Supply chain activity has normalized in operational terms during 2023, but there are significant risks across the industrial policy, labor action and environmental policy implementation spheres heading into 2024.

Supply chains need to be more resilient, but questions remain over whether corporations and their investors are willing to make the investments necessary to fortify them.

The Take

Global supply chains largely normalized in 2023 after years of disruption, and the need for resilience is clear. The willingness of corporations to build that resiliency is not.

Falling operating margins and higher interest rates may be leading companies to cut their inventory balances and reverse recent supplier diversification increases.

There is no shortage of technology available to enable supply chain resilience, with generative AI as the latest example. Most companies need to see short-term returns on investment, and recent experiences with blockchain, for instance, are leaving some hesitant.

Organizational alignments are necessary to ensure continuing supply chain resilience. Tools for success include increased engagement with labor unions, geographic diversification with an eye to mitigating operational risk, closer tracking of environment profiles, reshoring and enhanced supplier engagement to manage tariff and geopolitical risk.

Paying for Resilience in a High-Cost Environment

S&P Global Market Intelligence data indicates that gross operating profit margins for manufacturers globally are expected to fall to 10.4% of sales in 2024 from 10.7% in 2022. The decline is expected to be particularly stark for the computing and electronics sector and domestic appliance manufacturing. At the same time, capital expenditures are forecast to exceed gross operating profits by 5% in 2024 after being equal to them in 2022. Reinvesting in capital stock may take priority over spending on supply chains.

Empty shelves were one of the most tangible signs of supply chain challenges during the pandemic era. The shortage of inventories, whether of toilet paper or computer chips, led many companies to over-order and subsequently cut stock levels in late 2022 and into 2023.

Data from the S&P Global Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) indicates that manufacturing stocks of finished goods were in retreat for eight of the first nine months of 2023. Destocking has been particularly notable in computing, which has been going on for 27 months while the downturn in consumer goods has been more sporadic.

The evidence from corporate financial data is mixed. The inventory-to-sales ratio for the Russell 3000 group of manufacturers and retailers of goods was 54.1% on a trailing three-month basis as of Sept. 30 compared to 50.1% on average for the 2016 to 2019 period. The elevated level is not necessarily evidence of a change in inventory patterns, as it is below the 54.8% peak reached in March.

The increase is also caused by just a handful of sectors. The apparel sector has an inventory-to-sales ratio of 74.7% versus 68.6% historically, while electronics excluding semiconductors stands at 39.1% versus its historical average of 29.9%. 

Sectors with longer sales cycles are closer to balance. In the case of household durable goods, the inventory-to-sales ratio of 55.0% in September is well below the 64.7% peak of a 2022 and in line with the 54.9% historic average.

Diversification of suppliers and reshoring are not the same thing. Both can reduce the inherent risk of a supply chain, and they often go hand-in-hand. However, diversification of suppliers can come in and out of fashion depending on the need for cost reductions.

With a focus on cost cutting in 2024, there may be less diversification as companies seek to shorten their supplier lists by pushing more orders to fewer suppliers to get better prices.

The number of suppliers per ultimate consignee for US seaborne imports for all industrial companies — nonfinancial, logistics or services — among the top 500 US importers increased by 13% in 2021 compared to 2019, indicating the use of more suppliers to deal with disruptions.

That increase in suppliers broadly started to reverse in 2022 and fell below pre-pandemic levels in the 12 months through Sept. 30, 2023. At a sector level, consumer goods companies registered one of the steepest drop-offs in suppliers. Similarly, the pool of suppliers for consumer durables companies — including furniture, appliances and leisure goods — expanded through 2021 but has contracted since then, dropping below pre-pandemic levels.

The auto industry’s supplier pool has crested but remained elevated, potentially reflecting the secular shift to electric auto production while maintaining internal combustion engine production. Electronics has also remained elevated after a drop in 2022.

Chris Rogers is the Head of Supply Chain Research at S&P Global Market Intelligence.

Mark Fontecchio is a Research Analyst, covering the Internet of Things, 451 Research at S&P Global Market Intelligence.

