Last week Peru became the sixth country to ratify the UK’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a trade agreement between 12 countries mostly surrounding the Pacific Ocean or the South China Sea, except for the UK. The agreement will come into effect on the 15th of December this year with the members who have ratified the agreement. So far that is Peru, Japan, Singapore, Chile, New Zealand and Vietnam. Hopefully, the other members (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Malaysia and Mexico) will finish their ratification process shortly.

The CPTPP includes some of the world’s most affluent and rapidly growing countries, with a total GDP of US$15.4 trillion in 2023. 

No doubt the usual suspects will be complaining that the UK has given up its access to the EU for the CPTPP but that isn’t true. EU membership is very different from becoming a party to the CPTPP agreement. And the UK has retained its tariff-free and quota-free trade with the EU.

The CPTPP is focused on promoting market-driven economies and the elimination of tariffs and other trade barriers for manufactured goods, agricultural commodities, and services. It also establishes rules for investment and protection for investors, intellectual property, and communications, as well as transparency in government procurement. The CPTPP requires its parties to establish a committee to identify ways to assist SMEs in taking advantage of the commercial opportunities in the CPTPP and help them grow their exports. The CPTPP trade agreement has a chapter on the Environment, and it sensibly concentrates on achievable goals: protecting the oceans from ship pollution, overfishing, and illegal fishing; protection of wild flora and fauna, endangered species and their habitats; control of toxic chemicals, discharge of pollutants and environmental contaminants and protecting the ozone layer. These protections must be in each party’s legislation and be enforced by the members’ governments.

What the CPTPP is bodog sportsbook review is a group of countries moving towards a federal union. Unlike the EU, there is no CPTPP Commission, Parliament, Court, Flag or National Anthem and the UK doesn’t have to pay to be a member. The UK can determine its own VAT rates (and keep any money raised) and we are not forced to apply tariffs to goods imported from non-CPTPP countries – as we were when members of the EU. The CPTPP doesn’t even have one President, let alone five (like the EU). And most importantly the CPTPP does not require its members to adopt its regulations nor do UK courts have to defer to CPTPP laws above our own laws. And despite the social media rumours, the CPTPP won’t force the UK to give up its animal welfare regulations. (For the record, Chile does not allow cattle to be treated with hormone implants and it produces enough beef to fill the UK’s very small CPTPP beef quota.)

Quotas and tariff reductions
The usual suspects have also complained that the UK already has trade agreements with many countries in the CPTPP so there is no need to join. However, if these trade agreements were rolled over from the EU, then they will have had small quotas on many products that the UK needs to import but were in competition with other EU producers. When the UK left the EU we were generally given about 14% of the EU’s quotas with the CPTPP countries, this left us with small uneconomic tariff-free import allowances. And most of the EU’s trade agreements skipped over services – even though they are one of the UK’s largest export sectors.

The CPTPP goods liberalisation is generally better for UK consumers although the UK’s farmers have continued to get protection from CPTPP producers, even though they have no protection against EU producers. Inexplicably the UK has also limited rice and banana imports from other CPTPP parties.

But most UK import tariffs will be eliminated in full on CPTPP imports in December, at least from countries that have ratified the treaty. Although UK import tariffs on food that can be produced in the UK will be reduced more slowly. For example, imported beans will have their tariffs eliminated over 5 years, some types of apples will take 10 years, while dairy product tariffs will generally be lowered over 5 years although butter will take 11 years.

However, a lot of the UK’s protection from agricultural competition is unnecessary. The largest food exporters in the CPTPP are either in the southern hemisphere and so produce food in the opposite season to the UK or they are in the tropics and produce foods that cannot be grown in the UK climate. While the CPTPP’s two largest food exporters, Australia and New Zealand, have been limited to the quotas they received in their bilateral trade agreements with the UK so will not be eligible to use the CPTPP quotas.

This will be the UK’s first trade agreement with Malaysia, and it will allow the UK to import refined palm oil tariff-free directly from Malaysia rather than via EU refiners in the Netherlands, which import crude palm oil from Malaysia, refine it and then sell it to us (still!). While Malaysia will lower its 80% tariffs on imports of UK Whisky over 16 years (If you think this is unfair, please see the UK’s tariff reduction for Australia Beef or New Zealand Lamb).

Accumulation
Joining the CPTPP is particularly good news for UK manufacturers and exporters. The CPTPP’s process of accumulation allows imported materials, parts or semi-finished goods from other CPTPP countries to be counted as originating material if the finished product is exported to another CPTPP member.

Despite the delicious food and drink produced in CPTPP countries, they mostly export machinery and parts, electronics, oil and gas, minerals, chemicals, clothing and footwear. These products will probably become part of UK supply chains to benefit from the CPTPP’s process of accumulation. For example, if a UK fashion company uses wool or cotton produced in Australia, or cloth made in Malaysia, or manufactures their goods in a Vietnamese factory, these inputs count towards originating material under CPTPP rules so the finished products can be sold in other CPTPP countries at the CPTPP preferential tariff rate.

