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Last month, our cost of Brexit model showed that leaving the single market and customs union in January 2021 had reduced the UK’s total goods trade by 22 per cent. Using the data for February, which was released today, we estimate that goods trade is now 5 per cent, or £3.5 billion, lower. That is a significant improvement on the January data, as we expected, partly because businesses had built up stockpiles to cope with disruption at the EU border in January, and were replenishing them in February, and partly because volatile trade in precious metals rose sharply. Furthermore, the value of trade in ‘doppelgänger UK’ – a group of countries whose trade performance matched that of the UK between 2016 and 2019 – fell slightly in February. Monthly trade data is volatile, so it will take several more months for the impact of Brexit on the level of UK goods trade to become clear.

To read the full insight piece by the Centre for European Reform, please click here. 

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The relationship between the European Union and the United States is unique and built on shared history, shared values and shared interests. The transatlantic partnership was born of a promise of collective peace, progress and prosperity. After the Second World War, the Marshall Plan helped rebuild Europe’s communities and economies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ensured our collective security. Together, Europe and the US helped design and build the multilateral rules-based system to tackle global challenges. For people on both sides of the Atlantic, transatlantic ties are a vital element in our societies, identities, economies and personal lives.

Today, our combined global power and influence remains unrivalled. We are home to nearly a billion people and are the two largest blocs of advanced democracies. We account for about a third of the world’s GDP and trade, and 60% of foreign direct investment. The density and openness of transatlantic trade and investment creates millions of jobs and shapes large parts of the global economy. We have the reach to set regulations and standards that are replicated across the world. We are the primary drivers of innovation and the world’s research powerhouses, developing technology from 5G to vaccines.

This combined power and influence is indispensable to anchor global cooperation in the 21st century – whether it be on health, security, climate, trade and technology, or on the multilateral rules-based order. Our joint commitment is essential in a world where authoritarian powers seek to subvert democracies, aggressive actors try to destabilise regions and institutions, and closed economies exploit the openness our own societies depend on.

Just as this need for cooperation has become all the more important, so has the transatlantic partnership become in need of maintenance and renewal. In recent years, our relationship was tested by geopolitical power shifts, bilateral tensions and retreats to unilateral policies.

With a change of administration in the US, a more assertive Europe and the need to design a post-corona world, we have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to design a new transatlantic agenda for global cooperation – based on our common values, interests and global influence. This should be the linchpin of a new global alliance of like-minded partners. This comes at a time when there is a commonality of outlook and priorities on domestic and international agendas between the incoming US administration and the European Union.

As we set about defining this new agenda, we should not embark on a nostalgic search for the global order of past decades or the transatlantic partnership of past generations. The US and the EU have changed, as have power dynamics and geopolitical and technological realities.

We should also not fall into the trap of false debates that seek to oppose a stronger Europe and a stronger transatlantic partnership. A united, capable and self-reliant EU is good for Europe, good for the transatlantic partnership and good for the multilateral system – they are mutually reinforcing not mutually exclusive.

It is in this spirit that the EU is putting forward a proposal for a new, forward-looking transatlantic agenda for global cooperation, centred on areas where our interests converge, our collective leverage can best be used and where global leadership is required.

To download the full communication, please click here.

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Selected Issues

Trade Balance and Trade Practices
In 2018, the United States had an overall $115 billion trade deficit in merchandise and services with the EU, as the merchandise deficit ($170 billion) outweighed the services surplus ($55 billion) (see Figure 1). Germany, at $69 billion, accounted for the fourth-largest U.S. bilateral
merchandise trade deficit, after China, Mexico, and Japan.

The causes and consequences of trade deficits are debated. President Trump, who prioritizes reducing U.S. bilateral trade deficits, blames EU trade policies, and particularly those of Germany, for the U.S. merchandise trade deficit with the EU. The President also is critical of the U.S.-EU imbalance on auto trade, flagging disparate tariff levels (for cars, EU tariff is 10% and U.S. tariff is 2.5%; for trucks, EU tariff is 22% and U.S. tariff is 25%). EU leaders argue that the trade relationship is fair and mutually beneficial, observing, for example, that some EU auto companies have manufacturing facilities in the United States that support U.S. jobs and exports. Most economists say that the U.S. merchandise trade deficit is due to macroeconomic
variables rather than trade practices.

