bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_and this number will

Thomas Nielsen — Tue, 07 May 2024 21:20:58 +0000

Over the past decade, international trade has become an increasingly contentious political issue in both the United Kingdom and the United States. Departing from a postwar consensus in favour of liberalising trade, both countries have embraced a more ambiguous and complex attitude towards the issue. Neither country has embraced outright protectionism, but both have sought to manage and redirect trade and investment flows. By doing so, they have moved away from an approach to trade which focuses on maximising economic growth and towards one which involves a blend of political and national security considerations.

As both countries approach their next national elections, it is time to take stock of these trends and to consider how they might develop further in the coming years. As a struggle is underway to rewrite the rules of the international economy in regions like the Indo-Pacific, choices taken in Washington and London will have far-reaching impact. At stake are the standards of living, environmental protections, and labour rules affecting billions of people around the world.

bodog online casino

For different reasons, both the UK and the US have moved away from a pure emphasis on economic efficiency in their recent trade policy.

Although supporters often claimed that Brexit was a free trade measure designed to increase the UK’s economic opportunities abroad, its main practical effect has been to make trade between the UK and its largest export market more difficult. This negative effect on trade with the European Union was supposed to be offset by the UK’s ability to negotiate its own free trade agreements with third countries. The results of this were uncertain at the time of Brexit and have mostly proved to be disappointing since. This has particularly been so in the case of a US-UK trade agreement, which many supporters of Brexit touted as a major goal. In effect, Brexit has meant sacrificing a measure of future economic growth in order to “take back control” of other policy areas from Brussels.

Over roughly the same period, the US has also backed away from its past support for a liberalising trade agenda. President Trump famously started a trade war with China and pulled out of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a sweeping free trade agreement covering much of the Pacific rim. But his successor President Biden has proven to be sceptical of trade as well, imposing new economic sanctions on China, declining to rejoin the TPP, and announcing that expanding market access is no longer a priority of US trade policy.

The result has been the emergence of a new and powerful protectionist coalition in American politics. On one side, it comprises economic nationalists, China hawks, and members of Trump’s Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement, who see trade as weakening the American economy and destroying its manufacturing base. The other side consists firstly of economic progressives who see free trade deals as enriching corporations at the expense of American workers, and secondly of Democrats concerned about winning votes in key industrial Midwestern swing states.

This protectionist coalition reached its ascendancy at precisely the wrong moment for the UK, which since 2016 has been seeking a US-UK trade deal. There has been little to no appetite in Washington for expanding the access that the two countries have to the other’s market, which is the key goal of British policymakers. Limited talks over harmonising regulations and addressing other barriers to trade fizzled out late last year amid concerns among Democrats that even appearing to consider a substantive new trade agreement would harm them in November’s election. Even if there were a political appetite for a deal, long-running disagreements over agricultural standards would make one hard to achieve.

These political dynamics – both the ascendancy of a protectionist coalition in the United States and the specific barriers to a US-UK agreement – are not likely to improve even after this year’s elections. It is possible that, with the election behind it, a second Biden administration might return to talks on a limited agreement dealing mostly with regulation, but talks on expanding market access are unlikely. Trump, meanwhile, is campaigning on increasingly draconian trade policies, including a flat 10% tariff on all imports. His advisors are also reportedly debating whether to purposefully devalue the dollar, which would make British exports to the United States less competitive. These policies could significantly harm US-UK trade and foreclose the possibility of any constructive new agreement.

A whole world of trade

Even with US-UK trade arrangements appearing uncertain, both the UK and the United States are involved in setting and influencing the rules of the international economy further afield.

As it has moved away from traditional free trade agreements, the Biden administration has not completely lacked a trade policy. It has focused instead on more narrow negotiations which have sought to address non-tariff barriers, but also to persuade partners to raise their environmental and labour standards. Its most notable attempt came in the form of the Indo Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), an agreement covering 12 nations containing 2.6 billion people and over a third of the global economy.

Although these headline figures sound impressive, the results of IPEF have been limited. Last year, the cooperating nations reached minor agreements on coordinating supply chains and sharing knowledge related to the green energy transition. But the Biden administration walked away from the portion of the agreement related to environmental and labour standards, believing that the other IPEF states – which include India, Japan, and Vietnam – were not willing to do enough to satisfy American opinion.

The travails of IPEF revealed the limits of the Biden administration’s approach. Without offering its partners increased access to the US market, the administration gave them little incentive to raise their environmental and labour standards, which would in turn make their products less competitive internationally. But this means that the United States has lost the opportunity to have a strong voice in determining the economic future of the region. This points to there being a strong chance that the initiative will pass to China, which sits at the centre of a growing economic bloc called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – and which does little to raise environmental protections or standards for workers.

The UK has taken a different approach. In recent years, it has signed several new bilateral free trade agreements in the region – with New Zealand and Australia – and joined the successor to the TPP, known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The UK Government has not taken a formal position on IPEF, but the UK may try to join it in the future. Although the benefits to the British economy are small, these moves have signalled that the UK remains interested in new trade agreements and wants to play an increased geopolitical role in the region. This looks likely to remain the case regardless of the outcome of the next UK general election.

The most contentious international economic issue faced by the two countries in the coming years is likely to be relations with China. Trump has signalled that he is looking to engage in extremely harsh economic policies against China if elected. In this case, the UK will likely find itself caught uncomfortably between Washington and more dovish European countries who want to maintain economic ties with Beijing. Particularly if Trump also engages in new trade measures against European countries – as he did in his first term – it will be extremely difficult for the UK to pursue a liberalising agenda. Instead, the world is likely to be consumed by a new round of trade wars.

More harmonious relations can be expected between a second Biden administration and a government led by the Labour Party, which has voiced support for the “new overseas investment and regulatory partnerships” which are at the centre of the Biden administration’s approach. Ultimately, however, UK policymakers who want to pursue an agenda of liberalisation and integration will be at the mercy of sentiment in Washington. The UK economy is simply not big enough for London to drive the process itself.

A difficult future

Both the UK and the US have identified the Indo-Pacific as a region which is key to the future of global politics and economics. But political reservations in Washington are currently holding both countries back from playing a decisive role in setting the economic rules of the region. The UK’s enthusiasm is not matched by its heft, whereas America’s heft goes to waste without enthusiasm to match.

By working together, the two countries could offer a positive, optimistic vision of the international economy – one which prioritises raising environmental and labour standards as well as boosting economic growth. The aftermath of this year’s elections in both countries will be a critical test of whether this is possible, or whether familiar barriers and animosities will lead to another wave of protectionism.

Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.

To read the full article published by Foreign Policy Centre, click here.

The post bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_to the future of global appeared first on bodog.

bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_and this number will

Jude Althagafi — Fri, 17 Sep 2021 14:03:49 +0000

Washington and Brussels later this month will send senior delegations of economic and trade ministers to the first meeting of a new U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, dubbed the “TTC.” Their goal, as the name suggests, is to foster high-level cooperation on trade and technology issues of mutual interest. Given the long-simmering tensions between the two governments on matters such as digital taxation, cross-border data flows, antitrust, and more, such an effort is overdue.

Whether the United States and European Union succeed in using the TTC to rebuild the transatlantic relationship holds broad implications, because the alternative — strained engagement between major trading partners — would contribute to the global fragmentation of the digital economy. And worse, it would be a strategic gift to China, because it would represent a fatal dissolution of a key alliance needed to limit China’s technology mercantilism and counter its digital authoritarianism.

Forward-looking policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic need to recognize this and redouble their efforts to build a better, stronger, and deeper digital-trading relationship.

But to do that, U.S. and EU negotiators will need to meet in the middle on some critical issues. The White House should not define success as increasing cooperation for its own sake — particularly if the price of comity is embracing the EU’s precautionary approach to regulating competition and technological innovation. The administration’s emissaries should instead focus on advancing key U.S. economic interests in ways that also maintain cordial relations with Europe.

