The future of global trade is being shaped by several factors, in particular the twin digital and green transitions, supply chain disruptions and the increased trade policy uncertainty driven by geopolitical tensions. Yet, in the face of these challenges, global trade has been impressively resilient. In 2022 and 2023, the total volume of traded goods increased by 1.2%, despite the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. The projections for trade growth are 2.6% in 2024 and 3.3% in 2025. Digital trade – particularly digitally delivered services – is the fastest-growing segment of international trade, with an average annual growth rate of 8.1% for almost two decades.

This projected growth in trade volumes reinforces how robust the global trade system is, even in these times of significant distress and adverse pressures. However, the future of trade is certainly not without its challenges. The global economic landscape is becoming more and more complex, manifested by increasing sustainability requirements, geopolitical tensions, policy uncertainty and growing skepticism toward the ability of the multilateral trading systems to deliver. As a result, a ‘trade skeptic’ narrative has started to gain traction. This frames international trade as an obstacle to, rather than a solution for, building a more secure, inclusive and sustainable world.

bodog online casino

The current geopolitical context is applying pressure on the World Trade Organization (WTO) to deliver on a number of urgent topics. With companies around the world relying heavily on WTO rules, the organisation needs to reform in order to address its issues, such as stalled negotiations, including the difficulty of reaching plurilateral agreements where multilateral consensus is not feasible. There is also a pressing need to repair the – currently paralyzed – dispute resolution system.

In recent years, the development of the global economy has added several new concerns to trade relations within the WTO. Negotiations within the organisation have become progressively more complex, as they are increasingly influenced by domestic interests and politics. The conflict of interests between the developing and developed countries is also apparent, manifested in particular in the difficulties of WTO members in agreeing on new rules on agriculture. When allied to the fact that the WTO operates on consensus-based decision-making, it becomes more difficult to reach multilateral agreements among members that have increasingly diverse economic and political interests.

Some of the outcomes from MC13

The latest WTO Ministerial Conference (MC13) concluded with a ministerial declaration that laid the groundwork for a range of future negotiations. These included WTO reform, agriculture, the Agreement on fisheries subsidies, and e-commerce. This time, however, limited substantive outcomes were achieved.

One very important result emerging from the MC13 was the extension of the moratorium on e-commerce tariffs. This will now continue in force until the next ministerial conference in March 2026. The decision is crucial for digital trade, as it provides temporary relief from potential tariffs on electronic transmissions. The business community advocates not simply for an extension to the moratorium, but for a permanent solution to this issue. If a multilateral agreement were to prove impossible, the possibility of a plurilateral agreement by 2026 should be explored as an alternative.

For the business community, restoring the dispute settlement system – a cornerstone of the WTO framework – is essential. Since 2016, the US has blocked the appointment of judges to the WTO’s Appellate Body, claiming that the body overreaches its mandate. This impasse has left the Appellate Body to all intents inoperative, undermining the organisation’s ability to resolve trade disputes effectively. While members agreed to accelerate talks to reach a consensus by the end of 2024 during the MC13, businesses need to see concrete results quickly. Ideally this should be before the US elections this autumn. Unfortunately, however, this is an unlikely scenario.

Despite certain advances made during the MC13, there was a failure to reach agreements on a number of crucial topics, including agricultural issues and the second part of the agreement on fisheries subsidies. Attempts to initiate talks on limiting the harmful effects of national industrial subsidies – a key issue for business – were also unsuccessful. Leaving such issues unresolved adds to an environment of uncertainty for businesses globally, affecting a wide range of sectors. It also underscores the difficulty of consensus within the current multilateral system. The WTO should therefore explore, in depth, whether plurilateral agreements can offer a viable alternative where multilateral agreements have faltered on important topics, thus offering a pathway for subsets of WTO members to move forward in specific areas. Such agreements can be pivotal in addressing modern trade challenges, affording a more flexible approach to international trade negotiations, adapted to address current challenges.

