At stake is the future ownership of the world’s critical raw mineral supply chains that the renewable energy revolution will need to break free of our fossil fuel dependency.

The UN’s panel on critical energy transition minerals aims to inject justice, environmental standards and human rights into the sector’s supply chains. To do so, it must intervene in the international trade, investment and tax systems.

At present, the rich world wants to ensure that it – and it alone – controls critical mineral supply chains. The US Inflation Reduction Act dished out tax advantages to electric vehicle manufacturers which source, process or recycle in the US or its free trade agreement (FTA)-partners. The EU has also set a goal of processing 40% of the critical minerals that it consumes within its borders by 2030. The UK is following a similar path. But resource-rich countries aspire to process and transform more of their minerals so that they can see some of the economic rewards.

Of the ten countries which dominate the ownership of minerals via companies domiciled within their borders, eight are among the world’s richest Top 20.

While China is a major source of minerals like gallium, graphite, magnesium and tungsten, other countries including Brazil (niobium), Congo (cobalt), India (barite), Indonesia (nickel), Peru (arsenic), Russia (palladium) and South Africa (platinum and Manganese) are also significant players, and rarely talked about.

Critical minerals offer developing countries like these a “critical opportunity,” as the UN chief Antonio Guterres put it, when announcing the panel in April. “But only if they are managed properly,” he cautioned. “The race to net zero cannot trample over the poor.”

If that happens, the poor will understandably resist – and we will all suffer. To avoid this, we need a World Trade Organisation-level waiver of trade disputes in the climate realm preventing states from being challenged over policy tools crucial to sustainable industrialisation.

As well as carving producer states out of the processing value chain, the status quo also shuts out every African country except Morocco – with whom the US has an FTA – from Washington’s supply chains. This is unfair and a self-defeating invitation to other countries to strike deals with African producers, given that Africa is home to 30% of the world’s critical mineral reserves. Worse, if countries do sign FTAs, they are then prevented from adopting the same policies which could build their own green industries.

This is how it works. FTAs often prevent low and middle-income countries from using industrial policy tools – such as local content requirements, export restrictions and subsidies – to regulate, add value to, and share the benefits of their own mineral resources.

Most international investment agreements also contain investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions allowing corporations to sue governments in secret arbitration panels for billions of dollars when their profit expectations are affected by measures such as environmental regulations or public health protections. Increasingly, this presents a serious disincentive to pursue industrial policies or regulate extractive projects to ensure better labour conditions or reduce environmental destruction.

Here’s an example. One Canadian-Chilean company, Tethyan Copper, won $11bn from Pakistan after the country’s supreme court ruled in favour of local communities who argued that the contract signed by a regional administration had been illegal. Tethyan had only invested $150m in exploration but its award was so large that it would have bankrupted the Pakistani state. To avoid this, Pakistan caved in and awarded Tethyan a mining license.

ISDS mechanisms are a holdover from attempts to prevent former colonies from appropriating industrial concerns after independence. The office of the US Trade Representative compared them to gunboat diplomacy, while others liken the campaign against ISDS to abolishing slavery. The truth is that ISDS has no place in the modern world and should be repudiated and renegotiated by all nations working in this sector.

The world must also move to prevent a race to the bottom in tax competition. Fair taxation that allows for sustained industrialisation is essential for long term fiscal stability and high value chain integration. Disclosure requirements, the cross-border exchange of tax information to counter evasion threats and integrated regional partnerships can all build transition mineral value chains into a sustainable regional development model.

Ultimately, if we don’t get this right, the green transition will look – to most in the world – like just another resource grab. The green transition must be redistributive in order to have the global buy-in to succeed.

But to do this effectively at the scale needed, it will be necessary to go beyond the UN panel. Perhaps we need to start thinking about a producer organisation similar to the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 1970s, which advanced the interests of critical resource producers in a very different time and context. Certainly, the distribution of critical mineral profits should be fairer, the environmental impacts should be more closely monitored, and the democratic control of the sector’s decision-making processes must be broader and deeper.

In the teeth of a global economic system that answers first to the call of the dollar, it seems that it may well be time for producers to take a stand together. To quote Guterres again: “The renewables revolution is happening, but we must guide it towards justice.”

To read the blog post as it was published on Publish What You Pay website, click here.

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Taking as an example one category of activity that the IRA seeks to catalyze – manufacturing of solar energy equipment – what are those key lessons and how are EU policymakers missing them?

Industrial policy lesson: help with operating expenses, not just capital expenses, is essential.