For example, no matter how desperately the Biden administration’s trade negotiators may hope to restore harmonious transatlantic relations after watching in dismay as they deteriorated during the Trump administration, the United States cannot agree to a digital services tax or acquiesce to discriminatory regulation of internet platforms, as the European Commission seeks to do with its proposed Digital Markets Act. Either of those would skewer America’s leading technology companies (and kill U.S. jobs) and fundamentally alter longstanding regulatory principles at the expense of innovation and growth. By contrast, the administration and Congress could, and should, meet the EU somewhere in the middle on data protection — not by emulating its heavy-handed General Data Protection Regulation, but by passing a national privacy law that establishes a common set of protections across state lines while improving transparency and enforcement. That would hopefully persuade the EU to support robust cross-border data flows, while at the same time defending America’s pro-innovation regulatory system.

The most glaring differences between the United States and the European Union on digital economy issues stem from the fact that technology policy in the EU is motivated largely by social policy concerns — from data privacy rights to the potential for algorithmic bias — and it views the bodog casino proper role of government as one of regulating and restraining digital companies and technologies to ensure they cause no harm. In contrast, the United States has long acted on the view that government is the one that should do no harm — and, where it can, it should support technological innovation. As such, the Biden team should ensure that talks cover how to foster the growth of technologies such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence. Besides, social concerns such as privacy, bias, and other related issues are best addressed at the national or regional level, not in bilateral or multilateral trade talks.

The risk is that the EU delegation will press the United States to adopt their precautionary approach to regulating data privacy, AI, and internet platforms, and that the Biden administration will accede, in part because many Democrats long to emulate European economic and social policy.

The EU could do this in part because it genuinely believes the world would be better off under its regulatory system, but also because it knows that unless major competitors adopt its stifling regulatory system, its own tech companies will remain at a competitive disadvantage.

Finally, while China won’t be in the room when U.S. and EU officials meet, it should be near the top of everyone’s minds. China’s innovation mercantilist policies — from forced technology transfers to massive production subsidies — have harmed both the U.S. and EU economies, and its digital authoritarianism is a threat to freedom.

It is in the mutual best interest of the United States and EU to push back.

But while the EU has sometimes offered supportive rhetoric, many European policymakers are wary of rocking the boat with China for fear of losing market access and risking diplomatic aggression in return. The U.S. delegation should press their EU colleagues to jointly commit to at least some concrete actions, such as shared Chinese investment screening.

Given the increasing threat China poses — and the countervailing benefits that would come from resolving digital policy disputes between the United States and the EU — the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council has significant potential. But the parties will need to start by agreeing on the principle that advancing digital innovation is in everyone’s best interest.

Robert D. Atkinson (@RobAtkinsonITIF) is president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), a leading think tank for science and technology policy.

To read the full commentary from The Hill, please click here.

The post Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_For example, no matter appeared first on bodog.

bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_and this number will

Ryan Murphy — Wed, 04 Aug 2021 17:57:17 +0000

Under President Donald Trump, the United States launched a series of attacks on the liberal trading system, in particular the World Trade Organization (WTO). Kristen Hopewell’s article in International Affairs explores the fallout from this ‘assault’, focusing on US efforts to undermine the appellate body – the WTO’s mechanism for enforcing its rules.

What is the WTO appellate body?

The appellate body basically functions as the supreme court for global trade. It hears appeals regarding decisions by WTO dispute settlement panels. Its rulings are binding on member states. Around two-thirds of all WTO disputes are appealed and reach the appellate body. There are seven seats on the appellate body and the system requires a minimum of three judges to form a panel to adjudicate a given dispute. Since December 2020, all seven seats on the appellate body have been vacant.

What caused this disruption to the appellate body?

Starting in 2017, the United States began blocking all new appointments to the appellate body as the terms of its judges expired. Without a functional appellate body to hear cases, the country ruled against in a dispute can bypass a panel’s decision just by filing an appeal, which has major implications for the WTO’s ability to mediate disputes. This move was part of a wider approach to global governance under President Donald Trump, which I have characterized as an assault on the liberal trading order.

What were the grievances motivating US policy towards the WTO’s appellate body?

During his tenure, Trump arbitrarily imposed tariffs on all of the United States’ major trading partners, launched a trade war with China, and blatantly violated the rules of the WTO – even repeatedly threatening to withdraw from the institution. Under Trump, the United States really began behaving as something of a rogue state in international trade.

This assault was part of a broader trend. The United States has been articulating complaints about the appellate body since the early 2000s. It was actually the Obama administration which first began blocking the reappointment of judges to the appellate body. But it was under President Trump that this escalated. What is motivating this shift? The United States has articulated a lengthy list of procedural complaints against the appellate body, but there is also a wider concern in Washington that the WTO system has failed to address China’s trading practices.

How did the European Union (EU) respond to the appellate body crisis?

The EU’s key intervention was to propose the multi-party interim appeal arbitration arrangement, or MPIA. The idea behind this was to replicate, as closely as possible, the practices and procedures of the appellate body. This interim appeals arrangement applies only to participating states, but any WTO member state can join. By now [July 2021], over 50 states have agreed to participate, and this number will probably rise if the appellate body crisis continues.

In your article you present the EU as the major player leading the response to President Trump’s obstruction. What dynamics enabled the EU to play this role?

The main reason behind the EU’s success in taking a leadership role is its willingness to put forward a concrete solution, however temporary, to the appellate body crisis. Ultimately, the MPIA is a stop-gap measure – akin to triage or battlefield medicine – but it is respected as a means of salvaging the trading system and preventing the United States from destroying the WTO’s foundational rules and principles. More broadly, the EU holds a lot of credibility as a long-standing champion of multilateralism. If trade tensions between the United States and China continue to escalate, perhaps the EU is best placed to act.

Why did we not see a stronger response from China towards US policy on the WTO under Trump?

When Trump came to power, China tried to present itself as a country that was going to step in and play a leadership role – as a champion of globalization and the liberal trading order. But that’s not what we’ve seen at the WTO. China has certainly been an important partner in the MPIA initiative led by the EU, but very much as a follower of the EU’s lead. China doesn’t seem to have either the will or the ability to play the same kind of role as the EU in advancing system-preserving initiatives.

I think there are a couple of reasons for this. The first is that China lacks credibility as a defender of the rules-based trading system because of its own use of protectionist trade policies, and its attempts to weaponize trade as an instrument of economic coercion. We saw this, for instance, when China blocked imports from Canada, and also imprisoned two Canadian citizens, in retaliation for Canada’s participation in the Huawei extradition trial. Second, there is a widespread sense amongst WTO member states that China’s commitment to the rules-based trading system is really only partial and that China will violate the rules when it is in its interest to do so. As a result, Chinese efforts to assume leadership at the WTO have been greeted by a lot of distrust and suspicion.

What has this episode revealed about the strength of multilateral institutions such as the WTO, in the face of spoiling tactics from major powers?

The WTO is unique amongst international institutions because it has a powerful enforcement mechanism – the dispute settlement system. However, the fundamental vulnerability is that if powerful states like the US and others won’t participate in the system and be bound by its rules, they quickly risk becoming irrelevant. And that’s the situation we’re in right now with the appellate body crisis, where, without a functioning mechanism to ensure that WTO rules are enforced, the entire system of global trade rules risk collapsing. Ironically, the United States has been the leader of the liberal trading order for the past 70 years, but since Trump, it has become its leading saboteur.

What are the implications of a permanent collapse of the international trading system?

The very real danger from such a breakdown is a return to what we saw in the 1930s. In response to the outbreak of the Great Depression, you had countries imposing trade barriers, blocking imports from other state, and a general escalation of tit-for-tat protectionism. This response wound up not only exacerbating the effects of the depression itself but has also been credited by some as paving the way for the outbreak of the second world war. The reason why institutions like the WTO were created in the first place was to prevent a recurrence of the 1930s protectionist trade spiral. The danger now – if those rules become meaningless and unenforceable – is the institutional foundations of postwar economic prosperity could unravel, throwing us back into economic chaos and potentially political disorder.

What does the WTO’s future look like under new director-general Dr Okonjo-Iweala?

Dr Okonjo-Iweala has certainly made an encouraging start to her term, but the truth is the position of director-general itself holds very limited powers. The WTO is very much a member-driven organization. The director-general plays a role in trying to broker cooperation between states, but as we have seen the future of the WTO relies on the powerful states like the United States following the rules.

