.4 percent in 2020. This is slightly less severe than was previously feared back in June. Global trade volume, which declined 9.2 percent in FY 2020, is expected to increase 7.2 percent in FY 2021. The expected economic recovery in 2021 will be shaped by both regional and overall global success in containing the COVID-19 pandemic, in addition to boosting consumer spending.

Despite upward revisions to 2021 growth projections, projected real GDP remains below pre-pandemic levels. Economic recoveries will be dependent on the status of the pandemic and public health initiatives, including the successful distribution of vaccines. The U.S. economy contracts by 4.3 percent in 2020, with optimism for a recovery of 3.1 percent growth in 2021. The Eurozone economy declines by a more severe 8.3 percent in 2020, leading to a larger correction and a greater projected 2021 real GDP growth rate of 5.2 percent. The service-sector-dependent advanced economies continue to face enormous challenges imposed by the pandemic. Declines in consumer spending in recreation, food services, and travel account for most consumer demand declines. Savings rates continue to remain above pre-pandemic levels, signaling cautious consumer sentiment. The high savings rates hold potential for a large and swift economic recovery next year.

Real GDP in North America grows by a projected 3.3 percent in 2021 after a contraction of 4.9 percent bodog casino in 2020. Canada and Mexico experience significant GDP declines in 2020, down 7.1 percent and 9.0 percent, respectively. These larger contractions factor into the larger rebounds forecast for 2021. Canada grows by 5.2 percent and Mexico by 3.5 percent.

South American real GDP collectively declines by 8.1 percent in 2020, with a 3.6 percent growth rate in 2021. Having faced negative GDP growth just prior to the pandemic, Argentina is expected to have real GDP decline by 11.8 percent in 2020. This substantial contraction allows ample room for future growth. Numerous recent policy changes help Argentina to grow by 4.9 percent in 2021. Experiencing notably weaker growth than recent years in the wake of the pandemic, China is expected to have real GDP growth of 1.9 percent in 2020. In 2021, China’s growth rate returns to previous trend levels and grows at a rate of 8.2 percent. This return to large growth is dependent on many variables, including public health conditions, which have reduced consumer sentiment and caused the recovery of retail sales to lag the rest of the economy. Industrial production has and will continue to support China’s economic trajectory, but its success is also conditional on the recovery of its trading partners. Japan will improve from a 5.3 percent decline in GDP in 2020 to 2.3 percent growth in 2021. South Korea will improve from a decrease in GDP of 1.9 percent in 2020 to 2.9 percent growth in 2021.

Forecast reductions in tax revenue present additional challenges for rising debt levels due to pandemic-related fiscal spending across the globe. Governments reliant on high oil prices for financing public expenditures are expected to face tighter budgets going forward. International financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), however, have responded to the financial pressures by stating an increased tolerance for higher public debt in the short-term, as well as temporary debt moratoriums. Relaxation of debt burdens will allow countries to respond to the crisis with fiscal policy; however, it could increase pressure to cut expenditures in the future.

These forecasts still hold an atypically large margin of error, particularly to the downside, since the forecasts rely on public health and economic variables that are difficult to predict. For example, the IMF’s October World Economic Outlook forecast includes a protracted recovery scenario due to difficulty containing the spread of the virus and a delayed release of a vaccine. In this scenario, they estimate global GDP is 3 percent lower in 2021 than in their baseline forecast. There is also greater uncertainty in these forecasts due to changes in consumer preferences and behavior, which have dramatically shifted from the pre-pandemic world. It is yet to be seen how many of these changes will persist in the future.

To read the full report, please click here.

Bart Kenner is an Agricultural Economist in the Economic Research Service at the United States Department of Agriculture.

Hui Jiang is an Agricultural Economist in the Economic Research Service at the United States Department of Agriculture.

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Many stakeholders have credited NAFTA with facilitating agricultural trade in North America by reducing tariffs and other market access barriers and by providing a stable and improved trading environment in the region. Studies conducted to estimate the incremental effect of USMCA indicate modest increases to regional trade in North America. For example, a study commissioned by the Farm Foundation estimated that USMCA would generate a net increase in annual U.S. agricultural exports to Canada of $450 million—about 1% of U.S. agricultural exports under NAFTA in 2017. Similarly, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) assessed that U.S. agricultural exports would likely increase 1.1% in year six of USMCA implementation compared to its 2017 baseline export levels. Another study, conducted by the International Monetary Fund, estimated small gains in regional trade from USMCA compared with NAFTA; with respect to agriculture, it found modest gains to the region, primarily benefiting Canada. 

A study by economists at the University of Georgia says that USMCA may lead to losses for Georgia’s small fruit and vegetable producers because of subsidized imports from Mexico. The study was limited in scope and did not examine the broader impact of USMCA on other agricultural and nonagricultural sectors, other states, or the effects at the national level for the three USMCA signatories.

Issues for Congress

Congress has an interest in the implementation of USMCA because of its constitutional authority over foreign commerce and its long-standing involvement in U.S. farm policy.

Regarding market access, Congress may monitor Canada’s implementation of its commitments regarding U.S. dairy products, poultry products, and eggs. Some Members of Congress have raised concerns that Canada’s dairy TRQ allocation may not be consistent with its commitments under USMCA.

