It won’t be easy. Ambitions to broaden and deepen the transatlantic marketplace suffer from past disappointments. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership foundered in disputes over hormone-treated beef and investor-state dispute settlement. The current EU-US Trade and Technology Council has produced only narrow benefits. In the absence of coordination, both Washington and Brussels have resorted to unilateral measures, such as the US Inflation Reduction Act, national security-related tariffs on steel and aluminum, and the EU’s doubling down on its long-proposed carbon border adjustment mechanism. In the future, the need to take urgent unilateral measures will only increase as the dire consequences of failing to act become clear.

A comprehensive transatlantic economic agreement—not a traditional trade agreement—could avoid relitigating the issues that have sunk past US-EU trade and investment initiatives. Rather, learning from the lessons of past efforts, Washington and Brussels must accept that, despite their shared interests, Europe and the United States have decidedly different economic cultures and polities. And any new comprehensive agreement should accommodate these differences while coordinating parallel approaches to the rapidly evolving global economy.

One pillar of such an agreement should be addressing third-country practices. Both the EU and the United States are currently implementing a lengthening list of defensive trade measures—tariffs on electric vehicles and solar panels and investment screening—to protect their domestic industries and workers from subsidized Chinese competition. Unless Washington and Brussels can agree on mutually reinforcing defensive measures, Beijing will simply exploit differences in future US and European market openness. Recent experience with US duties on Chinese subsidized steel and aluminum production painfully demonstrates that unilateral defensive trade measures can adversely impact European producers. Washington and Brussels have spent more time and effort fighting each other than jointly confronting China’s nonmarket practices.

A bilateral comprehensive agreement could identify a set of policies—the types and levels of state subsidies, the use of stolen intellectual property, state regulatory and other protectionist measures—that Washington and Brussels agree lead to “unfair” competition and thus merit parallel defensive measures that do not distort transatlantic commerce.  

The second pillar of a comprehensive agreement should be improved regulatory cooperation. Regulations often seem esoteric, but they set the rules of business behavior. In a world in which market-based economies are in competition with state-driven economies, the United States and the EU need regulations that reinforce each other, do not conflict, and do not inflict unnecessary collateral damage.

Regulatory cooperation is not about adopting identical rules (the United States and the EU have tried and failed before). Nor is it about forcing US and European regulators to sit down and talk with each other (which has produced little in the way of results). Rather, Washington and Brussels need to first agree that in a deeply integrated transatlantic economy, regulations should achieve their objectives without unnecessarily undermining bilateral trade. Second, they need to agree on joint pre-regulation research and information-gathering so that regulators are each working with a common set of facts. And the US and EU regulators need to offer each other’s stakeholders a meaningful opportunity to provide pre-standard-setting and pre-regulation input to minimize business friction.

Finally, successful coordination of external measures and future regulation will not be possible without a third pillar—greater ongoing input from the business, labor, consumer, environmental, and political communities. It is a fundamental principle of democracy that those affected by governmental actions have a right to participate in such decision making. But it is also practical. As the ones directly affected, these stakeholders can ensure that the issues addressed are of practical significance. In this regard, it is particularly important that the US Congress and European Parliament are fully involved as negotiations proceed, to ensure that whatever is agreed upon has a chance of entering into force.

As both Brussels and Washington face an uncertain and challenging 2025 and beyond, they cannot afford to allow past failures to constrain future ambitions. They face too many shared challenges. Going forward, the EU and the United States can either row together in increasingly turbulent waters, or they will most assuredly sink separately.

L. Daniel Mullaney is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and GeoEconomics Center. He served as assistant US trade representative for Europe and the Middle East in the Office of the United States Trade Representative from 2010 to 2023. He was chief negotiator for comprehensive trade agreements with the EU and the United Kingdom, as well as trade lead for the US-EU Trade and Technology Council.

Bruce Stokes is a visiting senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, a former senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the former international economics correspondent for the National Journal.

To read the blog as it was published on the The Atlantic Council webpage, click here.

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As both countries approach their next national elections, it is time to take stock of these trends and to consider how they might develop further in the coming years. As a struggle is underway to rewrite the rules of the international economy in regions like the Indo-Pacific, choices taken in Washington and London will have far-reaching impact. At stake are the standards of living, environmental protections, and labour rules affecting billions of people around the world.

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For different reasons, both the UK and the US have moved away from a pure emphasis on economic efficiency in their recent trade policy.

Although supporters often claimed that Brexit was a free trade measure designed to increase the UK’s economic opportunities abroad, its main practical effect has been to make trade between the UK and its largest export market more difficult. This negative effect on trade with the European Union was supposed to be offset by the UK’s ability to negotiate its own free trade agreements with third countries. The results of this were uncertain at the time of Brexit and have mostly proved to be disappointing since. This has particularly been so in the case of a US-UK trade agreement, which many supporters of Brexit touted as a major goal. In effect, Brexit has meant sacrificing a measure of future economic growth in order to “take back control” of other policy areas from Brussels.

Over roughly the same period, the US has also backed away from its past support for a liberalising trade agenda. President Trump famously started a trade war with China and pulled out of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a sweeping free trade agreement covering much of the Pacific rim. But his successor President Biden has proven to be sceptical of trade as well, imposing new economic sanctions on China, declining to rejoin the TPP, and announcing that expanding market access is no longer a priority of US trade policy.

The result has been the emergence of a new and powerful protectionist coalition in American politics. On one side, it comprises economic nationalists, China hawks, and members of Trump’s Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement, who see trade as weakening the American economy and destroying its manufacturing base. The other side consists firstly of economic progressives who see free trade deals as enriching corporations at the expense of American workers, and secondly of Democrats concerned about winning votes in key industrial Midwestern swing states.

This protectionist coalition reached its ascendancy at precisely the wrong moment for the UK, which since 2016 has been seeking a US-UK trade deal. There has been little to no appetite in Washington for expanding the access that the two countries have to the other’s market, which is the key goal of British policymakers. Limited talks over harmonising regulations and addressing other barriers to trade fizzled out late last year amid concerns among Democrats that even appearing to consider a substantive new trade agreement would harm them in November’s election. Even if there were a political appetite for a deal, long-running disagreements over agricultural standards would make one hard to achieve.

These political dynamics – both the ascendancy of a protectionist coalition in the United States and the specific barriers to a US-UK agreement – are not likely to improve even after this year’s elections. It is possible that, with the election behind it, a second Biden administration might return to talks on a limited agreement dealing mostly with regulation, but talks on expanding market access are unlikely. Trump, meanwhile, is campaigning on increasingly draconian trade policies, including a flat 10% tariff on all imports. His advisors are also reportedly debating whether to purposefully devalue the dollar, which would make British exports to the United States less competitive. These policies could significantly harm US-UK trade and foreclose the possibility of any constructive new agreement.

A whole world of trade

Even with US-UK trade arrangements appearing uncertain, both the UK and the United States are involved in setting and influencing the rules of the international economy further afield.

As it has moved away from traditional free trade agreements, the Biden administration has not completely lacked a trade policy. It has focused instead on more narrow negotiations which have sought to address non-tariff barriers, but also to persuade partners to raise their environmental and labour standards. Its most notable attempt came in the form of the Indo Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), an agreement covering 12 nations containing 2.6 billion people and over a third of the global economy.

Although these headline figures sound impressive, the results of IPEF have been limited. Last year, the cooperating nations reached minor agreements on coordinating supply chains and sharing knowledge related to the green energy transition. But the Biden administration walked away from the portion of the agreement related to environmental and labour standards, believing that the other IPEF states – which include India, Japan, and Vietnam – were not willing to do enough to satisfy American opinion.

The travails of IPEF revealed the limits of the Biden administration’s approach. Without offering its partners increased access to the US market, the administration gave them little incentive to raise their environmental and labour standards, which would in turn make their products less competitive internationally. But this means that the United States has lost the opportunity to have a strong voice in determining the economic future of the region. This points to there being a strong chance that the initiative will pass to China, which sits at the centre of a growing economic bloc called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – and which does little to raise environmental protections or standards for workers.

The UK has taken a different approach. In recent years, it has signed several new bilateral free trade agreements in the region – with New Zealand and Australia – and joined the successor to the TPP, known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The UK Government has not taken a formal position on IPEF, but the UK may try to join it in the future. Although the benefits to the British economy are small, these moves have signalled that the UK remains interested in new trade agreements and wants to play an increased geopolitical role in the region. This looks likely to remain the case regardless of the outcome of the next UK general election.

