As both countries approach their next national elections, it is time to take stock of these trends and to consider how they might develop further in the coming years. As a struggle is underway to rewrite the rules of the international economy in regions like the Indo-Pacific, choices taken in Washington and London will have far-reaching impact. At stake are the standards of living, environmental protections, and labour rules affecting billions of people around the world.

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For different reasons, both the UK and the US have moved away from a pure emphasis on economic efficiency in their recent trade policy.

Although supporters often claimed that Brexit was a free trade measure designed to increase the UK’s economic opportunities abroad, its main practical effect has been to make trade between the UK and its largest export market more difficult. This negative effect on trade with the European Union was supposed to be offset by the UK’s ability to negotiate its own free trade agreements with third countries. The results of this were uncertain at the time of Brexit and have mostly proved to be disappointing since. This has particularly been so in the case of a US-UK trade agreement, which many supporters of Brexit touted as a major goal. In effect, Brexit has meant sacrificing a measure of future economic growth in order to “take back control” of other policy areas from Brussels.

Over roughly the same period, the US has also backed away from its past support for a liberalising trade agenda. President Trump famously started a trade war with China and pulled out of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a sweeping free trade agreement covering much of the Pacific rim. But his successor President Biden has proven to be sceptical of trade as well, imposing new economic sanctions on China, declining to rejoin the TPP, and announcing that expanding market access is no longer a priority of US trade policy.

The result has been the emergence of a new and powerful protectionist coalition in American politics. On one side, it comprises economic nationalists, China hawks, and members of Trump’s Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement, who see trade as weakening the American economy and destroying its manufacturing base. The other side consists firstly of economic progressives who see free trade deals as enriching corporations at the expense of American workers, and secondly of Democrats concerned about winning votes in key industrial Midwestern swing states.

This protectionist coalition reached its ascendancy at precisely the wrong moment for the UK, which since 2016 has been seeking a US-UK trade deal. There has been little to no appetite in Washington for expanding the access that the two countries have to the other’s market, which is the key goal of British policymakers. Limited talks over harmonising regulations and addressing other barriers to trade fizzled out late last year amid concerns among Democrats that even appearing to consider a substantive new trade agreement would harm them in November’s election. Even if there were a political appetite for a deal, long-running disagreements over agricultural standards would make one hard to achieve.

These political dynamics – both the ascendancy of a protectionist coalition in the United States and the specific barriers to a US-UK agreement – are not likely to improve even after this year’s elections. It is possible that, with the election behind it, a second Biden administration might return to talks on a limited agreement dealing mostly with regulation, but talks on expanding market access bodog poker review are unlikely. Trump, meanwhile, is campaigning on increasingly draconian trade policies, including a flat 10% tariff on all imports. His advisors are also reportedly debating whether to purposefully devalue the dollar, which would make British exports to the United States less competitive. These policies could significantly harm US-UK trade and foreclose the possibility of any constructive new agreement.

A whole world of trade

Even with US-UK trade arrangements appearing uncertain, both the UK and the United States are involved in setting and influencing the rules of the international economy further afield.

As it has moved away from traditional free trade agreements, the Biden administration has not completely lacked a trade policy. It has focused instead on more narrow negotiations which have sought to address non-tariff barriers, but also to persuade partners to raise their environmental and labour standards. Its most notable attempt came in the form of the Indo Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), an agreement covering 12 nations containing 2.6 billion people and over a third of the global economy.

Although these headline figures sound impressive, the results of IPEF have been limited. Last year, the cooperating nations reached minor agreements on coordinating supply chains and sharing knowledge related to the green energy transition. But the Biden administration walked away from the portion of the agreement related to environmental and labour standards, believing that the other IPEF states – which include India, Japan, and Vietnam – were not willing to do enough to satisfy American opinion.

The travails of IPEF revealed the limits of the Biden administration’s approach. Without offering its partners increased access to the US market, the administration gave them little incentive to raise their environmental and labour standards, which would in turn make their products less competitive internationally. But this means that the United States has lost the opportunity to have a strong voice in determining the economic future of the region. This points to there being a strong chance that the initiative will pass to China, which sits at the centre of a growing economic bloc called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – and which does little to raise environmental protections or standards for workers.