Trade Frictions
A major point of tension is the Trump Administration’s focus on unilateral trade measures such as tariffs. In 2018, the United States began applying tariffs of 25% and 10% on certain imports of steel and aluminum, under the national security-based “Section 232” trade law. The Administration granted some countries exceptions to the tariffs, but not to the EU. Despite the U.S. national security justification, the EU views the U.S. tariffs to be inconsistent with WTO rules on safeguard measures (which protect domestic industries from rising imports). The EU, accounting for one-fifth of U.S. steel imports and less than one-tenth of U.S. aluminum imports in 2018, applied retaliatory tariffs of 10% to 25% on about $3 billion of U.S. products (e.g., steel, whiskies, beauty products, yachts, and motorcycles), and may apply a second round of tariff increases in 2021. Both sides are now pursuing cases in Bodog Poker the WTO on the respective measures.
Another source of friction is potential Section 232 tariffs on autos and auto parts. On May 17, 2019, the President announced that a Commerce Department investigation found that auto imports threaten to impair U.S. national security, granting the President the authority to impose import restrictions, including tariffs. The President directed the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to negotiate with the EU, Japan, and other relevant trading partners to address the threat and report on its progress within 180 days.

Economic and Policy Impacts
Concerns are heightened over potential tit-for-tat escalation of tariffs on traded goods, adverse overall economic effects, and implications for EU-U.S. cooperation on global economic issues (e.g., steel and aluminum overcapacity). Harley-Davidson was the first U.S. firm to announce plans to shift some production overseas to avoid retaliatory tariffs by the EU, its largest overseas market for motorcycles. Economic impacts could be larger if tariff increases are imposed on autos, a top U.S. import from the EU.

Frictions also may rise in the 14-year-long U.S.-EU “Boeing-Airbus” cases in the WTO. The United States and EU announced preliminary lists of their traded goods on which they propose to impose countermeasure tariffs of about $11 billion and $12 billion, respectively—the
estimated harm that each claims the other’s subsidies on its respective domestic civil aircraft industry have caused the other. A final WTO assessment is expected in summer 2019 on appropriate countermeasure value amounts.
The United States continues to monitor other EU overall and country-specific policy developments, such as on data protection, digital trade, and penalties for corporate tax avoidance, some of which the United States sees as trade barriers. On July 10, 2019, the USTR initiated a “Section 301” investigation of France’s recently introduced digital services tax, based on concerns that the tax will discriminate against U.S.-based technology companies. Other developments may mitigate U.S.-EU frictions (see below).

WTO and Multilateralism
In the post-World War II era, the United States and EU have led in developing and liberalizing the rules-based international trading system, thereby contributing to its stability. EU officials are deeply troubled by the Trump Administration’s skepticism of the WTO, its periodic threats to not abide by WTO decisions over trade disputes that it finds contrary to U.S. interests and to withdraw the United States from the WTO, and its continuation of the Obama Administration practice of blocking new appointments to the WTO appellate body based on concerns about the WTO Dispute Settlement (DS) process.

Yet, the United States and EU, along with many other WTO members, are actively discussing potential WTO reform, including changes to DS. In addition, among other things, the United States continues to work through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on a multilateral agreement to address taxation issues posed by the digital economy. Nevertheless, many in the EU are concerned about a broader U.S. shift away from international cooperation, citing, for instance, the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. The Trump Administration’s skepticism of the EU’s multilateral nature, which precludes bilateral U.S. trade agreements
with individual EU member states, adds to frictions.

U.S.-EU Trade Negotiations
The United States and EU trade on WTO most-favorednation (MFN) terms, because there is no U.S.-EU free trade agreement (FTA) granting more preferential terms. U.S. and EU tariffs are generally low (simple average MFN applied tariff was 3.5% for the United States and 5.2% for the EU), but high on some sensitive products. Some regulatory and other nontariff barriers also may raise trading costs. On October 16, 2018, the Trump Administration notified Congress under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) of new broad-based U.S. trade agreement negotiations with the EU.

