All the talk of imposing new trade and investment restrictions—often in the name of promoting economic security—may have led officials and analysts to overlook one constructive unilateral option. Namely, strengthening the national and regional business environment so as to enable local firms to adapt to adverse circumstances and opportunities that geopolitical events create.

Here the case is made for bodog casino as a (partial) insurance policy against geopolitics.

As geopolitical rivalry intensifies, the siren song of insular, zero-sum thinking gains in prominence. This flies in the face of decades of experience where our standards of living have been enhanced by doing business with foreign buyers and sellers. Exports augment national sales and make jobs more secure. Import competition keeps local firms on their toes—complacent local oligopolists tend to rip off citizens.

No country in the past half a millennium has become an economic superpower by its economy being hermetically sealed to outsiders. Yet, even for economies as large as Japan, there is still the question: How best to react as China and the United States vie for primacy?

For better or for worse, at least since the global financial crisis, the world is in an era of trade policy unilateralism. The painstaking monitoring of commercial policy by the Global Trade Alert has shown this. Sadly, there remains no appetite for path breaking multilateral opening of markets.

At best, as demonstrated by the outcome of the recent WTO Ministerial Conference, sushi-sized reform is what the WTO has on the menu. Likewise, regional trading agreements. Recently, World Bank analysts reported that the number of newly signed regional accords has been falling as this century unfolds. Reciprocal approaches to trade reform are out of favour, alas. Unilateralism is in.

But, like cholesterol, there are two types of unilateralism. Stupid unilateralism involves erecting trade barriers to imports and other ruses that seek to tilt the commercial playing field in favour of local firms. That the idea for these ruses often come from local firms says a lot about their competitiveness. Successful managers think of new ways to create more value for customers, they don’t go running off for help from officials who are largely clueless in the ways of commerce.

What every government can influence constructively is their national business environment. Unlike trade accords, which take years to negotiate, governments can assess and benchmark their national business environment right away.

Fortunately, there are well-regarded measures and rankings of national competitiveness, such as this one produced by the IMD Business School in Lausanne, Switzerland. Economists can fight like cats and dogs about the best short-term macroeconomic policy, but when it comes to the drivers of long-term economic growth, there is a remarkable degree of agreement. Smart governments should capitalise on this consensus.

To fix ideas consider Switzerland, a country with one of the highest standards of living. Switzerland’s population is too small to support its many successful firms. Switzerland has to export. Therefore, everyone there understands that Switzerland must be competitive no matter what.

If Germany offers huge subsidies to its energy-intensive firms (as it did after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine), Switzerland must react differently because the state doesn’t have as deep pockets as Germany. That involves making sure the transport and digital infrastructure is first rate, that the corporate tax and regulatory burden is fit for purpose, and that Switzerland has the best possible access to the markets of the future as well as to the behemoths of today. Of course, such access does not come for free—in turn Switzerland has to be open to imports as well.

For sure, Switzerland’s current favourable business climate didn’t arise overnight—but bear in mind that these days trade talks take forever (a comment made in the spirit of making a fair comparison.) The intensification of geopolitical rivalry in recent years has strengthened the longstanding case for improving the supply side of national economies. Doing so involves taking on vested interests that cling to privileges that deliver either a quiet life or a very lucrative one. For this reason, supply side reform is like getting children to eat enough fresh vegetables—evidently the right thing to do but an uphill battle all the same.

Governments should focus in particular on those aspects of the business climate that enable firms to adapt to new circumstances. Suppose “economic coercion” by a trading power—or worse, conflict that cuts off supply chains—results in some existing sales markets or sourcing locations being blocked. Then national firms need to have the capabilities and the resources to spot alternative options and to act on them. These firms need to know where foreign markets are being liberalised and the regulations they must comply with to take advantage of any opportunities. This calls for granular monitoring of policy developments abroad as well as beefed up capabilities at home.

Critically, executives and officials need to be comfortable with geopolitical chaos and have gamed out in advance how they might respond. When faced with what many deem “economic coercion,” Australia and Lithuania have shown that small and mid-sized economies can effectively pivot, finding new markets for the valuable goods their firms produce. For sure, at the beginning of these episodes, there were reasons to be fearful. But firms and governments there knew they had alternatives (created in part by WTO and regional trade deals) and pursued them with vigour.

With greater geopolitical rivalry the political calculus of supply side reform has changed. Holdouts against reform must now explain why their interests matter more at a time when adaptability is at a premium. Economic security arguments should push the scales against reform holdouts. The media and public will be at a loss to understand why economic coercion abroad results in higher jobs losses on account of some vested local interest frustrating improvements in national exporters’ adaptability and productivity. Whose side are those vested interests on?

Of course, cushioning those interests that lose from reforms is typically smart politics—but letting them frustrate reform provides geopolitical foes with a greater incentive to strike. In open societies where debates over reform can be followed from autocracies, the opposition of vested interests to reform will be noted—and factored in by foreign governments. As local firms and sectors become more adaptable, the downside from economic coercion shrinks. Supply side reform is one way governments better protect their societies against economic coercion.

Intensified geopolitical rivalry is back—it won’t recede anytime soon. This puts a premium on having nimble firms that can adapt to whatever insanity transpires. In turn, this should shift the political calculus—putting the defenders of status quo bottlenecks on the back foot.

Firms and governments have agency—the times call for the courage to use it.

Simon J. Evenett is the Founder of the St. Gallen Endowment for Prosperity Through Trade and an economics professor. He is also Co-Chair of the World Economic Forum’s Council on Trade & Investment.

To read the full piece posted on LinkedIn by Global Trade Alert, click here.

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As numerous studies have demonstrated, the United States relies almost entirely on foreign entities for a range of critical minerals — including lithium, cobalt and nickel — that form the technological foundation of a wide array of consumer and military technologies, ranging from electric vehicle batteries to advanced weapon systems. Despite the importance of these minerals to both civilian and military technologies, the U.S produces only a fraction of its minerals supply here in the United States, leaving it open to major disruptions caused by natural disasters, geopolitical conflicts or supply chain failures.

Luckily, a bipartisan effort to secure the United States’ supply of critical materials is underway in Washington. In the past year, Congress has passed or introduced a number of bills to secure the United States’ supply of these critical minerals by boosting our nation’s capacity to acquire and extract them domestically. Although Congress should be applauded for its recent efforts, the truth is the United States won’t be able to produce or stockpile its way out of the current critical mineral crisis.

In order to secure the nation’s critical minerals supply, the United States also needs to increase its efforts to “make-use-recycle” critical materials that are already in circulation and repurpose them for future use — drawing from a set of strategies that some economists and policy experts have begun calling the “circular economy.”

At the core of the circular economy model is the effort to recover still-viable critical materials from existing products and reintegrate them into commerce via a “reverse supply chain,” rather than solely extracting new minerals from mines. Proponents of this approach often cite its ability to prevent environmental degradation and combat climate change by reducing waste and limiting the need for new, carbon-intensive manufacturing and extraction. Importantly, though, the principles of the circular economy will also be crucial to reducing the United States’ dependence on strategic adversaries for critical minerals.

The United States’ dependence on its geostrategic adversaries for critical materials constrains its ability to maneuver strategically and diplomatically. For instance, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, China currently accounts for more than 90 percent of the world’s rare earth processing capacity, while Russia is the largest supplier of palladium — a key mineral for reducing toxic emissions from automobile exhaust — to the United States.

