A future Harris presidency would likely maintain much of the Biden administration’s trade policy, including import barriers on specific technologies and sectors, paired with preferential market access for geopolitical allies – a policy to counter Chinese global trade and supply chain dominance. Trump favors a broader policy of global universal tariffs to reduce goods trade deficits and address alleged unfair trade practices, which would dramatically impact global markets and disproportionately harm smaller countries. 

Now is the time for global companies and investors to assess the risks and supply chain vulnerabilities that are possible for their businesses in each scenario and to determine the proactive measures necessary to mitigate their impact. 

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As a former US Senator and California Attorney General, Harris would enter the White House with limited trade policy experience. Harris’ agenda will be more clearly defined in the coming months, but as both vice president (2021-25) and senator (2017-21), she strongly supported strengthening multilateralism with US partners, supply chain resiliency (against China in particular), and placing environmental issues and protecting US workers at the forefront of trade policy. For these reasons, a Harris administration would likely continue many of Biden’s trade policies, which include maintaining the targeted high-tariff barriers in place against various countries to protect strategic US industries, targeting China with additional duties (in pursuit of reducing supply chain dependencies and preserving US technology leadership), and continually expanding export controls in a range of high-technology sectors.

Strong political support for protectionism and distaste for free trade with allies and adversaries alike began under the Trump administration but has permeated both political parties – a trend likely to continue in the coming years regardless of the 2024 election results. 

However, the Biden-Harris administration diverged from Trump’s protectionist vision in that they were far more willing to offer preferential US market access to geopolitical allies in pursuit of other priorities, such as creating resilient supply chains.  

This is most evident in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which offers lucrative investment subsidies to countries with which the US has either free trade agreement (FTA) or a specially negotiated deal—such as that agreed with Japan and currently proposed for the UK and EU. The Biden-Harris administration has offered similar incentives to rebuild the US domestic chip manufacturing industry and has also worked to enlist countries to join his multi-pillar Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).  

All these policies have been designed to incentivize third countries – preferably close allies – to decrease trade and supply chain dependencies on China in exchange for the US. This multilateralist aspect of US trade policy would continue in a potential Harris administration.

Trade under Trump

Trump’s priorities are more singularly focused on reducing goods trade deficits and punishing countries for alleged unfair trade practices. During his campaign, he and his advisors have proposed high import barriers on both allies and adversaries of the US, with especially high import taxes – 60% – reserved for all Chinese imports.  

It is important to note, however, that Trump does not have a clearly defined trade vision. His policymaking is highly transactional and has often depended on the nature of his personal relationship with the leader of the country in question. 

Former US Director of the Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy Peter Navarro and former US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer – the architects of Trump’s first-term trade policy – are likely to return to a potential second Trump administration. Navarro favors reciprocal tariffs as a remedy to US trade deficits, while Lighthizer prefers an increasing universal tariff on all countries. In recent interviews Trump has promised to implement both policies.

Reciprocal tariffs – a policy to mirror import taxes that other countries have in place against the US – would benefit companies from countries that already have low import duties, such as New Zealand or Japan. Universal tariffs would disproportionately harm smaller and less wealthy countries that are not a threat to US economic security, as was the case with the 25% Section 232 tariffs on steel imports under Trump.  

These universal tariffs would create significant market distortions. Exports from countries like Canada, for example, would suddenly be much more competitive relative to other non-FTA countries, like the EU or New Zealand (both close US allies). Such a scenario would have significant impacts on companies from countries that do not have an FTA with the US. 

There is a legal debate to be had as to whether Trump could implement universal tariffs against free trade partners. While the president can do so in limited cases – such as on a specific import over national security grounds – tariffs across all imports would clearly violate the terms of a Free Trade Agreement.  

The US president already has well-established authority to formulate and implement tariffs over national security grounds and on individual countries over unfair trade practices. However, Trump’s proposed reciprocal and universal tariffs are much more extreme in scope than anything proposed during his first term. Such policies, if implemented, would almost certainly be contested in court. 

Regardless of any limits on Trump’s power, he will pursue a far more aggressive tariff policy than what has been seen under the Biden-Harris administration.

Scenario-based risk assessments: the best preparation

Whether it’s Trump or Harris in the White House in 2025, the most well-prepared organizations are conducting scenario-based risk assessments on the various outcomes of the election and running crisis simulations to ensure supply chain resilience and business continuity in all contingencies.

To read the full analysis as it was published on Control Risks, click here.

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My answer is a cautious “Yes”. Below I discuss several key factors that could determine whether the WTO survives and how they might influence the future role of the WTO.

Will the friends of the WTO continue to see residual value in it?

We have to be realistic. The WTO’s ability to constrain US trade policy has weakened considerably and is likely to weaken more under a second Trump administration. The best-case scenario that can be expected from a second Trump administration is benign neglect and even that is not the only plausible scenario.