The Administration seeks a “fairer, more balanced” U.S.- EU relationship. The TPA notification followed the July 2018 Joint Statement (agreed between President Trump and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker) that aimed to de-escalate trade tensions. The negotiations have not started formally, largely due to lack of U.S.-EU consensus on their scope. While U.S. negotiating objectives include agriculture, the EU mandate to negotiate on tariffs excludes the sector. U.S.-EU differences also remain in such areas as government procurement, digital trade, regulatory cooperation, and geographical indications (GIs).

President Trump has threatened the EU repeatedly with tariffs, including over its exclusion of agriculture. The EU asserts that it will stop negotiating if it is subject to new Section 232 tariffs. Whether a U.S.-EU trade agreement, if concluded, would meet congressional expectations or TPA negotiating objectives and other requirements is unclear. Meanwhile, U.S.-EU sector-specific regulatory cooperation is ongoing, such as on pharmaceuticals. In August 2019, the two sides concluded a new deal on greater market access for U.S. beef exports to the EU.

The United States and EU each has its own constellation of FTAs—14 FTAs with 20 countries in force for the United States and over 40 trade agreements for the EU (see Figure 2). In the absence of a U.S.-EU FTA, U.S. businesses are disadvantaged in the EU market relative to such trading partners as Canada, Japan, and Vietnam, with whom the EU recently concluded FTAs. An FTA also could be significant strategically in jointly shaping global “rules for the road” on new issues and, for instance, with respect to China.

Brexit
The UK’s pending exit from the EU presents some uncertainty for U.S.-EU economic relations. An EU without the UK would remain the United States’ largest trading partner, but the outcome of EU-UK negotiations on their future trade and economic relationship could affect U.S. commerce. Many U.S. firms have a significant presence in the UK, and use the UK as a platform to access the EU market. Brexit also could have implications for U.S. commercial interests in terms of tariffs, customs procedures, or regulatory requirements. The United States
and UK are interested in negotiating a bilateral FTA. While an EU member, the UK cannot negotiate trade agreements with other countries, as the EU retains exclusive competence over its trade policy.

Issues for Congress
Potential issues in U.S.-EU trade relations include:
 Historically, how have U.S.-EU trade relations bolstered the U.S. economy and prosperity, or had negative implications?
 How do recent U.S.-EU trade developments affect the U.S. and global economy and the international trading system? What are the options to resolve current U.S.-EU trade frictions? Should the bodog casino President’s authority under U.S. trade laws be modified?
 What are the implications of the Administration linking Section 232 national security action to broader trade negotiations with the EU How do U.S.-EU frictions affect potential cooperation on economic issues of joint concern, such as regarding China?
 What are the benefits and costs of further liberalizing U.S.-EU trade—including through the proposed trade negotiations, ongoing regulatory cooperation, potential sector-specific tariff liberalization, and potential multilateral trade liberalization?

See CRS In Focus IF10931, U.S.-EU Trade and Economic
Issues, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar; and CRS Report R45745,
Transatlantic Relations: U.S. Interests and Key Issues,
coordinated by Kristin Archick.

To read original report, click here

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Extending Article 50

Amid the thicket of Brexit, one of the most difficult issues concerns extending the Article 50 process beyond the allotted two years. Article 50(3) allows the European Council, acting unanimously in agreement with the UK, to extend the period for the negotiation and conclusion of an agreement that sets out the arrangements for Britain’s withdrawal and takes account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. Initially, the EU insisted that, just as the treaty prescribes, the UK would cease to be a member state two years after it triggered Article 50 – that is, on 29 March 2019. However, when Theresa May failed to get the Withdrawal Agreement ratified by the House of Commons she abruptly faced the choice between crashing out on 29 March without a deal or of applying for an extension to the timetable.

There was much speculation about how opinion at the European Council meeting of 21 March would divide when confronted with Mrs May’s request. In the event, the heads of government rejected her specific proposal (for an extension until 30 June) but agreed to extend until 22 May on the condition that the Commons ratified the agreement during the immediately following week. In the case that the Commons still failed to ratify, the European Council demanded that the UK would, before 12 April, indicate a way forward for its further consideration.