Congress may also monitor the implementation of the various nontariff provisions that the three countries agreed to under USMCA, such as assurances by Canada and Mexico that they will provide the same treatment to U.S. proprietary food formula and alcoholic beverages as they provide to their domestic products. Some Members of Congress have raised concerns that Mexico has not taken actions to fulfill its commitments regarding improving access for U.S. cheeses and agricultural biotechnology products46 and that Canada is making insufficient progress toward a protocol to allow the registration of U.S. wheat varieties in Canada.

Efforts by the USMCA signatories to establish a coordinated approach for greater harmonization of SPS rules, rules governing trade in products created with agricultural biotechnology, and rules pertaining to geographical indications may also be of interest for congressional oversight. This subject has drawn the attention of some Members of Congress, who have suggested that USTR and USDA use the GI provisions in USMCA as a model for other trade agreements. 

USMCA has also expanded access for Canadian peanut butter, dairy, sugar, and sugar-containing products to the United States. Congress may monitor how this improved access to the U.S. market affects U.S. producers in these sectors and the U.S. rural economy more broadly.

Congress may also use its oversight and legislative authority to address the effects of COVID-19 pandemic on greater integration of the North American market. The COVID-19 pandemic has placed unexpected stresses on food supply chains, with bottlenecks in farm labor, processing, bodog sportsbook review transport, and logistics, particularly in developing countries such as Mexico. According to a report by a market intelligence company, Mexico has faced logistics and transportation difficulties including shortages of shipping containers, which could affect Mexico’s ability to trade perishable and packaged food products with the United States.

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Anita Regmi is a Specialist in Agricultural Policy for the Congressional Research Service.

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Worker rights are a prominent issue in U.S. FTA negotiations. Some stakeholders believe worker rights provisions are necessary to protect U.S. workers from perceived unfair competition and to raise labor standards abroad. Others believe these rights are more appropriately addressed at the International Labor Organization (ILO) or through cooperative efforts and capacity building. Since 1988, Congress has included worker rights as a principal negotiating objective in Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation. The United States has been in the forefront of using FTAs to promote core internationally recognized worker rights. Labor provisions have evolved significantly since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), moving from side agreements to integral chapters within FTA texts, with more provisions subject to enforcement. The conclusion of NAFTA renegotiations resulted in the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which replaces NAFTA and has a new labor chapter and enforcement mechanism. USMCA entered into force in July 2020.

Issues for Congress

In considering future TPA legislation (the current reauthorization expires in July 2021) or trade negotiations, Congress may wish to examine the application of worker rights provisions in FTAs. This debate could include

• The effectiveness of FTAs as a vehicle for improving worker rights and labor standards in other countries;
• The extent to which FTA partners are complying with labor obligations and whether dispute settlement provisions have been applied effectively;
• Whether USMCA labor provisions serve as a new template for future U.S. FTAs;
• The effectiveness of FTAs in providing technical assistance and trade capacity building; and
• The role of businesses in promoting U.S. labor practices abroad and conducting supply chain due diligence.

Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs is an Analyst in International Trade and Finance at Congressional Research Service

M. Angeles Villarreal is a Specialist in International Trade and Finance at Congressional Research Service.

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The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the United States Department of Commerce (Commerce) have jointly prepared this report outlining the Trump Administration’s plan to address threats that increased imports pose to American producers of seasonal and perishable fruits and vegetables.

Perishable fruit and vegetable producers face unique challenges because of the short window of time during which their produce retains the freshness that retailers and consumers demand. Given this narrow window of marketability, American fruit and vegetable producers’ profitability can be devastated when imports of a product surge immediately before or during the domestic growers’ marketing window for that product. This challenge is compounded when imported products are sold to the consumer at lower prices than the domestically grown produce, and particularly so if the import prices are significantly and artificially lower due to unfair trade practices.

Furthermore, while multiple regions of the United States may be suitable for growing a particular commodity, the disparate climates and temperature patterns among those regions create distinct marketing windows for each region that vary from one another. As such, different regions within the United States that grow the same seasonal commodity can be affected and potentially injured by import competition to drastically differing degrees. The various regions also may differ with regard to the sub-markets in which they primarily market their products. For example, blueberry farmers in Florida and Georgia may have to compete primarily against imports from a particular country in that region’s marketing window, Michigan blueberry farmers against a different country in their window, while blueberry farmers in the northwest in Washington and Oregon may face altogether different competitive dynamics.

Given the unparalleled variety of seasonal specialty crops grown in the United States, the differing marketing windows among regions growing those crops, and the variability of import competition for each crop, there are contrasting opinions on this matter that vary by crop and largely by region of the country. Generally, it is predominantly fruit and vegetable producers in southeastern U.S. states who contend that they are adversely affected by import competition from Mexico, whereas producers and stakeholders in California and western states generally consider foreign production to be countercyclical and beneficially complementary to domestic production in their region.

Wilbur L. Ross is the Jr. Secretary at the United States Department of Commerce.

Sonny Perdue is the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture.

Robert E. Lighthizer is the Ambassador to the Office of the United States Trade Representative 

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