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Producing these vaccines is evidently a complicated process, involving facilities in many locations, presumably implying a lot of cross-border shipments of vaccine ingredients. Notably, in Pfizer’s case all these facilities are in the United States and Western Europe, which is typical across pharma firms, although other companies have a few facilities in Brazil and India.So where do vaccine supply chains fit into the theory of international trade?If you’ve ever taken an economics course, you probably learned about the theory of comparative advantage, which says that countries trade to take advantage of their differences. The classic original example, from the early-19th-century economist David Ricardo, involved the exchange of English cloth for Portuguese wine.Comparative advantage is a powerful, illuminating theory — especially because it shows why countries export goods they’re relatively good at producing even if they’re less productive in those industries than potential competitors. Bangladesh is a low-productivity nation across the board (although it has been improving), but its productivity disadvantage is less pronounced in apparel than in other industries, so it has become a major clothing exporter.In the 1960s and 1970s, however, a number of economists began suggesting that comparative advantage was an incomplete story. World trade had been growing over time, but much of that growth involved trade between countries that didn’t seem very different — the United States and Canada, for example, or the nations of Western Europe. Furthermore, what these countries were selling to each other looked pretty similar: There was a lot of “intra-industry” trade like the large-scale, two-way trade in autos and related goods across the U.S.-Canada border.

What was going on? A few economists had long noted that comparative advantage wasn’t the only possible reason for international trade. Countries might also trade because production of some goods involves increasing returns — there are advantages to large-scale production, which creates an incentive to concentrate production in a few countries and export those goods to other countries. Automotive trade between the United States and Canada was a classic example: After the countries established a free-trade agreement for autos in 1965, North American car companies achieved economies of scale by limiting the range of items produced in Canada, exporting these goods and importing other items from the United States.But if trade reflected increasing returns rather than country characteristics, which countries would end up producing which goods? It might be largely random, the result of accidents of history.There was, however, remarkably little economic literature on increasing-returns trade until the late 1970s. Economists don’t like to talk about stuff they find hard to model, and trade models with increasing returns tended to be messy and confusing. Eventually, however, some economists came up with clever ways to cut through the confusion, in papers like this 1980 piece in the American Economic Review:

 

God, I was young! Anyway, history has a sense of humor. No sooner had economists come up with nifty models of trade between similar countries, driven by economies of scale, than the world economy took a hard turn away from that kind of trade toward trade between dissimilar countries driven by things like large differences in wages.World trade exploded from the mid-1980s until around 2008, a process sometimes called hyperglobalization:

And where trade growth in the ’60s and ’70s had largely involved advanced economies selling stuff to each other, hyperglobalization involved a surge in exports of manufactured goods from relatively low-wage developing countries:

So we had a New Trade Theory, but the new trade we were actually getting was much better explained by, well, old trade theory.

So what does all this have to do with vaccine supply chains? Well, as I already noted, vaccine ingredients are mainly produced in advanced countries — countries that are very similar in their education levels, overall level of technological competence and more. So why wasn’t each advanced country producing the whole ensemble of vaccine-related inputs? Here’s what Bown and Bollyky say:

“The business model that much of the pharmaceutical industry had shifted toward over the previous 25 years involved fragmentation. As tariffs and other trade barriers had fallen globally, information and communications technology (ICT) developed, shipping and logistics efficiency increased, and protection of intellectual property rights steadily improved. The fact that trade could play a greater role in distributing pharmaceutical products globally meant that companies could operate fewer plants but at a larger scale.” 

Hey, it’s New Trade Theory in action! And it sure looks as if there was a lot of random historical contingency determining national roles in the pattern of specialization. Europe was initially very dependent on Britain’s exports of lipids — but I doubt that there’s something about British culture that makes the country especially good at lipids. It’s just one of those accidents that play a big role in economic geography.Is there a moral to this story? There’s been a lot of backlash against globalization over the past decade, to some extent justified: Advocates of free-trade agreements oversold their benefits and understated the disruptions they might cause. But the case of vaccine production illustrates a positive side of globalization we tend to forget. These miracle vaccines are incredibly complex products that would have been hard to develop and produce in any one country, even one as large as the United States. A global market made it possible to deliver all the specialized inputs that are saving thousands of lives as you read this.

Paul Krugman joined The New York Times in 2000 as an Op-Ed columnist. He is distinguished professor in the Graduate Center Economics Ph.D. program and distinguished scholar at the Luxembourg Income Study Center at the City University of New York. In addition, he is professor emeritus at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs

To read the full commentary from The New York Times, please click here. 