Despite the election of President Biden – and his professed commitment to multilateralism, international cooperation and the rule of law – there has not yet been any shift in US policy on this issue. Even under Biden, the US continues to block appellate body appointments and is yet to lift controversial tariffs on steel and aluminum which affect virtually all of the United States’ big trading partners. The United States remains in violation of international trade law. There is no indication that Biden intends to bring it into compliance in the near future.

One key moment for assessing the future health of the WTO is the ministerial meeting scheduled for 30 November 2021, where a critical agenda item will be brokering a new agreement on fishery subsidies. This is one of the sole active areas of multilateral negotiations at the WTO right now and was mandated as part of the UN sustainable development goals. Not only is this issue critical for global environmental policy, but also for global development because so many states depend on fisheries for food security and livelihoods. So, this could be a crucial test case for whether the WTO can maintain its function as a forum for delivering multilateral trade agreements – with or without US support.

Ben Horton leads the Common Futures Conversations project, which develops new online formats for political dialogue between young people in Africa and Europe. Alongside this he manages the digital strategy of the Chatham House journal, International Affairs, and co-hosts the Chatham House podcast, Undercurrents.

Dr. Kristen Hopewell is Associate Professor, and Canada Research Chair in Global Policy, University of British Columbia

To read the full interview from Chatham House, please click here.

The post bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_case for whether the WTO appeared first on bodog.

bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_and this number will

Ashley Singh — Mon, 02 Aug 2021 14:36:36 +0000

Policymakers in the European Union (EU) and the U.S. have separately introduced legislative plans to tax imported goods based on the greenhouse gases (GHG) emitted in their production. Though uncoordinated, both border carbon adjustment (BCA) proposals aim to curtail the offshoring of jobs and emissions to economies with less stringent environmental standards.

Labor unions and key industries on both sides of the Atlantic support such measures, as well as environmentalists who view BCAs as an enabling condition for meeting the global emissions reduction targets called for in the Paris Agreement. However, the EU and U.S. plans differ in ways that could complicate transatlantic cooperation, as well as muddle negotiations with China and large developing countries over the direction of climate and trade policy. This divergence could imperil the ability of both economies to achieve their common goals.

Divided, the EU and the U.S. lack the market power to persuade China and other emerging economies to reject carbon-intensive development pathways, including the expansion of coal-fired power generation. Individually, the EU and the U.S. account for 14 percent and 16 percent of worldwide imports, respectively. A harmonized transatlantic approach, however, would add up to at least a 30 percent global market share and would likely form the foundation of a broader carbon club of like-minded countries — a development that would create a de facto international carbon price.

Out of the two proposals, the U.S. plan, led by Sen. Chris Coons(D-Del.) and Rep. Scott Peters (D-Calif.), offers the most flexibility in transatlantic bodog sportsbook review and broader international cooperation, including the possibility of a carbon club, because it is founded on climate policy ambition. Coons and Peters would have the U.S. waive the carbon fee on a country’s imports if that country did not impose a BCA on U.S. products and if the U.S. determined the foreign government enforced laws and regulations designed to limit or reduce GHG emissions that are at least as ambitious as the U.S.

The EU plan, on the other hand, has limited its ability to engage internationally: It would only grant a full waiver to countries with a carbon price that is linked to the EU’s Emissions Trading System, which would currently only benefit a small group of emitters like Norway and Switzerland. However, compared to the U.S. scheme, it is based on emissions performance, which would be more effective in reducing global emissions if adopted more broadly. Brussels would impose administrative costs on all foreign industry, outside of the EU’s limited exemption zone, and apply fees based on the carbon intensity of their products.

Both strategies have their advantages; there is a need for transatlantic dialogue and cooperation to develop a common position that takes the best from both proposals to achieve the global climate mitigation results desired. In this sense, there should be an alignment of interests between both economies, which are amongst the cleanest in the world in terms of manufacturing from a GHG life cycle perspective.

The U.S. needs to work with the EU to develop common approaches to carbon accounting. Imported fees on carbon pollution should be based on an objective formula that is independently verifiable as it relates to the carbon intensity of products. The U.S., for example, should not grant an exemption to China simply based on its promise to achieve net zero emissions by 2060 and adopt future regulations designed to achieve it.

On the other hand, the EU needs to embrace a more flexible view on how to exempt other nations, in the spirit of the U.S. proposal. Many countries are not in a position to adopt a price on carbon, because they are in different stages of GHG regulation. Instead of basing blanket exemptions on pricing carbon, the EU should credit decarbonization programs that are enforceable domestically, reportable and verifiable.

A transatlantic meeting of the minds is needed on how to merge climate and trade policy. Both sides of the Atlantic should work to leverage their combined market power, in coordination with other economies with similar climate mitigation goals, such as Canada, Japan and the Republic of Korea, to green global supply chains and encourage China to adopt policies that are consistent with the Paris Agreement. Moreover, forging a common path would help strengthen the security alliance between the U.S., the EU and their allies — a strategic objective that Washington and Brussels should both share and prioritize.

George David Banks is a fellow at the Bipartisan Policy Center. He was the former GOP chief strategist on the House Climate Committee and climate adviser to Presidents George W. Bush and Donald Trump.

Michael A. Mehling is the deputy director of the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research and works on climate policy design and implementation on both sides of the Atlantic

To read the full commentary from The Hill, please click here.

The post bodog online casino|Welcome Bonus_of worldwide imports, appeared first on bodog.

bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_and this number will

Johnny Morris — Thu, 15 Jul 2021 20:17:36 +0000

The United States has a strong national interest in being part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or something like it. The Biden administration has no intention at present to rejoin TPP. If those two statements are true—as I believe they are—then another path to eventual U.S. participation in TPP (or something like it) needs to be found. The White House is reportedly considering the option of pursuing a digital trade agreement with willing Indo-Pacific partners. While this approach has merit, there may be a better way.

To repeat a well-known refrain, U.S. participation in a comprehensive, high-standard regional trade agreement like TPP would serve three sets of national interests: economic, strategic, and “strategic economic.” It would make a small but significant addition to U.S. and global economic growth. It would demonstrate a lasting commitment to the Indo-Pacific region beyond the U.S. military presence there. And, most important, it would advance the nation’s strategic economic interest in updating and upholding U.S.-preferred rules and norms in a region representing half the world’s population and economic activity.

The Biden administration has made clear that it has no intention of pursuing traditional trade agreements like TPP. In his first major speech as secretary of state, Antony Blinken said the administration had learned “hard lessons” from previous trade agreements and that its trade policies “will need to answer very clearly how they will grow the American middle class, create new and better jobs, and benefit all Americans.” Testifying before Congress in May, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai steered clear of any commitment to an early return to TPP.

The Biden team knows that keeping TPP at arm’s length puts the administration in an awkward position with Asian allies and partners, who want to see the United States credibly engaging on trade as part of a broader strategy for the region. This is what draws the White House to a digital trade agreement. Accelerated by Covid-19, the digital economy is growing rapidly, yet there are few agreed international rules to govern this space. China, Europe, and others are moving to fill that void, establishing rules and norms on privacy, data management, and internet governance that are often at odds with U.S. interests.

Proponents of a digital trade agreement in the Indo-Pacific argue that it would be easier to negotiate than a comprehensive deal. For one thing, there is a lot of existing work to build on, including the digital rules in TPP and the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), as well as in bilateral deals such as the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement and the Singapore Australia Digital Economy Agreement. Moreover, as proponents point out, a sectoral deal on digital issues would not require formal approval from the U.S. Congress, since the United States would be making no new market-access concessions.

But there are three potential problems with a digital trade agreement. First, it would likely take significant time to conclude. Trade negotiations always take longer than expected, especially if they involve many diverse parties, complex issues, and high ambition. Second, the domestic politics will be challenging. Aligning business, labor, consumer, and government interests on sensitive digital issues will be difficult, and Congress will take an intense interest in the negotiations. The third, more substantive problem is that trade is only one dimension of the digital economy where rules and norms are in play. There are a range of other issues—from digital inclusivity to ethical standards for artificial intelligence—that arguably cannot or should not be captured in trade agreements.