Overcoming increasing barriers to trade

As already discussed, the geopolitical and security underpinnings of trade are becoming bodog sportsbook review increasingly pronounced. In addition, the re-emergence of nationalistic and protectionist sentiments in various countries is leading to some re-evaluation of existing trade agreements and partnerships. Reflecting on a broader trend, the imposition of trade restrictions has been steadily rising, from approximately 650 new restrictions in 2017 to over 3,000 in 2023. This increase in barriers is a clear indicator of the growing complexities and challenges that face the international trade system. This is a deeply worrying situation for business, not simply because fragmenting trade relationships tend to decrease economic security and increase conflict risks, but because it also comes at a great economic cost.

The trade tensions between China and the US are a prime example of this; and the EU needs to navigate between the two. Whereas the US is the EU’s ally, and while we are closer to the US than to China in many ways, we cannot embark on a process of decoupling from China. Such a step is not in our interest. However, the opportunities to improve trade relations with the US seem brighter than they do with China.

EU and US Trade and Technology Council

The relationship between the EU and the US is crucial, as it combines the economic strength of two of the world’s largest economies, enhancing global economic stability and growth as a result. Together, the two parties can help set the international standards and norms that influence global trade, environmental policies and technological advancements. To date, the EU and US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) have regrettably failed to deliver much in the way of concrete developments. However, it remains the most important forum for close cooperation on transatlantic trade and technology issues.

The latest sixth TTC meeting in April saw some progress on a few fronts. On the technology side, the parties updated their cooperation on AI terminology and taxonomy and signaled progress in research on AI. They also published a Joint 6G vision and established a quantum task force. On the trade side, there is more to the wish list than what has been delivered to date. The latest meeting was no different, and not a great deal was achieved on the topic of trade. With elections upcoming, it is clear the US is choosing not to engage in important trade questions that could potentially increase market access for European companies. However, the TTC at least resulted in the allies agreeing to continue cooperation for supply chain resilience, particularly for critical materials such as semiconductors. A Minerals Security Partnership Forum was also established, under which the EU and US agreed to advance the negotiations on a critical mineral deal, that would make it possible for European companies to benefit from the subsidies in the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA).

Given that both the EU and the US have elections on the horizon, the future of the TTC partnerships is uncertain. Advancing transatlantic cooperation therefore requires concrete outcomes; outcomes that are designed to endure any potential changes of leadership on both sides of the Atlantic.

In conclusion, as the global trade landscape continues to evolve in ways that reflect the complex and increasingly uncertain environment, it is crucial to remember the significant role international trade plays in addressing the most pressing challenges of our time. Policymakers must reinforce the resilience of the global trade system; such steps will be fundamental in shaping a sustainable and prosperous future for international trade and business worldwide.

To read the full article as it appears on Svenskt Naringsliv’s website, click here.

The post Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_is crucial appeared first on bodog.

The release of annual federal agency reports are rarely given significant airtime beyond some select circles. This year, however, the release of the Congressionally-mandated National Trade Estimate Report (NTE) by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and its decision to remove broad sets of barriers—including many significant measures harming operations of U.S. digital exporters—has sparked debate about the overall merits of identifying and challenging unfair trade practices abroad.

The issue surrounds the report that, under the 1974 Trade Act, USTR is required to publish to identify and analyze “significant barriers to, or distortions of” U.S. goods and services exports globally and, when possible, estimate the distortive impact they have on U.S. commerce.  This report serves as a key part of USTR’s mandate from Congress to protect U.S. businesses from unfair treatment abroad.  By chronicling the obstacles to operations and the cross-border delivery of goods and services in key foreign markets, the report lays down a marker for laws, regulations, and other policies abroad that are of concern to the United States.  

Through this process, USTR signals to the countries in question that these policies are being monitored by the United States government, are seen as problematic, and that further investigation or action—including, where appropriate, formal dispute settlement— could be forthcoming.  This is a crucial piece of USTR’s job assessing the global landscape for U.S. firms, targeting unfair treatment of U.S. goods and services exports, and addressing these barriers.  Inclusion of a barrier in the NTE does not necessarily mean enforcement action is bodog online casino forthcoming from USTR, but it is an indication that a rule or regulation is hindering international trade and puts that country on notice.

