European Union countervailing duties (CVD) on certain types of electric vehicles (EVs) from China went into effect provisionally on 5 July. The duties are being imposed based on a European Commission finding that China’s EV subsidies represent potential injury to EU industry as it transitions away from the internal combustion engine. EU imports of EVs from China are surging, but still represent a small share of EU car sales. Most imports from China originate from joint ventures of EU and Chinese manufacturers, and from Tesla, which is the largest importer. 

In the meantime, China is starting its own investigation into some EU exports, such as cognac. The EU has initiated consultations with the government of China to resolve the dispute, as it must do under the World Trade Organisation Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement. Under WTO rules, China cannot retaliate unless it challenges the EU measure and a dispute settlement panel rules in its favour.

The CVDs range from 17.4 percent to 37.6 percent of the import price, on top of the EU’s 10 percent tariff on imported vehicles. They represent a formidable barrier in an industry where average profit margins are typically in the range of 4 percent to 8 percent. The CVDs will affect all EVs imported from China regardless of whether the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) is Chinese, American or European. Here, we offer an economic and political (as opposed to legal) analysis of the CVDs.

Methodology behind the CVDs

The Commission methodology for identifying subsidies and countervailing them is well established. Reflecting the importance of the EV sector, the regulation implementing the CVDs is the result of a comprehensive investigation, encompassing extensive consultations with Chinese firms, EU firms, the Chinese government and Chinese trade associations. Identifying subsidisation in China’s opaque system is challenging, especially since, as the regulation documents repeatedly, the Chinese government and several of the Chinese entities covered were uncooperative. 

The regulation details how the Chinese government has prioritised the EV value chain (materials, batteries, vehicles) since 2010. Of course, the EU and the US are also prioritising EVs in their quest for decarbonisation. However, the Chinese state and Communist Party hold large sway over the Chinese economy, including state-owned and private corporations and powerful industry associations. Thus, the Chinese government adopts a ‘whole of society’ deployment of plans and instruments, including subsidies, as part of its industrial policy.

To determine whether imports from China are subsidised, the Commission chose a sample of three Chinese OEMs to conduct its investigation, namely BYD, Geely and SAIC. It set the CVD for all other cooperating firms at the average of the three. Curiously, Tesla, the largest exporter from China to the EU, was not chosen and has asked for a separate investigation.   

We assess how the four main sources of countervailable duties –below market supply, preferential financing, grants and land usage – are calculated. Though it is evident that that various forms of non-market incentives in the Chinese EV sector exist, they may be significantly less than suggested by the Commission’s methodology. 

• Below market provision of batteries and their inputs. The reference used to compute the subsidy are the differences between the export and domestic prices of batteries (for SAIC and Geely) and of lithium iron phosphate (a key battery input, relevant for BYD which produces its own batteries). But many exporting firms price to market (Parker, 2016), and the fact that the export price of these inputs is higher than the domestic price is not necessarily because of subsidies. The markets for EVs, batteries and minerals in China are known to be exceptionally competitive and in a price war, while in the EU car prices and consumer purchasing power are much higher.

• Preferential financing. Using its standard methods to try to establish a market-based rate as a counterfactual to the preferential financing received, the Commission assigned a credit rating of B to the three sampled Chinese firms and attributed a correspondingly higher spread compared to prevailing market rates to their borrowing and equity. The B rating, far below investment grade, is extremely low for large, modestly profitable firms, such as the sampled Chinese OEMs. For example, almost no firm in the S&P 500 is rated B or below. Moreover, credit ratings are available for Geely from the major international agencies, and they are higher than B.

• Preferential financing. Using its standard methods to try to establish a market-based rate as a counterfactual to the preferential financing received, the Commission assigned a credit rating of B to the three sampled Chinese firms and attributed a correspondingly higher spread compared to prevailing market rates to their borrowing and equity. The B rating, far below investment grade, is extremely low for large, modestly profitable firms, such as the sampled Chinese OEMs. For example, almost no firm in the S&P 500 is rated B or below. Moreover, credit ratings are available for Geely from the major international agencies, and they are higher than B.