The most contentious international economic issue faced by the two countries in the coming years is likely to be relations with China. Trump has signalled that he is looking to engage in extremely harsh economic policies against China if elected. In this case, the UK will likely find itself caught uncomfortably between Washington and more dovish European countries who want to maintain economic ties with Beijing. Particularly if Trump also engages in new trade measures against European countries – as he did in his first Bodog Poker term – it will be extremely difficult for the UK to pursue a liberalising agenda. Instead, the world is likely to be consumed by a new round of trade wars.

More harmonious relations can be expected between a second Biden administration and a government led by the Labour Party, which has voiced support for the “new overseas investment and regulatory partnerships” which are at the centre of the Biden administration’s approach. Ultimately, however, UK policymakers who want to pursue an agenda of liberalisation and integration will be at the mercy of sentiment in Washington. The UK economy is simply not big enough for London to drive the process itself.

A difficult future

Both the UK and the US have identified the Indo-Pacific as a region which is key to the future of global politics and economics. But political reservations in Washington are currently holding both countries back from playing a decisive role in setting the economic rules of the region. The UK’s enthusiasm is not matched by its heft, whereas America’s heft goes to waste without enthusiasm to match.

By working together, the two countries could offer a positive, optimistic vision of the international economy – one which prioritises raising environmental and labour standards as well as boosting economic growth. The aftermath of this year’s elections in both countries will be a critical test of whether this is possible, or whether familiar barriers and animosities will lead to another wave of protectionism.

Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.

To read the full article published by Foreign Policy Centre, click here.

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The future of global trade is being shaped by several factors, in particular the twin digital and green transitions, supply chain disruptions and the increased trade policy uncertainty driven by geopolitical tensions. Yet, in the face of these challenges, global trade has been impressively resilient. In 2022 and 2023, the total volume of traded goods increased by 1.2%, despite the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. The projections for trade growth are 2.6% in 2024 and 3.3% in 2025. Digital trade – particularly digitally delivered services – is the fastest-growing segment of international trade, with an average annual growth rate of 8.1% for almost two decades.

This projected growth in trade volumes reinforces how robust the global trade system is, even in these times of significant distress and adverse pressures. However, the future of trade is certainly not without its challenges. The global economic landscape is becoming more and more complex, manifested by increasing sustainability requirements, geopolitical tensions, policy uncertainty and growing skepticism toward the ability of the multilateral trading systems to deliver. As a result, a ‘trade skeptic’ narrative has started to gain traction. This frames international trade as an obstacle to, rather than a solution for, building a more secure, inclusive and sustainable world.

The challenges of the WTO

The current geopolitical context is applying pressure on the World Trade Organization (WTO) to deliver on a number of urgent topics. With companies around the world relying heavily on WTO rules, the organisation needs to reform in order to address its issues, such as stalled negotiations, including the difficulty of reaching plurilateral agreements where multilateral consensus is not feasible. There is also a pressing need to repair the – currently paralyzed – dispute resolution system.

In recent years, the development of the global economy has added several new concerns to trade relations within the WTO. Negotiations within the organisation have become progressively more complex, as they are increasingly influenced by domestic interests and politics. The conflict of interests between the developing and developed countries is also apparent, manifested in particular in the difficulties of WTO members in agreeing on new rules on agriculture. When allied to the fact that the WTO operates on consensus-based decision-making, it becomes more difficult to reach multilateral agreements among members that have increasingly diverse economic and political interests.

Some of the outcomes from MC13

The latest WTO Ministerial Conference (MC13) concluded with a ministerial declaration that laid the groundwork for a range of future negotiations. These included WTO reform, agriculture, the Agreement on fisheries subsidies, and e-commerce. This time, however, limited substantive outcomes were achieved.

One very important result emerging from the MC13 was the extension of the moratorium on e-commerce tariffs. This will now continue in force until the next ministerial conference in March 2026. The decision is crucial for digital trade, as it provides temporary relief from potential tariffs on electronic transmissions. The business community advocates not simply for an extension to the moratorium, but for a permanent solution to this issue. If a multilateral agreement were to prove impossible, the possibility of a plurilateral agreement by 2026 should be explored as an alternative.

For the business community, restoring the dispute settlement system – a cornerstone of the WTO framework – is essential. Since 2016, the US has blocked the appointment of judges to the WTO’s Appellate Body, claiming that the body overreaches its mandate. This impasse has left the Appellate Body to all intents inoperative, undermining the organisation’s ability to resolve trade disputes effectively. While members agreed to accelerate talks to reach a consensus by the end of 2024 during the MC13, businesses need to see concrete results quickly. Ideally this should be before the US elections this autumn. Unfortunately, however, this is an unlikely scenario.

Despite certain advances made during the MC13, there was a failure to reach agreements on a number of crucial topics, including agricultural issues and the second part of the agreement on fisheries subsidies. Attempts to initiate talks on limiting the harmful effects of national industrial subsidies – a key issue for business – were also unsuccessful. Leaving such issues unresolved adds to an environment of uncertainty for businesses globally, affecting a wide range of sectors. It also underscores the difficulty of consensus within the current multilateral system. The WTO should therefore explore, in depth, whether plurilateral agreements can offer a viable alternative where multilateral agreements have faltered on important topics, thus offering a pathway for subsets of WTO members to move forward in specific areas. Such agreements can be pivotal in addressing modern trade challenges, affording a more flexible approach to international trade negotiations, adapted to address current challenges.

Overcoming increasing barriers to trade

As already discussed, the geopolitical and security underpinnings of trade are becoming increasingly pronounced. In addition, the re-emergence of nationalistic and protectionist sentiments in various countries is leading to some re-evaluation of existing trade agreements and partnerships. Reflecting on a broader trend, the imposition of trade restrictions has been steadily rising, from approximately 650 new restrictions in 2017 to over 3,000 in 2023. This increase in barriers is a clear indicator of the growing complexities and challenges that face the international trade system. This is a deeply worrying situation for business, not simply because fragmenting trade relationships tend to decrease economic security and increase conflict risks, but because it also comes at a great economic cost.

The trade tensions between China and the US are a prime example of this; and the EU needs to navigate between the two. Whereas the US is the EU’s ally, and while we are closer to the US than to China in many ways, we cannot embark on a process of decoupling from China. Such a step is not in our interest. However, the opportunities to improve trade relations with the US seem brighter than they do with China.

EU and US Trade and Technology Council

The relationship between the EU and the US is crucial, as it combines the economic strength of two of the world’s largest economies, enhancing global economic stability and growth as a result. Together, the two parties can help set the international standards and norms that influence global trade, environmental policies and technological advancements. To date, the EU and US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) have regrettably failed to deliver much in the way of concrete developments. However, it remains the most important forum for close cooperation on transatlantic trade and technology issues.

The latest sixth TTC meeting in April saw some progress on a few fronts. On the technology side, the parties updated their cooperation on AI terminology and taxonomy and signaled progress in research on AI. They also published a Joint 6G vision and established a quantum task force. On the trade side, there is more to the wish list than what has been delivered to date. The latest meeting was no different, and not a great deal was achieved on the topic of trade. With elections upcoming, it is clear the US is choosing not to engage in important trade questions that could potentially increase market access for European companies. However, the TTC at least resulted in the allies agreeing to continue cooperation for supply chain resilience, particularly for critical materials such as semiconductors. A Minerals Security Partnership Forum was also established, under which the EU and US agreed to advance the negotiations on a critical mineral deal, that would make it possible for European companies to benefit from the subsidies in the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA).

Given that both the EU and the US have elections on the horizon, the future of the TTC partnerships is uncertain. Advancing transatlantic cooperation therefore requires concrete outcomes; outcomes that are designed to endure any potential changes of leadership on both sides of the Atlantic.

In conclusion, as the global trade landscape continues to evolve in ways that reflect the complex and increasingly uncertain environment, it is crucial to remember the significant role international trade plays in addressing the most pressing challenges of our time. Policymakers must reinforce the resilience of the global trade system; such steps will be fundamental in shaping a sustainable and prosperous future for international trade and business worldwide.

To read the full article as it appears on Svenskt Naringsliv’s website, click here.