Similarly, if UK car manufacturers use Australian bodog online casino bauxite to make aluminium or car parts made in Malaysia, Japan or Mexico, then this will count as local content if the final vehicles are sold within the CPTPP. This is likely, as Brunei, Australia, Chile, Peru and New Zealand have no local vehicle producers and are dependent on imported cars, trucks, and mining vehicles.

Conclusion
It was very encouraging to see the new Trade Minister, The Rt Hon Douglas Alexander, announce the accession of the UK to the CPTPP. This coincided with rumours that the Prime Minister was trying to rejoin the EU by meeting with Chancellor Scholz in Germany and President Macron in France. If this was the aim of the meetings, it is misplaced. UK trade with the EU is doing fine but is hampered by the EU’s sluggish economies – not Brexit. While allowing the UK to fully benefit from increased trade with the dynamic economies of the CPTPP, will help the UK achieve the economic growth the Prime Minister is looking for.

To read the blog as it was published on the Briefings for Britain webpage, click here.

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When the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement was being negotiated it was seen an exception. Instead of opening up trade, its goal was to ease the transition from the United Kingdom being part of the EU’s single market to a relationship primarily based on World Trade Organization rules. 

Whole policy areas typically included in free trade agreements such as public procurement are largely absent of this agreement. The European Union insisted on extensive level-playing field provisions in the expectation of the UK cheating. 

In retrospect, though, the TCA should perhaps have been seen as warning. Modern trade negotiations increasingly take place with a similar underlying atmosphere of suspicion. 

EU-Mercosur free trade agreement negotiations have for some time been moving in the direction of mutual distrust about what the other parties might do. Sometimes it is hard to recall that this agreement is supposed to increase trade. 

There are many more examples, whether from the EU and Australia, or almost anything the United States has done in trade policy since 2016. 

For businesses seeking a renewed free trade agreement agenda there is a fundamental problem. If you don’t change the mood, what is discussed will be more about market access conditions than openness.  

Any agreement reached in this way is unlikely to deliver much growth. 

What we may see in the UK-EU relationship in the coming years is a return to something more positive. There is every reason to believe deepening ties will lead to better agreements. 

Those seeking openness should heed this lesson. Mutual goodwill must be the basis of the free trade agreement agenda. 

Improving the mood between UK and EU 

In the early weeks of the new UK government there has been a noticeable change in attitudes towards the EU. Most notable were early calls from new ministers to their EU counterparts – which would have been unthinkable under previous governments since 2016. 

New foreign secretary David Lammy visited Poland, Sweden and Germany the weekend after the election. Business and Trade Secretary Jonathan Reynolds spoke with Valdis Dombrovskis on the phone and met at the G7 trade ministers meeting in July. 

The UK successfully hosted the second meeting of the European Political Community. Although there were no concrete deliverables, the EU leaders present spoke positively about London’s approach. 

Labour’s plans for enhancing trade relations with the EU remain formally rather modest. Agreements on sanitary and phytosanitary issues, visas for touring artists and recognition of qualifications are the frequently mentioned items. 

There are internal discussions on going further than that. 

Though evidently an awkward topic for the UK, there is a growing awareness of the need to respond to EU asks on youth mobility.  

Joint work on economic security, regulatory alignment and aligning Emissions Trading Schemes are also under consideration. 

Concrete agreements, even negotiations, may be some time away. Thinking has however started on both sides about what these may contain. 

Allowing officials to think creatively 

At a time when trade agreements were driven by more open attitudes, negotiators were empowered to find ways around problems. 

Through ministerial example, UK civil servants have also been given permission to engage with EU counterparts.  

Before the UK election, many officials in relevant areas could not wait to be allowed to test ideas on progressing particular issues with the EU. Now we can expect them to act on this. 

Formally, the EU line is to wait for proposals from London. In reality, many in Brussels will be equally keen to engage.  

Commission officials are already developing their thinking as to how discussions could be structured.  

This isn’t just about those working in EU institutions. Businesses and other stakeholders will take their signals from governments. 

There is ample opportunity for joint UK and EU industry positions. On past evidence this can be an effective tool to help forge agreements. 

Indeed, the extension of generous rules of origins for electric vehicles in the TCA at the end of last year, was considerably helped by joint pressure by the car industry. 

Goodwill is often infectious. Although the pain of recent UK-EU negotiations won’t be easily forgotten, a new picture can be built over this experience. 

The EU-Switzerland talks are perhaps ahead of the UK in this regard. Two previously troublesome relationships are therefore in recovery. 

Whether this can be transferred to other EU relationships remains however to be seen. 

European Union needs to recover its confidence 

If politicians create the impetus for their officials, there will only be a limited amount that EU negotiators can achieve right now. 

Pressure comes from several directions. Overt protectionism across the political spectrum means prospects for France ratifying any future trade agreements seem remote.  

Meanwhile many MEPs from various member states put pressure on trade from various angles, including with environmental, labour and nationalist arguments. 

Summarising the problem, Ursula von der Leyen’s ‘Political Guidelines’ released in July ahead of her confirmation vote as European Commission president for a second term sees trade as both an opportunity and a problem. Talk of “long-term, mutually beneficial partnerships” is undermined by suspicion. 