As it happens, these issues and more are covered in an arrangement already up and running in Asia: the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA). A non-binding undertaking to deepen cooperation in the digital economy, DEPA currently brings together Singapore, New Zealand, and Chile (three of the original four TPP members). It involves a dozen “modules” of joint work, including on digital inclusivity, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), cross-border data flows, and cybersecurity. As a platform for discussion of non-binding principles and best practices rather than a formal trade negotiation, DEPA enables experimentation and an ability to address new issues quickly.

Some would argue, not without merit, that a non-binding arrangement does not accomplish as much as a formal treaty. But there are several counterarguments: First, DEPA’s “soft” approach to rulemaking and norm-setting has proved effective in an Asian context, as evidenced by the useful work in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum (including on digital governance). Second, docking onto DEPA would enable the United States to quickly start shaping rules and norms in this critical area, rather than going through the drawn-out process of formal trade negotiations. (That said, some of DEPA’s existing principles may not align with U.S. interests, and existing members would need to be willing to discuss alternative approaches.) Third, DEPA would provide a platform for Washington to pursue its broader interests in the digital governance realm, beyond commercial interests. And finally, DEPA’s modules on digital inclusivity and SMEs would allow the Biden administration to highlight its efforts to “benefit all Americans.”

Asian allies and partners want the United States back in the regional trade game as quickly as possible. If early U.S. reentry into TPP is off the table for now, President Biden will need to come up with a credible alternative by the time he appears at the annual APEC summit in November. The president should announce the United States’ intention to join DEPA and make this a centerpiece of his regional economic strategy. Combined with new initiatives in other important areas of economic policy such as regional infrastructure, clean energy, and women’s empowerment, this could go a long way to persuading skeptical Asian allies and partners that the United States is back and serious about its long-term economic engagement in the region.

Matthew P. Goodman is senior vice president for economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

To read the original commentary from the Center For Strategic & International Studies, please visit here

The post bodog online casino|Welcome Bonus_major appeared first on bodog.

bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_and this number will

Ryan Murphy — Wed, 30 Jun 2021 20:10:41 +0000

Relations between the major powers are at their worst for decades with cooperation thin on the ground, and COVID-19 having deepened suspicions further.

In April, the US Senate passed the Strategic Competition Act with bipartisan support, promising to ‘counter the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally’. In front of his American counterpart, China’s top foreign policy official denounced the effrontery of those who ‘smear’ Chinese democracy. Joe Biden calls Vladimir Putin ‘a killer’, while the Kremlin has put the US at the top of its list of unfriendly countries. Tension between China and India is high, the EU and UK are involved in repeated spats. Competition and mistrust are everywhere.

Far from producing greater collaboration in adversity, COVID-19 has exacerbated global rivalries. Given that the tensions long pre-dated the pandemic and are unlikely to improve any time soon, it is hard to see how the major powers can be persuaded to cooperate better to tackle this crisis. Coronavirus is just the first test. Other crises will follow.

President Biden calls the relationship with China ‘naturally competitive, sometimes adversarial and, on key issues, necessarily collaborative’. Managing these competing impulses is proving difficult to navigate. One route is the established one, focusing on international institutions and multilateral groups to tackle the big global challenges. In times of tension they have a restraining role; in times of cooperation, they can do so much more.

Yet, if the disappointing results of the G7 are anything to go by, expectations should be managed even lower than they are already. But there is another way. The present atmosphere of intense competition can actually be exploited to the advantage of developing economies.

bodog sportsbook review

A few weeks into the crisis, Ricardo Lagos, former president of Chile and a member of the Elders group of international leaders wrote: ‘Hopefully the international institutions will rise to the challenge of responding to this pandemic with the force that it demands, because this crisis will not be overcome by defeating the disease in any one country alone, but by guaranteeing an end to the affliction throughout the world.’

The first reaction of nation states was to protect their own, hoard, close borders – and indulge in nationalist points-scoring.

The more the US and its allies blamed China, both for the outbreak in Wuhan and for what many considered to be a cover-up, and the more China refused to provide the necessary access or information, the more distrustful and disjointed the global response became.

The final year of Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ presidency was characterized by a COVID-19 policy of denial, denigration of science and, at that point, the world’s highest infection rate. The president launched repeated broadsides against the World Health Organization (WHO), denouncing its Director General Tedros Ghebreyesus as a ‘puppet’ of China; he announced the termination of the US’s WHO membership and $400m annual payment, putting its finances in peril just at a time when the organization was most bodog casino needed. Trump’s approach was borne partly of ideology, partly of a need to create a distraction from his administration’s incompetence.

The medical and health community rallied early, creating an initiative designed to distribute vaccines, even as they were still in the early stage of development. The aim of COVAX was to produce and make available two billion vaccines by the end of 2021. ‘No-one is safe until everyone is safe’ became the mantra of collaboration.

Solidarity was not the problem among the organizations – Gavi, the global vaccine alliance, and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) worked with the WHO to get access to the COVID -19 Tools Accelerator, ACT-A, up and running.

COVAX was heralded as the ‘only truly global solution’, but it was a mix of ambition and acknowledgement of the limited commitment of the big powers to collaborate to vaccinate the world. Still, vaccinating ‘the priority fifth’ of the world’s population is better than nothing.

Vaccines and flags

From the start of the pandemic, in the provision of masks or personal protective equipment (PPE), nation states indulged their competitive instincts. Vaccine diplomacy and its alter ego vaccine nationalism followed this trend.

Public relations battles were fought out not just between rivals, but also among supposed allies. The British government juxtaposed its mass purchase of vaccines with the early failures of the European Union (EU) as vindication of Brexit. For its part, the EU’s definition of solidarity was largely confined to the bloc.

Chinese vaccines were present in, or pledged to, 90 countries. Each shipment carried national flags and were accompanied by photo-opportunities with grateful local dignitaries at the airport of arrival.

By the end of May, China had sold or donated 700 million doses worldwide. Chinese vaccines were present in, or pledged to, 90 countries. Each shipment carried national flags and were accompanied by photo-opportunities with grateful local dignitaries at the airport of arrival. The biggest deals were geographically and politically disparate – from Chile to Egypt, Mexico to the Philippines. Russia was in 80 countries. As Champa Patel, director of Chatham House’s Asia-Pacific programme, notes: ‘Russia and China are not new actors on these continents and are sometimes capitalising on long-established political or economic relationships.’

The key question is why China and Russia were faster. China’s heavily enforced early lockdowns kept numbers at home far lower than elsewhere in the world. In Russia, COVID-19 spread rapidly but much of the public was wary of accepting the home-produced vaccine, leading to one of the lowest take-up rates among industrialized nations. At least that freed up stocks to enable the Kremlin to go on a global charm offensive.

Two regions

By late May, Latin America had exceeded one million deaths, the highest for any region in the world. The region was long considered to be the United States’ backyard. Frustrated at the lack of vaccines, several leaders took to social media diplomacy to ‘vaccine shame’ their traditional ally.

In March, president of the Dominican Republic Luis Abinader tweeted: ‘President @JoeBiden, less-developed countries and traditional allies of the USA, like Dominican Republic, have approved the AstraZeneca vaccine and we need it urgently’ while Paraguay was struggling to get Chinese vaccines because of its recognition of Taiwan.

Latin America didn’t help itself. ‘The region has failed to coordinate through existing mechanisms or to act as a bloc,’ says Chris Sabatini, senior fellow for Latin America at Chatham House. ‘Combined with the absence of the US, this has enabled others to fill the vacuum and split the region even more deeply.’

Shortly after delivering 400,000 doses to Bolivia, the Kremlin trumpeted access to its resources. ‘We are sure that Russian-Bolivian ties will expand, especially in sectors such as energy, mining and the peaceful use of nuclear technologies,’ Vladimir Putin said after meeting President Luis Arce. Bolivia has the world’s largest supply of lithium – an indispensable component in batteries for mobile phones – but has struggled to attract foreign investment to extract it.

Goodwill was thin on the ground in contract negotiations. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism alleged in February that Pfizer had insisted to several Latin American governments that they put up sovereign assets such as embassy buildings and military bases as collateral against the cost of potential future legal cases.

Africa has received two per cent of vaccines administered globally. The crisis was worsened by India’s decision to divert vaccines from the Serum Institute, the world’s largest vaccine manufacturing facility, which had been earmarked for export to deal with the country’s own COVID-19 emergency.