The deadline of 12 April was significant because it was the last date by which the UK could give notice to hold elections to the European Parliament on 23 May. It would have been possible for the European Council, acting under the rubric of Article 50, to grant the UK, as an imminently departing member state, a derogation from holding elections. But in order to protect the legitimacy of the new Parliament (and to bat off litigation) the leaders decided instead to insist that the UK would again have to elect MEPs.

[To read the original column, click here.]

Copyright© 2019 European Policy Centre. All rights reserved. 

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The European Union of Security and Defence has taken its first steps. Member States are now investing in common industrial and research projects, to develop the full spectrum of defence capabilities that we need for our common security. Our international missions have better command structures and we have committed to investing more in our civilian action. We are cooperating more than ever with our partners – from the United Nations’ peacekeepers to NATO, from Africa’s peace operations to ASEAN. Our partners know that Europe’s strength is not just our soft power. But this is not the only reason why we are more and more a global point of reference.

In times when the United Nations and the very idea of rules-based global governance have come under increasing pressure, we have invested in multilateralism like never before. We have shown this by stepping up our financial commitments to the UN system, for instance saving the UN Agency for Palestinian refugees from its financial crisis, supporting the UN Secretary General’s reform agenda, and working to preserve the nuclear deal with Iran. But it is not just that. We have always tried to build the right multilateral framework to solve every one of our world’s crises: because this is the only way to find sustainable solutions to the problems of our times. We have always put our convening power at the service of multilateralism, trying to bring the relevant regional and global powers to the negotiating table. This is the idea behind the Brussels Conferences on Syria, the International Contact Group on Venezuela, the Quartet for Libya, and the regional meetings we organised on Afghanistan.

We feel a responsibility to do our part, in a cooperative way. This is true in our very region, starting with the Balkans, where the positive potential of our engagement is immense and unparalleled. But this is also true for the rest of the world. The European Union has become a more indispensable partner in the pursuit of peace and security all across the globe. The Global Strategy laid out a vision for Europe’s place in the world, but it also and essentially promoted greater coherence in our Union’s external bodog casino action. We advocated the need to be more ‘joined-up’, not just as a way to move towards an ever closer Union, but primarily to make our action more effective and incisive. In these years, we have made progress in synchronising our development and security policies.

The connection between internal and external events has become impossible to deny, and our policies have evolved accordingly. We have developed smarter financial instruments, such as the Trust Funds, and EU Member States collaborate within the UN Security Council in ways that seemed impossible just three years ago. The Global Strategy has been our collective compass in these difficult times. The Strategy was the outcome of two years of collective reflection across the EU institutions and Member States, but also with civil society and academia. Throughout this process, a new consensus emerged on what our Union needed, on what we lacked and on the direction to take. Progress has only been possible because of a strong collective political will to move forward.

But everything we have achieved could prove short-lived if such political will fades away in the future. Results need to be consolidated and new avenues that have been opened need to be explored further. This report highlights achievements and shortcomings, and suggests options for possible future actions. With the Global Strategy, we have chosen the path towards a stronger Europe. That choice will have to be confirmed every day, at every step of the way.

To read original report, click here

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This paper highlights the importance of international trade to economic prosperity based on recent economic evidence. It shows how EU trade policy supports the three key principles of the European Commission’s ‘Trade for All’ strategy. Communicating these results in a more meaningful way can ensure a wider audience, and help dispel some of the myths around globalisation and trade liberalisation. Building a successful communication strategy needs to be based on macro and micro level evidence, presenting results through data visualisation and infographics.

International trade is a part of everyone’s life. Whether it is the fruit we have at breakfast or the electrical devices we use, our daily routine depends on complex trade flows and production processes scattered across multiple countries and are hardly noticed by the final consumer. To cater for a globalized economy, thousands of companies around the world sign business deals every day, either as exporters or importers. Trade flows have evolved over time and are becoming increasingly intricate, with countless parts and components crossing multiple borders at different stages of production along global supply chains, before reaching the final consumer. These “globalisation examples” provide a quick snapshot of the realities of world trade, as it happens. But is this multifaceted reality fully accounted for in trade theories and well reflected in the statistical and analytical support available to trade policy makers?

