However, investment restrictions along with other primary tools of economic statecraft like sanctions and export controls are “single use.” Once exercised, they either break or preclude economic ties. The tools admittedly have limitations and leakage. Nonetheless, given the sheer size of the U.S. market, role of the U.S. dollar in the global financial system, and magnitude of U.S. foreign direct investments, the measures are powerful and represent consequential U.S. national security and foreign policy positions.

These economic tools also provide significant points of leverage for the United States due to global economic interconnectedness created through U.S. leadership. But, used enough without alternatives to refill leverage reserves, the strategies risk sidelining the U.S., leaving few policy levers short of military conflict in the long term. The existential question is how the U.S. can continue to maintain and enhance its leverage when its offensive economic tools inherently diminish every time they are used? To continue to exercise these impactful tools, America needs to continually renew connection points and think strategically about how it’s exercising its leverage, including by re-engaging on trade, being more selective, and getting its own economic house in order.

The globalized world that sprung from the post-World War II rules-based order has created dependencies by fostering growth, prosperity, and peace through interconnectedness. Reduced barriers to trade and investment have encouraged global sourcing and value chains fueled by U.S. R&D, technology, and investment. The resulting global system has deep ties to U.S. technologies and wherewithal, with over 70% of global trade executed in U.S. dollars. Trade and financial ties exist with friend and foe—including China and Russia. Yet, as U.S. policy has increasingly utilized these ties to achieve foreign policy, national security, and economic objectives, dependencies have become liabilities.

Tectonic geopolitical shifts have precipitated the increased use of sanctions, export controls, and investment restrictions in lieu of military force, throttling touchpoints with the United States. The pure presence of U.S. technologies, parts, people, or funds in transactions can trigger a complex set of prohibitions that often apply extraterritorially—requiring that parties choose between doing business with the U.S. or targeted parties or countries. U.S. technologies remain pre-eminent in many sectors and are complicated to “design out.”

Once a country, entity or person is sanctioned, or the conveyance of technologies or capital is restricted, the tie that made the action impactful is immediately broken. The action cannot be “redone” for increased effect. And, these tools are being used at breakneck pace: In 2000, the U.S. sanctioned 912 people and entities. In 2022, the number had grown to nearly 12,000. Countries like China fill the vacuum, replacing U.S. technologies or investment with Chinese ones—and the U.S. cannot stop or affect that activity going forward.

The U.S. is thus quickly depleting its leverage without a plan to replenish. Given America’s rapidly declining percentage of global GDP—approximately 40% in 1960 to 15% in 2023, it needs to rethink its engagement with the world if these fracturing instruments remain primary policy tools. Witness the reticence of the Global South in supporting sanctions on Russia despite its brutal invasion of Ukraine.

The stakes are high and the U.S. needs a hard reset to secure its leverage in the short, medium and long term. It should:

Use more effectively the size of the U.S. market to create positive connections. Returning to the trade negotiating table is not only an economic imperative; it’s a national security one. Leverage is built by cementing foreign policy partnerships through permanent trade deals (as opposed to talk shops like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity). Creating Cold-War style blocks will reduce U.S. leverage in the long-term. In addition to building bridges with allies, America must enhance ties with “fence-sitter” countries (e.g., India) to regain lost leverage with close partners and even China.

Be selective in how it uses leverage going forward. There are times to throw down the gauntlet. Russia today is a good example. In the case of China where the game is long, the U.S. should be mindful of how it uses economic tools. The calculations for when to use these policies should look beyond what satisfies short-term political expediencies to how retaining interconnectedness and dependency can provide important points of leverage.

Get its political and economic house in order and use market-based tools to drive technological innovation and investment in the U.S. Current industrial policy with its use of subsidies and tariffs detracts from U.S. leverage. It creates negative precedents, causing even allies to erect reciprocal trade barriers. Case in point is responses by allies to the Trump tariffs and green subsidy provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act. American politicians should uphold our free market values. That is also part of our leverage.

Neena Shenai is a Nonresident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. This piece draws on a forthcoming paper written for the “Economic Security and the Future of the Global Order in the Indo-Pacific” 2023 conference at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House.

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While China’s support for Russia is widely reported, Hong Kong’s substantial contributions to Russia’s war efforts are less known. Recent reports have identified Hong Kong as a prominent node in Russia’s illicit procurement network, acting as a transshipment hub for diverting Western-made microelectronic components to companies affiliated with the Russian military. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Hong Kong has doubled its integrated circuits exports to around $400 million worth of semiconductors in 2022, second only to China and far exceeding any third country in the volume of semiconductor trade with Russia. Many of these transactions violate U.S. export control regulations against Russia, and multiple individuals and entities operating from Hong Kong have been sanctioned for their involvement in the Russian military’s procurement network.

Hong Kong’s complicity in sanctions busting is not merely a byproduct of being one of the busiest shipping hubs in the world; it is a direct consequence of Hong Kong’s increased subservience to China, now that Beijing has wiped out the last vestiges of autonomy in the special administrative region. In today’s Hong Kong, the government follows Beijing’s orders in virtually all matters of governance, particularly for issues with geopolitical salience. High levels of semiconductor trade between Hong Kong and Russia, as well as the Hong Kong government’s public scorn for Western sanctions, have made Hong Kong’s allegiance clear: it sits firmly in the camp of an emerging China-Russia axis.

RUSSIA’S SEMICONDUCTOR SUPPLY CHAIN

Numerous reports indicate that despite sweeping Western sanctions, Russia’s defense industrial base has successfully established alternative routes to import dual-use components needed for manufacturing military equipment. Lacking scalable domestic substitutes, Russia relies on foreign-made microelectronic components to produce a range of military gear, including weapons like drones and cruise missiles. Examining Russian weapons captured in Ukraine, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) discovered in August 2022 that the majority of microchip components in Russian systems originated from the United States, East Asia, and Western Europe. Tracing the supply chain of microelectronics, RUSI concluded that “third-country transshipment hubs and clandestine networks operated by Russia’s special services are now working to build new routes to secure access to Western microelectronics.”

A leader in low-end microchip manufacturing and the world’s top chip importer, China is now the foremost supplier of semiconductors to Russia. In 2022, as Western countries restricted technology supply, Russia’s semiconductor imports from China skyrocketed, jumping from $200 million in 2021 to well over $500 million in 2022, according to Russian customs data analyzed by the Free Russia Foundation. Importantly, the Sino-Russian technology trade involves not only Chinese-made components but also products manufactured by top U.S. chipmakers such as Intel, Advanced Micro Devices, and Texas Instruments. Nikkei Asia recently reported that exports of U.S. chips from Hong Kong and China to Russia increased tenfold between 2021 and 2022, reaching about $570 million worth. By one figure, China and Hong Kong together accounted for nearly 90 percent of global chip exports to Russia in the period between March and December 2022.

China’s support to Russia’s war effort is unsurprising. The two countries are aligned in their ambition to undermine the U.S.-led international order. Before the war, Beijing and Moscow declared that the countries’ friendship had “no limits,” and a Chinese top diplomat has recently reaffirmed that Sino-Russian relations are “reaching new milestones.” The summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, held in March 2023, further consolidated the importance of this strategic partnership. Less examined is Hong Kong’s role in Russia’s technology supply chain.

While most countries have begun to recognize Hong Kong’s loss of autonomy following the passage of the Hong Kong national security law in 2020, the city is still often treated as separate from China in economic and trade data. This is as much a matter of convention as an acknowledgement of Hong Kong’s unique function to China: the former British colony is highly integrated into the global economy, serving as China’s window to the world. Hong Kong’s connectivity with the world has allowed unscrupulous actors to hide their footprints amid the busy international flows. Its prominence in Russia’s technology supply chain exemplifies this point. Researchers and journalists have found that some Hong Kong–based companies have diverted significant quantities of Western-made electronic components to Russia since its invasion of Ukraine. Macro-level data bear out Hong Kong’s importance to Russia’s defense-industrial base (although export statistics vary depending on the source). The Free Russia Foundation found that Hong Kong doubled its semiconductors and integrated circuits exports to around $400 million in 2022, putting it second only to China’s $500-million-plus exports. China and Hong Kong far exceed any third country in the volume of microchips trade with Russia.

BEIJING PULLING THE STRINGS

What explains Hong Kong’s prominence in Russia’s effort to sustain war in Ukraine? The most immediate factor is Beijing’s increased control over all aspects of the governance of Hong Kong. Historically, Western countries treated Hong Kong’s exports as sufficiently autonomous from China’s strategic objectives. In 1992, the United States and other former Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) members designated Hong Kong a “cooperating country,” affirming that it possessed the necessary elements of an effective licensing and enforcement system.

The transfer of sovereignty to China in 1997 prompted fears that Hong Kong would become a hub for technology diversion into China and other so-called rogue states like North Korea. The principle of “one country, two systems” was designed to assuage such anxiety by promising that Hong Kong would continue to exercise independent authority over export controls, which the government interprets as a trade matter, meaning that it falls under the legal bounds of Hong Kong’s autonomy. Under the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, after China took over Hong Kong’s sovereignty in 1997, the “United States should continue to support access by Hong Kong to sensitive technologies controlled under [COCOM] for so long as the United States is satisfied that such technologies are protected from improper use or export.” As a result, Hong Kong was eligible to import, without license, extensive categories of U.S.-controlled dual-use items and was eligible for license exceptions for some categories. In contrast, China was required to obtain a license to procure items controlled for U.S. national security and was eligible for a license exception only when the destination was verified as civil end users. A 1997 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (now Government Accountability Office) characterized Hong Kong favorably for having demonstrated “excellent cooperation with the United States on export enforcement activities, including sharing of information and cooperation on investigations, searches, and seizures of suspected illegal shipments.”