Capital formation is not the main barrier to growing solar manufacturing in Europe and North America. The “cost penalty” associated with manufacturing in the United States versus manufacturing in Asia is large enough that, prior to the IRA’s enactment, an investor awarded a “free” U.S. solar cell or module factory could have expected to operate that factory at a continuous loss as far as the eye could see. This is why the U.S. policy mix, post-IRA, now includes per-unit-of-output benefits properly sized to close the ongoing gap. Cap-ex help may be necessary, but it is nowhere near sufficient. This applies in the EU as well.

The EU discussion, sadly, has been almost exclusively about cap-ex incentives. This was apparent from arguments about how much EU-level money was available, whether various unused amounts of structural funds could be repurposed, whether new borrowing by the EU itself could occur, etc. Rather than looking for a specific number of euros to award for factory-building, the EU and its Member States could have made space (by amending state aid rules) for new factories to operate for ten or more years free of corporate income taxation. This step alone would cover a good portion of the ongoing cost disadvantage of manufacturing in Europe versus manufacturing in Asia.

Political economy lesson #1: the easiest-to-use fiscal tactic is tax expenditures that don’t forgo much actual revenue.

The $369 billion number assigned to the IRA’s renewable energy title is not real. It reflects scorers’ guesses about private companies’ likely behavior (increasing activity in response to incentives), about corporate profits that theoretically would result, and about the “revenue loss” associated with not taxing (or lightly taxing) those profits over a 10-year period. In the case of solar manufacturing, the calculations mostly involve new factories that, absent the IRA, would never be built. So the tax revenue the US government is “foregoing” through, for example, the new Section 45X credit (a subset of the $369 billion) is not revenue that it could, in a counter-factual scenario, hope to collect. Congressional scoring doesn’t use this kind of rigorous counter-factual analysis, but legislators understand that the actual revenue cost is essentially zero.

Dollars like these are the politically-easiest ones to “spend” on industrial policy. When the government promises not to collect money it could never collect anyway, no one else’s taxes have to rise. Democrats passed the IRA on their own, but Republicans’ motivation to sabotage it will be muted.

Deficit hawks understand that the “foregone” tax revenues were never really accessible anyway. And small-government conservatives might not hate the concept of new industrial facilities being born inside a brand new low-corporate-income-tax bubble within the US economy.

EU policy discussions show no sign of heeding this lesson. Instead of alleviating corporate taxes imposed at the Member State level, policymakers focused on identifying EU-level resources which quickly proved to be a morass. Delivering incentives through the tax system works differently in EU Member States than in the United States, but it is not impossible.

Political economy lesson #2: address deployment incentives and manufacturing incentives in tandem.

Green power generation and green manufacturing are linked politically. Significant government incentives are still needed to increase renewables’ share of a developed country energy mix. These deployment incentives, while justified, are expensive. Political support for them is difficult to sustain when the equipment being connected principally comes from – and the related manufacturing jobs primarily exist in – another country. The IRA political strategy recognized this linkage and credibly set out a bodog sportsbook review vision of new solar installations full of made-in-America equipment. The EU’s latest commitments on solar deployment were made independently of any strategy or vision for related manufacturing.

Political economy lesson #3: Worrying too much about where investments will locate is a recipe for getting nothing done.

The IRA passed with exclusively Democratic support, even though it was apparent that much of the new manufacturing investment would land in America’s “red” states. In the EU, some of the most promising early threads of public conversation on a robust industrial policy response seem to have fallen victim to infighting: there was no way to guarantee that incentivized manufacturing investments would spread evenly across poorer and richer Member States.

There are understandable reasons, especially after Brexit, for EU policymakers to take “unity” into account in everything they do. The US has a milder version of this “unity” problem and is accordingly better-situated for deploying industrial policy at a continental level. Challenges notwithstanding, the EU needs to find a way forward. A successful energy transition seems imperative, and it will need expensive government incentives, and public support for those will be difficult to achieve (much less sustain) if all the new renewable energy installations are full of equipment made outside Europe.

If the EU draws the right lessons from America’s experience with the IRA, and applies those lessons strategically in its own industrial policy formation, success is not out of reach. Circumstances are more challenging in some respects but easier in others, given that carbon pricing is already present in the EU.

A re-set and reinvigoration of the EU policy discussion is in order.

John Magnus, President, TradeWins LLC. 

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The region at the heart of solar production is rife with forced labor and it is not clear that there is a meaningful supply anywhere else of the materials the solar industry relies on. Further, it is not clear how solar suppliers, importers, developers, or investors can verify that their supply chains are free of forced labor when the Chinese government denies that such practices exist and may punish those who would contradict that position.

