Appellate Body Archives - WITA http://www.wita.org/atp-research-topics/appellate-body/ Tue, 08 Dec 2020 19:55:16 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.6.1 /wp-content/uploads/2018/08/android-chrome-256x256-80x80.png Appellate Body Archives - WITA http://www.wita.org/atp-research-topics/appellate-body/ 32 32 Revitalizing the World Trade Organization /atp-research/revitalizing-the-wto/ Mon, 09 Nov 2020 14:51:16 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=24769 All three pillars of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have played a key role in promoting “rules-based” international trade for the past twenty-five years. Negotiations: The negotiations creating the WTO...

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All three pillars of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have played a key role in promoting “rules-based” international trade for the past twenty-five years.

  1. Negotiations: The negotiations creating the WTO were a major success, leading to a broad range of new rules that prohibit members from raising tariffs beyond agreed-upon levels, restrict non-tariff barriers, and ban discriminatory trade measures. Since then, a few negotiations have helped further lower barriers, including the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and Information Technology Agreement (ITA). Today, average applied tariffs are approximately half of what they were when the WTO was created, and numerous unfair trade practices have been discontinued.2
  2. Implementation and Monitoring: The WTO recognizes that the implementation and monitoring of commitments are essential to maintaining the integrity of an effective rules-based system. Accordingly, the WTO includes mechanisms to track implementation and rules that require members to notify it of changes in trade policies and share information on trade-distorting practices (e.g., subsidies). Transparency and information sharing promote business predictability, while the discussion of trade-distorting policies often leads to their modification or abandonment before adoption.
  3. Dispute Settlement: The WTO dispute-settlement system helps resolve trade disputes to minimize unilateral action and cycles of retaliation. Many countries use the dispute-settlement system to challenge adverse measures. In most cases, the member losing the dispute changes the offending measure. In other cases, that member exercises its sovereignty and chooses not to change the policy, freely accepting the consequences (retaliatory tariffs). Additionally, many disputes are settled before litigation commences.

The world has changed considerably since the WTO’s creation. It has experienced the rise of the Internet and other advanced technologies, China’s economic expansion, greater skepticism about the benefits of trade, and greater concern about income inequality. The world has changed, and so must the WTO. At the same time, the WTO itself has not met expectations. WTO negotiations have not readily facilitated new rules or additional market-access openings, the implementation and monitoring pillar has not held countries accountable for ignoring its requirements, and the dispute-settlement system has not strictly applied the rules as negotiated. As a result, the WTO is falling far short of its promise and mandate in different ways.

WTO negotiations have failed to update international trade rules to: account for non-market economies and deal with related unfair trade practices, such as forced technology transfer and massive industrial subsidies; account for new technologies, such as the Internet; improve commitments in key areas covered in detail by free-trade agreements (FTAs), such as intellectual property and services; and fully address politically important policy issues, such as labor and the environment. WTO negotiations have also failed to substantially lower or equalize tariff treatment among major economies.

The ability of large emerging economies to self-declare “developing-country” status and avoid taking on the same commitments as competitors has compounded the challenge. Worse yet, many countries claim that trade liberalization and the WTO rules that promote it are anti-development, undermining the WTO’s core mission.

Compliance with the WTO’s implementation and monitoring function has not been widespread, with many members failing to follow the basic notification requirements necessary to ensure the transparency and predictability of trade.

WTO dispute settlement has drifted from its original design. It has failed to properly adjudicate certain disputes, including by inventing new rules without consensus and improperly applying the rules to non-market economies;  allowed the WTO Secretariat to wield too much power in decision-making; and taken too long, depriving workers and businesses of real-time solutions.

Accordingly, all three pillars require reform to ensure the WTO retains a constructive and central role in resolving disputes before they spiral out of control, and in shaping international trade rules and behavior. When the WTO is functioning properly, it provides a mechanism to enforce agreed-upon rules in a predictable manner and create new rules to protect workers and businesses. When the rules are inadequate and disputes take too long, countries are more inclined to adopt unfair practices, and may be forced to respond unilaterally to protect their interests.

