However, investment restrictions along with other primary tools of economic statecraft like sanctions and export controls are “single use.” Once exercised, they either break or preclude economic ties. The tools admittedly have limitations and leakage. Nonetheless, given the sheer size of the U.S. market, role of the U.S. dollar in the global financial system, and magnitude of U.S. foreign direct investments, the measures are powerful and represent consequential U.S. national security and foreign policy positions.

These economic tools also provide significant points of leverage for the United States due to global economic interconnectedness created through U.S. leadership. But, used enough without alternatives to refill leverage reserves, the strategies risk sidelining the U.S., leaving few policy levers short of military conflict in the long term. The existential question is how the U.S. can continue to maintain and enhance its leverage when its offensive economic tools inherently diminish every time they are used? To continue to exercise these impactful tools, America needs to continually renew connection points and think strategically about how it’s exercising its leverage, including by re-engaging on trade, being more selective, and getting its own economic house in order.

The globalized world that sprung from the post-World War II rules-based order has created dependencies by fostering growth, prosperity, and peace through interconnectedness. Reduced barriers to trade and investment have encouraged global sourcing and value chains fueled by U.S. R&D, technology, and investment. The resulting global system has deep ties to U.S. technologies and wherewithal, with over 70% of global trade executed in U.S. dollars. Trade and financial ties exist with friend and foe—including China and Russia. Yet, as U.S. policy has increasingly utilized these ties to achieve foreign policy, national security, and economic objectives, dependencies have become liabilities.

Tectonic geopolitical shifts have precipitated the increased use of sanctions, export controls, and investment restrictions in lieu of military force, throttling touchpoints with the United States. The pure presence of U.S. technologies, parts, people, or funds in transactions can trigger a complex set of prohibitions that often apply extraterritorially—requiring that parties choose between doing business with the U.S. or targeted parties or countries. U.S. technologies remain pre-eminent in many sectors and are complicated to “design out.”

Once a country, entity or person is sanctioned, or the conveyance of technologies or capital is restricted, the tie that made the action impactful is immediately broken. The action cannot be “redone” for increased effect. And, these tools are being used at breakneck pace: In 2000, the U.S. sanctioned 912 people and entities. In 2022, the number had grown to nearly 12,000. Countries like China fill the vacuum, replacing U.S. technologies or investment with Chinese ones—and the U.S. cannot stop or affect that activity going forward.

The U.S. is thus quickly depleting its leverage without a plan to replenish. Given America’s rapidly declining percentage of global GDP—approximately 40% in 1960 to 15% in 2023, it needs to rethink its engagement with the world if these fracturing instruments remain primary policy tools. Witness the reticence of the Global South in supporting sanctions on Russia despite its brutal invasion of Ukraine.

The stakes are high and the U.S. needs a hard reset to secure its leverage in the short, medium and long term. It should:

Use more effectively the size of the U.S. market to create positive connections. Returning to the trade negotiating table is not only an economic imperative; it’s a national security one. Leverage is built by cementing foreign policy partnerships through permanent trade deals (as opposed to talk shops like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity). Creating Cold-War style blocks will reduce U.S. leverage in the long-term. In addition to building bridges with allies, America must enhance ties with “fence-sitter” countries (e.g., India) to regain lost leverage with close partners and even China.

Be selective in how it uses leverage going forward. There are times to throw down the gauntlet. Russia today is a good example. In the case of China where the game is long, the U.S. should be mindful of how it uses economic tools. The calculations for when to use these policies should look beyond what satisfies short-term political expediencies to how retaining interconnectedness and dependency can provide important points of leverage.

Get its political and economic house in order and use market-based tools to drive technological innovation and investment in the U.S. Current industrial policy with its use of subsidies and tariffs detracts from U.S. leverage. It creates negative precedents, causing even allies to erect reciprocal trade barriers. Case in point is responses by allies to the Trump tariffs and green subsidy provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act. American politicians should uphold our free market values. That is also part of our leverage.

Neena Shenai is a Nonresident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. This piece draws on a forthcoming paper written for the “Economic Security and the Future of the Global Order in the Indo-Pacific” 2023 conference at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House.

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Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, many countries have announced a wide range of financial measures to impede Russia’s ability to fund the war. However, Russia has not been excluded from international oil markets, despite many Western countries banning oil imports from that country.

This situation is analogous to that of a country that is an oil exporter and defaults on its debt, losing access to international financial markets but keeping access to international oil markets. Hence, when analyzing default episodes, the decision of a sovereign on whether to repay or renege on its debt is related to oil prices, oil extraction and oil reserves.

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In this blog post, we discuss this relationship between sovereign risk (debt) and oil in the data, and its effect on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In a 2022 working paper, Franz Hamann, Juan Camilo Mendez-Vizcaino, Enrique Mendoza, and Paulina Restrepo-Echavarria built a model of external sovereign default and oil extraction (PDF) and also used real-world data to study this relationship. The working paper was motivated by the fact that if we look at the behavior of oil prices over time, and how they relate to the Emerging Markets Bond Index (a measure of sovereign risk) and the number of defaults in the world’s 30 largest net oil exporters that are emerging markets, we can see that there is a negative relationship, as shown in the figure below.

Negative Relationship between Oil Prices and Spreads and Default Episodes

SOURCES: J.P. Morgan, U.S. Energy Information Administration; Eduardo Borensztein and Ugo Panizza, 2009; Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, 2010; and authors’ calculations.

NOTE: The Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) spread is the difference between the yield on 90-day Treasury bills and the interest rate on bonds of the world’s 30 largest net oil exporters that are emerging markets.

Furthermore, in the paper the authors explored this relationship in a formal way by running an error correction model, which allowed them to study how sovereign risk is affected by changes in oil production, changes in nonoil gross domestic product (GDP), changes in oil reserves, changes in external public debt and changes in oil discoveries, as well as by all these same variables in the long run.

Key Factors That Affect Sovereign Risk

The authors found that higher oil production decreases sovereign risk, higher nonoil GDP decreases sovereign risk, higher external public debt increases sovereign risk, and higher oil reserves increase sovereign risk. Note that the first three results are very intuitive. If a country can produce more oil and sell it in international markets, or if GDP is higher, it is easier for the nation to repay its sovereign debt; and if the country has more public debt, then there is more to repay and that makes it more difficult. However, the fourth result is surprising.

A country that has more oil reserves is riskier. How is this possible if more oil production improves its ability to repay debt? In the working paper, the authors argued that a country with more oil underground has not only financial assets but also oil, which is a real asset to finance spending. Hence, unlike a country that only has access to financial assets, an oil-exporting nation can still use oil to finance spending if it were excluded from international financial markets, making it less worried about the cost of default.

This is exactly what is going on in Russia right now. The country has received numerous financial sanctions from countries all over the world, but the Russians are undeterred given that they have not been excluded from international oil markets. With large oil reserves and access to international oil and natural gas markets, Russia can still use revenues from oil sales to finance war and other spending; hence, the country behaves riskier.

The downside of that is oil remains a risky asset because prices fluctuate frequently. However, oil prices are high right now, and if they do not drop sharply, Russia will still have high returns on its real assets, making the nation indifferent about being excluded from international financial markets.

Paulina Restrepo-Echavarria is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Her research focuses on international macroeconomics and on search and matching models of the labor and marriage market. She joined the St. Louis Fed in 2014. Read more about the author and her research.

Praew Grittayaphong is a research associate at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

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The United States also announced raising import duties on 569 8-digit HS categories of goods from Russia to 35% ad valorem. See Presidential Proclamation 10420 of June 27, 2022, 87 Fed. Reg. 38,875- 38,881 (June 30, 2022). The change in duties will apply to imports and goods removed from warehouse on or after July 30, 2022. The most recent Presidential Proclamation followed actions on March 8, 11, and April 8, 2022 in which the U.S. had banned various imports from Russia and suspended nondiscriminatory tariff treatment for products from Russia and Belarus (changing the tariff rate from the MFN rate in column 1 to the column 2 rate).

In reviewing U.S. imports from Russia covered by Presidential Proclamation 10420, data available from the U.S. International Trade Commission dataweb for 2021 and January-April 2022 showed imports in 491 of the 569 8-digit HS categories from Russia, worth $2.2 billion in 2021 and $582 million bodog sportsbook review in the first four months of 2022 (up from $362 million in the first four months of 2021). Total imports of all categories from Russia were $30.1 billion in 2021 and $10.5 billion in the first four months of 2022. The vast majority of imports from Russia have been petroleum products which are now banned.

Of the 491 categories for which import data (imports for consumption) were identified, one (HS 7207.12.00, Iron or nonalloy steel semifinished products, w/less than 0.25% carbon, w/rect. cross sect. (exclud. sq.), nesoi) accounted for $886.7 million of imports from Russia or 40.32% of the total for the 491 in 2021 but just 14.93% for 2022 (Jan.-April).