The question is how much residual value other key members (e.g. Canada, the European Union, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, China, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil) will see in a WTO that, in practice, does not regulate their trade relationships with Bodog Poker the United States. The WTO’s weakened ability to regulate trade relations with the United States is a huge loss, that is for sure. Yet, the scope of other trade covered by the WTO should be sufficiently large to provide an incentive to these countries to keep the faith in the WTO. While some of these countries have a vast network of free trade agreements (FTAs) that would give them some security should the WTO fail, the network is neither broad nor wide enough to entirely replace the WTO. Also, the need to comply with WTO rules can help stave off internal protectionist pressure as well as pressure from allies to take protectionist actions against certain countries. How much political capital they invest in supporting and driving the WTO will be one of the most decisive factors in determining whether the WTO survives a second Trump administration. To their credit, many of these countries already have taken a bigger role in the WTO since US leadership started to wane. But the next four years could require them to become even more proactive if the WTO is going to continue being relevant.

Would the Trump administration allow the WTO to continue operating?

Three scenarios seem plausible. A first scenario is one of neglect in which a second Trump administration effectively would ignore the WTO’s rules but would not actively seek to obstruct the WTO’s operations. The WTO’s role regulating trade relations with the United States would continue to weaken. However, it would still play an important role regulating trade relations between the other 163 members. WTO members may even continue their efforts to modernise WTO rules through plurilaterals and other initiatives. Some of these members still may hold hope that the United States can be brought “back into the fold”, while others may resign themselves to “ride out” the administration. This scenario partly describes the situation during the first Trump administration if one ignores the blocking of the appointment of adjudicators to the WTO Appellate Body. In this scenario, the WTO is more likely to survive, albeit with the risk of further weakening, unless the other 163 members succeed in their efforts to modernise the rules without the participation of the United States.

A second scenario is one in which a Trump 2.0 administration decides to actively disrupt the operation of the WTO. Concerns about this scenario may already be reflected in the proposal recently submitted regarding African countries to bring forward a decision to reappoint the Director-General. A threat to the WTO’s budget is another concern. Survival of the WTO in this scenario is not assured.

While some may consider that paralyzing the WTO would be in the US interest, such a move would be short-sighted. WTO rules protect US exports of goods, services and intellectual property rights. The US network of trade agreements does not have the geographic breadth of the WTO and has remained largely static for several years. Relying on unilateral action alone to fight foreign trade barriers is inefficient. Thus, there may still be sufficient incentives for a second Trump administration to play the role of an absent parent but without entirely blocking the operation of the WTO.

The third scenario is one where a second Trump administration pursues a “WTO minus China” strategy. This could take the form of tariffs clubs within the WTO that exclude China. The clubs could be sectoral, along the lines of the proposed Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and aluminium, or broader in scope. These clubs would undermine the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) principle, a key tenet of the WTO. However, some would argue that such clubs are no different than FTAs, which are allowed.

Any attempt to exclude China would raise tensions in the WTO. A strong response from China can be expected. Moreover, candidate Trump has spoken about raising tariffs on all imports across the board, not just those originating from China. A second Trump administration might raise tariffs and then seek concessions from trade partners (other than China) in exchange from bringing them down again. This would be seen as an attempt to renegotiate its WTO obligations and would certainly create frictions with other trading partners. Meanwhile, many of these trading partners also are likely to resist effort to exclude China. It is hard to see how these tensions would be resolved. What is clear is that this scenario would put the WTO under severe strain.

Will China agree to address some of the concerns raised by its trade partners?

The United States has justified some of its trade actions by arguing that they are necessary to confront with a Chinese regime that doesn’t “play fair”. US concerns about Chinese overcapacity and the role of state-owned enterprises are shared by many WTO members.

China should have a strong interest in preserving the WTO given its role providing stability to trade relations with many of its trading partners and in preventing further fragmentation. But other WTO members expect China to do more to address the concerns of other WTO members. WTO members want China to make more information available about its subsidies, at all levels of government. It could also show more willingness to address overcapacity and make commitments on state-owned enterprises. If it does not, the frustration with the WTO framework will grow among partners other than Bodog Poker the United States. These partners also will see unilateral action as the only effective way to address concerns with Chinese policies, further increasing internal tensions at the WTO.

Can WTO members overcome India’s obstructionism?

India has been obstructing WTO initiatives for many years, including attempts to move forward among smaller groups of WTO members (so-called “plurilateral” initiatives). Its position is unlikely to change in a second Trump administration. Members’ frustration with Indian obstructionism has been growing. Some members are taking a firmer stand against it and pushing for changes to WTO decision making. Members will need to continue to challenge India and to seek ways to make decision making more flexible. The problem is that a second Trump administration may not want decision making to be more flexible and may prefer a hamstrung WTO. What role India would take in such a scenario, and other members’ reactions to it, would prove critical for the organisation’s survival.

Will WTO members find a balance between trade and national security?

National security concerns will continue to weigh heavily on future trade policy. Invocation of national security as a justification for trade measures is likely to continue and may even grow under a second Trump administration. Indeed, it was the first Trump administration that used national security to justify trade measures on steel and aluminum.

The United States has put forward a consistent position on national security at the WTO, under which there can be no independent review of a country’s invocation of the security exceptions. This position is unlikely to change in a second Trump administration. If anything, the position is likely to harden.

