bodog poker review|Most Popular_own: How did the Detroit /blog-topics/manufacturing/ Fri, 19 Jul 2024 15:15:21 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.6.1 /wp-content/uploads/2018/08/android-chrome-256x256-80x80.png bodog poker review|Most Popular_own: How did the Detroit /blog-topics/manufacturing/ 32 32 bodog poker review|Most Popular_own: How did the Detroit /blogs/detroit-china/ Tue, 12 Mar 2024 18:58:42 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=42752 GM, Ford and Jeep Meet Their Maker All Too Soon The bodies are still warm. But the victims are already dead.   Natural causes? Or was there foul play?  GM,...

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The bodies are still warm. But the victims are already dead.  

Natural causes? Or was there foul play? 

GM, Ford and Jeep – once darlings of the Chinese consumer – are goners. Sales have collapsed. Profits are heading toward zero. 

In 2023, the Detroit Three sold 3 million fewer cars in China than they did in 2017: 2.3 million vs 5.4 million. That is six straight years of falling sales – and we have not hit bottom yet. 

Jeep’s China joint venture went bankrupt in October 2022, despite operating in the world’s largest SUV market.

Ford is losing buckets of money, operating at just 25% of its plant capacity. 

For years GM made ‘more money than God’ in China, a former executive once told me. Today, the company is grasping at straws. Mary Barra recently told investors that GM would move its products upmarket in China to be “more premium and high end,” including the Cadillac Celestiq, starting at $300,000. 

That’s a roundabout way of saying that GM can no longer compete in most segments of the China market.

Detroit’s China demise came so suddenly that there was talk of summoning Inspector Jacques Clouseau, the internationally famous solver of murder mysteries. Alas, China would not grant Monsieur Clouseau a visa. 

So we are left to piece together clues on our own: How did the Detroit 3 expire so swiftly? And what might the end of Detroit in China tell us about what happens when Chinese automakers enter the US market? 

Complacency & Confusion

Complacency kills. And smugness was no small part of what happened to Detroit in China. 

For decades, they knew nothing but growth and profits. GM, Ford and Jeep – along with their Chinese JV partners – grew convinced of two eternal truths:  First, Chinese consumers would forever prefer foreign car brands like Buick, Chevy and Ford over the Chinese offerings. And second, gasoline-powered vehicles would be dominant until kingdom come. 

As things turned out, they were wrong on both counts.

Bureaucratic confusion also played a role. “Our guys in China can’t make up their minds,” a senior GM executive in Detroit told me in 2018. He was referring to his colleagues working at the Shanghai-GM joint venture. “Last week, it was ‘we should hurry up and get more EVs ready’ for the China market. This week it’s ‘wait, never mind’.” 

When Chinese demand for EVs started its explosive growth in 2020, the Detroit 3 were caught flat-footed and without products. 

The tables turned in what seemed like a blink of an eye. Chinese EV brands were now in the lead. “When a Chinese buyer considers an EV, he thinks Tesla or one of the Chinese brands,” a senior executive from BYD told me in 2021. 

“Ford and GM are seen as old fashioned, out of step with the times.” 

EVs now account for 1 of every 3 new cars sold in China, Tesla is the only non-Chinese brand in the top 10. 

More Than Meets The Eye

Now, hold on a minute. Inspector Clouseau would be disappointed if we simply stopped our investigation there and called it case closed. I can almost hear him teasing us: “Was there not more going on than meets the untrained eye?”

Clouseau knows things. Detroit’s fall was also part of a grand Chinese plan. Detroit automakers had served their purpose, bringing advanced technology and processes to China. Now that China had what it needed, Detroit was being shown the exits. 

I first sensed this larger scheme years ago when I asked the Chinese Minister of Industry whether Detroit’s JVs in China would succeed over the long term. After all, the Chinese themselves describe JVs as precarious arrangements with partners “sleeping in the same bed, dreaming different dreams.”

The global automakers wanted market access. And the Chinese wanted technology.

“Look, despite their different dreams, they are still sleeping together,” he said with a chuckle. The Chinese, he hinted, were biding their time, waiting for the moment when they could emerge independent and triumphant, leaving the joint venture behind. 

Today, the partners sleep in separate beds. The Detroiters are taking their final breaths. And the Chinese side does not appear to be in mourning. 

So What

Are there implications for competition in America? You bet. Complacency can happen here in America, too. The Detroit 3 will continue to dominate the large pickup truck market for years to come. But they have withdrawn from the more affordable segments, convincing themselves that Americans do not want smaller cars anymore. 

This retreat presents the Chinese automakers, the lowest-cost producers on the planet, with a mouth-watering opening. That’s dangerous for Detroit.

Ford, GM and Jeep are dead in China—even if their executives can’t or won’t admit it.

The Detroit 3 still possess vast resources, technology, ingenuity and smart people. But they better start Bodog Poker hustling, taking risks, inventing and working harder than their Chinese competitors.

If not, they could face extinction – this time on their home turf.

Future Cars & Markets

Electrics 

Geely’s Crowded Portfolio. Geely’s array of EV brands – Polestar, Volvo, Zeekr and Lotus – are living on top of one another. This is making investors have second thoughts about their value. Lotus shares are down 67% since their market debut two weeks ago.

Xiaomi’s March Launch. The world’s second largest cell phone maker will start selling its SU7 premium sedan on March 28th. Consumers outside of China will need to wait 2-3 years before they can buy one.

Mercedes Welcomes Chinese EVs Into Europe. “Don’t raise tariffs. Go the other way around. Take the tariffs that we have [in the EU] and reduce them.” This is the stance announced this week by Ola Kallenius, CEO of Mercedes-Benz. He says competition is a good thing for Europe. But he just might also be working to preserve Mercedes’ market access to China, its largest market. Oh, and Geely happens to be a major shareholder in Mercedes, too.

Batteries / Supply Chains

Lithium Price Recovery? After falling by a stunning 80% in 2023, there are signs that lithium carbonate prices in China may be recovering. But Goldman Sachs says a recent bounce should not be interpreted as the end of the bear market

Koreans Into LFP. SK On says it is planning to mass produce LFP batteries as soon as 2026. Up until now, the LFP battery business has been totally dominated by Chinese battery makers.

Advanced Technologies

Pony.ai Goes Worldwide. Last week Pony.ai signed an agreement to establish an R&D center in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. This comes after forming a joint venture in South Korea and securing a $100 million investment from Saudi Arabia. In 2020, Toyota invested $400 million into Pony.ai through its China joint venture, Guangzhou Toyota.

NIO Humanoids. This is not a simulation. NIO has actually begun testing humanoids sourced from UBTech at its new factory.

New Numbers / Milestones

BYD: Brazil vs Europe. BYD had an underwhelming start in Europe, selling just 16,000 vehicles last year. Cross the Atlantic to Brazil and you find a totally different reality. BYD expects to deliver more than 100,000 cars in South America’s largest market. And the company is now renovating an idled Ford plant.

SAIC MG Fast Ramp in Europe. Europeans bought 239,000 SAIC MG vehicles in 2023, twice the number from the previous year. Competitive pricing and several powertrain options are the key drivers. Familiarity with the MG brand has been a huge asset, too. The MG ZS was Spain’s best-selling car in December, 2023.

VinFast Super Leasing Deal. Dealers in the US started leasing the VF8 at the incredibly attractive price of $249 per month in late January. Within weeks, all existing inventory was sold out. “At $249 a month, VinFast would be losing thousands of dollars a vehicle,” one dealer told me. Let’s watch what VinFast does next with its pricing. VinFast plans to appoint 100 dealers in America by the end of the year.

To read the full newsletter as it appears on The Dunne Insights Newsletter, click here

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_own: How did the Detroit /blogs/decouple-or-derisk/ Mon, 03 Jul 2023 20:32:17 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=38060 As often happens in diplomacy, the communique the G7 leaders issued in May from their meeting in Hiroshima ducked a key question: What is the difference between “de-risking,” which the...

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As often happens in diplomacy, the communique the G7 leaders issued in May from their meeting in Hiroshima ducked a key question: What is the difference between “de-risking,” which the communique expressed approval of, and “decoupling,” which it disapproved?

The G7 statement didn’t define those terms. It didn’t even mention that the foremost object of both decoupling and de-risking is China. That’s diplomacy for you.

The leaders of the seven countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Germany, France and Italy) simply said they were coordinating their approaches to economic resilience and economic security “based on diversifying partnerships and de-risking, not decoupling.”

As often happens in diplomacy, the vagueness was intentional. It conveniently papered over differences between the U.S. and some of its allies. “Economic resiliency” and “economic security” are diplo-speak for avoiding overreliance on China (and to some extent Russia) for key products and avoiding supplying those countries with strategically sensitive technologies.

On the surface, decoupling (the trendy word until recently) implies taking separation from China further than de-risking (the European Commission president’s word). De-risking suggests diversifying, ending exclusive reliance on China, rather than withdrawal.

In practice, though, much of the decoupling to date has also been diversification. For communique purposes, the difference between decoupling and de-risking is semantics. That’s why the U.S. could agree to the communique even though there are real differences between the U.S. and its allies in their concerns about reliance on China.

Those differences reflect their differing geopolitical situations, especially with regard to Taiwan. A Chinese military attack Bodog Poker on the island seems increasingly possible — possible enough that U.S. officials have to plan for it even as they pray it never happens.