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Exceptional policy support prevented a global economic depression, even as the pandemic took a heavy toll on lives and livelihoods. The global reaction, as seen in major shifts in travel, consumption, and trade, also made the world a more economically imbalanced place as reflected in current account balances—a record of a country’s transactions with the rest of the world.

In our latest External Sector Report we found that the global reaction to the pandemic further widened global current account balances—the sum of absolute deficits and surpluses among all countries—from 2.8 percent of world GDP in 2019 to 3.2 percent of GDP in 2020. Those balances are set to widen further as the pandemic continues to rage in much of the world.

If not for the crisis, global current account balances would have continued to decline. While external deficits and surpluses are not necessarily a cause for concern, excessive imbalances—larger than warranted by the economy’s fundamentals and appropriate economic policies—can have destabilizing effects on economies by fueling trade tensions and increasing the likelihood of disruptive asset price adjustments.

A year like no other

The dramatic fluctuations in current account deficits and surpluses in 2020 were driven by four major pandemic-fueled trends:

• Travel declined: The pandemic led to a sharp decrease in tourism and travel. This had a significant negative impact on the account balances of countries that rely on tourism revenue, such as Spain, Thailand, Turkey, and even larger consequences for smaller tourism-dependent economies.
• Oil demand collapsed: The collapse in oil demand and energy prices was relatively short lived, with oil prices recovering in the second half of 2020. However, oil-exporting economies, such as Saudi Arabia and Russia, saw current account balances decline sharply in 2020. Oil-importing countries saw corresponding increases to their oil trade balances.
• Medical products trade boomed: Demand surged by about 30 percent for medical supplies critical for fighting the pandemic, such as personal protective equipment, as well as the inputs and materials to make them, with implications for importers and exporters of these items.
• Household consumption shifted: As people were forced to stay home, households shifted their consumption away from services toward consumer goods. This happened most in advanced economies where there was an increase in the purchase of durable goods like electrical appliances used to accommodate teleworking and virtual learning.

All of these factors contributed to some countries seeing a wider current account deficit, meaning they bought more than they sold, or a larger current account surplus, meaning they sold more than they bought. Favorable global financial conditions, with the unprecedented monetary policy support from major central banks, made it easier for countries to finance wider current account deficits. In contrast, during past crises where financial conditions sharply tightened, running current account deficits was harder, pushing countries further into recession.

On top of these external factors, the pandemic led to massive government borrowing to finance health care and provide economic support to households and firms, creating large uneven effects on trade balances.

The outlook

Global current account balances are set to widen even further in 2021 but this trend is not expected to last. The latest IMF staff forecasts indicate that global current account balances will narrow in the coming years, as China’s surplus and the US’ deficit falls, reaching 2.5 percent of world GDP by 2026.

A reduction in balances could be delayed if large deficit economies like the US undertake additional fiscal expansions or there is a faster-than-expected fiscal adjustment in current account surplus countries, like Germany. A resurgence of the pandemic and a tightening of global financial conditions that disrupt the flow of capital to emerging markets and developing economies could also affect balances.

Despite the shock of the crisis and possibly due to its worldwide impact, excessive current account deficits and surpluses were broadly unchanged in 2020, representing about 1.2 percent of world GDP. Most of the drivers of excess external imbalances pre-date the pandemic and include fiscal imbalances as well as structural and competitiveness distortions.

Rebalancing the world economy

Ending the pandemic for everyone in the world is the only way to ensure a global economic recovery that prevents further divergence. This will require a global effort to help countries secure financing for vaccinations and maintain healthcare.

A synchronized global investment push or a synchronized health spending push to end the pandemic and support the recovery could have large effects on world growth without raising global balances.

Governments should step up efforts to resolve trade and technology tensions and modernize international taxation. A top priority should be the phasing out of tariff and non-tariff barriers, especially on medical products.

Countries with excess current account deficits should, where appropriate, seek to reduce budget deficits over the medium term and make competitiveness-raising reforms, including in education and innovation policies. In economies with excess current account surpluses and remaining fiscal space, policies should support the recovery and medium-term growth, including through greater public investment.

In the years to come, countries will need to simultaneously rebalance, while ensuring that the recovery is built on a solid and durable foundation.

To read the full commentary from IMF Blogs, please click here. 