The problem at the heart of this year’s NTE is that USTR has removed a sizable collection of barriers from last year’s report (466 pages’ worth) in this year’s edition (392 pages’ worth)—with a particular and concerning deprioritizing of barriers to digital trade.  This is in direct contradiction to USTR’s statutory obligation to “identify and analyze acts, policies, or practices of each foreign country which constitute significant barriers to, or distortions of… United States electronic commerce” through the NTE.  More recently, this move also runs contrary to the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 that directs USTR “to ensure that governments refrain from implementing trade-related measures that impede digital trade in goods and services, restrict cross-border data flows, or require local storage or processing of data.”  The recent trajectory of USTR also opposes the agency’s stated goal to “[d]efend U.S. interests in digital trade and digitally delivered services” that the agency outlined in its FY2025 budget request.  

In a previous article I covered the importance of digital trade to the U.S. economy—in 2022, digitally-deliverable services brought in $626 billion to the United States, with a $256 billion surplus in the sector.  Overall, the U.S. government estimates that in 2022, the digital economy brought in $2.6 trillion in value added, representing 10% of the U.S. GDP and supported 8.9 million jobs that generated $1.3 trillion in annual compensation.  Export strength in digital products and services also serves as a key foundation promoting U.S. competitiveness on the global stage.  

Further, restrictions to cross-border data flows, requirements to localize data, and obstacles to operate cloud services abroad all directly harm companies exporting goods and services across industries and of all sizes.  This is very much true for services providers, where 70 percent of U.S. services exports are made up of digitally-deliverable services and impacting sectors such as financial services and entertainment (where global markets have contributed to a boom in recent years).  However, companies in the goods world would also be hit by data localization mandates and cross-border data flow restrictions.  For example, automotive and pharmaceutical companies depend on data flows both to operate abroad as well as to conduct testing to ensure safety standards are met and strengthen their products.

USTR defended its decision to scale back inclusion of digital trade barriers by stating the agency is returning the report to “its stated statutory purpose” and that every government “has the sovereign right to govern in the public interest and to regulate for legitimate public policy reasons.”  

First, the claim that this reverts the report back to its “statutory purpose” is dubious—the 1974 Trade Act does not include any caveats in the section delineating the obligations for the NTE regarding whether a country behind any given barrier argues it is regulating in the public interest.

Second, and more importantly, the argument regarding what is suggested as justifiable discrimination is problematic and could have repercussions.  Of course, it is true that every country has the power and right to issue laws, rules, and regulations in the public interest—however, ceding such broad discretion regarding discriminatory or otherwise unfair practices in foreign markets undermines the very purpose of trade norms and rules—to voluntarily refrain from implementing policies that harm trade partners.  “Legitimate” is often in the eye of the beholder.  Governments generally adopt laws and regulations in the furtherance of what they would likely label as “legitimate public policy reasons,” even if those policies are harmful to imports from a specific or all other countries.  For governments enacting distortive industrial policy strategies, the discriminatory or harmful nature of the policy may actually be a central aspect of what the government sees as a legitimate public policy reason, whether that is to catalyze local production or boost employment in certain industries.  The removal of specific barriers from this report with the explanation implies that governments can pursue targeted or otherwise harmful policies for U.S. exports and claim it is in the public interest to be deemed justified and evade USTR scrutiny.  