My sense is that most other WTO members are uncomfortable with giving countries absolute discretion on the invocation of the security exceptions. Invocation of security as a justification for trade measures will continue to generate tension in the system. Although a written accommodation may be unrealistic (including because the United States would likely block it), a tacit, political accommodation on the issue could be an option.

***

Given the above, the survival of the WTO is by no means guaranteed. Much will depend on the political capital that other WTO members are willing to invest in preserving it, China’s willingness to address concerns raised by many WTO members, as well as the approach ultimately taken by a second Trump administration. Overcoming Indian obstructionism would help modernise the WTO, which, in turn, will make survival more likely. However, the inability to move forward is more of a medium-term than an immediate threat. Finally, there will always be some tension between trade and national security. A more robust political process (as opposed to litigation) would allow the WTO to contribute to managing those tensions.

What role would the WTO play then if it survives? The WTO will continue to be caught between the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China. It is increasingly difficult to conceive of a scenario in which the WTO regulates both trade with the United States, on the one hand, and trade with China, on the other hand. It looks likely that a Trump 2.0 administration will either feel unconstrained by the WTO and ignore it, or it would seek to drive a wedge between China and other WTO members. bodog sportsbook review Neither scenario will appeal to other WTO members who would much rather be able to rely on WTO rules in their trade relations with the United States and who also see value in the WTO for their engagement with China. WTO members will need to be strategic. It is in most members’ interest to preserve the WTO.

To read the full article as it was published on JD Supra, click here.

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After the 1960s, U.S. policy became more nuanced, with liberalization efforts balanced by new, coercive tools (like Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974) enabling successive administrations to use tariffs and other means to respond to unfair trading practices abroad. In retrospect, the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) the following year may be the high point of the U.S. strategy based on free trade. While the George W. Bush administration was able to achieve free trade agreements with several small and medium-sized economies, two mega-deals pushed by the Bush and Obama administrations—the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership—never made it past the finish line.

Then came Donald Trump, who repudiated the post-war belief in the value of free trade by imposing punitive tariffs on both rivals like China and like-minded partners like the European Union, blocking new appointments to the appellate body of the WTO’s dispute settlement system, and nearly pulling out of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement.

But with the arrival of the Biden administration—which doesn’t fit neatly into the protectionism-free trade continuum—an additional lens is now needed to assess the state of U.S. trade policy. Given the major transformations underway in the global economy, a framework borrowed from international relations would help. In parallel to protectionism-free trade, U.S. trade policy should also be considered along a continuum of realism-idealism.

After the destruction of World War II, the United States and its European partners led a major effort to build an international economic system based on an idealist confidence in cooperative international institutions to advance U.S. interests: the GATT and later the WTO, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and finally the G20 in response to the 2008 global financial crisis.

This approach is beginning to look incomplete. The interlinked security and values challenges presented by China’s domestic and foreign economic practices, the existential crisis of climate change, and disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence cannot be managed by idealism alone. A greater realist consideration is needed of the economic balance of power, climate and technological sovereignty, and pragmatic forms of cooperation.

The idealist structures and outlook that took hold after World War II are often referred to as a “liberal international order.” One reason for this is its emphasis on shared liberal values among countries, like individual freedom, high standards for consumers and workers, and a commitment to human progress. And at one end of the realist spectrum lies a mainly values-neutral stance that only a raw assertion of national power within a zero-sum context can promote a country’s interests.

But another, much more benign view—what could be called “liberal realism”—sees the opportunity for building coalitions of like-minded countries to advance their shared values and interests even in a world characterized as much by anarchy as order. This approach may hold the key to ensuring that the United States continues to thrive in a post-idealist global economy.

To read the full analysis as it appears on the American-German Institute website, click here.

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While many recoil at the prospect of a rematch between Joe Biden and Donald Trump, Super Tuesday’s outcome sealed Nikki Haley’s failed bid to challenge the former Republican president. With the second Biden-Trump face-off going down to the wire this November, the two presidential candidates are competing to raise the stakes against China. Thus, some argue that regardless of who wins, the United States’ overall China policy may remain largely unaffected. 

In rhetorical terms, that might hold true. However, in practice, the gap between their approaches to China may be more significant than anticipated.

With a political career spanning six decades, Biden has demonstrated his adeptness balancing his China policy, tailoring his message for different audiences. Domestically, the initial phase of his presidency was enveloped in a widespread anti-China sentiment in the United States, amid speculations about the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and China’s aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomacy. Against that backdrop, despite undoing many of Trump’s policies, Biden opted to retain the most high-profile piece: his predecessor’s tariffs on Chinese imports. As his presidency progressed, Biden took meticulous steps to gradually escalate the crackdown on Beijing’s tech development without inciting significant backlash from concerned Americans. 

Throughout his tenure, Biden strategically executed his China policy to address the prevailing anti-China sentiment among the domestic audience while minimizing the political costs incurred. This approach not only thwarted attempts by his political rivals to portray him as soft on China, but also shielded him from much of the criticism that Trump faced regarding his dealings with the Asian powerhouse.

