Almost since its inception, the North American Free Trade Agreement has generated controversy far out of proportion to its economic consequences. From Ross Perot’s 1992 warning that NAFTA would create a “giant sucking sound” of jobs flowing to Mexico to Barack Obama’s (and Hillary Clinton’s) campaign trail threat to pull out of the agreement to Donald Trump’s 2016 description of it as a “disaster,” criticism of the trade deal has been a near‐​constant feature of American politics.

Veracity aside, such swipes are curious. The agreement signed among Mexico, Canada, and the United States — building on a pre‐​existing free trade deal between the latter two — was never going to significantly alter the United States’ economic trajectory. It just wasn’t possible. Eliminating US tariffs on imports from a single, relatively smaller country already facing very low tariffs — an average of two percent — isn’t the stuff that economic game‐​changers are made of.

Perhaps, then, NAFTA is best understood as a lightning rod for criticism of globalization more broadly. Ire directed at the agreement is as much aimed at trade conceptually as it is at NAFTA itself, if not more so.

It is in this spirit that one best understands Helen Andrews’ recent critique of NAFTA in The American Conservative to mark the agreement’s 30th birthday. While Andrews, a senior editor at The American Conservative, directs several barbs at the trade deal, her main beef is the era of globalization she holds NAFTA responsible for helping usher in.

In Andrews’ telling, NAFTA was merely the first of several important free trade dominos to fall, setting off a “chain of events that allowed globalization to run free the way it did.” NAFTA’s entrance into force on January 1, 1994, she notes, was accompanied around the same time by other important milestones of expanded economic integration including the agreement creating the World Trade Organization, the formation of the European Union, and the opening of the Chunnel connecting the United Kingdom and France.

Boom, globalization was off to the races.

But the idea that 1994 heralded a new economic era is a strained interpretation of events. Put more bluntly, it’s false. Globalization — the process of increasing international economic integration—has been underway for centuries, if not millennia. (The first evidence of long‐​distance trade dates back to 3000 BCE) Sometimes it has ebbed (the outbreak of the world wars) and other times it has flowed (the Age of Discovery and the Industrial Age) but the direction has long been toward more expanded linkages. Indeed, each of the items cited by Andrews weren’t revolutionary events but further evolutions of events long underway.

The European Union, for example, was the successor to the European Community, which in turn traces its origins to the European Coal and Steel Community. The World Trade Organization, meanwhile, was preceded by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which had successfully reduced tariffs around the world through a series of negotiating rounds spanning many decades. Before the Channel Tunnel’s opening, commerce between the UK and its European neighbors took place via shipping and airplanes (and still does). And prior to NAFTA, there was the US‐​Canada Free Trade Agreement signed in 1988. Globalization has long been apace.

Andrews also errs in other elements of her narrative about globalization’s forward march. While she holds neoconservatives responsible for Republicans’ 1990s‐​era departure from their traditional pro‐​tariff stance and Ronald Reagan’s “nuanced and pragmatic” trade policies, she ignores that NAFTA was in many ways the realization of a vision first outlined by Reagan.

In Reagan’s 1979 announcement of his candidacy for president, he called for a “North American accord” — incorporated into the 1980 GOP platform — to develop closer ties among the United States, Canada, and Mexico. While the exact contours of this proposal were not spelled out, Reagan mentioned in his speech his dream of a future in which “a map of the world might show the North American continent as one in which the people’s commerce of its three strong countries flow more freely across their present borders than they do today.”

There’s also the small matter that the US‐​Canada free trade agreement that served as NAFTA’s foundation was signed by Reagan in 1988. Hardly a neoconservative, Reagan was arguably NAFTA’s intellectual godfather.

This miscasting of history, however, is a relatively minor detail. More notable is the thin nature of Andrews’ NAFTA criticism, which consists as much of promises unfulfilled as actual harms inflicted. She claims, for example, that Mexicans imported their goods from Asia instead of the US (in fact, US exports to Mexico more than doubled from 1994–2000), and points out that a bilateral trade balance that had been in US surplus swung to a deficit (an irrelevant measure of economic success). NAFTA’s immediate wake also saw an “explosion” of illegal immigration, “much” of which Andrews says — baselessly — the trade deal was “directly responsible for.”

On Mexico’s side of the ledger, meanwhile, she dings the agreement for rising obesity levels in the country, two million campesinos (rural farmers) losing their employment as US corn flooded in and then looking for work across the border, and a rising tide of progressive social policy including abortion, marriage equality, and permitting same‐​sex couples to adopt (which this author happens to support).

The idea that seismic economic or societal shifts would result from a free trade agreement, however, should be met with considerable skepticism.