Washington’s allies don’t. In the event of an attack, Japan could end up supporting the U.S., at least logistically. It’s a prisoner of its history and geography. The European allies would be far less inclined to see an attack on Taiwan as their problem. They might be cajoled into joining a coalition of the willing, but that is far from guaranteed.

The U.S., then, has greater reason to worry about providing China with technologies that strengthen it militarily. It has more serious fears of being cut off by China from critical products during hostilities.

When governments are planning for war, national security ranks higher in their concerns than economic efficiency. This can be a hard swallow for those who believe, as many in exporting sectors like agriculture do, that financial markets allocate capital more efficiently than governments and free trade produces the best economic outcomes.

But it explains why some Republican believers in free markets have voted for Biden administration industrial-policy initiatives. And why Republicans are solidly behind the Biden administration’s stepped-up efforts to block exports of the most advanced semiconductor technologies to China, despite warnings from U.S. high-tech companies that restrictions will have long-term economic consequences.

European countries share some of the same concerns about China as the U.S., but they’re nowhere near as worried about national security. Referring to Taiwan, French President Emmanuel Macron has warned Europe not to get “caught up in crises that are not ours.”

Europeans are displeased with the Biden administration’s high-tech subsidies and buy-American rules, which they see as drawing investment away from them as much as from China. Some Europeans are also leery of U.S. efforts to block exports of high-tech products to China. The Dutch government, however, eventually went along with the U.S. and restricted Dutch companies’ exports of the most advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China.

Europe, in sum, prefers “de-risking” because it doesn’t want as much economic separation from China as the U.S. The Biden administration accepted “de-risking” because it’s sufficiently vague to let allies march to different drummers.

Actually, so is decoupling. For all the talk of it over the last few years, for all the government’s industrial-policy moves, for all its export restrictions, for all the announcements by companies of plans to move manufacturing back to the U.S. or to Asian countries other than China, U.S.-China trade in goods set a record in 2022, as did U.S. exports to China.

U.S. ag exports to China also set a record in fiscal 2022 at $36.4 billion.

Though the U.S. and China are rivals, American companies’ supply chains are deeply imbedded in China. China is the largest trading partner of the U.S. and of about 120 countries, including American allies like Japan, South Korea and Germany.

China has dominant world market share in some product lines, like drones and solar panels, and is a critical supplier of countless thousands of others. In a war, China would unquestionably cut off exports to the U.S., which makes it logical to decrease reliance on China.

But short of war, how far disentangling today’s supply chains can or will go is unclear, regardless of which diplomatic euphemism is used to describe it.

Urban C. Lehner joined DTN as editor-in-chief in July 2003. He became vice president of the editorial operations of DTN and the Progressive Farmer in July 2010. He is a past president of the North American Agricultural Journalists and in August 2009 was named “Writer of the Year” by the American Agricultural Editors’ Association.

To read the full blog post, please click here.

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_own: How did the Detroit /blogs/making-supply-chains-resilient/ Mon, 07 Mar 2022 20:01:58 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=32717 This article is the second of a two-part series describing Christine McDaniel’s conversation with Leila Aridi Afas, the director of global public policy at Toyota Motor North America. Part one...

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This article is the second of a two-part series describing Christine McDaniel’s conversation with Leila Aridi Afas, the director of global public policy at Toyota Motor North America. bodog sportsbook discusses Leila’s background, Toyota’s crisis management strategy and the Beijing Olympics. Part two explores how Toyota is coping with the ongoing challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic and other geopolitical challenges.

Leila Aridi Afas coordinates cross-functional and cross-cultural teams to understand, anticipate and navigate the ever-evolving policy environment and successfully advocate Toyota’s position. Before joining Toyota, Afas was appointed by President Obama to serve at the U.S. Trade and Development Agency to help grow U.S. jobs and exports following the 2008 financial crisis. Her career spans the public and private sectors in the United States and abroad. She earned a master’s degree in international economics from Columbia University.

After Toyota’s supply chain was significantly disrupted by the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, the automaker decided to change its game. A team within the company started building a huge dataset of suppliers, suppliers’ suppliers and suppliers’ suppliers’ suppliers (yes, three steps out), which led to stocking strategic inventories of essential components. Creating the ability to catch a hiccup before it became an impediment put Toyota in a strong position to deal with the past two years of COVID-related supply chain issues.

Toyota weathered the first and second COVID waves of closures, port delays, natural disasters and shipping problems. The company had up to a four-month inventory of essential components such as chips. In fact, it was a surprise to many in the company how long it was able to keep production going.

But the third and fourth waves of COVID-induced closures of suppliers’ and chip makers’ factories across Asia presented too many obstacles at once. “Those new lockdowns exacerbated an already dire situation,” Afas explained, and in August of 2021 Toyota announced a 40% production cut.

Protect Your Supply Chain But Also Your People

Several other automakers announced COVID-induced production cuts as well, but while some of these companies laid off workers, Toyota kept theirs on the payroll. “Managers were calling their team members every week to check in with them and their families, and to see if they needed anything,” Leila said. Workers may not have been making cars at the plant, but they were figuring out how to improve performance once they returned.

Toyota had already seen how its people-first approach paid off after the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. As the U.S. and global economy slid into a recession and production lines slowed down (or in some cases stopped), Toyota workers stayed on the payroll and kept busy finding new ways to improve their own or their colleagues’ performance. Harvard Business Review showcased the “Toyota production system” that draws on frontline workers to identify ways to improve the production process. In some cases, workers spent time on community service projects. “So once the economy picked back up, Toyota came storming back,” Leila said.

The Death of Just-In-Time Manufacturing Has Been Exaggerated

Toyota is famous for its just-in-time manufacturing system, which relies on keeping just enough inventory to make value flow without interruption, thus minimizing waste. For decades it was praised as a key to good performance, but since the emergence of COVID, many observers are pointing to just-in-time manufacturing as the cause of supply chain problems. Toyota had more essential components in inventory than most other automakers, but even it succumbed to the continued disruptions. Keeping 8 to 12 months of complete inventory on hand is not commercially viable for most companies since the capital could be deployed in more efficient ways.

Still, just-in-time manufacturing does not appear to be going anywhere, although Toyota changed how it implements the techniques a decade ago, after the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Leila was hesitant to highlight or frown on any one inventory process. “For an industry like autos, the supply chain is so incredibly complex,” she said. Considering that the average vehicle has about 30,000 parts, and “you need all of them to build a car,” it is vital to have reliable ways of getting those critical parts and components into your manufacturing facilities.

If one supplier goes down, it’s not so easy to find a replacement. Certifying a supplier is a lengthy process to ensure that strict safety and quality specifications are met. This process can take up to several years in some cases. “You can’t just flip on a dime and switch suppliers,” Leila said. And suppliers do tumble. Toyota’s suppliers have been hit by natural disasters, a 2021 fire in a semiconductor facility, the Texas 2021 deep freeze and the COVID pandemic.

Regulatory Challenges After COVID

Like many companies, Toyota is taking a hard look at how it will move forward after the pandemic. There will always be crises, whether natural or geopolitical, and those are costly. But it is the changing policy landscape that worries Leila more.

Consider advanced electric vehicles with a high-tech landscape that includes new battery technology, fuel cells, charging stations and a host of privacy issues for smart cars. If Toyota develops these technologies in the United States, will it be able to commercialize them in the EU? Can the company do that in a way that includes Japan?

Or consider new laws around forced labor. In December 2021, President Biden signed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act into law, which bans imports of goods made with forced labor in China. As a result, U.S. companies are preparing for outright bans on everything from this region. The EU, U.K. and Canada are gearing up to pass similar laws.

It is yet to be seen how U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) will administer the legislation, but the key words in the statute are “rebuttable presumption.” That is, if the good comes from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, it is presumed to be made with forced labor, and the importer will have to prove otherwise. China closed down its one remaining independent auditor last year, which made it that much harder for shippers to prove their goods were not made with forced labor. Toyota, like some other large multinational corporations, has its own supplier certification process. But it is not clear if those processes will be sufficient for CBP.

Despite living through a once-in-a-century pandemic and a slew of horrible natural disasters, the biggest challenge for Toyota, according to Leila, has been “geopolitical risks and the protectionist measures put into place to grapple with them.” While the irony was not lost on her, she understands the desire to protect national security and health. “But unfortunately, many new barriers have been erected,” she said. Companies are trying to deal with challenges that are completely out of their control. On top of that, they are navigating how to comply with new policies and the barriers those policies create. “Lately, new rules have been coming down the pipe at a pretty fast clip,” she said. The latest are restrictive rules of origin for autos in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs that hurt Toyota’s domestic suppliers, even though Toyota sourced more than 90% of its steel from the United States for its U.S.-built vehicles.

The USMCA has far more stringent rules-of-origin requirements than did the original North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). So, when the freak deep freeze hit Texas in the winter of 2021, manufacturers could not get product in, and having to comply with the myriad USMCA rules of origin was not just an added cost but a huge roadblock to crisis management. Similarly, the Section 232 tariff on steel imports (25%) raised costs throughout the supply chain, further limiting flexibility.

Resist Protectionism in All Its Forms

Leila also warned against using statecraft to further certain goals. “It is wonderful to see countries make strides to reduce emissions, but be careful of protectionism in disguise because trade partners will undoubtedly retaliate.” For instance, the electrification tax credit might benefit the U.S. producers but not allies who are also working toward the common goal of electrification. If Congress makes certain domestic batteries eligible but not those of our trading partners, that will undermine global cooperation.