The UK has taken a different approach. In recent years, it has signed several new bilateral free trade agreements in the region – with New Zealand and Australia – and joined the successor to the TPP, known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The UK Government has not taken a formal position on IPEF, but the UK may try to join it in the future. Although the benefits to the British economy are small, these moves have signalled that the UK remains interested in new trade agreements and wants to play an increased geopolitical role in the region. This looks likely to remain the case regardless of the outcome of the next UK general election.

The most contentious international economic issue faced by the two countries in the coming years is likely to be relations with China. Trump has signalled that he is looking to engage in extremely harsh economic policies against China if elected. In this case, the UK will likely find itself caught uncomfortably between Washington and more dovish European countries who want to maintain economic ties with Beijing. Particularly if Trump also engages in new trade measures against European countries – as he did in his first term – it will be extremely difficult for the UK to pursue a liberalising agenda. Instead, the world is likely to be consumed by a new round of trade wars.

More harmonious relations can be expected between a second Biden administration and a government led by the Labour Party, which has voiced support for the “new overseas investment and regulatory partnerships” which are at the centre of the Biden administration’s approach. Ultimately, however, UK policymakers who want to pursue an agenda of liberalisation and integration will be at the mercy of sentiment in Washington. The UK economy is simply not big enough for London to drive the process itself.

A difficult future

Both the UK and the US have identified the Indo-Pacific as a region which is key to the future of global politics and economics. But political reservations in Washington are currently holding both countries back from playing a decisive role in setting the economic rules of the region. The UK’s enthusiasm is not matched by its heft, whereas America’s heft goes to waste without enthusiasm to match.

By working together, Bodog Poker the two countries could offer a positive, optimistic vision of the international economy – one which prioritises raising environmental and labour standards as well as boosting economic growth. The aftermath of this year’s elections in both countries will be a critical test of whether this is possible, or whether familiar barriers and animosities will lead to another wave of protectionism.

Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.

To read the full article published by Foreign Policy Centre, click here.

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Comprised of the United States and eleven other Pacific Rim countries—including economic heavyweight Japan—the TPP was found by a 2016 Cato analysis to result in net trade liberalization. A study by the U.S. International Trade Commission calculated a real U.S. GDP increase of $42.7 billion through 2032 as a result of TPP membership while a Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) working paper foresaw gains to U.S. real incomes of $131 billion through 2030.

But the United States withdrew from the TPP, and those gains never happened.

The TPP, however, was aimed at more than just lowering trade barriers. It was also an attempt by the United States—along with like‐​minded allies—to help shape the rules governing trade in the Asia‐​Pacific region. As Asia’s center both geographically and economically, China is already assured of having a significant say in such matters. The TPP was meant to ensure the United States had a prominent seat at the table when such rules were being hammered out—before it opted to push away.

In other words, U.S. losses from its TPP withdrawal have not just been economic but geopolitical. And if the TPP was deemed a useful tool in countering China’s influence during the years it was being negotiated, it would be even more of an asset now given the bilateral relationship’s increasingly acrimonious nature.

Other countries have been less short‐​sighted in their trade policies. Following U.S. withdrawal, the remaining TPP members went back to the negotiating table and struck a new deal: the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans‐​Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). As a result, these countries often have easier access to each other’s markets than what Americans enjoy. That’s a boon to consumers and businesses in CPTPP members who enjoy cheaper imports and expanded export opportunities.

Indeed, the CPTPP has proved so alluring that China and Taiwan have both applied to join while South Korea has taken initial steps toward becoming a member. Even the United Kingdom wants in.

Other notable trade liberalization initiatives have taken place in recent years as well. In late 2020, 15 countries of the Asia‐​Pacific region concluded the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Entering into force on January 1 of this year, the RCEP—which notably includes China—contains tariff reductions and regulatory harmonization measures meant to spur trade between member countries. And in 2018, Japan and the European Union signed a trade deal that took effect the following year.