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• Despite the warm atmosphere and strong personal ties between President Biden and EU leaders, the EU-U.S. summit delivered few noteworthy deliverables on tricky trade and economic issues. Talks on an agreement on sustainable steel and aluminum and separately on critical minerals were punted, leaving little new to announce. Consequently, the main point of the summit was the summit itself – to affirm transatlantic unity amid unprecedented global challenges.  
• Unsurprisingly, leaders’ discussions were completely overshadowed by the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Middle East. The summit reaffirmed shared commitment to continue support for Ukraine while holding Russia accountable for the war. In the Middle East, they reaffirmed support for Israel but also the need to protect Palestinian civilians and ensure humanitarian access in Gaza. For the EU, which has struggled to maintain a unified message on the conflict in the Middle East, the summit was a test that it passed.
• While the summit was very high on the EU’s wish-list, it also illustrates the Biden administration’s perception of the EU as a key global partner on a range of foreign policy, economic, and technology issues. However, the window for making progress on transatlantic cooperation is shrinking. Thus far, it does not appear that the specter of a post-election return to less productive transatlantic ties in 2025 is jolting the two sides to lock in deals to demonstrate progress and provide guardrails against future political disruption. 

Background

Much has changed in the external environment since the last EU-U.S. summit was held in mid-2021 in Brussels. Back then, a newly elected President Biden promised to revitalize ties with the EU establishing the much-heralded and ambitious Trade and Technology Council (TTC). While relations have remained strong since, several developments—including European reluctance to be too hawkish on China and the “snafus” of limited consultation on Afghanistan and AUKUS agreement—dampened enthusiasm for the transatlantic reset. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought the U.S. and the EU closer together, with close coordination between Washington and Brussels on sanctions, assistance to Kyiv, and diplomatic outreach to the Global South.

Despite the warm rhetoric, gradual progress on technical alignment in the TTC, and stronger coordination on security and foreign policy, the current irritant in the U.S.-EU relationship is the same as it has been for a long time: trade. The passage of the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in mid-2022 only exacerbated the irritation. The initial shock of the IRA has led to a gradual European embrace of its own industrial policy approach (albeit with limits) and the EU has relaxed its concerns about the threat posed by the bill’s more protectionist measures, particularly on electric vehicle (EV) tax credits. Ongoing discussions between the EU and the U.S. around an IRA-compliant critical minerals agreement would, if successful, further help ease of the pressure. In fact, the greatest concern for EU officials is sprawling Chinese green subsidies, which pose a larger threat to European competitiveness than the U.S. Hence, the recent EU announcement it is launching investigations into Chinese EV and windmill subsidies (with possible solar and steel ones to follow).

Another longstanding, unresolved dispute is the Trump-era Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum. Transatlantic cooperation managed to temporarily suspend the tariffs in 2021, but a permanent solution has remained elusive, despite intention from both sides. Cooperation on steel and aluminum is a test-case for transatlantic cooperation on several fronts: boosting manufacturing at home, pushing out heavily subsidized Chinese metals, and promoting the green transition. The talks have manifested into a push for a green-steel club with likeminded partners, dubbed the Global Arrangement on Steel and Aluminum, which would place tariffs on “non-market” producers like China while ensuring that U.S.-produced steel and aluminum would not be subject to new import tariffs under the EU’s new flagship Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).

On foreign policy, Russia’s 600+ day war in Ukraine continues to dominate transatlantic discussions. The Biden administration has found a partner in the EU on financial and humanitarian aid as well as sanctions; while the EU has a more limited military role, it has found a newfound role providing direct military assistance to Ukraine. Given turmoil on Capitol Hill, European officials have grown more concerned about continued U.S. support for Ukraine and what it means for Europe’s own support for Ukraine in the medium to long term.

Meanwhile, the conflict between Israel and Hamas has taken over much of the foreign policy agenda. Both the EU and the U.S. have sought to balance their unwavering support to Israel with expressing concern for Palestinian civilians and the need to ensure humanitarian access in Gaza – though the EU initially struggled to maintain a coherent position. Both EU and U.S. officials are concerned about the Israel-Hamas conflict escalating into a wider regional confrontation in the Middle East and are coordinating closely on the diplomatic response.

Lastly, on China, Washington increasingly sees the EU as a key partner for dealing on trade and technology issues, even adopting the European Commission’s language on “de-risking” from China rather than “decoupling.” However, the Commission’s proposed economic security strategy—that includes beefed-up FDI screening measures, new outbound FDI restrictions, and new export controls on sensitive technologies—has been met with skepticism from member states such as Germany who are uncomfortable being too confrontational and are hesitant of aligning too closely with Washington for fear of triggering Chinese retaliation.

A foreign policy-dominated summit

In a first sign of a less-than straightforward summit, the EU’s delegation sprawled in the weeks leading up to include both President von der Leyen and Council President Charles Michel as well as three commissioners. Illustrating the awkward dynamics between the EU’s two leaders, von der Leyen and Michel each held their own separate private meetings with Biden before joining together with Biden for a joint meeting. Von der Leyen is seen by Biden and his advisors as a strong interlocutor, staunch trans-Atlanticist, and partner on confronting China, with Biden keen to see her reappointed next year.

As expected, leaders’ discussions centered mainly around foreign policy issues in Ukraine and the Middle East, leading to limited attention to trade issues at the dismay of working level officials. Notably, the carefully crafted communique covered foreign policy issues first—aiming to minimize U.S.-EU differences on Israel by condemning Hamas, stressing the dire humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and working to prevent regional escalation—symbolizing the summit’s overall tenor of addressing ongoing crisis over long-term problems. In her public speech in Washington, von der Leyen echoed Biden’s comparison between Russia and Hamas and pledged continued strong support to Ukraine and Israel.

Expectations that the summit would deliver some wins on key trade issues fell flat. No new deal or agreements were announced on steel and aluminum or critical minerals. The joint communique simply stated that “we look forward to continuing to make progress on these important objectives in the next two months”, meaning that talks will continue but have yet to reach the goal line.

Key Summit Outcomes

Ukraine: The two sides pledged continued “unwavering” support for Ukraine “for as long as it takes” against the backdrop of a shared assessment by Western security officials that Russia’s war is likely to drag into 2025 and possibly beyond. Given uncertainty about continued U.S. funding for Ukraine, Biden administration officials hoped to use the summit to reassure EU counterparts that Washington’s support is not on the line. The night before the summit, Biden gave a rare, live Oval Office address pledging $60 billion in support for Ukraine (as part of a larger $105 billion package) that would seek to lock in U.S. assistance into 2025. Speaking at a think-tank in Washington during her visit, von der Leyen pledged to “double down” on financial and military support for Ukraine in what was clearly a message aimed at Congressional Republicans.

The communique also noted that the EU and U.S. will continue to “explore” how to make use of seized Russian sovereign assets to fund Ukraine reconstruction projects, something that U.S. officials have become gradually more open to in recent months while the European Central Bank remains more cautious for fear of causing financial instability. No new Russia sanctions were announced as the EU is still working to find internal agreement for its 12th EU sanctions package. The statement did pledge further work on sanctions enforcement of third parties who help Russia evade the sanctions, a timely topic in light of the recent discussions in Beijing between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping about “deepening China-Russia relations”.

China: The two sides clarified they are not “decoupling or turning inwards” but rather seek “de-risking and diversifying” in order to promote economic resilience. But the EU side walked back some of the language on technology restrictions it has previously signed up to at the G7 summit in May. Highlighting different priorities between U.S. and EU officials, the statement referred to the Biden administration’s new outbound investment measures as “necessary to complement its existing economic security toolkit”, while it only made a reference to the EU “exploring” whether such measures “could” serve the same role. Despite a push by Biden officials, this gap reflects pushback from certain member states over von der Leyen’s economic security agenda and a prevailing skepticism about aligning too closely with Washington on China.

Steel and aluminum: Despite last minute efforts by negotiators, the Biden administration resisted EU calls to permanently lift all tariffs, likely for fear of alienating labor unions in crucial Midwestern swing states ahead of next year’s election. Instead, Biden officials suggested a snap-back option that the EU duly rejected. The goal is still to try and reach agreement by the end of the year to single out China as part of a new green steel club, but more work is clearly needed to get there. The EU is concerned that a failure could result in the U.S. reimposing tariffs, something U.S. officials deny. While EU officials have privately criticized the Biden team for digging in their heels, it is equally true that the EU did not have much to bring that could have helped to forge a deal. Since the issue is unlikely to get any easier to resolve, the most likely outcome is another punt, as neither side is interested in a tit-for-tat tariff war in an election year.

Critical Minerals: Similarly, no agreement was reached on critical minerals, despite cited negotiation progress on allowing tax credits for EVs that uses EU-produced minerals like cobalt, graphite, lithium, manganese, and nickel. U.S. insistence on a rapid inspection system of mines and processing of critical minerals in Europe was too difficult for the EU to swallow and would likely require approval by the 27 member states, a process that can be long and tedious. However, since the EU also needs critical minerals for its own EVs, talks between the EU and U.S. also center on how to work jointly to reduce dependence on China in the EV battery supply chain and increase investments in new minerals projects in resource rich countries such as in Africa and Latin America. But no progress on such talks was reported though officials are privately more upbeat that a deal can be reached in the near future.