However, as Hong Kong’s autonomy has steadily eroded, so has its willingness to comply with Western export control regimes, especially when they contradict China’s strategic interests. Today’s Hong Kong scorns Western sanctions against Russia. After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Western governments launched a frantic campaign to seize the assets of Russian oligarchs, hoping to deter elites from aiding Russian war efforts. In sharp contrast, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive John Lee, himself sanctioned by the United States for suppressing the 2019 protests, said that the government would not recognize U.S. sanctions against Russia, asserting that Hong Kong has no legal obligation to enforce “unilateral sanctions” after a Russian oligarch’s yacht was spotted in Hong Kong in October 2022. Furthermore, Hong Kong has become a top alternative for Russian companies shut out of Western financial capitals like New York and London. As Bloomberg reported in October 2022, a number of major Russian companies, including state-owned enterprises, have sought to engage with Hong Kong law firms to help anchor them in a “friendlier jurisdiction.” A local research group later found that between February and October 2022, the number of Russia-affiliated businesses registered in Hong Kong reached thirty-five, more than doubled from the same period in 2021.

DOES THE CHINA FACTOR REALLY MATTER?

It is no coincidence that Hong Kong’s noncompliance with Western sanctions has been simultaneous with Hong Kong’s deteriorating political autonomy. Xi is determined to exploit Hong Kong’s advantages to further his strategic ambitions, even if it means tarnishing Hong Kong’s international reputation.

Some might argue that Beijing’s increased grip on Hong Kong has had little effect on the city’s attitude toward Western sanctions. After all, Hong Kong was already a major transshipment hub, even prior to signs of serious deterioration of its autonomy. The volume of dual-use items transshipped through Hong Kong has bodog casino contributed to conflict and terrorist activities that had less strategic salience to China than the war in Ukraine has. For example, transshipped U.S. electronics components and devices were used to build improvised explosive devices that were deployed against coalition forces in the Iraq war, a conflict for which China largely stayed on the sidelines.

Additionally, Hong Kong’s status as a busy transshipment port to locations around the world naturally increases the risks of illicit technology diversion. Transshipment is notoriously hard to detect from trade data because it requires visibility throughout multiple stages in the supply chain. Due to the sheer volume of transshipment occurring via Hong Kong, it is hard for export control officials to conduct preshipment screening or postshipment checks. It is particularly easy to set up front companies in jurisdictions like Hong Kong. As a manager at a leading U.S. semiconductor distributor explains, “there are many formless shell companies and small trading companies in Hong Kong that serve as receptacles for secondary sales. . . . If you spot one illegal trade, they can just change their name or use their other trading companies’ names.”

It becomes even more challenging to distinguish between transshipment to sanctioned entities and transshipment to legitimate importers if the importing country has a large existing market for dual-use goods. According to trade data compiled by the Observatory of Economic Complexity, Hong Kong has consistently been the world’s top importer of electrical machinery and electronics since 2004. In the global trade of integrated circuits, for instance, Hong Kong imported 24.3 percent (or $162 billion) of the world’s trade in 2020, exceeding even China’s $114 billion imports.

But this line of argument fails to account for the big picture. While the problem of illicit trade has historically bedeviled Hong Kong, the government’s open defiance against Western sanctions since the Ukraine war signals its commitment to a deliberately lax approach to export controls. The sizeable flow of technology from Hong Kong to Russia is the result of an active political choice. The reactions from other major transshipment hubs, such as Singapore and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), illustrate that it is possible to stem the flow of technology to Russia if there is political will to do so. U.S. authorities have long recognized the prominence of Hong Kong, Singapore, and the UAE in illicit trade networks. The three major transshipment ports reacted to Western sanctions regimes against Russia differently according to their geopolitical interests.

Despite being a U.S. security partner, the UAE has joined other Middle Eastern states in refusing to participate in Western sanctions regimes. It has abstained from voting in favor of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) draft resolution condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine, allowed Russian oligarchs to launder money through its ports, spurned Washington’s request that it pump more oil to diminish Russian oil revenue by reducing global oil price, and refused to crack down on the reexporting of electronic components to Russia. Data show that exports of electronic parts from the UAE to Russia increased sevenfold within a year to almost $283 million in 2022, while microchip exports rose by fifteen times to $24.3 million from $1.6 million in 2021. The Gulf country also sold 158 drones worth a total of $600,000 to Russia.

If the UAE has allowed tech trade with Russia to flourish out of self-interest, Singaporean leaders have pursued a different calculus—choosing to align themselves more closely with the U.S. position. In a statement made on February 28, 2022, Singapore’s foreign minister said, “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a clear and gross violation of the international norms and a completely unacceptable precedent. This is an existential issue for us.” In a rare move, the city-state announced sanctions against Russia that included “four banks and an export ban on electronics, computers and military items,” becoming the only Southeast Asian country to impose sanctions against Russia in the absence of binding UNSC approval. According to the Free Russia Foundation, Singapore is among the countries that have most dramatically curtailed trade with Russia. In terms of semiconductors and integrated circuits, Singapore was the ninth-biggest exporter to Russia in 2021. A prominent node in the global supply chain, Singapore accounts for 19 percent of the global share of semiconductor equipment, providing Russia in 2019 with approximately $10.6 million worth of semiconductor devices. This has shifted since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, when Singapore chose to side with Western sanctions regimes. In 2022, exports of semiconductors from Singapore to Russia collapsed dramatically down to a negligible level.

Geopolitical interests explain both the UAE’s spike and Singapore’s plummet in exports to Russia. These cases illustrate that changes in economic and technology ties with Russia are largely driven by the countries’ stances on the Ukraine war, which are in turn motivated by their geostrategic calculus. Similarly, Hong Kong’s permissive stance toward trading technology with Russia is a product of Beijing’s geopolitical calculations. Repeatedly, Hong Kong officials have demonstrated that they have no ability to defy Beijing’s will and no interest in doing so, even if it means alienating the international community. If China is determined to help Russia wage war against Ukraine by extending a technology lifeline, Hong Kong will follow suit.

STILL ASIA’S WORLD CITY?

In July 2020, recognizing Hong Kong’s loss of autonomy, former U.S. president Donald Trump announced that Hong Kong “is no longer sufficiently autonomous to justify differential treatment in relation to the People’s Republic of China.” The United States would “suspend or eliminate different and preferential treatment for Hong Kong.” Shortly after, the Commerce Department began rescinding Hong Kong’s export licensing privileges, such as by equalizing the availability of license exceptions for Hong Kong and China. In December, the department declared that it would treat exports to Hong Kong as destined for China, effectively ending Hong Kong’s preferential status in the U.S. export control system. Some of the United States’ closest partners have implemented similar changes.

Stripping away Hong Kong’s preferential trading status is a good first step in stopping the leakage of sensitive goods to China and its autocratic allies. But unilateral action from the United States is not enough. While these restrictions have slowed the movement of export-controlled goods in and out of Hong Kong—for example, the Commerce Department detected a 17.4 percent decline in shipments under a Bureau of Industry and Security license exception between 2020 and 2021—Hong Kong on the whole remains relatively interconnected with the global economy.

Russia’s permanent seat on the UNSC has guaranteed the failure of any efforts to push for comprehensive UN sanctions and continues to provide political cover for jurisdictions like Hong Kong and the UAE to resist pressure to cooperate with Western countries. This, combined with Hong Kong’s posture as a busy shipping port that is inherently difficult to monitor, has given the Hong Kong government plausible deniability when accused of supporting Russia’s war machine. There is no clear answer to how Western countries should deal with nonaligned countries in the Global South that wish to stay out of what they perceive as a great power competition, but one thing should be clear: Hong Kong falls outside the nonalignment camp, since it has taken the side of the emerging China-Russia axis.

A wider recognition of Hong Kong as a geostrategic asset of Chinese statecraft is in order. Hong Kong’s government is investing large sums in a charm offensive to rehabilitate its international image and attract international business. In a promotional video for the government’s $2 billion HKD “Hello Hong Kong” campaign, Lee claimed, “Hong Kong is now seamlessly connected to the mainland of China and the whole international world.” But the findings presented in this article show that a portrayal of Hong Kong as a neutral trading hub connecting East and West no longer holds up. Western leaders should be aware of the geopolitical costs of Hong Kong’s position as a major center of global trade and the advantages that subsequently accrue to Beijing.

Correction: This piece has been edited to reflect that Chief Executive John Lee said Hong Kong would disregard U.S. sanctions on Russia, not those on China.

Brian (Chun Hey) Kot is a research assistant in Carnegie’s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program.

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Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, many countries have announced a wide range of financial measures to impede Russia’s ability to fund the war. However, Russia has not been excluded from international oil markets, despite many Western countries banning oil imports from that country.

This situation is analogous to that of a country that is an oil exporter and defaults on its debt, losing access to international financial markets but keeping access to international oil markets. Hence, when analyzing default episodes, the decision of a sovereign on whether to repay or renege on its debt is related to oil prices, oil extraction and oil reserves.

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In this blog post, we discuss this relationship between sovereign risk (debt) and oil in the data, and its effect on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In a 2022 working paper, Franz Hamann, Juan Camilo Mendez-Vizcaino, Enrique Mendoza, and Paulina Restrepo-Echavarria built a model of external sovereign default and oil extraction (PDF) and also used real-world data to study this relationship. The working paper was motivated by the fact that if we look at the behavior of oil prices over time, and how they relate to the Emerging Markets Bond Index (a measure of sovereign risk) and the number of defaults in the world’s 30 largest net oil exporters that are emerging markets, we can see that there is a negative relationship, as shown in the figure below.

Negative Relationship between Oil Prices and Spreads and Default Episodes

SOURCES: J.P. Morgan, U.S. Energy Information Administration; Eduardo Borensztein and Ugo Panizza, 2009; Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, 2010; and authors’ calculations.

NOTE: The Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) spread is the difference between the yield on 90-day Treasury bills and the interest rate on bonds of the world’s 30 largest net oil exporters that are emerging markets.