Regarding the surge in illegal immigration, for example, it’s worth considering other contemporaneous events. In addition to NAFTA, 1994 also saw the so‐​called “Tequila Crisis” that plunged Mexico into recession (NAFTA helped facilitate the subsequent recovery). On the US side, the go‐​go economy of the late 1990s saw unemployment drop below 5 percent from May 1997 through August 2001. That immigration increased under such circumstances should surprise no one.

More relevant when evaluating a free trade agreement are economic outcomes — and from that perspective, NAFTA looks pretty good. From the date of the agreement to the present day, per‐​capita GDP has nearly doubled in Mexico and almost tripled in the United States, and US manufacturing output, median wages, and median household income have all experienced healthy gains. To be clear, it’s a mistake to single‐​handedly credit NAFTA with such outcomes — correlation isn’t causation. But the same principle applies to NAFTA’s critics, who often blame the agreement for any and all economic problems since 1994.

Interestingly, even Andrews concedes that the number of jobs lost to Mexico was “relatively small.” But, keeping with her overarching narrative, she nonetheless holds NAFTA culpable for its alleged unleashing of forces that allowed globalization to run riot, contributing to various economic ills, including the loss of 5 million manufacturing jobs from 1995–2015.

But NAFTA’s claimed role is ahistorical, and blame placed on globalization for manufacturing job losses is mistaken. The decline in US manufacturing jobs — something that has been taking place since 1979 — is more a story of technology (robots, computers, and the like) and changing US consumer tastes than it is about trade. We know this because while the number of manufacturing jobs has declined, output has risen. Manufacturing jobs have declined abroad too, even in China. More recent US manufacturing job gains, meanwhile, have been accompanied by stagnant industrial productivity. Most lost manufacturing jobs were claimed by automation and economic development, not Mexico and China.

So what is NAFTA’s real record? Literature on the subject paints a consistent picture: the agreement significantly expanded trilateral trade but had only a modest — and beneficial — economic impact. A 2012 OECD literature review of NAFTA studies generally found small but positive results, as did a 2013 US International Trade Commission (USITC) review. GDP, productivity, and wages increased by modest amounts — economic welfare increased. Another 2014 paper examining NAFTA’s effects produced similar results. Given NAFTA’s scope and the long‐​established gains of free trade, that’s about what one should expect.

It also bears mentioning that some of the agreement’s benefits are not easily quantifiable. The trade deal, for example, means that Americans now have easier access to out‐​of‐​season fruits and vegetables that can be grown in Mexico’s favorable climes. Since the late 1990s the amount of fresh vegetables imported into the United States — primarily from Mexico and Canada — has nearly doubled.

NAFTA has also played a role in bolstering the resilience of the US auto industry at a time of rising global competition, especially from Asia. The elimination of duties between the United States and Mexico has provided additional export opportunities for both US automakers and auto parts producers as well as a more competitive source of crucial inputs. The result: a more competitive North American auto industry, with the United States at its center. Indeed, it is for this reason that the Center for Automotive Research warned in 2017 that Detroit would be hard hit by a US withdrawal from NAFTA.

Admittedly, the removal of trade barriers does produce some disruption, particularly for workers previously insulated from import competition. But some context is in order. The dynamic US economy destroys and creates millions of jobs each year due to technology, trade (both international and interstate), innovation, and other factors. According to a 2014 Peterson Institute for International Economics analysis, however, only 5 percent of the job losses were attributable to trade with Mexico. An economy without job loss, whatever the reason, is an economy locked in stagnation and suffering.

If the United States has been harmed by NAFTA, it is perhaps found in the misplaced attention it receives. Energy devoted to the trade deal’s alleged harm is attention deflected from actual policy missteps. That’s useful to politicians and others for whom NAFTA (and other trade issues) provide a useful distraction from actual sources of economic damage such as overwrought environmental regulations, ballooning infrastructure costs, and protectionist policies that undermine US competitiveness such as tariffs on imported metals and the Jones Act.

Focusing on such realistic threats might roil powerful special interests, so blame is instead assigned to NAFTA and foreign competition.

NAFTA has, overall, produced limited but small benefits for the United States, and 30 years on should be regarded as a modest policy success. Its participants have, on net, benefitted from the deal. Three decades on, its critics should bodog poker review finally sheathe their rhetorical swords and move on to actual economic challenges facing the country.

Colin Grabow is a research fellow at the Cato Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies where his research focuses on domestic forms of trade protectionism such as the Jones Act and the U.S. sugar program.

To read the full article as it appears on the Cato Institute’s website, click here.