Translated into day-to-day operations, such messages are easily received by those at the front line as them not being fully trusted. However much it is claimed that the targets are really the third countries concerned. 

Some time ago, when I discussed Indian resistance bodog sportsbook review to trade agreements with informed observers, lack of public trust in negotiators emerged as an unexpected reason for it. In this specific Indian case, there would be suspicions of corruption if too much was given away.  

In the EU or US, it is more likely that creative officials could be seen as part of the ‘deep state’. This makes productive negotiations extremely difficult. 

To have a renewed trade agreement agenda, negotiators have to feel empowered. To use a particular term disliked by some, a safe space must be created. 

Right now, in most EU negotiations, that is not sufficiently present. Negotiations are thus bound to flounder. 

Atmospherics can change this, as we are starting to see with the UK. Though this has to be sustained if there are to be agreement in the end. 

Tricky though it will be, the most siren political voices need to be quietened for significant progress on trade policy and positive associations built with the idea of openness for workers and consumers.  

That’s outside the political mood of the moment and that’s why we’re struggling. 

Businesses need to seek to change to the mood music before demanding more agreements.

To read the perspective as it was published on the Borderlex webpage, click here.

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With barely two weeks until polling day, it is worth exploring why the incumbent Conservatives and their main challenger Labour are both avoiding the topic of trade relations with the EU – and other key areas in international trade that deserve the next government’s attention.

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While the UK may have notionally ‘taken back control’ over policy areas such as trade and migration, as campaigners for Brexit insisted it would, empirical evidence suggests that leaving the European Union has negatively affected the UK economy. Slower GDP growth and slower growth in trade than comparable economies are key indicators of this.

The UK is a very open economy and the value of trade relative to GDP is close to 70 per cent. More than one-fifth of UK jobs are directly or indirectly associated with the exporting activities of UK firms. Average wages tend to be higher in exporting sectors and importing offers the country access to a greater range and quality of consumer goods and intermediate inputs. All these factors are important drivers of prices, of UK firms’ competitiveness, and of future investment and economic growth in the country.

Approximately 50 per cent of UK trade is with the EU, and many UK firms’ supply chains are closely linked to the EU. Hence, it is hard to discuss international trade (policy) without mentioning EU trade (Brexit). As such, it is clear to see why parties struggle to discuss international trade without talking about the UK’s trade and trade relations with the EU.

The parties’ recently published manifestos do offer some main approaches to international trade. Broadly speaking the Conservatives seek a continued focus on free trade agreements as well as ‘freeports’. They plan to establish a UK-wide body called InterTrade to promote more internal trade, and they reject any closer relationships with the EU.

Labour seeks improved relations with the EU but is ruling out re-joining the customs union, the European Single Market, and the free movement of labour. It proposes a more judicious approach to free trade agreements, and has committed to publishing a trade strategy.

But both manifestos lack detailed policy on trade. Similarly, their many daily policy announcements (roughly 48 to date) neglect to mention international trade, particularly with the EU. So why aren’t the two main parties talking about trade with the EU?

Don’t mention the EU

It is pretty clear why the Conservatives don’t want to talk about the EU. Brexit, which they championed, has offered few economic advantages, nor have migration levels come down. The government has failed to organize itself to take advantage of sovereignty effectively. Almost all types of firms (especially SMEs) are critical of Brexit, and opinion polls suggest that a majority of the population now regrets it.

Within the Conservative party, the party leadership faces pressure from its Eurosceptic right wing over migration levels and many MPs are strongly against closer alignment with the EU. They are now getting very nervous about rising support for the populist Reform party.

Labour is involved in its own balancing act over the EU. It does not want to appear to override or disparage the electorate’s decision in the 2016 referendum on leaving the EU. Nor does it want to stir up the passions and antagonisms surrounding Brexit.

Closer integration with the EU will come with closer alignment to EU rules and regulations. Such a stance for Labour risks being portrayed as being ‘anti-Brexit’; it fears the (over-)reaction of the UK’s right-leaning press to any suggestion of surrendering sovereignty to the EU.

Labour also recognizes that any Brexit-related promises that involve negotiation with the EU will be hard to deliver, given the EU’s lack of trust in the UK. Added to this, some pro-Brexit sentiment still exists in the Labour Party.

What the parties’ trade policies should consider

Policy detail in the manifestos is lacking on trade as it relates to climate, on other types of agreements beyond free trade agreements (FTAs), and on services trade. The climate crisis is the biggest crisis the world faces, and trade policy is an important part of the toolkit needed to address it. The Conservative manifesto contains no discussion on this, while Labour has only a brief statement in support for a carbon border adjustment mechanism.

Too much discussion of trade policies focuses on FTAs. While FTAs are important, the scope of trade policy is much broader – ranging from bilateral agreements on specific issues such as mutual recognition, to digital agreements, critical minerals partnerships, technology cooperation, as well as multilateral cooperation in the World Trade Organization.