WTO reform provides the quickest and most constructive path to adequately address China’s unfair trade practices. The US-China Phase One trade deal made important progress on certain structural issues, but did not meaningfully address industrial subsidies or state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and it is unlikely that China will ever address these matters bilaterally given the government’s central role in its economy. Therefore, concerted multilateral pressure that paints these policies as a threat to the global trading system as a whole is necessary to effectuate change. In many respects, the WTO provides the ideal forum for countries to work together to persuade China to change its most problematic behavior. The WTO already has a core set of principles, such as non-discrimination, that are critical to countering such practices, and an existing infrastructure for negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing those rules. The WTO’s membership is also critical—it includes many countries impacted by these issues, as well as China itself. The broad reach of the WTO will also help ensure other countries do not adopt similar non-policies.

The United States has been calling for significant WTO reform for years, and many countries have recently joined the chorus. For example, in December 2018, all Group of Twenty (G20) members endorsed the following language in the leaders’ statement: International trade and investment are important engines of growth, productivity, innovation, job creation and development. We recognize the contribution that the multilateral trading system has made to that end. The system is currently falling short of its objectives and there is room for improvement. We therefore support the necessary reform of the WTO to improve its functioning.

Despite these high-level statements, WTO members have struggled to gain momentum toward tangible reform. Some blame the United States for refusing to offer specific proposals on dispute settlement, the European Union (EU) for an unwillingness to meaningfully address US concerns on this issue, China for refusing to engage on proposals related to its practices, and India for leading the fight to preserve preferential developing country status for large, emerging economies.

Regardless of who is to blame, the WTO is in crisis, and momentum for ambitious reform must be generated before the system loses its relevance. To catalyze momentum, members should quickly resolve ongoing negotiations while “thinking big” about the future and significantly raising their levels of ambition. The successful conclusion of ongoing negotiations, such as those on fisheries subsidies, will create new confidence in the WTO by demonstrating that the system is still capable of solving problems. But, negotiations will not solve the biggest problems facing the system. Therefore, even as members seek to make incremental progress, they increase their ambition with respect to the overall scope of reform needed to create a system fit for purpose in the twenty-first century and on “outside-the-box” ideas to solve some of the more intractable problems before it is too late.

Any successful WTO reform effort requires the United States and the European Union to better cooperate and coordinate. The United States and EU share common values, jointly spearheaded the creation of the original international trading system, and have both used it to promote trade-liberalizing, market-oriented policies around the globe. The economies of the United States and the EU are also equally challenged by China’s policies. If they cannot reach consensus on how to fix the WTO, it is inconceivable that the rest of the world could do so.

To this end, this paper proposes an ambitious WTO reform proposal that both the United States and the European Union should be able to endorse, and ultimately work together to promote. In particular, a joint US-EU WTO reform proposal should

  • address problems with all three pillars—negotiations, implementation and monitoring, and dispute settlement; these functions complement each other and reform is needed in all three to make the system work as a whole;
  • address the most difficult issues, including China’s unfair trade policies and how to fit a non-market economy into a system built by market economies;
    • create new rules to address issues that have emerged since the WTO was created, such as digital trade, and upgrade existing agreements, such as the intellectual property and services agreements, to the higher standards included in many FTAs;
  • include more robust commitments on politically important issues, such as labor and the environment, which are critical to regaining domestic support for trade;
  • eliminate the unfairly high tariff rates imposed by certain countries, and bring greater parity in tariff levels among major economic powers;
  • promote liberalization by all members, not just “developed” economies, while recognizing the unique challenges faced by least-developed countries (LDCs) and allowing for differential treatment predicated on fact-based need;
  • consider novel approaches to rescue the negotiating function, such as the use of plurilateral agreements that only benefit participants (non-most favored nation), or non-binding commitments for LDCs as an initial approach in certain areas;
  • increase high-level political engagement from capitals to promote greater ambition in Geneva;
  • hold countries accountable for failing to follow fundamental rules related to transparency;
  • fully address the underlying shortcomings of the dispute settlement system by
    • ensuring that adjudicators better respect the limited mandate provided by WTO members, and do not create rules to which members never agreed;
    • making institutional reforms to improve the transparency and accountability of the process, and address the imbalance in decision-making between the WTO Secretariat and the appointed adjudicators; and
    • improving the system’s efficiency so it serves as a viable “real-time” alternative to unilateral action; and
  • recognize that fixing the negotiating function is critical to fixing dispute settlement in a sustainable manner.