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At their meeting in January, the three North American leaders said they intended “to forge stronger regional supply chains, as well as promote targeted investment” in strategic sectors like semiconductors and batteries. Seeing North America as a competitiveness zone — one that helps producers in all three nations meet or beat foreign competition — is why we did NAFTA in the first place. But it has taken a resurgence of great-power competition, this time with China, to make the United States fully appreciate the benefits of integration with its neighbours, so much so that Mexico and Canada receive preferential treatment under the Inflation Reduction Act’s tax credits and other supports, much to the frustration of our other trading partners. North American trade ties, far from stoking fears of Ross Perot’s “giant sucking sound,” are now a vital part of U.S. economic development strategy.

This a unique moment for North America. U.S. policymakers can promote the competitive boost from trilaterally integrated supply chains with much less political blowback than in the past. This new political dynamic comes courtesy of the dramatic push to diversify sourcing from China but is aided by the unprecedented labour protections of USMCA/CUSMA, which include wage-enhancing rules of origin for autos and a “rapid response mechanism” to address unfair labour practices. Both lend political cover to a robust North American manufacturing, technology and services strategy.

Even in an environment driven by industrial policy and nearshoring, however, our nations need a coherent plan to attract investment to North America. It is not enough to chase subsidy dollars and assume companies eager to reduce their China footprint will commit to long-term investment here. Our three countries must create an investment climate characterized by certainty and predictability. And we must ensure that the agreement’s revived dispute settlement mechanism, which languished under NAFTA, is respected, preserved, and protected like the crown jewel it should be — particularly with the World Trade Organization dispute system having been severely hobbled.

North American dispute settlement is now the most efficient path to resolve challenges, with four panels requested thus far (dairy twice), a fresh consultation request from the U.S. over Mexico’s limitation of genetically modified corn imports and one looming over discriminatory Canadian digital policy. So far, all three countries have taken pains to reinforce dispute settlement’s credibility, with proceedings being managed professionally and generally in a timely fashion. The quality of the panel determinations has been unimpeachable, with the U.S. expressing “disappointment” about its recent loss in a case on auto rules of origin but also pledging to “engage Mexico and Canada on a possible resolution.”

At this juncture, all three nations need to show the world we are following the rules laid out by our agreement and are committed to making North America a “zone of predictability.” This will require flexibility in sensitive sectors from autos to agriculture to energy, where Mexico’s policies not only contravene agreed obligations but make energy supply and prices uncertain. Each partner will need to show it is moving towards compliance both in these disputed sectors and in those currently under discussion. Failure to demonstrate that the rules mean something will hurt all three.

Benefiting from nearshoring by default is one thing. But it would be better for North American workers and consumers alike if their governments were to signal they want the continent’s investment climate to be world-class and competitive. Doing so requires emphatic compliance with dispute panel determinations but also addressing disputes in agriculture, autos, and the digital realm before they become intractable. As the historical stigma of NAFTA finally fades in Washington, President Biden is due to visit Canada this month. There could be no better time to reinforce our joint commitment to preserve and protect the benefits of USMCA/CUSMA through rigorous compliance.

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Firms needing to diversify from China, in whole or part, because of rising Chinese costs and mounting trade and investment restrictions are now considering whether to reorganize production across Asia to complement continuing Chinese operations or to shift investment out of Asia to shorten supply chains serving the US market. Mexico seems like a natural choice for “nearshoring” investment, linked closely to the dominant US market by the newly minted United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).

But so far at least, Mexico has not lured substantial new investments that could supplant Asian production serving the US market, and the USMCA has added rather than removed concerns about investing in Mexican auto and other manufacturing sectors. The evidence cited in this blog suggests that Mexico faces significant competition for investments in restructured supply chains. Compared with other leading nearshoring locations in Asia and North America, Mexican policies tend to discourage new placements in manufacturing sectors. Another handicap flows from the flaws in the USMCA that work to Mexico’s disadvantage and favor new investment in US-based production of autos, trucks, and parts. As a result, Mexico cannot rely on its North American partners to finance its development and promote its effort to become a nearshoring hub for supply chains migrating from East Asia. To attract more investment diversifying out of Asia, Mexican officials need to recast domestic economic policies and recommit to combating corruption and organized crime to make Mexico more attractive to domestic and foreign investors.

BENCHMARKING MEXICO’S COMPETITIVENESS FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

When companies plan their production and trade strategies, they benchmark their strengths and weaknesses against key competitors. Countries whose economic development depends on trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) should do the same. To that end, table 1 arrays Mexico’s global ranking under three separate indices compiled by the Fraser Institute in Canada, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and Transparency International (TI) that assess critical factors that influence locational decisions for private investment. Each of the groups compiles data on numerous indicators covering Mexico’s performance with respect to its business regulations, infrastructure, international trade ties, legal system, and corruption.