Technology: Earlier speculations that the TTC would be folded into the summit were abandoned, with the next TTC is now scheduled for December in the U.S. While this deprived the summit of meaningful discussions on digital and technology issues, it also relieved officials from having to develop a series of new deliverables for the flailing TTC format. The communique mentioned AI risk and trustworthiness and pledged to endorse the G7 code of conduct for AI.

What to watch

While the EU and U.S. have managed to stay remarkably united over the past three years against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine and other geopolitical challenges, it is less clear what meaningful changes they have actually achieved to help protect the transatlantic partnership from disruption should a populist leader emerge on either side of the Atlantic in 2025. A return of President Trump in the White House would almost certainly give rise to renewed calls in Europe for doubling down on strategic autonomy and reducing foreign policy reliance on the U.S. In a sign that the EU is aware of the political dynamics in the U.S., EU leaders also spent time in bipartisan meetings on Capitol Hill and von der Leyen choose to deliver an address at a conservative-leaning think-tank while in Washington.

It is certainly possible that a reelected President Biden could have more flexibility on trade, though the protectionist U.S. approach to trade is likely to be a bipartisan fixture that outlives both President Trump and Biden. This observation likely feeds into the EU’s own decision making – why agree on a deal with Biden on steel that could undermine the EU’s commitment to the World Trade Organization (WTO) if a new U.S. president in 2025 would just rip up such a deal.

The next meeting of the TTC will take place in the U.S. in December (location still to be determined), with a final sixth meeting occurring during the Belgian EU Presidency in March before the EU legislative cycle grinds to a halt in the lead up to the European Parliament elections in June. After that, the format’s future will be up in the air, either fizzling out or reviving as a tool for incremental progress. The TTC remains the premier trans-Atlantic talk shop, moving slowly but steadily on technical standards, supply chain security, and green tech. While the format has exasperated industry stakeholders with its glacial pace and limited avenues for feedback, it has delivered consistently: its landmark voluntary AI code of conduct has been elevated to a G7-level discussion, showing a model for future TTC-G7 synergies. However, as always with TTC, the format is less geared toward summit-style major announcements but rather incremental progress in the various working groups on existing files.

To read the full summary as it was published by Albright Stonebridge Group, click here.

To read the full analysis, click here.

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Twelve miles outside of Paris lies the suburb of Saclay. Its hilly terrain was created when, in 1670, the French monarch’s engineers used the village as a base of a hydraulics network to connect Louis XIV’s Versailles with running water. That marvel of technological innovation—on par with the majesty of the Sun King’s palace itself—remains part of Saclay’s identity: the fusion of technology with power. Today, the village has become the heart of the Plateau de Saclay, or the Silicon Valley of France, best known for its research into nuclear physics and, increasingly, for its quantum research.

It is there that US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and US Trade Representative Katherine Tai will join with European Commission Executive Vice Presidents Margrethe Vestager and Vladis Dombrovskis for the first European meeting of the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), a follow-up to its September 2021 launch in Pittsburgh. Jolted by Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine, the Americans and Europeans seem to be setting a joint leadership agenda in democratic technology that deepens their strategic interdependence and hardens democratic autonomy. They have already begun to rewrite the global digital rulebook together in ways that favor human rights, rule of law, and open competition.

First, slowly—then all at once—an effort is emerging from Washington and Brussels to put in place the building blocks for a Euro-Atlantic digital order. On March 25, US President Joe Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced in Brussels a breakthrough in a decade-long conflict over US surveillance and the US-EU data bridge that powers the transatlantic digital relationship. Then, on April 28, the two led in the launch of the Declaration for the Future of the Internet—the outgrowth of the Biden administration’s Summit for Democracy—a covenant of sorts signed by more than 60 countries. Its major aim is that the Internet remains rooted in human rights, dignity, pluralism, open access, and economic empowerment for all people. In short, it aspires to take the values of the UN’s Universal Declaration on Human Rights into the digital domain. In a particularly sharp message to Russia and China, Ukraine and Taiwan were both prominently represented at the signing. The TTC meeting in Saclay is set to open a broader glimpse of what that order could look like.

Imposing Costs on Russian Tech

At its 2021 launch, some worried the TTC would devolve into a sort of meandering dialogue in which both sides aired grievances and reached no concrete outcomes—a fate that befell some preceding attempts at a US-EU systemic partnership. Those fears have been largely dispatched. Russia’s war has led to greater convergence between the US and EU on tech governance and a greater understanding of the knock-on effects of sanctions on partners when states seek to automate authoritarianism and continue to wage low-intensity global conflict.

The TTC created the structures bodog online casino that allowed the US and EU to react quickly to restrict dual-use technology exports and intellectual property to Russia. What could have taken six weeks took around 10 days in the end. The US application of the so-called Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR) to all of Russia has crippled Russian access to global semiconductor technology, crucial for industries from data centers to aviation to defense. Previously, the FDPR had only been applied to specific companies like Huawei. American and European cooperation on creating carve-outs that would protect European member states from knock-on effects of these sanctions, make its implementation possible. Long term, that muscle memory could come in handy as the two sides look to coordinate more closely on technology access and control vis-à-vis China, the more strategically tricky challenge that the TTC was in fact initially—if implicitly—designed to address.

At the same time, there are indications that the Russian aggression might have longer-term consequences on the transatlantic partnership. There are furtive signs that the two sides might codify the obvious: that trade between the two largest democratic blocs does not threaten American or European security. This is particularly meaningful in the wake of Trump-era use of tariff weapons—so-called 232 tariffs—on steel and aluminum against China but also treaty allies like European states, Canada, and Japan. It could also mean swearing off export restrictions that could kneecap the other side of the Atlantic on energy, critical materials, foundational technologies like chips, and even vaccines. Perhaps the two sides could formalize this commitment with a formal and mutual defense production exemption for treaty allies.

Democratic Autonomy in Technology Supply Chains

The notion that the US and Europe should build democratic supply chains—with stronger backstops based on partners who have a grounding in democracy and rule of law—makes them more secure than the world’s most important autocratic great powers like Russia and China. The regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin has already demonstrated that a certain idea of national identity, prestige, and global standing is more important than economic prosperity for its people, reliability for its partners, and interconnectedness to the world; so important indeed that they are willing to wage a brutal and unprovoked war. There is a strong question as to whether China’s Communist Party might feel the same.

This notion of reliability has been especially acute in semiconductor production and supply. The 40 percent increase in chip demand during the COVID-19 crisis layered on top of geo-political tensions over Taiwan, raw materials shortages, production bottlenecks, and even bad weather to strain global chip supply. In the TTC, the two sides have worked assiduously to identify weaknesses and create ongoing monitoring mechanisms in the feed-ins for the highly complex semiconductor production process. Together they have run a joint supply chain vulnerability mapping, often prying sensitive information from companies on both sides of the Atlantic.

Now the $52 billion US CHIPS Act—together with the €42 billion EU CHIPS Act set for passage in 2023—place industrial policy in cutting-edge technology at the heart of their strategic industrial bases. In order to create deeper technological strategic interdependence, the two sides are tentatively opening up about where and how they will invest so that state-centered industrial policy on both sides of the Atlantic is complimentary and mutually beneficial to their innovation industrial bases. In this regard, the TTC should continue to create greater space for transatlantic consortia to bind the Euro-Atlantic chip ecosystem closer together. In fact, Saclay—the location of the TTC meeting—is set to be a key research building block of an emergent transatlantic chip ecosystem, the capstone of which is a €17 billion Intel chip production facility in Magdeburg, Germany. This will likely create a larger research network with the National Semiconductor Technology Center (NSTC) in Albany, New York.

One of the major challenges to the democratic tech supply chain is where to source critical minerals like rare earths. Much of it still comes from states like Russia, China, and even states at risk from authoritarian aggression. The EU has attempted to use Ukraine as a hedge against its reliance on Chinese critical materials. The EU’s semiconductor industry is reliant on neon gas produced as a byproduct of the steel production process. Europe’s supply has come from the very Mariupol steel plants that were sheltering Ukrainian troops against the Russian onslaught.

Russia’s Disinfo Wars

Work in the Euro-Atlantic tech alliance should not be limited to hardware and exports, though. Against the backdrop of Russia’s war, the US and the EU have had no choice but to build a greater trust in each other on the global rule book. Old taboos are falling away. Areas once seen as off-limits—like data protection, technical standard setting, platform market power or rules to combat the Kremlin’s disinformation machine—are becoming central areas of discussion.