The top 5 categories of the 491 accounted for 62.47% of the total for 2021 and 33.97% in 2022. The other top four categories were 9306.30.41, Cartridges nesoi and empty cartridge shells ($163.5 million in 2021); 7106.91.10, Silver bullion and dore ($143.9 million in2021); 7115.90.05, Precious metal articles, incl. metal clad w/precious metal, rectangle/near rectangle shape,99.5%/ or pure, marked only by wgt/identity ($93.4 million in 2021); 7801.10.00 Refined lead, unwrought ($86.3 million in 2021).

The top 20 categories of the 491 accounted for 87.03% of the total in 2021 and 75.84% bodog sportsbook review in the first four months of 2022. The twenty 8-digit HS categories are: 4002.19.00, 4002.20.00, 4002.31.00, 4002.39.00 (rubber products); 4011.10.10 (passenger car tires); 4407.12.00 (certain sawed wood, pine and spruce); 7106.91.10 (silver bullion) 7115.90.05 (certain precious metal articles); 7202.11.50, 7202.30.00, 7202.41.00 (ferromanganese, ferrosilicon manganese, ferrochromium); 7207.12.00 (certain semifinished steel); 7224.90.00 (certain semifinished alloy (other than stainless) steel); 7304.29.20, 7306.29.20 (certain seamed and seamless steel pipe); 7408.11.60 (certain refined copper wire), 7605.11.00, 7606.12.30 (certain aluminum wire and plate/sheet products); 7801.10.00 (refined lead, unwrought), 9306.30.41 (ammunition Cartridges nesoi and empty cartridge shells).

Below are the changes in import duty rates applied to these goods from the Russian Federation. Column 1 was suspended pursuant to the Suspending Normal Trade Relations with Russia and Belarus Act (19 U.S.C. 2434 note) which brought the Column 2 rates into effect. The 35% rate will apply 30 days after the posting of the President Proclamation in the Federal Register (i.e., on July 30, 2022). The column 2 rate for HS 4407.12.00 is $1.70/m3. Imports from Russia in 2021 had an average value of imports/m3 resulting in a 0.39% ad valorem equivalent which declined to 0.31% bodog sportsbook review in the first four months of 2022.

As the unprovoked war by Russia in Ukraine continues (with support from Belarus), the most important sanctions are those limiting access to western technology, the financial sanctions and seizure of assets and the efforts to drastically reduce the dependence of the allies on Russian oil, gas and coal. But the broad based efforts to deny most favored nation treatment to the countries causing the European and global national security crisis — including limiting imports of various other goods and raising duties on any imported merchandise from Russia and Belarus — are also important.

While the WTO is focused on multilateralism, it is hard to see how Russia, Belarus and those supporting them won’t be treated as largely outside of the global system for the foreseeable future. Global integration is not compatible with the need for a respect for the global order. Putin’s desire to use force to claim neighboring land creates unacceptable risks to many trading partners who cannot permit an overreliance on goods and services from the Russian Federation. While there are costs from having different trading blocks, there are greater costs of having major outliers participate in a unified system with the downsides of overreliance of undependable sources or those willing to use access to resources for coercion and intimidation.

While Russia and Belarus have clearly broken the trust of many through the ongoing war, China has also been engaged in serious efforts at coercion and intimidation, causing many to reevaluate how to make bilateral and multilateral relations with China support the global order and be mutually beneficial. The comments from the G-7 in their recent communique are an example of the unease China’s actions are causing other nations.

While there was a successful WTO Ministerial Conference concluded in Geneva last month, the major threats to the global system remain and are intensifying. While trade is but one piece of the puzzle, it is hard to see an early resumption of normal trade relations with the Russian Federation and Belarus. Whether a new normal can be established with China is uncertain but likely the most important issue for this decade.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, Current Thoughts on Trade.

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In prior periods of agricultural shortages and inflationary prices for agricultural goods, there has been significant social unrest particularly in countries where food accounts for a large part of disposable income for people. See Financial Times, ʻPeople are hungryʼ: food crisis starts to bite across Africa, June 23, 2022, https://www.y.com/content/c3336e46-b852-4f10-9716-e0f9645767c4 (“During the 2007-2008 food crisis, which was caused by a spike in energy prices and droughts in crop-producing regions, about 40 countries faced social unrest: More than a third of those countries were on the African continent.”); see also Terence P. Stewart, The Food Crisis: A Survey of Sources and Proposals for Preventing a Global Catastrophe, 2008 (copied in March 30, 2022: Food security challenges posed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/03/30/foodsecurity-challenges-posed-by-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine/)(excerpt from the summary copied below).

A recent paper from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Programme identifies countries in danger of starvation or acute hunger in the June – September 2022 time period. FAO, WFP, Hunger Hotspots, FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity, June to September 2022 Outlook, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000139904/download/?_ga=2.27484728.588580763.1656342884-1119086152.1656342884. The Executive Summary (page 5 of the report) is copied below.

“The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) warn that acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate further in 20 countries or situations (including two regional clusters) – called hunger hotspots – during the outlook period from June to September 2022.

“Acute food insecurity globally continues to escalate. The recently published 2022 Global Report on Food Crises alerts that 193 million people were facing Crisis or worse (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC]/Cadre Harmonisé [CH] Phase 3 or above) across 53 countries or territories in 2021. This increase must be interpreted with care, given that it can be attributed to both a worsening acute food insecurity situation and a substantial (22 percent) expansion in the population analysed between 2020 and 2021. In addition, an all-time high of up to 49 million people in 46 countries could now be at risk of falling into famine or famine-like conditions, unless they receive immediate life and livelihoods-saving assistance. This includes 750 000 people already in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5)

“Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen remain at the highest alert level as in the previous edition of this report. In the current report, Afghanistan and Somalia have been added to the list. These countries all have some populations identified or projected to experience starvation or death (Catastrophe, IPC Phase 5) or at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions, and require the most urgent attention.

“In Afghanistan, for the first time since the introduction of IPC in the country in 2011. Catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5) are present for 20 000 people in Ghor due to limited humanitarian access during the March to May period. In the outlook period, acute food insecurity is projected to increase by 60 percent year-on-year.

“After projecting 401 000 people facing Catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5) in Tigray, Ethiopia, in 2021, only 10 percent of required assistance arrived in the region until March 2022, and local agricultural production – which was 40 percent of the average – was critical for food security and livelihoods. A recent ʻhumanitarian truceʼ remains fragile but has allowed for some convoys to reach the region. The Famine Review Committeeʼs 2021 scenarios of a Risk of Famine for Tigray might remain relevant, unless humanitarian access stabilizes.

“Although no populations were projected to be in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in Nigeria in the outlook period, the record-high levels of acute food insecurity are of serious concern. Importantly, the population in Emergency (CH Phase 4) is expected to reach close to 1.2 million people during the peak of the lean season from June to August 2022, including in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe where some local government areas continue to be inaccessible or hard to reach.

ʻIn Somalia, a Risk of Famine has been identified through June 2022, under a scenario where rains are significantly below average, food prices increase further, conflict and displacement increase and humanitarian assistance remains insuxicient – 81 000 people will face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) between April and June.

“In South Sudan, a Famine Likely situation, which was present in some areas in 2021, was averted by improved coordination of humanitarian assistance, and hence the projected number of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) was reduced slightly, to 87 000 between April and July. That said, the situation remains of highest concern.

“In Yemen, the food security situation deteriorated significantly compared to last year, including a strong increase in the number of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), which are projected to reach 161 000 over the outlook period. There is also a Risk of Famine projected for some areas.

“The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, the Sahel region, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic remain countries of very high concern, as in the previous edition of this report. In this edition, Kenya is added to the list. This is due to the high number of people in critical food insecurity coupled with worsening drivers expected to further intensify life-threatening conditions. Sri Lanka, West African coastal countries (Benin, Cabo Verde and Guinea), Ukraine and Zimbabwe have been added in the list of hotspot countries compared to the January 2022 edition of this report. Angola, Lebanon, Madagascar and Mozambique remain hunger hotspots.

“Organized violence and conflict remain the primary drivers for acute hunger, with key trends indicating that conflict levels and violence against civilians continued to increase in 2022. Moreover, weather extremes such as tropical storms, flooding and drought remain critical drivers in some regions.