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Our excess-mortality model suggests that 8m-16m people have died in the pandemic. The central estimate is 14m. The developing world is vulnerable to the virus, especially lower-middle-income countries where remote working is rare and plenty of people are fat and old. If you strip out China, non-rich countries have 68% of the world’s population but 87% of its deaths. Only 5% of those aged over 12 are fully vaccinated.

Alongside the human cost is an economic bill, since emerging markets have less room to spend their way out of trouble. Medium-term gdp forecasts for all emerging economies are in aggregate 5% lower than before the virus struck. People are angry and, even though protesting during a pandemic is risky, violent demonstrations around the world are more common than at any time since 2008.

Rich places, such as America and Britain, are no strangers to incompetence and turmoil. But disappointment has hit emerging economies especially hard. In the early 2000s they buzzed with talk of “catch-up”: the idea that poorer countries could prosper by absorbing foreign technology, investing in manufacturing and opening up their economies to trade, as a handful of East Asian tiger economies had done a generation earlier. Wall Street coined the term brics to celebrate Brazil, Russia, India and China—the world economy’s new superstars.

For a while, catch-up worked. The proportion of countries where the level of economic output per head was growing faster than in America rose from 34% in the 1980s to 82% in the 2000s. The implications were momentous. Poverty fell. Multinational companies pivoted away from the boring old West. In geopolitics catch-up promised a new multipolar world in which power was more evenly distributed.

This golden age now looks as if it has come to a premature end. In the 2010s the share of countries catching up fell to 59%. China has defied many doomsayers and there have been quieter Asian success stories such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. But Brazil and Russia have let down the brics and, as a whole, Latin America, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa are falling further behind the rich world. Even emerging Asia is catching up more slowly than it was.

Bad luck has played a part. The commodity boom of the 2000s fizzled out, global trade stagnated after the financial crisis and bouts of exchange-rate turbulence caused turmoil. But so has complacency as countries have come to think that fast growth was preordained. In many places basic services such as education and health care have been neglected. Crippling problems have been left unfixed, including South Africa’s idle power plants, India’s rotten banks and Russia’s corruption. Instead of defending liberal institutions, such as central banks and the courts, politicians have used them for their own gain.

What happens next? One risk is an emerging-market economic crisis as interest rates in America rise. Fortunately most emerging economies are less brittle than they were, because they have floating exchange rates and rely less on foreign-currency debt. Long-running political crises are a bigger worry. Research suggests that protests suppress the economy, which leads to further discontent—and that the effect is more marked in emerging markets.

Even if emerging economies avoid chaos, the legacy of covid-19 and rising protectionism could condemn them to a long period of slower growth. Many of their people will remain unvaccinated until well into 2022. Long-term productivity could be lowered as a result of so many children having missed school.

Trade may also become harder. China is turning inward, away from the broadly open policies that made it richer. If that continues, China will never be the vast source of consumer demand for the poor world that America has been for China in recent decades.

The West’s increasing protectionism will also limit export opportunities for foreign producers which, in any case, will be less advantageous as manufacturing becomes less labour-intensive. Unfortunately, rich countries are unlikely to make up for it by liberalising trade in services, which would open up other paths to growth. And they may fail to help exposed economies bodog sportsbook review such as Bangladesh—a success story—adapt to climate change.

Faced with this grim landscape, emerging markets may themselves be tempted to abandon open trade and investment. That would be a grave error. An unforgiving global environment makes it even more important for them to stick to policies that work. Turkey’s notion that raising interest rates causes inflation has been disastrous; Venezuela’s pursuit of socialism has been ruinous; and banning foreign firms from adding customers, as India just has with Mastercard, is self-defeating. When catching up is hard, those emerging markets which stay open will have the best chance.

Catch up, don’t give up

Some rules have changed: universal access to digital technologies is now vital, as is an adequate social safety-net. But the principles of how to get rich remain the same today as they ever were. Stay open to trade, compete in global markets and invest in infrastructure and education. Before the liberal reforms of recent decades, economies were diverging. There is time yet to avoid a return to the needless hardship of old.

To read the full commentary from The Economist, please click here. 

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This article briefly recounts the history of progressive multilateral liberalization and makes the argument that JSIs, far from being alien to the system, reflect the way progress has historically been made.