Amy Chang is the Lead Analyst at Panjiva, S&P Global Market Intelligence.

Emilee Nason is a Data Scientist at Panjiva, S&P Global Market Intelligence.

To read the full report, click here.

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Last month, our cost of Brexit model showed that leaving the single market and customs union had reduced the UK’s total goods trade by 11 per cent in March. Using the recently-released data for April, we estimate that total goods trade is once again 11 per cent, or £7.9 billion, lower.

To estimate the effect of single market and customs union exit, we use trade data from other advanced economies. An algorithm chooses – from a ‘donor pool’ of 22 advanced economies – a smaller selection of countries with economic characteristics that most closely matched those of the UK over the last decade. Those countries are combined into a ‘doppelgänger UK’, with the relative weighting of the selected countries chosen to create the smallest possible deviation from the real UK goods trade data between 2016 and 2019. By comparing the UK’s actual goods trade performance from January 2021 to that of the doppelgänger, we can assess how leaving the single market and customs union has affected Britain’s trade in goods. (For more details on how the model works, see the estimate for January.)

COVID-19 does not significantly affect our model, because we only use it to evaluate the UK’s performance from January 2021, when goods trade in advanced economies had largely recovered to pre-pandemic levels. The countries in our doppelgänger UK are chosen using pre-pandemic data, which also reduces the impact of the virus on our estimate.

To read the rest of the article on the Centre for European Reform, please click here.

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This report on the future of work after COVID-19 is the first of three MGI reports that examine aspects of the postpandemic economy. The others look at the pandemic’s long-term influence on consumption and the potential for a broad recovery led by enhanced productivity and innovation. Here, we assess the lasting impact of the pandemic on labor demand, the mix of occupations, and the workforce skills required in eight countries with diverse economic and labor market models: China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Together, these eight countries account for almost half the global population and 62 percent of GDP.

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In 2000, Congress established this Commission to monitor and report on the national security implications of the U.S.-China economic relationship. Over the years, we have tracked the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) accountability to its global commitments, including those made in its accession to the World Trade Organization. Two decades later, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) selectively adheres to its global economic, trade, and political obligations and has abandoned any concern for international opinion. Now the CCP envisions itself atop a new hierarchical global order in which the world acquiesces to China’s worldview while supplying it with markets, capital, resources, and talent.

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has focused public attention on China, but the PRC’s ambitions are neither new nor secret. For decades, the CCP has made its ambitions clear through industrial policy and planning documents, leadership speeches, and military directives. Under General Secretary Xi Jinping, however, the CCP is aggressively asserting its interests both domestically and globally.

In the past, the CCP focused its attempts at economic dominance on legacy sectors of steel, aluminum, and transportation, among others. Its current goals are to dominate the world’s newest and most cutting-edge industries, including biotechnology, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and clean energy. Though the focus of China’s industrial policies is changing, the government’s strategy and objectives retain the same mercantilist and coercive tools: compelling foreign entrants to transfer technology to their domestic competitors for limited market access, lavishing generous subsidies on state-owned enterprises and domestic national champions, and leveraging illicit methods, including cyber-enabled theft, to obtain valuable intellectual property and mountains of data.

China’s security laws threaten the arrest of anyone who criticizes China, its leaders, or its policies. This threat now extends to Americans inside China as well as those who live in or travel to countries that have an extradition treaty with China. Foreign journalists live in fear of detention or expulsion.

The CCP claims to protect the interests of the Chinese people. Its true purpose, however, is to protect its own existence and grow its power, no matter the costs. Party leaders judge any sign of criticism to be too great a risk to CCP rule. The CCP’s response is harsh and swift whether reacting to the single voice of a doctor raising health alarms about the emergence of COVID-19, to internal criticism, or to millions of peaceful prodemocracy demonstrators in Hong Kong. This year, the CCP undertook new levels of effort to silence critics and prevent the flow of information.

COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF THE COMMISSION’S RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter 1: U.S.-China Global Competition

Section 1: A Global Contest for Power and Influence: China’s View of Strategic Competition with the United States

The Commission recommends:

1. Congress adopt the principle of reciprocity as foundational in all legislation bearing on U.S.-China relations. Issues to be considered in applying this principle should include but are not limited to the following:

• The ability of journalists and online media to operate bodog poker review without undue restriction;

• The ability of nongovernmental organizations to conduct meaningful engagement with civil society;

• Access to information, including but not limited to financial and research data; • Access for social media and mobile apps from U.S. companies;

• Access for diplomatic personnel, including but not limited to diplomats’ freedom of travel and ability to meaningfully exchange views with the host country public; and

• Market access and regulatory parity, including but not limited to companies’ ability to participate in trade, investment, and financial market transactions, cross-border capital transfer, and protections of intellectual property.

2. Congress direct the U.S. Department of State to produce an annual report detailing China’s actions in the United Nations and its subordinate agencies that subvert the principles and purposes of the United Nations. Such a report would at a minimum document the following:

• China’s actions violating United Nations treaties to which it is a party;

• China’s actions to influence the votes of United Nations members, including through coercive means;

• China’s actions to nominate or support candidates for United Nations leadership positions that do not adhere to United Nations standards for impartiality or are subject to the influence of the Chinese government;

• Actions by nationals of the People’s Republic of China and others currently holding United Nations leadership positions that appear to support the interests of the Chinese government in violation of United Nations impartiality standards;

• Actions by nationals of the People’s Republic of China serving in functional positions in United Nations organizations impacting hiring practices, internal policies, and other functions that appear to support the interests of the Chinese government in violation of United Nations impartiality standards;

• Actions by Chinese military and support personnel engaged in United Nations peacekeeping operations that are inconsistent with the principles governing these missions, including China’s deployment of these personnel to protect its economic interests and improve the power projection capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army; and

• The number and positions of United States personnel employed by the United Nations and its agencies.

3. Congress expand the authority of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to monitor and take foreign government subsidies into account in premerger notification processes.

• The FTC shall develop a process to determine to what extent proposed transactions are facilitated by the support of foreign government subsidies.

• The definition of foreign government subsidies shall encompass direct subsidies, grants, loans, below-market loans, loan guarantees, tax concessions, governmental procurement policies, and other forms of government support.

• Companies operating in the United States that benefit from the financial support of a foreign government must provide the FTC with a detailed accounting of these subsidies when undergoing FTC premerger procedures.

• If the FTC finds foreign subsidies have facilitated the transaction, the FTC can either propose a modification to remedy the distortion or prohibit the transaction under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions where the effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”

4. Congress direct the Administration, when sanctioning an entity in the People’s Republic of China for actions contrary to the economic and national security interests of the United States or for violations of human rights, to also sanction the parent entity.

5. Congress amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to clarify that association with a foreign government’s technology transfer programs may be considered grounds to deny a nonimmigrant visa if the foreign government in question is deemed a strategic competitor of the United States, or if the applicant has engaged in violations of U.S. laws relating to espionage, sabotage, or export controls. Association with a foreign government’s technology transfer programs can include any of the following:

• Participation in a foreign government-sponsored program designed to incentivize participants to transfer fundamental research to a foreign country via a talent recruitment program or in a foreign government-sponsored startup competition;

• Acceptance of a government scholarship that requires recipients to study specific strategic scientific and technological fields, to return to the foreign country for a government work requirement after the scholarship term ends, or facilitates coordination with talent programs;

• Association with a university or a department of a university that the U.S. government has designated as a participant in the foreign government’s military-civil fusion efforts; or

• Status (current or past) as a scientist, technician, or officer for a foreign military, if the applicant does not disclose such information when applying for a visa.