It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which a strategic competitor could threaten to withhold its supply of critical materials unless the U.S. complied with its demands. Indeed, Japan faced this scenario in 2010, when China cut off rare earth element (REE) exports to Japan over a maritime security dispute, roiling global markets and threatening consumer electronic and hybrid vehicle battery production in Japan.

It is therefore not surprising the U.S. government is reviewing the national security implications of U.S. imports of neodymium magnets — used in a wide range of vehicle components, wind turbines, phones, appliances and power tools — from China, which is the world’s only active processor of these magnets.

Increasing the United States’ efforts to recover and repurpose critical minerals would go a long way toward resolving these vulnerabilities. Let’s look at the numbers.

The United States mined 43,000 tons of rare earth ores in 2021, according to the USGS but exported 45,000 tons primarily to China (including ores from external sources) for processing and re-export back to the U.S. market. A recent peer-reviewed study found that recycling from select consumer goods and recovery from the byproducts of other mining and phosphate processing could yield from two to 11 times the volume of rare earth elements that could be extracted through processing the raw materials.

Although cost, availability and quality are major factors in the success of recycling, the potential is nevertheless there to retrieve up to three-and-a-half times more dysprosium from recycling earbuds than from ores, six times more lanthanum from hybrid batteries, six times more neodymium from spent polishing powders and 11 times more scandium from aluminum and other “red mud” ore processing. This yield could be a significant secure source of critical materials with the acceleration of the circular economy.

Approaching the circular economy from the standpoint of national security will require the international community to reexamine certain policies that, while designed to combat Bodog Poker climate change and environmental degradation in the short term, may actually impede the transition to a circular economy and undermine national security efforts. A new proposal under consideration by the Basel Convention, for example, would restrict the trade-in of all end-of-life electronics. This will make it more difficult to extract still-viable critical materials — such as rare earths, lithium, cobalt, indium, nickel, gallium and tantalum found in mobile phones — from end-of-life products and put them back into productive commerce.

The implication is clear: a circular economy is a national security imperative. In tandem with its efforts to boost domestic production of critical materials, Congress should also recognize that building reverse supply chains for critical materials will be essential to securing the United States’ supply of critical minerals.

Ultimately, a circular economy will result not only in a cleaner and more sustainable planet, it will also lead to a safer and more secure homeland.  

Adina Renee Adler is deputy executive director of Silverado Policy Accelerator, a Washington-area think tank focused on trade, environmental, and cybersecurity policy. Adler is a former U.S. trade negotiator and has worked in the recycling and commodity manufacturing industries.

To read the full commentary from The Hill, please click here.

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I am a Senior Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center and a Cybersecurity Policy Fellow at New America. I have worked as an analyst of Chinese data and technology policies for the last decade, in the U.S. national security community, and in the private sector. I also advise corporate clients on China’s technology policies.

Today I will focus my testimony on data security in the context of the U.S.-China relationship and global cross-border data flows.

While my expertise focuses on China—and I will first speak specifically about the Chinese government’s approach to acquiring and extracting value from data—my view is that the most effective solutions for the United States require a more comprehensive approach to regulating data security and privacy. Some of these challenges require tools that are specific to risks posed by China, but these issues are bigger than China. Setting basic standards on what data can be collected and retained by all companies will help protect U.S. personal and other sensitive data, regardless of whether the risk comes from a state-sponsored hacker, a data broker, or a private company transferring the data to China. U.S. lawmakers have an opportunity to address transnational security threats while also advancing a more secure, ethical, and democratic global internet in its own right.

China’s National Data Strategy

1. The Chinese government has embarked on an ambitious national data strategy with the goal of acquiring, controlling, and extracting value from large volumes of data.

In addition to China’s two landmark laws that took effect this fall (the Data Security Law and Personal Information Protection Law1), Beijing has elevated the concept of data as an economic and strategic asset, centralizing state power over information flows within and outside of China’s borders:

– An April 2020 directive issued by the State Council and Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) designates data as the fifth factor of production—after land, labor, capital, and technology. At the National People’s Congress in March 2021, the outline of the 14th Five-Year plan called for “improving the market of data factors” (健全数据要素市场), and stressing the need to unlock the value of data to fuel the digital economy

– On November 30th of this year, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology released the 14th Five Year Plan (2021-2025) for China’s big data industry. The plan defines big data as a strategic emerging industry, slated for greater state support to unlock the value of data. State supporting measures focus on expanding “international cooperation” between Chinese and foreign “big data services” companies in standard setting and research & development (R&D), and encourage multinationals to set up R&D centers in China. By 2025, the plan calls for China to set up new mechanisms to facilitate China’s role in data trading and cross-border transfers. (建立数据资源产权、交易流通、跨境传输和安全等基础制度和标准规范) and “encourages Chinese firms to offer big data services in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) countries and regions.”

Beijing is also taking steps to centralize state control over data by breaking down silos or data islands across different government ministries and between the government and private companies, which have long plagued the government’s ability to aggregate and coordinate data. Barriers to data sharing are due to a variety of reasons. Chinese companies are reluctant to share their data as valuable commercial intellectual property, while government agencies often push back against one another’s access requests, guarding their data as a form of political power.

An article by the Tencent Research Institute argues for facilitating more data flows to China’s large tech platforms. Citing an International Data Corporation (IDC) estimate, the article states that “by 2025, the proportion of the world’s data held by [China] will increase from 23.4 percent in 2018 to 27.8 percent, making China the first in the world. The open use of data resources will determine whether our country can seize the initiative in a new round of international competition and guarantee national data security through the development and growth of the digital industry.”

What are the implications for the United States of China’s domestic and international efforts to acquire and make use of data as a strategic asset?

2. Understanding China’s motivations and different scenarios for how aggregated datasets could be used by the Chinese government is vital for creating effective U.S. policy.

There are concerning potential uses of U.S. personal data from a national security perspective. Beijing is already presumed to have sensitive national security information from the theft of personnel records of roughly 21 million individuals from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management; travel information from a cyber attack on Marriott hotels covering roughly 400 million records; and credit data from Equifax on roughly 145 million people.7 If additional sources of personal data such as location, social media, or pattern of life data were to be acquired or bought openly through unregulated data brokers and combined with what Beijing has already acquired through cyber theft, Chinese security services could use it to target individuals in sensitive government national security positions or military personnel for manipulation, blackmail, or other forms of coercion. This is particularly concerning from a counterintelligence perspective for individuals with security clearances or those with access to critical infrastructure.

As Chinese online services and network infrastructure gain in prominence around the world, it is also possible that the Chinese government could filter or monitor data processes abroad, just as the United States had done, as shown by Snowden, in utilizing data transmissions across U.S. networks for intelligence gathering. We also simply do not know what value and harm data created today will have in the future, regardless of who has access to it. As we move toward a world in which people have online profiles built on aggregated data, we must ask: what are the implications of the CCP gaining effective control of information flows beyond China’s closed internet system? What are the implications as the CCP takes even more drastic steps to close off the loopholes that to this day keep even the Great Firewall relatively porous and circumventable (e.g., stricter enforcement of restrictions on virtual private networks [VPNs] or shifting from a blacklist to a whitelist approach to permissible websites so technical controls can keep pace with online content deemed threatening)?