“Ripple effects of the war in Ukraine have been reverberating globally against the backdrop of a gradual and uneven economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, steadily increasing food and energy prices, and deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. Disruptions to the Ukrainian agricultural sector and constrained exports reduce global food supply, further increase global food prices, and finally push up already high levels of domestic food price inflation. Additionally, high fertilizer costs are likely to affect yields and therefore the future availability of food. Adding to the economic instability, civil unrest could emerge in some of the most affected countries in the upcoming months. Finally, humanitarian organizations are seeing sharp cost increases for their operations and reduced global attention risking to translate into increasing funding shortages. (emphasis added)

“Targeted humanitarian action is urgently needed to save lives and livelihoods in the 20 hunger hotspots. Moreover, in six of these hotspots – Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen – humanitarian actions are critical to preventing starvation and death. This report provides country-specific recommendations on priorities for emergency response as well as anticipatory action to address existing humanitarian needs and ensure short-term protective interventions before new needs materialize.”

The report at page 12 provides a chart showing the number of people in acute food insecurity in hotspot countries. The page is copied below.

The Financial Times article referenced earlier notes that there have already been signs of social unrest in a number of countries — Chad, Uganda, and Kenya. See Financial Times, ʻPeople are hungryʼ: food crisis starts to bite across Africa, June 23, 2022, https://www.y.com/content/c3336e46-b852-4f10-9716-e0f9645767c4. Similarly, the Economist has flagged social unrest from rising food and energy prices in two recent articles. See The Economist, Costly food and energy are fostering global unrest, June 23, 2022, https://www.economist.com/international/2022/06/23/costly-food-and-energy-are-fostering-global-unrest (“All around the world, inflation is crushing living standards, stoking fury and fostering turmoil. Vladimir Putinʼs invasion of Ukraine has sent prices of food and fuel soaring. Many governments would like to cushion the blow. But, having borrowed heavily during the pandemic and with interest rates rising, many are unable to do so. All this is aggravating pre-existing tensions in many countries and making unrest more likely, says Steve Killelea of the Institute for Economics and Peace (iep), an Australian think-tank.”); The Economist, A wave of unrest is coming. Hereʼs how to avert some of it, June 23, 2022, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/06/23/a-wave-of-unrest-is-coming-heres-how-to-avert-some-of-it (“Jesus said that man does not live by bread alone. Nonetheless, its scarcity makes people furious. The last time the world suffered a food-price shock like todayʼs, it helped set ox the Arab spring, a wave of uprisings that ousted four presidents and led to horrific civil wars in Syria and Libya. Unfortunately, Vladimir Putinʼs invasion of Ukraine has upended the markets for grain and energy once again. And so unrest is inevitable this year, too.”). The Economist, in the first referenced article, forecasts the likelihood of increase in serious outbreaks of unrest over the next twelve months. Much of Africa, various countries in Asia and the Middle East and parts of Central and South America show increases from 25% to 100% over the prior 12 months. The article also reviews challenges in Turkey, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tunisia, Peru, Uganda, Turkmenistan and South Africa.

Major countries and multilateral organizations have been taking actions to try to address some of the challenges presented from the price inflation on food, fertilizer and energy. Some countries that are able are providing assistance to their people with tax reductions or monetary grants. See, e.g., Reuters, Malaysia plans record $18 billion subsidy spend in inflation fight, June 25, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/malaysia-plans-record-18-bln-subsidy-spend-inflation-fight-2022-06-25/ (“Malaysia is projected to spend 51 billion ringgit on consumer subsidies including for fuel, electricity, and food, assuming that commodity market prices remain at current levels, Finance Minister Tengku Zafrul Aziz said in a statement. The government will also distribute 11.7 billion ringgit in cash aid, and 14.6 billion ringgit in other subsidies, he said.”). Other countries provide economic assistance to those in need in other countries. See, e.g., European Commission, Food security: EU to step up its support to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in response to Russiaʼs invasion of Ukraine, June 23, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_3889

Prices for wheat and sunflower oil have spiked since the war as Ukraineʼs large volumes that are normally exported have been trapped in Ukraine by Russiaʼs blockade of Black Sea ports, destruction of grain and sunflower seed silos by Russian missiles, by the they of Ukrainian product by the Russians and limitations on Ukrainian farmers being able to work their land during the war. See, e.g., NPR, Russia has blocked 20 million tons of grain from being exported from Ukraine, June 3, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/06/03/1102990029/russia-has-blocked-20-million-tons-of-grain-from-beingexported-from-ukraine; Center for Strategic & International Studies, Spotlight on Damage to Ukraineʼs Agricultural Infrastructure since Russiaʼs Invasion, June 15, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/spotlight-damage-ukraines-agricultural-infrastructure-russias-invasion (“Russia is taking advantage of the transportation bottlenecks caused by port blockades to target Ukraineʼs food storage facilities. According to Ukraineʼs ministry of defense, Russian forces have attacked (https://observers.france24.com/en/europe/20220506-russian-attacks-on-farms-and-silos-deliberately-tryingto-destroy-the-ukrainian-economy) grain silos across the country and stolen an estimated 400,000-500,000 metric tons of grain (https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-health-middle-eastf980a51dab3412aba611277821e2822b) from occupied regions to increase Russian competitive advantage in the export market (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/05/ukraine-grain-they-russia-hungerwar/).”).

Efforts have been being made by the UN, by Turkey and others to get Russia to stop its blockade of Ukrainian ports to permit the export of grain and other agriculture products. See, e.g., Reuters, Russia, Turkey to pursue talks on Ukraine grain exports, June 23, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-turkey-agree-moreconsultations-grain-exports-ukraine 2022-06-22/ (https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-turkey-agree-moreconsultations-grain-exports-ukraine-2022-06-22/) (“Ukraine is one of the top global wheat suppliers, but shipments have been halted by Russiaʼs invasion, causing global food shortages. The United Nations has appealed to both sides, as well as maritime neighbour Turkey, to agree to a corridor.”)

At the same time, the European Union and United States have been working to help Ukraine export wheat and other agricultural products by alternative routes, though the volume that can be so moved is only a small percentage of what Ukraine normally exports. See, e.g., European Commission, Commission to establish Solidarity Lanes to help Ukraine export agricultural goods, 12 May 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3002; Politico, Biden races against time to unlock Ukraineʼs trapped grain, June 17, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/17/biden-ukrainetrapped-grain-00040640 

Multilateral organizations like the World Bank, IMF and World Trade Organization have been offering assistance within their zones of competence. For example, the World Bank has a variety of programs that have been started or utilized to help with the growing food insecurity. See World Bank, Food Security Update | Rising Food Insecurity in 2022, June 23, 2022, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/agriculture/brief/foodsecurity-update#  (lists 14 projects including “The $2.3 billion Food Systems Resilience Program for Eastern and Southern Africa (https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/06/21/world-bank-approves-2-3-billion-programto-address-escalating-food-insecurity-in-eastern-and-southern-africa), approved on June 21, 2022, helps countries in Eastern and Southern Africa increase the resilience of the regionʼs food systems and ability to tackle growing food insecurity.”). The World Bankʼs update on food insecurity is embedded below.

The WTO during the 12th Ministerial Conference which concluded on June 17, 2022 did address food security concerns both by agreeing not to block exports to the World Food Programme and by agreeing to transparency on actions taken and exorts to minimize use of export restraints on agricultural products. See June 17, 2022: WTOʼs 12th Ministerial Conference — some successes after a difficult five plus days,https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/06/17/wtos-12th-ministerial-conference-some-successes-ayer-adixicult-five-plus-days/.

In addition, the U.S., European Union and other allies coordinating actions to help Ukraine and hold Russia accountable, have been working to address access to food products, energy products and to increase availability of fertilizers. These actions have been announced by major players unilaterally as well as through various groupings, including the current G-7 meeting in Germany, U.S.-chaired Global Food Security Ministerial Meeting, and the recently concluded Summit of the Americas Agriculture Producers Declaration. See, e.g., The White House, Summit of the Americas Agriculture Producers Declaration, June 13, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/13/summit-of-americasagriculture-producers-declaration/; U.S. Department of State, Chairʼs Statement for Global Food Security — call to Action, June 24, 2022, https://www.state.gov/chairsstatement-roadmap-for-global-food-security-call-to-action-2/; European Commission, Commission acts for global food security and for supporting EU farmers and consumers, 23 March 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1963; U.S. Department of State, Secretary Antony J. Blinken During the Uniting for Global Food Security Conference, June 24, 2022, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-during-the-uniting-for-global-food-security-conference/. These four documents are embedded below.

A few thoughts

The major efforts underway by various countries to reduce the global effect of the Russian war on food security are extensive and will have positive effects, some immediately, others over time (e.g., increasing production of fertilizers or improving efficiencies of fertilizers). However, for the poorest countries and those reliant on food imports from Ukraine and Russia, the internal pressures will continue to mount as limited financial resources and high food and energy prices push more and more people into food insecurity situations of increased severity. Social unrest in a number of countries is likely.