Amidst such trade integration, the United States has largely been left on the outside looking in. This means that not only has the country foregone the TPP’s projected benefits but the competitiveness of U.S. firms has been eroded owing to the lack of preferential market access enjoyed by their foreign counterparts.

As a result, a 2017 PIIE analysis calculated that the TPP/CPTPP’s net impact on the United States had swung from a $131 billion gain to a $2 billion loss. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, meanwhile, found that RCEP will shrink U.S. exports by over $5 billion as trade is diverted away from U.S. firms and toward foreign competitors subject to lower tariff rates under the agreement.

Even U.S. leaders have implicitly recognized that U.S. withdrawal from the TPP placed the United States on the backfoot in trade. In 2019, President Trump concluded a limited “mini‐​deal” with Japan to claw back some of the lost gains from TPP withdrawal. Presented as the prelude to a more comprehensive agreement (which never happened), the market access improvements realized from the agreement—mostly on agriculture and industrial goods—were still inferior to what would have been gained via the TPP.

Art of the deal, indeed.

On the geopolitical front, meanwhile, a recent Wall Street Journal piece points out that U.S. inaction on trade liberalization has handed a possible opportunity to China:

Beijing’s pro‐​trade steps have fueled concerns among American businesses and close allies. They worry that the U.S.’s absence in regional trade agreements gives Beijing an opening to establish its leadership in setting rules and standards for trade and economy, particularly in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and digital trade.

In a bid to reassert U.S. economic leadership the Biden administration is readying a new initiative called the Indo‐​Pacific Economic Framework. Although its exact contours are unknown, all indications are that it will not include improved market access measures such as tariff reductions. That means the United States will be competing for influence with China with one hand effectively tied behind its back. While Beijing offers improved access to its vast market through its participation in RCEP—and possibly the CPTPP—Washington will have few obvious enticements with which to sway other countries toward adopting its preferred set of trading rules and standards.

All of this could have been avoided. Had the United States remained in the TPP and Congress approved the deal, American consumers and businesses would be enjoying cheaper imports and expanded exports while U.S. diplomats would be better positioned to set trade rules in the Asia‐​Pacific region. Instead, all Washington has to show for its efforts is a less than comprehensive trade deal with Japan and a new economic initiative whose allure for U.S. trading partners is unclear. Rather than pursuing such half measures, the United States should return to the TPP/CPTPP. That, however, will require both vision and leadership, two commodities that are unfortunately currently lacking in Washington.

Colin Grabow is a policy analyst at the Cato Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies where his research focuses on domestic forms of trade protectionism such as the Jones Act and the U.S. sugar program.

To read the full commentary from the CATO Institute, please click here. 

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Though the i’s haven’t been dotted nor the t’s crossed, the Chinese ministry said both sides agreed to conclude negotiations for a bilateral FTA as soon as possible. Final negotiations over the details of the deal might still take a while, but all parties have clearly expressed their eagerness to see it through. This should come as no surprise. In 2020, China replaced the European Union as the GCC’s largest trading partner with bilateral trade valued at $161.4 billion. Furthermore, the bloc is a central pillar of China’s Belt and Road Initiative — the UAE and Saudi Arabia ranked second and third respectively as top destinations by volume for Chinese construction projects under the initiative. 

Negotiations for a China-GCC FTA began in 2004. However, they were suspended in 2009 when China decided to maintain tariffs on GCC petrochemical exports to protect its domestic chemical industry. Negotiations were further hampered by Sino-GCC disagreements over the conflict in Syria. Talks resumed in 2016 when the PRC assured the Gulf states they were willing to forge ahead. But then a diplomatic crisis between GCC members prevented progress. After nine rounds of talks and many promises over the course of eighteen years, the big question is whether a deal’s actually coming this time around. 

If you ask China and the GCC, they’ll tell you that the time is finally ripe. They’re not wrong — several significant changes affecting both bodog casino sides’ geopolitical interests have taken place in recent years that substantially raise the likelihood of an official agreement. 

