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The Obama Administration’s bold agenda to establish these rules across Europe and the Asia-Pacific did not yield lasting success, with the failure of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations and the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Nonetheless, the key elements of US digital trade policy enjoy bipartisan policy support, providing a promising basis for the next Democratic administration to re-engage with Europe, our biggest digital trading partner.

Part 1 of this issue brief explains why international rules are needed to protect and facilitate digital trade. Part 2 describes the turbulent past decade in transatlantic trade relations and the growing importance of US digital trade with Europe. Part 3 explains why the US government and the European Union (EU), during TTIP negotiations, were unable to agree on a digital trade chapter, including a key provision guaranteeing the free flow of data. Finally, Part 4 suggests how two parallel sets of trade negotiations beginning early this year — between the EU and the United Kingdom (UK) and between the United States and the UK — may help a future US Administration end the transatlantic stand-off over digital trade.

To view the full report at Progressive Policy Institute, please click here

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Economies with already strong underlying information technology are proving to be more resilient than those without this infrastructure already in place.  At a recent event, I listened to officials from Cambodia and Kenya explain how their strong digital track records are paying off during the current crisis.

In Cambodia, which had previously established an enabling regulatory environment around digital financial services, citizens were already accustomed to sending and receiving payments digitally, making it possible for the government to add tax functionality on to the pre-existing digital payment platforms. Similarly, in Kenya, citizens’ relative comfort with digital payments led to a recent uptick in the use of its e-tax system. The Kenya Revenue Authority has also been able to rely on its digital systems to obtain real-time data on emergency-related shifts in consumer spending, which helps the agency to predict the impact on revenues.

But the type of digital transformation necessary to get to this level is comparable to moving a boulder to the top of a mountain. It’s a long, arduous process, and it’s possible to lose footing along the way. Many economies, especially developing countries, rely on deeply entrenched systems and fight an uphill battle when it comes to public trust. In fact, many of the world’s lowest-income economies struggle to collect enough taxes to cover basic state functions. Add a global crisis into the mix and these tenuous relationships between taxman and citizen are likely to fall apart.

The current crisis provides an opportune moment to rework revenue strategies to be more digitally driven.  Tax administrations must shift the focus from simply processing taxpayers’ data to proactively improving compliance, policies, and efficiency. Modern revenue strategies will, to a large extent, have to run on digital platforms because they are necessary to effectively pursuing critical policy objectives such as:

• Broadening the tax base. Data-centric approaches can be used to close gaps and take advantage of missed opportunities without necessarily increasing the level of taxation. Such measures include: requiring e-commerce platforms to report sales in order to facilitate the collection of VAT and customs duties; analyzing past tax filings of citizens seeking relief under current stimulus programs to verify compliance; and supporting the collection of property taxes by matching the land registry with the taxpayer file.
• Enhancing transparency and trust. Establishing electronic platforms for tax registration, filing, payment, and dispute resolution make processes clear for citizens, provide assurances that tax payments end up in an actual government account, and reduce the risk of officials abusing their discretion. Implementation of technologies such as the MIT-incubated OPAL (Open Algorithm) provides researches, think tanks, or any citizen the ability to independently analyze tax data without having access to personally identifiable information. This will provide unprecedented transparency.
• Reducing the compliance burden. We know from a survey of 190 economies that it is getting easier for people and businesses to pay taxes. There are now 106 economies using electronic filing systems, double the number in 2004. Digital technology is reducing the time spent on paying taxes as well as the total number of individual payments taxpayers must make each year.
• Improving administrative efficiency. As governments mature in their use of information technology, they will be able to achieve substantial efficiency gains. For countries beginning their digital transformation, AI-enabled data capture of paper-based records can speed up the digitalization and reliability of the data. Others find significant value through the simplification of procedures and matching of filing information with third-party data sets. For more advanced tax administrations, the use of advanced analytics to identify underreporting will be a key value driver. In the current crisis, some administrations are also rethinking their balance between offsite and onsite audits.
• Advancing growth and other policy objectives. As the central depository of citizen data, tax administrations play an increasing role in advancing non-tax related objectives. For example, by using taxpayer data to: verify beneficiaries under cash transfer programs, monitor the consumption of goods with detrimental health impacts (e.g., alcohol and cigarettes), model tax policy responses to curb carbon emissions, identify growth drivers bodog online casino in the economy, detect labor market violations, and ascertain the well-being of vulnerable groups in society.