By May 2021, of 36 countries where death rates were rising, all but four were low- or middle-income countries. The cumulative effect has been to eradicate years of development, leading to a further division of wealth between nations and regions.

The African Union has set a goal of 40 per cent of vaccines to be produced on the continent within 20 years. Reforms such as these, vital though they are in the medium-term, will not alleviate the present crisis.

At first glance, the situation suggests a reversion back to the old paradigm of dependency. Yet there is another way of way of looking at Africa’s present predicament.

‘We are playing out the same thing again – but this time the politics are different,’ says Yates. This, he says, is reflected in the leadership of international agencies as three major UN institutions are now run by Africans. World Trade Organization (WTO) Director General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is a former Nigerian government minister; UNAIDS’ Executive Director Winnie Byanyima was a Ugandan MP who then ran Oxfam International. The head of the WHO, Tedros, was an Ethiopian minister.

Alex Vines, director of the Africa Programme, notes a series of regional summits with Africa planned for 2022 (several of which had been postponed because of the pandemic), including the EU, China and Turkey. Everyone is piling into Africa – and Africa knows it. ‘The trend is towards multi-polarity,’ he says.

Discussion of big-power winners and losers may actually be missing the point. This narrative assumes that recipient countries have little or no agency and are unable to disaggregate the various motivations and decide for themselves. Therefore, it may not feel like that now, as populations reel, but developing economies have more agency, more influence, than before.

Do motives matter?

A recent Chinese White Paper on international development states: ‘China considers it a mission to contribute more to humanity. Its wish is to offer more public goods to the international community and join forces with other countries to build a better common future’. Humanitarian assistance merges with geo-strategic motives. Is that noticeably different to other countries’ international development policies?

COVID-19 has also given China an opportunity to portray itself as a responsible, science-based global leader, a ‘pharma power’, helping to shift the narrative from its role in the cause of the crisis. Yu Jie, senior research fellow on China, points to another motivation. ‘Ultimately so much of this comes down to economic self-interest. China is pursuing its vaccine diplomacy to help secure its many Belt and Road-related projects. The quicker those developing countries recover from the pandemic, the better it is for China’s own economic growth,’ she says.

Patel points to a failure of analysis among Western powers. ‘What will not work is trying to instrumentalize emerging powers for Western capital’s strategic interests. This is as true for China attempting to do as much as for Western capitals.’

In any case, do motives matter that much in a time of crisis, particularly when the other side is absent from the pitch?

Ideas aplenty

At the start of 2021, the immediate tasks for the world were: share more vaccines now, provide more money for that international endeavour, and get serious about tech transfer to allow production to take place in more facilities around the world.

Just how committed is the Biden administration? A number of its initiatives seemed designed more to project systemic rivalry, particularly against China, than to embrace multilateralism. In early May, US Trade Representative Katherine Tai announced that Washington would support a waiver on intellectual property for vaccines. A number of countries, led by India and South Africa, had long been calling for the removal of restrictions on the transfer of patents in pharmaceuticals, something that had been agreed at the WTO in 1995. It had become an emotive issue.

Tedros hailed it move as ‘a monumental moment’. The move delighted civil society groups, but startled allies. A number of biotech-strong countries, including Germany, Switzerland, Canada and Britain opposed the idea. The White House is likely to have assumed that it would not prevail, but the initiative secured two goals: it put pressure on big pharma to do more to free up licensing and transferring technology, and it made America look good.

In the same week, Biden declared: ‘Our nation is going to be the arsenal of vaccines for the rest of the world. I literally have, virtually 40 per cent of the world leaders calling and asking, can we help them. We’re going to try’. He promised that the US would deliver 80 million vaccines, including from AstraZeneca, which had not been approved by his own country’s regulator, the FDA.

By this point, the US had not exported a single vial. A whole year after the establishment of COVAX, a mere 70 million vaccines had been sent through the multilateral facility – a tiny proportion of the not so ambitious two billion target.

To compensate at least in part for the political failures, a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) worked hard to find practical solutions to help alleviate the suffering. For its part, Chatham House brought together big pharma, leaders of international organisations and health experts in a global vaccine supply chain and manufacturing summit to look for an agreed set of measures to tackle shortages. The March 2021 summit led directly to the establishment of a COVAX Manufacturing Task Force to address bottlenecks.

Yates, who helped to bring the parties together for that summit, also points to the work of the International Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response (IPPPR). In a report commissioned by the WHO and published in mid-May, the group of 13 global statesmen and women, led by former New Zealand prime minister Helen Clark and former president of Liberia Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, sketched out a credible road map across all areas of COVID-19 policy, providing a midway point between radicalism – what should be achieved – and realism – what, given the disappointing circumstances, could be achieved.

The IPPPR called for a UN Pandemic Treaty and an International Pandemic Financing Facility that could mobilise funding of up to $10 billion per year. It also proposed a new global surveillance system, in which the WHO would have explicit authority to publish information about outbreaks without the prior approval of national governments and to dispatch experts to investigate pathogens with guaranteed right of access.

In spite of the exhortations and the clear proposals, the chances of countries coming to any form of meaningful consensus on the pandemic remained elusive. Meeting in Rome, the Global Health Summit of the G20 proposed a watered-down push for waivers and stopped short of committing wealthier states to provide more funds for the WHO. A few weeks later, the World Health Assembly, the WHO’s policy-making body, stepped back even further, delaying even consideration of a convention, agreement ‘or other international instruments on pandemic preparedness and response’ until a special conference in November.

On the eve of each of these forums, elder statesmen and women, health experts and activists urged governments to do more. They cited compelling economic arguments. Fully financing ACT-A for 2021 would cost less than one per cent of what governments have spent on stimulus packages for their own citizens.

The task is enormous and urgent. The number of doses needed to vaccinate 70 per cent of the world’s population is a staggering 11 billion. So far only about 1.7 billion have been produced; far, far fewer have been equitably distributed.

Has the West failed – again?

On the eve of the G7, the director of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, Dr John Nkengasong, declared: ‘Our worst nightmare has come to reality’. He added: ‘When this pandemic started, we cautioned that if we do not work in a cooperative way and express global solidarity we may run into a moral catastrophe’.

The messaging NGOs have used to persuade governments has become ever more desperate and ever more instrumentalist. ‘Self-interest’ became too tame. ‘Return on investment’ – a curious term for saving lives – started to be used.

In spite of all the entreaties, COVAX remains low on nations’ priorities. Two reasons point to self-interest of the most unappealing variety. ‘For COVAX to work as its originators intended, it needed essentially all governments to buy into it, rather than making their own deals with potential producers,’ Chatham House experts note in a forthcoming July 2021 research paper. The primary objective of the US, UK, and EU was to secure vaccines for their own populations. ‘There was therefore bodog sportsbook review always an inevitable tension, even contradiction, between the expressions of support for equitable global access by governments and their simultaneous pursuit of bilateral deals for domestic populations’, the paper notes.

One example spoke volumes. French president Emmanuel Macron and European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen toyed with the idea of circumventing COVAX by donating directly – with supplies labelled ‘Team Europe’ alongside colour-coded maps to track the destinations of vaccines from rival producers. In the UK, Boris Johnson was reported to have wanted the AstraZeneca vaccine, developed in conjunction with Oxford University, to be labelled with Union Jacks. Compassion wrapped up in a logo. Why bother with a centralized distribution network when you can earn plaudits for ostentatious generosity?

Considerations such as these formed the backdrop for the G7 summit in mid-June. For the first time since the pandemic started, leaders of the richest nations gathered by a Cornish beach to discuss COVID-19, climate change – and the rise of China. Their deliberations were not helped by a renewed bout of in-fighting between the UK and the EU. Biden used the meeting to frame geopolitics as a contest between democracies and autocrats and called for a Western infrastructure alternative to China’s Belt and Road.

The final decision – to provide fewer than the one billion vaccines that had been trailed beforehand, with no mechanism for delivery and with a vague deadline – was denounced by experts and activists. Gordon Brown, the former British prime minister who had been one of the most active lobbyists for radical action, called it an ‘unforgivable moral failure’.