Overall, Mexico’s scores place it in the middle of the pack of countries covered by the two broad indices compiled by the Fraser Institute and WIPO, but in the bottom third of countries examined in the TI Corruption Perceptions Index. Compared with its USMCA partners or key competitors in southeast Asia—the markets Mexico competes with for investments by companies that are restructuring their Asia-Pacific supply chains—Mexico does not fare very well.

In North America, commitments to support nearshoring to Mexico, discussed most recently at the September 9 High Level Economic Dialogue between senior US and Mexican officials, pale in comparison to the actions taken by US politicians to promote reshoring to the United States. Legislation in the current Congress is replete with programs designed to encourage new investment in US-based production plants through both subsidies and Buy American procurement regulations. These bills are meant to reinforce Executive Order 14017 on “America’s Supply Chains” issued by President Joseph R. Biden bodog casino Jr. on February 24, 2021. Although Biden committed to “close cooperation on resilient supply chains with allies and partners who share our values”, the subsequent White House report on critical products concluded in June 2021 noted that international cooperation was only needed “to secure supplies of critical goods that we will not make in sufficient quantities at home [emphasis added].”

For companies diversifying some of their production or sourcing from the Chinese market, southeast Asia provides a nearby and largely welcoming investment alternative. Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand score higher overall than Mexico on the Global Innovation indicators; so, too, do Taiwan and Malaysia on the Economic Freedom of the World Index. Mexico’s rating on business regulations and infrastructure raise yellow flags for prospective investors, as do its weak scores on legal protections, which align with its dismal TI grade on corruption. And while Mexico benefits from preferential market access to its major export markets and is highly graded for the USMCA and other free trade agreements (FTAs), its success in securing FTAs is now being matched by a wave of new intra-Asian trade pacts, including the soon-to-be implemented 15-member Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Simply put, Mexico needs to outcompete its USMCA partners and southeast Asian competitors if it is to benefit from new investments in manufacturing shifting from Asia. Even with a labor cost advantage compared to its USMCA partners, the added production and distribution costs associated with intrusive Mexican business regulations, inadequate and irregular power supplies, and clogged road and rail networks, could well erode the benefits for those considering new investments in Mexico. Indeed, these costs already seem to be a drag on decisions to switch investments to Mexico.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MEXICO

Mexico’s relatively weak standing in the Fraser Institute, WIPO, and TI indicators rating the business environment created by a country’s trade and investment policies, and legal systems, seems to be reflected in inflows of FDI into Mexico over the past few years. Except in 2020, when global activity declined sharply, annual inflows of FDI in Mexican manufacturing have not grown very much, averaging about $15.8 billion in 2018-2019 and slightly less on an annualized basis in the first half of 2021. Total FDI inflows are up on an annualized basis in the first half of 2021 due to strong catch-up growth in services (see table 2).

The majority of FDI inflows to Mexico since 2018 have been in service sectors, led by financial and insurance services. Manufacturing accounts for about 47 percent of total FDI inflows. The bulk of FDI in manufacturing is in transportation equipment (cars, trucks, parts), which covers about 46 percent of total Mexican FDI in manufacturing, much of which is from North America and Europe.

If Mexico was succeeding in nearshoring supply chains in manufacturing, it would likely be seen in supplements to sectors where Mexico already has attracted FDI, or previously had operations that subsequently moved to China or elsewhere in Asia: machinery and equipment; computer, communications, measurement devices; and transportation equipment. The machinery and equipment sector is recording FDI inflows equal to 2018 levels, and FDI in computers et al. is down by more than half. Transportation equipment FDI seemed to be recovering from sharp drops in 2020 until the second quarter of 2021, perhaps reflecting auto industry concerns about the future of Mexican-based production. If trends in FDI data for 2021 continue, concerns about increasing COVID-19 cases and restrictions on future access to the US market resulting from US regulations interpreting the USMCA auto and truck content requirements could dampen investment in this critical sector for Mexican economic growth.

THE USMCA DISADVANTAGE

North American economic integration has been driven for three decades by the idea that investing in Mexico and integrating production across the region would enhance the growth and international competitiveness of all three countries. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) fell short of its promise and most of the southern Mexican states benefited very little from the increased regional trade and investment. Labor-intensive Mexican industries serving the US market decamped to Asia in NAFTA’s first decade as Mexico’s tight monetary policies fueled an overvalued peso and undercut competitiveness vis-à-vis China and others.