On the international stage, Biden has positioned himself as a coordinator among traditional allies of the United States who is also willing to cooperate with China, a stark departure from Trump’s isolationist stance. On the one hand, Biden has aligned allies in the Indo-Pacific and globally to counter Chinese military presence and aggression in the South China Sea, reaffirming unwavering U.S. leadership in the face of China’s assertiveness. On the other hand, he has pursued active engagement with China, facilitating high-level dialogues to deescalate tensions between the two nations. This includes meetings between himself and Chinese President Xi Jinping, despite occasional challenges such as the Chinese surveillance balloon that passed over the U.S. mainland in early 2023. 

Although Biden has achieved some success in handling China, it is important to recognize flaws in his broader foreign policy, particularly exemplified by two significant setbacks in the Middle East that have provided new geopolitical opportunities for China. First, the chaotic withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan severely undermined the credibility of the United States’ military commitments, especially in deterring adversaries like China. Second, the Biden administration has struggled to offer a concrete resolution to the prolonged Israel-Hamas conflict. The U.S. veto against an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza has further tarnished the country’s leadership image in the Global South, inadvertently strengthening China’s narrative a proactive peacekeeper through its shuttle diplomacy efforts.

These foreign policy mishaps may reinforce stereotypes regarding the Republicans’ perceived advantage in foreign policy compared to the Democrats, potentially playing out in the GOP’s favor. To at least partially mitigate the negative impact of these setbacks, which can easily provoke domestic bodog online casino backlash in today’s United States and raise suspicion from the international community, it is politically prudent for the Biden administration to focus on a less controversial target – China. This strategy is exemplified in Biden’s narrative of China-U.S. relations as a competition, a theme that was reemphasized in the 2024 State of the Union address.

Nevertheless, Trump does not share Biden’s consideration in balancing domestic and international aspects of foreign policy. Operating under the “America First” doctrine, the former president prioritized actions that he believed would benefit the United States economically, often disregarding concerns about undercutting U.S. global leadership. Hence, despite frequently adopting a negative tone when addressing China, Trump was still willing to describe China-U.S. relations as “the best relationship we’ve ever had” during the 2020 State of the Union address, shortly after signing the Phase One trade deal aimed at rebalancing trade between the two nations.

Even though Trump recently boasted about plans to initiate another China-U.S. trade war by imposing tariffs of 60 percent or higher on Chinese goods in a potential second term, such actions are highly unlikely to materialize for two key reasons. First, many business and rural Republicans have already rejected Trump’s proposals to slap new tariffs on Chinese imports, with some GOP China hawks even aligning with Democrats to voice their opposition. 

Second, while the U.S. economy under the Biden administration has gradually recovered, the risk of recession and inflation remains. Increasing tariffs on Chinese imports could potentially wreck the U.S. economy again, contradicting Trump’s objective. Economic growth has consistently been a central selling point of his policies.

Perhaps the most pronounced difference between Biden and Trump’s China policy lies in their approach to Taiwan. On multiple occasions, Biden has unequivocally stated that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an unprovoked attack by China. Furthermore, he has continued to strengthen alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region amid China’s increasing assertiveness. 

In contrast, Trump characterized Taiwan as an economic rival, alleging that it “took away” American businesses. Aligned with the New Right within the GOP, Trump has doubled down on his pursuit of a path to isolationism, exemplified by his opposition to the Senate bill aimed at providing foreign aid to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan. Trump’s indifference to Taiwan led China to speculate that the island might be abandoned by the United States if he won the election.

While Biden continues to emphasize competition with China, his long-standing political experience makes him more predictable than Trump, whose grip on the Republican Party is tighter than ever before. Under Biden’s leadership, the competition with China has evolved into a philosophical and political issue, whereas Trump predominantly views it through an economic lens. 

For China, then, the November 2024 election is a contest between a predictable hard-liner and an unpredictable opportunist. As the election approaches, the anti-China rhetoric from both presidential candidates will likely intensify. However, clearer versions of their China policies will also emerge, revealing more details of the policy gap between them.

Jiachen Shi is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at Tulane University.

To read the full article as it appears on The Diplomat website, click here.

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In the end, China bought only 57 percent of the US exports it had committed to purchase under the agreement, not even enough to reach its import levels from before the trade war. Put differently, China bought none of the additional $200 billion of exports Trump’s deal had promised.

Trump’s “phase one” agreement with his “very, very good friend” President Xi Jinping was not a total washout. The deal did halt his spiraling trade war. And several of its elements should be kept, notably China’s commitments to remove technical barriers to US farm exports, respect intellectual property, and open up its financial services sector.

However, signing something that was problematic, if not unrealistic, from the start, shows some degree of bad faith on both sides. After two years of escalating tariffs and rhetoric about economic decoupling, the deal did little to reduce the uncertainty discouraging the business investment needed to restart US exports. Most of Trump’s tariffs remained in effect, especially on inputs, raising costs to US companies. And by failing to negotiate the removal of China’s retaliatory tariffs, the agreement may have funneled any Chinese demand for US exports away from China’s private sector toward its state-owned enterprises.