Carbon does not respect borders. So, if reducing emissions is the goal, policymakers may need to rethink these protectionist approaches. Leila went on, “Will the EU’s CBAM (carbon border adjustment mechanism) be one or the other? Are you pursuing a climate goal or a trade goal? They could be on a crash course.”

Companies like Toyota need the ability to maintain flexibility, not rigid rules. If policymakers want resilient manufacturers, they must help manufacturers help themselves in times of a crisis. Openness to trade brings that much-needed flexibility. It is what matters most for resiliency. Those ties with other countries are a good thing, and Washington must figure out how to keep them intact.

Christine McDaniel is a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Her research focuses on international trade, globalization and intellectual property rights.

To read the full commentary from Discourse Magazine, please click here.

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_own: How did the Detroit /blogs/biden-plan-revitalize-supply-chains/ Thu, 24 Feb 2022 16:50:27 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=32686 One year ago, President Biden signed Executive Order 14017 directing an all-of-government approach to assessing vulnerabilities in – and strengthening the resilience of – the United States’ critical supply chains....

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One year ago, President Biden signed Executive Order 14017 directing an all-of-government approach to assessing vulnerabilities in – and strengthening the resilience of – the United States’ critical supply chains. Within six months of taking office, the Administration completed a comprehensive review of the supply chains for four critical products, identified solutions to secure those supply chains against a wide range of risks and vulnerabilities, and established a first-of-its-kind Supply Chain Disruptions Task Force (SCDTF)  to address the challenges arising from a pandemic-affected economic recovery.

These actions are contributing to a historic recovery in American manufacturing and industrial strength. During President Biden’s first year in office, the economy added 367,000 manufacturing jobs – the most in nearly 30 years – manufacturing as a share of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) returned to pre-pandemic levels, and companies have announced major new investments in American manufacturing. American ports also moved a record amount of cargo, and inflation-adjusted Bodog Poker retail inventories – excluding autos – surged 5 percent in 2021 compared to the previous year, ensuring retailers’ shelves were fully stocked for a record-breaking holiday season. The progress made rebuilding American supply chains contributed to the fastest job growth in history, the fastest economic growth in nearly 40 years, and a faster recovery than every other country in the G7.   

Today, on the one-year anniversary of President Biden’s executive order, seven cabinet agencies published reports identifying key weaknesses in some of the nation’s most crucial supply chains, and devising multi-year strategies to address those weaknesses. The White House also published a capstone report that provides an overview of the key actions the Biden-Harris Administration has taken over the past year to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. supply chains across a range of key sectors. And in the coming months, a number of federal departments and agencies, including the Department of Commerce and the Department of Labor (DOL), will host regional summits that will bring together stakeholders to discuss opportunities to align regional economic development strategies with the national supply chain strategy.

Building on the conclusions outlined in these reports, the Biden-Harris Administration is announcing additional, concrete actions it will take this year to build long-term resilience across critical supply chains and formally institutionalize supply chain resilience throughout the Federal government. Central to this effort is implementing the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL), which is our nation’s most significant investment ever in modernizing the transportation systems on which our supply chains depend. Looking forward, with the historic investments included in the landmark America Creating Opportunities for Manufacturing, Pre-Eminence in Technology, and Economic Strength (COMPETES) Act, the United States Innovation and Competition Act (USICA), and President Biden’s Build Back Better Agenda, these actions will strengthen our supply chains, grow domestic manufacturing, enhance our domestic workforce with a focus on good, union jobs, and help us outcompete China and the rest of the world. Specifically, the Biden-Harris Administration will:

Put the U.S. Economy on a Path Towards Long-Term Resilience Across Critical Supply Chains:
Since his first day in office, President Biden has focused on an industrial strategy to address near-term disruptions linked to the global pandemic, revitalize our manufacturing base, strengthen critical supply chains, and position U.S. workers and businesses to compete and lead globally in the 21st century. To date, the SCDTF’s whole-of-government actions have contributed to a more than 70 percent decline in long-dwelling containers cluttering the docks at our two largest ports. Over $600 million in American Rescue Plan (ARP) resources have already been announced to strengthen the port workforce and improve facility efficiency at ports nationwide, from California and Florida to Massachusetts and Louisiana. These actions have also produced new supply chain partnerships between the automobile and semiconductor industries. And, they have helped secure $1 billion in ARP funding to expand meat processing capacity to promote competition and reduce prices for consumers. Because of the Biden-Harris Administration’s commitment to domestic industrial revitalization, American companies are also betting on the United States again. In just the last year, companies have announced nearly $200 billion in investments for semiconductor, electric vehicle, and battery manufacturing in the United States. But there is more work to do to build long-term resilience. In addition to working with Congress to enact the historic, bipartisan COMPETES/USICA legislation and the President’s Build Back Better Agenda, the Biden-Harris Administration will:

  • Propose a new domestic manufacturing initiative through the Export-Import Bank to strengthen U.S. manufacturing exports. Too many American manufacturers – especially small- and medium-sized ones– struggle to obtain the financing they need to expand their operations and compete for global sales. As the official export credit agency of the United States, the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) is well positioned to address this issue, supporting jobs in America along the way. This Spring, EXIM’s board will vote on a new domestic initiative, including providing financing priority to environmentally beneficial, small business, and transformational export area transactions, including semiconductors, biotech and biomedical products, renewable energy, and energy storage. This initiative will help America win the future by revitalizing American manufacturing, improving the resiliency of our supply chains, and leveling the playing field for American companies competing in overseas markets.
  • Expand access to capital for small manufacturers. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, too many small businesses struggled to access the capital needed to grow and compete. Through new and existing programs at the Department of the Treasury and the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Biden-Harris Administration will unlock tens of billions of dollars for small manufacturers. Specifically, $10 billion in ARP funds deployed by the Treasury Department under the new and improved State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI) will be leveraged into more than $70 billion in additional lending and investment for small businesses, including small manufacturers. Nearly a quarter of funding from the last round of SSBCI supported manufacturing companies.  To ensure small manufacturers can access this program, the Treasury Department will convene state, local, territorial, and Tribal governments this Spring to share ideas and highlight best practices, building to a roundtable of elected officials and other stakeholders later this year to highlight accomplishments. SBA will also promote and prioritize licenses for Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) committed to providing capital to domestic small business manufacturers. SBIC fund managers have financed over $14 billion in manufacturing-related businesses over the last decade, representing 24 percent of total dollars invested through the program during that period.
  • Advance the technological leadership of both small and large manufacturers. U.S. technological leadership remains critical to building greater long-term resilience and global competitiveness, including innovations in manufacturing. The Administration will host a series of roundtables with the 16 Manufacturing USA institutes focused on scaling innovative technologies, promoting sector-based regional workforce initiatives, partnering with unions, and supporting small- and medium-sized suppliers, to develop specific proposals for how the institutes can strengthen our supply chains. SBA will also host the inaugural America’s Seed Fund Start-up Expo to support Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) awardees seeking to access resources and assistance they need to help them commercialize and manufacture innovative technologies addressing critical supply chain challenges. Additionally, SBA will establish a committee of industry leaders to advise on transformative inventions and innovations from U.S.-based startups and established small businesses, as well as vulnerabilities in commercializing and financing domestic innovation.
  • Leverage the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law to move critical goods from ships to shelves faster and more affordably. Outdated infrastructure and the COVID-19 pandemic have strained the capacity of the entire goods movement supply chain, resulting in unprecedented snarls in global freight and logistics supply chains. Recognizing the importance of port investments for U.S. competitiveness, President Biden’s BIL is the single largest Federal investment in our ports in U.S. history. The Department of Transportation (DOT) is announcing the opening of the $450 million Port Infrastructure Development Grant program, the first and only Federal grant program wholly dedicated to investments in port infrastructure. In the coming weeks, DOT will also release notices of funding opportunity for the BIL’s INFRA, MEGA, CRISI, and grade crossing grant programs, which will fund a diverse set of transportation infrastructure projects of regional and national significance, including those that support the movement of freight and improve supply chain resilience. And, DOT will develop and issue revised State Freight Plan Guidance that incorporates updated requirements from BIL and requires consideration of cargo flows, the impacts of e-commerce, and supply chain resilience in directing BIL funding.
  • Invest in sustainable domestic production and processing of critical minerals. From rare earths in our electric motors and generators to the carbon fiber used for airplanes, the United States must ensure we are not dependent on foreign or single sources for critical minerals. To that end, this week the Biden-Harris Administration announced plans that will expand domestic rare earth processing; strengthen the National Defense Stockpile; update mining regulations to ensure sustainable and responsible practices; and issue recommendations for comprehensive reform of outdated mining laws. Through the BIL, the Department of Energy (DOE) will also demonstrate the feasibility of a full-scale integrated rare earth element extraction and separation facility and refinery from mine waste. Today, as part of the Mining Innovations for Negative Emissions Resources (MINER) Program, DOE is also releasing a $44 million funding opportunity to provide commercial-ready technologies that give the United States a net-zero or net negative emissions pathway toward increased domestic supplies of copper, nickel, lithium, cobalt, rare earth elements, and other critical elements required for a clean energy transition.  These and other efforts to secure a reliable, sustainable, and diverse supply of critical minerals and materials will help the United States meet its climate goals while creating good paying jobs and boosting U.S. competitiveness.
  • Leverage the American Rescue Plan to jumpstart a more competitive, innovative, and resilient meat and poultry supply chain. Over the last few decades, the meat and poultry processing sector has become dominated by a handful of large companies that control most of the business and most of the opportunities—raising prices and decreasing options for American families, while also squeezing out small businesses and entrepreneurs.  To increase competition and create more options for producers and consumers, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) is taking the next steps outlined in its comprehensive action plan to create a more diverse and resilient supply chain, supporting farmers, ranchers, and workers alike. This action plan includes dedicating $1 billion in American Rescue Plan funds to expand independent processing capacity. At a press conference this morning, USDA will announce the opening of applications for the first tranche of grants for new processing capacity and detail a partnership with DOL’s Goods Jobs Initiative to support the food processing workforce.  In the weeks ahead, USDA will also announce $10 million in technical assistance funding to establish an initial network, with additional efforts to follow, for a total of $25 million for technical assistance. Through that partnership, the agencies will improve workers’ access to information about their rights, engage with employers to improve job quality and workforce pathways, support workforce development such as Registered Apprenticeships, and provide technical assistance on grants, contracts, and other investments intended to improve job quality. 