While Russia has exacerbated the food insecurity by its actions on Ukraineʼs agricultural products and by other actions restricting its own exports (when sanctions do not cover agricultural goods or fertilizers) and has the ability to end the challenges it has created, it seems highly unlikely that any serious progress will be made in getting Ukrainian agricultural goods out through Black Sea ports while hostilities continue. EU and U.S. efforts are helping some but are not perceived to be a viable short-term solution to moving Ukrainian goods to export markets at affordable prices.

Some short-term steps the private sector can take to help alleviate the damage to at-risk countries is to increase funding to the World Food Programme (its June report cited earlier is this post reflect that with higher prices and challenges in getting funding, the WFP is being forced to reduce assistance in various countries). While most funding for WFP comes from governments, the private sector can contribute and should actively participate. Obviously, there is need for more funding by governments as well, but the multiple crises at least make it questionable how much more governments will do in fact in 2022.

Moreover, with the large number of low and middle-income countries facing potential debt crises, there is a need for at least selective debt relief where the challenges faced flow simply from the rapid increase in inflation.

None of the proposals for action by those looking to lessen the pressures on global markets has involved increasing the percent of the worldʼs grain that goes to human consumption during the current crisis. See The Economist, Most of the worldʼs grain is not eaten bodog online casino by humans, June 23, 2022, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/06/23/most-of-the-worlds-grain-is-not-eaten-by-humans. Presumably the challenges flow from the large percentage of grains that are fed to animals and the reduction in the worldʼs pasturelands which make alternative feeding of livestock less likely to increase in the short term. A small percentage (10%) of grains goes to biofuels and would be unlikely to be shifted in the short term as the use of grains in biofuels reduces the volume of petroleum products otherwise needed.

In challenging times, it is important for key countries to step forward and show leadership. There has been extensive leadership shown by the U.S., the EU and many of the other countries involved in supporting Ukraine and holding Russia to account for its unprovoked war with Ukraine. Continued coordination and adoption of bold actions by those currently engaged and an expanded group of willing participants will be needed to reduced the damage to low- and middle-income countries and limit the amount of social unrest that will yet unfold in 2022 and 2023.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, Current Thoughts on Trade.

To read the full commentary from Current Thoughts on Trade, please click here.

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“Sanctions

“4. The European Council is committed to intensify pressure on Russia and Belarus to thwart Russia’s war against Ukraine. The European Council calls on all countries to align with EU sanctions. Any attempts to circumvent sanctions or to aid Russia by other means must be stopped.

“5. The European Council agrees that the sixth package of sanctions against Russia will cover crude oil, as well as petroleum products, delivered from Russia into Member States, with a temporary exception for crude oil delivered by pipeline.

“6. The European Council therefore urges the Council to finalise and adopt it without delay, ensuring a well-functioning EU Single Market, fair competition, solidarity among Member States and a level playing field also with regard to the phasing out of our dependency on Russian fossil fuels. In case of sudden interruptions of supply, emergency measures will be introduced to ensure security of supply. In this respect, the Commission will monitor and report regularly to the Council on the implementation of these measures to ensure a level playing field in the EU Single Market and security of supply.

“7. The European Council will revert to the issue of the temporary exception for crude oil delivered by pipeline as soon as possible.”

 “II. FOOD SECURITY

“19. The European Council strongly condemns the destruction and illegal appropriation by Russia of agricultural production in Ukraine. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is having a direct impact on global food security and affordability. The European Council calls on Russia to end its attacks on transport infrastructure in Ukraine, to lift the blockade of Ukrainian Black Sea ports and to allow food exports, in particular from Odesa. The European Union is taking active measures to facilitate Ukraine’s agricultural exports and to support Ukraine’s agricultural sector in view of the 2022 season. In this regard, the European Council invites Member States to accelerate work on “Solidarity Lanes” put forward by the Commission, and to facilitate food exports from Ukraine via different land routes and EU ports.

“20. The European Council calls for effective international coordination to ensure a comprehensive global food security response. In this respect, it welcomes the Food and Agriculture Resilience Mission (FARM) – based on the three pillars: trade, solidarity and production – which aims to mitigate consequences for price levels, production and access to and supply of grain. It also supports the UN Global Crisis Response Group, the upcoming G7 initiative establishing a Global Alliance for Food Security (GAFS) and other EU and multilateral actions and initiatives. It reiterates its commitment to keep global trade in food commodities free of unjustified trade barriers, enhance solidarity towards the most vulnerable countries and increase local sustainable food production so as to reduce structural dependencies. The European Council invites the Commission to explore the possibility of mobilising reserves from the European Development Fund to support the most affected partner countries. The European Union welcomes the commitment and support of its partners and of international organisations.

“21. The European Council underlines the importance of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) in the EU’s contribution to food security and calls for the swift adoption of the CAP Strategic Plans.

“22. In view of the ongoing fertiliser shortages in the global market, the European Council calls for more concerted efforts to work with international partners to promote a more efficient use of and alternatives to fertilisers.”

It has been clear since the beginning of Russia’s war with Ukraine that the most challenging sanctions for the EU would be on banning Russian oil and gas. The EU has put in place sanctions on Russian coal and will be adding oil on a transitional basis by the end of the year for some 90% of oil imports from Russia with a carve out for oil delivered by pipeline — a carve out needed to address Hungary’s concerns and that of several other Central European countries.

Moreover, on May 31st, the EU and the U.K. agreed to ban insuring ships carrying Russian oil which will likely significantly affect Russia’s ability to export crude oil by ship. See Financial Times, UK and EU hit Russian oil cargoes with insurance ban, May 31, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/10372dd3-be3c-42b9-982b241a38efcc88.

The insurance ban is one of several other sanctions that the EU is including in its sixth package. See European Commission statement, Opening remarks by President von der Leyen at the joint press conference with President Michel following the special meeting of the European Council of 30 May 2022 Brussels, 31 May 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_3382 (“Indeed, we had a very good discussion tonight. And I am very glad that the Leaders were able to agree in principle on the sixth sanctions package. This is very important. Thanks to this, the Council should now be able to finalise a ban on almost 90% of all Russian oil imports by the end of the year. This is an important step forward. We will soon return to the issue of the remaining 10% of pipeline oil. I want to note that other elements in the package are also important. It is the de-SWIFTing of the Sberbank. The Sberbank is the biggest Russian bank, with 37% of the Russian banking sector. So this is good that we now de-SWIFT the Sberbank. There is a ban on insurance and reinsurance of Russian ships by EU companies; a ban on providing Russian companies with a whole range of business services. And, very important, there is the suspension of broadcasting in the European Union of three further Russian state outlets that were very typically spreading broadly the misinformation that we have witnessed over the last weeks and months.”).

The actions by the EU and the UK are resulting in higher oil prices at least for the present. Russia is also expanding the countries it is choosing not to supply gasl to. See Financial Times, Dutch and Danish set to be cut off by Russia over gas payment dispute, May 30, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/6715e4e9-d315-4594-8d57-80ce88613685; CNBC, Oil prices
jump after EU leaders agree to ban most Russian crude imports, May 30, 2022,
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/31/oil-prices-eu-russian-crude.html 

So there is little question but that the sanctions imposed by the U.S., EU, UK, Canada, Japan, Australia and others are being ratcheted up and will present increased challenges for Russia and continued pain at the pump for many global consumers and businesses.

By contrast, the efforts of the EU and others to address the growing food crisis caused by the disruption of Ukrainian agricultural exports, while continuing and being supported by multilateral organizations, seem unlikely to result in significant movement of Ukrainian wheat and other products in the coming months. The EU has been working hard to develop alternative export routes for Ukrainian goods as is reflected in the European Council’s conclusions from the May 30-31 meeting. See also Financial Times, EU steps up effort to bring millions of tonnes of grain out of Ukraine, May 30, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/0e0f6cd9-03f0- 4150-b330-62032f9a86ad.

However, a recent Politico article reviews the serious challenges to being able to make a significant dent in the exports of Ukrainian agricultural products with the Black Sea effectively closed. See Politico, Only black Sea ships will allow Ukraine to feed the world again, The EU plan to export grain by road and rail will barely move a fifth of regular food supplies, May 31, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/31/only-blacksea-ships-will-allow-ukraine-to-feed-the-world-again00035970#:~:text=The%20EU%20plan%20to%20export,fifth%20of%20regular%20food%20supplies.

Time will tell what options those opposing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or who are suffering from food shortages caused by the war are able to implement to address the food security challenges that will likely harm tens of millions of people around the world. See May 24, 2022: How severe is the food security challenge?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/05/24/how-severe-is-the-food-security-challenge/

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, Current Thoughts on Trade.

To read the full commentary from Current Thoughts on Trade, please click here.