The two sides are converging on AI. This is not only on vague ethical principles but on questions of methodology for assessing AI risk and means to manage it. Both sides are engaged in an intensive process to create risk governance for AI. They are making no pretense that like-minded states have self-interests currently under threat in international standard-setting bodies like the International Standards Organization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). Here, Chinese representatives working on behalf of the CCP flood the zone with working group members to support Chinese developed model technical standards proposals meant to strengthen Chinese competitiveness in the global tech race and some suspect that this could code in cybersecurity vulnerabilities and surveillance loopholes through the adoption of the standards themselves.

In light of a Russia bent on democracy-weakening disinformation, the EU and US can work to tackle state-backed disinformation. The EU—along with the US—should establish rules that avoid situations that could be perceived as a form of online “selective justice” —situations where political pressure arising from events like January 6, 2021 or February 24, 2022 leads to platform action that only shows major social media players still have preponderant power to direct online discourse and an “opacity, capriciousness and inconstancy with which they wield that power.”

The EU’s agreement on landmark platform governance legislation, the Digital Services Act (DSA), inspired American policymakers, even former President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The DSA redefines how illegal content will be treated in the EU with accountability, transparency, and oversight. The DSA compels the major platforms to conduct risk assessment that will be subject to outside accountability from regulators but also academics and civil society. The Biden administration is looking at ways to provide access to data for researchers and academics following the model the EU is pursuing with the Digital Services Act. Such moves could also divulge more detailed information about the connective tissue between platforms based in authoritarian states like Yandex and ByteDance and regime information operations. Data transparency requirements could also help buckle companies like Twitter to the rule of law should a private acquisition subject their governance to the whims of billionaire owners like Elon Musk. Whistleblower Francis Haugen’s Facebook revelations drew cross-party ire and led to new Biden administration measures to restrict targeted advertising to minors, an element reflected in the DSA.

To do so, the White House could also look at its own model codes of conduct. The Paris-Saclay TTC should inform a voluntary American “Code of Conduct” that the Biden administration could issue as an executive order reflecting the same principles developed by the EU’s code of practice as part of the European Democracy Action Plan. This could ultimately plug into the structure of the DSA, which holds the big platforms accountable by law for their decisions.

The EU, itself, will have to be extremely careful in defining the high criteria which would need to be met to trigger crisis response mechanisms that would justify limiting war propaganda from hostile states with outlets like RT and Sputnik in the future. Such a categorization could be akin to the designation of a country as a “state sponsor of terrorism.” As it currently stands, the Europe-wide de-platforming of Putin’s digital megaphones is largely grounded in political consensus rather than a strong legal basis.

Going South Fast

In many ways, Ukraine has already won the first phase of the war against Russia. It blunted Putin’s efforts to conquer the country, bled Russia’s military, wiped out Russia’s Potemkin defense technology, and decisively won over the hearts and minds of the world’s consolidated democracies amid Russian disinformation. But, paradoxically, Russia’s Ukraine war is only an episode—albeit an important battle—in a larger conflict. One that is increasingly sweeping into the countries of the Global South where the technological connections, online narratives, and fundamental values of the governing elite are less clear.

The Global South has become a central theater in the ideological competition for tech governance. On the disinformation side, trends are worrying. Even as Ukraine pushes facts, images, and stories of daily atrocities inflicted on its people in Bucha, Mariupol, Irpin, and elsewhere, there is an ominous sense that the Euro-Atlantic is losing the information war outside of the OECD. China’s industrial influence operations are amplifying Russian disinformation narratives—particularly in the Global South—around NATO expansion as a form of neo-colonialism and the catalyst for war. China is pushing the notion that sanctions are leading to higher global food prices, even as it has been discreetly complying with the Euro-Atlantic’s sanctions.

Even the like-minded drafters of the Internet Declaration ultimately boiled down to the Five Eyes, the EU, and Japan. Among the 60 signatories, the Global South’s systemically important democratic tech powers—India, South Africa, Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, and others—were missing from the roster. Kenya later withdrew its signature. Even some of the US’s closest non-Western allies like Mexico and South Korea were notably absent.

The European Commission is already looking at the TTC model to structure cooperation with India. India has become a much more pivotal tech actor on the international stage—banning Chinese software and hardware on national security grounds, invoking data localization laws, imposing expansive illegal speech legislation, eying its own semiconductor industrial policy, and even throwing its weight when it comes to Internet governance and technical standards diplomacy in the UN and elsewhere. The EU-India technology relationship—like the US relationship with India in the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) —could be important in efforts to create connective tissue on tech governance with the democratic Global South.

At the same time, both the Biden administration’s ICT development initiatives and the EU’s Global Gateway are unleashing hundreds of billions in new development assistance to build connectivity infrastructure in middle- and low-income countries. These efforts are taking a harder geopolitical edge as Chinese state-owned and state-adjacent companies like Huawei, Hikvision, iFlyTec, SenseTime, and NucTech show interest in the connectivity infrastructure of the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Africa, and elsewhere. The TTC aims to establish trusted vendor principles on development financing of ICT infrastructure. Such principles, building along the lines of the Blue Dot Network and the EU’s Cyber Toolbox for 5G, would look to preserve the connectivity sovereignty and freedom to choose of third countries and their citizens while excluding products and software could serve as cyber-security wormholes for espionage, data capture, and blackouts.

What’s Next

As the TTC enters its next phase—a third meeting is tentatively scheduled for December in the United States—it can broaden its agenda from the acute challenge of Russia’s war to more directly confront the chronic challenges posed by China and climate change.

First, the US and EU must focus on deeper technological convergence, specifically on 5G, AI, and climate-neutral tech but also anticipating frontier areas industrial data governance, 6G, and Quantum Computing. On data governance, the timing is right to act before the issue becomes politically charged between the two great democratic tech blocs. Already, some in Europe are attempting to redefine industrial data as a “strategic asset”—borrowing on some of the data governance principles of the Chinese. Industrial data could become a new frontline in European debates around digital sovereignty. The two sides could begin to develop democratic data spaces for industrial data, perhaps expanding the Franco-German GAIA-X framework to include non-European powers—specifically, the US, but also Japan, South Korea, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

Second, the US and EU should use the TTC, G7, and other bodies to operationalize the notion of connectivity as a global human right. Together they could establish a Democratic Connectivity Agenda that funds encrypted digital communication tools like trustworthy virtual private networks (VPNs) that can avoid detection and provide links to the outside world for those being enclosed in increasingly autarkic Internet spaces. They should also direct development funding from Global Gateway, Build Back Better World, and similar initiatives to fund a range of satellite capabilities—including SpaceX’s Starlink but also the UK’s OneWeb, the EU’s nascent Secure Connectivity Initiative, and others—that can be rapidly deployed to bridge connectivity between citizens behind digital Iron curtains and the global Internet. This will become part of a global doctrine to allow open information to be provided in conflict zones and authoritarian-driven Internet shutdowns—following the Cold War logic that drove Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL).

Third, the TTC should broaden and codify its work on dual-use export controls by creating a Coordinating Committee for Democratic Autonomy, a 21st-century version of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom). The new body—with an EU-NATO fusion center for information bodog sportsbook review sharing and consultation—could systematize restricted access to strategic technology by authoritarian states like Russia and China. This should include criteria and information-sharing dashboards on dual-use export and import controls of critical technology, investment screening, trustworthy vendors, and research protection. On the import side, particular attention should be paid to Chinese AI-powered surveillance equipment used in smart cities, digital services, and digital services and hardware. It could also work to level export, investment, and IP restrictions to cyber hired guns like Israel’s NSO—the maker of the notorious Pegasus spyware—and Germany’s now-defunct FinFisher, who peddle human-rights destroying surveillance technology to authoritarian regimes.

Fourth, the TTC—together with the G7—should push for the US, Germany, France, Canada, and others like-minded states to establish a Global Critical Minerals Reserve in lithium, nickel cobalt, manganese ore, and rare earth elements—key for digital and green technologies, especially in EV batteries. That effort would be similar to the IAE’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve, a facility that released 120 million barrels of oil in the first six months following the outset of Russia’s war in Europe. Such an action on critical minerals must be countercyclical—this moment of acute shortage is not the right moment to look at stockpiling. But the TTC could start to build mechanisms for such a joint facility.

Finally, clean tech must play a greater role in the TTC’s future. The twin crises of climate change and Russia’s war on Ukraine have made clear that an accelerated shift to renewable energy as a more critical Euro-Atlantic tech security priority.