Institutionalize Supply Chain Resilience Throughout the Federal Government:
Supply chain resilience must become a lasting focus for businesses and governments alike. In addition to the SCDTF, which has broken down silos and coordinated collaboration between agencies to respond to supply chain disruptions, the Administration has begun to formally institutionalize supply chain resilience throughout the Federal government. Earlier this month, DOE announced an internal realignment to effectively deploy more than $60 billion in BIL funding for clean energy infrastructure and deployment. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) announced a new dedicated public health industrial base expansion and supply chain management office. And, as highlighted above, DOT will now work with states to include supply chain resilience in their State Freight Plans, so that state-led infrastructure planning and investments bolster the resilience of the entire goods movement chain – across ports, trucking, rail, and warehousing. To build on this progress, the Administration is announcing new actions to institutionalize supply chain resilience throughout the Federal government. Specifically, the Biden-Harris Administration will:

  • Bolster the American manufacturing of critical goods through new reforms under the Buy American Act. President Biden believes that when the U.S. government spends Federal dollars, it should buy American-made products. During his first week in office he issued Executive Order 14005 to close loopholes and raise standards in the Buy American rules that govern Federal contracts. The White House Office of Management and Budget will soon issue a new Buy American rule that will create a new category of critical products that will be eligible for enhanced price preferences. By allowing the Federal government to pay an additional premium for critical domestic-made products and components essential to the Administration’s supply chain resiliency strategy, the new rule will create a steady source of demand that will help catalyze domestic production and bolster thin supply chains. Once implemented, American manufacturers will have an easier time securing the government contracts they need to expand their operations and create good-paying jobs.
  • Fully establish a Defense Production Act Investment Program to build and expand the health resources industrial base. The United States remains critically dependent on imports for a range of key pharmaceutical products and active pharmaceutical ingredients—the primary ingredients of generic drugs. During the pandemic, HHS established a Defense Production Act (DPA) office to ensure supply chain scarcity and shortages did not impede national efforts to combat COVID-19. Now, HHS will fully establish a DPA Title III Program to provide loans, grants, and other financing to build and expand the health resources industrial base. This program will ensure timely availability of essential domestic industrial resources; establish the necessary authorities and mechanisms to leverage the proposed Supply Chain Resilience and Crisis Response Office for management of the Public Health Industrial Base; support extended long-term contracts, on-hand inventory, and vendor-managed inventory; and ensure sufficient manufacturing capacity.
  • Bolster clean energy manufacturing through implementation of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. As part of the first ever Energy Sector Industrial Base strategy, America’s Strategy to Secure the Supply Chain for a Robust Clean Energy Transition, DOE is executing dozens of lines of work to accelerate domestic clean energy manufacturing. These include creating a new Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains bodog casino Office to strengthen and secure the energy supply chains needed to modernize the nation’s energy infrastructure and support the clean energy transition. Amongst many other activities, DOE is establishing four Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs and supporting the electric-vehicle battery materials supply chain. And today, as part of the Mining Innovations for Negative Emissions Resource Recovery (MINER) Program, DOE is releasing a $44 million funding opportunity to provide commercial-ready technologies that give the United States a net-zero or net negative emissions pathway toward increased domestic supplies of copper, nickel, lithium, cobalt, rare earth elements, and other critical elements required for a clean energy transition.
  • Restore U.S. global leadership on supply chains.  President Biden is committed to working with U.S. trading partners to address the immediate supply chain challenges from this unprecedented economic recovery and building long-term supply chain resilience for the future. Later this year, the Biden-Harris Administration will host a Ministerial-level Summit on Global Supply Chain Resilience to address near-term bottlenecks and tackle long-term challenges, building on the Summit on Global Supply Chain Resilience that President Biden held in October with the European Union and over a dozen like-minded countries. The Biden-Harris Administration will also partner with North American trading partners to prepare for future crises and mitigate resulting supply chain disruptions. Through the U.S.-Mexico High-Level Economic Dialogue, the United States and Mexico will establish a joint list of critical sectors involved in cross-border supply chains and create procedures to maintain continuity of supply chains in the event of times of crisis. The Competitiveness Committee of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement will also work to define essential industries and effective approaches for supply chains, including through information-sharing activities, providing advice and recommendations, identifying priority projects and policies, and designating a contact point for these efforts. And, as agreed to at the North American Leaders Summit in November, the United States, Mexico, and Canada will hold a trilateral supply chain coordination meeting by Summer 2022 to explore trilateral opportunities on supply chains based on results from the bilateral supply chain working groups.

There is still more to be done. To build on these investments and spur more private-sector investment in the United States, the President is committed to passing comprehensive competitiveness legislation like the COMPETES/USICA bills put forward in the House and the Senate to strengthen our supply chains, grow domestic manufacturing, and help us outcompete China and the rest of the world. This legislation, combined with the critical investments included in the Build Back Better Act, will help to deliver on the President’s mission to expand the productive capacity of our economy and lower costs for families.

To read the full announcement from The White House, please click here.

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_own: How did the Detroit /blogs/streamlining-toyotas-supply-chain/ Tue, 22 Feb 2022 20:06:00 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=32719 This article is the first of a two-part series describing Christine McDaniel’s conversation with Leila Aridi Afas, the director of global policy at Toyota Motor North America. Part one discusses...

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This article is the first of a two-part series describing Christine McDaniel’s conversation with Leila Aridi Afas, the director of global policy at Toyota Motor North America. Part one discusses Leila’s background, Toyota’s crisis management strategy and the Beijing Olympics. bodog online explores how Toyota is coping with the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Leila Afas coordinates cross-functional and cross-cultural teams to understand, anticipate and navigate the ever-evolving policy environment and successfully advocate Toyota’s position. Before joining Toyota, Afas was appointed by President Obama to serve at the U.S. Trade and Development Agency to help grow U.S. jobs and exports following the 2008 financial crisis. Her career spans the public and private sectors, and she earned a master’s degree in international economics from Columbia University.

Leila Aridi Afas speaks of world affairs like she is talking about what is happening down the street. A glance at her family background soon reveals the reason why. While she was born in Maryland, her mom was born in Britain and grew up there during World War II. Her father was born in Lebanon. Her parents met in Washington, D.C., and raised a family in the area. Leila grew up hearing about the civil war in Lebanon and the goings-on in the U.K. and around the world from family living in Australia, Colombia, Liberia, South Africa and across Europe. Her husband was born and raised in Casablanca. Because Leila grew up with one eye on the world, navigating the global policy affairs of a multinational company like Toyota felt like a natural fit.

One might think that a love for cars is a prerequisite for Leila’s job, but she wasn’t a “car gal.” So when the position came up, she was interested in it but had to be honest with her interviewers. “Listen,” she told them, “I have no background in the auto industry. I know nothing about cars. And I am not a lobbyist.”

“You’re perfect,” they said. Turns out that Toyota was looking for an industry outsider with a global perspective who could look “beyond the headlights” to identify emerging issues that could impact the company. As Leila explained, “If the 21st century has taught us anything, it’s that opportunities and threats are not contained within borders. We need to look beyond them.”

Dealing With Crises

I asked Leila what a typical day looks like—or, since there is no typical day for many of us lately, “How about one day this past week?” I asked. First thing in the morning, she connected with her colleagues around the globe—Brussels, Bangkok, Tokyo—to discuss topics related to global trade compliance. Next, she moderated a think tank panel discussion, and then she met with her colleagues to discuss emerging geopolitical events that might affect some of their plants and supply chains around the world.

The Beijing Olympics was on their radar that day, but not for the reasons Toyota had hoped. Toyota is an Olympic sponsor, and corporate sponsors are under fire from many in Congress and around the world because they are seen as ignoring human rights abuses in China “in blind pursuit of profits,” to quote Senator Marco Rubio. But what most people don’t understand, Leila said, is that Toyota’s sponsorship supports the Team Toyota athletes. Unlike in other countries, U.S. athletes receive no direct government funding, so corporate sponsorships are critical. She also explained that it is the International Olympic Committee (IOC) that selects the host city. And Toyota’s IOC sponsorship, including that of Tokyo 2020, Beijing 2022 and even Paris 2024, was decided years ago, in 2015, “well before the numerous reports of prison labor camps and genocide in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” she said. Listening to her, I could not help but think this is yet another large multinational company in a tight spot over a human rights issue in China—just what Ian Bremmer and the Eurasia Group warned us was coming as corporations risk losing the culture wars in new and unexpected ways.