Add to that issue the fact that Customs is stopping equipment at the border if the agency suspects there is forced labor in the supply chain, but the U.S. Government has not provided meaningful guidance on how to prove that solar products are free of forced labor and therefor admissible.

The industry and regulators are searching for a viable way to source clean supply chains for clean energy and to verify with some certainty that solar equipment in the United States if free of forced labor.

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Hoshine Silica Industry Co. is a major supplier to the solar industry and is more or less ground zero for forced labor abuses.  The solar industry relies on panels made from silicon. Hoshine is the world’s largest metallurgical-grade silicon producer.

Silicon can be made a number of ways, but the most common steps are to mine quartz, crush and heat that material into metallurgic-grade silicon, then use chemical processing to make polycrystalline silicon. There is obviously more complexity to the system, but the purpose of the explanation above is to point out that a major source for the silica rock, as well as the coal needed for the heat processing, are both found in the mines and manufacturing facilities of Hoshine Silica Industry co. According to reports, those facilities are in the same industrial park as two Uighur internment camps.

The solar industry recognizes the forced labor problem is real, is not going to go away on its own, and must be addressed head on.

2. The Current and Near Future State of Regulation

2.1 U.S. Customs is stopping equipment at the border

As we reported here, the U.S. Government issued a Withhold Release Order (WRO) stating that any products believed to contain silica material produced by Hoshine Silicon Industry Co. and its subsidiaries should be held by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and not released without evidence that the product’s supply chain was free of forced labor.

It appears that more similar regulation is coming down the pike. We understand that the effort to combat forced labor in the solar industry is being driven by the National Security Council at the White House, and supported by an unusual coalition of China hawks, Labor interests, and NGOs. For that we reason, we believe that there the current administration will pursue more WROs.

Additionally, on June 24, the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added four Chinese entities to the Entity List for accepting or utilizing forced labor in the implementation of China’s campaign of repression against Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). It is very possible those companies may soon be subject to WROs:

• Xinjiang Daqo New Energy Co., Ltd.
• Xinjiang East Hope Nonferrous Metals Co., Ltd.
• Xinjiang GCL New Energy Material Technology Co., Ltd.
• Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)

According to recent reports, BIS may also issue more entity list designations. Those designations prohibit exports to the designated companies. However, they may be a good indicator of what companies may be targeted for WROs thereafter.

2.2 The U.S. Congress may broaden prohibitions on imports

In parallel, the House and Senate are currently working on two bills, both titled Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. The senate bill has been passed, while the House bill is still in committee. Those bills could establish a presumption that anything produced in the XUAR uses forced labor. That would mean that importers of those articles would then be reqiured rebut that presumption in order to import any goods from the Region into the United States.

2.3 Other agencies may add to the restrictions

There is some speculation that the USTR may start issuing 301 designations – adding a substantial punitive tariff to equipment from the Xinjiang region. Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Treasury has shown that it is not afraid to use its sanctions authority to entirely cut off U.S. persons from transactions with parties suspected of forced labor abuses.

3. The Opening for Industry: Self-Regulation or Government Regulation

3.1 Customs will need some time to ramp up its enforcement apparatus

The U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents addressing forced labor are competent and hard-working. However, the agency is understaffed to deal with the overwhelming problem of forced labor in the solar industry. With maybe a couple dozen agents assigned to forced labor, and that force also looking at Xinjiang textile and agriculture imports, it will be difficult for CBP to find bandwidth to clear imports stopped at the border for forced labor issues.

That small group of enforcement officials will face the challenge of tracing supply chains from the base chemical level described above, with documentation in Mandarin. Finally, at this point, there is no clear guidance from the U.S. government as to what evidence would clear a shipment stopped at the border. There is no U.S. Customs checklist for forced labor verification nor a list of acceptable evidence that a supply chain is free of forced labor.

Because no guidance on what constitutes admissible product has been issued, it is unclear what CBP would want to see in order to clear equipment held under a WRO. This uncertainty leaves industry with an opportunity to lead before government imposes requirements (more in Section 5 below).

3.2 Industry can have a voice (for now) in what regulation will look like

As the U.S. Government slowly starts to work on figuring out what constitutes admissibility, the Solar Industry has opportunity to lead the process in a number of different ways:

• The Solar Industry could create and propose a list of criteria for admissible products.
• While it is taking steps to identify suppliers accepting or relying on forced labor (on which more in our second article of this series), the Industry could effectively clear a group of suppliers and white-list those in cooperation with the U.S. Government.
• The Industry could take the Better Cotton Initiative as a template and invest in a third-party verification system that would constitute substantive, auditable evidence of a supply chain free of forced labor.
• We understand that chemical signatures in the silicon wafer from the silicon rock processing would allow for batch tracing,[1] which allowing the Industry or a vendor to the industry to batch-test and identify the source of the materials rely on.