Progress toward these objectives has been uneven and the World Bank cannot get this “modernization boulder” to the top of the mountain alone. To help countries accelerate digital transformation, we need partners with multidisciplinary expertise who can help pull while we push. To that end, we co-founded the Prosperity Collaborative. This new multi-stakeholder initiative is dedicated to helping countries create better tax systems through innovative technology. Together with EY, New America, MIT and the Boston Global Forum, we are just getting started on a journey to bring tangible benefits to developing countries.  Our current priorities are –

• Developing global solutions to build capacity among developing countries and emerging market to undertake a successful digital transformation of their tax administrations;
• Promoting thought leadership on tax and technology;
• Exploring the creation of a mechanism to identify, prioritize, fund, and implement digital public goods for use by tax administrations;

By bringing these leading organizations together under the banner of the Prosperity Collaborative, we aim to create solutions that are well-targeted and easily replicable across different country contexts. Ultimately, we aim to create digital public goods that can be built once and deployed anywhere.

To view the original World Bank Blog post, please click here

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While powerful megatrends like global trade tensions, climate change, new technology innovations, and the current COVID-19 crisis impact all parts of the globe, the reality of those impacts – and therefore the necessary responses to them – are inherently driven by unique regional characteristics and the regional enabling environments. The Global Network of Advanced Manufacturing Hubs (AMHUBs) connects regional manufacturing ecosystems to help rapidly transform manufacturing to keep pace with the global megatrends that might otherwise create disruptions for manufacturers around the globe.

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This makes AI a crucial piece of policy concerning digital trade, data flows, and their implications for additional policy issues such as cybersecurity, privacy, consumer protection, and the broader economic impacts of access to data and digital technologies. Governments around the world are responding with plans to promote research and development, AI investment, and trade.

Last week, the European Commission (EC) published a white paper on AI and a data strategy as part of a plan for “shaping Europe’s digital future,” carrying out President Ursula von der Leyen’s objective to coordinate an approach to AI. The paper recognizes that the EU lags China and the U.S. in AI investment, development, and data resources, but sees the EU’s strong manufacturing sector as an opportunity for EU leadership in AI.

The paper outlines the need for EU leadership in developing an “ecosystem of excellence” by mobilizing resources for research and innovation in AI, with the aim of attracting over €20 billion annually for AI over the next decade. It also identifies the need to develop an “ecosystem of trust” by putting in place a regulatory framework that gives citizens, companies, and public organization confidence in using AI.

This could include new EU regulation to address cybersecurity risk from AI, improve understanding of how decisions using AI are made, and expand consumer protection regulation to AI services. The EU is also focusing on the need to create European data spaces that can facilitate the use and sharing of data by business and government.

In January 2020, the White House proposed 10 AI regulatory principles to govern the development and use of AI technologies in the private sector. Some of the principles resonate with the EU’s objectives. Direction to federal agencies to avoid regulation that unnecessarily hampers AI innovation and growth could apply to the EU’s white paper drafting as much as U.S. agencies.

If so, the white paper is likely to raise eyebrows in the U.S. In general, the white paper adopts a “risk-based” approach to AI regulation. For sectors and applications that are deemed “high-risk,” the EC outlined an approach that may include setting standards for the quality of AI systems and the likelihood of conformity assessments that could include testing and certification.

The white paper also declared that the EU “will continue to cooperate with like-minded countries, but also with global players.” Overlapping principles between the EC and U.S. announcements offer a basis for such cooperation with the United States. The White House principles include public trust in AI, the costs and risks of AI, and the impact of AI on fairness, discrimination, and security of information as well as on privacy, individual rights, autonomy, and civil liberties.