The will of all WTO members will ultimately be necessary to achieve the broad-based reforms envisioned in this paper, but improving cooperation and coordination between the United States and European Union is a necessary start. Section II of this paper further outlines some of the existing problems with the WTO system, while Section III details a joint US-EU reform agenda.

To download the full report, please click here.

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Clete R. Willems is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Mr. Willems is a partner at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, where he advises multinational companies, investors, and trade associations on international economic law and policy matters. Until April 2019, Mr. Willems was Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economics and Deputy Director of the National Economic Council.

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Can Interim Appeal Arbitration Preserve the WTO Dispute System? /atp-research/can-appeal-arbitration-save-wto/ Tue, 01 Sep 2020 15:36:58 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=22679 If legal obligations cannot be enforced, their value is greatly reduced. International law is famous for its emphasis on soft law—that is, legal instruments with little or no legally binding...

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If legal obligations cannot be enforced, their value is greatly reduced. International law is famous for its emphasis on soft law—that is, legal instruments with little or no legally binding force. In contrast to the typical approach in international law, the obligations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) stand out as being relatively enforceable. WTO dispute settlement is one of the most developed and legalistic adjudication systems that exists in international law, although it has far less power than a domestic court.

The precise scope of the WTO dispute system’s authority is a proper subject of debate: Just how enforceable should the rules of the WTO be? There are degrees of enforceability, and it is up to the governments that make up the system to decide how much power to delegate to international organizations and other bodies.

The prior trade dispute system that existed under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was less enforceable than its WTO successor: losing governments could block the adoption of GATT panel reports by the GATT membership, which meant they had no legal effect. Blocking adoption grew more frequent toward the end of the GATT era and became a concern. As part of the creation of the WTO, governments changed these rules and adoption became, for all practical purposes, automatic. As a result, reports would always have legal effect. At this time, governments also added an appeals mechanism, called the Appellate Body, to review panel reports to ensure that automatically adopted reports were of sufficiently high quality.

In its early years, the Appellate Body received more praise than criticism, but recently the United States has offered strong objections to some of the rulings and behavior of the Appellate Body. The Trump administration has used these objections as justification for blocking appointments to the Appellate Body, which is down to one member and is no longer operating. There is now a fear that the WTO dispute system, without a functioning Appellate Body, has been brought back to the GATT in terms of the degree of its enforceability.

But other WTO members have not been willing to give up on appellate review. They have pushed for a negotiated solution, with changes to the appellate process that might satisfy the United States, but a resolution does not seem to be imminent. They have also put forward a temporary appeals mechanism, known as the Multiparty Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement Pursuant to Article 25 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, to keep the system functioning until a permanent solution can be found. As of July 31, 2020, the MPIA is in effect for the 23 parties that have signed on, and other WTO members may join at any time.

This paper considers the historical development of the Appellate Body, explains the U.S. objections, and then sets out the details of the MPIA and evaluates its prospects. For the WTO dispute system to function properly, two features are crucial: dispute settlement decisions must have automatic effect, and some form of appellate review must be available. Ideally, the Appellate Body itself would be revived, but if that is not possible, many governments are hoping that the MPIA can preserve the effectiveness of the WTO dispute system during the continued shutdown of the Appellate Body.

 
 
Simon Lester is the Associate Director at Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies.
 
To download the full paper, please click here

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The World Trade Organization: An Optimistic Pre-Mortem in Hopes of Resurrection /atp-research/wto-in-hopes-of-resurrection/ Thu, 06 Aug 2020 13:49:40 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=23417 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY For decades, multilateral trade rules operated to keep government protectionist impulses in check. They provided a foundation of openness for international commerce, as well as a framework for...

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For decades, multilateral trade rules operated to keep government protectionist impulses in check. They provided a foundation of openness for international commerce, as well as a framework for liberalisation and integration. With the trade rules as a guarantor, capital and value chains spread across the globe.

The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 saw these rules reinforced with a feature that is nigh unheard-of in international law: binding and non-optional dispute settlement. For the first time, an international panel of legal experts would have the final say on the legality of trade measures, whether those implementing them liked it or not. On 10 December 2019, a procedural blockade by the world’s largest economy, the United States, culminated in that 24-year experiment being put on hold, perhaps permanently.