The USMCA changed the vision of deepening intraregional production networks. For political reasons, it was designed to differ markedly with its predecessor; the major change involved rules governing production of autos, trucks, and parts, and complemented the Trump administration’s efforts to reshore supply chains to US-based facilities (including some production from Mexico). Concerns about the deal, and its potential negative impact on auto sector investment in Mexico, initially were dismissed by Mexican officials. But when US regulations setting the terms for assessing domestic content requirements to qualify for USMCA preferences were issued in the summer of 2020, it became clear to auto industry and Mexican officials alike that the deal would require much more restructuring of auto and truck production, and shifting to US-based facilities, than they initially thought. The issue is in the early stages of USMCA dispute settlement; in the interim, Mexican producers face an uncertain future.

The USMCA, negotiated under the threat of US withdrawal from NAFTA, was hailed for removing the cloud of uncertainty about the future of regional economic integration. Longstanding critics of NAFTA supported the new pact whose future now seemed politically secure. Investors saw the new political support for regional integration, or rather the decline in criticism of the pact, as a positive sign that Mexico would be an attractive host for nearshoring investment from Asia. But the dispute over auto content rules, and a spate of new disputes on labor, environment, energy, and agricultural issues, brought under the USMCA’s enhanced enforcement procedures, has reopened questions about the durability of the pact’s political honeymoon in Mexico and the United States.

In sum, the USMCA does not seem to have accorded Mexico substantial advantages for nearshoring manufacturing investment from Asia. The pact reopens old conflicts and offers new avenues for trade retaliation. But the main obstacle to Mexico’s success in attracting new investment is homemade. Mexican officials should take a closer look at how their policies compare to those of leading competitors and recalibrate to build back Mexico better.

Jeffrey J. Schott joined the Peterson Institute for International Economics in 1983 and is a senior fellow working on international trade policy and economic sanctions.

To read the full commentary from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, please click here.

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The Aug. 20 letter highlighted that a free trade pact with Kenya would be “the appropriate next step in recognizing and strengthening relations, economic opportunities, and a security partnership between the United States and Kenya.”

Kenya began negotiations on a trade deal with the U.S. during the Trump administration. The Biden administration has stalled the negotiations without specifying whether or how Washington would resume the talks.

The letter to Tai made the case that the Biden administration has a “historic opportunity” to work toward a trade agreement with Kenya, which would be the first such pact between the U.S. and a sub-Saharan African country.

The letter further noted that “as the U.S. increasingly partners with Kenya to combat al-Shabab and other terrorist groups, it is more important than ever to recognize Kenya as an important ally in the Horn of Africa.”

Indeed, a trade agreement with Kenya is clearly in America’s interest. Regrettably, however, the Biden administration has shown little appetite for restarting stalled trade negotiations with Nairobi.

During a House Ways and Means Committee hearing in May, Tai did state the necessity of making sure that what we do with Kenya will “reinforce all of the things that Kenya is doing in Africa, not take away from that.”

Two months later, when she announced and highlighted a “U.S.-Africa trade ministerial” that will be held later this year, Tai said the ministerial would be focused on how to “build” on the African Growth and Opportunity Act.

Currently, the cornerstone of America’s economic engagement with Africa is the 21-year-old African Growth and Opportunity Act. A preferential trade program, it offers eligible sub-Saharan African countries duty-free access to the U.S. market for more than 1,800 goods until 2025.

More can and should be done to build on the African Growth and Opportunity Act and upgrade it to strengthen and broaden commercial ties with Africa.

A renewed U.S. effort to promote economic freedom across Africa should also be a central part of America’s long-term mission to assist African countries. Greater economic freedom, reinforced by trade freedom, is the long-term solution to the continent’s weak health security capacities and many more of its economic and social challenges.

It’s notable that in commemorating the launch of the Organization of African Unity, Rep. Karen Bass, D-Calif., chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Africa, global health, and global human rights, in June stressed that, moving forward, U.S. policy toward Africa should be more about trade and investment, less about aid.

She further underlined that “we will need to be aligned—like a lot of other countries around the world that view the continent of Africa as a partner—as an investment partner, a business partner, and not view the continent of Africa as a place where Bodog Poker we need to deliver charity.”

While the U.S. cannot provide the leaders of foreign nations the political will needed to transform their economies according to free market principles, it can support the cause of economic freedom through consistent policy dialogues with its African partners and by providing technical help for reform-minded countries.

A readily available and practical next step toward that strategic objective would be for the Biden administration to resume negotiations aimed at hammering out a free trade agreement with Kenya as noted by the senators’ letter.

Anthony B. Kim researches international economic issues at The Heritage Foundation, with a focus on economic freedom and free trade.

To read the full commentary from The Heritage Foundation, please click here.