These resemble seven key requirements identified by an EU High Level Group of Experts on AI that are incorporated into the white paper: human agency and oversight, technical robustness and safety; privacy and data governance; transparency; diversity, non-discrimination and fairness; societal and environmental wellbeing; and accountability.

In fact, the U.S. and the EU both agree on the need for AI regulation, the key challenge will be doing it in way that is effective and prevents unnecessary barriers to transatlantic trade and investment.

The white paper is clear that EU AI regulation will need to apply to bodog poker review all economic operators providing AI-enabled products and services. In other words, all investment and trade with the EU will need to be consistent with EU AI regulation, which given the potential widespread uptake of AI could include significant amounts of trade and investment in goods and services.

To view the full blog, click here.

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She suggested that the OECD AI Principles would be a good place to start with respect to operationalizing high AI standards in a U.S.-UK trade deal. There is a lot to be said for this approach, particularly in making Principle 2.5 c) a reality: c): “Governments should promote the development of multi-stakeholder, consensus-driven global technical standards for interoperable and trustworthy AI.”

This also makes sense because neither the United States nor the United Kingdom are likely going to want to do away with the idea that market access commitments in trade agreements should be technologically neutral, i.e. that if a country commits to open up the market in a given sector, that sector should be open no matter what technology is used to serve that sector.

Cooperating on standards development can, however, have the effect of stimulating the use of innovative technologies such as AI, which is a worthwhile goal.

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Laws, regulations, and standards are sometimes conflated, which occasionally leads to confusion. The European Center for Standardization defines a standard as “a technical document designed to be used as a rule, guideline or definition. It is a consensus-built, repeatable way of doing something.” The National Institute of Standards (NIST) provides examples of AI standards areas such as:

• Data sets in standardized formats, including metadata for training, validation and testing of AI systems
• Tools for capturing and representing knowledge and reasoning in AI systems
• Full documented use cases providing information re: specific AI applications and guides for making decisions about when to deploy AI systems
• Benchmarks to drive AI innovation
• Testing methodologies
• Metrics to quantifiably measure and characterize AI technologies
• AI testbeds
• Tools for accountability and auditing

For instance, AI systems often require safeguarding Personally Indentifiable Information (PII) data. This International Organization of Standards (ISO) standard (ISO/IEC 29101:2013) defines a privacy architecture framework for entities that process such data. It does not specify what the definition of PII data is (that is a country’s sovereign right to determine), only how to create ICT systems to protect such data.

Technical standards cooperation could pay dividends if companies could use standards (methodologies) accepted by regulators on both sides of the Atlantic to demonstrate how transparency, bias avoidance, privacy protection and other regulatory priorities are being addressed from a technical standpoint.

We are really talking about developing common methodologies (technical standards) to achieve certain objectives such as the protection of privacy, not substantive legal/regulatory convergence. And we are not talking about “checklists” either because the idea is that companies establish ongoing processes, not a checklist of compliance for a certain date in time.

Composition of U.S.-UK Trade

In this context, understanding the composition of U.S.-UK trade and recalling the most modern trade agreement in existence from a digital standpoint – the United States Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA) – is a good place to start. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) notes that in 2018, the U.S. goods and services trade with the UK totaled roughly $261.9 billion.

For both countries, trade in financial services, cars and pharmaceuticals is significant. From an AI promotion standpoint, honing in on these sectors could potentially allow for the two countries to do some innovative things in a trade agreement. The USMCA Digital Trade Chapter’s Chapter 19:14 says that the Parties “shall endeavor” to cooperate on a range of issues important for digital trade.

A U.S.-UK trade deal should ideally delineate areas where the U.S. and the UK “shall” cooperate. It might also be worthwhile for the U.S. and the UK to explore whether USMCA Chapter 11 commitments with respect to Technical Barriers to Trade might be worthwhile considering in the U.S.-UK context.

Financial Services: Are Robo-Advisors, Use of Public Records, and Alternative Data Ripe for Cooperation?