Given that Toyota has operations in 28 markets and sells its products in more than 170 countries and territories, the team has experience with geopolitical disasters, both natural and manmade. The 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami were massive, devastating human tragedies with a crushing impact on companies throughout Japan, including Toyota and its suppliers. One of Toyota’s main semiconductor suppliers was offline for many months, and the disruption had ripple effects on the carmaker globally. Its U.S. plants were forced to cut production by 75% as they waited for their Japanese suppliers to get back up and running. That was a big wake-up call, Leila said.

In 2016, a coup attempt in Turkey threatened to increase instability. For a moment the team was gearing up to protect its workers and families, not to mention their plant for the popular-in-Europe Toyota C-HR. Fortunately, the coup did not materialize. Crisis averted.

But for Toyota, or any company built on just-in-time manufacturing, navigating crises and disasters requires a big pivot. With just-in-time manufacturing (sometimes called lean manufacturing), items are created to meet demand, not created in surplus; there is no inventory. For any company that relies on this production process technique, the big question right now is how do you stay nimble and efficient to keep consumer prices competitive, yet still be able to deal with unforeseen events?

1,400 Critical Parts

As is often the case, the first step to solving any gigantic problem is to gather information. A team in the company worked around the clock to map out the entire supply chain—not just one supply chain for the company, but chains for nearly every single part it takes to make nearly every single one of their automobiles. The team identified about 1,400 critical parts (out of roughly 30,000 parts total) that had relatively long lead times. If any one of those 1,400 critical parts were not available, the entire production line could be forced to a halt.

“The team identified their suppliers, their suppliers’ suppliers, and their suppliers’ suppliers’ suppliers,” Leila explained. Over time, Toyota worked to increase inventory and manage lead times for these critical parts. Listening to her explain the database, you get the sense that if anyone so much as sneezes in a plant where one of those 1,400 critical parts is coming from, a red-alert button lights up. While that’s not literally the case, Leila described several ways in which Toyota worked to safeguard its supply of critical parts:

  • A team within the company worked to diversify its presence in multiple geographic regions while ensuring that it could procure the necessary parts to keep building vehicles if one particular region were unable to produce.
  • Toyota began standardizing parts across different vehicle models. Now, if one supplier shuts down for any reason, another plant is able to increase production of the standardized part to meet demand.
  • When standardization wasn’t an option—as is the case for the 1,400+ critical parts Leila’s team identified—Toyota increased inventory to maintain a supply in case of emergencies.

Leila identified several takeaways from Toyota’s experiences in dealing with supply chain problems. “In my view, the most important part is the trust and respect between Toyota and our suppliers, who are truly partners.” She also emphasized the importance of staying in close and constant communication with suppliers. Following the devastating 2011 earthquake and tsunami, Toyota created a new database called the RESCUE system, which suppliers update in real time and which Toyota tracks consistently. “It’s crucial that the information is always up to date,” Leila concludes. “You never know when a crisis will strike.” As part two of this series discusses, the current crisis of the global COVID-19 pandemic is forcing Toyota and many other companies to take these lessons to heart.

Christine McDaniel is a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Her research focuses on international trade, globalization and intellectual property rights.

To read the full commentary from Discourse Magazine, please click here.

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_own: How did the Detroit /blogs/vance-lighthizer/ Thu, 09 Sep 2021 13:26:51 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=48066 In light of Labor Day this past weekend, it’s worth reflecting on the condition of organized labor in this country. And for private sector unions, things aren’t looking good. Not long after World War...

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In light of Labor Day this past weekend, it’s worth reflecting on the condition of organized labor in this country. And for private sector unions, things aren’t looking good. Not long after World War II, 35% of private sector workers belonged to a union; now, that number is 6.3% (which is actually a slight increase over recent years).

While public sector unions have thrived because the public sector itself has grown, private sector unions have been annihilated by a bipartisan force: globalization. While much of our political debate over organized labor has focused on the effects of Right to Work and related laws, the evidence suggests that these types of reforms have minimal effect. Wisconsin, for instance, is a Right to Work state and Ohio is not, yet workers in Ohio have not fared obviously better (or worse) than those of Wisconsin.

That’s because on a national scale, the jobs that supported a good union wage have become less common or disappeared altogether. Economist David Autor has found that from 1999 to 2011, 2.5 million good manufacturing jobs were lost to import competition from China alone. We’ve also lost millions of jobs to other countries like Mexico. Combined, the effects of globalization have hollowed out America’s industrial core.

These policies have made our country far less self-sufficient economically. Just remember last year, when the Chinese Communist Party threatened America with a loss of critical pharmaceutical ingredients at the height of a global pandemic. But they’ve also destroyed millions of middle-class livelihoods. As Autor also found, when the manufacturing jobs moved out, a host of social problems moved in: family divorce and breakdown, child abuse and neglect and opioid addiction. Ohio suffered more than most states from the decline of manufacturing jobs.

Some blame the disappearance of these manufacturing jobs on unions themselves. And while there are undoubtedly examples of inflexible unions that made it harder for their companies to keep factories in America, many countries have far higher union participation rates but suffered much less of a decline in manufacturing employment.

Far more important than any individual union was the cheap labor overseas and the fact that our government did nothing to stop U.S. companies from exploiting it. Indeed, policymakers often encouraged offshoring through bad trade deals and tax policy.

As we now know, China gives companies who relocate their factories a massive advantage: cheap workers with no expectations and no rights. Some of our biggest corporations (like Apple) have benefited from literal slave labor in China.

That our biggest companies have taken their businesses to places like China is shameful, but our government policy shouldn’t depend on our biggest companies doing the right thing. In fact, during the Trump administration (where one of us served in the Cabinet), our country imposed tariffs on many goods coming into the United States from China. These policies had the effect of offsetting China’s unfair economic advantages and sending a clear signal to U.S. companies that the time has come to bring jobs home and reduce our dependence on China.

We should continue those policies and expand upon them. Instead, some in Congress and the Biden administration seem desperate to turn the clock back. Under influence from many American multinational companies, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and others want to reduce or eliminate tariffs that were part of a long overdue effort to combat China’s industrial warfare on the United States.

It would be regrettable if the Biden administration were to cave to this pressure and sell out the very workers it claims to champion. As we’ve learned the hard way over the last decades, there is no more important foundation for American workers than a strong manufacturing base.

Politicians will talk big about fighting China or standing up for the American worker. But unless they’re willing to impose real economic costs on the Chinese and stand up to the American CEOs who work with them, Labor Day will be little more than a reminder that we once lived in a country where the American worker was thriving.

Republican J.D. Vance of Cincinnati is a candidate for the U.S. Senate, and Robert Lighthizer is a former U.S. trade representative who has endorsed Vance’s candidacy.

To read the full opinion as it was published by the Akron Beacon Journal, click here.

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_own: How did the Detroit /blogs/green-energy-forced-labor/ Fri, 23 Jul 2021 17:01:47 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=29663 Clean energy faces a messy problem. The region at the heart of solar production is rife with forced labor and it is not clear that there is a meaningful supply...

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Clean energy faces a messy problem.

The region at the heart of solar production is rife with forced labor and it is not clear that there is a meaningful supply anywhere else of the materials the solar industry relies on. Further, it is not clear how solar suppliers, importers, developers, or investors can verify that their supply chains are free of forced labor when the Chinese government denies that such practices exist and may punish those who would contradict that position.

Add to that issue the fact that Customs is stopping equipment at the border if the agency suspects there is forced labor in the supply chain, but the U.S. Government has not provided meaningful guidance on how to prove that solar products are free of forced labor and therefor admissible.

The industry and regulators are searching for a viable way to source clean supply chains for clean energy and to verify with some certainty that solar equipment in the United States if free of forced labor.

1. Background

Hoshine Silica Industry Co. is a major supplier to the solar industry and is more or less ground zero for forced labor abuses.  The solar industry relies on panels made from silicon. Hoshine is the world’s largest metallurgical-grade silicon producer.

Silicon can be made a number of ways, but the most common steps are to mine quartz, crush and heat that material into metallurgic-grade silicon, then use chemical processing to make polycrystalline silicon. There is obviously more complexity to the system, but the purpose of the explanation above is to point out that a major source for the silica rock, as well as the coal needed for the heat processing, are both found in the mines and manufacturing facilities of Hoshine Silica Industry co. According to reports, those facilities are in the same industrial park as two Uighur internment camps.

The solar industry recognizes the forced labor problem is real, is not going to go away on its own, and must be addressed head on.

2. The Current and Near Future State of Regulation

2.1 U.S. Customs is stopping equipment at the border

As we reported here, the U.S. Government issued a Withhold Release Order (WRO) stating that any products believed to contain silica material produced by Hoshine Silicon Industry Co. and its subsidiaries should be held by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and not released without evidence that the product’s supply chain was free of forced labor.

It appears that more similar regulation is coming down the pike. We understand that the effort to combat forced labor in the solar industry is being driven by the National Security Council at the White House, and supported by an unusual coalition of China hawks, Labor interests, and NGOs. For that we reason, we believe that there the current administration will pursue more WROs.

Additionally, on June 24, the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added four Chinese entities to the Entity List for accepting or utilizing forced labor in the implementation of China’s campaign of repression against Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). It is very possible those companies may soon be subject to WROs:

  • Xinjiang Daqo New Energy Co., Ltd.
  • Xinjiang East Hope Nonferrous Metals Co., Ltd.
  • Xinjiang GCL New Energy Material Technology Co., Ltd.
  • Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)

According to recent reports, BIS may also issue more entity list designations. Those designations prohibit exports to the designated companies. However, they may be a good indicator of what companies may be targeted for WROs thereafter.