The importance of international trade to economic prosperity is well documented and has been acknowledged for centuries. Countries open up to trade because it gives them the incentive to produce what they are relatively better at producing. This in turn leads them to import goods and services that other countries are more efficient in producing. Trade also leads to downward pressure on consumer prices and greater product variety for importing companies and consumers. Over time, openness to trade allows ideas and technologies to flow more freely and encourages innovation and productivity growth.

Trade is therefore a powerful source of economic, technological and even societal change. However, trade can also sometimes be disruptive and lead to adjustments costs. These costs are often felt in certain regions and sectors, while the benefits of trade, although larger in overall magnitude, can be more diffuse. Sometimes these benefits are so diffuse that they are dismissed by opponents of trade as purely theoretical propositions that do not materialise in reality. This makes the political economy debate around trade challenging.

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• “equality of trade conditions” instead of closed economic empires;
• limitations on (though not yet an end to) colonialism;
• inviting post-war Germany and post-revolutionary Russia into the new system if, but only if, they respected its rules;
• welcoming the emergence or re-emergence of nation states in Central and Eastern Europe; and
• establishment of a League of Nations, backed by US power, to enforce the peace.

This strategy was not vapid “Wilsonian idealism,” as it is often dismissed, but reflected shrewd assumptions (and massive self-confidence) that: “Yankee ingenuity” would flourish best in a rules-based, open world without closed economic empires; US national interests would advance with democracy and the rule of law; the United States would prosper best when other nations prospered as well; and, thus, the United States could make the world a better place and get rich in the process. Its flaws notwithstanding, this first US effort at world leadership ought to be seen in the context of the competition: Vladimir Lenin’s world communist revolution and French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau’s rebooted great-power system.

In this grand strategy, Central Europe’s new nations were to be an integral part of the new system, embedded in an undivided transatlantic community with their independence and security implicitly underwritten by American power. Little wonder that Central Europeans—living in vulnerable states between a sullen Germany and aggressive Bolshevik Russia—liked it (the Poles and Czechoslovaks especially). The legacy of this appreciation still lingers. On the centenary of the Fourteen Points bodog casino in 2018, Warsaw’s main downtown street near the Presidential Palace had a large outdoor display in honor of Wilson and the Fourteen Points (which is more than can be said for Washington or New York.)

But, Wilson’s Fourteen Points did not survive their first contact with reality at the Versailles Peace Conference. As Clemenceau famously forecast, “God gave us the Ten Commandments and we broke them. Wilson gives us the Fourteen Points. We shall see.” France and the UK insisted on imposing a punitive settlement against Germany, rather than welcoming it back to the European family, and the new nations of Central Europe were more fractious than Wilson and his foreign policy team anticipated. They were insecure, often poor, administratively weak, sometimes unsatisfied with post-war borders (especially Hungary, but also Poland, which would shortly be attacked by Bolshevik Russia); and with large, often unsatisfied minorities. Creating more or less homogenous nation states in Central Europe was not possible, given where people actually lived.

The most profound US failure was its unwillingness to underwrite the flawed, but potentially workable, peace that emerged from the Treaty of Versailles. Communist Russia was still weak. The emerging nations of Central Europe were still democracies, seeking allies and models. Even after Versailles, the Germans still had pro-Western leaders. The weaknesses of the Treaty of Versailles might have been mitigated had the United States taken responsibility for implementing the peace of which it was co-author.

Instead, the United States withdrew from Europe. Wilson’s political rigidity at home killed the US Senate’s ratification of the League of Nations. Wilson was a broken man finishing his term in ill health, and the United States abandoned his attempt at world leadership. It left the Germans to themselves, and the French to deal with the Germans. It also forgot about the Poles, Czechoslovaks, and Yugoslavs, of whose independence the United States was a sponsor.

[To read the original column, click here.]

Copyright© 2019 Atlantic Council. All rights reserved. 

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