At the same time, the Chinese government’s use of data is not monolithic. Different actors are seeking data not just for security and surveillance, but also as fuel for the digital economy and other basic administrative functions. Outside observers of China often view Beijing’s actions solely through the lens of security, neglecting the economic development drivers that play an important role. China’s Data Security Law makes explicit that security and development must be balanced in China’s data-governance system. These two competing priorities have shaped China’s cyber bureaucracy for years. This long-standing internal source of friction and negotiation has contributed, at least in part, to the Chinese government not necessarily enforcing to date the strictest or most conservative security-oriented readings of Chinese cybersecurity laws and regulations. An entire early chapter of the Data Security Law was dedicated to this balance, indicating a recognition by Chinese authorities that state power hinges not only on security of data, but also on its commercial use, and that China must therefore find an effective way to leverage both at once. This duality also is driving an ambitious national effort to classify all data resources held by government and industry by category and grade (“categorized and graded protection system for data;” 数据分类分级保护制度). The goal is to distinguish less sensitive data for circulation to fuel the economy from data that should be locked down with tighter security restrictions.

As China grows in prosperity, and its leadership seeks to assert state control over data for both strategic and economic gain, the United States must also develop a comprehensive vision and regulation to maintain leadership. Leading Chinese data scholar Dr. Hong Yanqing writes that “China should also consider how to enable Chinese enterprises to control and use more data globally. After all, the United States can extend its ‘arm’ because its enterprises are all over the world.” Hong observes that Chinese tech companies need access to global data flows, and that if the United States and the European Union are able to align on digital policies, China will be at a disadvantage of creating split products for different markets (for example, Bytedance segmenting its global and Chinese versions of the apps TikTok and Douyin). He adds that this approach “prevents Chinese ICT companies from upgrading services by using a global data pool and limits the gains from the economies of scale. Once the United States and the European Union reach an agreement, at least their enterprises can avoid data localization and segregating storage, which puts Chinese ICT enterprises at a disadvantage.”

Inaction by the United States will result in failure to create the interoperable coalition on data that Chinese leaders fear. Stalled progress on Privacy Shield and a global vision for data flows like APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules underscore the challenges ahead.

Recommendations

To be effective, U.S. policy should be based on an accurate understanding of why data matters. The analogy of data as the new oil is false, and leads to bad policy that treats data as a finite and zerosum resource that is only valuable in large volumes. Matt Sheehan writes that five dimensions are crucial for machine learning data today: quantity, depth, quality, diversity, and access. This understanding of data’s value matters because it means that policies by Beijing or Washington that seek to hoard or wall off data as a national resource from the other could have unintended consequences that lessen national power, rather than increase it.

Lack of regulation in the United States makes Americans’ sensitive data vulnerable to privacy and security harms not only from sophisticated state-backed cyber intrusions, but also from the unregulated industry of data brokers around the world trading in consumer data without transparency or controls. Setting basic standards on what data can be collected and retained by all companies will help protect U.S. personal data, regardless of where the risk originates. Developing a comprehensive federal privacy law that includes restrictions on data brokers is vital to this effort, along with the creation of strong enforcement mechanisms. Inaction by the United States means ceding leadership and influence in setting international standards to both Europe and China in setting international standards.

Without higher standards for data security and privacy, U.S. citizen bodog casino data held by unregulated private companies are more vulnerable to breaches by hackers from China or from being sold to third-parties openly buying, aggregating, and selling consumer data. For example, Equifax’s many security issues are well-documented, such as the company’s failure to patch known vulnerabilities that ultimately left exposed the data of 145 million Americans. But the hack was also conducted by a foreign government entity with sophisticated hacking capabilities and access to considerable state resources. Companies should not have access to such a volume of personal data that it creates a target to be hacked or transmitted to China.

This reality is also why bans on Chinese software applications are not an effective way to secure Americans’ data. Even if TikTok were American-owned, for example, it could still legally sell data to data brokers that could transmit it to China’s security services.

Given this, American data is shockingly exposed and will remain that way so long as restrictions on data flows only focus on specific companies from countries deemed adversaries.

Debate over a range of issues will make progress on a federal privacy law slow. In the meantime, having baseline rules for the data broker industry would contribute to closing off vectors that make American’s data vulnerable to exploitation by a range of actors.

We must also keep in mind that U.S. actions to respond to data security risks posed by the Chinese government are not occurring in a vacuum. Our policy approach should be tailored to take into account the fact that technology competition with China will not only play out in the United States and China, but also in other parts of the world from India to Europe. How we respond to Chinese companies operating in the United States has ramifications on whether other countries are willing to accept our vision of data governance.

The ability of U.S. firms to maintain a high rate of innovation depends upon access to global markets, talent, and, perhaps most important, datasets. But rising data sovereignty policies around the world are an increasing obstacle to the ability of U.S. companies to operate internationally, beyond China. These policies are an effort by nation-states to ensure control over data by prohibiting transfers of data out of the country or seeking to limit foreign access to certain kinds of data. In this context, U.S. actions will be a reference and a roadmap for other governments that are concerned about U.S. companies and the U.S. government getting access to their citizens’ data.

The United States should work with like-minded governments to develop a common set of standards that would allow data to flow—building off of the concept of “data free flows with trust” put forward by Japan. A multilateral approach should be based on creating a system of incentives for compliance. The United States could lead the way in setting up a certification system that would extend benefits to countries whose data regimes and companies meet certain clear criteria for data protection. The OECD privacy guidelines, for example, could serve as a reference in creating a baseline for commercial data flows.

We need to address national security risks where they exist, but that should be done as one part of a broader U.S. initiative for comprehensive data privacy and higher cybersecurity standards for all companies —whether domestic or foreign. Failure to offer a compelling vision for U.S. data governance will make the United States less secure, less prosperous, and less powerful, and allow more space around the world for companies controlled by the CCP to flourish.

Samm Sacks is a Senior Fellow at Yale Law School Paul Tsai China Center & New America. 

To read the full testimony by Samm Sacks, please click here. 

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But the supply of semiconductors was at risk long before the pandemic, and the virus is only partly to blame for today’s shortages. One of the biggest culprits was a sudden shift in U.S. trade policy. In 2018, motivated by national security concerns, the Trump administration launched a trade and tech war with China that jolted the entire globalized semiconductor supply chain. The fiasco contributed to the current shortages, hurting American businesses and workers. Now, the Biden administration must pick up the pieces.

In its first five months, the Biden administration has laid the groundwork for a more resilient semiconductor supply chain. Discarding the nationalistic policies that got the United States into this mess, the Biden administration has reached agreements at summits with Japan, South Korea, and the European Union to cooperate on a new semiconductor strategy. With their overarching goal now set, Washington and its partners must turn to the hard work of hammering out the details. Only then will they be able to protect their national security and stave off another economic crisis.

Weaponizing Trade 

The troubles for the United States’ multibillion dollar semiconductor industry started when the Trump administration used it as a pawn to go after Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant and a major chip consumer. For years, Western policymakers worried that Huawei’s shoddy gear was vulnerable to cyber-hacking and thus a threat to critical telecommunications infrastructure. More worrisome were the company’s close ties to the Chinese Communist Party, raising the prospect that Beijing would use Huawei’s 5G network equipment to spy on rivals and steal their military intelligence, governmental communications, or trade secrets.