2.2 The U.S. Congress may broaden prohibitions on imports

In parallel, the House and Senate are currently working on two bills, both titled Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. The senate bill has been passed, while the House bill is still in committee. Those bills could establish a presumption that anything produced in the XUAR uses forced labor. That would mean that importers of those articles would then be reqiured rebut that presumption in order to import any goods from the Region into the United States.

2.3 Other agencies may add to the restrictions

There is some speculation that the USTR may start issuing 301 designations – adding a substantial punitive tariff to equipment from the Xinjiang region. Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Treasury has shown that it is not afraid to use its sanctions authority to entirely cut off U.S. persons from transactions with parties suspected of forced labor abuses.

3. The Opening for Industry: Self-Regulation or Government Regulation

3.1 Customs will need some time to ramp up its enforcement apparatus

The U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents addressing forced labor are competent and hard-working. However, the agency is understaffed to deal with the overwhelming problem of forced labor in the solar industry. With maybe a couple dozen agents assigned to forced labor, and that force also looking at Xinjiang textile and agriculture imports, it will be difficult for CBP to find bandwidth to clear imports stopped at the border for forced labor issues.

That small group of enforcement officials will face the challenge of tracing supply chains from the base chemical level described above, with documentation in Mandarin. Finally, at this point, there is no clear guidance from the U.S. government as to what evidence would clear a shipment stopped at the border. There is no U.S. Customs checklist for forced labor verification nor a list of acceptable evidence that a supply chain is free of forced labor.

Because no guidance on what constitutes admissible product has been issued, it is unclear what CBP would want to see in order to clear equipment held under a WRO. This uncertainty leaves industry with an opportunity to lead before government imposes requirements (more in Section 5 below).

3.2 Industry can have a voice (for now) in what regulation will look like

As the U.S. Government slowly starts to work on figuring out what constitutes admissibility, the Solar Industry has opportunity to lead the process in a number of different ways:

  • The Solar Industry could create and propose a list of criteria for admissible products.
  • While it is taking steps to identify suppliers accepting or relying on forced labor (on which more in our second article of this series), the Industry could effectively clear a group of suppliers and white-list those in cooperation with the U.S. Government.
  • The Industry could take the Better Cotton Initiative as a template and invest in a third-party verification system that would constitute substantive, auditable evidence of a supply chain free of forced labor.
  • We understand that chemical signatures in the silicon wafer from the silicon rock processing would allow for batch tracing,[1] which allowing the Industry or a vendor to the industry to batch-test and identify the source of the materials rely on.

Any one or a combination of the above approaches could help the Industry support the laudable goal of eliminating forced labor from the supply chain while, at the same time, helping the Industry avoid onerous or inconsistent regulations devised without its input. There is opportunity for solar to continue its spectacular growth, but it will need to take steps to address this messy problem.

Reid Whitten is the Managing Partner of Sheppard Mullin’s London office, practicing in international trade regulations and investigations.

Julien Blanquart is an International Trade associate in the Government Contracts, Investigations & International Trade in the firm’s Brussels and London offices.

To read the full commentary from Sheppard Mullin, please click here

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_own: How did the Detroit /blogs/biden-administrations-products-china/ Fri, 25 Jun 2021 15:56:55 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=28531 The Biden Administration has taken new actions related to forced labor in the Xinjiang region that may affect the supply for material critical for solar panels: U.S. Customs and Border...

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The Biden Administration has taken new actions related to forced labor in the Xinjiang region that may affect the supply for material critical for solar panels: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issued a Withhold Release Order (WRO), the Department of Commerce (Commerce) updated its Entity List, and the Department of Labor (Labor) updated its “List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor.”  These updates are part of an increased emphasis on both forced labor issues and a crackdown on goods from China’s Xinjiang province, and come on the heels of the G7 Summit that was held in mid-June.  The White House indicated that the Administration’s actions are a “translation” of the commitments made at the G7 denouncing forced labor in the Xinjiang region.

CBP issued a WRO on silica-based products manufactured by Hoshine Silicon Industry Co., Ltd. and its subsidiaries (Hoshine).  Hoshine is located in Xinjiang.  CBP issued the WRO based on unidentified “information available” that “reasonably but not conclusively” points to the use of forced labor.  Based on the WRO, silica-based products will be detained at all U.S. ports of entry.  It is also possible that CBP could issue redelivery notices for affected goods imported and released within 30 days of the redelivery notice.  This WRO marks the eleventh order on goods allegedly made by forced labor from Xinjiang.  Additionally, it broadly applies not only to goods exported by the Hoshine Silicon Industry Co., Ltd. but to any goods incorporating materials produced by this company.  This broad scope may be the largest problem for purchasers of the Hoshine product, who now may be faced with the disruption of their imports or even redelivery notices.

Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) also updated its Entity List to include the following five (5) entities:

  • Hoshine Silicon Industry (Shanshan) Co., Ltd.
  • Xinjiang Daqo New Energy Co., Ltd.
  • Xinjiang East Hope Nonferrous Metals Co., Ltd.
  • Xinjiang GCL New Energy Material Technology Co., Ltd.
  • Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)

Several of these entities are major manufacturers of monocrystalline silicon and polysilicon which are used in the production of solar panels.  As a result of the BIS Entity List designation, effective June 24, 2021, the export, reexport, and in-country transfer of commodities, software, and technology subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) is prohibited if a company on the Entity List is an end-user, purchaser, or intermediate or ultimate consignee.

BIS’s action did include a savings clause which allows shipments of items “en route aboard a carrier” as of June 24, 2021 to proceed to the newly listed entities if those shipments were made pursuant to actual orders and would not have otherwise required BIS export licensing.

BIS’s action is in addition to the WRO issued by CBP.  In a press release issued by Commerce, the Administration indicated that “ [t]his action targets these entities’ ability to access commodities, software, and technology subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), and is part of a U.S. Government-wide effort to take strong action against China’s ongoing campaign of repression against Muslim minority groups in the XUAR.”

Finally, the Labor Department added polysilicon produced with forced labor in China to its “List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor.”  Updates to this List are typically published at two-year intervals, but this update is the first in the List’s history that was published before the next scheduled publication.

Jeffrey Neeley has more than 25 years of experience representing private parties in international trade remedies disputes in the U.S. and in foreign jurisdictions. He guides clients in matters including antidumping investigations, countervailing duties, subsidies, intellectual property disputes as well as related customs, export control, and other import/export issues.

To read the original commentary from Husch Blackwell please visit here

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_own: How did the Detroit /blogs/american-trade-china-predatory-practices/ Fri, 11 Jun 2021 16:41:34 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=28262 Trade policy in the United States has reached a turning point as a rising China seeks absolute advantage across a broad range of vital industries. If the United States rejects...

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Trade policy in the United States has reached a turning point as a rising China seeks absolute advantage across a broad range of vital industries. If the United States rejects both free trade and protectionism, and going forward adopts power trade as a strategy, what needs to be done to implement that strategy? This is the third of three articles which examine power trade as practiced by Germany before World War II, and by China today.

The practice of U.S. power trade from 1945 to 2016, focused as it was on ensuring global market integration (outside of the Soviet Union and then Russia)—even at the expense of U.S. industrial competitiveness—has run its course. America’s adversary today is not a sclerotic but militarily powerful foe that could inflict little or no economic damage outside of its bloc. China today is a dynamic, militarily and technologically powerful foe that can and does inflict considerable economic damage around the world, including to the U.S. economy.

As such, the United States needs to shift from an approach to power trade based on advancing U.S. foreign policy interests to an approach that focuses on advancing U.S. competitive advantage against China, especially in critical advanced technology sectors. Doing so necessitates a new approach to trade strategy, including a more sophisticated and analytical role for the federal government.U.S. trade negotiation has long been premised on the notion that nations do best when they align their trade policies with market forces based on comparative advantage. In this sense, U.S. trade negotiators have often seen their role, at least in part, as helping other nations identify and advance their own comparative advantages. The endless dialogues with China under the George W. Bush and Obama administrations were a reflection of this: U.S. negotiators worked to get China to open its markets to certain U.S. industries because they believed the United States and China both would benefit.

Under a new power trade doctrine that focuses on U.S. competitiveness, the assumption should be that nations know their strategic industrial interests and negotiate to achieve them. As such, trade negotiations with China should not be about achieving enlightenment or changing minds; they should be about compelling change from a position of superior power. In this sense, Trump assumed that China was not going to negotiate in good faith, so persuasion was futile and only threats backed up by action would work. While this was a better reflection of the reality of power trade negotiations, it accomplished little, in part because acting alone is no longer enough to compel China to change.

Power trade also has implications for how trade strategy is developed. If the optimal domestic industrial structure and trading relationships reflect a nation’s natural comparative advantage—Britain as good at textiles, Portugal at wine, and so forth—then there is no need for the state to have strong analytical capabilities. Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage was developed at a time when well more than half of nations’ GDPs was a product of agricultural sectors (with 60 percent of Britain’s labor force still in the fields). Today, agriculture contributes less than 1 percent of U.S. GDP, and the vast majority of economic impact derives from knowledge- and technology-driven manufacturing and services industries, where comparative advantage is created, not naturally given.