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“12. Our unprecedented package of coordinated sanctions has already significantly hindered Russia’s war of aggression by limiting access to financial channels and ability to pursue their objectives. These restrictive measures are already having a significant impact on all Russian economic sectors – financial, trade, defence, technology, and energy – and will intensify pressure on Russia over time. We will continue to impose severe and immediate economic costs on President Putin’s regime for this unjustifiable war. We collectively commit to taking the following measures, consistent with our respective legal authorities and processes:

“a. First, we commit to phase out our dependency on Russian energy, including by phasing out or banning the import of Russian oil. We will ensure that we do so in a timely and orderly fashion, and in ways that provide time for the world to secure alternative supplies. As we do so, we will work together and with our partners to ensure stable and sustainable global energy supplies and affordable prices for consumers, including by accelerating reduction of our overall reliance on fossil fuels and our transition to clean energy in accordance with our climate objectives.

“b. Second, we will take measures to prohibit or otherwise prevent the provision of key services on which Russia depends. This will reinforce Russia’s isolation across all sectors of its economy.

“c. Third, we will continue to take action against Russian banks connected to the global economy and systemically critical to the Russian financial system. We have already severely impaired Russia’s ability to finance its war of aggression by targeting its Central Bank and its largest financial institutions.

“d. Fourth, we will continue our efforts to fight off the Russian regime’s attempts to spread its propaganda. Respectable bodog online casino private companies should not provide revenue to the Russian regime or to its affiliates feeding the Russian war machine.

“e. Fifth, we will continue and elevate our campaign against the financial elites and family members, who support President Putin in his war effort and squander the resources of the Russian people. Consistent with our national authorities, we will impose sanctions on additional individuals.”

The U.S. released a fact sheet on its new sanctions. See White House Briefing Room, FACT SHEET: United States and G7 Partners Impose Severe Costs for Putin’s War Against Ukraine, May 8, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/08/fact-sheet-united-states-andg7-partners-impose-severe-costs-for-putins-war-against-ukraine/. In the fact sheet, the U.S. outlines the sanctions it is imposing in this latest round.

Terence Stewart,  former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, Current Thoughts on Trade.

To read the full commentary from Current Thoughts on Trade, please click here.

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Keeping up with all sanctions being imposed is challenging in light of the expanding set of actions being taken although different organizations have compiled lists. The version I reviewed was updated on April 8, 2022 and shows actions through April 7. “Reuters is tracking government sanctions and actions against Russia taken by large companies and organisations around the world in the lead up to and following its invasion of Ukraine.” Reuters shows sanctions imposed by 41 governments (viewing the EU as 27) and 99 actions taken by large companies and organizations.

A fact sheet released by the White House on April 6 summarizes actions being taken by the United States in light of the continuing Russian aggression and atrocities. The fact sheet is copied below.

“Today, the United States, with the G7 and the European Union, will continue to impose severe and immediate economic costs on the Putin regime for its atrocities in Ukraine, including in Bucha. We will document and share information on these atrocities and use all appropriate mechanisms to hold accountable those responsible. As one part of this effort, the United States is announcing devastating economic measures to ban new investment in Russia, and impose the most severe financial sanctions on Russiaʼs largest bank and several of its most critical state-owned enterprises and on Russian government officials and their family members. These sweeping financial sanctions follow our action earlier this week to cut o Russiaʼs frozen funds in the United States to make debt payments. Importantly, these measures are designed to reinforce each other to generate intensifying impact over time.

“The United States and more than 30 allies and partners across the world have levied the most impactful, coordinated, and wide-ranging economic restrictions in history. Experts predict Russiaʼs GDP will contract up to 15 percent this year, wiping out the last fieen years of economic gains. Inflation is already spiking above 15 percent and forecast to accelerate higher. More than 600 private sector companies have already le the Russian market. Supply chains in Russia have been severely disrupted. Russia will very likely lose its status as a major economy, and it will continue a long descent into economic, financial, and technological isolation. Compared to last year, U.S. exports to Russia of items subject to our new export controls have decreased 99 percent by value – and the power of these restrictions will compound over time as Russia draws down any remaining stockpiles of spare parts for certain planes, tanks, and other resources needed for Putinʼs war machine.

“As long as Russia continues its brutal assault on Ukraine, we will stand unified with our allies and partners in imposing additional costs on Russia for its actions. Today, the United States is announcing the following actions:

“Full blocking sanctions on Russiaʼs largest financial institution, Sberbank, and Russiaʼs largest private bank, Alfa Bank. This action will freeze any of Sberbankʼs and Alfa Bankʼs assets touching the U.S financial system and prohibit U.S. persons from doing business with them. Sberbank holds nearly one-third of the overall Russian banking sectorʼs assets and is systemically critical to the Russian economy. Alfa Bank is Russiaʼs largest privately-owned financial institution and Russiaʼs fourth largest financial institution overall.

“Prohibiting new investment in the Russian Federation. President Biden will sign a new Executive Order (E.O.) that includes a prohibition on new investment in Russia by U.S. persons wherever located, which will further isolate Russia from the global economy. This action builds on the decision made by more than 600 multinational businesses to exit from Russia. The exodus of the private sector includes manufacturers, energy companies, large retailers, financial institutions, as well as other service providers such as law and consulting firms. Todayʼs E.O. will ensure the enduring weakening of the Russian Federationʼs global competitiveness.

“Full blocking sanctions on critical major Russian state-owned enterprises. This will prohibit any U.S. person from transacting with these entities and freeze any of their assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction, thereby damaging the Kremlinʼs ability to use these entities it depends on to enable and fund its war in Ukraine. The Department of Treasury will announce these entities tomorrow.

“Full blocking sanctions on Russian elites and their family members, including sanctions on: President Putinʼs adult children, Foreign Minister Lavrovʼs wife and daughter, and members of Russiaʼs Security Council including former President and Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. These individuals have enriched themselves at the expense of the Russian people. Some of them are responsible for providing the support necessary to underpin Putinʼs war on Ukraine. This action cuts them off from the U.S. financial system and freezes any assets they hold in the United States.

“The U.S. Treasury prohibited Russia from making debt payments with funds subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Sanctions do not preclude payments on Russian sovereign debt at this time, provided Russia uses funds outside of U.S. jurisdiction. However, Russia is a global financial pariah — and it will now need to choose between draining its available funds to make debt payments or default.

“Commitment to supporting sectors essential to humanitarian activities. As we continue escalating our sanctions and other economic measures against Russia for its brutal war against Ukraine, we reiterate our commitment to exempting essential humanitarian and related activities that benefit the Russian people and people around the world: ensuring the availability of basic foodstuffs and agricultural commodities, safeguarding access to medicine and medical devices, and enabling telecommunications services to support the flow of information and access to the internet which provides outside perspectives to the Russian people. These activities are not the target of our efforts, and U.S. and Western companies can continue to operate in these sectors in Russia. When necessary, relevant departments and agencies will issue appropriate exemptions and carveouts to ensure such activity is not disrupted.”

Similarly, the European Commission announced proposed additional sanctions (fifth round) on April 5 and agreed sanctions were announced by the Council of the European Union on April 8. The Councilʼs statement is copied below.

“In light of Russiaʼs continuing war of aggression against Ukraine, and the reported atrocities committed by Russian armed forces in Ukraine, the Council decided today to impose a fifth package of economic and individual sanctions against Russia.

“The agreed package includes a series of measures intended to reinforce pressure on the Russian government and economy, and to limit the Kremlinʼs resources for the aggression.

“ʻThese latest sanctions were adopted following the atrocities committed by Russian armed forces in Bucha and other places under Russian occupation. The aim of our sanctions is to stop the reckless, inhuman and aggressive behaviour of the Russian troops and make clear to the decision makers in the Kremlin that their illegal aggression comes at a heavy cost.ʼ Josep Borrell, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

“The package comprises:

“- a prohibition to purchase, import or transfer coal and other solid fossil fuels into the EU if they originate in Russia or are exported from Russia, as from August 2022. Imports of coal into the EU are currently worth EUR 8 billion per year.

“- a prohibition to provide access to EU ports to vessels registered under the flag of Russia. Derogations are granted for agricultural and food products, humanitarian aid, and energy.

“- a ban on any Russian and Belarusian road transport undertaking preventing them from transporting goods by road within the EU, including in transit. Derogations are nonetheless granted for a number of products, such as pharmaceutical, medical, agricultural and food products, including wheat, and for road transport for humanitarian purposes.

“- further export bans, targeting jet fuel and other goods such as quantum computers and advanced semiconductors, high-end electronics, soware, sensitive machinery and transportation equipment, and new import bans on products such as: wood, cement, fertilisers, seafood and liquor. The agreed export and import bans only account for EUR 10 billion and EUR 5.5 billion respectively.