The USMCA’s Chapter 17 covers financial services and provides for a point of departure in thinking about what a U.S.-UK deal might look like with respect to financial services. For example, chapter 17:7 provides for commitment with respect to “New Financial Services.” What this means is that if one Party permits a new financial service to be offered in its territory, then it must allow the other two parties to offer the same new financial service. See below for the text of this provision:

Each Party shall permit a financial institution of another Party to supply a new financial service that the Party would permit its own financial institutions, in like circumstances, to supply without adopting a law or modifying an existing law.5 Notwithstanding Article 17.5.1(a) and(e) (Market Access), a Party may determine the institutional and juridical form through which the new financial service may be supplied and may require authorization for the supply of the service.

If a Party requires a financial institution to obtain authorization to supply a new financial service, the Party shall decide within a reasonable period of time whether to issue the authorization and may refuse the authorization only for prudential reasons. There is a “like circumstances” caveat, as well as scope for the Parties to “determine the institutional and juridical form through which the new financial service may be supplied.”

The U.S. and the UK may want to consider areas where the two sides might want to consider mutual recognition regimes of some kind. There has been a lot of discussion, for instance, regarding how to regulate financial advisory services “robo-advisors.” See this LEXOLOGY piece, for instance, on how regulators in the U.S., the UK, Europe, Canada and Hong Kong are dealing with this issue.

Michel Girard’s January 2020 Paper entitled: “Standards for Digital Cooperation” provides some good ideas for what might be possible in this and other sectors. He notes, for instance, that the report from a 2018 High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation proposes new bodog online casino data governance technical standards to address gaps such as the creation of audits and certification schemes to monitor compliance of AI systems with technical and ethical standards. I have also written about how explanations and audits can enhance trust in AI. 

Another example where closer U.S.-UK cooperation might be warranted is in the area of know your customer (KYC) and anti-money laundering (AML) services. Although to date, trade agreements have appropriately not entered into detail regarding what a privacy law should look like (the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and USMCA only say that Parties shall have a privacy system), it might be worth clarifying that privacy law should not be an impediment to the provision of these essential services.

In practice this would mean that the “right to be forgotten” laws would have to be appropriately tailored and that companies would continue to be able to use public records and wide distributed media to provide high quality KYC and AML services. Alternative data is another area where the U.S. and the UK might want to step up collaboration. For example, the U.S. and investment industries could potentially benefit from greater use of voluntary alternative data standards.

Standards that have the effect of improving data documentation; raising data quality; unifying data pipeline management; reducing time spent on data delivery and ingestion; easier permissions management and authentication; and, simplifying vendor due diligence and contracting would be a good thing. Export Britain actually advises UK firms to focus on , among other sectors, financial services in exporting to the United States.

The same is undoubtedly true for U.S. financial services firms looking to expand in the UK. It may make sense for regulators on both sides of the Atlantic to work together to promote the use of alternative data standards for the investment industry. There is perhaps also scope to work together on the use of alternative data in making consumer credit decisions.

There is substantial evidence suggesting that the use of alternative data in credit scoring can help in expanding service to underserved markets as these comments to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) make clear. Common U.S.-UK alternative data standards could be helpful, particularly if they are coupled with safeguards to ensure that alternative data can be developed through access to public records and widely distributed media in both the United States and the United Kingdom.

Cars – Can the United States and the United Kingdom Drive Connectedness?

On January 8, 2020, the Trump Administration released “Ensuring American Leadership in Automated Vehicle Technologies: Automated Vehicles 4.0 AV 4.0). Clearly, going forward this will be a U.S. strength given the investments being made by U.S. tech firms. But there is plenty of potential interest in the UK as well as this 2019 Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) report notes. One of the report’s recommendations is to harmonize international harmonization of regulations.

And as this AV Investor Tracker report establishes, concerns about data privacy are holding back the development of the sector. This Booz Allen Hamilton White Paper delineates some of the issues at stake. Perhaps one of the ways to help U.S. and UK carmakers would be to take what is relevant from the U.S. National Institute of Standards (NIST) Privacy Framework in creating “privacy by design” for AV manufacturers in the UK and the U.S.