Moreover, in China, the United States faces a com- petitor who rejects even the notion of comparative ad- vantage and instead seeks absolute advantage across all high-value–added, advanced technology industries, from airplanes and biotechnology to clean energy to critical information and communications technologies from semiconductors to 5G equipment. When the intentional actions of nation-states are capable of creating and shifting advantage in these sectors, then the United States had better have strong analytical capabilities to understand this dynamic.

But the longstanding view has been that as long as trade policy is focused on removing barriers and distortions, market forces do the rest and produce the optimal economic structure. This belief explains the lack of strong analytical capabilities in the federal government to evaluate industrial capabilities and trade interests. The United States Trade Representative’s Office is not an analytical agency; it is a legalistic one, staffed principally with lawyers who deal with trade law arcana. While the U.S. Department of Commerce engages in some modest collection of trade statistics coupled with equally modest export promotion programs, it lacks analytical capabilities to understand U.S. industrial structure or domestic and international competitive forces in key industries. And while the Bureau of Industry and Security and the International Trade Commission engage in analysis, the former’s is limited to narrow national security issues, and the latter’s relates to trade adjudication issues and ad hoc requests for industrial and trade analysis.

By contrast, trade and industrial policy focused on boosting U.S. competitive advantage requires deep analysis, both of how to generate the optimal industrial structure, and also of adversaries’ industries and strategies. This is why, in his 1945 book National Power and the

Structure of Foreign Trade, noted develop- ment economist Albert O. Hirschman wrote with respect to Germany, “the amazing coherence of German policies was due … in part to detailed planning springing from economic analysis.” This also explains the advantage China has developed in its vast bureaucratic apparatus governing and analyzing trade, from the National Development and Reform Commission to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology to the Ministry of Commerce, and it highlights the nature of the shift that has occurred under Xi Jinping from a “China, Inc.” regime to a “CCP, Inc.” regime, as analyst Jude Blanchette at the Center for Strategic and International Studies has articulated.

This recognition explains the recent widespread calls for the Biden administration to step up its analytical capabilities when it comes to trade and industrial competitiveness in order to at least close the gap between the country’s economically oriented analytical capabilities and its national security–oriented analytical capabilities. Indeed, the closest America has to that now is in the Defense Department’s Office of Industrial Policy, but the focus, as expected, is defense oriented. What the country needs is an economy-wide equivalent to the Defense Department’s “net assessment” structure and process, which is a “framework for strategic analysis” involving quantitative and qualitative in- formation, to assess the current and future military power of the United States and its adversaries. The United States needs the same in-depth practice to assess the commercial power and capabilities of itself and its adversaries.

In addition, while the domestic politics of trade are real regardless of the regime— free, limited, or power—they are considerably more difficult in a power trade regime. Indeed, one core challenge with implementing a competitiveness-based power trade policy is that it generates considerable domestic policy conflicts, because it requires actively promoting certain industries while “sacrificing” others. While such conflicts might exist in the free trade regime, the expectation is that the role of the state in adjudicating these conflicts is minimal; the government promotes free trade and reduced market barriers for all. In this world, there is a gen- eral direction of opening up, and while some negatively affected domestic interests might complain, it is in the context of a broader liberalization and opening, so their complaints have less weight.

But in competitiveness-based power trade, it is clear that the state can and does play a decisive role and must choose. As Hirschman writes, “conflicts between the policies implementing the different principles of a power policy with foreign trade as an instrument are conceivable and do occur.” For example, a power trade-based trade negotiation would not put the chicken industry on par with the semiconductor industry for the simple reason that the latter is much more important to national security and growth and much harder to replicate later if trade were to harm it. Nor would it shrink from a fight for strong intellectual property rights in trade agreements for industries like biopharmaceuticals because of their strategic importance vis-à-vis China.

This explains why power trade has been easier to implement in nondemocratic regimes where the state more easily imposes its will on industry. With its CCP dictatorship, especially now with the cult of President Xi, the Chinese state can largely ignore vested domestic interests that are a casualty of a trade war. It can even force Jack Ma, the richest person in China, to lay low for several months. It can force CCP members onto the boards or executive teams of all enterprises operating in China, whether these are domestic or foreign companies. But this doesn’t mean that in America’s pluralist and contentious system more cannot be done to prioritize strategic industries in trade policy.

In addition, countering China’s power trade can be difficult for any nation, because so many of those coun- tries’ domestic economic interests are now dependent on China. And that is precisely what China has sought. For example, when in response to Trump’s initial rounds of tariffs China erected tariffs on U.S. agricultural products, particularly from politically important midwestern states, China was doing what Germany had done in the first part of the twentieth century. As Hirschman points out, “In the social pattern of each country there exist certain powerful groups, the support of which is particularly valuable to a foreign country in its power policy; the foreign country will therefore try to establish commercial relations with these groups, in order that their voices will be raised in its favor.” Given the U.S. reflexive embrace of free trade, this kind of trade reorientation obviously will be much more difficult, especially given the extent to which Beijing has now leveraged its domestic market to create dependency for certain U.S. exporters such as farming interests. Consequently, even the Trump administration asked for concessions from China to import more U.S. agricultural products.

Strategic Implications for the Direction of U.S. Trade Policy

So what should be done at a policy level?
First, policymakers should abandon, at least while China is controlled by the CCP, any hope that the world can be remade in the Ricardian image of free-trading nations pursuing comparative advantage through fair, rules based trade. The high-water mark for that was in 2001, just after China joined the World Trade Organization, when the Doha round commenced. It has largely been downhill ever since, at least in terms of fulfilling the idealized global free trade vision.

Achieving that vision was never going to be easy, because, as Hirschman writes:

[I]nternational trade remains a political act whether it takes places under a system of free trade or protection… Still, the belief is widespread that it is possible somehow to escape this intimate connection between international trade and “power politics” and to restore trade to its “normal and beneficial economic functions.”

And if getting to deeper global integration and free trade was harder before China ramped up its power trade, it is virtually impossible now.

If trying to force open the stuck free trade door is not possible, at least on a global, multilateral basis, then what should the United States do? In short, it must trade where it can, protect what it must, and embrace industrial policy as much as possible.

In other words, the Biden administration should continue to seek trade liberalization with nations that are not power traders, either on a bilateral basis (such as in a U.S.-UK agreement), on a multilateral basis (such as in a U.S.-Commonwealth agreement), or in particular sectors, such through an expanded Information Technology Agreement, a new e-commerce and digital trade agreement, or an environmental goods and services agreement. But these sorts of agreements should be nego- tiated without China’s involvement to ensure U.S. interests are reflected as fully as possible. The administration should also work for robust World Trade Organization reforms to better deal with China violations, as a Center for Strategic and International Studies commission has recommended. It should also form a new allied-nation trade compact that would operate outside and in parallel to the World Trade Organization.

Shifting to a new form of power trading will also entail altering the meaning of President Biden’s commitment to a trade policy for the middle class, which appears an amalgam of protectionism (for example, strengthened “Buy America” provisions), limited defense of U.S. economic interests (such as weakening intellectual property protection in trade agreements), and domestic spending to help those hurt by trade, all the while paring back the ambition of the prevailing U.S. power trade doctrine. While ensuring that American workers benefit more from trade is critical, the best way to accomplish that is to bolster U.S. advanced industrial competitiveness vis-à- vis China. America’s middle class is not in a “precarious state” principally because of imbalances of distribution; it is in a precarious state because the overall U.S. economy is in a shaky competitive position. Any new trade doctrine to help the middle class should be first and foremost focused on helping enterprises, large and small, in advanced industries compete globally, especially against China. Among other steps, this means abandoning the misguided notion that certain U.S. business interests, such as intellectual property protection overseas, are not also the interest of U.S. workers.

President Biden is right to focus on domestic investment and boosting competitiveness as part of any new approach to trade. For too long, policymakers believed that America did not need a competitiveness strategy to compete—partly because the country was in a superior position, and partly because of the prevailing belief that competitiveness strategies were not effective. China has largely changed that. As such, a core component of a China-focused power trade doctrine must be a domestic competitiveness agenda.

The United States needs to do a better job of supporting its own advanced and critical industries through smart industrial and technology policies. But the conven- tional wisdom generally stops at advocating for better generic factor inputs, such as supporting high-skill im- migration and increased science funding. These are nec- essary but woefully insufficient in confronting the China challenge. A real strategy should focus on policies and programs that change corporate strategy and decision- making in sectors key to the United States’ future, in part to align these firms’ interests with the long-term interests of the United States. These policies should include a much more robust research and development tax credit and a new investment tax credit, establishment of well- funded, pre-competitive R&D institutes, major investment incentive programs like the CHIPs Act focused on semiconductors, and major federal government moonshots—involving funding and massive procurement— for key areas like smart cities, robotics, curing cancer and other chronic diseases, and clean energy.

On the trade front, a new China-focused doctrine will entail closer collaboration between allied nations to push back against China’s predatory power trade practices including by increasing foreign aid to help developing nations avoid crippling dependency on China, by better coordinating export controls and inward investment reviews, and by collaborating on technology policy. But U.S. policymakers should have modest and realistic expectations here. Europe seems to have little stomach for anything other than exporting a few more cars to China. While South Korea and Japan are more willing to be on America’s side against China, ultimately they will likely have to choose neutrality.

