The future of global trade is being shaped by several factors, in particular the twin digital and green transitions, supply chain disruptions and the increased trade policy uncertainty driven by geopolitical tensions. Yet, in the face of these challenges, global trade has been impressively resilient. In 2022 and 2023, the total volume of traded goods increased by 1.2%, despite the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. The projections for trade growth are 2.6% in 2024 and 3.3% in 2025. Digital trade – particularly digitally delivered services – is the fastest-growing segment of international trade, with an average annual growth rate of 8.1% for almost two decades.

This projected growth in trade volumes reinforces how robust the global trade system is, even in these times of significant distress and adverse pressures. However, the future of trade is certainly not without its challenges. The global economic landscape is becoming more and more complex, manifested by increasing sustainability requirements, geopolitical tensions, policy uncertainty and growing skepticism toward the ability of the multilateral trading systems to deliver. As a result, a ‘trade skeptic’ narrative has started to gain traction. This frames international trade as an obstacle to, rather than a solution for, building a more secure, inclusive and sustainable world.

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The current geopolitical context is applying pressure on the World Trade Organization (WTO) to deliver on a number of urgent topics. With companies around the world relying heavily on WTO rules, the organisation needs to reform in order to address its issues, such as stalled negotiations, including the difficulty of reaching plurilateral agreements where multilateral consensus is not feasible. There is also a pressing need to repair the – currently paralyzed – dispute resolution system.

In recent years, the development of the global economy has added several new concerns to trade relations within the WTO. Negotiations within the organisation have become progressively more complex, as they are increasingly influenced by domestic interests and politics. The conflict of interests between the developing and developed countries is also apparent, manifested in particular in the difficulties of WTO members in agreeing on new rules on agriculture. When allied to the fact that the WTO operates on consensus-based decision-making, it becomes more difficult to reach multilateral agreements among members that have increasingly diverse economic and political interests.

Some of the outcomes from MC13

The latest WTO Ministerial Conference (MC13) concluded with a ministerial declaration that laid the groundwork for a range of future negotiations. These included WTO reform, agriculture, the Agreement on fisheries subsidies, and e-commerce. This time, however, limited substantive outcomes were achieved.

One very important result emerging from the MC13 was the extension of the moratorium on e-commerce tariffs. This will now continue in force until the next ministerial conference in March 2026. The decision is crucial for digital trade, as it provides temporary relief from potential tariffs on electronic transmissions. The business community advocates not simply for an extension to the moratorium, but for a permanent solution to this issue. If a multilateral agreement were to prove impossible, the possibility of a plurilateral agreement by 2026 should be explored as an alternative.

For the business community, restoring the dispute settlement system – a cornerstone of the WTO framework – is essential. Since 2016, the US has blocked the appointment of judges to the WTO’s Appellate Body, claiming that the body overreaches its mandate. This impasse has left the Appellate Body to all intents inoperative, undermining the organisation’s ability to resolve trade disputes effectively. While members agreed to accelerate talks to reach a consensus by the end of 2024 during the MC13, businesses need to see concrete results quickly. Ideally this should be before the US elections this autumn. Unfortunately, however, this is an unlikely scenario.

Despite certain advances made during the MC13, there was a failure to reach agreements on a number of crucial topics, including agricultural issues and the second part of the agreement on fisheries subsidies. Attempts to initiate talks on limiting the harmful effects of national industrial subsidies – a key issue for business – were also unsuccessful. Leaving such issues unresolved adds to an environment of uncertainty for businesses globally, affecting a wide range of sectors. It also underscores the difficulty of consensus within the current multilateral system. The WTO should therefore explore, in depth, whether plurilateral agreements can offer a viable alternative where multilateral agreements have faltered on important topics, thus offering a pathway for subsets of WTO members to move forward in specific areas. Such agreements can be pivotal in addressing modern trade challenges, affording a more flexible approach to international trade negotiations, adapted to address current challenges.

Overcoming increasing barriers to trade

As already discussed, the geopolitical and security underpinnings of trade are becoming increasingly pronounced. In addition, the re-emergence of nationalistic and protectionist sentiments in various countries is leading to some re-evaluation of existing trade agreements and partnerships. Reflecting on a broader trend, the imposition of trade restrictions has been steadily rising, from approximately 650 new restrictions in 2017 to over 3,000 in 2023. This increase in barriers is a clear indicator of the growing complexities and challenges that face the international trade system. This is a deeply worrying situation for business, not simply because fragmenting trade relationships tend to decrease economic security and increase conflict risks, but because it also comes at a great economic cost.

The trade tensions between China and the US are a prime example of this; and the EU needs to navigate between the two. Whereas the US is the EU’s ally, and while we are closer to the US than to China in many ways, we cannot embark on a process of decoupling from China. Such a step is not in our interest. However, the opportunities to improve trade relations with the US seem brighter than they do with China.

EU and US Trade and Technology Council

The relationship between the EU and the US is crucial, as it combines the economic strength of two of the world’s largest economies, enhancing global economic stability and growth as a result. Together, the two parties can help set the international standards and norms that influence global trade, environmental policies and technological advancements. To date, the EU and US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) have regrettably failed to deliver much in the way of concrete developments. However, it remains the most important forum for close cooperation on transatlantic trade and technology issues.

The latest sixth TTC meeting in April saw some progress on a few fronts. On the technology side, the parties updated their cooperation on AI terminology and taxonomy and signaled progress in research on AI. They also published a Joint 6G vision and established a quantum task force. On the trade side, there is more to the wish list than what has been delivered to date. The latest meeting was no different, and not a great deal was achieved on the topic of trade. With elections upcoming, it is clear the US is choosing not to engage in important trade questions that could potentially increase market access for European companies. However, the TTC at least resulted in the allies agreeing to continue cooperation for supply chain resilience, particularly for critical materials such as semiconductors. A Minerals Security Partnership Forum was also established, under which the EU and US agreed to advance the negotiations on a critical mineral deal, that would make it possible for European companies to benefit from the subsidies in the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA).

Given that both the EU and the US have elections on the horizon, the future of the TTC partnerships is uncertain. Advancing transatlantic cooperation therefore requires concrete outcomes; outcomes that are designed to endure any potential changes of leadership on both sides of the Atlantic.

In conclusion, as the global trade landscape continues to evolve in ways that reflect the complex and increasingly uncertain environment, it is crucial to remember the significant role international trade plays in addressing the most pressing challenges of our time. Policymakers must reinforce the resilience of the global trade system; such steps will be fundamental in shaping a sustainable and prosperous future for international trade and business worldwide.