The loss of the WTO’s Appellate Body does not mean the global trading system is in anarchy, but it does move it a significant step closer to unilateralism and transactionalism in trade policy. Moreover, the Appellate Body crisis is just one of the areas where the WTO is bleeding, and the WTO is just one symptom of a global trading system besieged.   

Policymakers looking to restore predictability and order must grapple with a WTO that has struggled to negotiate new rules and enforce and monitor existing ones; which civil society distrusts; and on which business has largely given up as a source of solutions. The global consensus, based on the underlying wisdom of sacrificing some sovereign policy space to allow predictable, rules-based trade, has never been weaker. There are no easy answers, but one thing is certain: technocratic fixes from Geneva and ministerial press releases bereft of specifics will not be enough. 

CONCLUSION

This Appellate Body crisis may abate, and the impending budget crisis may be averted, but the WTO’s challenges run deep. Unless the consensus on gradual liberalisation and rules-based trade can be rebuilt, the WTO will continue to fall short of the political will required to move beyond current impasses and inefficiencies. Ministerial calls for unspecified reforms, or reforms with no chance of securing consensus from the very players they target, will continue to sound hollow.

The United States has to be central to any future plan. No amount of technical work, statements of concern, or speeches in the General Council can fix a trading system to which the world’s largest economy is uncommitted. US allies and trading partners with an interest in maintaining a rules-based multilateral trading system will need to use collective and creative diplomacy to pressure the United States to return to a productive member of the WTO, if not a leader as it has been in the past.

Whatever the future of the WTO, governments who believe in rules-based trade must look inwards and begin rebuilding the interest and engagement of business and civil society.  Business must be convinced to devote the time and resources to shape and inform trade policy, and civil society actors must be brought, however sceptically, into the tent. That is not going to be easy, but the decades of economic growth and prosperity enabled by predictable, rules-based trade, show that it is worth it.

Grozoubinski,WorldTradeOrganisation

Dmitry Grozoubinski is a former Australian trade negotiator and diplomat, now based in Geneva where he serves as the Executive Director of the Geneva Trade Platform and founder of the consultancy ExplainTrade.

To read the full analysis, click here.

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USTR: Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization /atp-research/ustr-report-on-the-appellate-body-of-the-world-trade-organization/ Fri, 28 Feb 2020 15:47:12 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=19618 The United States and other free-market nations established the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 1995 as a forum for negotiating and implementing trade agreements. The dispute settlement mechanism of the...

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The United States and other free-market nations established the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 1995 as a forum for negotiating and implementing trade agreements. The dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO was designed to help Members resolve trade disputes arising under those agreements, without adding to or diminishing the rights and obligations to which Members had agreed.

When the WTO dispute settlement system functions according to the agreed rules, it provides a vital tool to enforce Members’ WTO rights and obligations. For more than 20 years, however, the United States and other WTO Members have expressed serious concerns with the Appellate Body’s disregard for those rules.

As detailed in this Report, the Appellate Body has repeatedly failed to apply the rules of the WTO agreements in a manner that adheres to the text of those agreements, as negotiated and agreed by WTO Members. The Appellate Body has strayed far from the limited role that WTO Members assigned to it, ignoring the text of the WTO agreements. Through this persistent overreaching, the Appellate Body has increased its own power and seized from sovereign nations and other WTO Members authority that it was not provided. For example:

  • The Appellate Body consistently ignores the mandatory deadline for deciding appeals;

  • The Appellate Body allows individuals who have ceased to serve on the Appellate Body to continue deciding appeals as if their term had been extended by WTO Members in the Dispute Settlement Body;

  • The Appellate Body has made findings on issues of fact, including issues of fact relating to WTO Members’ domestic law, although Members authorized it to address only legal issues;

  • The Appellate Body has issued advisory opinions and otherwise opined on issues not necessary to assist the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in resolving the dispute before it;

  • The Appellate Body has insisted that dispute settlement panels treat prior Appellate Body interpretations as binding precedent;

  • The Appellate Body has asserted that it may ignore WTO rules that explicitly mandate it recommend a WTO Member to bring a WTO-inconsistent measure into compliance with WTO rules; and

  • The Appellate Body has overstepped its authority and opined on matters within the authority of WTO Members acting through the Ministerial Conference, General Council, and Dispute Settlement Body.