Even as the Euro-Atlantic tech relationship flourishes against the dark backdrop of war, differences remain between the US and EU on democratic tech governance remain. The lack of US data protection remains a potential stumbling block in the new Transatlantic Data Protection Framework’s ability to withstand Schrems III. Washington’s agencies remain at odds on how to tackle the preponderant power of American tech giants. Some like the FTC, the Justice Department, and the USTR are sympathetic to the Brussels approach while the Commerce and State Departments align more closely with US Big Tech.

But Russia’s war on Ukraine has focused the Euro-Atlantic mind about how much the international system—including the global tech order—has allowed rot to creep in that are now threatening digital rights, cyber security, and technological resilience. Russia burst the illusion that the petty differences can define the Euro-Atlantic tech relationship. If it works, the TTC could serve as a hidden G2 for rules-based, democratic tech governance.

Tyson Barker is head of the Technology and Global Affairs Program at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).

To read the full commentary by Internationale Politik Quarterly, please click here.

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Russia’s revanchist aggression in Ukraine has shocked Europe, the United States, and the world. At the same time, it has breathed new life into the imperatives for a transatlantic partnership and the broader liberal-democratic order it represents.

One key area of added transatlantic cooperation lies with the newly established forum for negotiation on technology and innovation issues, the U.S.-E.U. Trade and Technology Council (TTC). However, while the newfound transatlantic unity provides a valuable opportunity for American and European leaders to cooperate through the TTC, some experts have expressed doubt that the TTC would succeed in solving long-standing disputes.

Existing Obstacles

Renewed liberal-democratic solidarity is not entirely a result of Russian president Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine. In fact, since the beginning of the Joe Biden presidency, the United States has sought to  repair the transatlantic relationship frayed by the policies of the Trump administration. Bart Gordon, former congressperson and current director of the Trans-Atlantic Business Council, described the new thrust as a “sea change.” Gordon noted that “the previous administration … was looking for reasons to try to pick a fight, whereas in this administration, they’re looking for reasons to try to work together.” The Trade and Technology Council is one product of this shift, meant to bolster Western coordination on technology policy against growing assertiveness by some authoritarian regimes to control and exploit the potential of emerging technological domains.

However, even with a more amicable partner in the White House, relations between American and European leaders have had their bumps. In September 2021, just a week before U.S. and E.U. diplomats were scheduled to hold their first meeting of the TTC, the United States announced a new defense technology pact with the United Kingdom and Australia, known as AUKUS. This agreement scrapped a partnership that France had been cultivating with Australia, an action which French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian described as “a stab in the back.” Since this dispute, France has been the most vocal detractor of holding talks on technology collaboration.

There have also been obstacles to cooperation on issues of data privacy. In recent years, the European Union has grown increasingly hawkish towards Big Tech companies. It has pressured the U.S. to adopt digital privacy and antitrust legislation in line with European standards to ensure the safe flow of European data across the Atlantic. Compromise here, however, has been slow to materialize, as many of the world’s largest tech firms are based in the United States and the U.S. has not yet reached a domestic consensus on regulating its tech sector.

Addressing many of these challenges in an interview with the Atlantic Council in September 2021, E.U. Commissioner for the Internal Market, Thierry Breton, a Frenchman, expressed with regret that “there is, indeed, growing feeling in Europe … that something is broken in our transatlantic relations.”

Promising Signs for Enhanced Cooperation

Optimism for meaningful cooperation, though, is still warranted. The TTC is the most promising forum for technology and innovation collaboration in recent memory. Launched in June 2021, the TTC’s explicit goal is “to lead global, like-minded [democratic] partners in promoting an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable digital space, and to remain leaders in developing and protecting tomorrow’s technology.”

Importantly, the Council’s agenda intentionally avoids topics of long-standing disagreement and tension between the U.S. and Europe (so-called “iron rice bowls”) which have doomed previous forums for negotiation, such as agricultural subsidies, the Boeing-Airbus dispute, and Trump-era steel and aluminum tariffs.

The Council established ten working groups to promote high-level dialogue on a variety of issues where collaboration appears possible, including:

The Council’s first meeting in September 2021 led to a series of notable outcomes on issues where significant agreement already exists. For example, on the issue of the global semiconductor shortage, both sides are committed to “identify[ing] gaps in the semiconductor value chain” and enhancing their respective semiconductor ecosystems. The U.S. and Europe have already begun taking important steps towards this shared goal. Of note, the European Commission has drafted legislation to mobilize over €43 billion in public and private funds to double its share of the global semiconductor manufacturing market by 2030. Meanwhile, in the United States, lawmakers continue to debate the CHIPS for America Act and the FABS Act, which provide lump-sum and tax-based incentives for chip manufacturers to “onshore” their operations. While these appear to be self-serving initiatives, the two sides view them as critical to ensuring mutual resiliency in a critical strategic industry.

In artificial intelligence (AI), the U.S. and E.U. affirmed their commitment to responsibly developing AI which is used in a way that respects democratic values and universal human rights. The European Union has already proposed sweeping legislation, known as the AI Act, which would serve as the first comprehensive law on artificial intelligence use and development worldwide. While the U.S. has no similar legislation making its way through Congress, the White House has established several bilateral initiatives through U.S. embassies and federal agencies with European partners to promote “democracy-affirming technologies” and responsible artificial intelligence and machine learning.

The next TTC meeting is scheduled for May 15-16, 2022, and this event will be the first dialogue since the Russian invasion, providing the TTC with a sense of urgency and seriousness that some analysts suggest might instill a spirit of compromise. Already on March 25, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen released a joint statement with President Biden announcing “an agreement in principle on a new framework for transatlantic data flows,” an agreement that the TTC will likely be tasked with fleshing out. Kenneth Propp with the Atlantic Council argues that this could mean a softening of Europe’s position on the issue of data privacy, acknowledging that the biggest threat to European data security is Russia, not U.S. tech companies. This could represent a significant breakthrough in cooperation on an issue where the two sides have struggled to find common ground, possibly heralding a wave of collaborative activity across a variety of other domains as well.

Putin’s wanton aggression in Ukraine has united a previously fractured Western world in a way that appeared impossible just months ago. The May meeting of the TTC provides a chance to build upon previous points of compromise. The United States and its European allies have a remarkable opportunity to harness the current political momentum to forge cooperation in securing their shared leadership in the technologies of the future.

Gregory Arcuri is a research intern with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.

To read the full commentary by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, please click here.

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The full implications for the transatlantic economy are only slowly emerging. But one thing is already clear: as Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is changing the United States and European economies, there must also be changes in the primary forum for U.S.-EU cooperation on economic issues of geostrategic importance—the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC).

The TTC was launched in 2021 to facilitate greater U.S.-EU cooperation in the trade and tech sectors. During a successful first meeting in September in Pittsburgh, the TTC leadership—Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, U.S. trade representative Katherine Tai, European Commission executive vice president Margrethe Vestager, and Executive Vice President Valdis Dombrovskis—confirmed the overall aim of coordinating approaches on major trade and tech issues. They also assigned workplans to the ten working groups and identified four priorities: supply chains (especially for semiconductors), export controls, investment screening, and artificial intelligence (AI).

The second meeting at the leaders’ level is now confirmed for mid-May in Europe. Under normal circumstances, this meeting would probably have been aimed at demonstrating that the United States and European Union can agree to formal information sharing mechanisms on investment screening and export controls and shared definitions of trustworthy AI. But policymakers are no longer dealing with normal circumstances.

The TTC now must change—the May meeting will require a sharp shift in focus and an upgraded level of ambition. Some of this is already happening, and the TTC has played its part. Even though the working group on export controls had barely started to address the agenda assigned at Pittsburgh, the fact that key people had met and been given a mandate to cooperate facilitated the rapid agreement on export controls against Russia and Belarus. Sanctions had never been part of the TTC’s mandate, but the atmosphere of closer collaboration made both parties more knowledgeable about the other’s system—and what they could and could not do—and gave them confidence that political superiors would view enhanced cooperation positively.

In light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it is time for the TTC to become a frontline mechanism for coordinating joint efforts between the United States and European Union. It cannot simply be a forum for discussion of common approaches to emerging tech questions. Certainly, such discussions are important and should not be abandoned. But the TTC can no longer make them its primary focus. At the May meeting, the TTC leadership should:

Make clear that it is no longer business as usual for the TTC. The challenge facing the transatlantic partnership is enormous. All of its institutions must contribute to facing this challenge. TTC leaders should make coordination regarding Ukraine a key priority when they meet, and in thinking about the next set of working group agendas.