In January 2019, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted Huawei for financial fraud, money laundering, conspiracy to defraud the United States, obstruction of justice, and sanctions violations. On paper, the case had little to do with concerns about national security and 5G networks, but there was no doubt that those issues motivated prosecutors. Unusually, the Trump administration chose not to punish Huawei with financial sanctions. Instead, it weaponized trade. The administration restricted companies from selling to Huawei from the United States by imposing export controls in an attempt to starve Huawei of inputs, especially semiconductors.

The Trump administration had a clumsy approach to a complex supply chain. Modern semiconductor manufacturing is a fragmented process, and even the chips developed by U.S. companies are often not made in the United States. Qualcomm and Nvidia, two major U.S. technology companies, design world-leading semiconductors, but they often farm out the production of those chips to foreign firms, especially Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world’s largest contract manufacturer of chips. Because U.S. law was designed to stop exports leaving the United States, the Trump administration’s export control rollout in 2019 could do nothing about chips being made abroad, blunting the policy’s effectiveness.

Export controls imposed by the United States alone were bound to flop. Non-American companies make great chips, too, allowing Huawei to swap out the American semiconductors it used in its 5G equipment with those from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, or Europe. The policy was lose-lose: it ended up hurting U.S. companies and failing to mitigate the national security threat. What is more, the export controls discouraged chip manufacturers from investing in the United States. American producers ultimately faced trade limits that no country besides their own was applying.

Undeterred, the Trump administration reached deeper into the semiconductor supply chain. Huawei’s other suppliers all needed cutting-edge equipment to produce their chips. But many of those tools were also made by U.S. companies, such as Applied Materials, KLA, and Lam Research. So beginning in mid-2020, the administration tried to use the dominance of U.S. equipment manufacturers as leverage with foreign chipmakers that were still selling to Huawei. It presented companies such as TSMC and Samsung with an ultimatum: stop selling to Huawei or lose the ability to use American tools.

These export controls have also had nasty side effects. To TSMC, Samsung, or any other company that was about to invest hundreds of millions of dollars on new chip-making tools produced by U.S. companies, other equipment makers—including Tokyo Electron in Japan or ASML in the Netherlands—were suddenly much more attractive suppliers.

Furthermore, China threw even more money at its already heavily subsidized chipmakers. Under pressure to accelerate its industrial development, Beijing has sought to quickly free itself from the tight grip of Western technologies. Simultaneously, the fear of losing access to the Chinese market has the U.S. semiconductor industry now seeking upward of $50 billion in federal subsidies as part of legislation now winding its way through Congress. By the industry’s reckoning, the conflict with China could threaten a third of its revenues, requiring a new funding source to spur the research and development of future chips.

By cutting off Huawei’s access to semiconductors, the full suite of U.S. export controls imposed in 2019 and 2020 may ultimately hurt the company’s 5G equipment sales enough to protect U.S. national security, although it is too early to say for sure. Nevertheless, the extreme collateral damage from the episode demands that policymakers find a new way to ensure the resilience of the semiconductor supply chain.

The Shortage Heard Round the World 

By the time U.S. President Joe Biden took office, the COVID-19 pandemic had laid bare the extent of the semiconductor crisis. Carmakers overreacted to the initial shock of COVID-19 and, in early 2020, slashed orders for chips. By the time the auto companies realized their mistake, chipmakers were already at capacity supplying the suddenly booming market for work-from-home goods. The perfect storm only got worse: Arctic weather in Texas, a drought in Taiwan, and an earthquake and fire in Japan all worked to slow production.

U.S. trade policy also squeezed supply. In July 2018, the Trump administration imposed 25 percent tariffs on imported chips as part of its trade war. Despite growth in the global semiconductor market, the tariffs meant that the United States was buying half as many chips from China in 2020 as it was before the trade war, and imports from elsewhere did not replace those missing semiconductors. Making matters worse, Chinese buyers, fearful of the ever-tightening U.S. export controls, hoarded chips, thus contributing to the global shortage.

The semiconductor shortage was high on the agenda in April when Bidenwelcomed to the White House his first foreign leader, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. Although there was nothing Biden or Suga could do to immediately boost production and alleviate the shortages facing their auto sectors, they agreed to “cooperate on sensitive supply chains, including semi-conductors.” Similar priorities were set in May at Biden’s summit with South Korean President Moon Jae-in and in June with leaders from the European Union.

Washington’s efforts to shore up the semiconductor supply chain require bringing each partner into the fold. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Europe are home to some of the world’s most important equipment suppliers and chipmakers. Getting everyone on the same page will require a deft diplomatic touch. Relations between Tokyo and Seoul remain tense, in light of a recent flare-up that led Japan to impose export controls on chemicals critical to South Korean semiconductor producers. Because its companies produce most of the world’s leading chips, Taiwan must also be central to Washington’s efforts. But coordinating policy with Taipei inevitably antagonizes Beijing, which views the island as a renegade province and seeks to eventually reunify it with the rest of China.

On export controls, the semiconductor saga has revealed the need for a common policy that Washington and its partners agree on. Broad, unilateral, and extraterritorial U.S. export controls are not a viable long-term strategy to protect national security. U.S. partners won’t put up with them for long, since democratically elected leaders face domestic pushback when they cede bodog online casino sovereignty to Washington and impose huge commercial costs on their companies. European firms, for example, were quick to accuse the Trump administration of designing its export controls less to address any Chinese national security threat and more to advantage their American competitors.

Extraterritorial controls also won’t work for long, because foreign semiconductor manufacturers will seek to swap out U.S. equipment with tools from alternative suppliers. Once they have done so, Washington loses the only short-term leverage it had over them and over the ultimate target, Chinese firms buying the chips. Preventing this outcome requires collaboration. U.S. partners must both buy into the security threats that China poses and enforce the commonly set export limits on their own firms. Given the difficulties with multinational enforcement, overly broad attempts to control everything are likely to end up controlling nothing. Success may instead demand tighter export limits but on fewer technologies.

Washington and its partners will also need to get more creative. Both the U.S.-Japanese and U.S.-South Korean summits signaled the potential embrace of an innovative policy called “Open RAN.” Under this approach, policymakers would agree on common industry standards that force greater compatibility between different types of 5G equipment. The end goal is to prevent Huawei—or any other 5G equipment provider—from dominating global telecommunications infrastructure. This policy would introduce competition and could weaken the market power of major vendors. It may also be more effective than the existing approach: better to allow for a diversity of suppliers than dedicate resources to killing off one bad actor, such as Huawei, only to see another take its place.

Nevertheless, the United States and its partners will have to accept that aligning their policies comes with costs. If they agree to common export controls, for instance, China will almost certainly carry out a more confrontational foreign and economic policy, intensifying its own efforts to decouple. In turn, semiconductor firms in U.S. partner countries will likely join their American counterparts in losing commercial access to the Chinese market.

Washington and its partners must thus prepare for their semiconductor industries to lose revenues, which fund their considerable R & D expenditures. To ease the sting, they should jointly fund an R & D consortium for firms in allied countries along the semiconductor supply chain.  R& D consortiums, which pool resources for chip research to prevent each company from having to reinvent the wheel, are nothing new for the chip sector at the national level. In fact, Japan developed one in the 1970s, as did South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States shortly thereafter. Here, coordinating a new multilateral consortium could also help allied countries withstand pressure to compete among themselves, thus preventing excessive subsidization and a race to the bottom.