Furthermore, in the paper the authors explored this relationship in a formal way by running an error correction model, which allowed them to study how sovereign risk is affected by changes in oil production, changes in nonoil gross domestic product (GDP), changes in oil reserves, changes in external public debt and changes in oil discoveries, as well as by all these same variables in the long run.

Key Factors That Affect Sovereign Risk

The authors found that higher oil production decreases sovereign risk, higher nonoil GDP decreases sovereign risk, higher external public debt increases sovereign risk, and higher oil reserves increase sovereign risk. Note that the first three results are very intuitive. If a country can produce more oil and sell it in international markets, or if GDP is higher, it is easier for the nation to repay its sovereign debt; and if the country has more public debt, then there is more to repay and that makes it more difficult. However, the fourth result is surprising.

A country that has more oil reserves is riskier. How is this possible if more oil production improves its ability to repay debt? In the working paper, the authors argued that a country with more oil underground has not only financial assets but also oil, which is a real asset to finance spending. Hence, unlike a country that only has access to financial assets, an oil-exporting nation can still use oil to finance spending if it were excluded from international financial markets, making it less worried about the cost of default.

This is exactly what is going on in Russia right now. The country has received numerous financial sanctions from countries all over the world, but the Russians are undeterred given that they have not been excluded from international oil markets. With large oil reserves and access to international oil and natural gas markets, Russia can still use revenues from oil sales to finance war and other spending; hence, the country behaves riskier.

The downside of that is oil remains a risky asset because prices fluctuate frequently. However, oil prices are high right now, and if they do not drop sharply, Russia will still have high returns on its real assets, making the nation indifferent about being excluded from international financial markets.

Paulina Restrepo-Echavarria is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Her research focuses on international macroeconomics and on search and matching models of the labor and marriage market. She joined the St. Louis Fed in 2014. Read more about the author and her research.

Praew Grittayaphong is a research associate at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

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The United States also announced raising import duties on 569 8-digit HS categories of goods from Russia to 35% ad valorem. See Presidential Proclamation 10420 of June 27, 2022, 87 Fed. Reg. 38,875- 38,881 (June 30, 2022). The change in duties will apply to imports and goods removed from warehouse on or after July 30, 2022. The most recent Presidential Proclamation followed actions on March 8, 11, and April 8, 2022 in which the U.S. had banned various imports from Russia and suspended nondiscriminatory tariff treatment for products from Russia and Belarus (changing the tariff rate from the MFN rate in column 1 to the column 2 rate).

In reviewing U.S. imports from Russia covered by Presidential Proclamation 10420, data available from the U.S. International Trade Commission dataweb for 2021 and January-April 2022 showed imports in 491 of the 569 8-digit HS categories from Russia, worth $2.2 billion in 2021 and $582 million in the first four months of 2022 (up from $362 million in the first four months of 2021). Total imports of all categories from Russia were $30.1 billion in 2021 and $10.5 billion in the first four months of 2022. The vast majority of imports from Russia have been petroleum products which are now banned.

Of the 491 categories for which import data (imports for consumption) were identified, one (HS 7207.12.00, Iron or nonalloy steel semifinished products, w/less than 0.25% carbon, w/rect. cross sect. (exclud. sq.), nesoi) accounted for $886.7 million of imports from Russia or 40.32% of the total for the 491 in 2021 but just 14.93% for 2022 (Jan.-April).

The top 5 categories of the 491 accounted for 62.47% of the total for 2021 and 33.97% in 2022. The other top four categories were 9306.30.41, Cartridges nesoi and empty cartridge shells ($163.5 million bodog casino in 2021); 7106.91.10, Silver bullion and dore ($143.9 million in2021); 7115.90.05, Precious metal articles, incl. metal clad w/precious metal, rectangle/near rectangle shape,99.5%/ or pure, marked only by wgt/identity ($93.4 million in 2021); 7801.10.00 Refined lead, unwrought ($86.3 million in 2021).

The top 20 categories of the 491 accounted for 87.03% of the total in 2021 and 75.84% in the first four months of 2022. The twenty 8-digit HS categories are: 4002.19.00, 4002.20.00, 4002.31.00, 4002.39.00 (rubber products); 4011.10.10 (passenger car tires); 4407.12.00 (certain sawed wood, pine and spruce); 7106.91.10 (silver bullion) 7115.90.05 (certain precious metal articles); 7202.11.50, 7202.30.00, 7202.41.00 (ferromanganese, ferrosilicon manganese, ferrochromium); 7207.12.00 (certain semifinished steel); 7224.90.00 (certain semifinished alloy (other than stainless) steel); 7304.29.20, 7306.29.20 (certain seamed and seamless steel pipe); 7408.11.60 (certain refined copper wire), 7605.11.00, 7606.12.30 (certain aluminum wire and plate/sheet products); 7801.10.00 (refined lead, unwrought), 9306.30.41 (ammunition Cartridges nesoi and empty cartridge shells).

Below are the changes in import duty rates applied to these goods from the Russian Federation. Column 1 was suspended pursuant to the Suspending Normal Trade Relations with Russia and Belarus Act (19 U.S.C. 2434 note) which brought the Column 2 rates into effect. The 35% rate will apply 30 days after the posting of the President Proclamation in the Federal Register (i.e., on July 30, 2022). The column 2 rate for HS 4407.12.00 is $1.70/m3. Imports from Russia in 2021 had an average value of imports/m3 resulting in a 0.39% ad valorem equivalent which declined to 0.31% in the first four months of 2022.

As the unprovoked war by Russia in Ukraine continues (with support from Belarus), the most important sanctions are those limiting access to western technology, the financial sanctions and seizure of assets and the efforts to drastically reduce the dependence of the allies on Russian oil, gas and coal. But the broad based efforts to deny most favored nation treatment to the countries causing the European and global national security crisis — including limiting imports of various other goods and raising duties on any imported merchandise from Russia and Belarus — are also important.

While the WTO is focused on multilateralism, it is hard to see how Russia, Belarus and those supporting them won’t be treated as largely outside of the global system for the foreseeable future. Global integration is not compatible with the need for a respect for the global order. Putin’s desire to use force to claim neighboring land creates unacceptable risks to many trading partners who cannot permit an overreliance on goods and services from the Russian Federation. While there are costs from having different trading blocks, there are greater costs of having major outliers participate in a unified system with the downsides of overreliance of undependable sources or those willing to use access to resources for coercion and intimidation.

While Russia and Belarus have clearly broken the trust of many through the ongoing war, China has also been engaged in serious efforts at coercion and intimidation, causing many to reevaluate how to make bilateral and multilateral relations with China support the global order and be mutually beneficial. The comments from the G-7 in their recent communique are an example of the unease China’s actions are causing other nations.

While there was a successful WTO Ministerial Conference concluded in Geneva last month, the major threats to the global system remain and are intensifying. While trade is but one piece of the puzzle, it is hard to see an early resumption of normal trade relations with the Russian Federation and Belarus. Whether a new normal can be established with China is uncertain but likely the most important issue for this decade.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, Current Thoughts on Trade.

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In prior periods of agricultural shortages and inflationary prices for agricultural goods, there has been significant social unrest particularly in countries where food accounts for a large part of disposable income for people. See Financial Times, ʻPeople are hungryʼ: food crisis starts to bite across Africa, June 23, 2022, https://www.y.com/content/c3336e46-b852-4f10-9716-e0f9645767c4 (“During the 2007-2008 food crisis, which was caused by a spike in energy prices and droughts in crop-producing regions, about 40 countries faced social unrest: More than a third of those countries were on the African continent.”); see also Terence P. Stewart, The Food Crisis: A Survey of Sources and Proposals for Preventing a Global Catastrophe, 2008 (copied in March 30, 2022: Food security challenges posed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/03/30/foodsecurity-challenges-posed-by-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine/)(excerpt from the summary copied below).

A recent paper from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Programme identifies countries in danger of starvation or acute hunger in the June – September 2022 time period. FAO, WFP, Hunger Hotspots, FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity, June to September 2022 Outlook, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000139904/download/?_ga=2.27484728.588580763.1656342884-1119086152.1656342884. The Executive Summary (page 5 of the report) is copied below.

“The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) warn that acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate further in 20 countries or situations (including two regional clusters) – called hunger hotspots – during the outlook period from June to September 2022.

“Acute food insecurity globally continues to escalate. The recently published 2022 Global Report on Food Crises alerts that 193 million people were facing Crisis or worse (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC]/Cadre Harmonisé [CH] Phase 3 or above) across 53 countries or territories in 2021. This increase must be interpreted with care, given that it can be attributed to both a worsening acute food insecurity situation and a substantial (22 percent) expansion in the population analysed between 2020 and 2021. In addition, an all-time high of up to 49 million people in 46 countries could now be at risk of falling into famine or famine-like conditions, unless they receive immediate life and livelihoods-saving assistance. This includes 750 000 people already in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5)

“Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen remain at the highest alert level as in the previous edition of this report. In the current report, Afghanistan and Somalia have been added to the list. These countries all have some populations identified or projected to experience starvation or death (Catastrophe, IPC Phase 5) or at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions, and require the most urgent attention.

“In Afghanistan, for the first time since the introduction of IPC in the country in 2011. Catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5) are present for 20 000 people in Ghor due to limited humanitarian access during the March to May period. In the outlook period, acute food insecurity is projected to increase by 60 percent year-on-year.

“After projecting 401 000 people facing Catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5) in Tigray, Ethiopia, in 2021, only 10 percent of required assistance arrived in the region until March 2022, and local agricultural production – which was 40 percent of the average – was critical for food security and livelihoods. A recent ʻhumanitarian truceʼ remains fragile but has allowed for some convoys to reach the region. The Famine Review Committeeʼs 2021 scenarios of a Risk of Famine for Tigray might remain relevant, unless humanitarian access stabilizes.