Identify the economic isolation of Russia as a key goal of the TTC. The initial target of some TTC initiatives—investment screening, trade challenges, semiconductor supply chains—was China. China has not reformed its approach to global markets. But the issues it raises are not as urgent as adjusting bodog casino supply chains to the total disruption of trade with Russia and ensuring that Russian companies have few, if any, opportunities for investment in the West.

Add sanctions to the list of TTC topics and create a new working group. The TTC will not be the only forum for discussing sanctions; indeed, the urgency of imposing sanctions will often require that it will not be. But the TTC will encourage regular conversations about sanctions and their impact. Moreover, including sanctions on the TTC agenda will also recognize the interrelationship between sanctions, export controls, supply chains, and other measures.

Assign the supply chain working group to shift its focus from semiconductors to the impact of disruptions on trade with Russia. What are alternative supply options for oil and gas? How can the United States and European Union compensate for Russian and Ukrainian agricultural exports, which currently make up 26 percent of global wheat exports (and more of other farm commodities). Ukrainian wheat feeds livestock across Europe, but also feeds animals and humans across the entire world. Can the TTC identify alternatives in the supply chain that can ameliorate the threat of hunger in certain areas of the world?

Add to the agendas of other TTC working groups. The working group on the misuse of technology should become a key coordination mechanism for addressing Russian disinformation, while the working group on information and communication technology security should consider how the United States and European Union can help the Ukrainian government keep communications functioning in that country. Can the working group on small and medium-sized enterprises’ (SME) access to tech include a special component on Ukrainian SMEs (even though Ukraine is not a member of the EU)? Could the working group on technical standards examine not only how the United States and EU can better cooperate in standard-setting, but also ensure that standards are set with minimal Russian influence?

Bring like-minded countries into an expanded TTC framework. While the TTC was designed as a U.S.-EU mechanism, and should remain so, there must also be room for conversations and coordination with other like-minded countries, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. These countries are already cooperating closely with the United States and EU on sanctions and export controls and should have some mechanism to encourage consultation on a less ad hoc basis.

Explore options for sustaining the Ukrainian tech sector. Before the invasion, Ukraine had a significant tech sector. Whether those companies remain in the country or move into exile, the United States and EU should find ways to support it—through money, technical support, and protection from cyberattacks—so that it can, in turn, support their country.

The TTC was launched as a mechanism to allow the United States and EU to address key issues of trade and technology together. It was meant to be an evolutionary process, with cooperative elements focused on emerging technologies. But the Russian invasion of Ukraine has launched a revolution in Europe and in the transatlantic partnership. The TTC must play its part in responding to that challenge.

Frances G. Burwell is a Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

To read the full commentary by the National Interest, please click here.

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That [negotiating trade deals] seems a distant memory now for the world’s biggest trade bloc. Concerns about human rights in China and fears about deforestation in Latin America mean that the EU’s free trade agenda is running out of steam.

Doing trade deals is no longer just about keeping German carmakers and French farmers happy — which was often challenge enough. EU trade officials must now also please young climate marchers, union leaders and human rights activists — and that’s before they even start to haggle over tariffs and quotas with the negotiators across the table. The growing litany of public objections to trade means that the European Parliament and EU capitals are increasingly unwilling to sign off on deals that the Commission has struck.

What intrigues me most about this is that you could take out “EU” and insert “United States,” and it would still make perfect sense. Clearly, there has been a sea change in thinking about trade, perhaps not by the majority of people (U.S. polls continue to show strong support for trade), but certainly among the people that make the most noise.

This debate over trade is not new—the older folks reading this will remember Seattle in 1999—but the argument has evolved. In the early days, the focus was on what the activists were against—most trade agreements, which were deemed to be tools of big corporations that exploit the workers. Now it has turned a useful corner, and the trade skeptics, while still seeing a corporate conspiracy, are talking about what they are for rather than what they are against. This is a hopeful sign because it permits a more constructive conversation, although we have yet to have it.

The fact that these concerns are international is also not new. It was obvious during negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) that the agreement was in more trouble in Europe than in the United States, as activists convinced European consumers that the deal would be a giant regulatory downgrade that would imperil their health and safety. (This concern is also not new. One of my favorite headlines from the 1980s appeared in a Canadian paper attacking the proposed U.S.-Canada free trade agreement: “Free Trade Called Threat to Day Care.” It’s on the wall in my office.)

Sadly, these ideas have not gotten better with age. They were wrong then, and they are wrong now. Overall, trade creates benefits. It leads to more jobs and more growth. As every economist will tell you, however, trade agreements, while net positives, produce both winners and losers, and as politicians will tell you, the losers make the most noise. Historically, the answer was to design programs like trade adjustment assistance that compensated the losers. For a variety of reasons, those programs have not been as successful as we would like, and the debate has turned from compensation to prevention—let’s not have trade agreements that don’t do what we want.

The list of things we want has also grown longer, to include worker rights in other countries, avoidance of forced labor and other human rights concerns, climate change mitigation, opportunities for women, and more. These are all worthy objectives, consistent with administration goals and values the United States has long advocated. (The Scholl Chair has recently completed analysis on three of these issues—the role of women in trade, climate and trade, and forced labor in Xinjiang.)

Where I get off the boat is with the insistence that these are more important than other trade priorities, and we should oppose agreements that do not contain them. In that regard, I am admittedly old fashioned.  Trade agreements should be about trade. Their goal is to promote the exchange of goods and services to the benefit of all parties in the agreement. There are millions of Americans who have a stake in the global economy (whether they know it or not) because they grow things, make things, or provide services that are exported. Improving market access will enhance their prosperity and grow our economy.

The trade activists seem to have forgotten this, and the administration seems to be forgetting it as well. They will be reminded of it if they ever launch a trade negotiation, because I can guarantee the other party will bring it up because it has its eyes more clearly on the prize. That does not mean we should give up on these other important goals. They are fair game in negotiations, but we should be realistic about how much we can obtain and not forgo agreements that provide important market access because they don’t give us everything we want on other issues.

There is a disconnect here. Trade negotiations are incremental—get what you can and come back later and try again for more. Environmental, labor, and human rights activists are pursuing a moral agenda. They want the whole loaf because it is right and just and are willing to sacrifice the agreement if they don’t get what they want. The two groups speak different languages. Here at the Scholl Chair, we’re dedicated to bridging that divide. I hope the administration will attempt to do the same.

William Reinsch holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. 

To read the full commentary from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, please click here.

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While the B3W claims to be a highly cohesive initiative, the BRI has expanded beyond comprehension and would be extremely difficult to dethrone, even when some of the most lucrative economies of the world are joining heads to compete over the largely untapped potential of the region. Now let’s be fair and contest that neither the G7 nor China intends the welfare of the region over profiteering. However, China enjoys a headstart. The BRI was unveiled back in 2013 by president Xi Jinping. The initiative was projected as a transcontinental long-term policy and investment program aimed to consolidate infrastructural development and gear economic integration of the developing countries falling along the route of the historic Silk Road. 

The highly sophisticated project is a long-envisioned dream of China’s Communist Party; operating on the premise of dominating the networks between the continents to establish unarguable sovereignty over the regional economic and policy decision-making. Referring to the official outline of the BRI issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the BRI drives to: “Promote the connectivity of Asian, European, and African continents and their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen partnerships among the countries along the Belt and Road [Silk Road], set up all-dimensional, multi-tiered and composite connectivity networks and realize diversified, independent, balanced, and sustainable development in these countries”. The excerpt clearly amplifies the thought process and the main agenda of the BRI. On the other hand, the B3W simply stands as a superfluous rival to an already outgrowing program.

Initially known as One Belt One Road (OBOR), the BRI has since expanded in the infrastructural niche of the region, primarily including emerging markets like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The standout feature of the BRI has been the mutually inclusive nature of the projects, that is, the BRI has been commandeering projects in many of the rival countries in the region yet the initiative manages to keep the projects running in parallel without any interference or impediment. With a loose hold on the governance whilst giving a free hand to the political and social realities of each specific country, the BRI program presents a perfect opportunity to jump the bandwagon and obtain funding for development projects without undergoing scrutiny and complications. With such attractive nature of the BRI, the program has significantly grown over the past decade, now hosting 71 countries as partners in the initiative. The BRI currently represents a third of the world’s GDP and approximately two-thirds of the world’s entire population.

Similar to BRI, the B3W aims to congregate cross-national and regional cooperation between the countries involved whilst facilitating the implementation of large-scale projects in the developing world. However, unlike China, the G7 has an array of problems that seem to override the overly optimistic assumption of B3W being the alternate stream to the BRI. 