On services trade, each of the manifestos only manage a scant one or two mentions despite the fact that the UK is predominantly a services economy, and services account for around half of UK exports.

Strong arguments have been made in the past in favour of creating an independent Board of Trade. Such a body would contribute to more coherent and consistent trade policy in the UK and would provide independent analysis and assessment. In previous bodog poker review speeches, Labour supported this proposal but it is not in their manifesto. Should Labour get elected, it is to be hoped the proposal will be considered.

Over the course of the next parliament, public pressure for closer alignment to the EU may well grow – which may involve the government considering re-joining the European Single Market. As the pains of the Brexit political traumas diminish, the UK’s trade with the EU is likely to rise up the political agenda. Whoever wins the election, more open discussion of international trade is going to be important to the UK’s future economic success.

To read the expert comment as it was published by Chatham House, click here.

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As both countries approach their next national elections, it is time to take stock of these trends and to consider how they might develop further in the coming years. As a struggle is underway to rewrite the rules of the international economy in regions like the Indo-Pacific, choices taken in Washington and London will have far-reaching impact. At stake are the standards of living, environmental protections, and labour rules affecting billions of people around the world.

The new trade policy

For different reasons, both the UK and the US have moved away from a pure emphasis on economic efficiency in their recent trade policy.

Although supporters often claimed that Brexit was a free trade measure designed to increase the UK’s economic opportunities abroad, its main practical effect has been to make trade between the UK and its largest export market more difficult. This negative effect on trade with the European Union was supposed to be offset by the UK’s ability to negotiate its own free trade agreements with third countries. The results of this were uncertain at the time of Brexit and have mostly proved to be disappointing since. This has particularly been so in the case of a US-UK trade agreement, which many supporters of Brexit touted as a major goal. In effect, Brexit has meant sacrificing a measure of future economic growth in order to “take back control” of other policy areas from Brussels.

Over roughly the same period, the US has also backed away from its past support for a liberalising trade agenda. President Trump famously started a trade war with China and pulled out of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a sweeping free trade agreement covering much of the Pacific rim. But his successor President Biden has proven to be sceptical of trade as well, imposing new economic sanctions on China, declining to rejoin the TPP, and announcing that expanding market access is no longer a priority of US trade policy.

The result has been the emergence of a new and powerful protectionist coalition in American politics. On one side, it comprises economic nationalists, China hawks, and members of Trump’s Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement, who see trade as weakening the American economy and destroying its manufacturing base. The other side consists firstly of economic progressives who see free trade deals as enriching corporations at the expense of American workers, and secondly of Democrats concerned about winning votes in key industrial Midwestern swing states.

This protectionist coalition reached its ascendancy at precisely the wrong moment for the UK, which since 2016 has been seeking a US-UK trade deal. There has been little to no appetite in Washington for expanding the access that the two countries have to the other’s market, which is the key goal of British policymakers. Limited talks over harmonising regulations and addressing other barriers to trade fizzled out late last year amid concerns among Democrats that even appearing to consider a substantive new trade agreement would harm them in November’s election. Even if there were a political appetite for a deal, long-running disagreements over agricultural standards would make one hard to achieve.

These political dynamics – both the ascendancy of a protectionist coalition in the United States and the specific barriers to a US-UK agreement – are not likely to improve even after this year’s elections. It is possible that, with the election behind it, a second Biden administration might return to talks on a limited agreement dealing mostly with regulation, but talks on expanding market access are unlikely. Trump, meanwhile, is campaigning on increasingly draconian trade policies, including a flat 10% tariff on all imports. His advisors are also reportedly debating whether to purposefully devalue the dollar, which would make British exports to the United States less competitive. These policies could significantly harm US-UK trade and foreclose the possibility of any constructive new agreement.

A whole world of trade

Even with US-UK trade arrangements appearing uncertain, both the UK and the United States are involved in setting and influencing the rules of the international economy further afield.

As it has moved away from traditional free trade agreements, the Biden administration has not completely lacked a trade policy. It has focused instead on more narrow negotiations which have sought to address non-tariff barriers, but also to persuade partners to raise their environmental and labour standards. Its most notable attempt came in the form of the Indo Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), an agreement covering 12 nations containing 2.6 billion people and over a third of the global economy.

Although these headline figures sound impressive, the results of IPEF have been limited. Last year, the cooperating nations reached minor agreements on coordinating supply chains and sharing knowledge related to the green energy transition. But the Biden administration walked away from the portion of the agreement related to environmental Bodog Poker and labour standards, believing that the other IPEF states – which include India, Japan, and Vietnam – were not willing to do enough to satisfy American opinion.

The travails of IPEF revealed the limits of the Biden administration’s approach. Without offering its partners increased access to the US market, the administration gave them little incentive to raise their environmental Bodog Poker and labour standards, which would in turn make their products less competitive internationally. But this means that the United States has lost the opportunity to have a strong voice in determining the economic future of the region. This points to there being a strong chance that the initiative will pass to China, which sits at the centre of a growing economic bloc called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – and which does little to raise environmental protections or standards for workers.