China and Russia lost no time in denouncing both the tough tone of the G7 communique towards both countries and the weakness of its vaccine response. A few days after the summit, the US said it was sending 80 vials of vaccine to Trinidad and Tobago, a decision that was mocked in the Chinese media. ‘Would this be selected for the Worst Public Relations Award of the Year?’ the official Xinhua news agency asked in a carefully coordinated set of social media posts.

Because of the length and breadth of the G7 closing statement, some useful decisions received less prominence than they otherwise might have done, such as the agreement to establish a Global Health Board that could improve the early-warning system for future pandemics. Few would disagree however with an assessment that the G7 had fallen woefully short, suggesting that this gathering of nations which now constitutes less than half the world’s GDP is losing ever more influence.

The economist and long-time adviser to the UN, Jeffrey Sachs, was scathing in his assessment. Describing gatherings such as the one in Cornwall as an anachronism, Sachs argued: ‘The G7 is particularly irrelevant because its leaders don’t deliver on their promises. They like making symbolic statements, not solving problems. Worse, they give the appearance of solving global problems, while really leaving them to fester. This year’s summit was no different.’

Will the G20 meeting in Rome at the end of October, with its wider representation, do any better? More nations and more political systems will be represented. That is an opportunity to do business face-to-face. It is also opportunity for more grandstanding between systemic rivals.

Poorer nations and power

Even at the height of Cold War tensions, the US and Russia were part of a global coalition to eradicate smallpox. Yet with COVID-19, big-power collaboration has been virtually non-existent, with little prospect for improvement.

Biden’s instruction to his intelligence to ‘redouble’ their efforts and identify a ‘definitive conclusion’ within 90 days on how the virus was first transmitted in humans has enraged the Chinese government.

In February, when urging rich nations to agree a target of sending five per cent of vaccines to poorer ones – something they are as far away as ever from achieving – Macron said: ‘It is an unprecedented acceleration of global inequality and it is politically unsustainable too because it’s paving the way for a war of influence over vaccines. You can see the Chinese strategy, and the Russian strategy too’. In other words, competition should be the key driver.

The question now is: have the US and its allies left it too late? The poorest countries hit hardest in the last few months may well remember the fact that America was planning to inoculate its children while the elderly and frail and key workers in Africa and Latin America were dying.

Those countries who were helped out at their time of most need may retain a residual sense of affinity, perhaps obligation, towards China and Russia. Chatham House’s Yu Jie quotes a Chinese proverb: ‘You always offer the burning coals at times of heaviest snow’.

Perhaps with this in mind, American officials insist that they are not trying to pressurise countries to make a zero-sum choice, on health or broader partnerships. As Blinken told a NATO meeting in March: ‘The United States won’t force allies into an ‘us-or-them’ choice with China’.

Several Chatham House experts argue that if the US and its allies act quickly and deftly, they may be able to repair some of the damage. ‘Helping developing countries to vaccinate their populations represents a tremendous opportunity for the West to make up lost ground,’ Yates argues. ‘Not only will this potentially win over wavering non-aligned nations; it will accelerate the end of the pandemic and bring disproportionate benefits to their own economies as the world economy recovers.’

Vines says of Africa: ‘There is plenty of room left for the Americans to re-engage and be involved. This is also where the EU has a role.’ He adds: ‘African countries like choice.’

Perhaps developing countries can make a virtue of this unrelenting soft-power rivalry. Imagine a situation in which production increases and the competing powers vie to entice recipient countries. They would compete against each on the efficacy and reliability of vaccines, on cost and terms – and on geo-strategic allegiances.

‘Is it the end of the world if America, China and the others compete to ensure vaccinations?’ asks Chatham House chair Jim O’Neill, who has been on a number of inter-governmental preparatory groups for the G7 and G20.

This is not as it should be. In a perfect world, multilateral and cooperation would be the guiding principles. And where such collaboration exists, it should be promoted and pursued. But this crisis has shown the world at its most imperfect. If rivalry has to prevail, it can be turned around to the advantage of those who most need assistance.

John Kampfner has recently become a Consulting Fellow at Chatham House and has written the first in a three-part series on competitive rivalries in an era of global crisis. The first report, on the Covid pandemic, was published on 30 June. He is also a Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute.

John established the Creative Industries Federation to much acclaim in 2014, providing a single voice for the UK’s creative sector. For eight years he was founder Chair of Turner Contemporary, one of the country’s most successful art galleries. He is now Chair of the House of Illustration. He was awarded an Honorary Doctorate for his services to the arts by Bath Spa University in 2019.

For four years running he was named one of the most influential Londoners in the Evening Standard Progress 1000 survey. Fluent in German and Russian, he regularly speaks at political conferences and cultural festivals around the world.

To read the full commentary from Chatham House, please click here.

The post bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_will rise to the appeared first on bodog.

bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_and this number will

Ryan Murphy — Fri, 04 Jun 2021 18:28:34 +0000

The G7 summit to be held in Cornwall on June 11-13 will be the first ‘in person’ meeting of western leaders since the pandemic took hold in March 2021.

It will be their first real opportunity since then to work out a collective response to the enormous test posed by the pandemic, as well as three other global challenges – climate change, the accelerating digitization of the global economy and growing strategic competition between the West and China.

As well as substantive outcomes the summit delivers, it will also be an opportunity for leaders to consider what role the G7 should play over the next decade or longer.

The grouping was formed when six of the current members – the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, France and Italy – first met at the Chateau de Rambouillet in 1975 in the aftermath of the first oil shock. Canada and the EU were invited to join the group shortly afterwards . In these years, if agreement could be reached on an aspect of managing the global economy – initiating a fiscal stimulus, completing a global trade negotiation, restructuring developing country debt or boosting international aid – it was typically decisive.

This situation largely prevailed through to the early 2000s, when the G7’s influence began to decline. Driven primarily by its declining share of world economic activity as a result of the rapid growth in China and other emerging economies, the G7 also faced an increasing diversity of global players with the growth in international civil society and multinational corporations.

The change in status was recognized in the response to the 2008-9 global financial crisis. While G7 finance ministers and central bank governors played a pivotal role in preparing the ground, it was the G20 major economies that delivered the response to the crisis.

As the G20 took centre stage, there were doubts as to whether the G7 – or G8 as it then was with the participation of Russia – had a future at all. Many thought, or at least hoped, that the G20 would be able to continue its unity of purpose.

Over its next five summits, however, the G7/G8 demonstrated its value, not just in terms of the nature of the discussions that were uniquely possible among its leaders, reflecting their shared culture, values and personal familiarity, but also through the specific outcomes it achieved.

The group remained a critical forum for addressing economic crises – such as the Eurozone crisis –that originated or were contained within its membership. It developed new approaches to solving global problems that could be mainstreamed through wider bodies, particularly the G20.

With Donald Trump’s election in 2016, the G7 quickly became a focus for major differences between the US and its traditional allies. By contrast the Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union, together with its continued commitment to multilateralism outside the EU, has, if anything, increased the logic for the G7.

The new Biden administration’s energetic support for coordination with allies and willingness to lead on such controversial issues as global tax arrangements and a Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights waiver for vaccines, combined with the greatest period of economic upheaval since the Second World War, means that the G7 now has a unique opportunity to evolve.

To achieve this, there are four issues on which G7 leaders need to reach agreement in Cornwall.

First, they need to reaffirm their shared values, highlighting their belief in democracy, human rights, support for the free market and economic openness. This should be much easier now that Trump has left office, but there could still be areas in which it will be difficult to reach consensus, for example on the role of the state and the G7’s stance on free trade. The leaders will also need to consider how to put these values into effect.

Second, the group needs to be clear about what it can and cannot do. It no longer has the economic scope, financial resources or legitimacy to solve the world’s biggest challenges on its own – not in the short term as we have seen with the roll out of Covid vaccines to the developing world, or longer term as seen with unsustainable developing country debt and climate change. Short of morphing into the G20, it cannot aspire to this.

The group should be clear, however, that it does see itself as having a core responsibility to come up with and champion approaches that can effectively address these problems and that do so in a way that is equitable and reflects the concerns of the wider international community.

Third, the group should acknowledge that a further core responsibility will be to provide a forum in which its members can coordinate policies to uphold shared economic values and interests, including when these are in competition with other economies.