Given the uncertain pace and trajectory of semiconductor innovation, there will be bumps in the road. But failing to coordinate the export controls needed to mitigate the most critical national security threats, develop common industry standards, and prevent excessive subsidies to stave off infighting over suppliers—that would be much, much worse.

Chad P. Bown, Reginald Jones Senior Fellow since March 2018, joined the Peterson Institute for International Economics as a senior fellow in April 2016. His research examines international trade laws and institutions, trade negotiations, and trade disputes. With Soumaya Keynes, he cohosts Trade Talks, a weekly podcast on the economics of international trade policy.

To read the full commentary from Foreign Affairs Magazine, please click here. 

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Certainly, the G7 – cancelled last year because of the COVID-19 pandemic – was the most forward looking and productive for many years, at least in terms of the usual avalanche of ambitious statements of intent. This was important because the G7 has come under a lot of criticism in recent times. Many NGOs claim that it takes initiatives that are not implemented, such as the promise back in 2009 to give $100bn to developing countries to help them to adapt to climate change. Others point out that the G20, founded in 2008, is a more legitimate structure as it includes the emerging economies in the world and is therefore a better mechanism to achieve a global impact than the G7. The latter today represents around 40% of global GDP, whereas it was 60% just a decade ago and 80% when it first met in France in 1975. So, the G7 was under pressure to show that it can still be a useful forum to set international priorities and stimulate broader multilateral initiatives. Angela Merkel spoke of “values-based multilateralism”. The implication was that the democracies not only provide human freedom in contrast to the authoritarian states, but can provide security and economic prosperity as well – and even better than their rivals.In this respect, in person meetings matter in terms of facilitating relationships, especially as Biden had met in person only the Japanese and South Korean leaders in the White House prior to the G7. So, he held a number of bilaterals, especially with the UK host, Boris Johnson, with whom he signed a new Atlantic Charter’, an updated version of the one agreed between Churchill and Roosevelt in 1941 when they pledged to promote democratic values and universal human rights, as well as new structures for multinational cooperation after the Second World War. This was an important marker for the British in prolonging their ‘special relationship’ with the US and giving the narrative of ‘Global Britain’ a more secure basis after the UK’s departure from the EU. As there is no US-UK post-Brexit trade agreement in sight, one of the promised deliverables of Brexit, the new ‘Atlantic Charter’ is at least a signal that the UK will remain primus inter pares as a security partner for Washington.If the West is to be a force on the international stage, it needs to better harmonise its financial and economic policies. During the Trump years this type of cooperation proved difficult across the Atlantic, with both the EU and the US engaged in trade disputes over steel, aluminium and aircraft subsidies. There were also hefty disputes over data handling and storage and the taxation of multinational companies, particularly in the technology sector. Here, G7 finance ministers achieved a breakthrough two weeks before the G7 summit when they agreed on a minimum 15% global tax rate and tax adjustments in countries where the tech multinationals do most of their business. The US made the major concessions here but wants the EU countries like France and the UK to abandon their national rules on tax first before the new global regime will enter into force. It is unpopular with Republicans in the US and has to be endorsed by the G20 to be globally effective.

On other trade issues there was disappointment on the European side. The US has kept ‘Buy American’ provisions in its public procurement. The EU and the US have helpfully postponed the implementation of tariffs on steel, aluminium and aircraft, but they have not yet come to a final agreement on removing these tariffs. A new US-EU trade pact is not on the horizon yet. So, much work remains to be done on integrating the G7 economies to boost domestic growth.The G7 was more impressive for its efforts on the international front.The G7 was under a lot of pressure to deliver more solidarity on the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in the area of the distribution of vaccines. Biden committed the US to providing 500mn doses of the Pfizer vaccine – 200mn this year and the remainder in 2022. The US has already dispatched 80mn doses from its national stockpile. The UK announced the delivery of 100mn doses over the next year but with no precise timetable. France and Germany each pledged 30mn as part of an overall EU effort totalling 100mn. The G7 leaders made a great deal of these various vaccine pledges and together pledged to distribute 1bn vaccines through COVAX and GAVI by the end of 2022.The sub-text behind this initiative was not only to help the 46 poorest countries that so far have received only 1% of their vaccine requirements, but also to push back against China and Russia and regain the high moral ground. Several G7 leaders lamented that the West has been put on the public relations defensive by China and Russia, which have exploited in the media their own modest contributions to the developing countries and presented the West as selfish and uncaring, despite the slow progress of their own vaccination campaigns at home. Although the G7’s new focus on getting 60% of the world’s population vaccinated by the end of 2022 was welcomed by many, NGOs pointed out that 1bn extra vaccines falls well short of the WHO target of 11bn and was lacking in urgency given that 3.9mn have already died from the virus worldwide. With two jabs required, the vaccine numbers need to be doubled as part of a wartime mobilisation effort.

Also, there were few details about how the G7 countries can work with the developing countries on setting up administrations and systems to actually inject the vaccines into people’s arms quickly. Here, the G7 members have gained useful experience with their national vaccination campaigns which could be passed on. Given that the virus is now surging in Africa, NGOs also criticised the slow pace of the vaccine distribution wanting more action now. One issue that could have been contentious did not really surface: the transatlantic debate over intellectual property and patent waivers where the US has been in favour but Germany opposed because of its impact on the research and development investments of the pharmaceutical sector. Instead, the G7 spoke of boosting domestic vaccine production in Africa and elsewhere, setting up a global alert network to spot virus outbreaks earlier and bringing together more rapidly international experts to analyse and identify virus pathogens. Here again, G20 endorsement will be key if these initiatives are to get off the ground. Where the G7 has more autonomy is in learning the lessons of the current COVID-19 pandemic in order to better prepare for future pandemics, a debate led by the UK. Here the debate covered the well-known territory of resilience, ensuring domestic production of key elements like pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, and the integrity or diversity of critical supply chains.Another aspect of pushing back against increasing Chinese influence in the developing world was the adoption of the Build Back Better World initiative (B3W). This was presented as bodog casino a direct response to Beijing’s One Belt, One Road programme. The idea is to give those countries attracted by Chinese offers an alternative source of advice and expertise with none of the associated downside, as the G7 would see it, of indebtedness, environmental and social exploitation, and long-term foreign control and influence. This initiative chimes with the current emphasis within the G7 countries to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic by investing in the digital economy and green carbon neutral technologies and infrastructure. Yet it is not clear where the billions of dollars needed to fund such an initiative will come from and how B3W will be organised and managed. Will it be new money or money re-directed from existing funds in the IMF or World Bank? At all events it can build on the International Development Finance Corporation which the US has set up as an alternative to Chinese financing.