The UK has taken a different approach. In recent years, it has signed several new bilateral free trade agreements in the region – with New Zealand and Australia – and joined the successor to the TPP, known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The UK Government has not taken a formal position on IPEF, but the UK may try to join it in the future. Although the benefits to the British economy are small, these moves have signalled that the UK remains interested in new trade agreements and wants to play an increased geopolitical role in the region. This looks likely to remain the case regardless of the outcome of the next UK general election.

The most contentious international economic issue faced by the two countries in the coming years is likely to be relations with China. Trump has signalled that he is looking to engage in extremely harsh economic policies against China if elected. In this case, the UK will likely find itself caught uncomfortably between Washington and more dovish European countries who want to maintain economic ties with Beijing. Particularly if Trump also engages in new trade measures against European countries – as he did in his first term – it will be extremely difficult for the UK to pursue a liberalising agenda. Instead, the world is likely to be consumed by a new round of trade wars.

More harmonious relations can be expected between a second Biden administration and a government led by the Labour Party, which has voiced support for the “new overseas investment and regulatory partnerships” which are at the centre of the Biden administration’s approach. Ultimately, however, UK policymakers who want to pursue an agenda of liberalisation and integration will be at the mercy of sentiment in Washington. The UK economy is simply not big enough for London to drive the process itself.

A difficult future

Both the UK and the US have identified the Indo-Pacific as a region which is key to the future of global politics and economics. But political reservations in Washington are currently holding both countries back from playing a decisive role in setting the economic rules of the region. The UK’s enthusiasm is not matched by its heft, whereas America’s heft goes to waste without enthusiasm to match.

By working together, the two countries could offer a positive, optimistic vision of the international economy – one which prioritises raising environmental and labour standards as well as boosting economic growth. The aftermath of this year’s elections in both countries will be a critical test of whether this is possible, or whether familiar barriers and animosities will lead to another wave of protectionism.

Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.

To read the full article published by Foreign Policy Centre, click here.

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What are the UK’s aims in the pursuit of new trade deals? It seems such a simple question, yet ministers are unwilling, or unable, to answer it, according to a growing band of critics. Rob Merrick digs into the issue.

More than three years after Brexit, and almost seven years since the referendum was won, critics are warning that the UK’s “priorities and objectives” in its multiple trade talks remain an enigma – an uncertainty damaging to businesses and government alike.

There are fears for firms at risk from cheap imports, that worker protections and economic security are being neglected, that wider opportunities to improve trade performance are being missed and the ‘net zero’ climate promise undermined. And, also, that the government is weakening its own hand in negotiations.

In the words of Michael Gasiorek, a trade expert who gave evidence to a recent parliamentary inquiry: “There is a lack of joined-up thinking about trade policy and how it might be used most effectively to achieve domestic policy objectives. 

“In the face of the challenges we face – geo-political tensions, supply chain resilience, climate change, regional policy, an industrial strategy – there is a lack of a conversation and transparency about those objectives and how we want to achieve them,” the director of the UK Trade Policy Observatory at the University of Sussex warned.

The rebuke opens up a new front in criticism of the post-Brexit trade revolution, which normally centres on the stark evidence that whatever deals are struck can never compensate for the economic harm from erecting trade barriers with the EU.

A chorus of voices is now calling on Kemi Badenoch, the business and trade secretary, to publish a clear “trade policy framework” for proper scrutiny – modelled on the USA and New Zealand – but with little sign she will listen.

Let’s take a step back. Ask the government for its aims and it replies “growing exports and inward investment, “reducing market access barriers” and “championing the rules-based international trading system” – but little else.

What the critics want is the details beneath the gloss: How important are labour and environmental standards? What about boosting the UK’s poorer regions, labour mobility, recognising professional qualifications, tackling climate change, protecting the UK’s economic security and foreign policy objectives? What is the balance between consumer and producer interests? Is the UK prioritising reform of the World Trade Organisation? And much, much more.

Moreover, they say, the likes of the USA and New Zealand have sought to answer these questions – the former with a “worker-centric” agenda, the latter with much-admired commitments to use trade to protect the environment and put climate centre stage.

It is a far cry from the secrecy surrounding the UK’s new trade agreements. Notoriously, the details of how the 2021 Australia deal opened up access for its farmers were published openly in that country – even as London tried to keep them secret.

Now the issue has been confronted by the House of Lords International Agreements Committee, which has demanded a proper trade framework after speaking to business and bodog poker review union leaders, civil society groups, academics and other experts.

They included the Food and Drink Federation, whose head of international trade Dominic Goudie told The House about the dangers of signing a deal with India without a clear-sighted approach.

Mr Goudie explained that the UK’s “thriving rice-milling sector” would be undermined by “flooding the market with processed rice” from India – which would also remove vital food safety checks and push up prices by running down domestic stocks.

“It could have a chilling effect on investment if those businesses fear the trade deal could undermine their UK operations,” he said, highlighting how attempts to uncover ministers’ intentions have hit a brick wall.