• Grants. The government of China provides a subsidy to manufacturers for each vehicle sold. In economic terms, both consumer and producer subsidies have the effect of increasing the incentive to produce. However, the Chinese subsidy, unlike the EU subsidy, is not available to importers and the Commission is correct in arguing that it is countervailable for that reason. Still, the scheme was discontinued as of December 2022, and even though some benefits continue to accrue to Chinese producers because payments are staggered, its distortive effects are fading by now. The Commission Regulation states that some Chinese provinces are introducing their own schemes but does not provide evidence of this.

• Land use. Land in China is owned by the state. Provinces subsidise EV producers by allowing them use of land at below market price. The Commission uses the price of land use – rent – in Taiwan as the reference point. However, Taiwan is far more densely populated than China and its income per capita is three times higher. Land prices tend to be correlated with income and density, so the reference price appears too high.

The risk of injury

Adopting a kind of ‘infant industry’ argument normally associated with developing countries, the Commission Regulation argues that the EU EV sector is too young to withstand Chinese competition. But while some of the key success factors in EVs (eg battery technology) are different from the combustion-engine vehicle sector, the value chains of the two sectors have many common elements. This is most evident in the popularity of various types of hybrid vehicles. It is well known, of course, that the EU’s OEMs are among the world’s most successful.

To make a historical analogy, in the 1970s and 1980s, Japanese and then Korean OEMs appeared to threaten the European automotive industry, but they became established in the EU market only over decades and after large investments. European OEMs adjusted to them by greatly increasing productivity and quality and by adding innovative features. Chinese OEMs still have a minuscule share of the EU automobile market, while EU OEMs are in the process of rapidly developing their own lower priced EVs and investing in battery technology and manufacture, often in joint ventures with Chinese producers.

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Today’s proposals are part of a broader three-pillar approach to EU economic security by promoting the EU’s competitiveness, protecting against risks and partnering with the broadest possible range of countries to advance shared economic security interests.

The initiatives adopted today aim at:

• further strengthening the protection of EU security and public order by proposing improved screening of foreign investment into the EU;
• stimulating discussions and action for more European coordination in the area of export controls, in full respect of existing multilateral regimes and Member States’ prerogatives;
• consulting Member States and stakeholders to identify potential risks stemming from outbound investments in a narrow set of technologies;
• promoting further discussions on how to better support research and development involving technologies with dual-use potential;
• proposing that the Council recommends measures aimed at enhancing research security at national and sector level.

Future EU actions will continue to be informed by the on-going risk assessments and by strategic coordination with Member States to reach a shared understanding of the risks that Europe faces and of the appropriate actions.

Legislative proposal to strengthen foreign investment screening

Foreign investments into the EU benefit the European economy. However, certain foreign investments may present risks to the EU’s security and public order. The Commission has reviewed over 1,200 foreign direct investment (FDI) transactions notified by Member States over the past 3 years under the existing FDI Screening Regulation. Building on this experience and extensive evaluation of the functioning of the current regulation, today’s proposal addresses existing shortcomings and improves the efficiency of the system by:

1. ensuring that all Member States have a screening mechanism in place, with better harmonised national rules;
2. identifying minimum sectoral scope where all Member States must screen foreign investments;
3. extending EU screening to investments by EU investors that are ultimately controlled by individuals or businesses from a non-EU country.

Monitoring and assessment of outbound investment risks

The EU is one of the biggest foreign investors in the world and recognises the importance of open global markets. It also acknowledges the growing concerns regarding outbound investments in a narrow set of advanced technologies that could enhance military and intelligence capacities of actors who may use these capabilities against the EU or to undermine international peace and security.

This is currently neither monitored nor controlled at EU or Member State level. The Commission’s White Paper on Outbound Investments is therefore proposing a step-by-step analysis of outbound investments to understand potential risks linked to them. This analysis will include a three-month stakeholder consultation and a 12-month monitoring and assessment of outbound investments at national level, which will contribute to a joint risk assessment report. Based on the outcome of the risk assessment, the Commission will determine, together with Member States, if and which policy response is warranted.