To read the full article as it appears on Svenskt Naringsliv’s website, click here.

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This deficiency arises because the government members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the global trade rule body, have struggled to reach consensus on new trade rules since 1995, coinciding with the public emergence of the World Wide Web.

This digital void poses an escalating challenge. In the absence of global rules to structure consistent regulations and laws for the digital economy, governments are independently addressing issues, resulting in a rising level of fragmentation that proves increasingly difficult for businesses to navigate.

While the WTO governments have acknowledged the issue, their attempt to address it dates back to 1998 when they initiated a work program to discuss what was then termed electronic commerce. The group established one important rule, prohibiting WTO members from imposing customs duties or tariffs on electronic transmissions. Although this rule was initially put in place for a two-year period, it requires renewal every time trade ministers convene. The most recent ministerial conference (MC13) in Abu Dhabi at the end of February saw the moratorium on customs tariffs renewed, potentially for the last Bodog Poker time, with an expiration date set for 2026.

Despite the lack of clarity surrounding the term “electronic transmissions,” it is expansive enough to cover many digital trade activities, including cross-border delivery of software subscriptions, entertainment streaming, digital payments, and online education. The intentionally vague language adopted in 1998 aimed to allow internet-enabled transactions to continue across borders without tariff impediments.

In the decades since, digital trade has burgeoned with applications that were inconceivable in the 1990s. Despite the absence of customs forms or potential tariffs for cross-border activities, if the moratorium expires, WTO members could demand customs paperwork and impose tariffs or duties on each transmission.

While some argue that WTO members wishing to impose tariffs on digital trade may face practical challenges, such as the inability of customs departments worldwide to track and trace online transactions, the moratorium’s expiration may still lead to attempts to collect duties, especially from larger firms engaged in significant cross-border activities. Although the difficulty in collecting customs tariffs might not be a sufficient barrier, the costs of collection will likely outweigh tariff amounts, particularly for transactions bundled into larger payments like subscriptions or professional service fees, or for those delivered for free.

It is crucial to note that the moratorium exclusively applies to customs tariffs. Governments can already levy other forms of taxes on digital transactions.

The WTO rule book, crafted primarily before the internet’s pivotal role in cross-border trade, contains few rules directly applicable to the digital economy. Many internet-delivered services are covered by commitments made for postal mail or fax delivery across borders.  A few updated rules for intellectual property apply to digital trade. Governments have adapted commitments originally intended for offline use to fit online trade situations, but this is undeniably a suboptimal approach to managing the digital economy.

Despite agreeing at MC13 to “reinvigorate” the original work program on electronic commerce, 90 WTO members have spent several years negotiating new e-commerce rules under the “Joint Statement Initiative” (JSI). Expectations for significant conclusions at the ministerial level were unmet due to substantial gaps among JSI members on sensitive issues such as cross-border data flows, data localisation, source code protections, overall agreement scope, and permitted exceptions. Consequently, members opted not to advance any JSI activities for consideration at the ministerial meeting. Even if JSI members reach an agreement, it remains unclear how these rules will be incorporated into the global rule book.

The global business community has fervently called for an extension of the moratorium, emphasising the need for consistent efforts to prompt WTO members to agree on global digital rules that better suit the 21st century.

Dr. Deborah Elms is Head of Trade Policy at the Hinrich Foundation in Singapore. Prior to joining the Foundation, she was the Executive Director and Founder of the Asian Trade Centre (ATC). She was also President of the Asia Business Trade Association (ABTA) and the Board Director of the Asian Trade Centre Foundation (ATCF).

To read the full Expert Opinion as it appears on the Tech for Good Institute’s website, click here.

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Looming elections in India, the United States, and Mexico, plus a newly installed administration in Indonesia, severely restricted the room for maneuver and crushed any inclination to compromise.

Where the negotiating efforts fell short of agreement – in agriculture, fisheries subsidies, and reform of the organization’s crippled dispute settlement system – the outcome was almost preordained. India was not going to risk blowback from its farmers or fishers and the US was not going to yield on a newly minted Appellate Body.

In her concluding press conference, WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala referenced the many strong headwinds confronting MC13 including the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, slumping demand in many economies, and pending elections in more than 60 countries in 2024. She tried to put a brave face on the results from the five-day meeting by suggesting what trade ministers achieved was “pretty amazing” and that the glass was “three-quarters full.”

To be sure, there were some positive results, including the accessions of Comoros and Timor Leste and the entry into force of the 2021 agreement on Domestic Regulation in Services.

But on the major issues, WTO members came up empty.

No deal on agriculture

Agriculture talks ran asunder on India’s demand to make permanent a “peace clause” agreed in 2013 which shields New Delhi from any legal ramifications for breaching its limits on allowable farm subsidies used in its public stockholding program. The building of food stocks is permissible under WTO rules, but India purchases rice from farmers at inflated levels through its Market Price Support system which leads to greater production. Many of India’s trading partners believe the rice reserves, meant to build up domestic stocks, are later exported.

During one small group meeting, Thailand’s ambassador to the WTO, Pimchanok Vonkorpon Pitfield, alleged that 40% of rice held in the subsidized Indian public stocks was being exported. Infuriated Indian officials, including trade minister Piyush Goyal, told Okonjo-Iweala and the conference chair that India would not attend further meetings if Pitfield was present.

No deal on fisheries

Negotiations to expand on the 2022 agreement curtailing fisheries subsidies likewise ran aground. The agreement struck at MC12 banned subsidies for illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. This was an important achievement but the subsidies most responsible for depleting fish stocks globally are those that lead to overfishing and overcapacity. The goal at MC13 was to ban subsidies for fishery-related shipbuilding, labor, and fuel, among other things. Once again, India was front-and-center arguing that its fishers should be able to receive unlimited subsidies if fishing in sovereign waters. Developed countries, India proposed, would meanwhile ban all deepwater subsidies while developing countries could continue such support for 25 years.

Pacific island nations argued that subsidies for deepwater fishing must be banned, something the Chinese could not accept. About one-third of the world’s fishing vessels are Chinese-owned and many of them fish waters throughout Asia but also off the coast of Africa and Latin America. China also objected to US demands that any vessels that use forced labor must register themselves as such.