“It’s a question of public safety, price and jobs. It’s not about protectionism, or stopping imports – it’s just stopping that finished product coming in in a volume that could sink a domestic industry.”

For the Trades Union Council (TUC), a crucial weakness is a failure to even debate whether trade deals should enforce workers’ rights, in stark contrast to the 2020 United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).

It boasts an explicit “rapid response labour mechanism” already used to sanction six firms guilty of bad practice or union-busting in Mexico, a “core tenet” of a “worker-centred trade policy” says the Biden administration.

Rosa Crawford, the TUC’s policy officer for international trade, explained: “It stops the race to the bottom, with obligations for all the countries to adopt and respect International Labour Organisation conventions. There’s a legal underpinning through the trade agreement.”

Here in the UK, the TUC is required to sign a non-disclosure agreement to join an advisory group on any proposed trade deal – but protested it is told nothing more about objectives than is made public anyway.

“It’s absurd,” Ms Crawford added. “We sign these agreements, but we only see the text of the agreement when it is finalised and nothing can be done about it. In the US, material improvements were made because trade unions were consulted.”

A major problem is that the trade department, now the Department for Business and Trade since a February shake-up, is viewed as “semi-detached” from a government otherwise committed to net zero carbon emissions and restoring nature.

The Green Alliance said this was laid bare by the way the Australia deal flouts climate goals by expanding its agricultural exports, but also warned the mistake risks being repeated in the hunt for an agreement with the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council.

It would boost UK’s long-term GDP by as little as 0.06%, the government’s own impact assessment admits – while pushing up carbon emissions from shipping by as much as 43%.

“Why is the government risking significant emissions increases for little to no economic benefit?” asked Shaun Spiers, the Green Alliance’s executive director.

“None of the Gulf states have legally binding targets on net zero and some don’t have any. If the UK is serious about the Cop26 Glasgow agreement and the UK’s environmental leadership, shouldn’t it be demanding more from countries with which it strikes trade deals?”

David Henig, UK director of the European Centre for International Political Economy, criticised “the absence of clear purpose” in trade policy and a “defensiveness that seemingly takes pride in secrecy and resistance to proper scrutiny”.

In an article, he attacked the focus on exporters as “extremely unhelpful, overly simplistic”, and echoed Professor Gasiorek in arguing: “Trade policy must demonstrate what a country stands for, and how the government is seeking to meet broad policy goals.”

In a letter to Ms Badenoch, the chair of the International Agreements Committee, Baroness Hayter, said the need for confidentiality over “sensitive information” is no excuse for the absence of a clear “policy framework”.

Publishing that strategy would “show third countries how any items outwith the agreed framework could jeopardise ratification by Parliament. Such an approach is used by other countries and clearly strengthens their hand,” the letter argued.

However, the Department for Business and trade shows no sign of budging, insisting last year’s Outcome Delivery Plan already charts a clear path forward.

A spokesperson said: “Our strategy is focused on making the UK the best place to live and do business by securing high quality trade deals with the world’s biggest and fastest growing markets, growing exports, and attracting greater levels of inward investment.”

To read the full article, please click here.

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Despite some potential challenges, there is a new momentum in the India-U.K. bilateral engagement these days with both sides confident of moving forward swiftly. Mr. Goyal was emphatic that “nothing is necessarily a deal-breaker in this agreement,” and suggested that no one should “worry about issues which are sensitive to any country, because both sides have agreed that sensitive issues are not our priority”. Ms. Trevelyan viewed this deal as “a golden opportunity to put UK businesses at the front of the queue as the Indian economy continues to grow rapidly”, that will “unlock this huge new market for our great British producers and manufacturers across numerous industries from food and drink to services and automotive”.

New Delhi is hoping to conclude its first FTA in over a decade with the United Arab Emirates this year. And another one with Australia is in the offing.

There have been indications that instead of the two nations trying to tackle all sensitive issues in one go, there could be an interim pact to cover “low hanging fruit” to be followed by a full-fledged FTA in a year’s time. Such an early harvest deal can often be deleterious for the prospects for a full FTA, but given India’s abysmal reputation in concluding FTAs, this may not be a bad strategy in keeping interlocutors engaged in the process.

A new trade outlook
As the global economy undergoes a fundamental transformation in the aftermath of COVID-19 and supply chains get restructured, India cannot lose any more time in setting its house in order. New Delhi is hoping to conclude its first FTA in over a decade with the United Arab Emirates this year. And another one with Australia is in the offing. If concluded, the India-U.K. FTA will be the next in line at a time when New Delhi is demonstrating a new seriousness of purpose as it negotiates 16 new and enhancing several other trade pacts with nations as diverse as Canada, the United States, the European Union and South Korea.

In fact, just before the launch of FTA talks with the U.K., India and South Korea also decided to expedite the upgradation of the existing FTA, formally called the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. The Narendra Modi government is showing a newfound flexibility in engaging with its partners on trade as it seeks balanced trade pacts at a time when new trade blocs in the Indo-Pacific such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) are gaining traction. Strategic partnerships without strong economic content would have no meaning in the Indo-Pacific, where China’s economic clout is growing by the day.