The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic undermined any chance of success. Public health–related lockdowns and a short economic recession were accompanied by a temporary collapse in goods trade globally, even if China’s imports were mostly spared. Restrictions on mobility also decimated US services exports like tourism and business travel.

But the pandemic was only one factor. Major American manufacturing sectors, for example, could not reverse their poor export performance in 2020–21. When confronted with trade war tariffs in 2018, some automakers moved their production out of the United States in order to maintain access to Chinese consumers. US aircraft sales plummeted in 2019, following crashes of Boeing’s airplanes. In both sectors and despite the phase one agreement, US exports did not resume.

Trump set the US–China trade relationship on a new path, beginning with his trade war in 2018. Nearly four years later, the main lesson of the phase one agreement is that different terms for the trade relationship are still needed.

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The phase one agreement committed China to increases its purchases of certain US goods and services in 2020 and 2021 by at least $200 billion over 2017 levels (figure 1). China agreed to buy at least $227.9 billion of US exports in 2020 and $274.5 billion in 2021, for a total of $502.4 billion over the two years. The agreement also established legal commitments for a defined set of manufacturing, services, agricultural, and energy products, as examined below.

Ultimately, China bought only 57 percent of the US exports it committed to purchase over 2020–21. US exports of covered goods and services to China over the two years were $288.8 billion.

The Biden administration was not to blame, as China was never on pace to meet its purchase commitments (figure 2). Trump’s deal was agreed on December 13, 2019 and signed on January 15, 2020. By the end of June 2020, China’s purchases were at only 54 percent of the pro-rated target; they reached 59 percent of the year-end commitment for 2020. China was never able to catch up, as the agreement was back-loaded, with additional purchase commitments for 2021 that were more than 60 percent higher than 2020.

In addition to the unrealistic $200 billion target, 18 months of trade war tariff escalation designed to decouple the two economies meant US goods exporters started from a hole. They would first have to reestablish connections with Chinese buyers to climb out of the 2019 trough—$13.6 billion lower than the agreement’s 2017 baseline level—before chipping away at the additional $200 billion.

China ended up buying none of that extra $200 billion of US exports it had promised to purchase. (In Davos, only a week after it was signed, Trump boasted that the deal “could be closer to $300 billion when it finishes.”) In 2020–21, China fell $13.6 billion short of reaching even the baseline level of purchases.

MANUFACTURING EXPORTS SUFFERED IN THE TRADE WAR AND DID NOT RECOVER

Bodog Poker China purchased only 59 percent of the full commitment of US manufactured products in 2020–21 (figure 3). Manufacturing was the most economically significant part of the deal, making up 44 percent of covered US exports in 2017 (appendix table 1). Of that, autos and aircraft dominated US exports before the trade war. Both did poorly in 2020–21.

US auto exports reached only 39 percent of the target over 2020–21. The sector’s suffering is a trade war cautionary tale. In July 2018, Trump’s tariffs on imports from China included auto parts; China’s tariff retaliation hit US vehicle exports. US auto exports dropped sharply in 2018, as companies like Tesla and BMW reacted to the higher costs by moving production destined for the Chinese market out of the United States. (Ford, another major exporter, including through its Lincoln brand, complained in 2018 that Trump’s separate steel and aluminum tariffs raised the cost of its US-based manufacturing by $1 billion.) Even when China lifted the retaliatory tariffs, in early 2019, US exports did not recover.

Sales of US aircraft, engines, and parts to China did even worse, reaching just 18 percent of the 2020–21 target. Though the industry was less directly impacted by trade war tariffs, US sales to China plummeted in 2019 following two crashes of the Boeing 737 MAX. Between March 2019 and late 2020, the model was grounded, with Boeing shutting down production in early 2020. China canceled orders in April 2020, and though the legal text allows credit for aircraft “orders and deliveries” (emphasis added), additional orders had not been publicly announced by the end of 2021, despite complaints by the Biden administration that Chinese policy was holding back sales. (Exports of the 737 MAX may eventually resume, as Chinese regulators instructed airlines in December 2021 to implement the changes needed to allow the model to fly again in China.)

Not all manufactured exports performed poorly in 2020–21. Medical supplies needed to treat COVID-19 boomed. US exports of semiconductors and manufacturing equipment also accelerated—thanks to a combination of stockpiling by Chinese firms as US export controls in 2019–20 threatened to cut off companies like Huawei and SMIC as well as increased demand for chips needed for consumer electronics and data servers brought on by the pandemic shift to remote work, schooling, and leisure.

COVID-19 DEVASTATED EXPORTS OF SERVICES

Services were the second-largest part of the deal, comprising another 37 percent of US exports to China. When the phase one agreement was signed, in early 2020, China’s services purchase commitments were arguably the most reasonable. The buying ask was relatively modest. Trade war tariffs had not directly hit US services exports; their phase one starting point was therefore actually above 2017 baseline levels. Finally, China took on additional commitments in the agreement expected to benefit services exports. It promised to open its market to foreign providers of financial services (Chapter 4) and agreed to improve protection of intellectual property rights (Chapter 1) and curtail the forcible transfer of foreign technology (chapter 2), potentially benefiting US services exports recorded as “charges for intellectual property.”  