On the UK side there has been plenty of preparatory thinking about the privacy issues surrounding AVs – particularly what to do about location data. See this piece, for instance, entitled: “Where your data is being driven.” The Center for Connected & Autonomous Vehicles has done innovative work in this space. Perhaps U.S. and UK negotiators could agree on how privacy can be addressed through mutually agreed upon privacy by design standards for car manufacturers and the apps that will have increasing value add in automobiles.

On February 14, 2019 the United States and the United Kingdom signed a Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) with respect to standards. One of the stated purposes of the agreement is to promote trade between the two countries. The agreement at this time focuses on mutual recognition with respect to telecoms equipment, electromagnetic compatibility, and pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices. Perhaps there might be scope to expand this to AVs and other standards important to innovative digital industries?

Making the Most of AI to Make Drug Discovery Cheaper and Quicker

There is a lot of excitement about the potential for AI to help with drug discovery but there is arguably a need for standards to realize the potential of the technology. AI Startup Entrepreneur and Ph.D. Charles K. Fisher actually asks the FDA to develop such standards. Why not work with the UK equivalents to do precisely that together with NIST and UK equivalents?

The Confidentiality Coalition (the Coalition is composed of a range of different healthcare industry players, including pharmaceutical companies) submitted a January 14, 2019 letter to NIST requesting that it work on a privacy framework that is protective of privacy but at the same time allows for needed healthcare data to go to where it is needed. One of the Coalition’s requests is for the Privacy Framework to be consistent with HIPAA and other existing Privacy Frameworks.

The NIST Privacy Framework does not explicitly establish a system to comply with specific laws. And, for instance, with respect to international transfers of clinical trial data, there are some differences between HIPAA and the GDPR as this article notes. Although the NIST is appropriately careful to note that its cybersecurity and privacy frameworks are not “checklists,” it might be helpful, especially given the 2019 MRA to select some sectors where additional guidance might be useful such as healthcare.

After all, in 2018 the United States imported about $5 billion in pharmaceuticals from the United Kingdom. In 2016, the United States exported about $2.5 billion to the UK in medical and pharmaceutical products. Despite these seemingly impressive numbers though, it is hard to think of a sector more in need of a revolution for a changed innovation model. And besides the economics, AI-driven enhanced drug discovery clearly has potential to help people in the way that matters most: improving health outcomes through faster development of new drugs.

In this context, given the politics surrounding healthcare, it is worthwhile underscoring that this technical standards cooperation is about ensuring high quality as well as efficiency, and that it has nothing to do with healthcare delivery models that that United States and the United Kingdom choose. The UK can keep the NHS. And the U.S. can keep its largely private insurance-based system.

Conclusion

The U.S. is putting its money where its mouth is in that federal money is being prioritized for AI R&D. The UK is also a strong AI adopter and leader. And the countries are partners that share similar values. Let’s make the most of these strengths and develop a trade deal that promotes AI-driven innovation.

To view the full blog, click here.

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The UK is under no illusions as to the cyber threat posed by China. The UK government and critical industry sectors, such as defence, telecommunications and IT, have all been subject to Chinese cyber intrusions designed to steal data on an industrial scale. This was last called out publicly in 2018 by then-foreign secretary, Jeremy Hunt, who described Chinese attacks against UK managed service providers as ‘one of the most significant and widespread cyber intrusions against the UK … uncovered to date’.

Drawing on its own experiences in the cyber domain, the UK will also fully understand that espionage capabilities can quickly become sabotage capabilities – the hack of a network to steal data can quickly become the hack that brings the network down. And the UK knows that China’s intelligence law requires Chinese companies to provide it assistance if asked to do so. The UK’s assessment of the cyber threat posed by China does not differ from that of the US.

2. The UK may have managed the use of Huawei kit in its 3/4G networks, but its use in 5G networks significantly increases the risk of Chinese espionage and sabotage.

Just as 3/4G networks are entangled together today, 5G will be entangled with 3/4G networks. Given that Huawei is already providing kit in the UK’s 3/4G networks, the theoretical ability of the Chinese to access and sabotage the UK mobile network would be little changed even if Huawei kit were not used in the 5G elements of the networks.