More concerning in the near-term, the exclusion of such a broad swath of digital trade barriers with the suggestion that they are legitimate declares to these countries that they are justified in these actions and demonstrates to third-party countries that they are free to impose similar obstacles to U.S. digital products and services.  Of course, if the goal is to lay the foundation for protecting one’s own, newly-designed glass house, to shield it from attack by one’s trade partners, one might discern a certain logic. But, at least in the digital sphere, U.S.-proposed laws, regulations, or policies that would invite such challenges are absent, and thus declining to address foreign barriers only hurts U.S. interests, with no corresponding benefit.

bodog online casino

Looking closer at the barriers that were removed between the 2023 and 2024 reports, a broad trend that barriers to the cross-border delivery of digital products and services are now seen as reasonable becomes clear.  To the extent these laws, proposals, or regulations are now seen as acceptable by the United States, it can carry consequences for companies not only in these markets but others that may decide to adopt similar restrictive policies.  It is unclear why these barriers are now seen as justifiable by the U.S. government.  

Below are some of the bodog casino most prominent trade barriers that appeared in the 2023 NTE and that clearly disadvantage U.S. firms that have since been dropped by USTR:

Online News

References to laws that require online services providers to make mandatory payments to news publishers for the presence of any news content, including hyperlinks, have been removed in this year’s NTE after being included in the last few iterations.  Specifically, Australia’s News Media Bargaining Code and Canada’s Online News Act, both of which exclusively target U.S. digital exports and pose threats to the online ecosystem writ large, are no longer listed as significant barriers to trade in the report, despite neither law changing in any meaningful way to alleviate concerns. 

European Union

References to the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) have been removed from the report entirely.  The law is still highly experimental and disproportionately affects U.S. companies—the European Commission has designated six companies as so-called “gatekeepers” under the DMA, and five out of those six companies are from the United States, while the sixth is Chinese.  Meanwhile, this still-burgeoning concept of “gatekeeper” is being applied to industrial data markets through the DATA Act and is being considered for the online banking realm through the Payment Services Regulation, thereby restricting U.S. companies from these sectors.  As such, the threat of this law to U.S. exports, and massive compliance burden it entails is very much a live issue, but is no longer labeled a significant barrier through the NTE—suggesting free reign for the application of the “gatekeeper” label to spread to other sectors, shutting out U.S. companies, and empowering other governments to adopt regulations where the consequences are not yet known.  The DMA is clearly a barrier and in concert with the Digital Services Act would reportedly impose vast costs on U.S. businesses and smaller companies, but whether or not it is justified is not yet known—deleting it, therefore, is a premature stamp of approval on a policy for which the potential harms or benefits have not yet materialized.  The Digital Services Act has also been cut significantly from detailing the different obligations under the law for “Very Large Online Platforms” to instead solely focusing on the law’s impact on bodog casino intellectual property rights such as copyrights and trademarks.

Elsewhere in the NTE, references to the EU’s AI Act and the DATA Act have been greatly diminished, restricted to narrow references to trade secrets and proprietary information.  As both develop, it is critical that the U.S. government remains wary of tiered oversight models whereby U.S. companies receive higher levels of scrutiny or punishment compared to those of European or third-party origin.  This is particularly visible for the DATA Act, which features prescriptive rules on when, where, and how companies should be able to access, process, and share non-personal and personal data with other companies and governments. The DATA Act would prohibit U.S. companies from becoming third parties to receive IoT data in Europe if designated as “gatekeepers;” create a separate regime for non-personal data, and in practice has the potential to also sweep in personal data, transferred internationally for cloud services providers subject to third party countries’ data access requests; and by potentially empowering national regulators to oversee aspects of the proposal, it would raise the possibility of duplicative enforcement throughout the 27 member states. Such regulation could leave U.S. companies at a distinct disadvantage compared to Europeans in a constantly innovating and growing IoT market—all of which is left out of this year’s NTE.

Indonesia  

This year, USTR removed references relating to:

1. barriers to building and maintaining submarine cables
2. digital taxation and duty reporting requirements
3. financial services regulations that require data localization for certain banking data
4. the Personal Data Protection Law No. 27, which was described by USTR in last year’s report as imposing “requirements for data collection, processing, and transfer, as well as criminal and administrative penalties for violations, and may restrict cross-border data flows.” 