Yet, US services exports to China plummeted in 2020–21, reaching only 52 percent of the commitment (figure 4). Travel made up more than half of US services exports to China in the years before 2019. Both tourism and business travel fell 90 percent in 2020, as a result of the pandemic. US exports of educational services—Chinese students studying at American colleges and universities—also dropped.

China’s other phase one commitments affecting services exports also showed no immediate returns, although they could potentially be beneficial over the long term. Both financial services exports and charges for intellectual property, for example, declined slightly in 2020; combined, they made up 20 percent of US services exports to China in 2017.

AGRICULTURE EXPORTS SUFFERED IN THE TRADE WAR, RECEIVED SUBSIDIES, AND THEN RECOVERED

To the Trump administration, agriculture was the most politically important part of the deal, despite accounting for only 14 percent of covered exports. When China’s retaliatory tariffs hurt US farm exports in 2018–19, Trump awarded the sector tens of billions of dollars in federal subsidies. In the days leading up to the 2020 election, the administration released a report touting resumed farm sales to China—ignoring the continued troubles facing US manufacturing, energy, and services exports. US farm exports did get back to 2017 levels and ultimately reached 83 percent of the 2020–21 commitment (figure 5).

Soybeans made up roughly 60 percent of US agricultural exports to China in 2017. They were devastated by the trade war, falling from $12 billion to only $3 billion in 2018, when China imposed retaliatory tariffs. Though soybean exports managed to reach their pre–trade war levels over 2020–21, they still fell over 30 percent short of their target.

Products like pork, corn, wheat, and sorghum exceeded expectations, though not necessarily because of the agreement. A local outbreak of African swine fever led China to increase pork imports from the United States in 2019 before the deal was agreed. (In 2020–21, China’s pigmeat imports from the rest of the world also averaged about five times 2017 levels.) Corn and wheat imports increased after China began to comply with a 2019 World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement ruling against its unfilled tariff rate quotas.[13] (Compared with 2017, China’s imports from the rest of the world in 2020–21 were roughly 350 percent higher for corn and 200 percent higher for wheat, on average.) Some farm exports also benefited less from the purchase commitments but from the agreement’s Chapter 3, which removed some Chinese nonscientific regulatory barriers affecting trade.

Other seafood and farm products did not rebound from the effects of the trade war. After being hit with Chinese tariffs, US lobster exports, for example, re-achieved about half of their target in 2020–21. US exports of raw hides and skins ended up at less than one-third.

CARBON-INTENSIVE ENERGY EXPORTS HAD UNREALISTIC TARGETS BUT GREW STEADILY

Historically, the United States has not been a large energy exporter to China. Trump tried to change that by establishing a large commitment for carbon-intensive energy products (figure 6). US energy exports in 2021 were more than double pre-trade war levels, even though China’s purchases reached only 37 percent of the commitment over 2020–21. Coal, crude oil, and liquefied natural gas all contributed to the increase.

A number of factors affected energy sales. Energy was one sector where failing to meet the obligations may be partially explained by (knowable) capacity constraints. According to Bloomberg, for example, in January 2020, the US industry informed the Trump administration that it lacked the capacity to fulfill the commitments. (The returns to export capacity expansion may also have been uncertain, if long-term US policy involves pressuring China to decarbonize by cutting reliance on coal-fired power plants.) The fact that the commitments were written in value (dollars) and not volume (e.g., barrels of oil) terms also meant that they were not immune from price shocks. Crude oil prices briefly turned negative in April 2020, depressing the value of sales; by the fall of 2021, they had doubled from one year earlier, over-inflating the value of sales.

NEW MACROECONOMIC CHALLENGES AFFECTED SUPPLY CHAINS AND FUELED INFLATION

The US, Chinese, and global economies experienced several shocks in 2020–21 affecting China’s purchases of US exports. Some increased the value of recorded purchases, others dampened it.

The onset of COVID-19 in early 2020 led to a short but sharp US recession in April and May; US gross domestic product contracted for the year. China’s economic growth in 2020 was lower than expectations, at only 2.2 percent. While global trade collapsed briefly in April 2020, China’s imports finished flat in 2020. US exports of goods and services to the world did worse, finishing 16 percent lower than in 2019.

The global economy recovered in 2021, with China’s economic growth rebounding to 8.1 percent and the United States growing 5.7 percent. Chinese goods imports from the world were 31 percent higher in 2021, and US goods and services exports to the world finished up 18 percent.

bodog poker review Global goods trade rebounded in the second half of 2020 and boomed in 2021, in part because COVID-19 shifted consumer demand toward goods and away from services. The supercharged demand for imported goods put stress on shipping infrastructure—especially on the route from China to the United States—resulting in shortages of containers, ships, trucks, workers, and more. How much these stresses hurt US goods exports back to China is unknown.