First is the evolving relations of the GCC with Iran. Uncertainty over the Iranian nuclear deal negotiations in Vienna has worried member states of the GCC not only of the threat of a nuclear Iran, but also of the risk of a direct confrontation between the United States and Israel against Iran, where the Gulf countries would pay a heavy price. The need to de-escalate tensions and to consolidate a united front in the face of the shared prospect of regional instability has thawed frictions between GCC member countries. After an almost four-year Saudi-UAE diplomatic and economic boycott of Qatar, in early 2021 all sides reached a rapprochement. At the GCC Summit in December 2021, member states agreed to economic reforms meant to bring the bloc closer together. Bridging differences among GCC states is a welcome sign for a potential GCC-China FTA.

Simultaneously, China has indicated its intent to deepen economic ties with Iran with the signing in March 2021 of a 25-year cooperation agreement that exchanges Chinese investment for Iranian oil. The GCC bloc is aiming to incentivize Iranian compliance with the nuclear deal through the promise of trade following the easing of sanctions. The Iranian Foreign Minister’s visit to China on the same day that the four GCC countries’ foreign ministers wrapped up their visit to China could signal the potential benefits of returning to compliance. 

Second is Washington’s withdrawal from the region. For decades, Gulf countries looked to the United States as a security guarantor in exchange for uninterrupted oil trade. Yet, over the past decade, Washington has weaned itself off Middle Eastern oil as it developed its own domestic oil production capacity. Furthermore, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and its pivot to the Indo-pacific signaled to Gulf states that US priorities increasingly lie outside the Middle East. As their ties with the United States weaken, GCC members feel a more urgent need to boost and consolidate their ties with China as their new primary trading partner and provider of broad-scale economic development.

Third, China’s energy needs. As Washington’s imports from the region have fallen, Beijing’s have steadily risen. The country’s size and rapid industrial growth, combined with its relatively lackluster domestic petroleum resources, mean China has been the primary growth market for oil-producing nations. Major power outages and soaring energy prices have injected new urgency into China’s need to secure a stable supply of energy to meet its rising demands. As a result, Beijing is looking to boost bilateral relations with the oil-rich Gulf, which already supplies more than 40% of its oil imports. 

Since joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, China has steadily increased its engagement in FTAs around the world. By 2015, Beijing had FTAs with countries that together make up a greater share of global GDP than those that hold agreements with Washington. Over the last two years, China and the United States have clearly diverged in their approach to trade. Chinese President Xi Jinping has embarked on a worldwide trade spree and has free trade deals in the works with the GCC, Israel, Norway, Sri Lanka, Moldova, and Peru. Meanwhile, Biden has put a moratorium on trade until he determines the domestic economy is back on track. But the global economy will not wait until then. 

A potential China-GCC FTA should remind US policymakers that for Beijing, Washington’s absence means opportunity — both in the Gulf and on the international stage at large. As President Trump withdrew from the global trade arena, Xi moved in to fill the void. Under President Biden, who has largely kept Trump’s trade policy, China has joined the largest multilateral trade agreement in the world, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and applied to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific (CPTPP) and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA). Without a seat at the table, and unsupported by a thriving network of trade agreements, the United States will not be able to set norms for the multilateral trading system as China is seeking to do. 

Inbar Pe’er is a consultant to the GeoEconomics Center. She is also a program coordinator at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University.

Niels Graham is an Assistant Director with the GeoEconomics Center focusing on trade.

Mrugank Bhusari is a Program Assistant with the GeoEconomics Center focusing on global governance and human security.

To read the full commentary bodog online casino from Atlantic Council, please click here. 

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Tai spelled out four efforts as “the starting point” for “realigning our trade policies with China.” The first is to enforce the Phase One deal negotiated under Trump, part of which included a number of commitments from China to purchase various American goods. As Chad Bown from the Peterson Institute for International Economics has comprehensively detailed, China has fallen short of those commitments. The second is to expand the exclusion process for U.S. businesses that have been impacted by the tariffs levied by the Trump administration, many of which are still in place. In fact, as Bown notes, “the United States retains tariffs imposed by President Trump covering over $135 billion—or 93 percent—of imports of intermediate inputs from China.” As my colleague Scott Lincicome has also detailed, these tariffs have hurt the U.S. economy, and have had little impact on the Chinese economy. Furthermore, the exclusion process has been fraught with challenges, including inconsistencies in documenting exclusion requests—a finding by the Government Accountability Office. Despite these problems, Tai seems to be embracing these Trump era policies fully, which is certainly a cause for concern.