Finally, climate change was another agenda item. In the run up to the COP26 in Glasgow this November, the G7 was obviously keen to reiterate the commitment of its members to halve their carbon emissions by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality by mid-century. They also pledged to give $100bn in climate finance to the developing countries to help them to adapt their economies and infrastructure. Yet, as said already, this was the renewal of an old commitment rather than coming up with a new financial tranche for the COP26 for the decade ahead.Some tough issues were avoided in areas such as domestic carbon taxes and the EU’s proposal for a carbon border tax on goods coming in from countries with lower standards. This said, there were initiatives to protect biodiversity through establishing special climate reserves in up to 30% of the world’s oceans and land surfaces. Equally, the G7 pledged to stop financing coal production in foreign aid projects and to lobby against fossil fuel subsidies. Climate change was one area, however, where the difficulty of making significant progress without having China at the table was remarked upon in much of the commentary.In sum, China may not have been mentioned in every paragraph of the G7 communique but competing with China and pushing back against growing Chinese global influence were leitmotifs that ran throughout every session discussion topic. The invitation to four non-G7 countries – Australia, South Korea and South Africa – to join the meeting in Cornwall in person, with India linking up by video, testified to the G7’s need to broaden its base and reach out to more major democracies to gain legitimacy and traction for its initiatives with the G20 and beyond. It will be difficult to leave them out on future occasions.Despite some reservations from France, Italy and Germany – who do not want a confrontational approach towards China – and at the urging of Biden, China was addressed directly in the communique, especially on the topic of the treatment of the Uighur community in Xinxiang and of Hong Kong. China was also criticised for its ‘anti-market’ trade policies, mainly dumping at below market prices. This inevitably led China to push back against the G7’s legitimacy in speaking on behalf of the global community and to denounce once again interference in its domestic affairs. The problem in building coalitions of democracies around new causes is that it also drives adversaries into deeper retrenchment, thereby compounding the competition that brings the coalition into existence.

The G7 was long on commitments, not all of which lived up to the hopes of observers, but as in the past, the credibility test will lie behind the press announcements and in the painful bureaucratic work mobilising governments, multilateral institutions and the private sector to come up with the needed resources and detailed delivery programmes. Big summit events like the G7 rely on new initiatives and media deliverables that show politicians leading from the front, but following up on previous commitments is just as important for effectiveness in the long run.The Cornwall G7 was a big effort to return the G7 to its former role as the Directoire of the global political system, the central coordinating axis of the most influential powers around which the global multilateral system turns. Now that Russia has been excluded following its annexation of Crimea in 2014, the short lived G8 has put paid to the idea that the forum could be a badly needed meeting point of the great powers, democratic or otherwise, to build bridges and tackle the global challenges that they still share. For instance, climate change, arms control or regional conflicts.The G7 has reverted to being essentially a club of the West, the embodiment of ‘old power’ at a time when 3.4bn people and 60% of global GDP reside in Asia, and more of the world’s population live in authoritarian than democratic societies. Whether the G7 can make a comeback as the leader of the West, recovering its strength and its mojo to out-compete the authoritarians, and make the 21st century – against all expectations – the age for democratic renaissance will take more than just one upbeat meeting in a sunny Cornwall. But it will be interesting to watch.

Jamie Shea is the Senior Fellow for Peace, Security and Defence at Friends of Europe and former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for emerging security challenges at NATO

To read the full commentary from Friends of Europe, please click here.

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The United States, along with allies and partners, imposed sanctions and export restrictions following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its election interference, and attempts on the lives of regime opponents. The sanctions are likely to be a topic of discussion during President Joe Biden’s summit with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on June 16 in Geneva.

To mitigate the impact of the sanctions, Moscow pursued a policy of import substitutionto offset losing access to vital components for its civilian and military manufacturing sectors. For instance, Russia was reliant on Ukrainian manufacturers like Motor Sich and Zorya-Mashproekt for marine and aircraft engines. These companies not only provided key inputs for Russia’s own military capabilities, but also for those systems that Russia exported to other nations.

Russia’s attempts to substitute domestic production for previously imported technologies have been delayed and in many cases have fallen short. The main problem with Russia’s import substitution program is its inability to acquire high-tech machine tools (PDF)from Western suppliers for industrial production.

Subsidiaries of Russia’s United Engine Corporation (UEC) pursued development of advanced marine engines to replace those previously imported from Zorya-Mashproekt but have faced various difficulties. Many of these issues are symptoms of larger problems in the Russian military-industrial complex. For example, Moscow made the decision to write-off debt held by UEC, United Aircraft Corporation, and United Shipbuilding Corporation as a result of years of financial issues and mismanagement. The extent to which the Russian government can continue to prop up the defense industrial base is not clear. Putin has stated recently that renationalization of the industry is one possible path the government could pursue.

What is clear is that the termination of the Russian defense industrial relationship with Ukraine has had cascading effects for Russia’s arms exports. Russia was negotiating deals with both India and Vietnam to export naval vessels, but both prospective sales have encountered problems. In the case of Vietnam, negotiations are currently stalled for lack of engines. India, in contrast, had to acquire marine engines directly from Ukraine in early 2021, separate from Russia, for installation on the vessels. India has separately pursued joint production of marine turbine engines with Rolls-Royce. These workarounds do not bode well for future Russian arms sales.

Recently, Russian officials announced that production for a civil aircraft had been stalled due to Western sanctions. Russia has also used its intelligence services to assist in the pursuit of aircraft engine development. In April, the FBI added an intelligence officer for Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, who was working as a UEC executive, to its most-wanted list for allegedly conspiring to steal trade secrets from a Western aerospace company.

Further harming Russian aircraft development and production is the rise of China’s defense industry. Increasingly, China has transitioned from, and even replaced, Russian engines with its own domestically-built ones. The rise of China and other new competitors in the international arms market may challenge Russia’s transition to greater indigenous production because its military-industrial complex partially relies on export orders to sustain itself.

Russia tried to address its engine production challenge by purchasing a Norwegian marine engine facility. For a variety of reasons, Norway’s Ministry of Justice and Public Security announcedin March that it had blocked the sale of Bergen Engines, which produces and maintains marine engines for Norwegian intelligence vessels. The Norwegian facility has been owned by Rolls-Royce for years, but it has struggled to turn a profit. Importantly, the international conglomerate seeking to buy the Norwegian facility was Russia’s Transmashholding, which is not a sanctioned entity like UEC. It is listed neither on the Office of Foreign Asset Control’s Specially Designated Nationals nor its Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (PDF).

Nevertheless, the Norwegian government stated it blocked the sale due to national security concerns. Norway’s Ministry of Justice highlighted how the sale would have benefitted Russia’s defense industry and that permitting the sale could have allowed it to circumvent Western sanctions. The Norwegian government, as a founding NATO member, did not believe the immediate economic benefits of Bergen Engines’ sale outweighed the security risks inherent in providing military naval engines to its aggressive neighbor.

Like Norway, many countries around the globe are on high alert for Russia’s provocative actions. Norway stood up to Russia and put its security and that of its allies and partners ahead of potential short-term economic benefit. This is an example other countries might follow.

To read the full commentary from The RAND Corporation, please click here.

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In place of these EOs, the new EO, “Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data from Foreign Adversaries,” builds on steps the US Commerce Department has already taken under EO 13873 of May 15, 2019, to protect the information and communications technology and services (ICTS) supply chain against threats from China and other identified foreign adversaries.

As a result of the new EO, the US government will further analyze the risks arising from the use of applications such as TikTok and WeChat – including risks related to the security of Americans’ sensitive data — and bodog casino could take further steps to mitigate those risks, either through existing ICTS regulations or through additional executive and legislative actions.