Anyone who knows the history of the multilateral trading system of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) was not surprised by the failure of the Doha Round.  A critical mistake was made when it was decided that the outcomes of the Doha Round should be decided by consensus and that all Members should be bound by those outcomes (the “single undertaking” approach).  Trying to make progress on this basis was bound to fail and it also reflected a misunderstanding of the origins of the Uruguay Round’s “single undertaking”.

When one revisits the Punta del Este Declaration that launched the Uruguay Round negotiations, it’s clear that there were a number of subjects, such as trade in services and protection of intellectual property rights, listed for negotiation where it was never expected that all of the Contracting Parties would participate in the negotiations and be bound by the outcomes.  How these outcomes would be implemented was left open for decision at the end of the talks. Technically, the services negotiations were not even under GATT auspices. It was decided that from a timing standpoint, the disparate negotiations should move forward as a “single undertaking”.

Progress in the GATT and WTO has almost never been possible on the basis of all member countries being bound by the same rules. In the 1950s only a limited number of governments undertook to be bound by the export subsidy disciplines of GATT Article XVI:4. The Kennedy Round produced the limited-membership Antidumping Code and the Tokyo Round resulted in a large number of limited-membership agreements that were implemented as “codes”. I would argue that even with their limited membership, the codes represented a big step forward in rule-making for important trade issues.

Bringing the codes into the GATT system was problematic.  Developing countries refused (initially) to have the GATT Secretariat administer the codes of which few of them were members. They blocked agreement and funding for this to happen. This led to a negotiation whereby, in order to get the codes into the system, developed countries agreed to the inclusion in GATT of Part IV – Trade and Development, and in particular the so-called “Enabling Clause” in paragraph 8 of Article XXXVI. The ‘Enabling Clause’ is the basis for special and differential treatment, including non-reciprocity and alower level of commitments from developing countries.  For developed countries, this was the price to pay for bringing the codes into the GATT framework.

It was the creation of a new organization – the WTO – at the end of the Uruguay Round, that made it possible to broaden membership in what had been the limited-membership codes and other agreements resulting from the round.  But it was not the WTO Agreement itself that obliged countries to participate. In reality participation was the result of blackmail by the Quad countries (the USA, European Community, Japan and Canada).  At the end of the Round, the Quad countries quit GATT 1947 and said that any country that did not join the WTO and accept all the agreements’ commitments would lose their MFN access to Quad markets. That is why there is a GATT 1994 and a GATT 1947.  It was the blackmail more than the creation of the WTO that enabled a “single undertaking” approach to WTO membership.

After the advent of the WTO, trade liberalization progress on the “multilateral” front came with limited-membership agreements for telecommunications services, financial services, and information technology products. Generally, these are called “critical mass agreements” because enough of a percentage of global trade was covered that participants were willing to accept some free-riding. Non-participants did not object because they received the benefits of the agreements on an MFN basis.

Fast forward to the post-Doha period where we find ourselves now. Over the past twenty years, all significant trade rule-making and liberalization has taken place in the context of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements outside of the WTO. WTO rule-making has been frozen in the 1990s while important trade issues have been subject to updated rules in the plurilaterals.

In recent years, some WTO Members have moved to update WTO rules through new “critical mass” agreement efforts called JSIs. JSIs address electronic commerce, services domestic regulation, and investment facilitation.  Certain countries – chief among them India and South Africa – evidently do not want to see progress in these areas and have opposed JSIs. In February 2021, India and South Africa circulated a paper arguing against the “legality” of JSIs (WT/GC/W/819).

There are a number of points made in this paper that I agree with. If a subset of WTO members negotiates an agreement that would modify rules and then want to “add that agreement to Annex 4” or formalize the agreement “into the WTO framework of rules” or bring the results of their agreement “under the umbrella of the WTO”, this cannot be done outside of the accepted framework of WTO rules and decision-making procedures. Related to this, in another part of their paper they correctly suggest that a proposed Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) involves rule-making and therefore would need to be implemented outside the framework of WTO rules. I don’t see a problem here as it was always my understanding that TISA would have been an agreement concluded pursuant to GATS Article V.

Where I disagree with India and South Africa is with some of the things they put forward in the Annex to their paper. For example, I disagree with their assertion that “even changes to schedules cannot be made unilaterally, as other members have the right to protect the existing balance of rights and obligations”. This is true if you want to make your schedule more trade restrictive but not if you unilaterally modify your schedule to make it more liberal. The certification procedure they refer to in connection with the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) was not a negotiation with all other WTO members. The ITA was essentially negotiated as an early JSI only among a subset of members on a critical mass basis.