No deal on dispute settlement

Earlier efforts to reform the dispute settlement system had borne fruit in the form of a document produced by former Guatemalan delegate Marco Molina. Molina’s text, widely praised by delegates, proposed increased emphasis on arbitration and mediation and stricter limits on the length of submissions.

Molina avoided in his text the fractious issue of the WTO’s Appellate Body, which remains scuttled by a US embargo on bench appointments. But none of this mattered when Molina was mysteriously fired by his own government shortly before MC13 began.

Without Molina, it seems a tall order to bridge the vast differences separating members on appellate reform.

Pyrrhic victory on e-commerce

Even the surprising decision to extend a moratorium on the application of import duties on e-commerce transmissions rang hollow. India, South Africa, and Indonesia sought an end to the moratorium, which was first agreed at that 1998 Ministerial Conference in Geneva. These countries maintain that the application of such duties will boost their revenues, though many studies indicate otherwise. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development said in a report that such a tax would generate only 0.1% of India’s total government revenue while raising costs and hampering competitiveness of poorer economies and smaller companies.

The hardline taken by India, South Africa, and Indonesia led many to suspect that compromise was not on the cards. But India has a close relationship with the MC13 host United Arab Emirates.

So when the Emirati trade minister Thani bin Ahmed Al Zeyoudi asked Goyal to extend the moratorium as a personal favor, Goyal agreed. The South Africans and Indonesians then went along with the growing consensus.

The pledge to keep digital trade duty-free will come to an end at the next ministerial meeting or 31 March 2026, whichever comes first. Individual WTO members may choose to roll the moratorium over or make it permanent, but as an organization the duty-free commitment will be dropped. For the first time, the WTO will open the door for tariff hikes and create the conditions for the unprecedented application of duties on trade in services. Call it MC13’s Pyrrhic victory.

Plurilaterals make small gains

Hopes ran high before MC13 that ministers would greenlight two plurilateral agreements so that they could be incorporated into the WTO’s legal architecture. Plurilateral agreements are a way for smaller groups of WTO members to build consensus as it gets increasingly harder for the full membership to move as one.

eliHowever, India and South Africa have long opposed plurilateral negotiations.

These two members have couched their protests on plurilateral negotiations in arcane legal arguments, but the reality is far simpler – New Delhi and Pretoria abhor these negotiations because they cannot block them.

This hostility was made plain in Abu Dhabi when the two members blocked proponents’ efforts to incorporate plurilaterally agreed text on Investment Facilitation for Development into the WTO rulebook.

The plurilateral agreement on Domestic Regulation in Services met a better fate. The legal structure of this agreement, which includes 71 participating members and covers 92% of world trade in services, is based on individual members’ commitments to the others and is thus much more difficult to undermine. Aware of the shaky legal foundation of their objections, India and South Africa partially lifted their blockade on the agreement, allowing it to come into force.

So, six key takeaways in the aftermath of MC13:

1. The WTO is not going anywhere. Prognosticators enjoy using phrases like death knell when examining the WTO’s shortcomings but the collapse of the organization and the system it oversees is not going to happen. A foundation based on 75 years of rulemaking is too ingrained in the trading practices of nations and businesses. If every country applied different and variable tariffs on its trading partners, chaos would swiftly ensue. The question about the WTO is not whether it will continue to exist, but how relevant it will be.
2. MC13 underscored that if members want to accomplish anything, plurilateral negotiations are the only viable option. Some important lessons were learned in Abu Dhabi about how results from these negotiations might be implemented. This will have meaningful ramifications particularly with respect to the 90-member negotiations on electronic commerce. The plurilateral process is increasingly the WTO’s only e-commerce game in town.
3. When the new dispute settlement is reformed, it will have a very different look. Many smaller, poorer members seek ways to access the complex and costly process of dispute resolution. One way to do that would be through incentives to use mediation and arbitration. It’s unclear how a new Appellate Body would look but it’s inconceivable that there will be a return to a powerful WTO “court.” A pared-down and less heavy-handed mechanism is inevitable.
4. Economies still want to join the WTO. With the accessions of Comoros and Timor-Leste, the WTO will have 166 members. There are 22 candidate countries still in the accession queue. None of the current members have ever expressed a desire to leave. Whatever criticisms there may be on the WTO, governments still believe there is value in membership.
5. Several major systemic issues were not really addressed at MC13, including the use of national security exemptions. The dispute settlement cases on the national security exception have strained the system to its breaking point. Given the tense state of the world today, such cases are unlikely to disappear. There are also unresolved questions over China’s formal status in the WTO as a developing economy that is also the world’s largest trading nation.
6. Okonjo-Iweala’s future is uncertain. Her term expires at the end of August 2025. The process of reappointing her or choosing her successor will start in December. The US may not back her for a second term, especially if Donald Trump wins. In Abu Dhabi, Okonjo-Iweala worked around the clock and to the very end to broker deals. But her tactics angered two powerful members, India and Brazil, and some delegates in Geneva say they are weary of her work style.

Keith M. Rockwell is a Senior Research Fellow at the Hinrich Foundation. Prior to his retirement in June 2022, Keith served as a Director at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and spokesperson for the organization for more than 25 years. He also is a Global Fellow at the Wilson Center.

To read the full article published by the Hinrich Foundation, click here.

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The following communication, dated 29 February 2024, is being circulated at the request of the delegation of South Africa on behalf of the 65 Co-Sponsors of the IP/C/W/669/Rev.1 proposal and Brazil; Colombia; Paraguay and Sri Lanka.

_______________

1.1. The most solemn obligation of every government is to protect the life and health of its people.

1.2. The Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the COVID-19 situation a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on 30 January 2020. The need for scaled-up access to diagnostics, treatments, vaccines and personal protective equipment (PPE) (“health products”) was manifest.

1.3. The co-sponsors approached Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) with a proposal to temporarily waive certain provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to support the global COVID-19 pandemic response. This was in recognition that the intellectual property system is meant to provide a balance between providing incentives for bringing about innovation and rewarding creativity and promoting the broader public interest. In the area of public health, intellectual property objectives must also be balanced against realising the right to health, of which access to medicines and other health products is a central part. It was also in recognition that allowing legal monopolies may delay access to the requisite health products becoming available, as evidenced by disputes on infringement of intellectual property rights even at the height of the pandemic and that health products would be in global short supply drawing from the experience of previous pandemics and health emergencies. The co-sponsors believed that pooling financial and scientific resources is the only option for accelerating progress towards new vaccines, treatments and diagnostics.