Finally, moderate price inflation might actually have helped China meet purchase commitments, as the agreement was written in value (not volume) terms. According to data from CPB World Trade Monitor, Chinese import and US export prices fell in early 2020 before quickly recovering. By March 2021, Chinese import prices were 10 percent higher than in December 2019; by October 2021, they were 22 percent higher. US export prices were 7 percent higher in March 2021 than December 2019; by October 2021, they were 16 percent higher.

US EXPORTS TO CHINA LIKELY WOULD HAVE BEEN HIGHER WITHOUT A TRADE WAR AND PHASE ONE AGREEMENT

Was the trade war worth it for US exporters? The answer so far is no. Suppose that in 2018–21, US goods exports to China of phase one products had grown at the same pace as China’s imports of those products from the world and that US services exports to China had grown at the rate of US services exports to the world. Cumulative US goods and services exports to China in 2018–21 were about 19 percent lower with the trade war and phase one agreement (figure 7).

These estimates suggest the United States would have avoided trade war export losses of $24 billion (16 percent) in 2018 and $30 billion (20 percent) in 2019. Exports would also have been $26 billion (18 percent) higher in 2020 and $39 billion (23 percent) higher in 2021 than under phase one. Without the export losses in 2018–19, American taxpayers would also not have needed to foot the bill for tens of billions of dollars of farm subsidies.

The trade war was also costly to the US economy through the impact of the US tariffs. Numerous economic studies have documented that the effect of the tariffs was to raise prices and hurt American consumers and companies buying imported inputs, harming American competitiveness by reducing employment and sales. Some sectors and workers may have benefited from the US tariffs, but those gains were more than offset by losses by others, resulting in overall damage to the US economy.

US EXPORTS OF PRODUCTS NOT COVERED BY PURCHASE COMMITMENTS PERFORMED WORSE THAN COVERED PRODUCTS

The purchase commitments in the phase one agreement excluded 27 percent of US goods exports to China in 2017. China had little incentive to buy such goods from the United States in 2020–21, as they would not be credited.

Naturally, US exports to China of products without purchase commitments performed even worse than products covered by the agreement in 2020–21 (see, for example, figure 7). The Trump administration may have deemed such products as unimportant, seeing as 9 of the top 20 uncovered products by value included the words “waste” or “scrap”  or “not elsewhere specified or indicated’ in their descriptions. However, declining exports there simply offset one-for-one any increases in covered products.

AS THE PURCHASE COMMITMENTS END, THE UNITED STATES NEEDS A NEW TRADE STRATEGY WITH CHINA

President Trump’s trade war and phase on agreement did little to change China’s economic policymaking. Beijing seems intent on becoming more state centered and less market oriented. With the December 31, 2021 deadline for the $200 billion of purchase commitments now past, US policymakers are seeking a different approach.

One start to the new strategy has involved the United States working with other major economies. The most advanced to date is its effort with the European Union, including through the Trade and Technology Council. Identifying what, specifically, the US and EU find costly about the Chinese approach is needed in order to begin to craft and ultimately negotiate new rules. Even if policymakers agree that multilateral purchase commitments must be part of a long-term solution to China’s trade relationship with the world, they should learn the right lessons from the US experiences under the phase one agreement.

Chad P. Bown, Reginald Jones Senior Fellow since March 2018, joined the Peterson Institute for International Economics as a senior fellow in April 2016.

To read the full commentary from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, please click here. 

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What is the WTO appellate body?

The appellate body basically functions as the supreme court for global trade. It hears appeals regarding decisions by WTO dispute settlement panels. Its rulings are binding on member states. Around two-thirds of all WTO disputes are appealed and reach the appellate body. There are seven seats on the appellate body and the system requires a minimum of three judges to form a panel to adjudicate a given dispute. Since December 2020, all seven seats on the appellate body have been vacant. 

What caused this disruption to the appellate body?

Starting in 2017, the United States began blocking all new appointments to the appellate body as the terms of its judges expired. Without a functional appellate body to hear cases, the country ruled against in a dispute can bypass a panel’s decision just by filing an appeal, which has major implications for the WTO’s ability to mediate disputes. This move was part of a wider approach to global governance under President Donald Trump, which I have characterized as an assault on the liberal trading order. 

What were the grievances motivating US policy towards the WTO’s appellate body?

During his tenure, Trump arbitrarily imposed tariffs on all of the United States’ major trading partners, launched a trade war with China, and blatantly violated the rules of the WTO – even repeatedly threatening to withdraw from the institution. Under Trump, the United States really began behaving as something of a rogue state in international trade.

This assault was part of a broader trend. The United States has been articulating complaints about the appellate body since the early 2000s. It was actually the Obama administration which first began blocking the reappointment of judges to the appellate body. But it was under President Trump that this escalated. What is motivating this shift? The United States has articulated a lengthy list of procedural complaints against the appellate body, but there is also a wider concern in Washington that the WTO system has failed to address China’s trading practices.

How did the European Union (EU) respond to the appellate body crisis?

The EU’s key intervention was to propose the multi-party interim appeal arbitration arrangement, or MPIA. The idea behind this was to replicate, as closely as possible, the practices and procedures of the appellate body. This interim appeals arrangement applies only to participating states, but any WTO member state can join. By now [July 2021], over 50 states have agreed to participate, and this number will probably rise if the appellate body crisis continues. 