Any one or a combination of the above approaches could help the Industry support the laudable goal of eliminating forced labor from the supply chain while, at the same time, helping the Industry avoid onerous or inconsistent regulations devised without its input. There is opportunity for solar to continue its spectacular growth, but it will need to take steps to address this messy problem.

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To read the original commentary from New Republic, please visit here

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“We’re not really going to have what is [a] sustainable recovery” as long as vaccine scarcity continues, Okonjo-Iweala said at an Atlantic Council Front Page event hosted by the Council’s GeoEconomics Center. “The supply scarcity is driving behavior,” she said, not only fueling countries to competitively bid on vaccines, but also to “bid away vaccines from COVAX,” the global coalition tasked with improving COVID-19 vaccine access. “That’s why COVAX has been struggling to deliver what it should.” 

Okonjo-Iweala outlined ways the WTO can alleviate the scarcity problem across the supply chain for COVID-19 vaccines: by encouraging the removal of trade restrictions while working with manufacturers to unlock bottlenecks and spread their production expertise. “Without the transfer of technology and know-how, you also cannot manufacture or increase output,” she said. Members of the WTO are negotiating a proposal to waive intellectual property rights for COVID-19 vaccines, and Okonjo-Iweala hopes “they will come to a conclusion that is pragmatic, allowing developing countries to have access but also [protecting] research, development, and innovation.” 

Meanwhile, the WTO, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Health Organization proposed a $50 billion plan to end the pandemic, foster a sustainable recovery, and generate an estimated $9 trillion in global economic returns by 2025. Okonjo-Iweala said the plan includes $10 billion allocated to boosting preparedness for and prevention of future pandemics. 

Here are some of the highlights of Okonjo-Iweala’s vision for the WTO, from her plans to revive trust among its members to her philosophy on bringing the trade body into the digital era. 

A trust-building exercise ahead 

• Among the WTO’s challenges, “there is a trust deficit between members: between developed countries and developing countries, between China, the US, the EU… You name it, in any configuration,” said Okonjo-Iweala. “[Trust] is something that we really need to build up.”  

• She suggested that one way to build trust is to revive the WTO’s original purpose set out in the organization’s founding document, the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement. The “WTO is supposed to help enhance living standards for people, create employment, and support sustainable development. This is all about people,” Okonjo-Iweala said. If the organization aims to “make things better for people, then it wouldn’t take twenty years to negotiate an agreement” that benefits people. 

• The comment alluded to the WTO’s twenty-year negotiations on prohibiting fishing industry subsidies that contribute to global overfishing. Trade ministers will meet to discuss the issue on July 15, and Okonjo-Iweala noted that this meeting may “kick us along the path towards agreement” by the end of 2021. The leader of the negotiations, Permanent Representative of Colombia to the WTO Santiago Wills, has produced a draft agreement “that so far, nobody has thrown out,” Okonjo-Iweala noted. 
• If WTO members can strike deals such as a fisheries subsidies agreement and “work in these multilateral ways together,” Okonjo-Iweala said, that can begin “to build the trust that you can work together and you can deliver together.” 

A mission to get with the times 

• The WTO will also have to “update its rules and move with the times” to build trust among its members, said Okonjo-Iweala. “The world is going digital,” she noted, but she also acknowledged that “the WTO does not yet have an agreement” on digital trade and e-commerce regulations.  

• With her vision focusing on inclusive growth, Okonjo-Iweala said that a WTO approach to digital is key. She noted that during the pandemic, small- and medium-sized enterprises with digital access avoided shutting down entirely. Women specifically own many of these enterprises, “and when they do have access to the Internet, they can directly connect with their customers, and this is very helpful.” Thus, she concluded, “in order to have a fair, transparent, and level playing field for digital trade, and to solve many of the issues about cross-border data flows, you need some agreement.” 

• Okonjo-Iweala admitted that, while trade lifted people out of poverty, “people have been left behind.” She partially attributed that to protectionism and to technological changes in economic sectors. Weeks after the Biden administration released a plan for a new US industrial policy in an Atlantic Council speech, Okonjo-Iweala noted that industrial policy can be helpful in building infrastructure (like internet access) but cautioned that “industrial policies that lead to protectionism [are] something we need to watch,” and could be “against WTO rules” depending on their approaches. 