3. Even if the risk doesn’t increase from 3/4G to 5G, the UK shouldn’t be using Huawei in any ‘G’ network because the threat of serious cyber espionage cannot be mitigated.

The basic cyber security measures that have been used for 3/4G also apply to 5G, with the proper use of encryption to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of data being a crucial one. Ironically, it remains the case that those with the best chance of reading traffic on anyone’s mobile networks are the companies providing ‘over-the-top’ encrypted applications, as well as whichever government hosts those companies under the terms of their domestic lawful intercept (so in the UK that is overwhelmingly the Silicon Valley companies and the US government).

Increasingly, the UK finds itself unable to read the encrypted traffic between suspected terrorists in London and Manchester without Silicon Valley’s help. The presence of Huawei makes no difference – even if the Chinese government were able to use the Huawei kit to listen in, it would face the same problem as the UK government. Let’s be clear – Google can get to the content of gmail passing over a bit of Huawei kit, but China cannot.

4. Ok, the real risk isn’t about spying, it is about China’s ability to use Huawei kit to sabotage the network.

The provision of kit into UK mobile networks and the interfaces between those networks and the rest of the UK’s telecommunications infrastructure are complex processes. Any kit that Huawei provides into UK networks will be integrated with kit and over networks run by other providers – such as BT, Vodaphone, Virgin Media, EE and others. Those providers have a degree of visibility and control over the various interfaces, with ‘redundancy’ built in – another basic UK requirement being to build redundancy into traffic routing to ensure the network as a whole can survive the loss of a single element (network resilience).

Additionally, many of the components inside Huawei kit are manufactured by other nations, particularly the US – software from Microsoft, microchips from Intel and Qualcom. Removing kit within a complex twenty-first century telecommunications network based simply on the nationality of the kit’s ‘supply chain’ is almost impossible. National ownership of a piece of kit is not the only deciding factor when it comes to ‘ease of interference’. As an illustration, if the US were behind the Stuxnet attack, as alleged, it interfered with the kit of a German company, Siemens.

In short, bringing down a complex modern telecommunications network is not easy, whichever bit of kit within the network you ‘own’. But even if you could, when would you do it? It is effectively a ‘one shot’ capability – if used by China, it would undermine the position of all Chinese companies in the world tech market, effectively handing the market to exclusively non-Chinese companies. China would therefore presumably save the ‘one shot’ for war or near-war, in which case it would need to be sure it would work. As I have outlined above, that is not easy.

The sabotage risk is, in reality, probably far subtler. It is more likely that China might try to insert damaging code via mobile networks remotely and deniably, with the Huawei kit used to facilitate an insertion or exfiltration of code/data into other networks – it is part of a pathway or a small but essential cog in a bigger wheel. Note again, however, that other countries could get into Huawei (or Nokia or Ericsson for that matter) kit remotely to do the same thing.

5. Given that there is a potential sabotage risk, can the UK really isolate the core of its network from Huawei?

5G is a cool technology, providing greater bandwidth, faster speeds, better quality and instant connections. It is this faster, smarter layer that will enable the truly innovative applications that we call the ‘Internet of Things’, for example, self-driving vehicles.

Sitting behind this are various technologies. The use of higher frequencies (ultimately including ‘millimetre waves’) means that the system can carry more information and support more devices (‘smart things’) at the same time (4G uses data at rates of 200–300 megabits per second, while service providers are ultimately looking to get 5G to above 40 and even up to 100 gigabits per second). There are many more and smaller transmitting and receiving antennae, using less power and covering smaller geographic areas – allowing the transmission and receipt of signals simultaneously through multiple antennae.

5G uses a Cloud Radio Access Network, meaning cheaper infrastructure and less maintenance. Unlike current generations, 5G base stations use ‘beamforming’ to detect and locate the user, and only transmit in that direction. 5G uses ‘Full Duplex Mode’ enabled by high-speed switching that can handle simultaneous transmission and receipt. Using all of the above, a 5G network can be ‘sliced’ and dedicated to a specific task (e.g. one part for phones and one part for driverless cars).