And fourth, the G7 needs to explain how, taking account of these values and roles, it will work constructively with other economies and the global governance architecture. In a practical sense this is the most important, both in terms of the group’s ability to influence the international agenda and in the example it sets to other major economies. It is also the most difficult.

The lead on solving some global issues – such as climate finance, recovery from the pandemic, reform of the global tax system and developing-country debt – must necessarily lie ultimately with the G20.

Others – such as resilience in supply chains, digital governance and national security considerations in investment – may need to be dealt with at a G7 level among close allies but could still be tied into more universal frameworks of benefit to all.

The G7 will need to balance finding global solutions to global problems with parallel efforts to underpin the values and economic interests of its members and find a way to communicate this sympathetically.

bodog online casino Apart from the inevitable ‘not invented here’ syndrome, there is a risk the wider world will distrust G7 initiatives intended for the greater good if they are presented alongside actions that are focused on upholding common group interests. To counter this the G7 will need to persuade sceptics – through practical examples – that competition in some areas can coexist with cooperation in others.

To complement greater clarity on its new role, the G7 should take stock of how it can maximize its effectiveness. In principle, the presidency needs the consent of other members for the decisions it takes on summit organisation. This is rarely withheld, but any change of approach will only become permanent if actively supported by other members and adopted by subsequent presidencies.

There have been several attempts by individual presidencies to review the effectiveness of the institution and hardwire the conclusions into future practice. These have had mixed results at best. But there are four themes on which the group should try again to reach a consensus in Cornwall.

First, expansion: The success of the G7 depends on the like-mindedness of its participants, the fact that the leaders typically get to know each other well, and that the group is small enough to sit round a medium sized dining table.

It should therefore set a high bar for any permanent expansion and potentially rule it out for the foreseeable future. It is particularly important to avoid including new members who would prevent discussion of core national economic security interests – as was the case when Russia was a member.

Second, scope: The G7 has ranged across economic, social and political issues, and this should continue. Similarly, a successful theme may be inspired by an immediate crisis or be a slower-burn, second-tier topic that deserves to rise to the top tier.

But the most successful presidencies have almost always had limited agendas focused on one or two themes where effective outcomes can only be achieved through international cooperation. The G7 should establish this approach as a norm with the summit tackling at most three closely related themes or two unrelated themes.

Third, outreach: Both the G7 and G20 have experimented with a range of outreach approaches to countries, international organizations and non-official stakeholders. Sometimes these have been valuable, but too often they have been largely cosmetic and potentially counterproductive. It should be a priority to work out what works and what doesn’t.

Specific steps should include: identifying areas where outside expertise or political support is critical to a chosen theme and embedding outreach to specific countries, institutions or individuals from the outset; avoiding permanent institutionalized groups of stakeholders rolling over from one presidency to the next, since these can easily become divorced from the presidency agenda and an end in themselves; and ensuring that any high-level independent expert group established to investigate aspects of a chosen theme publishes recommendations well before the final outputs for the summit are locked down.

Fourth, tools and working methods: Covid has transformed the way the G7 and G20 groups have worked over the past year, with most preparatory meetings and contact between leaders happening virtually. It is critical to capture the best of virtual working in future practice, while recognizing that a complete lack of personal contact is a major drawback.

One approach might be to cut the number of in-person ‘Sherpa’ meetings from four to two and add four shorter virtual sessions. The G7 needs to make sure it has communications that are secure enough to meet the needs of its growing role in economic security.

During the Cornwall summit, the British presidency has a rare opportunity to communicate a clear vision of what the G7 is for and how it will operate in the future. This would be an important contribution to the wider system of global governance, enhancing the influence of the individual G7 members and setting an example to similar groups in what could otherwise become an increasingly fragmented and dysfunctional system.

We should all hope that it steps up to this challenge.

Creon Butler joined Chatham House from the Cabinet Office where he served as director for international economic affairs in the National Security Secretariat and G7/G20 ‘sous sherpa’, advising on global policy issues such as climate change, natural resource security, global health threats and the future of the international economic architecture. Earlier in his career, he served in the Bank of England, HM Treasury and in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, where he was director for economic policy and chief economic adviser.

To read the full commentary from Chatham House, please click here.

Image from metro.co.uk

The post Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_by its declining share appeared first on bodog.

bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_and this number will

Ryan Murphy — Fri, 04 Jun 2021 15:03:14 +0000

The stars may, at long last, be aligned for closer transatlantic cooperation on climate change. As US President Joe Biden heads to Europe, he should be preparing to make the most of this promising constellation.

Both the European Union and the United States have now committed to achieving climate neutrality by 2050. And they have established similar milestones along the way: by 2030, the EU intends to slash its greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions by at least 55%, relative to the level in 1990, while the US intends to cut them by 50-52% from their 2005 level.

To fulfil these commitments, the EU and the US will have to overcome many of the same challenges. For starters, they must scale up the deployment of existing clean technologies (including solar panels, wind turbines, and electric vehicles) and foster innovation in emerging technologies (such as green hydrogen, solid-state batteries, and enabling digital innovations). Here, cooperation could go a long way toward accelerating progress.

Second, the EU and the US need to make better use of carbon pricing, where Europe is leading the way: it has already established the world’s largest carbon market, which it soon plans to upgrade and expand. The US currently has no country-wide carbon-pricing system, but the intellectual and political momentum for one is building.

Yet harnessing this momentum to make real progress in the US, and ensuring the fairness and political durability of any carbon-pricing system, will demand measures to address distributional effects. Returning the revenue to the public as carbon dividends could prove vital.

Third, both the EU and the US will have to address the socioeconomic disruptions arising from the green transition. This means facilitating industrial transformation in carbon-intensive regions and assisting workers who are forced to change jobs. Employment and economic opportunity are central to climate strategies in both the US – “when people talk about climate, I think jobs,” Biden recently declared – and Europe, with its green “industrial strategy.”

The EU and the US are also aligned in terms of the international climate imperatives they face. Neither side’s efforts will count for much if they do not also support the green transition in developing countries. To this end, mobilising climate finance and facilitating transfers of clean technology are essential.

Supporting developing countries’ green transition could go a long way toward deterring “carbon leakage”: when companies relocate production to countries with lower carbon taxes or less stringent environmental regulations. But more direct solutions – such as a carbon border adjustment mechanism, whereby companies pay a higher price to import goods whose production involved higher GHG emissions – will also be needed.

The EU is already working on such a mechanism as part of the European Green Deal. This is clearly a good thing. But a joint EU-US mechanism would be better – especially if it was part of a broader transatlantic green deal.

In fact, the EU and the US should go even further and create a “climate club,” as Nobel laureate economist William Nordhaus proposed in 2015. As one of us (Simone) and Guntram B. Wolff recently argued, economies would have to take four steps to join: strengthen and align domestic targets; agree to a system for quantifying and comparing domestic climate policies; establish a standard for measuring the carbon content of complex goods; and ensure transparent taxation and regulation.

Any country that wanted to join the climate club should be welcomed. This would help to advance another shared EU-US interest: establishing rules of the game in emerging sectors and markets, such as green hydrogen and sustainable finance.

Markets need widely accepted rules to grow and develop, and those who help to devise those rules reap a significant strategic advantage. Nobody is better positioned to claim that advantage than the US and Europe, which together represent 40% of global GDP and 30% of goods imports.

Other countries cannot ignore what happens in the US or Europe. If they take joint action – whether to adopt a joint sustainable-finance taxonomy or introduce a climate border adjustment mechanism – others would surely follow suit. Beyond accelerating climate action worldwide, this would strengthen the global leadership position of the EU and the US – and reinforce the open, rules-based multilateral system they support.

Add to all this the values and principles that the EU and the US share – including respect for human rights and the rule of law – and it seems clear that greater climate cooperation is in both sides’ interests. Biden’s trip to Europe is the ideal opportunity to get started.

Ana Palacio is an international lawyer specializing in international and European Union law. Ms. Palacio is a Member of the Council of State of Spain and is the Founding Partner of the law and public affairs firm Palacio y Asociados.

Simone Tagliapietra is a Senior fellow at Bruegel. He is also Adjunct professor of Energy, Climate and Environmental Policy at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore and at The Johns Hopkins University – School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Europe.

To read the full commentary from Bruegel, please click here.