The third effort outlined by Tai, to raise “broader policy concerns with Beijing” on its “state-centered and non-market trade practices,” acknowledges a missing piece of the original Phase One deal. The negotiations should have addressed longstanding complaints on China’s trade practices, but instead, the Trump administration took a mercantilist approach that seemed to rely on China’s state-centric model it claimed was the problem to begin with. Forcing Beijing to purchase American goods was never going to solve structural issues in China’s trade policy, but to get a quick win, Tai’s predecessor, Amb. Robert Lighthizer, settled for a deal that made it look like we were getting something from China, even if it wasn’t the exact thing we needed to get. Instead of calling Lighthizer’s deal a failure, however, Tai doubled down on the approach, saying during the Q&A: “I don’t think it’s fair to say that I’ve characterized the previous administration’s efforts as failed. What I would say is that that hasn’t gotten us to where we need to go.” But the Phase One deal did not get us “where we need to go” for two key reasons. First, it didn’t include a discussion on the most critical concerns, such as China’s state-owned enterprises. Second, (and perhaps most importantly), “the entire deal rested on China’s willingness to fulfill its commitments” and lacked an effective enforcement mechanism, as noted by my colleague Scott Lincicome. The structure of the deal essentially destined it to fail. That Tai shies away from calling this a failure is puzzling, but at the very least she has acknowledged that the deal did not achieve any progress on key outcomes of concern.

The final effort Tai outlines is to “to work with allies to shape the rules for fair trade in the 21st century.” Now, this sounds a whole lot warmer and fuzzier than anything Lighthizer would have said, but the remarks were missing details of how exactly we would engage with our allies on China. This is not necessarily a bad thing, as the United States and the European Union recently met under bodog casino the auspices of the Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council to “coordinate approaches to key global technology, economic, and trade issues; and to deepen transatlantic trade and economic relations, basing policies on shared democratic values.” These discussions are still new, and there are still plenty of issues that need to be smoothed over with the EU (I’m looking at you Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs!), but it is a good place to start. The key question is whether this engagement with allies will be genuine and collaborative, or if it will resort back to the bullying tactics played by the Trump administration. This change in tone could also simply be cover for protectionist actions on trade remedies, labor and environmental regulations, which would bode ill for repairing transatlantic ties. On this, we will have to wait and see.

While the United States tries to regain its footing again after four years of tumultuous trade policy by tweet, it is important for the trade policy community to get the conversation going again about pragmatic ways forward. This will not be easy, particularly when the rhetoric being used by the current administration so closely echoes that of the last. But we need to move beyond domestic signaling and worries about the midterm congressional elections and towards an honest discussion of how to preserve and strengthen a global trading system that includes China.

There are reasons for trepidation, however. The departure of Mark Wu, a senior advisor on China at USTR, is a significant loss on the China portfolio. And while trade wonks all made jokes on Twitter about Tai’s remark that she had not seen Chad Bown’s “scorecard” on China’s Phase One purchase commitments, this is a notable oversight. Tai must reach out to the trade community broadly—not just some Democratic interests. These discussions should also be grounded in evidence, not rhetoric. If the administration is truly committed to bringing the country back together, then it cannot simply dust off the previous administration’s policies and repackage them as their own. Tai’s speech wasn’t the final word on U.S. trade policy towards China, but if the administration fails to engage with allies and experts soon, we risk a continuation of the unsuccessful unilateralism of the Trump years.

Inu Manak is a research fellow at the Cato Institute. She is an expert in international political economy, with a specialization in international trade policy and law.

To read the full commentary from the Cato Institute, please click here.