The Appellate Body’s persistent overreaching has also taken away rights and imposed new obligations through erroneous interpretations of WTO agreements. The Appellate Body has attempted to fill in “gaps” in those agreements, reading into them rights or obligations to which the United States and other WTO Members never agreed.

These errors have favored non-market economies at the expense of market economies, rendered trade remedy laws ineffective, and infringed on Members’ legitimate policy space. For example:

  • The Appellate Body’s erroneous interpretation of the term “public body” threatens the ability of Members to counteract trade-distorting subsidies provided through SOEs, undermining the interests of all market-oriented actors;

  • The Appellate Body has intruded on Members’ legitimate policy space by essentially converting a non-discrimination obligation for regulations into a “detrimental impact” test;

  • The Appellate Body has prevented WTO Members from fully addressing injurious dumping by prohibiting a common-sense method of calculating the extent of dumping that is injuring a domestic industry (“zeroing”);

  • The Appellate Body’s stringent and unrealistic test for using out-of-country benchmarks to measure subsidies has weakened the effectiveness of trade remedy laws in addressing distortions caused by state-owned enterprises in non-market economies;

  • The Appellate Body’s creation of an “unforeseen developments” test and severe causation analysis prevents the effective use of safeguards by WTO Members to protect their industries from import surges; and

  • The Appellate Body has limited WTO Members’ ability to impose countervailing duties and antidumping duties calculated using a non-market economy methodology to address simultaneous dumping and trade-distorting subsidization by non-market economies like China.

For many years, successive Administrations and the U.S. Congress have voiced significant concerns about the Appellate Body’s disregard for the rules agreed to by WTO Members. As set forth in the Appendices to this Report, in multiple Congressional Sessions, up to and including the current Session, Senators and Representatives of both parties have voiced urgent concerns and the need for reform in numerous resolutions, reports, and statements.

Unfortunately, U.S. efforts were ignored, and the problem has worsened as too many WTO Members remain unwilling to do anything to rein in this conduct. The proper functioning of the WTO Appellate Body has a disproportionate impact on the United States because more than one- quarter of all disputes at the WTO have been challenges to U.S. laws or other measures.

Specifically, 155 disputes have been filed against the United States, and no other Member has faced even a hundred disputes. According to some analyses, up to approximately 90 percent of the disputes pursued against the U.S. have led to a report finding that the U.S. law or other measure was inconsistent with WTO agreements. This means that, on average, over the past 25 years, the WTO has found a U.S. law or measure WTO-inconsistent between five and six times per year, every year.

But these failings have dire consequences for U.S. interests in the WTO, and for all WTO Members, as well. The negotiating function of the WTO has atrophied as the Appellate Body has facilitated efforts by some Members to obtain through litigation what they have not achieved through negotiation; the effectiveness of WTO tools designed to address distortions by non- market economies has been greatly diminished; and the WTO dispute settlement system continues to lose the credibility necessary to maintain public support for the system.

In short, the Appellate Body’s failure to follow the agreed rules has undermined not only WTO dispute settlement, but the effectiveness and functioning of the WTO more generally. Furthermore, by encouraging behavior that distorts markets, the Appellate Body has helped to make the global economy less efficient. Lasting and effective reform of the WTO dispute settlement system requires all WTO Members to come to terms with the failings of the Appellate Body.

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To view the full report, click here.

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Developing Countries Can Help Restore the WTO’s Dispute Settlement System /atp-research/developing-countries-can-help-restore-the-wtos-dispute-settlement-system-2/ Sun, 19 Jan 2020 21:25:39 +0000 /?post_type=atp-research&p=19446 No nation or group of nations has more at stake in salvaging the rules-based multilateral trading system than the world’s big emerging-market economies: Brazil, Mexico, India, China, Korea, Thailand, and...

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No nation or group of nations has more at stake in salvaging the rules-based multilateral trading system than the world’s big emerging-market economies: Brazil, Mexico, India, China, Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, among others. Trade has fueled rapid economic growth in these countries, raising the standards of living of hundreds of millions of people there.