“- a series of targeted economic measures intended to strengthen existing measures and close loopholes, such as: a general EU ban on participation of Russian companies in public procurement in member states, the exclusion of all financial support to Russian public bodies, an extended prohibition on deposits to crypto-wallets, and on the sale of banknotes and transferrable securities denominated in any official currencies of the EU member states to Russia and Belarus, or to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia and Belarus.

“Furthermore, the Council decided to sanction companies whose products or technology have played a role in the invasion, key oligarchs and businesspeople, high-ranking Kremlin officials, proponents of disinformation and information manipulation, systematically spreading the Kremlinʼs narrative on Russiaʼs war aggression in Ukraine, as well as family members of already sanctioned individuals, in order to make sure that EU sanctions are not circumvented.

“Moreover a full transaction ban is imposed on four key Russian banks representing 23% of market share in the Russian banking sector. After being de-SWIFTed these banks will now be subject to an asset freeze, thereby being completely cut o from EU markets.

“In its conclusions of 24 March 2022, the European Council stated that the Union remains ready to close loopholes and target actual and possible circumvention of the restrictive measures already adopted, as well as to move quickly with further coordinated robust sanctions on Russia and Belarus to effectively thwart Russian abilities to continue the aggression.

“Russiaʼs war of aggression against Ukraine grossly violates international law and is causing massive loss of life and injury to civilians. Russia is directing attacks against the civilian population and is targeting civilian objects, including hospitals, medical facilities, schools and shelters. These war crimes must stop immediately. Those responsible, and their accomplices, will be held to account in accordance with international law. The siege of Mariupol and other Ukrainian cities, and the denial of humanitarian access by Russian military forces are unacceptable. Russian forces must immediately provide for safe pathways to other parts of Ukraine, as well as humanitarian aid to be delivered to Mariupol and other besieged cities.

“The European Council demands that Russia immediately stop its military aggression in the territory of Ukraine, immediately and unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine, and fully respect Ukraineʼs territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders.

“The relevant legal acts will soon be published in the Official Journal.”
As listed above, the Official Journal with the legal actions identified was published on April 8 (OJ L111).

The United Kingdom also took action on April 6 to expand sanctions. The sanctions announced in the press release are listed below.

Bodog Poker “Key sanctions announced today include:

“asset freezes against Sberbank and Credit Bank of Moscow. Sberbank is Russiaʼs largest bank and this freeze is being taken in co-ordination with the US

“an outright ban on all new outward investment to Russia. In 2020 UK investment in Russia was worth over £11 billion. This will be another major hit to the Russian economy and further limit their future capabilities

“by the end of 2022, the UK will end all dependency on Russian coal and oil, and end imports of gas as soon as possible thereafter. From next week, the export of key oil refining equipment and catalysts will also be banned, degrading Russiaʼs ability to produce and export oil – targeting not only the industryʼs finances but its capabilities as a whole

“action against key Russian strategic industries and state owned enterprises. This includes a ban on imports of iron and steel products, a key source of revenue. Russiaʼs military ambitions are also being thwarted by new restrictions on its ability to acquire the UKʼs world-renowned quantum and advanced material technologies

“and targeting a further eight oligarchs active in these industries, which Putin uses to prop up his war economy.”

Canada, Japan and Australia also announced additional sanctions.

On April 8, President Biden also signed two Congressional bills into law, one suspending normal trade relations with Russia and Belarus and one banning imports of oil, gas and coal from Russia (President Biden had already banned such imports).

While major importing nations of Russian oil and gas have been unable or unwilling to date to cut o purchases of oil and gas, the level of economic and financial sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation and Belarus coupled with the withdrawal of major businesses (temporarily or permanently) from Russia are having significant negative effects on the Russian economy both short term and longer term. These effects coupled with the damage to the Ukrainian economy inflicted by the Russian war on Ukraine will have global effects. As reviewed in an earlier post, Ukraine and Russia are major exporters of various agricultural products. The war is both creating increased food insecurity and driving inflation on agricultural products which hurts all consumers but the poorest the hardest.

The WTOʼs Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala has indicated that global trade growth will be nearly 50% lower than previously projected for 2022 (2.5% vs. 4.7%) flowing from the war in Ukraine and ongoing supply chain issues. The war and individual countries reactions to Russiaʼs aggression are also likely to have longer term effects on global integration and supply chains. One is already seeing significant reductions in foreign investment flows into China. Chinaʼs actions or inactions towards Russiaʼs aggression may reduce foreign investor confidence in the Chinese economy as a place for investment at least for exports. A return to isolation of some countries from the larger global community is certainly afoot. The only question is whether states besides Russia and Belarus will be in the ostracized group.

With Russia continuing its aggression against Ukraine and with apparent scorched earth tactics being pursued, it is likely that the latest round of sanctions will not be the last. The strains on the global economy are likely to worsen in the coming months.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, Current Thoughts on Trade.

To read the full commentary from Current Thoughts on Trade, please click here. 

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At the WTO, a number of Members notified the General Council that accession negotiations with Belarus would not continue. Belarus was described as “unfit” to be a Member.

While, as the joint statement notes, there has been no progress in the accession talks since 2000 based on events within Belarus, the joint statement makes clear that Belarus will not become a member of the WTO, certainly not in the foreseeable future.

The actions of Russia with the support from Belarus in invading Ukraine have led to a massive backlash and effort to remove or limit the role of Russia (and Belarus) in the global economy and in multilateral organizations. In previous posts, I have reviewed efforts by various countries to remove most favored nation treatment on Russia and Belarus. 

The G-7 and EU have limited access to funding for Russia from the IMF, World Bank and other institutions, are attempting to limit Russia’s role in the WTO. Additional sanctions were announced this week in Brussels. 

“Today’s actions include:

“Full blocking sanctions on more than 400 individuals and entities, including the Duma and its members,

additional Russian elites, and Russian defense companies that fuel Putin’s war machine.

“This includes:

“328 Duma members and sanctioning the Duma as an entity.
“Herman Gref, the head of Russia’s largest financial institution Sberbank and a Putin advisor since the 1990s.

“Russian elite Gennady Timchenko, his companies and his family members. “17 board members of Russian financial institution Sovcombank.

“48 Large Russian defense state-owned enterprises that are part of Russia’s defense-industrial base and produce weapons that have been used in Russia’s assault against Ukraine’s people, infrastructure, and territory, including Russian Helicopters, Tactical Missiles Corporation, High Precision Systems, NPK Tekhmash OAO, Kronshtadt. We are targeting, and will continue to target, the suppliers of Russia’s war effort and, in turn, their supply chain.

“Establishment of an initiative focused on sanctions evasions.

“G7 leaders and the European Union today announced an initiative to share information about and coordinate responses related to evasive measures intended to undercut the effectiveness and impact of our joint sanctions actions. Together, we will not allow sanctions evasion or backfilling. As part of this effort, we will also engage other governments on adopting sanctions similar to those already imposed by the G7 and other partners.

“Continuing to blunt the Central Bank’s ability to deploy international reserves, including gold, to prop up the Russian economy and fund Putin’s brutal war.

“G7 leaders and the European Union will continue to work jointly to blunt Russia’s ability to deploy its international reserves to prop up Russia’s economy and fund Putin’s war, including by making clear that any transaction involving gold related to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation is covered by existing sanctions.”

This week President Biden noted the U.S. preference to have Russia removed from the G-20, although press accounts indicate such a move even if backed by the G-7 would be blocked by China and possibly others. If Russia is not excluded, it is unclear if G-7 Members and others might opt not to attend any G-20 meetings during the pendency of the war.

At the WTO, the joint statement to the General Council on the need of Members to take actions in light of the threats posed by Russia was followed by a response from Russia.

The two largest economic challenges from the war in Ukraine is escalating energy prices and food security flowing from the large percentage of global wheat shipments coming from Ukraine and Russia. While the U.S. and Canada have banned imports of oil and/or gas from Russia in recent weeks, that option is not immediately available to the EU countries.

The U.S. and the EU reached agreement on joint efforts to help reduce EU dependence on Russia energy which include U.S. commitments to export to the EU (or get third countries to export to the EU) a quantity of liquified natural gas equal to the LNG purchased from Russia in 2021 (15 BCM) and to ramp up exports to the EU of LNG in the coming years to 50 BCM. 

Because of the dependence of many countries on imports of grains from Ukraine and Russia, the war in Ukraine poses significant food security issues. The WTO’s Director-General has recently noted the potential for social unrest from food insecurity.