1.4. Developing countries including the LDCs were gravely concerned. Much of the latest technology used to develop and manufacture necessary health products was owned and controlled by companies, governments and other institutions based in developed countries. Without access to this technology, the prospects for manufacturing and distributing health products would be restricted. Access to health products would be at the discretion of pharmaceutical companies from a handful of high-income countries.

1.5. The COVID-19 pandemic offered WTO Members an opportunity to act in solidarity by adopting a multilateral solution to help bolster the capability of developing countries to respond to a health crisis. Co-sponsors advocated for a multilateral solution so as to restore faith in multilateralism and avoid Members adopting self-help measures, thereby fragmenting the intellectual property system. An undesirable outcome that a time-bound and limited waiver could have helped prevent.

1.6. The WTO failed to deliver a comprehensive multilateral solution on the pandemic and even when it delivered on COVID-19 vaccines, this was too little too late. Rather than heed the call of the co-sponsors, non-proponents advocated for voluntary arrangements and donations as the only solution to equitable distribution. In reality, however, an inconsequentially small number of voluntary licenses were availed with strict conditionalities that did not assist to respond to the global crisis. And there were no voluntary licenses or any licensing arrangements when it came to the most-used vaccines in developed countries.

1.7. The COVID-19 virus is still with us, and the world needs therapeutics and diagnostics to ensure better management of its impact. If WTO Members were serious about providing an effective solution in the context of global solidarity, they needed to extend the TRIPS decision to diagnostics and therapeutics within six months as promised. However, over a year after the deadline, the non-proponents have stalled any possible outcome, ensuring that the world remains vulnerable not only to this pandemic but future pandemics. Resilience for future pandemics can be achieved through resolving challenges of equitable and affordable access to health products by addressing concentration of production, and building adequate manufacturing capacity, especially in regions with limited production.

1.8. Failure to deliver on a multilateral outcome to effectively address concerns on equitable and affordable access to health products including therapeutics and diagnostics, casts a dim light on the ability of the WTO to act in solidarity during an international emergency as recognized by the WHO. The IP barriers that challenge equitable and affordable access have prolonged this pandemic and remain unaddressed, threatening us in the next pandemic. The co-sponsors remain committed to addressing these concerns of developing countries including the LDCs in the context of health emergencies such as pandemics by advancing policy space for Members, along with full utilization of existing flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement including Article 73.

__________

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The following communication, dated 28 February 2024, is being circulated at the request of the delegations of Bangladesh, Columbia, Egypt and India.

__________

1. We, keeping in mind the upcoming 30th anniversary of the TRIPS Agreement, instruct the Council for TRIPS to undertake and finalize its first review under Article 71 on the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.

2. Pursuant to paragraph 19 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, we instruct the Council for TRIPS to expedite ongoing work to examine the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore.

3. We also call upon the TRIPS Council to examine how the TRIPS Agreement could facilitate transfer and dissemination of technologies to developing countries including LDCs.

4. We further instruct the Council to examine the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 2001 and the Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS Agreement of 2022, to review and build on the lessons learned during COVID-19, with the aim to address the concerns of developing countries including LDCs in the context of health emergencies including pandemic.

5. In undertaking this work, the TRIPS Council shall be guided by the objectives and principles set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and shall take fully into account the development dimension and shall provide a report on the progress made, including any recommendations, to the Ministers at the 14th Ministerial Conference.

__________

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The backdrop to MC13

Ministers have gathered to discuss a series of critical issues including bodog poker review environmental issues like fisheries and climate change; digital trade; investment facilitation; and new negotiations on agriculture and industrial policies. In addition, the WTO is adding two new members, Timor-Leste, and Comoros, demonstrating that countries continue to see value in joining the WTO.

Yet within the WTO, members disagree on the form and prioritization of potential agreements—with more advanced economies pushing for forward-leaning issues like digital and climate change negotiated with a subset of members, while less developed countries push for work on issues such as food security as well as special and differential treatment. As the WTO rules require unanimous approval, countries’ willingness to use their veto power as a bargaining tool creates complex negotiations. Ministers must advance their country’s and citizens’ priorities, but increasingly narrow, nationalistic policies such as tariffs, export restrictions, import bans, and discriminatory non-tariff barriers make finding middle ground and compromise in negotiations more challenging than in the past. At MC13, the WTO’s consensus driven process will require ministers to find a balance in addressing these divergent but connected issues and finding common ground where possible.

While the substantive issues are important, the most critical issues ministers must address are the structural deficiencies that undermine the future health and functioning of the WTO. The WTO has undertaken many reforms since MC12, with improvements implemented via changes in the WTO’s typical practices. However, critical areas remain unresolved within the four primary areas of work within the WTO: (1) negotiations, (2) technical assistance, (3) reviews, and (4) dispute settlement. Currently, both the negotiation and dispute settlement functions are broken and not working to their full potential. Before tackling additional issues, the WTO members must first make the WTO functional and fit for purpose.

Negotiations

Reviving the negotiating function of the WTO is the most important outcome of MC13. In the past thirty years, the Doha Development Round talks collapsed and have remained dormant. The WTO members concluded a plurilateral agreement on Trade Facilitation in 2013, and the first phase of an Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies in 2022, but members have concluded no other agreements. The Fisheries agreement took more than twenty years to negotiate and despite heroic efforts by several dedicated chairpersons, members agreed to kick some unresolved issues into a Phase 2 agreement that is still being negotiated. Today’s world requires that the WTO and its members move faster on dynamic and urgent issues.

In 2019, a sub-group of countries tried another approach, launching three new plurilateral negotiations on (1) domestic regulations for services, (2) e-commerce, and (3) investment facilitation, in a new format known as the “Joint Statement Initiatives (JSIs).” India and South Africa have challenged the legal basis for these agreements as outside Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement and argue that they undermine multilateralism. With agreements concluded on Services Domestic Regulations (67 signatories) in December 2021 and Investment Facilitation for Development (130 supporters) at MC13, a small group of countries continue to oppose including them as official plurilateral agreements to the WTO.

Innovative approaches to negotiations could strengthen the multilateral trading system while accommodating the diverse interests of WTO members. If the WTO remains confined to negotiating only on issues that all 164 members (soon to be 166) can agree upon, this prevents the institution and its members from updating or adapting trade rules in a timely manner. Without such flexibility, the WTO will become brittle and irrelevant, with countries moving to other fora such as regional or bilateral agreements. At MC13, it is critical to resolve this issue and find a path forward.