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To repeat a well-known refrain, U.S. participation in a comprehensive, high-standard regional trade agreement like TPP would serve three sets of national interests: economic, strategic, and “strategic economic.” It would make a small but significant addition to U.S. and global economic growth. It would demonstrate a lasting commitment to the Indo-Pacific region beyond the U.S. military presence there. And, most important, it would advance the nation’s strategic economic interest in updating and upholding U.S.-preferred rules and norms in a region representing half the world’s population and economic activity.

The Biden administration has made clear that it has no intention of pursuing traditional trade agreements like TPP. In his first major speech as secretary of state, Antony Blinken said the administration had learned “hard lessons” from previous trade agreements and that its trade policies “will need to answer very clearly how they will grow the American middle class, create new and better jobs, and benefit all Americans.” Testifying before Congress in May, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai steered clear of any commitment to an early return to TPP. 

The Biden team knows that keeping TPP at arm’s length puts the administration in an awkward position with Asian allies and partners, who want to see the United States credibly engaging on trade as part of a broader strategy for the region. This is what draws the White House to a digital trade agreement. Accelerated by Covid-19, the digital economy is growing rapidly, yet there are few agreed international rules to govern this space. China, Europe, and others are moving to fill that void, establishing rules and norms on privacy, data management, and internet governance that are often at odds with U.S. interests.

Proponents of a digital trade agreement in the Indo-Pacific argue that it would be easier to negotiate than a comprehensive deal. For one thing, there is a lot of existing work to build on, including the digital rules in TPP and the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), as well as in bilateral deals such as the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement and the Singapore Australia Digital Economy Agreement. Moreover, as proponents point out, a sectoral deal on digital issues would not require formal approval from the U.S. Congress, since the United States would be making no new market-access concessions.

But there are three potential problems with a digital trade agreement. First, it would likely take significant time to conclude. Trade negotiations always take longer than expected, especially if they involve many diverse parties, complex issues, and high ambition. Second, the domestic politics will be challenging. Aligning business, labor, consumer, and government interests on sensitive digital issues will be difficult, and Congress will take an intense interest in the negotiations. The third, more substantive problem is that trade is only one dimension of the digital economy where rules and norms are in play. There are a range of other issues—from digital inclusivity to ethical standards for artificial intelligence—that arguably cannot or should not be captured in trade agreements.

As it happens, these issues and more are covered in an arrangement already up and running in Asia: the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA). A non-binding undertaking to deepen cooperation in the digital economy, DEPA currently brings together Singapore, New Zealand, and Chile (three of the original four TPP members). It involves a dozen “modules” of joint work, including on digital inclusivity, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), cross-border data flows, and cybersecurity. As a platform for discussion of non-binding principles and best practices rather than a formal trade negotiation, DEPA enables experimentation and an ability to address new issues quickly.

Some would argue, not without merit, that a non-binding arrangement does not accomplish as much as a formal treaty. But there are several counterarguments: First, DEPA’s “soft” approach to rulemaking and norm-setting has proved effective in an Asian context, as evidenced by the useful work in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum (including on digital governance). Second, docking onto DEPA would enable the United States to quickly start shaping rules and norms in this critical area, rather than going through the drawn-out process of formal trade negotiations. (That said, some of DEPA’s existing principles may not align with U.S. interests, and existing members would need to be willing to discuss alternative approaches.) Third, DEPA would provide a platform for Washington to pursue its broader interests in the digital governance realm, beyond commercial interests. And finally, DEPA’s modules on digital inclusivity and SMEs would allow the Biden administration to highlight its efforts to “benefit all Americans.” 

Asian allies and partners want the United States back in the regional trade game as quickly as possible. If early U.S. reentry into TPP is off the table for now, President Biden will need to come up with a credible alternative by the time he appears at the annual APEC summit in November. The president should announce the United States’ intention to join DEPA and make this a centerpiece of his regional economic strategy. Combined with new initiatives in other important areas of economic policy such as regional infrastructure, clean energy, and women’s empowerment, this could go a long way to persuading skeptical Asian allies and partners that the United States is back and serious about its long-term economic engagement in the region.