“17. More immediately, President Putin’s war places global food security under increased pressure. We recall that the implementation of our sanctions against Russia takes into account the need to avoid impact on global agricultural trade. We remain determined to monitor the situation closely and do what is necessary to prevent and respond to the evolving global food security crisis. We will make coherent use of all instruments and funding mechanisms to address food security, and build resilience in the agriculture sector in line with climate and environment goals. We will address potential agricultural production and trade disruptions, in particular in vulnerable countries. We commit to provide a sustainable food supply in Ukraine and support continued Ukrainian production efforts.

“18. We will work with and step up our collective contribution to relevant international institutions including the World Food Programme (WFP), in parallel with Multilateral Development Banks and International Financial Institutions, to provide support to countries with acute food insecurity. We call for an extraordinary session of the Council of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to address the consequences on world food security and agriculture arising from the Russian aggression against Ukraine. We call on all participants of the Agriculture Markets Information System (AMIS) to continue to share information and explore options to keep prices under control, including making stocks available, in particular to the WFP. We will avoid export bans and other trade-restrictive measures, maintain open and transparent markets, and call on others to do likewise, consistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, including WTO notification requirements.”

It is clear that food security in the coming months will be an important focus within the WTO Committee on Agriculture. 

Comments

The war in Ukraine is leading to an isolation of the Russian Federation and Belarus and a rethinking of the global economic integration of the last thirty years. How large the retreat from global economic integration turns out to be will depend on various factors including the duration of the war, the extent to which some countries aid the Russian war effort and hence lead to a larger group of sanctioned countries, and the basic incompatibility of state-controlled/directed economies with the current global trading system architecture. The changes in supply chains, trade flows and investment decisions that have been made in the last month will have profound effects on global commerce going forward.

Short term, because of the disruption in grain production and shipments from Ukraine, there is an immediate challenge to food security which if not addressed effectively can have debilitating effects including societal upheaval in a number of developing countries as was seen in 2008- 2009.

The WTO has an obvious role to play on the food security issue. Time will tell how many Members contribute to a meaningful solution on food security.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, Current Thoughts on Trade.

To read the full commentary from Current Thoughts on Trade, please click here. 

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BERKELEY – To be effective, economic sanctions depend on multilateral coordination. Freezing the Russian central bank’s holdings and kicking Russian banks out of the SWIFT financial messaging system for international payments in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are groundbreaking moves. But such measures will be successful only if there are no (or at least very few) ways to circumvent them. Their implementation and enforcement must be truly multilateral, extending beyond NATO and the transatlantic community.

The unprecedented multilateral response to Russia’s war is an opportunity for the United States and its allies to strengthen their collaboration on a wide range of shared security and economic issues. Consider the semiconductor industry, which is crucial for today’s economy and for national security. The sanctions limiting Russian access to semiconductors depend on support from TSMC in Taiwan and Samsung in South Korea, the leading global producers of both commodity chips and the more advanced chips used in many weapons systems.

Policy collaboration in the semiconductor sector can and should extend beyond the sanctions. There are many promising opportunities for collaboration among the economies that form the core of today’s complex semiconductor bodog online casino supply chain: the US, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Israel. All are investing significant public funds and deploying industrial, research, training, trade, and cross-border investment policies to increase their semiconductor producers’ capabilities.

Multilateral policy coordination in the semiconductor industry should aim to ensure a competitive, resilient, secure, and sustainable (CRSS) supply of semiconductors to meet the significant increase in global demand over the next decade. Given the global dispersion of research, production, talent, and knowledge, this goal cannot be accomplished through technological autarky or isolationist self-sufficiency.

The concentration of chip production in Asia – where China accounts for a growing share – poses a long-term threat to CRSS. The solution is to invest significantly more in US and European semiconductor production capabilities, particularly for the most advanced chips. This need not exclude Asian companies and Asian allies. For Asian producers, locating some production facilities in the US and Europe would provide protection against regional supply-chain shocks.

There are several important issues to consider in moving toward more multilateral policy collaboration in the semiconductor industry. For starters, proposals for policy interventions in Europe and the US come in many forms depending on the national context. Among the options are competitive grants, capital subsidies, tax credits, and funding for research and development.

The challenge will be to ensure that these policies increase investments in production capabilities rather than fund wasteful zero-sum competition among governments to attract private investment that would have occurred anyway. Competing national industrial policies, however well motivated, can quickly lead to counterproductive bidding wars of the sort we have seen before among US states and European countries. Government interventions should come with clear conditions and metrics on business performance to counter the incentives for private companies to exploit promised subsidies for their own benefit and that of their shareholders.

Assuring competitive markets for commodity and advanced chip production is important in its own right. But chip fabrication and production also provide leverage throughout the semiconductor supply chain – from equipment, materials, and design to integrating customers’ future plans and needs into the development of new products. Maintaining a competitive edge in fabrication is thus crucial for developing the equipment and materials needed for ongoing innovation throughout the supply chain. The US and Europe have strong competitive positions in these areas; however, those positions need to be defended and strengthened.

That will take time and substantial investment. Construction of a new fabrication facility is estimated to require 3-5 years, at a cost of $10-20 billion. Congress is currently considering legislation that would allocate $52 billion (mainly in the form of grants) to catalyze US-based fabrication by both domestic and foreign firms. That is a large number, representing about three times more than what the US government spent to support COVID-19 vaccine development and manufacturing. But it is a small fraction of the capital investment needed to build and operate fabrication facilities required to meet US military and commercial needs over the next two decades.

A second consideration is that building and operating competitive new fabrication capacity in the US and Europe will call for more than capital investment. It will also require regulatory support to facilitate environmental reviews and permitting of high-tech production facilities, as well as complementary investments in infrastructure, including energy, water, and transportation networks.

Third, semiconductor companies (both domestic and foreign-owned) will base their decisions about where to build on access to talent, skills, and university research. Revitalizing US semiconductor production thus requires both physical and human capital. In the medium term, that means issuing more visas for highly skilled and experienced foreign workers; and, over time, it means increasing the number of Americans graduating from college with engineering degrees.

The ability to prototype, produce, and scale up innovations can be severely hampered by “lab to fab” gaps in funding and talent along the innovation pathway. Multilateral collaboration among the US and allied governments to create and fund joint pre-competitive research programs, including shared R&D facilities, can fill these gaps, accelerate innovation, nurture the development of new companies, and maintain technological leadership throughout the supply chain.

Finally, joint research programs involving companies, universities, and government partners can be designed to address other shared challenges like climate change (semiconductors are critical inputs in solar, wind, and other forms of alternative energy), security vulnerabilities, and the risks associated with artificial intelligence. Such programs will require agreements among participants on intellectual-property rights, trade, and cross-border investments.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has highlighted an essential feature of the semiconductor industry. The technology and trade sanctions come at a moment when the US, Europe, and other key nodes in the semiconductor supply chain are planning large investments to address both economic and national security concerns. There is no better time to collaborate in developing a CRSS global supply of semiconductors.

Laura Tyson, a former chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers during the Clinton administration, is a professor at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, and a member of the Board of Advisers at Angeleno Group.

John Zysman, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, is Co-Founder of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy.

To read the full commentary by Project Syndicate, please click here.

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Although deterrence clearly failed to stop Russia’s aggression, the sanctions imposed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine could still deter other countries like China from undermining the sanctions. The sanctions may also deter China from carrying out its own aggressive acts against Taiwan. As for effectiveness, the sanctions have proven among the most powerful in modern history, largely because so many countries have gone along with them. The punishment to the Russian economy, and to rich and poor Russians individually, has also been extraordinarily severe. But nearly three weeks after Russia invaded Ukraine, there is not the slightest evidence that Moscow will change course and “rehabilitate” itself in the eyes of the West.

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As Sun Tzu declared 2,500 years ago, “The greatest victory is that which requires no battle.” Deterrence through threatened sanctions is a modern application of the general’s wisdom, and the first stage of effectiveness. On December 7, 2021, well before Russian President Vladimir Putin recognized the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic (carved out of Ukrainian territory on February 21, 2022), President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. threatened “high impact” sanctions but did not make a public commitment by disclosing specifics. Unfortunately, Western threats failed to convey the extent and certainty of sanctions awaiting the Russian invasion.

Many experts argue that if President Biden and European leaders had declared in advance, in public, and in detail the path-breaking sanctions now imposed on Russia, Putin might have reconsidered. But advance threats from Washington and European capitals were ambiguous and deterrence failed, perhaps because Putin grossly underestimated not only Ukrainian opposition but also the worldwide condemnation and punishment evoked by the invasion. The size, speed, and sweep of existing sanctions—supported not only by the United States but also by the entire European Union and several Asian allies—are exceptional. It is entirely possible that Putin was unreceptive to Western threats leading up to the invasion because unified and damaging sanctions against Russia have little historical precedence.