Dispute settlement

The second important reform is revisions to the WTO’s dispute settlement. Ensuring that WTO members comply with their obligations instills fairness and confidence in the global trading system. Due to concerns with previous rulings, the United States blocked appointments to the dispute settlement’s appellate body since 2017. The EU led the creation of an alternative system, but countries have appealed dozens of cases “into the void”. Members must discuss meaningful reforms to the dispute settlement system at MC13 and outline either a new process or reforms to correct imbalances in the previous process. There are glimmers of hope for progress at MC13 with members constructively engaged.

Priorities for MC13

If these reforms received meaningful progress at MC13, the WTO could move to work on forward-looking global issues where it can make meaningful contributions. The UAE, as host of MC13, will present a strategic report on trade and trade policy in 2050, providing a vision for the WTO. This report will try to marry the forward-looking issues such as technology and climate change, with the needs of less developed members who still need assistance to develop and cover the basic needs of their citizens. Future-proofing the WTO will necessitate ongoing dialogue, adaptation, and institutional reform to remain relevant in a rapidly changing world. Providing a common vision for 2050 will require the UAE to be an active and engaged chair.

The WTO has a lengthy list of other issues that ministers will discuss at MC13, especially with the e-commerce moratorium generating attention. This agreement on duty-free cross-border digitally delivered services will expire, and members need to decide whether to extend or retire the moratorium. The United States and China agree with extending the moratorium, a rare occurrence. And they’re right about it: As governments grapple with how to fund their activities when economic activity shifts online, study after study has shown tariffs are an easy but inefficient and counter-productive method of raising revenue.

Finally, the WTO will address several environmental issues during MC13. Beyond the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, which impacts overfishing and overall health of our oceans, the WTO will also look at other areas where trade and environmental goals are mutually reinforcing, as well as areas of friction including in industrial policies. Director General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala has repeatedly pointed to the significant role trade must play in addressing climate issues for all countries.

At a time when global fora are dwindling, the WTO remains an imperfect but important forum for countries to engage in constructive conversations about economic and trade issues. World merchandise exports grew from around $5.4 trillion in 1995 to over $19 trillion in 2019, with a similar increase expected over the next 25 years. Ministers must use this week’s meeting to outline a robust, future-looking agenda, built on strong foundational reforms and reflecting the need to balance the needs of advanced economies and less developed economies. A strong political message from the ministers this week that integrates the interests of all stakeholders and fosters consensus-building will be essential for revitalizing the multilateral trading system and ensuring its long-term sustainability.

Penny Naas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and was most recently UPS president for international public affairs and global sustainability.

To read the full blog post as it appears on the Atlantic Council website, click here. 

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The LDC-specific priorities are placed in four key areas: (a) agriculture and food security, (b) fisheries subsidies, (c) decisions on graduation, and (d) paragraph 8 of the MC12 outcome document. Of these, LDC graduation is the most critical, especially for the LDCs already on the path to coming out of the category within three to five years. Bangladesh, along with Nepal and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, will formally come out from the UN-defined category by the end of 2026. More LDCs will follow these countries. There are 45 LDCs, of which 15 are now on the path to graduation, and 10 are WTO members. Last December, Bhutan came out from the list.

In the document placed for MC13, LDCs categorically emphasised ‘the need for fresh support measures by the development partners targeted to LDCs after graduation to ensure smooth and sustainable transition.’

Five months ago, in October last, the General Council meeting of the WTO decided to encourage members of the organisations to provide a smooth and sustainable transition period for the graduated LDCs before withdrawing the unilateral tariff or duty-free and quota-free (DFQF) market access to these countries have been enjoying as LDCs. The decision becomes a big boost to the LDCs, although it is not binding. It is also unlikely that the scheduled ministerial conference will make it binding instead of keeping it voluntary or ‘best endeavour’ for the member countries. In that case, a continuation of the benefits for the LDCs after graduation will entirely depend on the willingness of the market access-providing countries. In other words, LDCs have to negotiate separately or bilaterally to enjoy the benefit for an extended period.

Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FBCCI), at a proposal regarding MC13, urged the Bangladesh government to take proactive action plans to negotiate with the respective DFQF and GSP granting countries and preferential trade agreements partners for extension of all support measures for at least three years after the graduation following the European Union’s Everything But Arms (EBA) extension for three years for graduating LDCs. EU and the United Kingdom (UK) currently offer DFQF benefits for all the graduated LDCs for three additional years.

In the last ministerial conference, LDCs stressed the extension of international support measures (ISM) available under WTO in favour of graduating LDCs and proposed to phase out unilateral trade preferences granted to these countries for six years or a period determined by the preference-giving bodog casino country. It was not accepted at the conference, however. The continuation of the trade-related benefits is necessary to ensure the smooth graduation and contain any abrupt disruption in trade in goods and services of the countries, as per the spirit of the UN General Assembly Resolution.

Between 2018 and 2022, LDCs’ exports of goods and services increased at an average annual rate of 7.1 per cent, according to the estimate provided by the WTO secretariat. LDCs’ share in global trade in goods and commercial services increased from 0.95 per cent in 2018 to 1.02 per cent in 2022. And LDCs’ share in global exports reached 1.23 per cent in 2022, which is far below the target set in the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Target 17.11 of SDGs underscored doubling the least developed countries’ share of global exports by 2020. It means that LDCs’ share in global exports should be at least 1.92 per cent in 2020, which was 0.96 per cent in 2015, the year of launching the SDGs. Thus, the countries need continuous support in the multilateral trade forum.

Moreover, those advancing to become non-LDC also require support to make the transition smooth and effective. It is, however, challenging to secure support in the upcoming conference as some developed countries, mainly the United States (US), have strong reservations. Advanced developed countries like India are also less interested in backing the LDC’s demand. So, there is no alternative to persistent, tough negotiation, no matter how disappointing that is.

The LDC-specific international support measures also include exemption from the prohibition of export subsidies and an extended transition period up to 2033 for the LDCs on implementing the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), especially for pharmaceutical products. Currently, there is no provision for a transition period, so when an LDC officially becomes a non-LDC, it will not be able to enjoy the benefits, which means it has to abolish the export subsidies immediately and face stringent IP requirements.