“Although no populations were projected to be in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in Nigeria in the outlook period, the record-high levels of acute food insecurity are of serious concern. Importantly, the population in Emergency (CH Phase 4) is expected to reach close to 1.2 million people during the peak of the lean season from June to August 2022, including in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe where some local government areas continue to be inaccessible or hard to reach.

ʻIn Somalia, a Risk of Famine has been identified through June 2022, under a scenario where rains are significantly below average, food prices increase further, conflict and displacement increase and humanitarian assistance remains insuxicient – 81 000 people will face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) between April and June.

“In South Sudan, a Famine Likely situation, which was present in some areas in 2021, was averted by improved coordination of humanitarian assistance, and hence the projected number of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) was reduced slightly, to 87 000 between April and July. That said, the situation remains of highest concern.

“In Yemen, the food security situation deteriorated significantly compared to last year, including a strong increase in the number of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), which are projected to reach 161 000 over the outlook period. There is also a Risk of Famine projected for some areas.

“The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, the Sahel region, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic remain countries of very high concern, as in the previous edition of this report. In this edition, Kenya is added to the list. This is due to the high number of people in critical food insecurity coupled with worsening drivers expected to further intensify life-threatening conditions. Sri Lanka, West African coastal countries (Benin, Cabo Verde and Guinea), Ukraine and Zimbabwe have been added in the list of hotspot countries compared to the January 2022 edition of this report. Angola, Lebanon, Madagascar and Mozambique remain hunger hotspots.

“Organized violence and conflict remain the primary drivers for acute hunger, with key trends indicating that conflict levels and violence against civilians continued to increase in 2022. Moreover, weather extremes such as tropical storms, flooding and drought remain critical drivers in some regions.

“Ripple effects of the war in Ukraine have been reverberating globally against the backdrop of a gradual and uneven economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, steadily increasing food and energy prices, and deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. Disruptions to the Ukrainian agricultural sector and constrained exports reduce global food supply, further increase global food prices, and finally push up already high levels of domestic food price inflation. Additionally, high fertilizer costs are likely to affect yields and therefore the future availability of food. Adding to the economic instability, civil unrest could emerge in some of the most affected countries in the upcoming months. Finally, humanitarian organizations are seeing sharp cost increases for their operations and reduced global attention risking to translate into increasing funding shortages. (emphasis added)

“Targeted humanitarian action is urgently needed to save lives and livelihoods in the 20 hunger hotspots. Moreover, in six of these hotspots – Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen – humanitarian actions are critical to preventing starvation and death. This report provides country-specific recommendations on priorities for emergency response as well as anticipatory action to address existing humanitarian needs and ensure short-term protective interventions before new needs materialize.”

The report at page 12 provides a chart showing the number of people in acute food insecurity in hotspot countries. The page is copied below.

The Financial Times article referenced earlier notes that there have already been signs of social unrest in a number of countries — Chad, Uganda, and Kenya. See Financial Times, ʻPeople are hungryʼ: food crisis starts to bite across Africa, June 23, 2022, https://www.y.com/content/c3336e46-b852-4f10-9716-e0f9645767c4. Similarly, the Economist has flagged social unrest from rising food and energy prices in two recent articles. See The Economist, Costly food and energy are fostering global unrest, June 23, 2022, https://www.economist.com/international/2022/06/23/costly-food-and-energy-are-fostering-global-unrest (“All around the world, inflation is crushing living standards, stoking fury and fostering turmoil. Vladimir Putinʼs invasion of Ukraine has sent prices of food and fuel soaring. Many governments would like to cushion the blow. But, having borrowed heavily during the pandemic and with interest rates rising, many are unable to do so. All this is aggravating pre-existing tensions in many countries and making unrest more likely, says Steve Killelea of the Institute for Economics and Peace (iep), an Australian think-tank.”); The Economist, A wave of unrest is coming. Hereʼs how to avert some of it, June 23, 2022, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/06/23/a-wave-of-unrest-is-coming-heres-how-to-avert-some-of-it (“Jesus said that man does not live by bread alone. Nonetheless, its scarcity makes people furious. The last time the world suffered a food-price shock like todayʼs, it helped set ox the Arab spring, a wave of uprisings that ousted four presidents and led to horrific civil wars in Syria and Libya. Unfortunately, Vladimir Putinʼs invasion of Ukraine has upended the markets for grain and energy once again. And so unrest is inevitable this year, too.”). The Economist, in the first referenced article, forecasts the likelihood of increase in serious outbreaks of unrest over the next twelve months. Much of Africa, various countries in Asia and the Middle East and parts of Central and South America show increases from 25% to 100% over the prior 12 months. The article also reviews challenges in Turkey, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tunisia, Peru, Uganda, Turkmenistan and South Africa.

Major countries and multilateral organizations have been taking actions to try to address some of the challenges presented from the price inflation on food, fertilizer and energy. Some countries that are able are providing assistance to their people with tax reductions or monetary grants. See, e.g., Reuters, Malaysia plans record $18 billion subsidy spend in inflation fight, June 25, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/malaysia-plans-record-18-bln-subsidy-spend-inflation-fight-2022-06-25/ (“Malaysia is projected to spend 51 billion ringgit on consumer subsidies including for fuel, electricity, and food, assuming that commodity market prices remain at current levels, Finance Minister Tengku Zafrul Aziz said in a statement. The government will also distribute 11.7 billion ringgit in cash aid, and 14.6 billion bodog casino ringgit in other subsidies, he said.”). Other countries provide economic assistance to those in need in other countries. See, e.g., European Commission, Food security: EU to step up its support to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in response to Russiaʼs invasion of Ukraine, June 23, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_3889

Prices for wheat and sunflower oil have spiked since the war as Ukraineʼs large volumes that are normally exported have been trapped in Ukraine by Russiaʼs blockade of Black Sea ports, destruction of grain and sunflower seed silos by Russian missiles, by the they of Ukrainian product by the Russians and limitations on Ukrainian farmers being able to work their land during the war. See, e.g., NPR, Russia has blocked 20 million tons of grain from being exported from Ukraine, June 3, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/06/03/1102990029/russia-has-blocked-20-million-tons-of-grain-from-beingexported-from-ukraine; Center for Strategic & International Studies, Spotlight on Damage to Ukraineʼs Agricultural Infrastructure since Russiaʼs Invasion, June 15, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/spotlight-damage-ukraines-agricultural-infrastructure-russias-invasion (“Russia is taking advantage of the transportation bottlenecks caused by port blockades to target Ukraineʼs food storage facilities. According to Ukraineʼs ministry of defense, Russian forces have attacked (https://observers.france24.com/en/europe/20220506-russian-attacks-on-farms-and-silos-deliberately-tryingto-destroy-the-ukrainian-economy) grain silos across the country and stolen an estimated 400,000-500,000 metric tons of grain (https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-health-middle-eastf980a51dab3412aba611277821e2822b) from occupied regions to increase Russian competitive advantage in the export market (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/05/ukraine-grain-they-russia-hungerwar/).”).

Efforts have been being made by the UN, by Turkey and others to get Russia to stop its blockade of Ukrainian ports to permit the export of grain and other agriculture products. See, e.g., Reuters, Russia, Turkey to pursue talks on Ukraine grain exports, June 23, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-turkey-agree-moreconsultations-grain-exports-ukraine 2022-06-22/ (https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-turkey-agree-moreconsultations-grain-exports-ukraine-2022-06-22/) (“Ukraine is one of the top global wheat suppliers, but shipments have been halted by Russiaʼs invasion, causing global food shortages. The United Nations has appealed to both sides, as well as maritime neighbour Turkey, to agree to a corridor.”)

At the same time, the European Union and United States have been working to help Ukraine export wheat and other agricultural products by alternative routes, though the volume that can be so moved is only a small percentage of what Ukraine normally exports. See, e.g., European Commission, Commission to establish Solidarity Lanes to help Ukraine export agricultural goods, 12 May 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3002; Politico, Biden races against time to unlock Ukraineʼs trapped grain, June 17, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/17/biden-ukrainetrapped-grain-00040640 

Multilateral organizations like the World Bank, IMF and World Trade Organization have been offering assistance within their zones of competence. For example, the World Bank has a variety of programs that have been started or utilized to help with the growing food insecurity. See World Bank, Food Security Update | Rising Food Insecurity in 2022, June 23, 2022, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/agriculture/brief/foodsecurity-update#  (lists 14 projects including “The $2.3 billion Food Systems Resilience Program for Eastern and Southern Africa (https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/06/21/world-bank-approves-2-3-billion-programto-address-escalating-food-insecurity-in-eastern-and-southern-africa), approved on June 21, 2022, helps countries in Eastern and Southern Africa increase the resilience of the regionʼs food systems and ability to tackle growing food insecurity.”). The World Bankʼs update on food insecurity is embedded below.

The WTO during the 12th Ministerial Conference which concluded on June 17, 2022 did address food security concerns both by agreeing not to block exports to the World Food Programme and by agreeing to transparency on actions taken and exorts to minimize use of export restraints on agricultural products. See June 17, 2022: WTOʼs 12th Ministerial Conference — some successes after a difficult five plus days,https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/06/17/wtos-12th-ministerial-conference-some-successes-ayer-adixicult-five-plus-days/.

In addition, the U.S., European Union and other allies coordinating actions to help Ukraine and hold Russia accountable, have been working to address access to food products, energy products and to increase availability of fertilizers. These actions have been announced by major players unilaterally as well as through various groupings, including the current G-7 meeting in Germany, U.S.-chaired Global Food Security Ministerial Meeting, and the recently concluded Summit of the Americas Agriculture Producers Declaration. See, e.g., The White House, Summit of the Americas Agriculture Producers Declaration, June 13, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/13/summit-of-americasagriculture-producers-declaration/; U.S. Department of State, Chairʼs Statement for Global Food Security — call to Action, June 24, 2022, https://www.state.gov/chairsstatement-roadmap-for-global-food-security-call-to-action-2/; European Commission, Commission acts for global food security and for supporting EU farmers and consumers, 23 March 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1963; U.S. Department of State, Secretary Antony J. Blinken During the Uniting for Global Food Security Conference, June 24, 2022, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-during-the-uniting-for-global-food-security-conference/. These four documents are embedded below.