• Okonjo-Iweala said that eighty-three WTO members are participating in plurilateral negotiations to modernize trade rules for a digital world. “We’re very hopeful that… [by] the next [ministerial], we would be able to come up with an agreement with a set of rules that can help us underpin digital trade.” 

• But in equipping the WTO to deal with modern challenges, she acknowledged that helping to solve trade’s health and environmental issues, alongside digital issues, will be urgent, too. “I believe we can do it. We can’t do them all at once, but we can sequence what we want to do.” 

Support for Africa’s largest trade endeavor 

• Okonjo-Iweala is both the first woman and the first African to lead the WTO. The Nigeria native hailed the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which came into effect in January, as “one of the best things I think the continent has done. … The WTO has been a foundation for putting these rules together and, I hope, will be a companion as we try to implement [it].” 

• She noted that the WTO is ready to partner with the AfCTFA on issues like digital trade and improving Internet access. “We have a lot of work that we can do together to breach the digital divide,” she said. 

• Among the ways the WTO can support the AfCTFA, Okonjo-Iweala mentioned that the trade organization can help reduce barriers to the movement of goods and services across borders and encourage investment to create value-added exports and keep jobs on the continent. 

Time for reform? 

• When asked about differences in opinion among WTO members over issues like the benefits of free trade and the role of the dispute-settlement system, Okonjo-Iweala pushed back by saying that members “believe that trade and trade liberalization is the right way to go,” but that they differ on the way “they put this into practice.”  

• And while the differences in opinion may pose challenges for the WTO, they don’t erode the organization’s utility, said Okonjo-Iweala, arguing that instead of labeling the WTO as dysfunctional, members should come together to make it work better. “Is the best answer to walk away and say this doesn’t work? This organization, the WTO, has worked for the US, has worked for China, has worked for the UK and the EU, and lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty and enriched economies. It is still the same organization,” she said. 

Katherine Walla is the assistant director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.  

To read the full commentary from the Atlantic Council, please click here. 

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From the production of renewable agricultural feedstocks to the many circular end-of-life options for the materials themselves, the plant-based products industry is bringing the circular economy closer to reality. Looking more specifically at economic benefits, the infographic below describes a few metrics that show how plant-based products are driving economic growth, particularly in rural areas:

Growing the Feedstock

American agriculture has the capacity to grow a wide array of potential feedstock crops required to sustain a robust plant-based materials industry without impacting domestic food supply or hampering America’s trading role as the world’s breadbasket. According to the USDA Economic Research Service, farming directly employs 2.6 million Americans and exports over 20 percent of production. The plant-based products industry represents a wide range of uses and applications for American crops that can both increase and maintain existing demand for Americancommodities and value-added products both domestic and abroad.

Manufacturing of Plant-Based Materials

The emergence or expansion of plant-based product manufacturing facilities immediately stimulates local economies and connects these communities to the bodog poker review global supply chain through the innovative materials created at these facilities. In fact, the plant-based products industry contributes over $57 billion to the U.S. economy through exports and supports another 550,000 global trade-related jobs. In terms of direct domestic employment, currently the U.S. biorefining, biobased chemicals, and biobased plastic bottles and packaging industries employ over 15,000 people. As noted in the infographic, these are well-paying, skilled jobs. As consumer demand for more sustainable alternatives to traditional materials and packaging continues to increase around the world, the expansion of plant-based materials manufacturing to meet this demand would create more economic opportunities for producers and increase international competitiveness of U.S. bioeconomy sector moving forward.

End of Life and Conversion of Plant-Based Materials into Manufacturing Feedstock

Plant-based alternatives offer a wide suite of circular end-of-life management options, ranging from recyclability to compostability, with each option possessing its own opportunity for job creation. Composting is a particularly advantageous end-of-life option for many plant-based materials. The Institute for Local Self Reliance has estimated that for every 1 million tons of organic material composted, and its subsequent use, almost 1,400 new full-time jobs could potentially be supported.

America is not alone in its desire to seek out better waste management options. A thriving domestic plant-based materials industry provides countries around the world with opportunities to import these critical materials for transitioning to a better waste management future.

Conclusion

Growing a robust plant-based products industry presents a chance to create economic opportunity throughout America. Not only in the immediate term, but in the long term as the U.S. industry seeks out new ways to compete more effectively in a rapidly-evolving international market of advanced materials. From preserving the livelihoods of the farmers who grow agricultural feedstocks, supporting climate changes solutions, to the manufacturing of the materials themselves and the practical benefits of a wide range of end-of-life options, plant-based materials contribute positively to the shift towards a more circular global economy.