Section 2: The China Model: Return of the Middle Kingdom

The Commission recommends:

6. Congress hold hearings to consider the creation of an interagency executive Committee on Technical Standards that would be responsible for coordinating U.S. government policy and priorities on international standards. This Committee would consist of high-level political appointees from executive departments with equities relating to international technical standards, including the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and other agencies or government stakeholders with relevant jurisdiction. The Committee’s mandate would be to ensure common purpose and coordination within the executive branch on international standards. Specifically, the Committee would:

• Identify the technical standards with the greatest potential impact on American national security and economic competitiveness;

• Coordinate government efforts relating to those standards;

• Act as a liaison between government, academia, and the private sector to coordinate and enhance joint efforts in relation to standards;

• Manage outreach to counterpart agencies among U.S. allies and partners;

• Set funding priorities and recommendations to Congress; and

• Produce annual reports to Congress on the status of technical standards issues and their impact on U.S. national security and economic competitiveness.

Section 3: China’s Strategic Aims in Africa

The Commission recommends:

7. Congress require the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, within 180 days, to prepare a report on China’s use of rules of origin intended to benefit countries eligible for the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to ensure AGOA countries obtain the benefit of favorable trade policies and China is not using them to circumvent U.S. trade policies.

Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations

Section 2: Vulnerabilities in China’s Financial System and Risks for the United States

The Commission recommends:

8. Congress enact legislation establishing a China Economic Data Coordination Center (CEDCC) at the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the U.S. Department of Commerce. The Center would be mandated to collect and synthesize official and unofficial Chinese economic data on developments in China’s financial markets and U.S. exposure to risks and vulnerabilities in China’s financial system, including:

• Data on baseline economic statistics (e.g., gross domestic product [GDP]) and other indicators of economic health;

• Data on national and local government debt;

• Data on nonperforming loan amounts;

• Data on the composition of shadow banking assets;

• Data on the composition of China’s foreign exchange reserves; and

• Data on bank loan interest rates.

9. Congress request that the Administration prepare a report on the research and development activities of the affiliates of U.S. multinational enterprises operating in China and the implications of such activities for U.S. production, bodog casino employment, and the economy.

Section 3: U.S.-China Links in Healthcare and Biotechnology

The Commission recommends:

10. Congress enact legislation to require ancestry and health testing services to (1) require explicit consent from customers to provide, sell, lease, or rent to any party individual data that is aggregated for the purposes of research; and (2) disclose to customers any parent company or subsidiary relationship.

11. Congress establish a new U.S. national laboratory focusing on biotechnology or designate an existing U.S. national laboratory to focus on biotechnology.

12. Congress consider establishing a “Manhattan Project”-like effort to ensure that the American public has access to safe and secure supplies of critical lifesaving and life-sustaining drugs and medical equipment, and to ensure that these supplies are available from domestic sources or, where necessary, trusted allies. Such a project would supplement the recommendation the Commission made in its 2019 Annual Report that Congress hold hearings with a view toward enacting legislation requiring the U.S. government to procure medicines only from U.S. production facilities or from facilities that have been certified compliant with U.S. standards.

To read the full report, please click here.

Alexander A. Bowe is a Policy Analyst on Security and Foreign Affairs at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Kendra Brock is a Research Assistant on Economics and Trade at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Erik Castillo is an Operations Support Specialist at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Jameson Cunningham is the Director of Congressional Affairs and Communications at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Kevin Fashola is a Congressional Fellow at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Christopher P. Fioravante is the Director of Operations and Administration at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Benjamin B. Frohman is the Director of Security and Foreign Affairs Will Green, and a Policy Analyst in Security and Foreign Affairs at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Charles Horne is a Research Coordinator and Policy Analyst in Economics and Trade at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Sierra Janik is a Policy Analyst in Security and Foreign Affairs at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic is a Policy Analyst in Security and Foreign Affairs at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Kaj Malden is a Policy Analyst in Economics and Trade at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Leyton Nelson is a Policy Analyst in Economics and Trade at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Emma Rafaelof is a Policy Analyst in Economics and Trade at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Nargiza Salidjanova is the Director of Economics and Trade at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Howard Wang is a Policy Analyst in Security and Foreign Affairs at the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

Daniel W. Peck is the Executive Director of the U.S.-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission.