More effective EU control of dual-use goods exports

Today’s increasingly challenging geopolitical context requires action at EU level to improve the coordination of export controls on items with both civil and defence uses – such as advanced electronics, toxins, nuclear or missile technology – so that they are not used to undermine security and human rights. Today’s White Paper on Export Controls proposes both short and medium-term actions, in full respect of the existing rules at EU and multilateral level. The Commission proposes to introduce uniform EU controls on those items that were not adopted by the multilateral export control regimes due to the blockage by certain members. This would avoid a patchwork of national approaches.

The White Paper also provides for a senior level forum for political coordination and announces a Commission Recommendation in Summer 2024 for an improved coordination of National Control lists prior to the planned adoption of national controls. The evaluation of the EU Dual-Use Regulation is advanced to 2025.

Options to support research and development in technologies with dual-use potential

With a White Paper on options for enhancing support of research and development (R&D) of technologies with dual-use potential, the Commission launches a public consultation. Announced by President von der Leyen in November 2023, the White Paper contributes to the ‘promote’ dimension of the European Economic Security Strategy, aiming at maintaining a competitive edge in critical and emerging technologies with the potential to be used for both civil and defence purposes.

The White Paper reviews current relevant EU funding programmes in the face of existing and emerging geopolitical challenges and assesses whether this support is adequate for technologies with dual-use potential. It then outlines three options for the way forward: (1) going further based on the current set-up, (2) removing the exclusive focus on civil applications in selected parts of the successor programme to Horizon Europe, and (3) creating a dedicated instrument with a specific focus on R&D with dual-use potential. Public authorities, civil society, industry, and academia can have their say in an open public consultation and inform the Commission’s next steps until 30 April 2024.

Enhance research security across the EU

In today’s complex geopolitical context, the openness and borderless cooperation in the research and innovation sector may be exploited and turned into vulnerabilities. Results of international research and innovation cooperation can be used for military purposes in third countries, or in violation of fundamental values. Higher education and research institutions can fall victim to malign influence by authoritarian states.

Against this background, the Commission presents a proposal for a Council Recommendation to provide more clarity, guidance and support to Member States and the research and innovation sector at large. EU action is required to ensure consistency across Europe and to avoid a patchwork of measures. By joining forces at all levels and across the Union we can mitigate the risks to research security and ensure that international research and innovation cooperation is both open and safe. The overall approach follows the principle ‘as open as possible, as closed as necessary’ as regards international research cooperation.

Background

On 20 June 2023, the European Commission and the High Representative published a Joint Communication on a European Economic Security Strategy, to minimise the risks in the context of increased geopolitical tensions and accelerated technological shifts, while preserving maximum levels of economic openness and dynamism. It provides a framework for assessing and addressing – in a proportionate, precise and targeted way – risks to EU economic security, while ensuring that the EU remains one of the most open and attractive destinations for business and investment.

The strategy identified four risk categories to be addressed as a matter of priority: supply chains; physical and cyber-security of critical infrastructure; technology security and technology leakage; weaponisation of economic dependencies or economic coercion.

To address these risks, the Strategy is structured around three pillars:

• Promoting the EU’s competitiveness and growth, strengthening the Single Market, supporting a strong and resilient economy, and strengthening the EU’s scientific, technological and industrial bases.
• Protecting the EU’s economic security through a range of policies and tools, including targeted new instruments where needed.
• Partnering and further strengthening cooperation with countries worldwide who share our concerns and those with which we have common economic security interests.

To read the press release as it appears on the European Commission’s press corner, click here.

For more information

Communication: advancing European economic security: an introduction to five new initiatives

Proposal for a Council Recommendation on enhancing research security

White Paper on options for enhancing support for research and development involving technologies with dual-use potential

White Paper on export controls

White Paper on outbound investment

Proposal for a new regulation on the screening of foreign investments

Memo on European Economic Security

Factsheet – Proposal for a Council Recommendation on enhancing research security

Factsheet – White Paper on options for enhancing support for research and development involving technologies with dual-use potential

Factsheet – White Paper on export controls

Factsheet – White Paper on outbound investments

Factsheet – Proposal for a new regulation on the screening of foreign investments

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The global pandemic, Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war in Ukraine, hostile economic actions, cyber and infrastructure attacks, foreign interference and disinformation and a global increase in geopolitical tensions have exposed risks and vulnerabilities in our societies, economies and companies that did not exist only a few shorts year ago.