So 5G looks complicated and distributed. But it can still be divided into core and non-core. The latter refers to the myriad of small antennae, small cells and base stations distributed on masts, street corners and rooftops creating ‘smart’ environments. But there still has to be a controlling brain – the handful of main data centres at the heart of the network, with there being only two or three more centres needed in a 5G network than in a 3/4G network. That is the core, which can be owned and protected by UK service providers, such as Vodaphone and the like, including if held in the ‘cloud’. That is why the UK thinks it bodog sportsbook review might be able to manage the overall risk by restricting Huawei kit to the ‘non-core’ network.

6. But isn’t Huawei kit rubbish anyway?

Perhaps the single-most important reason why Huawei 5G kit seems to outperform its rivals is the amount it has invested in R&D, and its deployment support is very good. The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre has, however, been very critical of Huawei’s coding. Nonetheless, kit can still perform well even when the underlying coding is a mess, meaning that it is not configured in a uniform way and is therefore very ‘buggy’, like Huawei’s. The presence of bugs in software is ‘normal business’ – they are not back doors in themselves, but they can be used to create back doors.

An international standard that set how coding is done would have reduced the number and type of bugs, and, therefore, made the kit inherently more secure. This is a crucial point: the international community should have baked security standards into the design of 5G networks from the outset, rather than now trying to retrofit security measures by means of, for example, the core/non-core debate.

This is the key lesson from the current Huawei saga for future generations of critical technology, including Artificial Intelligence. If we did not do enough to establish the right standards for 5G, we should now start developing the best standards for the 6G that we will be installing in a decade.

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The growth of international trade is one of the defining trends of our time. While trade has shaped societies and economies for as long as societies and economies have existed, its impact over the past half century has been nothing short of extraordinary. During this time, trade volumes of goods and services increased 20-fold and now top $23 trillion. As a percentage of global GDP, exports now account for nearly one-third of global economic activity, a 100 percent increase since 19701. Technology plays a unique role in the international trade landscape. As a category, it represents one of the largest segments of U.S. trade. This reflects the insatiable demand of consumers and businesses for the latest and greatest in devices, applications, content – and by extension, the underlying digital infrastructure to make it all work. Additionally, as an enabling force, trade in technology goods and services creates its own virtuous cycle. The more technology is put into use, the more businesses and consumers have the tools to communicate, create, and exchange, thereby encouraging even more trade.

OVERVIEW

U.S. information technology exports reached an estimated $338 billion in 2018, an increase of 2.5 percent over the previous year. Growth slowed slightly compared to the 2017 rate of 4.5 percent. Since 2010, U.S. exports of technology added nearly $65 billion in new earnings and aggregate growth of 23 percent. Growth in the tech sector, especially as it relates to international trade, is a function of many factors. Macro technology trends, such as the ongoing push of digital business transformation, combined with economic conditions – are customers in the mood to buy, currency fluctuations, and government trade policies all have a bearing on growth.

Analysis of the export subsectors within the technology category reveal many of these factors. On a percent change basis, the information and data processing services subsector led all technology export categories in growth at 15.2 percent. The IT services category and the software/software-as-a-service category also performed well, recording growth of 5.9 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively. The growth in tech services and the “everything-as-a-service” model have been driving forces in the tech sector over the past decade. The migration to cloud computing, the modernization of legacy applications and workflows, and the mission-critical importance of data – and soon artificial intelligence (AI), translate to demand for expertise in integration, software development, data management, cybersecurity and related competencies categorized as technology services.

On the hardware front, also referred to as manufactured goods, the computing equipment category recorded the highest export growth at 7.4 percent. This was followed by navigational, measuring, and control equipment category (6.3 percent), and semiconductors and components (1.6 percent). As important as tech services, applications, and data have been to growth, these categories can only thrive when there is a large installed base of devices (think users with computers, tablets, mobile phones, etc.) and robust infrastructure that reliably delivers faster, higher capacity, and less costly computing and storage. Emerging technologies such as internet of things (IoT), edge computing, smart cities, and robotics require cutting edge processors and the components that form the “brains” of these intelligent solutions.