USTR did include a regulation (​​MOF Regulation No. 190/PMK.04/2022) that imposes obligations for customs declarations within 30 days of receiving payment for the importing of digital products (which could sweep in potentially all software downloads).  However, the NTE language has been significantly adjusted: last year its focus was on “cybersecurity, privacy, and data protection concerns,” noting the impact on small-and-medium sized enterprises, and potentially undermining the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions at the World Trade Organization; this year the harms are most glossed over, to a much more scaled-back “paperwork retention requirement that is undefined and uncertain.”

Japan

This year’s NTE removed reference to the Act on Improving Transparency and Fairness of Digital Platforms and the two reports on “competition for mobile operating systems and for voice assistants and wearables, with the eventual goal of possible regulation under the Transparency Act” published by the Digital Market Competition Headquarters.  Similar to the concerns regarding the DMA, the fact that USTR has removed this barrier at such a nascent stage of the regulation signals a lack of U.S. concern regarding the experimental regulatory proposals suggested in these reports, which include forcing digital platforms to share data with third parties and to provide third parties access to analytics (such as click-and-query search data); restrictions on platforms using data across services; and harming bodog casino intellectual property by imposing obligatory sharing of trade secrets and copyright.

Turkey

This year’s NTE has removed reference to the 2016 Law on the Protection of Personal Data, which was previously described by USTR in last year’s report by explaining that “[r]estrictions on the flow of data have a significant effect on the conditions for the cross-border supply of numerous services and for enabling the functionality embedded in smart devices.” Circular 2019/12—a data localization measure—and the Law on Regulation of E-Commerce (Law No. 6563) were also excluded in this year’s report after inclusion last year. 

Vietnam

Although USTR included the highly-problematic Law on Cybersecurity as a barrier, it downplayed a data localization measure issued under the law—Decree 53—in this year’s report after including a lengthy explanation of the data localization hurdles last year.  Last year, USTR noted that the Decree required all domestic companies, including subsidiaries of foreign investors, to “store a copy of Vietnamese user data on servers located within Vietnam and establish a physical office in Vietnam that would be under the jurisdiction of Vietnamese law enforcement. If international firms, that do business in Vietnam are found to be in violation of the Law on Cybersecurity, then Vietnam’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) could force the firms to localize their data as well, following a 12-month notification period.”  This year, the report focused more on “uncertainty around the scope of specific requirements for businesses as they apply broadly to domestic and foreign enterprises that provide services on telecommunications networks or the Internet, or that provide other value-added services in cyberspace in Vietnam.”

The Positive Aspects of this Year’s NTE Report: The Issues Included by USTR

Despite all of the above, it is important to note that USTR did include several barriers to digital exports in this year’s report.  This reflects commendable, continued work in important areas including problematic policies on cloud services providers, online streaming requirements and obligatory funding mechanisms, and network usage fees, among other specific data localization and cross-border data flow restrictions.  The following measures were included in USTR’s 2024 NTE report:

• Australia’s online streaming funding obligations.
• Canada’s online content funding obligations through the Online Streaming Act and Digital Services Taxes.
• The European Union’s EU Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services (EUCS), network usage fees, and Digital Services Taxes.
• Indonesia’s GR 71/2019 which requires “private sector electronic system operators (ESOs) to facilitate supervision by government agencies, including by granting access to electronic systems and data for monitoring and law enforcement purposes.”  Also included, with adjusted language as previously mentioned, was Regulation No. 190/PMK.04/2022 on mandatory digital product customs declaration.
• Korea’s network usage fees, restrictions on the export of geospatial data, and barriers to the public secret market for cloud services providers posed by the Cloud Security Assurance Program (CSAP).  However, although the original CSAP regime was included by USTR in this year’s report, the 2023 amendments to the program that have since meant that no foreign supplier has been able to provide service under the program were not included.
• Vietnam’s online content proposals for over-the-top radio and television in Decree 71; the Revised Telecom Law; the Law on Cybersecurity and Decree 53 with adjusted language as previously discussed; strict online content restrictions implicating free speech and online services providers’ ability to operate in Decree 72; and the Personal Data Protection Decree (Decree 13/2023/ND-CP).