Moreover, except for canceling the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia, Western economic sanctions, including the freezing of Russian central bank assets, have exempted sales of fossil fuels. Crude petroleum, refined petroleum, and petroleum gas constitute roughly 35 percent of Russian exports, while all fuels and minerals make up 59 percent of exports. Putin clearly believed that his economy could easily weather the fallout from his war and that Europe would not risk cutting off Russian gas and oil supplies. Perhaps threatening to hit Russia where it would really hurt—by sanctioning exports of fossil fuels—would have made an effective deterrent. But Europe’s energy shortages at the height of winter made an embargo politically impossible.

Despite their failure in deterring the invasion, current sanctions may serve future deterrence: Putin might, for example, desist from threatening Moldova, Finland, and Sweden (not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) in his quest for a grander Russian empire. As well, Beijing might draw a sobering lesson from the worldwide condemnation of Russia and reconsider military plans for eventual unification with Taiwan. China is more integrated with the world economy than Russia: Two-way Chinese trade was 36 percent of GDP in 2019 while two-way Russian trade, excluding oil and gas exports, was 25 percent. The prospect of Russia-style sanctions on China would entail a drastic fall in living standards.

SECOND STAGE: ENFORCEMENT

Once sanctions are authorized by the president or prime minister (or by the legislature), the next stage of effectiveness belongs to the domain of officials charged with implementation. In the United States, those are predominantly Treasury officials in the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), customs officials in the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency, and intelligence officials in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Their task is to close inevitable loopholes in the shipment of goods, provision of services, and movement of money. Other members of the sanctions alliance— Canada, Europe, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, and Australia—have parallel agencies and officials.

Smuggling and evasion accompany sanctions, since shortages drive up prices of target-country imports, drive down prices of its exports, and mark up the cost of transferring funds. Earnings from smuggling and evasion can be substantial. But given the sophistication of Treasury, CBP, and CIA officials (and their foreign counterparts), direct smuggling and evasion from the territory and financial institutions of the sanctions alliance should be limited.

More troublesome will be sanctions busting through the territory and financial institutions of neutral or friendly countries. In the UN General Assembly vote denouncing Russia on March 2, 2022, four countries sided with Moscow (Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, and Syria), while 35 countries abstained, including China, India, and Pakistan. These countries are prime candidates for sanctions-busting transactions. They are logical destinations for Russian gas and oil sold at steep discounts, as well as sources of consumer and industrial goods shipped to Russia at high prices. State Department and Treasury officials are now trying to dissuade neutral countries from overt sanctions busting and may threaten secondary sanctions to back up their arguments.

China especially poses a threat to enforcement of sanctions. Under its new Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, China bars its citizens from complying with foreign sanctions. As Russia imports approximately 68 percent of its computers, semiconductors, and smartphones from China, the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, if invoked, would allow Russia to evade the US Commerce Department’s export controls targeting its defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors. Indeed, US officials claim that Russia has already asked Chinafor military supplies.

THIRD STAGE: PUNISHMENT

The third stage of effectiveness is the extent of economic punishment visited on the target country. Rarely does deprivation exceed 10 percent of a target country’s GDP; in the great majority of sanctions cases over the past century, punishment has not exceeded 5 percent of GDP. Unlike many targets, Russia had a flourishing stock market and a convertible ruble before the invasion. Between February 20, 2022, just before Moscow’s recognition of the two ersatz republics, and March 11, 2022, the ruble collapsed from 77 per US dollar to 117 per US dollar, a drop of 35 percent. Shortly after the invasion of Ukraine, Russia closed its stock market. Rich Russians lost substantial paper wealth. Meanwhile, Western assets of Russian oligarchs were frozen, including mansions and yachts that could be identified.

More significant for ordinary Russians, the rate of inflation in 2022, forecast by economists polled by the Russian central bank, is expected to reach 20 percent, and the economy is forecast to drop 8 percent. More realistic, the Institute of International Finance, based in Washington, forecasts a GDP drop of 15 percent. The voluntary withdrawal of Western firms from Russia—over 300 at latest count—will deprive rich and ordinary Russians everything from McDonald’s to Mercedes. Russian firms will experience an acute shortage of spare parts and intermediate components as their Western suppliers depart.  

By historic yardsticks, the economic hardship now inflicted on Russia ranks among the brutal episodes of modern times, far greater than the mild punishment inflicted for the annexation of Crimea in 2014. In recent decades, only North Korea, Cuba, Iraq, and Iran have suffered comparable losses from the imposition of sanctions. By singling out Russian elites, including Putin himself, for travel bans and asset freezes, Western leaders seek to penalize the Russian ruling class, but financial and trade freezes are bound to bring misery to the Russian masses.

Fearing escalation to the realm of nuclear war, NATO allies refused to declare a no-fly zone over Ukraine, but they have supplied considerable conventional weapons to Ukrainian forces in the form of small arms, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft missiles, plus expert advice on cyber war. All this amounts to a quasi-military component alongside economic sanctions, a familiar marriage from past episodes, including Cuba and Iran.

FOURTH STAGE: REHABILITATION

The fourth, most important, and most difficult stage of effectiveness is rehabilitation, or changed behavior by the selected country. Deterrence and rehabilitation are the twin goals of economic sanctions. The prospect of punishment is meant to inspire deterrence, while the actual imposition of punishment, coupled with strict enforcement, is meant to force rehabilitation. Following Putin’s invasion, rehabilitation would require removing all troops and tanks from Ukrainian territory and withdrawing recognition from the two new republics. As long as Putin remains a modern czar, those goals are unattainable. He has staked his political future and possibly his life on annexing Ukraine. The best that can be envisaged—and even this seems farfetched—is an agreed line of demarcation at the Dnieper River, leaving Kiev and eastern Ukraine under Russian control, but allowing western Ukraine to survive as an independent state.

Mediation by China or another third country has been mentioned. If Russia runs short on war materiel as it slogs through Ukraine, owing in part to the effectiveness of sanctions as punishment, a ceasefire might be negotiated, though prospects are slight. If that happens, swift and strong sanctions will deserve partial credit, but credit will be shared with quasi-military support provided to Ukraine from Europe and the United States, as well as the resolve demonstrated by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian people.

Since complete rehabilitation is unattainable as long as Putin remains in power, some commentators wishfully hope for regime change. Over the past century, regime change has indeed been the objective of more than 100 sanctions, with more than a third of them successful, but the successful episodes typically targeted small countries in chaotic conditions with weak internal security. Russia is a large country with historically strong secret police, now the FSB, successor to the KGB and the Okhrana. Hopes that oligarchs and army generals will stage a coup are vastly overoptimistic.

Popular protest seems another avenue for regime change, but numbers cited for demonstrations (mainly in Moscow) are too small to overcome an entrenched security apparatus. As of March 10, fewer than 20,000 Russians have been arrested for protesting, indicating that the total number of protestors may be under 100,000 in a nation of 145 million. As well, it is reported that tens of thousands of Russians have departed to Turkey and Central Asia. While both protestors and exiles reflect broad Russian sentiment against the war, they do not threaten Putin’s commanding position.

CONCLUSION

Threatened sanctions proved ineffective as deterrence. Enforcement by countries in the sanctions alliance should prove highly effective with respect to goods and finance originating in their territory and conducted through their companies. However, significant sanctions busting can be anticipated both by neutral countries and countries friendly to Russia. Soon the sanctions alliance will need to decide whether to augment diplomatic protests with secondary sanctions to discourage neutral or friendly commerce with Russia. This question finds antecedents in the Napoleonic Wars, when the United States played a neutral role but was subjected to economic and military pressure by Britain.

Punishment of Russia generally and especially the Russian elite has been swift and effective. On a punishment scale of 1 to 10, sanctions already imposed rate at least an 8. Few in the West, and even fewer in Russia, anticipated the massive blockade against trade (virtually everything except energy and humanitarian supplies), freezing of Russian central bank and private bank assets, freezing assets of oligarchs, and wholesale departure of Western firms. On top of sanctions already imposed, frozen Russian assets may be seized by alliance governments, the proceeds used to support Ukrainian refugees and reconstruction, and possibly to compensate alliance firms whose assets are seized by Russia.

In the end, rehabilitation remains elusive and, if partially achieved through a ceasefire and partition between west and east Ukraine, credit must be shared with quasi-military support for Ukraine and the country’s valiant armed resistance.

Once Putin recognized two ersatz republics and invaded Ukraine, harsh sanctions were inevitable. But as often happens, the record on effectiveness is mixed, if all four stages are considered. Against a strong and resolute adversary, military force, with all its risks, may be the only means to achieve rehabilitation.

Gary Clyde Hufbauer is a Senior Research Staffer at the The Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Megan Hogan is a Research Analyst at the The Peterson Institute for International Economics.

To read the full commentary by The Peterson Institute for International Economics, please click here.

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