So, as long as a JSI only involves changes in schedules (making them more liberal) and does not seek to modify WTO rules or bring the resulting agreement into Annex 4, I don’t see any conflict between JSIs and the legality of decision-making in WTO. With Members like India and South Africa blocking progress at the multilateral level in WTO, other Members have no recourse other than to pursue the JSI route, either as critical mass agreements within the WTO framework or where rule-making is involved, outside the WTO as plurilateral agreements.

Progress in the WTO has been scant over the past two decades, with many questioning its continued relevance as they pursue liberalization through bilateral and plurilateral agreements outside the system. In the lead up to WTO’s next Ministerial Conference, it could well be the success or failure of JSIs that determines whether Members will see that WTO has continued relevance.

Andrew Stoler, former WTO Deputy Director-General; former Office of the United States Trade Representative senior trade negotiator; former Executive Director of Institute for International Trade; current advisory board member for European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) and the University of Sydney’s United States Studies Centre.

To read the full commentary from the University of Adelaide, please click here.

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Few programs are as central to fulfilling that promise as the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. In first proposing TAA to Congress in 1962, President Kennedy recognized two truths. First, we as a nation have a responsibility to help our fellow citizens that are harmed by our collective policy choices. Workers, farmers, and businesses invest their time and resources in making themselves competitive within a marketplace that is defined in part by government policies. If the government changes those policies to benefit the nation as a whole, the government must make good, as Billy Joel put it, on “the promises our teachers gave, if we worked hard, if we behaved.”

Second, if the nation does not honor those promises, citizens cannot reasonably be expected to continue to support a policy of trade liberalization. That policy has been an incredible driver of economic growth, both in the United States and abroad. The opening of U.S. markets helped rebuild Europe and Japan after World War II, has lifted millions out of poverty worldwide, and in so doing has been one of the most important human rights policies the United States has ever adopted. But a democratic society cannot ask its citizens to support their own economic demise, or that of their fellows, in the name of the general welfare.

Unfortunately, TAA has largely failed both to vindicate our moral responsibility to our fellow citizens and to shore up support for the larger policy of trade liberalization. For years, union workers have pilloried TAA as “burial insurance.” A 2012 report commissioned by the Labor Department to assess TAA’ performance concluded that, “without considering the benefits of TAA stemming from the possibility that it promotes free trade, the net benefits of the TAA program as it operated under the 2002 amendments were negative.”

With U.S. trade policy at an inflection point, Congress and the Biden Administration have a unique opportunity to remake TAA. The program is currently set to expire this summer, along with Trade Promotion Authority. Congress should take immediate action to reauthorize TAA before it expires. In reauthorizing the program, Congress should take the following steps:

Expand Eligibility and Benefits

TAA has long suffered from limited eligibility criteria and meager benefits. Indeed, no workers or firms were certified as eligible for benefits between the program’s inception in 1962 and 1969. Currently, TAA is available to workers and firms for whom 1) increased imports 2) have “contributed importantly” to both 3) layoffs or the threat thereof and 4) decreased sales or production (a similar program is available to farmers). These criteria create a high bar to establishing eligibility to apply for benefits. Usually, economic distress in a globalized economy of 330 million people does not have a single cause, but rather many interrelated causes: competition from imports; automation both here and overseas; increased input prices; the trade bodog online casino policies of foreign governments; interest rates; and natural disasters, such as hurricanes or wildfires, or public health events like the COVID-19 pandemic, that disrupt production.

Apportioning blame among these causes is often impractical, even where trade is a major contributing factor. Moreover, the complicated eligibility requirements force both the public and private sector to devote resources to navigating bureaucracy, instead of getting help in the hands of those who need it.

Instead, these criteria should be simplified and expanded to reflect how modern trade policy impacts the real economy.

First, applicants for TAA should only have to show that foreign competition is a contributing factor in their economic distress, rather than an “important” factor.

Second, workers, firms, and farmers should be eligible for benefits if exports decline as a result of foreign governments’ trade policy choices. Today, retaliatory tariffs have shuttered foreign markets for many American industries. TAA should recognize and support both our import-competing sectors and our export competing sectors that may be harmed by the United States standing up to unfair foreign practices.

Third, Congress should extend benefits to those whose economic output decreases or fails to increase as a result of competition from imports or retaliatory tariffs overseas. As currently written, benefits are only available upon a finding that output has decreased. This limitation puts TAA out of reach for many workers and firms that may have their opportunities limited by competition with imports.