A few thoughts

The major efforts underway by various countries to reduce the global effect of the Russian war on food security are extensive and will have positive effects, some immediately, others over time (e.g., increasing production of fertilizers or improving efficiencies of fertilizers). However, for the poorest countries and those reliant on food imports from Ukraine and Russia, the internal pressures will continue to mount as limited financial resources and high food and energy prices push more and more people into food insecurity situations of increased severity. Social unrest in a number of countries is likely.

While Russia has exacerbated the food insecurity by its actions on Ukraineʼs agricultural products and by other actions restricting its own exports (when sanctions do not cover agricultural goods or fertilizers) and has the ability to end the challenges it has created, it seems highly unlikely that any serious progress will be made in getting Ukrainian agricultural goods out through Black Sea ports while hostilities continue. EU and U.S. efforts are helping some but are not perceived to be a viable short-term solution to moving Ukrainian goods to export markets at affordable prices.

Some short-term steps the private sector can take to help alleviate the damage to at-risk countries is to increase funding to the World Food Programme (its June report cited earlier is this post reflect that with higher prices and challenges in getting funding, the WFP is being forced to reduce assistance in various countries). While most funding for WFP comes from governments, the private sector can contribute and should actively participate. Obviously, there is need for more funding by governments as well, but the multiple crises at least make it questionable how much more governments will do in fact in 2022.

Moreover, with the large number of low and middle-income countries facing potential debt crises, there is a need for at least selective debt relief where the challenges faced flow simply from the rapid increase in inflation.

None of the proposals for action by those looking to lessen the pressures on global markets has involved increasing the percent of the worldʼs grain that goes to human consumption during the current crisis. See The Economist, Most of the worldʼs grain is not eaten by humans, June 23, 2022, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/06/23/most-of-the-worlds-grain-is-not-eaten-by-humans. Presumably the challenges flow from the large percentage of grains that are fed to animals and the reduction in the worldʼs pasturelands which make alternative feeding of livestock less likely to increase in the short term. A small percentage (10%) of grains goes to biofuels and would be unlikely to be shifted in the short term as the use of grains in biofuels reduces the volume of petroleum products otherwise needed.

In challenging times, it is important for key countries to step forward and show leadership. There has been extensive leadership shown by the U.S., the EU and many of the other countries involved in supporting Ukraine and holding Russia to account for its unprovoked war with Ukraine. Continued coordination and adoption of bold actions by those currently engaged and an expanded group of willing participants will be needed to reduced the damage to low- and middle-income countries and limit the amount of social unrest that will yet unfold in 2022 and 2023.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, Current Thoughts on Trade.

To read the full commentary from Current Thoughts on Trade, please click here.

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“Sanctions

“4. The European Council is committed to intensify pressure on Russia and Belarus to thwart Russia’s war against Ukraine. The European Council calls on all countries to align with EU sanctions. Any attempts to circumvent sanctions or to aid Russia by other means must be stopped.

“5. The European Council agrees that the sixth package of sanctions against Russia will cover crude oil, as well as petroleum products, delivered from Russia into Member States, with a temporary exception for crude oil delivered by pipeline.

“6. The European Council therefore urges the Council to finalise and adopt it without delay, ensuring a well-functioning EU Single Market, fair competition, solidarity among Member States and a level playing field also with regard to the phasing out of our dependency on Russian fossil fuels. In case of sudden interruptions of supply, emergency measures will be introduced to ensure security of supply. In this respect, the Commission will monitor and report regularly to the Council on the implementation of these measures to ensure a level playing field in the EU Single Market and security of supply.

“7. The European Council will revert to the issue of the temporary exception for crude oil delivered by pipeline as soon as possible.”

 “II. FOOD SECURITY

“19. The European Council strongly condemns the destruction and illegal appropriation by Russia of agricultural production in Ukraine. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is having a direct impact on global food security and affordability. The European Council calls on Russia to end its attacks on transport infrastructure in Ukraine, to lift the blockade of Ukrainian Black Sea ports and to allow food exports, in particular from Odesa. The European Union is taking active measures to facilitate Ukraine’s agricultural exports and to support Ukraine’s agricultural sector in view of the 2022 season. In this regard, the European Council invites Member States to accelerate work on “Solidarity Lanes” put forward by the Commission, and to facilitate food exports from Ukraine via different land routes and EU ports.

“20. The European Council calls for effective international coordination to ensure a comprehensive global food security response. In this respect, it welcomes the Food and Agriculture Resilience Mission (FARM) – based on the three pillars: trade, solidarity and production – which aims to mitigate consequences for price levels, production and access to and supply of grain. It also supports the UN Global Crisis Response Group, the upcoming G7 initiative establishing a Global Alliance for Food Security (GAFS) and other EU and multilateral actions and initiatives. It reiterates its commitment to keep global trade in food commodities free of unjustified trade barriers, enhance solidarity towards the most vulnerable countries and increase local sustainable food production so as to reduce structural dependencies. The European Council invites the Commission to explore the possibility of mobilising reserves from the European Development Fund to support the most affected partner countries. The European Union welcomes the commitment and support of its partners and of international organisations.

“21. The European Council underlines the importance of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) in the EU’s contribution to food security and calls for the swift adoption of the CAP Strategic Plans.

“22. In view of the ongoing fertiliser shortages in the global market, the European Council calls for more concerted efforts to work with international partners to promote a more efficient use of and alternatives to fertilisers.”

It has been clear since the beginning of Russia’s war with Ukraine that the most challenging sanctions for the EU would be on banning Russian oil and gas. The EU has put in place sanctions on Russian coal and will be adding oil on a transitional basis by the end of the year for some 90% of oil imports from Russia with a carve out for oil delivered by pipeline — a carve out needed to address Hungary’s concerns and that of several other Central European countries.

Moreover, on May 31st, the EU and the U.K. agreed to ban insuring ships carrying Russian oil which will likely significantly affect Russia’s ability to export crude oil by ship. See Financial Times, UK and EU hit Russian oil cargoes with insurance ban, May 31, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/10372dd3-be3c-42b9-982b241a38efcc88.

The insurance ban is one of several other sanctions that the EU is including in its sixth package. See European Commission statement, Opening remarks by President von der Leyen at the joint press conference with President Michel following the special meeting of the European Council of 30 May 2022 Brussels, 31 May 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_3382 (“Indeed, we had a very good discussion tonight. And I am very glad that the Leaders were able to agree in principle on the sixth sanctions package. This is very important. Thanks to this, the Council should now be able to finalise a ban on almost 90% of all Russian oil imports by the end of the year. This is an important step forward. We will soon return to the issue of the remaining 10% of pipeline oil. I want to note that other elements in the package are also important. It is the de-SWIFTing of the Sberbank. The Sberbank is the biggest Russian bank, with 37% of the Russian banking sector. So this is good that we now de-SWIFT the Sberbank. There is a ban on insurance and reinsurance of Russian ships by EU companies; a ban on providing Russian companies with a whole range of business services. And, very important, there is the suspension of broadcasting in the European Union of three further Russian state outlets that were very typically spreading broadly the misinformation that we have witnessed over the last weeks and months.”).

The actions by the EU and the UK are resulting in higher oil prices at bodog online casino least for the present. Russia is also expanding the countries it is choosing not to supply gasl to. See Financial Times, Dutch and Danish set to be cut off by Russia over gas payment dispute, May 30, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/6715e4e9-d315-4594-8d57-80ce88613685; CNBC, Oil prices
jump after EU leaders agree to ban most Russian crude imports, May 30, 2022,
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/31/oil-prices-eu-russian-crude.html 

So there is little question but that the sanctions imposed by the U.S., EU, UK, Canada, Japan, Australia and others are being ratcheted up and will present increased challenges for Russia and continued pain at the pump for many global consumers and businesses.

By contrast, the efforts of the EU and others to address the growing food crisis caused by the disruption of Ukrainian agricultural exports, while continuing and being supported by multilateral organizations, seem unlikely to result in significant movement of Ukrainian wheat and other products in the coming months. The EU has been working hard to develop alternative export routes for Ukrainian goods as is reflected in the European Council’s conclusions from the May 30-31 meeting. See also Financial Times, EU steps up effort to bring millions of tonnes of grain out of Ukraine, May 30, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/0e0f6cd9-03f0- 4150-b330-62032f9a86ad.

However, a recent Politico article reviews the serious challenges to being able to make a significant dent in the exports of Ukrainian agricultural products with the Black Sea effectively closed. See Politico, Only black Sea ships will allow Ukraine to feed the world again, The EU plan to export grain by road and rail will barely move a fifth of regular food supplies, May 31, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/31/only-blacksea-ships-will-allow-ukraine-to-feed-the-world-again00035970#:~:text=The%20EU%20plan%20to%20export,fifth%20of%20regular%20food%20supplies.

Time will tell what options those opposing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or who are suffering from food shortages caused by the war are able to implement to address the food security challenges that will likely harm tens of millions of people around the world. See May 24, 2022: How severe is the food security challenge?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/05/24/how-severe-is-the-food-security-challenge/

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, Current Thoughts on Trade.

To read the full commentary from Current Thoughts on Trade, please click here.

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EC President von der Leyen’s statement at Davos is copied in part below (section dealing with food security) and includes both the EU view on the challenges being faced as well as steps the EU is taking to try to reduce the severity of the food insecurity crisis. See European Commission, Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum, Davos, 24 May 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_22_3282.