The Scaling Back of Digital Trade Language in the National Trade Estimate Report is Part of a Continuing and Concerning Trend

This move to trim the NTE of barriers in the digital space does not come in a vacuum.  In the past year, USTR has significantly receded from defending U.S. interests in the digital trade space.  In October, USTR announced that the United States was withdrawing support for key digital trade rules at the World Trade Organization’s Joint Statement Initiative on E-Commerce (JSI) to ensure that participating countries’ firms receive reasonable treatment with respect to cross-border data flows, data localization, and the protection of companies’ source code.  Then, in November, it emerged that the United States rescinded those same digital trade rules at the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).  

The United States is alone in this regard when compared to its allies in the region that are also members of the IPEF initiative that the United States itself was central to generating with the goal of “restoring U.S. economic leadership in the region and presenting Indo-Pacific countries an alternative to China’s approach to these critical issues,” as Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo told reporters at the launch of the framework.  IPEF members are themselves seeking strong digital trade rules with partners.  For example, Kevin Rudd, Australian Ambassador to the U.S., told an audience in July when discussing IPEF: “Some say in the case of digital trade that it only benefits big corporations. We in Australia don’t see it this way.”  Additionally, Singapore has signed Digital Economy Agreements with several other fellow IPEF members (New Zealand, Australia, and South Korea) with strong provisions since 2020.  Japan has been a leader in digital trade, including in partnership with the United States by striking a Digital Trade Agreement in 2019.

The United States has abdicated leadership in bodog online casino this realm with the argument that it must provide “policy space” for domestic and foreign legislators and regulators “examining their approaches to data and source code, and the impact of trade rules in these areas.”  Jonathan McHale has detailed why such arguments are flawed and should not result in abandoning digital trade rules on the international stage.  Countries have been free to regulate in the public interest since the onset of trade rules through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—so long as those rules do not discriminate against a supplier or producer from a specific country through thresholds or other means.  This remains true today, and despite hundreds of trade agreements globally, governments have continued to legislate and regulate.

To read the full article as it appears on the Disruptive Competition Project’s website, click here.

The post Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_This year’s NTE has removed appeared first on bodog.

The requirement for this report is contained in Section 181 of the Trade Act of 1974. The relevant part requires USTR to

“identity [sic] and analyze acts, policies, or practices of each foreign country which constitute significant barriers to, or distortions of—(i) United States exports of goods or services (including agricultural commodities; and property protected by trademarks, patents, and copyrights exported or licensed by United States persons), (ii) foreign direct investment by United States persons, especially if such investment has implications for trade in goods or services, and (iii) United States electronic commerce.”

That is not all it requires, but it is the key element—USTR is to report on trade practices in foreign countries that “constitute significant barriers to, or distortions of” U.S. exports of goods or services. In its press statement announcing this year’s report, however, USTR laid out a somewhat different set of criteria:

“The NTE Report has received unprecedented attention this year because we are taking steps to return it to its stated statutory purpose. We respect that each government—including our own—has the sovereign right to govern in the public interest and to regulate for legitimate public policy reasons. Over the years, the NTE Report expanded from its statutory purpose to include measures without regard to whether they may be valid exercises of sovereign policy authority. Examples include efforts by South Africa to render its economy more equitable in the post-Apartheid era; import licensing requirements for narcotics and explosives; and restrictions on imports of endangered species. By carefully editing and returning the NTE Report to the statute’s intent, USTR is making it a more useful document that enumerates significant trade barriers that could be addressed to expand market opportunities and help our economy grow.”

This is a terrible idea on several levels. First, the “stated statutory purpose” is the first quote above. I can confidently say that none of the people who prepared this report, including Ambassador Tai, were out of grade school in 1974, and they don’t have much credibility in discussing what Congress intended. I was working in Congress at that time, and I’m reasonably confident that the authors’ interests were more prosaic—they simply wanted to identify trade barriers that hurt Americans.