Developed and developing countries have already put several issues of their interests on the negotiation table and are working hectically to get some of those in the outcome documents. Decisions on prohibiting fisheries subsidies, permanent solutions on public stockholding (PSH) of foods, and reforms of the WTO’s dispute settlement system are top agendas where Bangladesh and all the LDCs can do little but watch. The withdrawal of suspension of e-commerce taxation is also critical, where Bangladesh has some interests. Then, plurilateral deals on domestic regulations on services trade and e-commerce are also proposed by some members. As the final days of the conference approaches, the temperature of intense fighting rises.

To read the full editorial as it appears on The Financial Express, click here.

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MC13 To Start the Year, Moratorium Once Again Up for Renewal

The 13th World Trade Organization Ministerial is quickly approaching, taking place February 26-29 in Abu Dhabi. The outcomes and issues discussed are likely to set the stage for the rest of the year.

With respect to digital issues, announcements are expected on the Joint Statement Initiative on E-Commerce. At the end of last year, co-conveners announced consensus text on the following areas: online consumer protection; electronic signatures and authentication; unsolicited commercial electronic messages (spam); open government data; electronic contracts; transparency; paperless trading; cybersecurity; open internet access; electronic transaction frameworks; electronic invoicing; and “single windows.” The intent is to conclude these negotiations by early 2024. With the U.S. withdrawal of support for key rules, however, the final framework will be significantly less impactful than hoped for. Absent any valid alternatives to text on data flows, localization, and source code protection, it is unclear whether parties to the exercise will succeed in delivery of a comprehensive and strong final agreement in the next year. To the extent that alternatives emerge that represent a significant weakening of proposed rules, the JSI could verge on being affirmatively unhelpful–legitimizing trade partners’ discretion to impose unjustified or discriminatory restrictions of digital service suppliers.

Another key issue will be the renewal of the moratorium on imposing customs duties for electronic commerce, which has been renewed at every Ministerial since 2000. The prohibition on customs duties has been critical to the development of global digital trade, benefiting a wide range of MSMEs around the world. However, countries like India, South Africa, and Indonesia continued to oppose its renewal. Failure to renew this year will have significant implications for the millions of firms dependent on trading in software, games, video and other digitized products, while doing little to solve concerns on revenue. International institutions have looked at the risk of ending the moratorium, and identifying preferable alternatives to customs duties on electronic transmissions:

• OECD: “Failure to renew the Moratorium would result in greater policy uncertainty and less trade, and tariffs on electronic transmissions would reduce domestic competitiveness. Adverse effects would be most pronounced for low-income countries and smaller firms. Overall, evidence demonstrates that there is a strong case for the Moratorium to be renewed.”
• WTO: “Tariffs on electronic transmissions might also impact competitiveness and participation of firms in trade, especially MSMEs and women owned traders.”
  World Bank: “Considering the incidence of tariffs, consumer welfare, implications for export competitiveness, and the option to capture revenues through economically neutral value added taxes, the benefits of the moratorium may well outweigh the costs incurred. Moreover, the application of reciprocal tariffs could make the application of tariffs on electronic transmissions fiscally counterproductive.”
• IMF: “The World Trade Organization (WTO) moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmission can help to effectively channel developing countries’ tax reform efforts in a more efficient direction.”

A sign of success at MC13 will be the renewal of the moratorium, and commitments to continue work on achieving a high-standing agreement within the framework of the JSI.

U.S. Retreat on Digital Trade Casts Unwelcome Shadow

Three years into the Biden Administration’s new strategy of “Worker-Centered Trade,” stakeholders are still left puzzled on what that means for U.S. trade engagement. While the U.S. hosted many conventions and summits with trade partners in 2023, issuing relatively vague progress updates, concrete deliverables were unfortunately lacking.

The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) has yet to deliver on its initial promise at its launch (with the exception perhaps of the Commerce Department-led IPEF Supply Chain Agreement). Little was announced at the San Francisco Summit last November, where final outcomes were long expected. The IPEF Trade Pillar seems to have hit a standstill. Last minute demands from Congressional leaders not to announce anything on trade appear to have been successful, leaving future engagement highly uncertain.

While the USTR tabled text on the digital chapter in early 2023, the U.S. position is now unknown (which necessitated the move at the WTO) in comparison to the digital trade chapter in the U.S. Mexico Canada Agreement. More worrisome is that the change in position was reportedly at the behest of political leadership of the DOJ/FTC absent Congressional consultation based on unclear justifications linking domestic antitrust enforcement with international trade rules U.S. trading partners would be subject to.

And the U.S. new (or nonexistent) digital trade policy introduces uncertainty on upcoming workstreams. With USMCA’s inclusion of a “sunset” provision, negotiations are forthcoming. Will the U.S. seek a reversal in its prior support for the strong rules in the digital trade chapter? Such a move would prove quite controversial, with USTR only having negotiated the text mere years ago, based on strong bipartisan support from Congress.

Likely Trade Irritants in 2024

Outside the trade negotiation context, market access barriers continue to foster conflict for digitally-enabled services.

Digital services taxes (DSTs) are likely to once again take the spotlight. Despite the OECD agreement reached in 2021, and positive announcements of significant progress on the international framework to improve fairness in global taxation, some countries are once again pursuing unilateral DSTs. Canada announced it still intends to move forward with a DST this year, despite the warning of the U.S. government and Canada’s signature to the OECD agreement.

Other trade irritants include discriminatory on cloud computing restrictions that disadvantage foreign cloud providers in certain markets. Korea continues its practice of effectively shutting out U.S. firms from the domestic procurement market. The European Union is finalizing its consideration of the EU-wide certification scheme drawing from France’s SecNum Cloud approach. As drafted, the EUCS would disadvantage U.S. cloud services from participating in the EU market. Engagement in the U.S.-EU Trade & Technology Council is an important venue to address any discriminatory measures that undermine transatlantic cooperation in the ICT sector. The TTC is expected to meet following delays at the end of this month.

Countries’ approaches to regulating digital platforms will also pose trade conflicts to the extent the application of these rules are narrowly targeted to U.S. firms, excluding domestic competitors absent clear justifications. Engagement with foreign regulators will be critical to ensure that any ex-ante regulations provide fair and adequate guidance to covered entities that limit unintended consequences. A focus on the EU, where a panoply of requirements will begin to take effect this year, will be important–both for how access to the EU market is affected, and for defining a model other countries may seek to emulate.