Matthew P. Goodman is senior vice president for economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

To read the original commentary from the Center For Strategic & International Studies, please visit here

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“There has always been a close relationship between RTAs and the multilateral trading system,” Director-General Okonjo-Iweala said at the Committee’s 100th session since it was first established by the General Council in 1996. “The work done by the Committee helps us understand how this relationship is evolving and is a regular reminder of how important it is for RTAs and the multilateral trading system to work towards the same goals,” she said, noting that over 190 RTAs have been reviewed in the Committee.

All 164 WTO members are party to at least one RTA and estimates suggest that close to 20% of global merchandise trade occurs between RTA partners on the basis of preferential tariff rates. Over 75% of global trade, on the other hand, occurs on most-favoured-nation (MFN) terms, underscoring the continuing commercial importance of multilateral agreements at the WTO.

“RTAs today go beyond market access in goods and services and related WTO rules,” the Director-General said. “The work of the Committee in considering these more complex trading relationships is especially valuable. Indeed, today you will be considering one of the largest and most complex RTAs, the CPTPP,” she said. The full speech can be accessed here.

The CPTPP is currently in force for seven of the 11 parties. It entered into force on 30 December 2018 for Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand and Singapore and then on 14 January 2019 for Viet Nam. Singapore liberalized all its tariffs at entry into force while New Zealand will do so by 2024. Other parties will liberalize at least 95.9% of their tariff lines by 2039 at the latest. Moreover, CPTPP commitments in trade in services are in general broader than those under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services. The CPTPP also includes commitments in investment, government procurement, intellectual property, competition, state-owned enterprises, environment, labour, electronic commerce, and small and medium enterprises.

New Zealand and Japan introduced the Agreement at the meeting on behalf of the CPTPP parties. They said the CPTPP is a trailblazer at the forefront of many issues on the wider multilateral trade agenda. They noted the parties’ continuing commitment to cooperate on economic recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. They also reported that the parties decided on 2 June 2021 to start the accession process for the United Kingdom. Several members took the floor to welcome the Agreement and thank the parties for their replies to written questions.

The Committee chair, Ambassador Cleopa Kilonzo Mailu of Kenya, said the consideration of the CPTPP had allowed members to clarify a number of questions and thanked the parties for their responses.

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The chair further noted that 53 RTAs have still not been notified to the WTO. In addition, there are 72 RTAs involving WTO members and 34 involving non-members for which a factual presentation has to be prepared, counting goods and services separately. The factual presentation for six other services agreements are on hold pending the negotiations of services commitments (of these, one involves non-members). The steep increase in pending factual presentations is due to the new trade agreements between the United Kingdom and its partners following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.

The Chair said he had held consultations with delegations for which the RTA factual consideration remains delayed due to the lack of comments or data from the members involved and hoped that the outstanding information would be provided soon.

To read the original commentary by the World Trade Organization, please click here.

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Why have some heralded RCEP as a landmark agreement? For starters, any trade agreement more than eight years in the making that brings together leaders from 15 members over 28 rounds of formal negotiation could be considered monumental. The countries involved in the agreement accounted for nearly 30% of global GDP in 2019, topping NAFTA as the world’s largest trade bloc . RCEP would also become the world’s largest export supplier and second-largest import destination. The United States was a party to a broad Pacific Trade deal called the Trans-Pacific Partnership but withdrew, and the remaining 11 members stayed together to form the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). RCEP effectively consolidates the “Asian market” in ways that previous agreements, including the CPTPP (the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s successor), have not.

The reception of RCEP has not been entirely positive. Some argue that RCEP is a “shallow” agreement in terms of tariff cuts and lacks substance on 21st-century trade issues like consumer protection and labor standards. This view stems from the comparison of RCEP with CPTPP, which was touted as the “gold standard” in trade agreements. RCEPs tariff cuts are indeed relatively modest. RCEP will eliminate tariffs on 90% of goods, but existing trade agreements among member countries already cover roughly 80% of these goods. The agreement also has relatively patchy coverage on important issues like service trade and agricultural trade (although there is more coverage on agricultural goods than initially expected). Overall, the agreement is projected to increase GDP in member countries by 0.2% by 2030 (PDF), which is a little more than the projected income gains due to CPTPP. Still, not a substantial amount.

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