Jessica Bowman serves as the Plant Based Products Council’s (PBPC) Executive Director. In her position, she leads PBPC’s efforts in advocating for using more renewable, plant-based materials and ensuring they become part of the circular bioeconomy.

Jessica joins PBPC from the American Chemistry Council, where she served as Executive Director of the FluoroCouncil, and previously as Senior Director of Environmental Affairs for the Airports Council International – North America. She holds a J.D. with a concentration in environmental law from University of Maryland School of Law and a B.S. in GeoEnvironmental Engineering from Penn State University.

To read additional commentary from the Plant Based Products Council (PBPC), please click here. 

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The two special provisions of the TCA regarding TSD commitments 

There are a number of novel contributions regarding TSD obligations in the TCA. One is Article 9.4 which regulates the ability of the parties to impose rebalancing measures, and the other one is Article 8.10 regarding the importance of responsible supply chain management. I address each in turn.

First, Article 9.4 under “Title XI: Level Playing field for open and fair competition and sustainable development” of the TCA allows the EU or the UK to impose rebalancing measures when significant divergences regarding their policies and priorities with respect to labour, social, environmental or climate protection, or with respect to subsidy control, arise and cause material impacts on trade and investment between them. A rebalancing measure is a sanction (e.g., tariffs) which is designed to compensate one side for an unfair disadvantage.  In such a scenario, the party who intends to impose rebalancing measures must notify the other party and consultations will take place to find a solution. If no agreement is reached, after five days from the conclusion of the consultations, the party can adopt necessary and proportionate rebalancing measures to remedy the situation, providing that the other party has not requested the establishment of an arbitration tribunal. If an arbitration tribunal is established, but  does not deliver its final ruling after 30 days, the party is allowed to adopt rebalancing measures. In return, the other party can also take proportionate counter-measures until the tribunal delivers its ruling. In enacting measures, the aim is to craft something so that disruption to the trading relationship is minimized. 

This provision represents an improvement from the TSD chapters of the EU’s existing trade agreements. While those chapters include different types of dispute settlement mechanisms, they do not include the possibility to impose rebalancing measures against non-compliant third countries. On the contrary, the EU-UK TCA provides, for the first time, a strong mechanism for parties to implement sustainable development obligations. However, it remains to be seen how enforcement of this chapter will work in practice, as the TCA does not provide a definition for “significant divergences,” and neither does it specify examples of appropriate “rebalancing measures.” 

Second, Article 8.10 of the fair competition and sustainable development chapter of the TCA states that the parties recognize the importance of responsible supply chain management and corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices. In this regard, the EU and the UK must encourage responsible business conduct by providing supportive policy frameworks and by supporting the adherence and implementation of relevant international instruments (e.g., OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, among others). In particular, the EU and the UK obliged themselves to implement measures to promote the uptake of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. 

But this is not the first time that the EU refers to corporate social responsibility in its trade agreements and the use of international guidelines. For instance, the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) has a similar provision in its TSD and environment chapters. However, it is the first time that the EU and the UK added extra language on responsible supply chain management in its trade agreements. This reflects the growing importance of supply chain due diligence obligations with respect to environment and human rights in the EU as well as in the UK. 

The EU and UK’s internal regulations on supply chain due diligence

Both the EU and the UK are in favor of adopting internal regulations on supply chain due diligence. In the EU, the  Conflict Minerals Regulation, which establishes supply chain due diligence for trade in certain minerals and metals to minimize the risk of financing armed groups in conflict-affected and high-risk areas, entered into force on 1 January 2021. Moreover, the European Commission is currently preparing a legislative proposal that includes mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence obligations for companies in the context of sustainable corporate governance. The EU’s new Supply Chain Due Diligence Regulation is likely to elaborate on specific sanctions to provide a strong enforcement mechanism. The Commission will present its proposal in the second quarter of 2021. 

Similarly, the UK is proactive in promoting and implementing supply chain due diligence on human rights and the environment. In October 2015, the UK’s Modern Slavery Act, which requires businesses to report on slavery and human trafficking in their supply chains, entered into force. It was the first of its kind in Europe and one of the first in the world. In addition, in November 2020, the UK submitted a separate legislative proposal for supply chain due diligence on deforestation, which is currently being debated in the House of Commons. Under the new rules, which are expected to be passed by mid-2021, companies would face substantial fines if they cannot prove that their commodity supply chains are not linked to illegal deforestation.  