Over the last years the EU has been successful both in moving forward to deliver on our priorities and at the same time in addressing vulnerabilities, whether on energy security, pandemic preparedness, or the resilience of our economies, supply chains and key technologies more generally.

However this experience has also revealed that Europe was in some cases insufficiently prepared for new and emerging risks that have arisen in the more challenging geopolitical context that we find ourselves in. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the risks that highly concentrated supply chains can pose to the functioning of the European economy. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine showed how an overreliance on a single country, especially one with systemically divergent values, models and interests, reduces Europe’s strategic options and puts our economies and citizens at risk. Member States and businesses have also had to shoulder the cost of economic coercion, including bans of European exports and boycotts of European brands, designed to force them to comply and conform with the political priorities of another country. All these trends pose a direct risk to the functioning of our societies, economies and of global trade – as well as a direct challenge to the EU’s strategic interests and ability to act.

With geopolitical tensions rising and global economic integration deeper than ever before, certain economic flows and activities can present a risk to our security. More than ever, our security is deeply intertwined with our ability to make ourselves more resilient and reduce the risks arising from economic linkages that in past decades we viewed as benign. Profound technological shifts are adding to the intensity of this competition and making the economic and security challenges more complex.

New geopolitical and technological realities requires us to adapt our approach, preserving the vast majority of Europe’s highly valuable economic links to the world while ensuring that the new risks we face, which are narrow but critical, are effectively tackled.

The EU is not alone in this process: countries all over the world have started addressing challenges to their economic security. Some advanced economies have already adopted dedicated strategies and are now implementing them. Developing economies are also taking action, diversifying their economic ties to reduce harmful dependencies and increasing local production. This trend reflects the fact that only by completing traditional approaches to national security with new measures to safeguard our economic security can we ensure our prosperity, sovereignty and safety in the current age. Working together with our allies, partners, and the business sector to articulate and execute a vision of economic security will serve as a force multiplier.

While the European Union has done a lot to respond to specific challenges in recent years, it now needs a comprehensive strategic approach to economic security, de-risking and promoting its technological edge in critical sectors. The aim is to provide a framework for a robust assessment and management of risks to economic security at EU, national and business level while preserving and increasing our economic dynamism. This is all the more important to put in place at a time when these risks are both evolving rapidly and merging with national security concerns. A prime example of this is the speed with which critical new technologies are emerging and blurring the boundaries between the civil and military sectors.

The starting point for this strategy is taking a clear-eyed look at the risks and acknowledging the inherent tensions that exist between bolstering our economic security, and ensuring that the European Union continues to benefit from an open economy.

The EU is one of the most attractive destinations for global companies and for investment. Our economies thrive on open and rules-based trade and investment, on secure cross-border connectivity and collaboration on research and innovation. These elements will remain critical drivers of European competitiveness and resilience as we speed up the twin green and digital transitions. We need to rely on trade and on the Single Market to spur competition and ensure that we have access to the raw materials, technologies, and other inputs which are crucial for boosting our competitiveness, resilience and for sustaining current and future employment and growth. Similarly, we want our partners around the world to continue to benefit from access to the European markets, capital and technologies for their transition to a clean and resilient economy.

Getting this balance right is essential and can ensure that our economic and security interests reinforce each other. Achieving this will depend on the following three priorities: (1) promoting our own competitiveness; (2) protecting ourselves from economic security risks; and (3) partnering with the broadest possible range of countries who share our concerns or interests on economic security.

This strategy builds on the work already started at European level, taking a critical look at the Union resilience and vulnerabilities in order to make the European economy and industry more competitive and resilient and strengthen our open strategic autonomy. This ranges from bigger investment in the green and digital transitions through NextGenerationEU and the crowding-in of more private investments to the pillars of the EU industrial policy such as the Acts on Chips, Critical Raw Materials and Net Zero Industry. This was reaffirmed by the Versailles Declaration, in which Leaders agreed on the need to strengthen European resilience and sovereignty in areas like energy, health and pharmaceutical products, food security and defense capabilities. This strategy also responds to the concerns of citizens as expressed in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe.