Finally, with regard to China directly, the Biden administration needs to replace the Trump administration’s shotgun style of confrontation with more carefully aimed rifle shots to advance America’s strategic economic interests while constraining China’s. Unless Europe fully joins the United States, or the World Trade Organization undergoes significant reform so it can take effective action against non-rule-of-law nations like China, it is unlikely that outside forces will be able to roll back China’s rampant unfair and predatory economic and trade practices.

What the United States can and should do is better protect itself against China’s predatory policies. This will entail stepping up commercial counterintelligence efforts and cybersecurity to limit Chinese access to key intellectual property. It will require using the powers the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act gave the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to largely stop Chinese investment in U.S. technology-related firms, including venture capital investments. It will mean effectively tracking Chinese companies that benefit from U.S. intellectual property theft or unfair subsidies, and limiting their access to U.S. markets.

U.S. trade policy is at a turning point, between one regime and another. The old, post-war regime has exhausted itself. The Trumpian alternative was a backward-looking dead end. However, the risk now is that the Biden administration’s “middle-class” trade doctrine will make redistribution the key focus, continuing long-term decline in American economic and technology competitiveness and power. To avert that, it is time for a new China-containing power trade doctrine and regime focused on developing a sizable and sustainable lead in the key advanced technology industries central to America’s future prosperity and defense.

As founder and president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), recognized as the world’s top think tank for science and technology policy, Robert D. Atkinson leads a prolific team of policy analysts and fellows that is successfully shaping the debate and setting the agenda on a host of critical issues at the intersection of technological innovation and public policy.

He is an internationally recognized scholar and a widely published author whom The New Republic has named one of the “three most important thinkers about innovation,” Washingtonian Magazine has called a “tech titan,” Government Technology Magazine has judged to be one of the 25 top “doers, dreamers and drivers of information technology,” and the Wharton Business School has given the “Wharton Infosys Business Transformation Award.”

To read the full commentary from the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, (ITIF) please click here.

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_own: How did the Detroit /blogs/how-bidens-personnel-choices/ Wed, 03 Mar 2021 16:15:05 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=26859 A Long View Covid-19 has depressed global trade greatly, but strategic and structural concerns about trade will outlive the virus. The Trump administration had a huge impact on trade, from...

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A Long View

Covid-19 has depressed global trade greatly, but strategic and structural concerns about trade will outlive the virus. The Trump administration had a huge impact on trade, from waging a trade war with China to ratcheting up anti-free trade rhetoric and levying tariffs against China, Canada, Mexico, and the European Union.

Under President Joe Biden, U.S. trade policy will change greatly, although not immediately. President Biden has made abundantly clear that his first priority is the Covid-19 pandemic, and his $1.9 trillion stimulus plan will dominate economic policymaking for weeks. Even if President Biden does not materially address trade policy until after the pandemic subsides, his remarks and nominees for international economic positions suggest what changes to U.S. trade policy he will make during the rest of his term. Three key areas are analyzed below through the lens of his personnel and policy choices to date.

(1) Integration of Trade and Other Strategies

President Biden and his nominees have signaled their intention to integrate trade into general national security strategy and economic policy. In her introductory remarks upon her nomination as President Biden’s U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Katherine Tai described trade as being “like any other tool in our domestic or foreign policy,” a means rather than “an end in itself.” The nomination of Wally Adeyemo, President Biden’s selection for U.S. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, also signals an integration between economic and national security policy; Mr. Adeyemo held numerous economic policy positions in the Obama administration, including Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics, a position on the National Security Council (NSC).

Biden’s intention to integrate trade into broader strategies would pivot from President Trump’s approach. President Trump often spoke about trade surpluses as ends themselves, and his administration closed the NSC’s Office of International Economics. This abolished the position Mr. Adeyemo held in President Obama’s NSC.

President Biden’s appointments this far also reveal that his trade and security strategy will include a focus on domestic economic concerns. Weeks after being announced as Biden’s choice for National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan gave a far-ranging interview with NPR in which he articulated a view of foreign policy that incorporates and prioritizes the economic concerns of middle-class Americans, and President Biden expressed a similar focus throughout the 2020 campaign. This framework reflects Mr. Sullivan’s recent work: after serving as a senior advisor to Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign, he led a project on foreign policy and the middle class at the Carnegie Endowment, which Press Secretary Jen Psaki recently tweeted about Ms. Tai will also surely bring domestic economic concerns to trade negotiations. As Chief Trade Counsel to the Chairman and Democratic Members of the House Ways and Means Committee, she advocated for labor and environmental protections in the recent U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement (USMCA).

(2) New Free Trade Agreements

Free trade agreements (FTA’s) are notoriously difficult to negotiate and ratify even in the best of times. The pandemic means new FTA’s will not come soon, and Biden has indicated as much. He has repeatedly said he will not focus on FTA’s in the near-term, instead directing his energy to address Covid-19 and domestic issues. However, Biden’s personnel choices suggest renewed opportunities for FTA’s later in his term.

Although the Trump administration negotiated and ratified the USMCA and phase one of a free trade agreement with China, they also abandoned FTA’s the Obama administration had initiated. In January 2017, Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the FTA the Obama administration had negotiated with 11 Pacific nations, comprising 40% of global GDP. Trump also ended negotiations the Obama administration had begun with the European Union for an FTA, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

Key members of Biden’s incoming team have a wealth of experience with FTA’s. During his time in the Obama Treasury Department, Mr. Adeyemo served as the chief negotiator for the TPP’s provisions on macroeconomic policy. Additionally, Ms. Tai worked on the USMCA for the Ways and Means Committee.

Recent FTA’s indicate where new agreements under the Biden administration may emerge. The U.S. and the U.K. have not agreed to an FTA, although they have had initial rounds of negotiations, so a new agreement may be on the horizon. The United Kingdom and the EU agreed to an FTA in December 2020. The U.S. and the EU also still do not have an agreement, though the EU seems open to new FTA’s. In December 2020, the EU released a blueprint for the transatlantic partnership, specifically mentioning Biden’s election as a key opportunity to strengthen relations. It remains to be seen how willing the EU is to start negotiating any deal until the U.S. lifts its steel and aluminum tariffs. However, President Biden’s recent recommitment to the Paris Climate Accord is likely a necessary, if incremental, first step because some EU member states require another country’s ascent to the accord as a precondition to an FTA. Additionally, in November 2020, the U.S. and the EU agreed to a mini-FTA for lobsters. The EU also agreed to an FTA with Canada in 2017.

President Biden may pivot back to Asia for an FTA. Since President Trump abandoned the TPP in 2017, the TPP’s other member countries have enacted an FTA without the United States. Labor provisions could be a concern for an American FTA with Asian countries, but Ms. Tai’s experience addressing labor concerns in FTA’s would equip her well to do so again. Mr. Adeyemo’s experience with the TPP for the Obama administration would also prove relevant to renewed FTA efforts in Asia. Finally, an FTA with Asian countries would offer a bulwark against China, so this could support the administration’s broader China strategy.

(3) Currency Manipulation?

A key area to pay attention to in any FTA’s the Biden administration negotiates is currency manipulation. In a trade context, currency manipulation allows a country to artificially lower the prices other countries pay for their products. This makes the country’s exports unfairly competitive. In this way, exchange rate policy is trade policy.

Currency manipulation has gained political salience in recent years. President Trump accused China of manipulating its currency many times. In 2019, the Trump Treasury Department officially labeled China a currency manipulator and did the same to Vietnam and Switzerland in December 2020.

Biden officials have said they prioritize addressing currency manipulation, but their specific plans have not been revealed. During the campaign, President Biden committed to “aggressive trade enforcement” actions against Chinese currency manipulation, and in her confirmation testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Dr. Janet Yellen, President Biden’s Treasury Secretary, said she supports efforts against countries’ currency manipulation that seeks “an unfair trade advantage.” Ms. Tai served as the head of U.S.-China trade enforcement at USTR, and Mr. Adeyemo has also warned against currency manipulation many times.

However, Mr. Adeyemo’s experience with the TPP may prove most relevant to currency manipulation. Mr. Adeyemo served as deputy chief of staff to former Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, and upon President Biden’s announcement that he would nominate Mr. Adeyemo as Deputy Treasury Secretary, Mr. Lew praised Mr. Adeyemo’s work negotiating a deal for greater foreign exchange policy enforcement in the macroeconomic declaration that accompanied the TPP. The Wall Street Journal identified Mr. Adeyemo’s role similarly.

Three critical points emerge from this declaration. First, it affirms that each TPP country will avoid unfairly manipulating exchange rates, particularly for competitive purposes. Second, it requires each TPP country to promptly disclose data regarding their foreign-exchange reserves, IMF assessments of their exchange rate, and foreign-exchange intervention their government enacts. Finally, it establishes regular dialogue between officials of all TPP countries about macroeconomic and exchange rate policies. This framework could help shape the Biden administration’s approach to currency manipulation in trade agreements, and Mr. Adeyemo appears well-positioned to lead those efforts due to his experience working on these provisions.

Conclusion

In his prolific biographies of President Lyndon Johnson, historian Robert Caro puts forth a corollary to the aphorism “power corrupts.” Caro writes that power reveals, too. After three presidential campaigns across thirty years, Mr. Biden finally holds the office and wields its power. Ultimately, his power over trade will reveal his vision and priorities for the subject, but there will be few chances for major trade policy change until the pandemic abates. At present though, Biden’s personnel selections, namely Messrs. Adeyemo and Sullivan and Ms. Tai, signal that his administration will reframe U.S. trade strategy and address numerous structural trade issues. Personnel does not reveal as clearly as power does, but personnel does preview.

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