It is important to note that companies in the EU and the UK broadly support this new initiative on strengthening supply chain due diligence obligations. In a public consultation for the EU’s new Supply Chain Due Diligence Regulation, which ended on 8 February 2021, stakeholders generally supported this initiative and urged the Commission to implement effective and mandatory rules to ensure respect for human rights and for the protection of the environment. However, some stakeholders stressed that the new initiative should consider the complexity of global supply chains, for example, indirect sourcing relations,  and the differences between companies and sectors. In the UK, companies like Marks & Spencer called for action on human rights abuses in the cotton fields of Xinjiang, for instance. 

The relevance of the TSD obligations under the EU-UK TCA

The EU-UK TCA is a front-runner in the field of sustainable development obligations. While Article 9.4 provides a strong enforcement mechanism with a possibility to impose rebalancing measures, Article 8.10 highlights the importance of supply chain management and due diligence obligations for human rights and environmental protection, and provides that the EU and the UK must work together to strengthen their cooperation in these areas. Considering the growing importance of TSD obligations in trade policy, the EU-UK TCA could provide a good example of a strong TSD chapter for future trade bodog casino agreements, which could be used as a template. 

At the same time, it would be important to monitor whether and how the EU and the UK will impose rebalancing measures, as well as how the two parties implement their own supply chain due diligence obligations and internal regulations. More interestingly, stakeholders need to pay close attention to whether these two new provisions included in the TCA will be replicated in the EU’s or UK’s future trade agreements. While much remains to be seen, the TSD chapter in the EU-UK TCA is a promising step forward. 

To read the full commentary from Trade Experettes, please click here. 

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The European Union is a global leader in climate policy. It has made considerable progress in reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, whether measured per capita, per unit of GDP, or by its use of renewable energy. It is raising its decarbonization targets under its Green Deal and in the run up to the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP26) in Glasgow in November. The EU’s climate plans include a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), outlined in a leaked preliminary draft and due to be formally proposed in July. This would be essentially a tax on imports designed to offset the (notional) difference in carbon price between the EU and its trading partners high emission traded sectors such as steel and aluminum. The EU is under pressure to provide compensation to high emitters who pay higher prices for carbon permits under its emission trading system (ETS). Meanwhile, the CBAM is supported by many in civil society as an effort likely to encourage countries to adopt more ambitious emission reduction measures.

To read the full report from the Policy Center for the New South, please click here.

Uri Dadush is a Senior Fellow at the Policy Center for the New South, previously known as OCP Policy Center in Rabat, Morocco and a non-resident scholar at Bruegel. 

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Leading figures convene at the UN Trade Forum 2021 to explore how to ensure a COVID-19 economic recovery that protects the planet and promotes inclusive development.

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Despite some progress, the G7 have so far failed to adequately commit to the urgent need to tackle ever growing natural resource consumption and generation of waste – the primary drivers of climate change, biodiversity loss and many other environmental and geopolitical challenges.

Looking beyond the G7 towards upcoming summits, such as COP26 and the G20, this article will outline three principles for a truly global green recovery: efficiency, sufficiency and fairness.

The climate emergency and COVID-19 pandemic have exposed and exacerbated major cracks in the foundations of the neoliberal economic model – the rise of nationalism and protectionism, growing wealth inequality, fragile global supply chains, uneven access to basic human needs and worker exploitation. It is no coincidence that society is experiencing them simultaneously as they are, by and large, symptoms of the same underlying cause – the global race to endlessly maximize and capture economic growth through resource consumption.

In 2019, for the first time in history, humanity consumed over 100 billion tonnes of the earth’s resources in just one year. Extraction and processing of natural resources is responsible for approximately half of the world’s carbon emissions and 90 per cent of biodiversity loss. Such high rates of resource consumption are causing, and will continue to cause, irreparable damage to ecosystems.

A green recovery from the pandemic is a ‘once in a generation’ opportunity to address these issues and to make the economic system greener, fairer and more resilient. The green recovery took centre stage at the G7 with the announcement of the B3W partnership and expressed support for the transition to sustainable management and use of natural resources. But what does sustainable management and use of natural resources mean in the context of a global green recovery?

Is Green Growth the Answer to a Green Recovery?

Many argue that the green recovery should be underpinned by pursuing green growth – in other words growing the economy while simultaneously reducing environmental impact through increasing material and energy efficiency. The EU’s €1.8 trillion post-COVID-19 fund and President Biden’s $6 trillion stimulus package proposal are prime examples of the green growth agenda, as is the B3W with its commitment to accelerating ‘clean and green growth’.