“We are witnessing how Russia is weaponising its energy supplies. And indeed, this is having global repercussions. Unfortunately, we are seeing the same pattern emerging in food security. Ukraine is one of the world’s most fertile countries. Even its flag symbolises the most common Ukrainian landscape: a yellow field of grain under a blue sky. Now, those fields of grain have been scorched. In Russian-occupied Ukraine, the Kremlin’s army is confiscating grain stocks and machinery. For some, this brought back memories from a dark past – the times of the Soviet crop seizures and the devastating famine of the 1930s. Today, Russia’s artillery is bombarding grain warehouses in Ukraine – deliberately. And Russian warships in the Black Sea are blockading Ukrainian ships full of wheat and sunflower seeds. The consequences of these shameful acts are there for everyone to see. Global wheat prices are skyrocketing. And it is the fragile countries and vulnerable populations that suffer most. Bread prices in Lebanon have increased by 70%, and food shipments from Odessa could not reach Somalia. And on top of this, Russia is now hoarding its own food exports as a form of blackmail – holding back supplies to increase global prices, or trading wheat in exchange for political support. This is: using hunger and grain to wield power. 

“And again, our answer is and must be to mobilise greater collaboration and support at the European and global level. First, Europe is working hard to get grain to global markets, out of Ukraine. You must know that there are currently 20 million tons of wheat stuck in Ukraine. The usual export was 5 million tons of wheat per month. Now, it is down to 200,000 to 1 million tons. By getting it out, we can provide Ukrainians with the needed revenues, and the World Food Programme with supplies it so badly needs. To do this, we are opening solidarity lanes, we are linking Ukraine’s borders to our ports, we are financing different modes of transportation so that Ukraine’s grain can reach the most vulnerable countries in the world. Second, we are stepping up our own production to ease pressure on global food markets. And we are working with the World Food Programme so that available stocks and additional products can reach vulnerable countries at affordable prices. Global cooperation is the antidote against Russia’s blackmail.

“Third, we are supporting Africa in becoming less dependent on food imports. Only 50 years ago, Africa produced all the food it needed. For centuries, countries like Egypt were the granaries of the world. Then climate change made water scarce, and the desert swallowed hundreds of kilometres of fertile land, year after year. Today, Africa is heavily dependent on food imports, and this makes it vulnerable. Therefore, an initiative to boost Africa’s own production capacity will be critical to strengthen the continent’s resilience. The challenge is to adapt farming to a warmer and drier age. Innovative technologies will be crucial to leapfrog. Companies around the world are already testing high-tech solutions for climate-smart agriculture. For example, precision irrigation operating on power from renewable; or vertical farming; or nanotechnologies, which can cut the use of fossil fuels when producing fertilisers.

“Ladies and Gentlemen,

“The signs of a growing food crisis are obvious. We have to act urgently. But there are also solutions, today and on the horizon.

“This is why – again, an example of cooperation – I am working with President El-Sisi to address the repercussions of the war with an event on food security and the solutions coming from Europe and the region. It is time to end the unhealthy dependencies. It is time to create new connections. It is time to replace the old chains with new bonds. Let us overcome these huge challenges in cooperation, and that is in the Davos spirit.”

The New York Times article provides excerpts from Mr. Beasley’s comments. “’It’s a perfect storm within a perfect storm,’ said David Beasley, the executive director of the World Food Program, a United Nations agency. ‘If we don’t get the port of Odesa open, it will compound our problems.’ Calling the situation ‘absolutely critical,’ he warned, ‘We will have famines around the world.’”

The UN World Food Programme has a press release on its webcite that addresses the food security crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. See UN World Food Programme, Failing to open Ukrainian ports means declaring war on global food security, WFP Chief warns UN Security Council, 19 May 2022, https://www.wfp.org/news/failing-open-ukrainian-ports-means-declaring-war-global-food-security-wfpchief-warns-un. The release is copied below.

“NEW YORK – The UN World Food Programme (WFP) Executive Director, David Beasley, addressed the United Nations Security Council today on the impact of the war in Ukraine on global food security. Here are selected highlights from his remarks:

“’We truly are in an unprecedented crisis. Food pricing is our number one problem right now, as a result of all this perfect storm for 2022. But by 2023 it very well will be a food availability problem. When a country like Ukraine that grows enough food for 400 million people is out of the market, it creates market volatility, which we are now seeing

“’In 2007 and 2008, we all witnessed what happened when pricing gets out of control. There were over 40 nations with political unrest, riots and protests. We’re already seeing riots and protesting taking place as we speak. Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Pakistan, Peru… We’ve seen destabilizing dynamics already in the Sahel from Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad… these are only signs of things to come. And we have enough historical experience to understand the consequences when we failed to act. When a nation that is the breadbasket of the world becomes a nation with the longest bread lines of the world, we know we have a problem.

“’As the Secretary General clearly spoke, we’re now reaching about 4 million people inside Ukraine. In fact, we’re scaling up to 900,000 on cash-based transfers as we speak. That will put liquidity back into the marketplace, but that does not solve the problem outside of Ukraine. That’s why we’ve got to get these ports running. We’ve got to empty the silos so that we can help stabilize the food crisis that we’re facing around the world.

“’Truly, failure to open those ports in Odesa region will be a declaration of war on global food security. And it will result in famine and destabilization and mass migration around the world.

“’Leaders of the world, it’s time that we do every possible thing that we can to bring the markets to stability because things will get worse, but I do have hope. We averted famine. We averted destabilization over the past many years because many of you in this room stepped up and we delivered. And we can do that again. But we’ve got things that have to happen. Getting the ports open, stabilizing the markets, increasing production around the world. We’ll get through this storm, but we must act and we must act with urgency.’”

See also, reliefweb, War in Ukraine: WFP renews call to open Black Sea ports amid fears for global hunger, originally posted on May 20, 2022, updated May 22, 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/war-ukraine-wfp-renews-call-open-black-sea ports-amid-fears-global-hunger#:~:text=The%20World%20Food%20Programme%20(WFP,of%20lives%20%E2%80%93%20around%2 0the%20world (“In impassioned pleas to the specially convened ‘call to action’ group on 18 May, attended by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and the UN Secretary-General António Guterres, Beasley added: ‘The silos are full. Why are the silos full? Because the ports are not operating … It is absolutely essential that we allow these ports to open because this is not just about Ukraine, this is about the poorest of the poor around the world who are on the brink of starvation as we speak’”.). 

As reviewed in earlier posts, there are production issues on grains in a number of other countries flowing from heat or draught or low inventories. Challenges in other countries are complicating the ability to substitute products from other countries for the large volumes not being shipped from Ukraine. See May 16, 2022: Wheat prices spike following Indian export ban, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/05/16/wheatprices-spike-following-indian-export-ban/; May 15, 2022: India bans exports of wheat, complicating efforts to address global food security problems posed by Russia’s war in Ukraine, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/05/15/india-bans-exports-of-wheat-complicating-efforts-toaddress-global-food-security-problems-posed-by-russias-war-in-ukraine/; April 19, 2022: Recent estimates of global effects from Russian invasion of Ukraine, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/04/19/recentestimates-of-global-effects-from-russian-invasion-of-ukraine/; April 19, 2022: Recent estimates of global effects from Russian invasion of Ukraine,
https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/04/19/recent-estimates-of-global-effects-from-russian-invasionof-ukraine/.

While many countries are expressing the desire to help out in the crisis and while the WTO and other multilateral organizations are taking or talking about some actions that are available to them, the crisis is likely to significantly worsen in the coming months as there is little likelihood that Russia will permit the reopening of the Black Sea ports to Ukrainian wheat and other products. The crisis will likely exceed the level of the challenges from the 2007-2008 period and will reduce global GDP growth, including forcing some areas into recession, will increase starvation and malnourishment and result in increased political instability in a number of countries around the world. Expect larger parts of the global community to view Russia as a pariah state. While trade is an important part of the answer, the war started by Russia is not controllable by global trade rules in fact. We are in for a challenging period with much of the harm born by those least able to handle the harm being inflicted.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, Current Thoughts on Trade.

To read the full commentary from Current Thoughts on Trade, please click here.

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At the same time, Vladimir Putin was delivering a speech on the importance of private enterprise and foreign direct investment (FDI). Later, Putin said that privatization must be “fair and honest,” going out of his way to praise the private sector and promising to reduce state intervention.

Needless to say, most foreign investors prefer countries where their employees are safe. These events underscore a Russian economic backslide – one which began long before Putin’s invasion of Ukraine – and signal worse to come.

Putin knows (as does his central bank chief) that economic growth is tightly linked to productivity growth. Productivity growth comes mostly from the private sector. For countries like Russia, far from the technology frontier, access to goods, services, people and ideas from other countries is an important lifeline. FDI is a key part of that lifeline. Today, Russia risks losing much of the foreign investment the country has attracted over the years.

Nearly 1,000 companies have already curtailed operations in Russia. Economic and financial sanctions make it costly to do business there for risk of getting caught up in legal problems. There is also the reputational risk. A spokesman for Goldman Sachs said the investment banking company is winding down business operations “in compliance with regulatory and licensing requirements.” French luxury giant Chanel has shut its Russian stores, citing the need to comply with EU sanctions banning the sale of luxury goods in Russia priced over €300, or $312. A classic Chanel medium flap bag is over $8,000. Some rich Russian women are tearing up their Chanel. Meanwhile, mothers in Ukraine are being forced to uproot their families and flee the country they love.

As for the Russian economy, even before the war, it wasn’t thriving. “Russia doesn’t make anything,” President Obama stated back in 2014. “Immigrants aren’t rushing to Moscow in search of opportunity. The life expectancy of the Russian male is around 60 years old. The population is shrinking.” A 2019 RAND report explains Russia’s shocking deterioration in detail.