Implementing this strategy will require joined-up action across internal and external policies. It will also require buy-in beyond policy makers at European and national level. The private sector will be an essential partner and is already advanced in its work on de-risking. Global asset managers have radically changed their allocations of capital in response to growing and increasingly complex risks that exist within the global economy. Seeking resilient, diversified supply chains that enhance economic security will be a core part of a long-term business strategy that protects not only shareholders’ interests but also the general interest. Identifying the main risks and designing policy responses should tap into the knowledge of European companies that are already working to mitigate many of these threats.

This Communication lays the groundwork for a discussion on economic security with Member States and the European Parliament with a view to creating a common framework to de-risk and protect the Union’s economic security. This Communication will help to define the strategy that should guide the common assessment of risks, the use of existing tools and the identification of possible gaps in the EU’s economic security arsenal for which we will develop a common response.

To read the full joint communication, click here.

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The door appears to be open for the United States or other EU trading partners and like-minded countries to join, although the term club is also being applied to negotiations over trade deals—such as the limited US-Japan free trade agreement—designed to manage trade between major economies that are also critical mineral importers. But many of the top producers of critical minerals are not developed economies. Countries like Bolivia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, and Indonesia are key exporters and/or have massive exportable mineral resources.

Decarbonization is not the only impetus behind the proposed Brussels buyers club. Both the European Union and United States view China’s dominance of critical mineral supply chains as a national security issue, because these minerals are key inputs to modern military technology. Access to strategic resources—the resources necessary to field modern militaries and the economies that sustain them—has always informed national security strategy; the issue has been given increased urgency by disruptions of energy supply chains stemming from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and weaponization of its oil and gas exports and reports that China is considering banning certain rare earth mineral and magnet exports in response to US and Dutch export controls on leading-edge semiconductors and fabrication equipment to China.

The proposed buyers club could yield several benefits for the European Union, including preventing outbidding between EU-based purchasers, sending more accurate and transparent demand signals, and facilitating coordination with broader economic and security priorities. But for reasons ranging from intra-EU politics to challenges inherent to running cartels, such a buyers club may be politically and economically unworkable. And if successful, it would shift an important share of the economic benefits of green energy transitions from mostly developing and middle-income economies to the European Union, undermining putative commitments to just energy transitions at the global level.

Supply chains for critical minerals desperately need widening to meet projected global demand and tackle climate change mitigation. A purchasers club would not be a step in the right direction.

Cullen S. Hendrix is senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), nonresident senior research fellow at the Center for Climate & Security, and a specially appointed research professor with the Network for Education and Research on Peace and Sustainability (NERPS) at Hiroshima University.

To read the full policy brief, please click here.

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European countries are investing heavily in the green transition. But projects such as the Italian and Croatian wind farms have taken on new relevance and urgency as Europe deals with the war in Ukraine and works to reduce its energy dependence on Russia. Both projects, however, illustrate the challenges ahead for the European Union in ensuring a future that is both green and energy-secure. In the Taranto project, a European turbine-maker’s failure to deliver products on time provided an opening for its Chinese competitor. At Senj, Norinco International, which is providing both capital and hardware, is not only a Chinese state-owned industrial giant, but also a major defence company and supplier of weapons and equipment to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

Though Europe’s oil and gas dependence on Russia is the more immediate chokepoint, its reliance on China for the energy technologies of the future poses a similar problem. China has become a global player across a wide range of green technologies, which makes it indispensable for the green transition that the EU is pursuing. As with Russia, this creates risks of over-dependence on an authoritarian power. Compared to Russia, however, China is a far bigger non-market economy and has much greater sway over global technology markets.

To read the full report from the Rhodium Group. please click here.

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This new impetus largely reflects a transformed geopolitical landscape since the last round of EU-India talks were abandoned in 2013. The increased tension between India and China, as well as the EU’s intent to reduce its reliance on Chinese manufacturing have created the conditions for changes in policy by both parties. However, many of the issues that bedeviled the 2007-2013 negotiations remain unresolved. In this analysis, we provide an overview of EU-India trade and investment relations as well as the major topics in these negotiations. The impact of key global initiatives on climate change and WTO reform that will shape the negotiations is also briefly discussed.