The post bodog poker review|Most Popular_and appeared first on bodog.

bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_and this number will

Ashley Singh — Tue, 04 May 2021 19:01:27 +0000

We launched the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center in 2021 with a clear purpose: fostering a close US relationship with a strong and united European Union (EU) as America’s best asset in navigating global challenges.

From its foundation with the Coal and Steel Community in 1950, European integration has been supported by American diplomacy. In a letter to EU founding father Jean Monnet, President John F. Kennedy asserted that “ever since the war the reconstruction and the knitting together of Europe have been objectives of United States policy, for we have recognized with you that in unity lies strength. And we have also recognized with you that a strong Europe would be good not only for Europeans but for the world. America and a united Europe, working in full and effective partnership can find solutions to those urgent problems that confront all mankind in this crucial time.”

But while the transatlantic relationship is rooted in a history of common values and strategic interests, we can’t take solace in the successes of the past, nor ignore the challenges of the future. The alliance has grown more turbulent in the past several years, as a backlash against globalization, liberalism, and trade has swept through our societies. We should treat those years not as an aberration but as a warning—and learn their lessons.

With the post-COVID world in sight and a new American administration in place, 2021 offers a unique opportunity to reset and reshape the transatlantic relationship and ask some important questions. What do we expect from each other? What can we learn from each other? And, more importantly, what can we achieve together?

In recent years, the EU has become a key international player in setting standards on trade, the environment, and the digital space, harnessing the power of its single market. With its agenda on content removal, data privacy, and ethics around artificial intelligence, for instance, the European Commission is shaping global norms and sparking a transatlantic debate over the role of tech platforms. In multilateral fora, Europeans are increasingly learning to speak with one voice. And the EU has also started to take security matters into its own hands. As the United States reckons with the challenge represented by China’s growing assertiveness, responses can’t be solely, or even primarily, military in nature. The United States will need to partner with its allies to once again define the norms and rules of the global system. Embracing the EU as a partner in this endeavor is as important as strengthening the foundations of NATO and bilateral relations with European states, if not more so.

And both the European Union and the United States are hugely influential actors in the global economy. The EU is America’s largest trade partner. According to the United States Trade Representative, US goods and services trade with the 27 members of the EU amounted to $1.1 trillion in 2019, and the EU 27’s foreign direct investment in the United States totaled $2 trillion that same year. As the European Commission notes, “either the EU or the US is the bodog sportsbook review largest trade and investment partner for almost all other countries in the global economy.” Combined, the European Union and United States represent about half of global gross domestic product and almost one-third of global trade flows.

Many useful ideas have been advanced lately to shape the transatlantic conversation. In its December communication on transatlantic relations, for example, the European Commission proposed the creation of a Trade and Technology Council—an idea embraced by Atlantic Council experts as well as tech companies. Others have highlighted the need for a structured US-EU strategic dialogue.

And that’s where the EU-US Future Forum, which gets underway this week from May 5 through May 7, comes in. Created by the Atlantic Council in partnership with the European Union Delegation to the United States, the forum intends to provide a new platform for US and EU officials, as well as experts, business leaders, and civil-society figures, to discuss trade, tech, energy, space, defense and security, and the recovery from COVID-19. These conversations should not be limited to the Beltway. In recent months, we have conducted focus groups across the United States with diverse groups of Americans in Oregon, Indiana, Florida, and Michigan to hear more about their views of Europe and what they expect from the US-EU relationship. We will bring those voices into the conversation as well.

Celebrating the US-EU relationship does not mean papering over our differences or attributing them to simple misunderstandings. Disagreements and misunderstandings did not disappear with a change of president in the White House. Polling conducted among European publics since the US election shows that trust has not been immediately restored. Trade disputes still loom on the horizon. The conclusion of the EU’s Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China has created controversy on both sides of the Atlantic and is currently subject to a heated debate in the European Parliament. Reconciling different views on regulation of the digital space is essential to addressing authoritarian regimes like China, whose vision for online privacy diverges dramatically from the nuanced divisions within the transatlantic alliance. With the United States rejoining the Paris climate agreement and President Joe Biden setting ambitious targets for carbon-emissions reductions, both sides agree on the need to respond to the climate-change emergency. But they may well differ on the ways to get there.

Allies disagree. They have their own interests and agendas. That’s fine. Our role is to build the platform where those views can be aired and resolved. Addressing these issues head-on will help shape shared answers that will strengthen both sides of the Atlantic, remind us of what we have in common, and prepare us to act together for decades to come.

Benjamin Haddad is the director of the Europe Center at the Atlantic Council.

To read the original blog by the Atlantic Council, please click here.

The post bodog poker review|Most Popular_climate appeared first on bodog.

bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_and this number will

Ashley Singh — Fri, 09 Apr 2021 18:53:53 +0000

Two decades ago, countries saw global trade in technology goods and services as an on-ramp to the economy of the 21st century. International agreements to eliminate barriers to trade in technology goods and services helped enable dramatic increases in technology trade, while countries looked to promote foreign investment in the cutting-edge technologies of the future. Consumers everywhere got access to new, lower-priced technology, millions of jobs were created and businesses from Paris to Pittsburgh have been able to reach new customers around the world, generating trillions of dollars in sales.

Times have changed: We’re all using digital tools, and recognizing the risks of abuse and the need for responsible innovation. But while well-crafted regulation can help unlock the benefits of technology, an explosion in national policies is detering trade in technology. Those barriers include not just tariffs (which have also beset other sectors), but also trade controls, discriminatory taxes, investment restrictions and novel digital regulations aimed straight at foreign-headquartered companies. In short, we’re seeing the erosion of a carefully nurtured global trading system that has contributed to progress and prosperity in the U.S. and around the world.

This erosion of trade norms isn’t limited to the U.S.-China relationship. Even more concerningly, the technology trade relationship between the U.S. and Europe — once one of the closest in the world — is fraying.

In Washington, in recent years, “transatlantic tech policy” has been largely reduced to pressing Europe to follow U.S. supply chain initiatives. Meanwhile Europe has undertaken a broad series of unilateral initiatives in areas ranging from digital taxes to market regulation. Transatlantic coordination has largely become an afterthought, if it’s thought of at all.

These policy trends hurt both the U.S. and European economies, risking the 16 million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic linked to transatlantic trade and investment. They also make it harder for the U.S. and the EU to address new global technology challenges and partner with emerging economies in Asia.

But there’s a better path forward. Coming out of the pandemic, with new momentum behind bilateral cooperation, we have a chance to revitalize the transatlantic technology trade relationship.

The European Commission recently proposed an EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC). The United States should accept the invitation — and build on it. An expedited high-level trade dialogue on technology issues is critical to avoid unilateral approaches on pressing issues like data flows that are essential to commerce, regulation of digital platforms that we all use every day, and other essential components of a modern economy. A TTC could also prevent divergence on emerging areas like artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies and promote cooperation on third-country technology challenges.

Of course a TTC needs to be set up for success. When entering trade negotiations, each side typically avoids preemptive or unilateral actions that might foreclose meaningful alignment. In entering a TTC, both sides should commit to meaningful consultation before taking any further actions harming transatlantic tech trade. The U.S. should not enact new privacy or technology trade control regulations without consulting with the EU; the EU should pursue bilateral consultation to ensure technology initiatives like the Digital Markets Act reflect the EU-U.S. values-based alliance. Quickly forming a TTC can help drive a consistent and non-discriminatory approach on these challenging new areas of technology regulation.

The need for alignment has never been greater or more urgent. An aligned approach will promote more tech-enabled economic growth; tech-supported measures to tackle other shared challenges like climate change; and new norms to ensure that technology will — in the words of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken — “protect your privacy, make the world safer and healthier, and make democracies more resilient.”

The historic partnership between Europe and the U.S. faces a profound challenge — but also an opportunity to re-build based on shared values of openness and connectivity. As European Commission Executive Vice-President Dombrovskis said recently: “The bottom line is simple: whatever challenges the EU and U.S. face, there is no stronger values-based alliance in the world … So, even if the current crisis feeds the temptation to look inward, this is not the answer.” We couldn’t agree more.

Karan Bhatia is an American attorney and former senior official in the Bush administration.

To read the original blog, please click here.

The post bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_These policy trends hurt appeared first on bodog.