The new criteria ignore whether a policy is a barrier and instead focus on whether the other countries’ policies were undertaken for legitimate public policy reasons and were “valid exercises of sovereign policy authority.” That completely misses the point of the statute. The issue is not whether trade measures were legitimate or valid for the implementing country, but how they affect us. In other words, Section 181 is as much about us as it is about them, meaning barriers that adversely affect Americans should be listed. Whether they are good for the country imposing them is irrelevant to USTR’s mandate. I could understand USTR saying that it would not try to tear down a particular barrier because the United States regarded it as a legitimate public policy, but to deny it’s a barrier and encourage countries to continue it undermines the statute’s intent. It also undermines the trade rules we have spent 75 years building. There is a big difference between saying, “I don’t like what you’ve done, but I’m not going to do anything about it,” and “I’m fine with what you’ve done—keep on doing it.”

This new approach is particularly harmful to the digital sector, which, notably, is specifically mentioned in Section 181. As usual, Jake Colvin at the National Foreign Trade Council said it best:

“Specifically, in failing to call out significant barriers to American e-commerce and digitally-enabled exports, the Biden Administration is wasting an opportunity to stand up for U.S. innovation and inviting discrimination against American companies and workers by our economic competitors. By refusing to catalog local content requirements and other key foreign trade barriers, USTR is also willfully ignoring its congressional mandate to identify ‘significant barriers’ to U.S. exports of goods and services, bodog online casino foreign investment and electronic commerce.”

Over the past three years, the Scholl Chair has done a lot of work on digital trade issues, and we are about to publish a policy tracker that help readers stay on top of digital policies in some 30 countries. We are doing this because of the enormous growth in digital trade and digital services over the past two decades and because of the sector’s importance to the U.S. economy. U.S. companies are leaders in this space, and it is in the nation’s interest to maintain and grow that lead globally. Instead, the USTR’s failure to even identify barriers, much less go after them, undermines our companies, hurts our economy, and ignores USTR’s own mission of advancing U.S. trade interests and promoting international trade rules. It appears the agency has moved from simply missing opportunities, as with the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, to doing actual harm to our economy, which should be cause for all of us to be concerned. 

William Reinsch holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

To read the full National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers published by the Office of U.S. Trade Representative, click here.

To read the full commentary by William Alan Reinsch as it appears on the CSIS’ website, click here.

The post bodog poker review|Most Popular_1300 Pennsylvania appeared first on bodog.

Frightening Figure 1:

In recent years Americans have paid more than twice the world price for sugar. Based on sugar deliveries for domestic use in 2020/21, the difference between paying the world refined sugar price of 17 cents per pound or paying the U.S. refined beet sugar price of 42.1 cents per pound is nearly $6.2 billion in higher costs for American sugar users.

As supply chain problems continue to disrupt the economy, some have suggested that the solution is to bring production back to the United States. For example, according to President Joe Biden, “We need to invest in making more of our products right here in the United States. Never again should our country and our economy be unable to make critical products we need because we don’t have access to materials to make that product.”

A more effective approach would be to remove trade barriers that reduce the ability of U.S. producers to create resilient supply chains and access critical inpus from abroad. Christine Lantinen, the owner of Maud Borup candy, recently testified: “Let me put this simply: the U.S. Sugar Program, a collection of policies written and implemented by Congress, creates supply chain shortages for businesses that need sugar to make their products. If we want to address global supply chains and small business trade challenges, this is a good place to start.”

She’s exactly right. Instead of attempting to replicate the costly sugar program in other sectors of the economy in order to repatriate supply chains, the Biden administration should drive a stake through the heart of policies that prey upon Americans looking for affordable sugar, steel, aluminum, fertilizer, and other products whose supply is restricted by unfair U.S. trade barriers. 

Bryan Riley is Director of NTU’s Free Trade Initiative.

To read the full commentary from the National Taxpayers Union Foundation, please click here.

The post bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_inpus from abroad appeared first on bodog.