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Trade policy in the United States has reached a turning point as a rising China seeks absolute advantage across a broad range of vital industries. If the United States rejects both free trade and protectionism, and going forward adopts power trade as a strategy, what needs to be done to implement that strategy? This is the third of three articles which examine power trade as practiced by Germany before World War II, and by China today.

The practice of U.S. power trade from 1945 to 2016, focused as it was on ensuring global market integration (outside of the Soviet Union and then Russia)—even at the expense of U.S. industrial competitiveness—has run its course. America’s adversary today is not a sclerotic but militarily powerful foe that could inflict little or no economic damage outside of its bloc. China today is a dynamic, militarily and technologically powerful foe that can and does inflict considerable economic damage around the world, including to the U.S. economy.

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In particular, various outlets reported that Commerce has published preliminary findings in the second AD/CVD administrative review, more than doubling the combined duty rate on Canadian lumber imported into the United States (from 8.99% for 2018 to 18.32% for 2019). This result shows three key concerns that I raised in my previous post:

• First, the U.S. AD/CVD system is highly uncertain, with duty rates potentially changing significantly from period to period pursuant to annual “administrative reviews.” This uncertainty acts as a significant non‐​tariff barrier on imports of goods subject to AD/CVD orders, beyond whatever the rate is at the time of importation. And, in the case of lumber, it has been exacerbated by the on‐​again, off‐​again nature of the decades‐​long dispute.
• Second, because the United States applies a “retrospective” system for collecting duties on imports subject to AD/CVD orders, the new duty rate announced last week for lumber (assuming it’s confirmed in final results expected in November) would not apply to imports currently being imported but instead to lumber already imported back in 2019. Where final duty rates for those products end up higher than the estimated rates applied at the time of importation, U.S. importers (who have no control over the process) would be on the hook for the difference. Where the change is significant (as it often is), it can result in millions of dollars in new and unexpected duty liability. Importers will also be forced to increase their cash deposits on imports now coming in (in line with the higher rate), but they won’t know for years — when Commerce finishes its 2021 review — if they owe U.S. Customs more or less in final duties. All of this creates even more financial uncertainty for importers, further discouraging them (especially smaller ones) from importing lumber from Canada.
• Finally, that Commerce doubled duty rates while lumber prices are sky high (and perhaps threatening the U.S. economic recovery) again shows how insulated the AD/CVD process is from economic reality. In this case, the law has no quick fix for “emergency” economic situations and expressly prohibits U.S. administering agencies (including Commerce) from considering duties’ harms to consumers or the broader “public interest.”

bodog online casino Thus, America’s “lumber duty problem” is really a systemic problem — one that requires a systemic (legislative) solution.

Scott Lincicome is a senior fellow in economic studies. He writes on international and domestic economic issues, including international trade; subsidies and industrial policy; manufacturing and global supply chains; and economic dynamism.

To read the original blog post on the CATO Institute, please click here.

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Since its inception, SelectUSA has facilitated more than $84 billion in client-verified investment, supporting more than 106,000 U.S. jobs. Even during the global pandemic, companies across the world continue to target the United States as the launch pad for global growth, with the SelectUSA team supporting them through client services such as assistance navigating the federal regulatory environment, market research, and counseling.

Following a year of adjusting to our new reality in the wake of the global COVID-19 pandemic, this news comes as no surprise, showcasing the United States’ ability to adapt and overcome unprecedented challenges. At SelectUSA, we are celebrating the retention of our #1 spot in the 2021 Confidence Index, as FDI creates jobs and contributes to economic development across the United States. The ranking in the Index is a direct reflection of the appeal of the U.S. economy and how that economy enables businesses of any size to access a massive consumer base, explore working within a culture that welcomes innovation, and employ a world-class, productive workforce.

When looking to invest, investors look for established markets that are safe and stable, possess strong infrastructure, strong governance, macroeconomic stability, and are known for their progress in technology and innovation. These are all attributes the U.S. market is proud to maintain. The United States offers unmatched diversity, a culture of innovation, and the world’s most productive workforce to companies of all sizes, from startups to multinationals, looking to grow and succeed in the U.S. market.

For foreign companies considering investing in the United States and for economic development teams looking to attract job-creating business investment, there is no better place to connect than the virtual 2021 SelectUSA Investment Summit from June 7-11, 2021. This is the United States’ highest profile event dedicated to promoting FDI, and plays a key role in attracting and facilitating business investment and job creation by raising awareness about the wide range of investment opportunities in the United States and enabling vital direct connections between investors and U.S. economic development organizations.