Based on this analysis, we discuss three potential ways forward for EU-India trade and investment negotiations: a comprehensive agreement similar to that reached between the EU and Vietnam; a limited investment deal primarily focused on manufacturing; and a reinforced status quo with trade and investment relations growing organically under the existing multilateral umbrella.

To read the full report from Brugel, please click here.

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The TTC was formally launched during the EU-US Summit on 15 June 2021. High-level politicians will guide the Council, while the groundwork will be carried out in ten working groups, comprised of experts from both partners. They will cover issues such as common standards, resilient supply chains, tech regulation, global trade challenges, climate and green tech as well as investment screening and export controls.

The establishment of the TTC has been widely welcomed by stakeholders and the think-tank community as an important step towards bridging existing gaps and moving on with a forward looking agenda, focused on strategic areas and new ways of cooperation. While there is a genuine will to work together on common challenges, some difficult issues such as unresolved issues from the past and different approaches to regulating digital markets persist, and it remains to be seen whether the TTC will lead to the creation of an ambitious joint policy that influences trade and technology worldwide. The first meeting is due to take place on 29 September 2021 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

To read the full report from the European Parliament, please click here.

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Medical devices are technologies that help diagnose or treat patients, or prevent illness without the use of drugs. They include everything from MRI scanners, hip implants and scalpel blades to smartphone apps that treat depression. The EU is currently struggling to implement a wide-ranging change in how medical devices are regulated – from the 1993 Medical Device Directive (MDD) to the 2017 Medical Device Regulation (MDR). Phased introduction of the MDR was due to be completed by May 2020, but was extended until this year due to COVID-19 pressures. This new regulatory framework is designed to ensure more thorough testing of devices before they can be used on patients, and more rigorous monitoring of performance of devices once on the market. The MDR’s implementation, however, has not gone smoothly.

To read the full report from the Centre for European Reform (CER), please click here. 

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The relationship between the European Union and the United States is unique and built on shared history, shared values and shared interests. The transatlantic partnership was born of a promise of collective peace, progress and prosperity. After the Second World War, the Marshall Plan helped rebuild Europe’s communities and economies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ensured our collective security. Together, Europe and the US helped design and build the multilateral rules-based system to tackle global challenges. For people on both sides of the Atlantic, transatlantic ties are a vital element in our societies, identities, economies and personal lives.

Today, our combined global power and influence remains unrivalled. We are home to nearly a billion people and are the two largest blocs of advanced democracies. We account for about a third of the world’s GDP and trade, and 60% of foreign direct investment. The density and openness of transatlantic trade and investment creates millions of jobs and shapes large parts of the global economy. We have the reach to set regulations and standards that are replicated across the world. We are the primary drivers of innovation and the world’s research powerhouses, developing technology from 5G to vaccines.

This combined power and influence is indispensable to anchor global cooperation in the 21st century – whether it be on health, security, climate, trade and technology, or on the multilateral rules-based order. Our joint commitment is essential in a world where authoritarian powers seek to subvert democracies, aggressive actors try to destabilise regions and institutions, and closed economies exploit the openness our own societies depend on.

Just as this need for cooperation has become all the more important, so has the transatlantic partnership become in need of maintenance and renewal. In recent years, our relationship was tested by geopolitical power shifts, bilateral tensions and retreats to unilateral policies.

With a change of administration in the US, a more assertive Europe and the need to design a post-corona world, we have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to design a new transatlantic agenda for global cooperation – based on our common values, interests and global influence. This should be the linchpin of a new global alliance of like-minded partners. This comes at a time when there is a commonality of outlook and priorities on domestic and international agendas between the incoming US administration and the European Union.

As we set about defining this new agenda, we should not embark on a nostalgic search for the global order of past decades or the transatlantic partnership of past generations. The US and the EU have changed, as have power dynamics and geopolitical and technological realities.

We should also not fall into the trap of false debates that seek to oppose a stronger Europe and a stronger transatlantic partnership. A united, capable and self-reliant EU is good for Europe, good for the transatlantic partnership and good for the multilateral system – they are mutually reinforcing not mutually exclusive.

It is in this spirit that the EU is putting forward a proposal for a new, forward-looking transatlantic agenda for global cooperation, centred on areas where our interests converge, our collective leverage can best be used and where global leadership is required.

To download the full communication, please click here.

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