Assuming that all green recovery fiscal stimulus packages focus entirely on green investments – setting aside the fact that, to date, most of them have largely failed at this – there remains no empirical evidenceto suggest that green growth driven by efficiency gain has been – or can be – achieved anywhere near the scale needed to prevent dangerous climate change and other dimensions of ecological breakdown.

The reason for this is that efficiency gain is the driver of economic growth. The more efficient your economy becomes, the faster it grows and the more resources it bodog casino consumes – otherwise known as the Jevons paradox.

For the G7 to keep their promise of ‘protecting at least 30 per cent of global land and at least 30 per cent of the global ocean by 2030’ and ‘support the transition to sustainable management and use of natural resources’ they must look beyond simply curtailing waste and consider how to absolutely reduce natural resource consumption in a fair manner.

The summation of all of this is simple but stark. A green recovery dependent on green growth may reduce carbon emissions, but it will continue to accelerate natural resource consumption and therefore the destruction of the natural world.

This poses a difficult but essential question for global leaders: how can B3W ensure sustainable management and use of natural resources under a growth-based scenario?

Three Principles for a Global Green Recovery

Many leading thinkers have sought to answer this question with ideas such as Doughnut Economics, Wellbeing economics, Degrowth or the Safe Operating Space. But despite increasing political traction, these ideas have yet to be translated into binding multilateral agreements. With 2021 being the ‘super year’ for the environment, there has never been a better time to convert these ideas into action. What is needed for a truly global green recovery are the principles of efficiency, sufficiency and fairness.

Efficiency: Circular use of materials and energy
There is no way the world can remain within the 1.5°C target or address biodiversity loss without massive resource efficiency gains. The G7 must reaffirm their commitment to the Bologna roadmap which aims to coordinate and progress actions to increase resource efficiency and transition to a more circular economy. The goal of the circular economy is simple: to design out waste and pollution by keeping products and materials in use for as long as possible. Resource efficiency and circular economy should be deeply integrated into the B3W initiative.

However, efficiency gain on its own is not enough to overcome the accelerated resource demand fuelled by the need for constant economic (green) growth – for that we turn to sufficiency.

Sufficiency: An adequate amount of something essential
Sufficiency means consuming the right quantity of material goods and services necessary for optimal health and wellbeing — avoiding underconsumption (poverty) but also conspicuous overconsumption (environmental destruction). Sufficiency is growth agnostic in that it promotes growth where it is needed to eliminate poverty and in economic activities which are beneficial to people and the planet, such as renewable energy or the caring economy. In this respect, the G7 commitment to support clean and green growth in low-income countries is commendable and essential. But to allow developing countries the space to grow within the planetary boundaries, developed countries must also significantly curtail their levels of consumption.

Achieving sufficiency is not necessarily contrary to proponents of green growth. If proponents of green growth are in fact correct, and it is feasible to decouple economic growth from material and energy consumption, placing a moratorium on resource extraction – like the cap on carbon emissions agreed through the Paris Agreement – will only serve to complement this goal. A multilateral agreement on a ‘Safe Operating Space’ is required to ensure fair and sustainable management of natural resources.

Fairness: Reduce inequality through redistribution
Critical to achieving sufficiency is fair redistribution. There is an urgent need to strengthen resource equality and redistribution, both within and across nations, to ensure that all communities have the necessary resources, capacity and material share to deliver wellbeing. Wealth accumulation also needs to be distributed fairly to those who contributed to it, including the public sector where it can be reinvested into more resource efficient public goods and services such as public transport, healthcare and education.

Finally, any global recovery must also put a just transition front and centre. Many people’s jobs and livelihoods – particularly the poorest – are, and will continue to be, affected by the transition to a wellbeing economy, as well as the effects of climate change. The $100 billion per year climate finance fund and financing for the Sustainable Development Goals to achieve the human development targets for 2030 should be substantially increased to support this transition.

In conclusion, the G7 have shown leadership in committing to the B3W partnership and recognizing the need for sustainable management and use of natural resources. But the question remains: what does sustainable natural resource management mean in the context of building back better? The principles of efficiency, sufficiency and fairness could serve as the framework for world leaders to address this question at the upcoming G20 and COP26 summits.

Dr Jack Barrie is an expert on the topic of the circular economy. He holds a PhD from University of Strathclyde on circular economy innovation policy, and previously held the role of Schmidt-MacArthur fellow with the Ellen MacArthur Foundation.

Patrick Schröder is a senior research fellow in the Energy, Environment and Resources department. At Chatham House he specializes in research on the global transition to an inclusive circular economy with a specific focus on collaborative opportunities between key countries, closing the investment gap and building an evidence base for trade in the circular economy.

To read the full commentary from Chatham House, please click here.

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