The reason
Britain has made a trade pact with India one of its post-Brexit priorities as it seeks a greater role in the Indo-Pacific. India is at the heart of the U.K.’s Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’, which has generated considerable interest around the world. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson came to office promising one of the deepest and broadest British foreign, security, development and defence reviews since the end of the Cold War. And the Integrated Review (a ‘comprehensive articulation of the U.K.‘s national security and international policy) released in March 2021 categorically underlined that, “In the decade ahead, the UK will deepen our engagement in the Indo-Pacific, establishing a greater and more persistent presence than any other European country”. While the U.K. will also be launching trade negotiations this year with Canada, Mexico and the Gulf to underscore its ‘Global Britain” credentials, a trade deal with India along with its membership in the CPTPP remains critical in anchoring the U.K. economically to the Indo-Pacific.

Many factors at play
A range of factors have coalesced to create an impetus for the U.K. to adopt a more robust Indo-Pacific strategy: the trading implications of Brexit; the U.K.’s changing approach towards China — shifting from being a major proponent of China to perhaps the most hawkish in Europe; and the fact that the U.S., the U.K.’s closest ally and security guarantor, remains firmly focused on the Indo-Pacific. Like its allies in the region, the U.K. recognises the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific to global stability and prosperity, and has made clear its intentions to deploy strategic assets to this end. London is also looking to amplify its efforts by entering into the regional security architecture. The trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS), announced in September 2021, enabling Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines with assistance from the U.S. and U.K., has given London a greater voice in the region.

Trade and investment will be a key dimension of this U.K. tilt. Brexit has necessitated greater access to non-EU markets, and the U.K.’s changing relationship with China requires a diversification of trading partners. But this shift in focus is also driven by a recognition that the Indo-Pacific is now largely the force behind global economic growth. The U.K. is looking to leverage its historical connections, development work, and its credibility when it comes to combating climate change (particularly relevant to these low-lying states vulnerable to sea-level rise) to help establish itself as a serious player in the region where there remain serious doubts about the U.K.’s staying power.

Through its Indo-Pacific tilt, the U.K. is finally carving out a direction and purpose to its post-Brexit foreign policy. And it is this prioritisation that has opened up a new window for New Delhi and London to quickly finalise their FTA. It is a unique “now or never” moment and the two sides seem willing to seize it despite the challenges.

Professor Harsh V Pant is Director, Studies and Head of the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He holds a joint appointment with the Department of Defence Studies and King’s India Institute as Professor of International Relations at King’s College London. 

To read the full commentary from the Observer Research Foundation, please click here. 

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The two special provisions of the TCA regarding TSD commitments 

There are a number of novel contributions regarding TSD obligations in the TCA. One is Article 9.4 which regulates the ability of the parties to impose rebalancing measures, and the other one is Article 8.10 regarding the importance of responsible supply chain management. I address each in turn.

First, Article 9.4 under “Title XI: Level Playing field for open and fair competition and sustainable development” of the TCA allows the EU or the UK to impose rebalancing measures when significant divergences regarding their policies and priorities with respect to labour, social, environmental or climate protection, or with respect to subsidy control, arise and cause material impacts on trade and investment between them. A rebalancing measure is a sanction (e.g., tariffs) which is designed to compensate one side for an unfair disadvantage.  In such a scenario, the party who intends to impose rebalancing measures must notify the other party and consultations will take place to find a solution. If no agreement is reached, after five days from the conclusion of the consultations, the party can adopt necessary and proportionate rebalancing measures to remedy the situation, providing that the other party has not requested the establishment of an arbitration tribunal. If an arbitration tribunal is established, but  does not deliver its final ruling after 30 days, the party is allowed to adopt rebalancing measures. In return, the other party can also take proportionate counter-measures until the tribunal delivers its ruling. In enacting measures, the aim is to craft something so that disruption to the trading relationship is minimized. 

This provision represents an improvement from the TSD chapters of the EU’s existing trade agreements. While those chapters include different types of dispute settlement mechanisms, they do not include the possibility to impose rebalancing measures against non-compliant third countries. On the contrary, the EU-UK TCA provides, for the first time, a strong mechanism for parties to implement sustainable development obligations. However, it remains to be seen how enforcement of this chapter will work in practice, as the TCA does not provide a definition for “significant divergences,” and neither does it specify examples of appropriate “rebalancing measures.” 

Second, Article 8.10 of the fair competition and sustainable development chapter of the TCA states that the parties recognize the importance of responsible supply chain management and corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices. In this regard, the EU and the UK must encourage responsible business conduct by providing supportive policy frameworks and by supporting the adherence and implementation of relevant international instruments (e.g., OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, among others). In particular, the EU and the UK obliged themselves to implement measures to promote the uptake of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. 

But this is not the first time that the EU refers to corporate social responsibility in its trade agreements and the use of international guidelines. For instance, the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) has a similar provision in its TSD and environment chapters. However, it is the first time that the EU and the UK added extra language on responsible supply chain management in its trade agreements. This reflects the growing importance of supply chain due diligence obligations with respect to environment and human rights in the EU as well as in the UK. 