One major contention in the B3W model is the facile assumption that all 7 democracies have an identical policy with respect to China and would therefore react similarly to China’s policies and actions. While the perspective matches the objective of BRI to promote intergovernmental cooperation, the G7 economies are much more polar than the democracies partnered with China. It is rather simplistic to assume that the US and Japan would have a similar stance towards China’s policies, especially when the US has been in a tense trade war with China recently while Japan enjoyed a healthy economic relation with Xi’s regime. It would be a bold statement to conclude that the US and the UK would be more cohesively adjoined towards the B3W relative to the China-Pakistan cooperation towards the BRI. Even when we disregard the years-long partnership between the Asian duo, the newfound initiative would demand more out of the US than the rest of the countries since each country is aware of the tense relations and the underlying desperation that resulted in the B3W program to shape its way in the Summit.

Moreover, the B3W is timed in an era when Europe has seen its history being botched over the past year. Post-Brexit, Europe is exactly the polar opposite of the unified policy-making glorified in the B3W initiate. The European Union (EU), despite US reservations, recently signed an investment deal with China. A symbolic gesture against the role played by former US President Donald J. Trump to bolster the UK’s exit from the Union. As London tumbles into peril, it would rather join hands with China as opposed to the democrat-regime of the US to prevent isolation in the region. Despite US opposition, Germany – Europe’s largest economy – continues to place China as a key market for its Automobile industry. Such Bodog Poker a divided partnership holds no threat to the BRI, especially when the partners are highly dependent on China’s market and couldn’t afford an affront to China’s long envisaged initiative.

Even if we assume a unified plan of action shared between the G7 countries, the B3W would fall short in attracting the key developing countries of the region. The main targets of the initiative would naturally be the most promising economies of Asia, namely India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh. However, the BRI has already encapsulated these countries: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIMEC) being two of the core 6 developmental corridors of BRI. 

While both the participatory as well as the targeted democracies would be highly cautious in supporting the B3W over BRI, the newfound initiate lacks the basic tenets of a lasting project let alone standing rival to the likes of BRI. The B3W is aimed to be domestically funded through USAID, EXIM, and other similar programs. However, a project of such complex nature involves investments from diverse funding channels. The BRI, for example, tallies a total volume of roughly USD 4 to 8 trillion. However, the BRI is state-funded and therefore enjoys a variety of funding routes including BRI bond flotation. The B3W, however, simply falls short as up until recently, the large domestic firms and banks in the US have been pushed against by the Biden regime. An accurate example is the recent adjustment of the global corporate tax rate to a minimum of 15% to undercut the power of giants like Google and Amazon. Such strategies would make it impossible for the United States and its G7 counterparts to gain multiple channels of funding compared to the highly leveraged state-backed companies in China.

Furthermore, the B3W’s competitiveness dampens when conditionalities are brought into the picture. On paper, the B3W presents humane conditions including Human Rights preservation, Climate Change, Rule of Law, and Corruption prevention. In reality, however, the targeted countries are riddled with problems in all 4 categories. A straightforward question would be that why would the developing countries, already hard-pressed on funds, invest to improve on the 4 conditions posed by the B3W when they could easily continue to seek benefits from a no-strings-attached funding through BRI?

The B3W, despite being a highly lucrative and prosperous model, is idealistic if presented as a competition to the BRI. Simply because the G7, majorly the United States, elides the ground realities and averts its gaze from the labyrinth of complex relations shared with China. The only good that could be achieved is if the B3W manages to find its own unique identity in the region, separate from BRI in nature and not rivaling the scale of operation. While Biden has remained vocal to assuage the concerns regarding the B3W’s aim to target the trajectory of the BRI, the leaders have remained silent over the detailed operations of the model in the near future. For now, the B3W would await bipartisan approval in the United States as the remaining partners would develop their plan of action. Safe to say, for now, that the B3W won’t hold a candle to the BRI in the long-run but could create problems for the G7 members if it manages to irk China in the Short-run.

Syed Zain Abbas Rizv is an active current affairs writer primarily analyzing the global affairs and their political, economic and social consequences. He also holds a Bachelor’s degree from Institute of Business Administration (IBA) Karachi, Pakistan.

To read the full commentary from Modern Diplomacy, please click here.

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Biden left Washington for his first trip abroad on a mission to rally partners to work together, “demonstrating the capacity of democracies to both meet the challenges and deter the threats of this new age.” These challenges include the coronavirus pandemic and the climate crisis—on both of which G7 leaders failed to be truly ambitious—as well as the need to “[confront] the harmful activities of the governments of China and Russia.”

The atmosphere at the G7 was of determination to show leadership and of warmth among leaders—with the exception of the host, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who was under pressure from pretty much everyone to avoid a trade war with the EU over the implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol. Brexit yet again tainted the unity of the West.

Of these summits, the U.S.-EU appointment today, June 15, is the least glamorous and the most under-reported. Yet it is the first summit between the two sides since 2014 and the first test of what can be achieved through U.S.-EU cooperation.

It is clear that the United States’ new method is to work with its partners to forward its goals, starting with containing China’s expansion. What has received less elaboration are its goals with regard to Europe.

Biden had warm words for the EU as “strong and vibrant,” but the details of what the two can do together are yet to emerge.

Key positions relevant to Europe also are awaiting appointments, such as the U.S. ambassadors to NATO and the EU.

The EU, on the other hand, has been quite disciplined on the transatlantic agenda, showing that it has learned a few lessons from the recent past.

First of all, EU leaders have avoided squabbling to get the first photo shot with Joe Biden, the first invitation to the White House—it will be Angela Merkel in July—, and gracefully accepted that the EU institutions would be the first port of call after NATO and G7.

Secondly, they have been remarkably united in their public messaging and avoided trumpeting unrealistic wishlists or grandstanding big ideas.

Thirdly, the EU has been quietly but proactively working on a bilateral agenda to translate good intentions into practical steps and deeds. This is not news headline material, but it displays a more mature approach to the transatlantic relationship.

What then to expect of the EU-U.S. summit?

Today’s summit will echo some of the commitments made by leaders at the G7 on ending the pandemic and supporting all countries in investing in a green economy. But the flesh on the bones is to be found in what the EU and the United States decide to pursue bilaterally.

Back in December the EU had proposed to create an EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council (TTC). This is likely to be one of the most significant deliverables of today’s summit. There are multiple reasons why this decision is important. Two stand out.

Firstly, it represents a practical response to the United States’ call to cooperate on the challenges posed by China, a politically controversial quest from the European perspective, where views on China differ from those of the United States and among EU members. Deconstructing the challenges posed by China will help EU member states deal with specific issues rather than accept the overarching narrative of democracy versus authoritarianism that the Biden administration is embracing.

Secondly, it will provide a semi-institutionalized space for dialogue through which the EU and the United States can reach constructive consensus but also manage their differences, which are many, complex, and require the mobilization of several departments of government, which is complicated in itself.

A commitment to greater systematic cooperation on a wider range of international issues is also likely to emerge from the summit. The EU-U.S. dialogue on China is seen as a positive initiative and the precedent of the EU, United States, UK, and Canada coordinating sanctions against China for the treatment of the Uighur minority earlier this year also speaks in favor of more regular and institutionalized dialogue. It could provide a format relevant to other issues, such as coordinating positions on dealing with Russia.

Then there are things to watch out for.

The TTC and, potentially, an EU-U.S. dialogue on Russia in the mold of the existing dialogue on China are ways for the EU to respond to Washington’s call for action on China and Russia. The broader narrative framing global politics as a struggle between authoritarianism and democracy is much harder for the EU as a whole to embrace.

There have been significant shifts in the EU’s views of China during the past couple of years, part at the urging of the United States, part as a growing realization that China’s economic and financial investments in the European continent have the political objectives of sowing divisions and building vulnerabilities to and dependencies on China, and part as a result of Beijing’s wolf warrior diplomacy, which has taken an explicitly aggressive turn since the coronavirus pandemic.

Yet views in the EU on the democracy versus authoritarian paradigm differ widely—from countries that are firm transatlanticists but are abandoning democracy domestically to those whose democracies are thriving but which are deeply interconnected with the Chinese economy and/or Russian energy.

Hesitancy about the United States also continues to hover over the constructive agenda and the optimism that will come out of today’s summit.

The EU is painfully aware that the window of opportunity for the transatlantic reset could be narrow and must prepare for the eventuality that after 2024 it might be left out in the cold—again. The union needs to simultaneously build back better with the United States and on its own.

Rosa Balfour is director of Carnegie Europe. Her fields of expertise include European politics, institutions, and foreign and security policy.

To read the original commentary from Carnegie Europe, please visit here.

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