Work to Continue on Trusted Methods for Data Flows

However, it is not all doom and gloom. International support for actualizing “Data Free Flow with Trust” (DFFT) is encouraging. bodog poker review DFFT was an initiative of Japan under its G20 Presidency, and subsequent G20 workstreams continue to support its development. The concept of (DFFT) aims to promote the free flow of data while ensuring trust in privacy, security, and intellectual property rights.Over the past year, there has been increasted discussions and support to operationalize DFFT, complementing and working with institutional partners like the OECD. Relatedly, Japan and the EU amended their bilateral FTA to include meaningful provisions aimed at promoting data flows and preventing data localization.

With positive initiatives like these gaining support, one can hope that the end of 2024 closes out on a more hopeful note for digital trade, and the economic benefits it brings to consumers across the globe, than the last.

To read the full article as it appears on the Disruptive Competition Project, click here.

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After a much-hailed ministerial meeting in 2022, the world trade body is gearing up for crucial negotiations in Abu Dhabi. Its chief economist talks to Geneva Solutions about the need for reform and dispels alarmist calls to scrap the whole organisation altogether.

As the countdown begins for the 13th Ministerial Conference in Abu Dhabi next month, the halls of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva are abuzz with activity.

The WTO’s 164 member states are making a final, frenetic push to reach consensus on key issues at their highest decision-making meeting, convened every two years. These include the reforms of the dispute settlement system, the landmark fisheries subsidies agreement and reforms regarding agricultural subsidies, a divisive topic among member nations.

The extension of the intellectual property rights waiver for Covid-19 vaccines to include diagnostics and treatments adds to the mix as well as the lifting of a longstanding moratorium on customs duties on data transfer.

Addressing the WTO’s Trade Negotiations Committee in December, director general Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala underscored the dire state of the global economy and urged members to finalise as much of the ongoing negotiations in Geneva as possible before the critical February conference.

At this stage, the outcome of these talks, which are set to shape the future of global trade policies, is shrouded in uncertainty.

At the upcoming conference, Ralph Ossa will make his debut after serving for a year as the organisation’s chief economist and head of the statistical division. In his role, Ossa is responsible for guiding the research agenda and supporting negotiations with reports and insights produced by his team of 60 people.

He received Geneva Solutions at his office nestled on the second floor of the WTO’s headquarters overlooking the lake. Without venturing into rash predictions, he said he didn’t want MC12 to be a “one-time miracle that happened at Lake Geneva, where 164 countries demonstrated that multilateralism is effective”.

The “miracle” Ossa refers to is the so-called Geneva package, hashed out at the WTO’s 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) in 2022 after five and a half days of marathon talks. It included the historic deal on fisheries subsidies – only the second multilateral agreement to be reached by the WTO since its establishment in 1995.

Ossa said that MC13 should “send a clear signal indicating a serious commitment of member states to the WTO”.

From insight to impact

The German-born economist has been critical of the WTO in the past. In 2015, he wrote in a blog post that the WTO had failed to deliver any significant multilateral trade liberalisation while showing only minimal progress towards its Doha Development Agenda to reduce trade barriers and aid developing countries. He also recognised that the “WTO’s success at preventing trade wars far outweighs its failure to promote trade talks”.

Asked about how the WTO has changed since he wrote that post, Ossa said the trade body has made important progress since then, both on the multilateral and plurilateral fronts.

“Seventy-five per cent of trade is conducted under most-favoured-nation terms (a policy requiring WTO member states to offer the same trade concessions to all other members), and the WTO is playing a crucial role not just about managing tariffs, but also providing market participants confidence that tariffs and trade costs will remain low,” he said.

He acknowledged that the trade environment has become more challenging since he wrote his PhD dissertation that won him the inaugural WTO Essay Award for Young Economists fourteen years ago. At that time, his simulations of the costs of a trade war were dismissed by some as an academic exercise far from a realistic scenario. A few years later, the US-China trade war of a volley of tariffs and retaliatory measures turned Ossa’s simulation into almost a prediction.

Ossa chaired the department of economics at the University of Zurich, where he will continue to teach part-time while he works at the WTO.

Even though he admits he would have never imagined ending up as WTO chief economist, he finds his new role exciting and multifaceted.

“Academia is all about insights, but here, we are all about impact,” he says.

Principled change

In Ossa’s tidy office, images of bustling ports contrast with serene forest landscapes facing his desk, echoing memories of family hikes in the mountains. A book, A World Trading System for the Twenty-First Century by Robert Staiger, is proudly displayed on his desk. For Ossa, it is both an academic resource and a guiding light for understanding and teaching the complexities of modern trade and the WTO.

Staiger’s work, which advocates for measured reform of the WTO, aligns with Ossa’s belief in principled rather than radical change. This perspective was evident at the recent WTO open forum, where Ossa stressed the text’s role in shaping current trade discussions.

As the world faces a “polycrisis” of pandemics, geopolitical conflicts and economic instability, the WTO is under increasing pressure to reform. Since its inception in 1995, the WTO has often faced criticism for issues like favouring wealthier nations and lacking transparency, with some critics and political figures going as far as to suggest shutting it down over its deep-rooted systemic problems.

The Appellate Body, essential for resolving trade disputes, has been inactive since late 2019 due to the US blocking new judge appointments, resulting in a backlog of 29 cases. This move effectively crippled the organisation’s ability to adjudicate international trade disagreements, further fueling debates about its effectiveness and relevance in the modern global economy.

Addressing these criticisms, Ossa defended the WTO’s crucial role in fostering a rules-based, multilateral trading system. He cautioned against the detrimental effects of a power-based alternative, which he believes would disproportionately affect weaker members, particularly developing countries.

Ossa praised the WTO’s consensus-based decision-making process, noting its distinctiveness in allowing every member, regardless of their economic stature, to have an equal voice and the power to veto decisions.

He also argued international trade is a powerful tool for development, as shown by the findings from the WTO’s latest flagship World Trade Report: between 1981 and 2019, lower and middle-income economies increased their share of global exports from 19 per cent to 29 per cent and reduced the share of people subsisting on less than $2.15 per day from 55 per cent to 10 per cent.

However, he acknowledged that some of the weakest countries and individuals have not benefited as much as they could from international trade.

“We don’t want to be the PR team that says trade is good and we need more of it,” he said, “but also to look at some of the problems that either come with trade or that perhaps trade is not addressing as effectively as it could, and really try to find solutions.”

Addressing disappointments, he expressed frustration over budgetary constraints. However, he views the recent consensus among member nations to approve a 3.6 per cent increase in the operational budget — a rise from CHF 197.2 million to CHF 204.9 million for 2024-2025 — for the 620-staff organisation as a “commitment to multilateralism”.