The EU and UK’s internal regulations on supply chain due diligence

Both the EU and the UK are in favor of adopting internal regulations on supply chain due diligence. In the EU, the  Conflict Minerals Regulation, which establishes supply chain due diligence for trade in certain minerals and metals to minimize the risk of financing armed groups in conflict-affected and high-risk areas, entered into force on 1 January 2021. Moreover, the European Commission is currently preparing a legislative proposal that includes mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence obligations for companies in the context of sustainable corporate governance. The EU’s new Supply Chain Due Diligence Regulation is likely to elaborate on specific sanctions to provide a strong enforcement mechanism. The Commission will present its proposal in the second quarter of 2021. 

Similarly, the UK is proactive in promoting and implementing supply chain due diligence on human rights and the environment. In October 2015, the UK’s Modern Slavery Act, which requires businesses to report on slavery and human trafficking in their supply chains, entered into force. It was the first of its kind in Europe and one of the first in the world. In addition, in November 2020, the UK submitted a separate legislative proposal for supply chain due diligence on deforestation, which is currently being debated in the House of Commons. Under the new rules, which are expected to be passed by mid-2021, companies would face substantial fines if they cannot prove that their commodity supply chains are not linked to illegal deforestation.  

It is important to note that companies in the EU and the UK broadly support this new initiative on strengthening supply chain due diligence obligations. In a public consultation for the EU’s new Supply Chain Due Diligence Regulation, which ended on 8 February 2021, stakeholders generally supported this initiative and urged the Commission to implement effective and mandatory rules to ensure respect for human rights and for the protection of the environment. However, some stakeholders stressed that the new initiative should consider the complexity of global supply chains, for example, indirect sourcing relations,  and the differences between companies and sectors. In the UK, companies like Marks & Spencer called for action on human rights abuses in the cotton fields of Xinjiang, for instance. 

The relevance of the TSD obligations under the EU-UK TCA

The EU-UK TCA is a front-runner in the field of sustainable development obligations. While Article 9.4 provides a strong enforcement mechanism with a possibility to impose rebalancing measures, Article 8.10 highlights the importance of supply chain management and due diligence obligations for human rights and environmental protection, and provides that the EU and the UK must work together to strengthen their cooperation in these areas. Considering the growing importance of TSD obligations in trade policy, the EU-UK TCA could provide a good example of a strong TSD chapter for future trade agreements, which could be used as a template. 

At the same time, it would be important to monitor whether and how the EU and the UK will impose rebalancing measures, as well as how the two parties implement their own supply chain due diligence obligations and internal regulations. More interestingly, stakeholders need to pay close attention to whether these two new provisions included in the TCA will be replicated in the EU’s or UK’s future trade agreements. While much remains to be seen, the TSD chapter in the EU-UK TCA is a promising step forward. 

To read the full commentary from Trade Experettes, please click here. 

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The British trade minister has confirmed that corporate rights to sue governments are being discussed in the final negotiations for the Australia-UK free trade agreement before an announcement at the G7 meeting in the UK on 11 June.

The agreement is part of the post-Brexit rush by the UK to conclude deals to make up for its loss of zero tariff access to the huge European market. It’s therefore puzzling that the UK appears to be promoting, and that Australia may agree to, investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions which are likely to fuel community opposition to the deal in both Australia and the UK.

All trade agreements have state-to state-dispute processes. ISDS is an optional extra only included in some bilateral and regional trade agreements. ISDS began when former colonies became independent and provided compensation to companies if their assets were expropriated. But the system has developed concepts like “indirect expropriation”, “legitimate expectations” and “fair and equitable treatment”, which allow corporations to seek compensation by claiming that regulatory changes reduce the value of their investment and/or that they were not fairly consulted about the change.

ISDS is unpopular because it gives global (but not local) corporations special rights to sue governments for millions of dollars in international tribunals if they can argue that changes to regulation by any level of government will harm the value of their investment. ISDS claims can be made over public health, environment and other public interest laws made by democratically-elected governments.

Legal experts such as the former high court chief justice Robert French have noted that ISDS has no independent judiciary. Cases are conducted by temporary tribunals staffed by practising advocates who can represent a corporation in one case and then sit on a tribunal the next. There are no precedent or appeals, leading to inconsistent decisions.

Australians remember Bodog Poker that the US Philip Morris tobacco company sued Australia for billions over our plain packaging law. The Philip Morris company could not sue under the US-Australia free trade agreement, because community opposition resulted in the Howard government refusing to include ISDS in the 2004 agreement.

Tobacco companies comprehensively lost a compensation claim in Australia’s high court, and had to pay the government’s costs. Philip Morris found an obscure Hong Kong-Australia investment agreement which included ISDS, shifted some assets to Hong Kong, declared they were a Hong Kong company and claimed billions in compensation, prompting community outrage.

Dr Patricia Ranald is Convener of the Australian Fair Trade and Investment Network and a Research Fellow at the University of Sydney.

To read the full commentary on The Guardian, please click here.

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