As relations with the West freeze over, a complete trade embargo appears increasingly likely. Recent estimates show no readily available domestic substitution for high-tech intermediate inputs that Russian manufacturers need. For instance, imported semiconductor chips are necessary for industrial equipment, motor controls, switches, bodog sportsbook review cars and hundreds of other consumer goods. But it is the curtailing of FDI by companies headquartered in allied countries that will hurt the most. Russia attracted an annual average of $24.1 billion in FDI from 2015 to 2019. That was down from the pre-Crimea annexation annual average of $36.3 billion from 2010 to 2014.

Coauthors and I estimate that an allied trade embargo against Russia would decrease its real GDP by an estimated 15 percent to 20 percent, and a big chunk of that impact (85 percent to be precise) is driven by FDI suspension or withdrawal. It turns out that curtailing allied FDI is a powerful sanction tool, inflicting colossal damage to the Russian economy at little net economic cost to allied and non-allied economies. Allied governments looking for more efficient sanctions should take note.

Speaking about the Russian economy in the face of sanctions, Russian Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina noted how output would decline and inflation would exceed expectations. Grasping for a silver lining, she reportedly said the situation would “create opportunities for Russian businesses that previously couldn’t compete with imports.” And speaking at the State Duma recently, she reportedly called for new business models and said the Russian economy will enter a period of structural transformation.

In a recent op-ed in Kommersant, a Russian political and business newspaper, a prominent Russian CEO calls for embracing import substitution. There’s just one problem: To make things domestically, you still need access to the global marketplace. The author asks what kind of autarky Russia needs. Economic logic would lead one to answer “none.”

There is an undertone of panic in these comments. Understandably. While the word “globalization” doesn’t hold the same positive sway it did in the West a decade ago, no one faces involuntary self-sufficiency to the extent Russia may confront.

We have never seen a country go backwards as fast as it looks like Russia will.

To read the full article by The Hill, please click here. 

Christine McDaniel | The Hill

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Twelve miles outside of Paris lies the suburb of Saclay. Its hilly terrain was created when, in 1670, the French monarch’s engineers used the village as a base of a hydraulics network to connect Louis XIV’s Versailles with running water. That marvel of technological innovation—on par with the majesty of the Sun King’s palace itself—remains part of Saclay’s identity: the fusion of technology with power. Today, the village has become the heart of the Plateau de Saclay, or the Silicon Valley of France, best known for its research into nuclear physics and, increasingly, for its quantum research.

It is there that US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and US Trade Representative Katherine Tai will join with European Commission Executive Vice Presidents Margrethe Vestager and Vladis Dombrovskis for the first European meeting of the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), a follow-up to its September 2021 launch in Pittsburgh. Jolted by Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine, the Americans and Europeans seem to be setting a joint leadership agenda in democratic technology that deepens their strategic interdependence and hardens democratic autonomy. They have already begun to rewrite the global digital rulebook together in ways that favor human rights, rule of law, and open competition.

First, slowly—then all at once—an effort is emerging from Washington and Brussels to put in place the building blocks for a Euro-Atlantic digital order. On March 25, US President Joe Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced in Brussels a breakthrough in a decade-long conflict over US surveillance and the US-EU data bridge that powers the transatlantic digital relationship. Then, on April 28, the two led in the launch of the Declaration for the Future of the Internet—the outgrowth of the Biden administration’s Summit for Democracy—a covenant of sorts signed by more than 60 countries. Its major aim is that the Internet remains rooted in human rights, dignity, pluralism, open access, and economic empowerment for all people. In short, it aspires to take the values of the UN’s Universal Declaration on Human Rights into the digital domain. In a particularly sharp message to Russia and China, Ukraine and Taiwan were both prominently represented at the signing. The TTC meeting in Saclay is set to open a broader glimpse of what that order could look like.

Imposing Costs on Russian Tech

At its 2021 launch, some worried the TTC would devolve into a sort of meandering dialogue in which both sides aired grievances and reached no concrete outcomes—a fate that befell some preceding attempts at a US-EU systemic partnership. Those fears have been largely dispatched. Russia’s war has led to greater convergence between the US and EU on tech governance and a greater understanding of the knock-on effects of sanctions on partners when states seek to automate authoritarianism and continue to wage low-intensity global conflict.

The TTC created the structures that allowed the US and EU to react quickly to restrict dual-use technology exports and intellectual property to Russia. What could have taken six weeks took around 10 days in the end. The US application of the so-called Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR) to all of Russia has crippled Russian access to global semiconductor technology, crucial for industries from data centers to aviation to defense. Previously, the FDPR had only been applied to specific companies like Huawei. American and European cooperation on creating carve-outs that would protect European member states from knock-on effects of these sanctions, make its implementation possible. Long term, that muscle memory could come in handy as the two sides look to coordinate more closely on technology access and control vis-à-vis China, the more strategically tricky challenge that the TTC was in fact initially—if implicitly—designed to address.

At the same time, there are indications that the Russian aggression might have longer-term consequences on the transatlantic partnership. There are furtive signs that the two sides might codify the obvious: that trade between the two largest democratic blocs does not threaten American or European security. This is particularly meaningful in the wake of Trump-era use of tariff weapons—so-called 232 tariffs—on steel and aluminum against China but also treaty allies like European states, Canada, and Japan. It could also mean swearing off export restrictions that could kneecap the other side of the Atlantic on energy, critical materials, foundational technologies like chips, and even vaccines. Perhaps the two sides could formalize this commitment with a formal and mutual defense production exemption for treaty allies.

Democratic Autonomy in Technology Supply Chains

The notion that the US and Europe should build democratic supply chains—with stronger backstops based on partners who have a grounding in democracy and rule of law—makes them more secure than the world’s most important autocratic great powers like Russia and China. The regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin has already demonstrated that a certain idea of national identity, prestige, and global standing is more important than economic prosperity for its people, reliability for its partners, and interconnectedness to the world; so important indeed that they are willing to wage a brutal and unprovoked war. There is a strong question as to whether China’s Communist Party might feel the same.

This notion of reliability has been especially acute in semiconductor production and supply. The 40 percent increase in chip demand during the COVID-19 crisis layered on top of geo-political tensions over Taiwan, raw materials shortages, production bottlenecks, and even bad weather to strain global chip supply. In the TTC, the two sides have worked assiduously to identify weaknesses and create ongoing monitoring mechanisms in the feed-ins for the highly complex semiconductor production process. Together they have run a joint supply chain vulnerability mapping, often prying sensitive information from companies on both sides of the Atlantic.

Now the $52 billion US CHIPS Act—together with the €42 billion EU CHIPS Act set for passage in 2023—place industrial policy in cutting-edge technology at the heart of their strategic industrial bases. In order to create deeper technological strategic interdependence, the two sides are tentatively opening up about where and how they will invest so that state-centered industrial policy on both sides of the Atlantic is complimentary and mutually beneficial to their innovation industrial bases. In this regard, the TTC should continue to create greater space for transatlantic consortia to bind the Euro-Atlantic chip ecosystem closer together. In fact, Saclay—the location of the TTC meeting—is set to be a key research building block of an emergent transatlantic chip ecosystem, the capstone of which is a €17 billion Intel chip production facility in Magdeburg, Germany. This will likely create a larger research network with the National Semiconductor Technology Center (NSTC) in Albany, New York.

One of the major challenges to the democratic tech supply chain is where to source critical minerals like rare earths. Much of it still comes from states like Russia, China, and even states at risk from authoritarian aggression. The EU has attempted to use Ukraine as a hedge against its reliance on Chinese critical materials. The EU’s semiconductor industry is reliant on neon gas produced as a byproduct of the steel production process. Europe’s supply has come from the very Mariupol steel plants that were sheltering Ukrainian troops against the Russian onslaught.

Russia’s Disinfo Wars

Work in the Euro-Atlantic tech alliance should not be limited to hardware and exports, though. Against the backdrop of Russia’s war, the US and the EU have had no choice but to build a greater trust in each other on the global rule book. Old taboos are falling away. Areas once seen as off-limits—like data protection, technical standard setting, platform market power or rules to combat the Kremlin’s disinformation machine—are becoming central areas of discussion.

The two sides are converging on AI. This is not only on vague ethical principles but on questions of methodology for assessing AI risk and means to manage it. Both sides are engaged in an intensive process to create risk governance for AI. They are making no pretense that like-minded states have self-interests currently under threat in international standard-setting bodies like the International Standards Organization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). Here, Chinese representatives working on behalf of the CCP flood the zone with working group members to support Chinese developed model technical standards proposals meant to strengthen Chinese competitiveness in the global tech race and some suspect that this could code in cybersecurity vulnerabilities and surveillance loopholes through the adoption of the standards themselves.

In light of a Russia bent on democracy-weakening disinformation, the EU and US can work to tackle state-backed disinformation. The EU—along with the US—should establish rules that avoid situations that could be perceived as a form of online “selective justice” —situations where political pressure arising from events like January 6, 2021 or February 24, 2022 leads to platform action that only shows major social media players still have preponderant power to direct online discourse and an “opacity, capriciousness and inconstancy with which they wield that power.”

The EU’s agreement on landmark platform governance legislation, the Digital Services Act (DSA), inspired American policymakers, even former President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The DSA redefines how illegal content will be treated in the EU with accountability, transparency, and oversight. The DSA compels the major platforms to conduct risk assessment that will be subject to outside accountability from regulators but also academics and civil society. The Biden administration is looking at ways to provide access to data for researchers and academics following the model the EU is pursuing with the Digital Services Act. Such moves could also divulge more detailed information about the connective tissue between platforms based in authoritarian states like Yandex and ByteDance and regime information operations. Data transparency requirements could also help buckle companies like Twitter to the rule of law should a private acquisition subject their governance to the whims of billionaire owners like Elon Musk. Whistleblower Francis Haugen’s Facebook revelations drew cross-party ire and led to new Biden administration measures to restrict targeted advertising to minors, an element reflected in the DSA.