On the MC13 agenda

One of the most controversial and polarising discussions leading to the conference in Abu Dhabi is around the renewal of a 1998 moratorium of customs duties on electronic transmissions.

In the ever-evolving global trade landscape, digitally delivered or ordered services, such as video streaming platforms like Netflix or mobility apps like Uber, are becoming a driving force. According to a recent WTO report, since 2005, their value has been increasing by 8.1 per cent on average per year, outpacing goods (5.6 per cent) and other services exports (4.2 per cent). This has opened new doors for market players, notably micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs).

Developed economies are the leading exporters in this sector, with the US being a dominant player in software, semiconductors and internet technologies and Chinese companies becoming larger tech exporters.

Still, developing nations are struggling to carve out their space in the digital sector. For example, Africa’s contribution to globally exported digitally delivered services is less than one per cent. Least-developed countries (LDCs) are lagging even more in this digital leap with a contribution of 0.2 per cent.

Developing countries such as South Africa want to end the contentious moratorium, arguing it favours major tech firms at their expense. They believe lifting it could bolster local digital industries and increase tax revenue. Conversely, the European Union, Canada and other advanced economies advocate for its continuation, citing its role in promoting duty-free digital trade.

A joint report by the WTO and other financial and economic institutions found that the end of the moratorium would impact government revenue at less than 0.33 per cent. It suggests that imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions might reduce digital trade, thus lowering its benefits, especially for MSMEs and women-owned firms.

So how can LDCs finance their digital industrialisation without significant tax revenue?

“Customs duties are not the most efficient way to raise revenue from an economic standpoint, and a more effective approach could be implementing other taxes, like a value-added tax (VAT), which can also be applied to digital goods,” said Ossa.

“In contrast, customs duties make imports more expensive than domestic goods, distorting consumption and production choices, leading to less efficient outcomes.”

Contention also surrounds the expansion of the Covid-19 vaccine waiver to diagnostics and treatments. The initiative is backed by civil society groups, while the pharma industry argues it could hinder medical innovation.

For Ossa, the waiver “didn’t introduce many new flexibilities but rather re-emphasised existing ones”.

“This reaffirmation, though seemingly lacking Bodog Poker novelty, is vital, especially for developing countries facing political pressure,” he said.

Another hoped outcome is the entry into force of 2022’s agreement to reduce harmful fishing subsidies, which is crucial to combat global fish stock decline. As of last month, 55 WTO members had ratified the agreement, but two thirds of all member states are needed for the agreement to come into effect.

To read the full analysis, click here.

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WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala has identified the key areas that will require close attention if MC13 is to succeed and fulfil the promises of the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) — food security, fisheries subsidy disciplines, the development dimension of trade, dispute settlement reform, intellectual property rights and e-commerce.

Each of these topics warrants attention — and each raises difficult issues.

Key issues include addressing purchasing power difficulties of the poorest communities, gaining additional acceptance of the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies and helping countries that lose support as they graduate from Least Developed Country status. Other issues include addressing the US conviction that the WTO Appellate Body jurisprudence is openly hostile to trade defence instruments, resolving the paradox of patents and meeting the twin goals of data security and data access in the promotion of digital trade.

But there is an overriding challenge facing MC13. The liberal trading order is under siege as world trade becomes increasingly weaponised through targeted government interference, with imports, exports and state-funded subsidies all utilised in the pusuit of other goals. The evidence is clear — the stockpile of G20 trade restrictions has grown more than tenfold since 2009.

There are four interlinked motivations for using trade as a weapon when pursuing other objectives

First, trade can be curtailed to sanction aggression — notably in the case of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine which has caused major collateral damage to international grain supplies. Second, to arm the global value chain to increase self-reliance, particularly in semiconductor production. Third, to execute trade remedies in self-defence, as with the Trump and Biden administrations’ penalty tariffs on imports of steel and aluminium. Fourth, to ‘serve’ science in the interests of the environment and public health, whether through restrictions on trade in key solar energy components or the US$122 billion export restrictions on COVID-19 treatment products.

Crucially, the weaponisation of trade for other purposes has been made possible by a pervasive questioning of the gains from international trade and investment — not only by traditional sceptics on the left but also, now, by the populist right.

For MC13 to build on the promise of MC12 and lay solid foundations for durable progress, it is imperative that in addition to addressing the key challenges identified by WTO Director-General Okonjo-Iweala, alternatives to trade weaponisation are sought and that the discontents of trade are seriously addressed.

In the lead up to MC13 and beyond, this means pursuing the need for diplomatic carrots to accompany the sanctions stick. It is also essential to build resilience in supply chains through sound domestic policy instead of increased self-reliance, such as in the form of re-shoring and friend-shoring. Critical for the continuation of the liberal trading order are multilateral WTO remedies to rulebreaking instead of power-based penalties in the name of national sovereignty, and direct action on environment and public health goals instead of the blunderbuss of trade restrictions.

But to restrain the damaging subordination of trade policy to other ends, governments must also address the discontents of trade. Governments should do more to help the losers of trade opening, adjust to technological change and make the case for open markets — not least by showing how trade weaponisation brings harm to both the user and the target. For example, US steel consumers now pay an estimated extra US$650,000 per year for every job saved by Trump-era penalty tariffs kept by the Biden administration.

No item on the MC13 agenda is more important than dispute settlement reform. Without full restoration of the WTO dispute mechanism, it will be extremely difficult to restrain the use of the trade weapon — whether by unilaterally breaching bound tariffs or by unjustifiably invoking General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Article 21 to restrict trade in the name of ‘essential security interests’. With just a modicum of flexibility, particularly from the United States and China, dispute settlement reform should be a feasible deliverable at MC13.

While responsibility for strengthening the trading system rests with the leaders of the G20, it is ultimately in the capitals of the major traders — in Washington, Beijing, Brussels and Tokyo — that the fate of MC13 will be determined.

The danger of restrictions on trade is real. Growth in the volume of world merchandise trade is expected to fall from 2.7 per cent in 2022 to 1.7 per cent in 2023. And the stakes are high. Failure to strengthen the trading system and the liberal order that underpins it will put three decades of growth and development made possible by globalisation at risk, and the ability to successfully deal with the next pandemic and the climate transition.

Ken Heydon is a former Australian trade official and senior member of the OECD Secretariat, and Visiting Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

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