Repeal of Three Prior Executive Orders

Section 1 of the new EO repeals three prior Executive Orders: EO 13942 of August 6, 2020 (which directed the US Commerce Department to prohibit certain transactions related to ByteDance/TikTok), EO 13943 of August 6, 2020 (which similarly directed the Commerce Department to prohibit certain transactions related to WeChat), and EO 13971 of January 5, 2021 (which directed the Commerce Department to prohibit certain transactions with the persons who control or develop eight other software applications linked to China).

Pursuant to EOs 13942 and 13943, the Commerce Department published rules in September 2020 that identified prohibited WeChat- and ByteDance-related transactions.  Among other prohibited transactions, downloads and hosting of the WeChat and TikTok applications in the United States were to be prohibited.  Opponents of these new rules soon brought challenges in US courts and ultimately won injunctions that prevented the rules from taking effect.  No rules were published to implement EO 13971.

Under section 2(a) of the new EO, the Commerce Department’s September 2020 rules on WeChat- and ByteDance-related transactions must be rescinded.

New Framework

While the new EO revokes the three prior Executive Orders, it provides new means to reach similar ends – namely, protecting sensitive U.S. data and addressing other national security risks created by apps from identified foreign adversaries.

• Further analysis and recommendations: Under section 2(b) of the EO, the Secretary of Commerce – in consultation with other relevant agencies – must submit a report to the National Security Advisor with recommendations to protect against two identified harms: “harm from the unrestricted sale of, transfer of, or access to United States persons’ sensitive data” and “harm from access to large data repositories by persons owned or controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of, a foreign adversary.” This report is due by October 7, 2021.  Under section 2(c) of the EO, the Secretary of Commerce – again in consultation with other relevant agencies – must submit a second report recommending additional executive and legislative actions to address the risks posed by connected software applications that are designed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned, controlled, or under the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.  The second report is due by December 6, 2021.
• Continuing evaluation of connected software applications under EO 13873 and the ICTS regulations: Section 2(d) of the new EO requires the Secretary of Commerce to evaluate, on a continuing basis, transactions involving connected software applications that may pose unacceptable risks to US national security, and to take appropriate action under EO 13873 and its implementing regulations (the ICTS regulations).  Those regulations, issued as an interim final rule in January 2021 with effect from March 2021, empower the Commerce Department to (i) identify transactions where the acquisition or use of information and communications technology and services linked to foreign adversaries poses unacceptable national security risks, and (ii) impose restrictions on those transactions, or prohibit them altogether.

Conclusion

The new EO reflects continuity in the US government’s view that a national security risk arises from transfers of sensitive personal or commercial data, including transfers that occur through connected software applications linked to foreign adversaries. It also signals that the Biden administration believes the remedies attempted in 2020 regarding TikTok and WeChat (such as attempting to bar downloads of those popular applications) infringed excessively on other fundamental interests, such as freedom of communication.

Although the three EOs that took aim at TikTok, WeChat, and other China-linked applications have been revoked, the new EO reinforces the application of the ICTS regulations to connected software applications, and sets in motion a new policymaking process that could lead to more narrowly tailored restrictions on the handling of sensitive US data by applications linked to China and other identified US adversaries.

David Stetson, a former senior lawyer at the US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and in-house sanctions lawyer, leads investigations and advises clients on OFAC sanctions and related anti-money laundering (AML) and export controls issues.

Edward J. Krauland represents clients on matters involving US and multilateral economic sanctions, dual use, defense and nuclear export controls, anti-money laundering (AML) compliance, anti-boycott, review of foreign investments in the United States, and government procurement regulations in the cross-border context.

Brian Egan is a distinguished international lawyer who advises on a range of complex legal issues that affect his US and foreign clients.

Wendy Wysong focuses her practice on regulatory compliance and white-collar defense of international laws, including the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), Export Administration Regulations (EAR), US sanctions laws and regulations administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and US anti-boycott laws, as well as government fraud and public corruption. 

Nick Turner works with multinational financial institutions and corporations in the United States, European Union, Hong Kong, China, Singapore, Australia, and other jurisdictions in Asia on all aspects of economic sanctions, anti-money laundering, and anti-bribery and corruption compliance and investigations. 

Meredith Rathbone counsels clients in numerous countries on achieving their business goals while ensuring compliance with US export controls and economic sanctions laws administered by the Departments of Commerce, State, and Treasury. 

To read the original commentary from Steptoe International Compliance, please visit here.

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We do need more domestic production and more of the high-paying jobs that go along with it—but we won’t get there by going it alone. That’s because pivoting supply chains back home is not always realistic; we rely on components and materials from many parts of the world. There is a better way forward, and it starts by selectively leaning into our trade and co-production relationships with friends and allies we trust—what we call “ally-shoring.”

In announcing its strategy for supply chain resilience, the Biden White House recently embraced ally-shoring as the most realistic and effective path to ensuring U.S. supply chains are never as vulnerable as was exposed by COVID-19. It also is the best way to rebuild our economy and that of our friends, which strengthens the health of all our democracies. Additionally, working together to rewire supply chains and co-produce high-tech products in emerging sectors will serve to rebuild bruised alliances and U.S. global economic and political leadership, as well as check China’s bid to extend their own authoritarian economic and political model across the globe.

One reason ally-shoring makes so much sense is that in automotive and other industries, we don’t so much engage in “trade” as we make things together with other countries. This is especially true in our auto and mobility sector. Nearly 50% of Midwest states’ so-called “trade” is with Canada, and 30% is with Mexico. Over half of this North American trade and 37% of our trade with allies in the EU is in intermediate goods—meaning component parts of a finished product. This “co-production” reality will be true for electric vehicles as well as other emerging mobility products, like the AI-controlled delivery robot vehicle now being “trained” on the streets of Ann Arbor, Mich.

With the disruptions of COVID-19, it is understandable that many of our leaders are proposing the “onshoring” of critical supplies. But as attractive as onshoring sounds, it is not an effective way to win the strategic competition with China. An onshoring push would not only irk our allies, but would also be problematic for U.S. companies (including our automakers) who want to keep doing business in foreign markets and using foreign-made component parts in products. It would also be impractical and impossibly costly. With sophisticated, IT-laced products like cars and phones integrating dozens of components from around the globe at the lowest cost possible, no one could afford to buy a solely domestically made one. Even attempting to onshore many supplies would reduce our influence on the world stage. Alliances have benefits too, particularly when in the middle of a global strategic tug of war for primacy between autocratic and democratic political systems.

Ally-shoring is a much better choice. It involves deliberately sourcing essential materials, goods, and services with countries who share our democratic values and commitment to an open, transparent, rules-based international economic and trade regime. Many countries would prefer to work with the U.S. than China and its dependency-building and corrupting development approach, including lower-cost producers such as Mexico, Vietnam, India, and other developing world economies that are essential in keeping supply chains cost-efficient and where we can work together to reinforce strong institutions, a level playing field for manufacturers, and transparent supply chains.

Ally-shoring increases the reliability of critical supply chains while reducing dependence on China and other state actors who will seek to continue to use that dependence to undermine the U.S. Reworking relationships to promote partnership with countries that share our values and interests would reduce our vulnerabilities while maintaining access to a wide variety of goods and markets for U.S. businesses and consumers alike.