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China’s economy appears to have sprung back to normal. While the overall growth numbers have recovered and China has put forth an ambitious economic agenda for the next five years, optimism has also returned to the new-energy vehicles (NEV) sector, a good metric for the new economy. At the Beijing Auto Show, held in late September, automakers unveiled a dizzying 785 new models, 160 of which were electrified. There is growing speculation that China’s NEV sector is ready to burst onto the global stage and become an export powerhouse. But despite the glitzy new models, incremental progress on several fronts, and initial signs of expanding business abroad, China’s NEV sector still faces substantial roadblocks. Some are the result of continuing economic troubles, while others paradoxically are a result of gradual success. Consequently, the new wave of enthusiasm is a bit premature.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The one upside of the ongoing domestic challenges for China’s NEV sector is a likely delay in the outbreak of a possible “NEV war” between an upstart China and the world’s dominant producers. For the immediate future, the contest will still be primarily in the Chinese market, but eventually the field of play could move to showrooms around Europe and North America and, by implication, present a new challenge to domestic automakers and their workers. To the extent these cars come equipped with automous vehicle or driver-assistance capabilities or are otherwise connected to the internet, vehicles from China could also raise national security concerns related to vehicles’ performance and passenger data.

One appropriate reaction would be defensive. Trade lawyers and officials within the U.S. Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration could sharpen their pencils in preparation for a bevy of antidumping and countervailing duty cases. And officials elsewhere in Washington will need to develop regulatory protections because of the potential national security risks related to network security, data storage, and data privacy.

But an equally if not more important response will be offensive—for U.S. industry, educational and training institutions, consumer groups, and government to collaborate in strengthening the United States’ own NEV industry from top to bottom. This means: (1) fostering design and engineering talent (which includes attracting international students and workers to the United States); (2) conducting R&D for batteries, hydrogen fuel cells, other alternative energy sources, car components, and chasis materials; (3) encouraging transportation manufacturing clusters in multiple regions; (4) investing in private and public charging infrastructure; (5) expanding incentives for producers; (6) offering larger buyer rebates to make NEVs more affordable for everyone; and (7) integrating developments in NEVs with autonomous vehicle technology, other transportation systems, and urban and regional planning.

Beyond being proactive at home, the United States’ international strategy likewise should not be purely defensive. The United States needs to be more supportive without violating its international trade commitments and copying any of China’s discriminatory practices. Washington certainly should oppose China’s unfair trade practices and any threats to our national security, but successfully developing NEVs and transportation systems requires greater coordination with other economies and in international institutions on setting technical standards, engaging in R&D, developing trusted supply chains, and protecting data.

There is no doubt China is accelerating its efforts in NEVs. If the United States is going to win this competition, it must develop and execute on its own effective playbook. And the sooner it does so, the better.

Scott Kennedy is senior adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

To read the full policy brief, please click here.

© 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

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Keeping the free flow of digital transactions reinforces overall economic, social, and political stability. Across the spectrum, actors benefit from increased connectivity and expediency while saving on costs, resources, and bureaucratic procedures.

Online transactions help governments in various ways, including by expanding their net of services while improving time and efficiency, making information available to their constituents, reaching vulnerable communities, and modernizing governmental processes. On a wider perspective, electronic transactions also boost ICT infrastructure and the economic growth of countries. Recent studies estimate that digital commerce accounts for 15.5 percent of global GDP.298 Second, citizens gain access to a broader amount of goods and services at a fair price. Given the increased accessibility, firms compete for price and quality, thus benefiting consumers. It should also be noted that digital flows are how it’s possible to connect the unconnected, enhancing inclusive growth.

Finally, businesses—particularly MSMEs—can access untapped markets worldwide, increasing their revenue and resiliency. Accessing and operating in foreign markets is vital for the survival of MSMEs and local entrepreneurial ecosystems. Electronic transactions also facilitate knowledge and data sharing, enabling seamless, digitally integrated global supply chains. Moreover, firms are incentivized to innovate, unlocking more investment resources in both tangible and intangible assets.

Digital economic activity drives economic growth and activates a win-win scenario that maximizes the welfare of big and small players alike. Ensuring electronic transaction flows fosters certainty and predictability for all—an Indian mother using an online payment platform to pay for her son’s tuition in the UK, a Nigerian startup offering ICT services in Vietnam, or a local Argentinian municipality processing the paperwork of one of its ex-pats.