The 2019 SelectUSA Investment Summit was one of its largest, drawing more than 3,100 attendees to Washington, D.C. Several new announcements were made, including nearly $100 million in new investment projects and the release of SelectUSA’s case-study report on reshoring in the United States. In total, 1,200 business investors from a record 79 international markets joined economic developers from 49 states and territories. The Investment Summit has directly affected more than $48.4 billion in new investment projects supporting more than 45,000 U.S. jobs.

I hope you will join us this year to network, learn more about how to expand through investment, and see firsthand why the United States continues to remain top destination for business investment for the ninth year in a row.

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Thus, in the 2021 edition of our flagship report Foresight Africa, the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative has chosen to highlight the transformative leadership of women—in management roles, on the front lines of the pandemic, and in everyday life—by opening each chapter with a salient quote from an eminent woman.

Now, to celebrate International Women’s Day this year, the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative asked leading women to reflect on the challenges facing young women and to share their thoughts on how we can more effectively encourage and empower young women and girls to become leaders themselves. Each woman was approached for this purpose because they took action against all odds, rising to great heights in their communities, on the continent, and on the global stage. Below are the responses from these inspiring women.

Rt. Hon. Winnie Kiiza
Former Leader of Opposition, Parliament of Uganda

Even though women are vaulting to leadership spaces, our communities remain obstinately resistant to women in leadership roles. They (the patriarchy) too often perceive women as too delicate to lead. This trend, among many other deeply-seated and unconscious gender biases, force potential women leaders to withdraw into their shells. Yet, women possess inherently strong attributes that can help lead more effectively.

As women leaders, we should and can operate under the existing patriarchal system by sharing our accomplishments and ambitions, so as to change and shape our communities’ perceptions about women’s ability to lead, and create a source of inspiration for women to rise above the gender bias and fear.

Hafsat Abiola
President, Women in Africa Initiative

Africa’s girls and women stand to gain most from shaping their continent into a place that releases its enormous potential. It is to them that I look for leadership. So many are living on the margins of society, in the black and gray economies, in community associations, in peer lending groups. They are not integrated into the economy or the institutions of governance. It is high time they were. Indeed, we will go on talking about Africa’s potential until this army-in-waiting of changemakers take charge. They can and must connect their businesses to the economy and anchor the state to their vibrant communities. They can give birth to an Africa that becomes the finest expression of how to develop a continent. Africa was the cradle of civilization. Tomorrow, it can be a leader in a globalized world.

Dr. Frannie Léautier
Senior Partner and CEO, SouthBridge Investments

This year, more than any other year, we should celebrate women in leadership. The COVID-19 pandemic has fallen heavily on the shoulders of women. Many have lost sources of livelihood. Most have triple duty, caring for families, managing households, and holding down economic activities. And some have faced the brunt of the pandemic as caregivers and essential service providers. Yet others have stepped up to also solve challenges in their communities. We should engage our young women to realize that they already have superpowers they can invoke to solve problems and lead—locally, nationally, and internationally. They should trust in these superpowers, ones of observing, listening and learning; empathizing with others; experimenting and persevering when doing what’s hard; and crystallizing lessons into actions that bring systemic change. But most importantly, we should encourage them to not be afraid to dream big or to start small, as seeking solutions to the day-to-day problems facing us and our communities can lead to broader change in the world.

Arunma Oteh, OON
Former Treasurer, World Bank

Harnessing Africa’s phenomenal female leadership is critical to “building forward better” post COVID-19. Indeed, when given the opportunity, African women bring to bear important leadership qualities such as courage, compassion, character, and empathy. They are also able to succeed with managing complex situations because they are authentic, collaborative, rigorous, results-oriented, and sacrificial. These are all attributes that society needs today to rebuild after the greatest crisis of our lifetime and to end the twin challenges of poverty and inequality. I am optimistic that, if we equally leverage men and women, young and old, we can transform what has been a multi-faceted crisis into possibilities that will unleash Africa’s enormous potential.

For more on women in leadership and the unique obstacles they face, see the recent Brookings event, “Women and Leadership” with new World Trade Organization Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and former Prime Minister of Australia Julia Gillard.

See the blog, “5 ways women are driving Africa’s transformation and contributing to a global reset” by Winnie Byanyima and Caroline Kende-Robb for more on the remarkable role of women in Africa’s long-term recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.

For strategies on how women and girls can be put at the center of the COVID-19 response, see the blog by the World Bank’s Mamta Murthi, “Putting girls at the center of the COVID-19 pandemic response in Africa.”

Furthermore, you can learn more about the pressing challenges facing women and girls under COVID-19, in Damaris Parsitau’s Foresight Africa 2021 viewpoint, “Invisible lives, missing voices: Putting women and girls at the center of post-COVID-19 recovery and reconstruction.”