The Biden administration’s just released critical supply chain reviewencouraged working in partnership with allies who share our values. The Senate could help the country lean into ally-shoring as well, by passing the Innovation and Competition Act of 2021. This sprawling legislation includes multiple supply chain resilience and competitiveness provisions, including a “Strategic Competition Act” that talks of “prioritizing” alliances and partnerships. In addition, ongoing legislative efforts by the Helsinki Commission—a bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers committed to countering foreign corruption, kleptocracy, and authoritarianism—further reinforce democratic principles and good governance norms around the world, strengthening the foundations for long-term economic security.

If the U.S. takes steps toward ally-shoring, it would be a strong lever to put democracy at the heart of our foreign policy (as many call for) given the aggressiveness of China and Russia in trying to make authoritarianism dominant. Aside from countering rogue actors, we can shift the focus to strategies that reinforce strong democratic governance. Purposefully re-centering trade relations, production, distribution, and sourcing networks with nations that agree to standards of openness, rule of law, and democratic governance will help reverse the tide of anti-democratic rulers, norms, and practices.

Perhaps most important at a moment of rebuilding the pandemic-ravaged domestic economy, ally-shoring would also help bring new economic opportunities and create more good jobs here at home—including where they are needed most, like the industrial Midwest. To understand how ally-shoring can contribute to an increase in production and grow new jobs in the U.S., look no further than when supply chains were initially cut. As the country worked frantically to find or make ventilators, masks, and medical equipment, it turned to domestic manufacturers with global supply chains and production capabilities—many headquartered right here. Companies such as General Motors converted sophisticated facilities and extensive networks in the Midwest and Mexico to answer the call. The Ford Motor Company quickly followed suit.

Ally-shoring is one significant tool to speed our economic recovery and help realize the president’s pledge of a “foreign policy for the middle class.”Rethinking our domestic industrial and jobs “base” is at the heart of delivering more opportunity to Americans and rebuilding a strong and prosperous middle class. Reworking our supply chains can also be a powerful contributor to restoring U.S. global leadership and strategic alliances, protecting and enhancing democracy, and checking China’s (and other authoritarians’) bad behavior—all in one fell swoop.

bodog poker review Elaine Dezenski is Senior Advisor at the Center on Economic and Financial Power and Chief Growth Officer at Blank Slate Technologies

John C. Austin is the former President of the Michigan State Board of Education. Austin directs the Michigan Economic Center, a center for ideas and network-building to advance Michigan’s economic transformation. Austin also serves as a nonresident senior fellow with the Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and the Upjohn Institute, where he leads these organizations efforts to support economic transformation in the American Midwest. Austin also Lectures on the Economy at the University of Michigan.

To read the full commentary from the Brookings Institute, please click here.

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In one of his earliest executive orders (EO), President Joe Biden directed the secretaries of Health and Human Services, Transportation and Homeland Security and the CDC director to “immediately commence diplomatic outreach to the governments of Canada and Mexico regarding public health protocols for land ports of entry” and to submit to him a plan to implement appropriate public health measures at those ports of entry. This plan should “implement CDC guidelines, consistent with applicable law, and take into account the operational considerations relevant to the different populations who enter the United States by land.” These operational considerations include, among others, the recent surge of border crossings, the construction of the border wall, and the testing and vaccination campaigns in the border communities.

The Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) program—also known as “Remain in Mexico”—was put in place in the early days of the pandemic. Under the program, Central American asylum seekers were required to wait in Mexico while their asylum claims were considered by U.S. immigration courts. This created crowding of asylum seekers in border communities of Mexico, often in temporary housing, furthering the spread of COVID. The Biden administration terminated the MPP program. Small groups are allowed to cross the border every day, and border towns have taken on the responsibility of testing for COVID and contact tracing any positive cases to make sure that the migrants complete their self-quarantine. The situation is exacerbated by a significant surge of unaccompanied minors from Central America and an increase in border apprehensions. The Biden administration has reversed the previous administration’s decision to prevent all border crossings and is allowing unaccompanied minors to enter the U.S. With Customs and Border Protection (CBP) facilities and Health and Human Services shelters beyond capacity, controlling the entry of the large number of migrants at the border will likely be a prerequisite to border reopening, both for political and health-related reasons.

The Biden EO returned to the Department of Defense funding that former President Donald Trump redirected for the border wall. However, the EO that “paused” construction—as well as all real estate acquisition activities—may run counter to congressional appropriation of border wall funding, approximately $2.75 billion. There is ongoing debate if the president has the ability to redirect or “pause” the funds through executive action. Republican members of Congress have expressed concerns with the Biden administration and are pressuring it to maintain funding as appropriated by Congress. Considering the surge of migrants and the need for border security, consultations with local border authorities on how to best utilize the funds allocated to DHS should be a central component of the current debate.

Some of the potential uses of the funds promoted by members of Congress representing border communities include: (1) strengthening the COVID testing and vaccination campaigns in the border regions; (2) improving and expanding border technology, such as rescue beacons and video surveillance cameras; (3) securing additional immigration judges and support staff to reduce the backlog of immigration cases at the southern border; and (4) securing additional CBP officers, Border Patrol agents and processing coordinators, and agriculture specialists to help streamline trade at the ports of entry as well as improve security along the border. It remains to be seen whether the Biden administration and Congress will reach a compromise on repurposing border wall funds, in particular with the challenges of including any potential in any larger immigration package.

The COVID public health emergency remains a significant challenge to overcome. Both the United States and Mexico have had a similarly high rate of infections and extensive community spread. However, different approaches taken by the United States and Mexico toward resolving the pandemic may complicate the process of reopening the border. Mexico has not prioritized COVID testing and is significantly behind the United States in the percentage of the population that has been vaccinated. The border communities on both sides will need to emphasize continued aggressive testing as any new outbreak in the border communities on the U.S. side—once the virus has been declared controlled—could create additional complications. Some have suggested that U.S. authorities could consider transferring surplus testing infrastructure to Mexico border regions, and the Biden administration has already transferred a significant number of AstraZeneca vaccine doses to Mexico.

Finally, there has been significant discussion of “vaccine passports” as a solution for reestablishing normal border operations. While a seemingly attractive solution, it would likely be very difficult to implement: vaccines are administered by various providers, and travelers are unlikely to be able to provide a secure and consistent proof of vaccination. CBP agents are already screening travelers for drugs, weapons and fraudulent documents and would not welcome the additional vaccination screening. Furthermore, without a change in U.S. immigration laws, CBP would likely not have authority to prevent non-vaccinated travelers from entering for temporary reasons. Civil liberties advocates and some members of Congress may also be concerned about digitally storing individual vaccination records and sharing them with government authorities and private entities. Separating these issues from the larger immigration debate will prove difficult. Reopening the border for legal crossings and trade and returning to pre-pandemic border crossing regulations will be a challenge. That said, the Biden administration should consider actions to balance ensuring that these symbiotic border communities can function while appropriately using already appropriated federal dollars to maintain a safe and secure border. 

Maka Y. Hutson is counsel in the international trade practice at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld’s Dallas office.

 Hans Christopher Rickhoff is a senior counsel in the public law and policy practice at the firm’s Washington, D.C., office.

To read the original commentary, please visit here

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