In your article you present the EU as the major player leading the response to President Trump’s obstruction. What dynamics enabled the EU to play this role? 

The main reason behind the EU’s success in taking a leadership role is its willingness to put forward a concrete solution, however temporary, to the appellate body crisis. Ultimately, the MPIA is a stop-gap measure – akin to triage or battlefield medicine – but it is respected as a means of salvaging the trading system and preventing the United States from destroying the WTO’s foundational rules and principles. More broadly, the EU holds a lot of credibility as a long-standing champion of multilateralism. If trade tensions between the United States and China continue to escalate, perhaps the EU is best placed to act.

Why did we not see a stronger response from China towards US policy on the WTO under Trump?

When Trump came to power, China tried to present itself as a country that was going to step in and play a leadership role – as a champion of globalization and the liberal trading order. But that’s not what we’ve seen at the WTO. China has certainly bodog poker review been an important partner in the MPIA initiative led by the EU, but very much as a follower of the EU’s lead. China doesn’t seem to have either the will or the ability to play the same kind of role as the EU in advancing system-preserving initiatives. 

I think there are a couple of reasons for this. The first is that China lacks credibility as a defender of the rules-based trading system because of its own use of protectionist trade policies, and its attempts to weaponize trade as an instrument of economic coercion. We saw this, for instance, when China blocked imports from Canada, and also imprisoned two Canadian citizens, in retaliation for Canada’s participation in the Huawei extradition trial. Second, there is a widespread sense amongst WTO member states that China’s commitment to the rules-based trading system is really only partial and that China will violate the rules when it is in its interest to do so. As a result, Chinese efforts to assume leadership at the WTO have been greeted by a lot of distrust and suspicion.

What has this episode revealed about the strength of multilateral institutions such as the WTO, in the face of spoiling tactics from major powers?

The WTO is unique amongst international institutions because it has a powerful enforcement mechanism – the dispute settlement system. However, the fundamental vulnerability is that if powerful states like the US and others won’t participate in the system and be bound by its rules, they quickly risk becoming irrelevant. And that’s the situation we’re in right now with the appellate body crisis, where, without a functioning mechanism to ensure that WTO rules are enforced, the entire system of global trade rules risk collapsing. Ironically, the United States has been the leader of the liberal trading order for the past 70 years, but since Trump, it has become its leading saboteur.

What are the implications of a permanent collapse of the international trading system?

The very real danger from such a breakdown is a return to what we saw in the 1930s. In response to the outbreak of the Great Depression, you had countries imposing trade barriers, blocking imports from other state, and a general escalation of tit-for-tat protectionism. This response wound up not only exacerbating the effects of the depression itself but has also been credited by some as paving the way for the outbreak of the second world war. The reason why institutions like the WTO were created in the first place was to prevent a recurrence of the 1930s protectionist trade spiral. The danger now – if those rules become meaningless and unenforceable – is the institutional foundations of postwar economic prosperity could unravel, throwing us back into economic chaos and potentially political disorder.

What does the WTO’s future look like under new director-general Dr Okonjo-Iweala?

Dr Okonjo-Iweala has certainly made an encouraging start to her term, but the truth is the position of director-general itself holds very limited powers. The WTO is very much a member-driven organization. The director-general plays a role in trying to broker cooperation between states, but as we have seen the future of the WTO relies on the powerful states like the United States following the rules.

Despite the election of President Biden – and his professed commitment to multilateralism, international cooperation and the rule of law – there has not yet been any shift in US policy on this issue. Even under Biden, the US continues to block appellate body appointments and is yet to lift controversial tariffs on steel and aluminum which affect virtually all of the United States’ big trading partners. The United States remains in violation of international trade law. There is no indication that Biden intends to bring it into compliance in the near future.

One key moment for assessing the future health of the WTO is the ministerial meeting scheduled for 30 November 2021, where a critical agenda item will be brokering a new agreement on fishery subsidies. This is one of the sole active areas of multilateral negotiations at the WTO right now and was mandated as part of the UN sustainable development goals. Not only is this issue critical for global environmental policy, but also for global development because so many states depend on fisheries for food security and livelihoods. So, this could be a crucial test case for whether the WTO can maintain its function as a forum for delivering multilateral trade agreements – with or without US support.

Ben Horton leads the Common Futures Conversations project, which develops new online formats for political dialogue between young people in Africa and Europe. Alongside this he manages the digital strategy of the Chatham House journal, International Affairs, and co-hosts the Chatham House podcast, Undercurrents.

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So common, in fact, that former President Donald Trump and President Joe Biden – who share little common ground – have both promoted the concept.

Biden most recently made the case for buying American goods during his speech Wednesday night to Congress, selling it as a way to breathe more life into the U.S. economy.

But buying American is easier said than done, in no small part because the definition of an “American” product has been muddied in recent decades amid an increasingly globalized economy.

Biden said he has “strenuously” insisted that members of his administration direct their spending power, bolstered by his recent stimulus package, toward American goods.

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