To defend their commercial interests and resolve inevitable trade conflicts, these countries have actively and successfully used the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) dispute settlement system. The question is whether they have enough economic or political clout to persuade the United States to cease and desist in its campaign to wreck a pillar of the rules-based trading system.

By refusing to fill vacancies in the WTO’s Appellate Body, the Trump administration has paralyzed the key component of the dispute settlement system. On December 10, 2019, the Appellate Body officially lacked the minimum number of judges (or members) to operate.

As a result, any disputes that are appealed would remain in legal limbo, effectively allowing the losing parties to block adoption of panel rulings and rendering the mechanism inoperative. Several WTO members are exploring interim appellate review mechanisms; while important to mitigate the damage, they do not aim to resurrect the Appellate Body. With the world trading system back to being a power-based arrangement, trade disputes risk turning into small and not so small trade wars.

An effective dispute adjudication and enforcement mechanism is critical for big emerging-market economies to secure market access for their exports. The mechanism is also designed to protect third parties against any settlements between disputing countries that potentially discriminate against these third countries.

Likewise, the system shields trade policymakers in emerging-market economies against domestic protectionist pressures, which prevent their integration into the world economy. Most important, effective enforcement fosters sound rules and good policies, which encourage investment and economic growth across the world, in turn enabling a business environment conducive for firms to invest and trade to thrive.

The Appellate Body crisis is not of the emerging-market economies’ making, but they may hold a key to unlock it. The Trump administration has also focused its ire on a longstanding practice of giving these economies latitude to seek “special and differential treatment” in trade negotiations because of their developing-country status (González 2019).

Thus the largest emerging-market economies, which have a significant stake in preserving a two-step, rules-based mechanism for resolving trade disputes, could play a role in driving a potential bargain to save the appeals mechanism. They could unite to give up that special status in return for a US commitment to end its boycott of the nomination of Appellate Body members.

Because the dispute is more about the nature and function of the Appellate Body, this proposal may be a long shot. More may be required to address US concerns; the timing may not be right. Also, for such a deal to work, the United States must seriously engage. On the contrary, recent moves to cap the compensation of Appellate Body members and to block decisions on pending appeals have further complicated the discussions.

Washington appears ready to return to the pre-WTO days, when any one member could unilaterally block the establishment and adoption of panels. But the United States may also be looking for a deal. Emerging-market economies could enter the fray to get a negotiation going.

GROWING IMPORTANCE OF LEADING DEVELOPING ECONOMIES IN GLOBAL TRADE

Developing countries have become important actors in global trade, especially since 2000. Their goods exports have grown four-fold, from $2,239 billion in 2000 to $8,477 billion in 2017, with their share in world goods trade increasing from 34.7 to 47.8 percent in the same period.

Rapid trade growth has helped bring unprecedented prosperity across the world, with the expansion of global value chains facilitating the integration of developing countries into the world economy and helping a billion people move out of poverty. By driving consumption and domestic demand, the emerging middle class has contributed to economic progress worldwide.

This remarkable performance has been driven mostly by China, which accounts for about a third of that growth, and by 14 other developing economies: Korea, Hong Kong, Mexico, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, India, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Brazil, Vietnam, Indonesia, Turkey, and South Africa.

The cumulative exports of these 15 economies have grown from $1,458.1 billion in 2000 to $6,306 billion in 2017. With 35.6 percent of global merchandise exports in 2017, up from 22.6 percent in 2000, these 15 economies account for some three-quarters of goods exports of all developing countries.

The data in table 1 also show the importance of the 15 largest developing economies in global trade. In 2000 merchandise exports of these 15 economies amounted to 60 percent of EU merchandise exports and 187 percent of US merchandise exports; by 2017 their share in world goods exports at 35.6 percent was slightly higher than that of the European Union (33.3 percent) and four times larger than that of the United States (8.7 percent).

With such remarkable trade performance comes increased potential for trade conflict, which has enhanced the stake of these 15 largest developing economies in the preservation of a well-functioning dispute settlement system, including its effectiveness as a mechanism for advancing and defending their commercial interests.

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To view the full report, click here.

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