To do so, the White House could also look at its own model codes of conduct. The Paris-Saclay TTC should inform a voluntary American “Code of Conduct” that the Biden administration could issue as an executive order reflecting the same principles developed by the EU’s code of practice as part of the European Democracy Action Plan. This could ultimately plug into the structure of the DSA, which holds the big platforms accountable by law for their decisions.

The EU, itself, will have to be extremely careful in defining the high criteria which would need to be met to trigger crisis response mechanisms that would justify limiting war propaganda from hostile states with outlets like RT and Sputnik in the future. Such a categorization could be akin to the designation of a country as a “state sponsor of terrorism.” As it currently stands, the Europe-wide de-platforming of Putin’s digital megaphones is largely grounded in political consensus rather than a strong legal basis.

Going South Fast

In many ways, Ukraine has already won the first phase of the war against Russia. It blunted Putin’s efforts to conquer the country, bled Russia’s military, wiped out Russia’s Potemkin defense technology, and decisively won over the hearts and minds of the world’s consolidated democracies amid Russian disinformation. But, paradoxically, Russia’s Ukraine war is only an episode—albeit an important battle—in a larger conflict. One that is increasingly sweeping into the countries of the Global South where the technological connections, online narratives, and fundamental values of the governing elite are less clear.

The Global South has become a central theater in the ideological competition for tech governance. On the disinformation side, trends are worrying. Even as Ukraine pushes facts, images, and stories of daily atrocities inflicted on its people in Bucha, Mariupol, Irpin, and elsewhere, there is an ominous sense that the Euro-Atlantic is losing the information war outside of the OECD. China’s industrial influence operations are amplifying Russian disinformation narratives—particularly in the Global South—around NATO expansion as a form of neo-colonialism and the catalyst for war. China is pushing the notion that sanctions are leading to higher global food prices, even as it has been discreetly complying with the Euro-Atlantic’s sanctions.

Even the like-minded drafters of the Internet Declaration ultimately boiled down to the Five Eyes, the EU, and Japan. Among the 60 signatories, the Global South’s systemically important democratic tech powers—India, South Africa, Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, and others—were missing from the roster. Kenya later withdrew its signature. Even some of the US’s closest non-Western allies like Mexico and South Korea were notably absent.

The European Commission is already looking at the TTC model to structure cooperation with India. India has become a much more pivotal tech actor on the international stage—banning Chinese software and hardware on national security grounds, invoking data localization laws, imposing expansive illegal speech legislation, eying its own semiconductor industrial policy, and even throwing its weight when it comes to Internet governance and technical standards diplomacy in the UN and elsewhere. The EU-India technology bodog poker review relationship—like the US relationship with India in the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) —could be important in efforts to create connective tissue on tech governance with the democratic Global South.

At the same time, both the Biden administration’s ICT development initiatives and the EU’s Global Gateway are unleashing hundreds of billions in new development assistance to build connectivity infrastructure in middle- and low-income countries. These efforts are taking a harder geopolitical edge as Chinese state-owned and state-adjacent companies like Huawei, Hikvision, iFlyTec, SenseTime, and NucTech show interest in the connectivity infrastructure of the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Africa, and elsewhere. The TTC aims to establish trusted vendor principles on development financing of ICT infrastructure. Such principles, building along the lines of the Blue Dot Network and the EU’s Cyber Toolbox for 5G, would look to preserve the connectivity sovereignty and freedom to choose of third countries and their citizens while excluding products and software could serve as cyber-security wormholes for espionage, data capture, and blackouts.

What’s Next

As the TTC enters its next phase—a third meeting is tentatively scheduled for December in the United States—it can broaden its agenda from the acute challenge of Russia’s war to more directly confront the chronic challenges posed by China and climate change.

First, the US and EU must focus on deeper technological convergence, specifically on 5G, AI, and climate-neutral tech but also anticipating frontier areas industrial data governance, 6G, and Quantum Computing. On data governance, the timing is right to act before the issue becomes politically charged between the two great democratic tech blocs. Already, some in Europe are attempting to redefine industrial data as a “strategic asset”—borrowing on some of the data governance principles of the Chinese. Industrial data could become a new frontline in European debates around digital sovereignty. The two sides could begin to develop democratic data spaces for industrial data, perhaps expanding the Franco-German GAIA-X framework to include non-European powers—specifically, the US, but also Japan, South Korea, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

Second, the US and EU should use the TTC, G7, and other bodies to operationalize the notion of connectivity as a global human right. Together they could establish a Democratic Connectivity Agenda that funds encrypted digital communication tools like trustworthy virtual private networks (VPNs) that can avoid detection and provide links to the outside world for those being enclosed in increasingly autarkic Internet spaces. They should also direct development funding from Global Gateway, Build Back Better World, and similar initiatives to fund a range of satellite capabilities—including SpaceX’s Starlink but also the UK’s OneWeb, the EU’s nascent Secure Connectivity Initiative, and others—that can be rapidly deployed to bridge connectivity between citizens behind digital Iron curtains and the global Internet. This will become part of a global doctrine to allow open information to be provided in conflict zones and authoritarian-driven Internet shutdowns—following the Cold War logic that drove Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL).

Third, the TTC should broaden and codify its work on dual-use export controls by creating a Coordinating Committee for Democratic Autonomy, a 21st-century version of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom). The new body—with an EU-NATO fusion center for information sharing and consultation—could systematize restricted access to strategic technology by authoritarian states like Russia and China. This should include criteria and information-sharing dashboards on dual-use export and import controls of critical technology, investment screening, trustworthy vendors, and research protection. On the import side, particular attention should be paid to Chinese AI-powered surveillance equipment used in smart cities, digital services, and digital services and hardware. It could also work to level export, investment, and IP restrictions to cyber hired guns like Israel’s NSO—the maker of the notorious Pegasus spyware—and Germany’s now-defunct FinFisher, who peddle human-rights destroying surveillance technology to authoritarian regimes.

Fourth, the TTC—together with the G7—should push for the US, Germany, France, Canada, and others like-minded states to establish a Global Critical Minerals Reserve in lithium, nickel cobalt, manganese ore, and rare earth elements—key for digital and green technologies, especially in EV batteries. That effort would be similar to the IAE’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve, a facility that released 120 million barrels of oil in the first six months following the outset of Russia’s war in Europe. Such an action on critical minerals must be countercyclical—this moment of acute shortage is not the right moment to look at stockpiling. But the TTC could start to build mechanisms for such a joint facility.

Finally, clean tech must play a greater role in the TTC’s future. The twin crises of climate change and Russia’s war on Ukraine have made clear that an accelerated shift to renewable energy as a more critical Euro-Atlantic tech security priority.

Even as the Euro-Atlantic tech relationship flourishes against the dark backdrop of war, differences remain between the US and EU on democratic tech governance remain. The lack of US data protection remains a potential stumbling block in the new Transatlantic Data Protection Framework’s ability to withstand Schrems III. Washington’s agencies remain at odds on how to tackle the preponderant power of American tech giants. Some like the FTC, the Justice Department, and the USTR are sympathetic to the Brussels approach while the Commerce and State Departments align more closely with US Big Tech.

But Russia’s war on Ukraine has focused the Euro-Atlantic mind about how much the international system—including the global tech order—has allowed rot to creep in that are now threatening digital rights, cyber security, and technological resilience. Russia burst the illusion that the petty differences can define the Euro-Atlantic tech relationship. If it works, the TTC could serve as a hidden G2 for rules-based, democratic tech governance.

Tyson Barker is head of the Technology and Global Affairs Program at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).

To read the full commentary by Internationale Politik Quarterly, please click here.

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“12. Our unprecedented package of coordinated sanctions has already significantly hindered Russia’s war of aggression by limiting access to financial channels and ability to pursue their objectives. These restrictive measures are already having a significant impact on all Russian economic sectors – financial, trade, defence, technology, and energy – and will intensify pressure on Russia over time. We will continue to impose severe and immediate economic costs on President Putin’s regime for this unjustifiable war. We collectively commit to taking the following measures, consistent with our respective legal authorities and processes:

“a. First, we commit to phase out our dependency on Russian energy, including by phasing out or banning the import of Russian oil. We will ensure that we do so in a timely and orderly fashion, and in ways that provide time for the world to secure alternative supplies. As we do so, we will work together and with our partners to ensure stable and sustainable global energy supplies and affordable prices for consumers, including by accelerating reduction of our overall reliance on fossil fuels and our transition to clean energy in accordance with our climate objectives.

“b. Second, we will take measures to prohibit or otherwise prevent the provision of key services on which Russia depends. This will reinforce Russia’s isolation across all sectors of its economy.

“c. Third, we will continue to take action against Russian banks connected to the global economy and systemically critical to the Russian financial system. We have already severely impaired Russia’s ability to finance its war of aggression by targeting its Central Bank and its largest financial institutions.

“d. Fourth, we will continue our efforts to fight off the Russian regime’s attempts to spread its propaganda. Respectable private companies should not provide revenue to the Russian regime or to its affiliates feeding the Russian war machine.

“e. Fifth, we will continue and elevate our campaign against the financial elites and family members, who support President Putin in his war effort and squander the resources of the Russian people. Consistent with our national authorities, we will impose sanctions on additional individuals.”

The U.S. released a fact sheet on its new sanctions. See White House Briefing Room, FACT SHEET: United States and G7 Partners Impose Severe Costs for Putin’s War Against Ukraine, May 8, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/08/fact-sheet-united-states-andg7-partners-impose-severe-costs-for-putins-war-against-ukraine/. In the fact sheet, the U.S. outlines the sanctions it is imposing in this latest round.

Terence Stewart,  former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, Current Thoughts on Trade.

To read the full commentary from Current Thoughts on Trade, please click here.

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