Finally, each chapter of this year’s Foresight Africa report begins with a salient quote from an eminent woman, emphasizing the transformative leadership of women—in management roles, on the front lines of the pandemic, and in everyday life. You can find all of those reflections here.

To read the original report from Brookings, please click here

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“The ITC’s determination spells future success for the recently negotiated US Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA),” said FPAA president Lance Jungmeyer.

“Had the ITC tagged Mexico or Canada for injury or trade remedies, this could have unravelled the promise of the trade agreement, because the proposal to a have seasonal produce tariffs was rejected by USMCA negotiators.”

The FPAA said it remained “extremely concerned” by the number of trade investigations opened recently by US trade representatives on imported produce, especially key commodities from Mexico, the country’s number one trade partner.

Mexican tomato imports already face US trade sanctions, and the ITC has now initiated investigations on bell peppers, strawberries, squash, cucumbers and raspberries. 

“By trade value, 42 per cent of Mexico’s produce is under sanction or investigation by the US,” Jungmeyer said.

“Although we are heartened by ITC’s decision on blueberries, the previous administration left these investigations for the Biden Administration, which now must navigate a tenuous situation with Mexico, our top trading partner. The investigations that were requested by Southeastern growers were clearly the result of political pressure.”

Mexico’s Agriculture Secretary Victor Villalobos said recently that if Mexican produce was targeted for trade remedies such as tariffs or quotas, it would respond against US exports with “mirror policies”. 

Many US agriculture organisations recognised what was at stake when they signed a letter to USTR in December opposing the above-mentioned global safeguard investigations, and that tariffs on Mexican produce would result in retaliatory measures harming American farmers of grains, meats, dairy and other items. 

Beyond ITC’s ruling, the FPAA said it is hopeful that moderate voices on trade emerging within the Biden Administration will work to preserve the spirit of what was negotiated in USMCA.

“Rather than trade conflicts, we hope to see strengthened cooperation between the U.S. Mexico and Canada on agriculture, phytosanitary and border security issues,” Jungmeyer said.

“We need to get back to the business of feeding North America, keeping consumers supplied with affordable and nutritious foods. The complementarity of food supplies is why USMCA and NAFTA have been so positive for consumers and farmers.”

To read the original blog post, please click here. 

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Geographical indications — place names or names associated with locations that are used to identify products — are a priority in the European Union’s trade policy. But there are so many criteria, categories and databases that finding out what is protected can be pretty confusing.

Often the first databases we reach via the EU website are the ones containing protected names in different categories: wines, spirits, and other products such as food and beer. Even those three do not contain names the EU protects as a result of its trade agreements with other countries.

They only contain names that are protected via a complete registration process, not the ones listed in bilateral agreements. And for registration, there are also four different ways that the EU protects these names:

• protected designation of origin (PDO)
• protected geographical indication (PGI)
• geographical indication of spirit drinks and aromatised wines (GI) — just to confuse everyone else who uses “GI” to mean all geographical indications
• traditional speciality guaranteed (TSG)

Thankfully, there is one database to bind them all: GI View.

It contains all names protected in the EU, whether registered (including names still going through registration) or listed in bilateral agreements — from all over the world.

Here are some fun facts from applying various search filters on GI View, at the time of writing (January 5, 2021).

Where the names come from (some names may come from more than one country):

• Total names in the database = 5,091
• From EU countries = 3,344
• From rest of the world = 1,747

Whether via registration or under special deals (including free trade agreements):

• Registration = 3,498
• Under agreements = 1,593

Where the registered names come from:

• Registration, from non-EU countries = 154
• Registration, from the UK (left the EU in 2020) = 86 (registered or submitted for registration while the UK was an EU member)
• Registration, from non-EU, non-UK = 68

All of this has implications for how the UK protects non-EU countries’ names.

Note: For searching by country, EU members are listed first, then the rest of the world — alphabetically according to 2-character country code where Switzerland is “CH” and the UK is “GB”.)

As well as listing the search results, the database can also map where the names come from. This can be a lot of fun. First, this is the map for the whole dataset. There are three single items. They are: “Íslenskt lambakjöt / Icelandic lamb”, “Poivre de Penja” from Cameroon, and “Увс чацаргана / Uvs Seabuckthorn” from Mongolia — all three with registration applied for:

What about those 691 names in North America? Click on the dot and we get:

And for East Aisa?

What about Europe? Now it gets pretty congested. Some of the dots still cover several countries:

What if we click on the count of a single country like Australia, with 109 names protected in the EU?

To see each geographical indication, we have to get down to this level, and click on each item. (Or we could just select the “list” display instead of “map”.)

To view the original blog post, please click here

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