The one export category that notably lagged was telecommunications. Exports of communications equipment hardware fell -6.0 percent, a loss of $2.5 billion in revenue, while telecommunications services dropped -8.1 percent, a loss of nearly $900 million in revenue compared to the prior year. For context, the overall U.S. telecom market for equipment, services, and employment has been sluggish the past couple of years. In many markets, traditional wired telecom along with segments of wireless telecom, can be considered mature categories. Moreover, as the transition to 5G gets underway, both telecom providers and customers must contend with the uncertainty that comes with any disruptive shift.

Like most countries, the U.S. is both a buyer and seller of technology. U.S. businesses and consumers purchased nearly $500 billion in technology goods and services from overseas sellers in 2018. The net of technology exports from the U.S. and technology imports to the U.S. results in a trade deficit of nearly $161 billion. In tech services, the U.S. experienced a trade surplus of nearly $40 billion in 2018, a figure that grew 10.5 percent over the previous year. This is driven heavily by U.S. software (+$29.5 billion surplus), followed by information and data processing services (+$7.2 billion surplus).

In tech goods, the U.S. experienced a trade deficit of slightly over $200 billion in 2018, a figure that grew by 4.1 percent year-over-year. The largest deficit occurred in the communications equipment category, where U.S. buyers purchased $83.7 billion more in goods from overseas buyers than overseas buyers purchased from U.S. providers. The computing equipment category recorded a deficit of -$56.8 billion, followed by semiconductors (-$25.5 billion), and audio and video equipment (-$22.3 billion). China accounted for 84 percent of the deficit in tech goods trade with the U.S., down slightly from their 2017 rate of 87 percent. Since 2010, China’s share of the tech goods trade deficit has fluctuated between a high of 97 percent and bodog sportsbook review a low of 84 percent. The next two largest trade imbalances for tech goods in 2018 belong to Malaysia (10 percent of the total deficit), and Mexico (also 10 percent).

Note: because the U.S. runs a trade surplus with the vast majority of its tech goods trading partners (82 percent surplus vs. 18 percent deficit), as a percentage of the total trade balance, some figures may appear to exceed 100 percent, which is a function of offsetting figures in the surplus column.

The top destinations for U.S. exports in 2018 was nearly identical to the previous year. The top four markets for U.S. tech product exports remained unchanged, while at #5, Germany moved up one slot, switching places with Japan at #6. U.S. tech services exports followed a similar pattern, with the top 10 markets consistent with the prior year. The one notable newcomer to the list was Hong Kong appearing at #10. See tables on following page.

Debate over the meaning of trade deficits has been a topic of discussion since the earliest days of international economic analysis. Given the many complexities of trade, confusion and concern are not uncommon. Because of limitations in how trade statistics are calculated, deficits can be mischaracterized and misinterpreted, which can be especially problematic for technology goods and services.

For example, the iPhone is designed in the U.S. by Apple and then an estimated two hundred suppliers from around the world provide the materials and parts that go into the final product. Lastly, the phone is mostly assembled in China. When shipped back to the U.S. for domestic customers, the entire wholesale value of the device is counted as an import from China. According the research consultancy IHS Market, Chinese assembly facilities capture only 3 to 6 percent of the total manufacturing costs of an iPhone, meaning nearly all of the value flows to Apple and other suppliers.

As noted by Louis Kuijs, head of Asia economics research at Oxford Economics, “if trade deficits were measured to account for the complex nature of global supply chains for products such as smartphones, the U.S.-China trade deficit would be about 36 percent lower.” This is but one example. The same principle applies to many tech product categories. See CompTIA’s supplemental brief for additional details on U.S.-China tech trade.

Another limitation with trade statistics is the difficulty in accounting for avoidance behaviors. This typically entails sellers in one country shipping their product to an intermediary country that may have more favorable trade terms with the final market destination. For example, tech goods from China sent first to Mexico and then onto the U.S. market. The data indicates Mexico recorded the largest gain of any country exporting tech goods to the U.S. market: +$5.5 billion in new sales or an increase of 9.2 percent. In the aggregate the figures generally hold, but evaluating the trade relationship with any single market can quickly get murky because of these scenarios.

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