With all of this at stake, WTO members should renew the moratorium on customs duties on international electronic transmissions, and ideally make it permanent and binding. The temporary and ambivalent status of the suspension feeds into the uncertainty that affects the broader trade environment. Therefore, policymakers should acknowledge the palpable necessity and benefits of suspending duties on e-transactions by promoting policies directed to:

• Increasing connectivity, including ICT infrastructure and the adoption of emerging technologies.
• Investing in intangible assets, including R&D, high-skilled training, and intellectual property rights.
• Providing economic incentives for innovation.
• Elevating the digital services capacities among developed and developing countries.
• Promoting free trade globalization on the international stage.

Far from erecting barriers to trade and transactions, the international community should build bridges to enhance connectivity, economic stability, and survival. An open and tariff-free Internet leads to global economic growth as it makes trade more accessible, dynamic, and innovative.

To download the full report, please click here.

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TikTok launched in the United States in August 2018. The app is available in over 155 countries in 39 languages and has approximately 800 million monthly active users. In the United States, the app has approximately 49 million monthly active users. TikTok’s appeal lies heavily on what has been called its “addictive” video feed, For You. The app builds this feed through a “recommendation engine” algorithm built on artificial intelligence (AI) technologies and data mining practices. According to the company, the recommendation engine relies on a complex set of weighted factors to recommend content, including hashtags and videos watched previously, as well as the kind of device a person is using. TikTok critics cite problems with how much data TikTok collects from and about its users and with how that data is stored—and could be shared.

On August 6, 2020, President Trump signed an Executive Order aimed at stopping TikTok from doing business in the United States. Once in effect on September 27, 2020 (an extension from the original date of September 20), the order will prohibit any U.S. company or person from “transacting” with ByteDance. On August 14, 2020, the President issued a second Executive Order stating that ByteDance, its subsidiaries, and partners must divest from all assets that support TikTok’s operations in the United States and destroy all previously collected U.S. user data. Divestiture may be accomplished by finding a U.S. buyer for TikTok. The requirements are designed to limit the Chinese government’s access to current and future data from U.S. TikTok users. ByteDance does not want to divest from TikTok and has sued the Trump Administration.

On September 14, 2020, Oracle announced that it had reached an agreement with ByteDance to “serve as [the company’s] trusted technology provider” in the United States. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin announced that he had received the proposal. From the terminology used, it appears that the deal may involve a partnership between the two companies rather than a sale. This arrangement would keep the source code of the For You recommendation engine in the hands of ByteDance. It is unclear if this deal satisfies the conditions in President Trump’s Executive Orders. Secretary Mnuchin said that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States will review the proposal and present President Trump with its opinion. On September 19, 2020, Oracle announced that Walmart would be joining the TikTok acquisition.

On September 27, 2020, Judge Carl J. Nichols of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction against the Trump administration order. He stated that while President Trump has broad authority to prohibit business transactions with foreign entities that are deemed to pose a national security risk, TikTok appears to be exempt from such a prohibition because it is a personal communication service, which is protected by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The ruling does not affect the November 12, 2020, deadline that ByteDance divest from TikTok in the United States.

Some believe TikTok and other Chinese-owned apps pose a serious security risk to the United States because Chinese companies are subject to China’s laws that require compliance with government requests for data. Others believe bodog poker review that TikTok has fallen into “the crosshairs of a global technology battle” based on technology trade protectionism (this concept, also called “techno-nationalism,” refers to a country’s refusal or reluctance to import other countries’ advanced technology, as well as to export, or to allow other nations to benefit from, its own advanced technology).

Similar situations may arise in the future with other apps created by foreign companies. Options that Congress may consider include (1) developing an overarching legal and regulatory framework to protect the security and privacy of U.S. citizens’ data and communications, and (2) developing a uniform, transparent process to assess and mediate risks posed by foreign apps.

Patricia Moloney Figliola is a Specialist in Internet and Telecommunications Policy at the Congressional Research Service.

To download the full report, please click here.

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