By way of example, consider a firm that automates part of its assembly line, and thus lays off workers, in order to reduce costs to compete with imports. If the cost savings from automation allow the import-competing firm to maintain its previous levels of production and sales, the laid-off workers would not be eligible for benefits under current law. They are not eligible even though it was pressure from imports that caused their firm to reduce costs and yet still not be able to increase output. In the absence of import competition, the firm might have translated the efficiency gains from automation into increased production, allowing it to keep its employees on staff. TAA’s eligibility criteria should recognize this dynamic.

Apart from eligibility, Congress should increase the benefits available under TAA. The size of those benefits has shrunk in recent years. TAA’s annual appropriations hit $575 million in 2009, the high-water mark for the program, but have declined to $450 million today. Individual benefits are also insufficient to meet the needs of many workers, especially older ones that the 2012 TAA study found have more difficulty transitioning into new lines of work. At a minimum, TAA’s appropriations should be restored to its 2009 high (approximately $700 million adjusted for inflation) and indexed to inflation going forward. Individual benefit caps should be increased, and benefits should become increasingly more generous as workers get older.

Focus on Communities

TAA currently focuses primarily on individuals and firms. But job losses and closures from trade competition hurt more than just the people who lose their jobs. They hurt entire families, communities, towns, and cities. Children may grow up in homes without a stable breadwinner. Minority communities are often disproportionately impacted by the loss of manufacturing jobs. Towns and cities may suffer from brain drain and an eroding tax base as businesses and citizens flee in search of opportunities elsewhere. Those who remain must contend with crumbling infrastructure, a loss of services, and poorer schools. The result is a downward spiral that impacts many more people than just the employees and business owners left without work.

Congress should recognize this reality by expanding TAA to offer aid to trade-impacted communities. Just as with individuals, a community TAA program would require eligibility criteria and the provision of benefits. With respect to the former, the International Trade Commission (ITC) studies the impact of U.S. trade agreements. Congress should expand the ITC’s mandate to require it to evaluate periodically the impact of trade policies on the state, county, and community level, with special attention to historically disadvantaged groups. Pursuant to such studies, the ITC would then certify areas or communities that have suffered significant job losses and economic stagnation as a result of competition with imported goods and services as adversely trade impacted, and thus eligible for TAA Community Benefits.

Those benefits should take the form of investments in the adversely affected “Trade Communities.” Direct spending programs that boost the resilience of the community as a whole will be most effective. For instance, TAA has provided grants to community colleges. This program should be expanded to include grants to primary and secondary schools within the certified communities, as well as to support four-year colleges and research universities whose mission is to give back to their local and regional communities and historically disadvantaged groups.

Supporting families who have had their primary breadwinners laid off means supporting their children throughout their education, not merely once they enter, or are preparing to enter, the workforce. Other similar investments could target education and economic mobility within Trade Communities. For instance, Congress could set the maximum Pell Grant for qualifying students within Trade Communities at 200% of the otherwise applicable maximum. These investments in education would seek to ensure that any harms from trade liberalization do not reach into future generations.

Trade Communities should also be targets for infrastructure investments. These investments could take the form of new programs, such as building public broadband networks that would attract new businesses and provide residents with the means to access a wider range of educational and economic opportunities. Trade communities could also be given preferential access to existing infrastructure programs. For instance, a certain percentage of BUILD (Better Utilizing Investments to Leverage Development) Transportation Discretionary Grants could be set aside for Trade Communities.

Although new direct spending programs are likely to be more effective at providing assistance, tax credits could also be made available to private investors and businesses who invest in Trade Communities. Examples of such credits could include:

i. Making capital gains tax benefits (under 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2) to investors in Opportunity Zones, applicable to investors in Trade Communities;

ii. Providing tax credits to businesses that hire full-time employees previously certified by the Department of Labor as eligible for assistance under TAA;

iii. Making tax credits for qualifying activity in Trade Communities refundable or tradeable to ensure that businesses with already low taxes still have an incentive to invest and operate in Trade Communities.

Tie the Future Reauthorization of TAA to the Renewal of Trade Promotion Authority and Trade Agreements

Historically, U.S. trade agreements are indefinite, while TAA is authorized for only a few years at a time. As a result, proponents of trade liberalization can put each new trade agreement in their pocket and begin negotiating the next round of liberalization, while proponents of adjustment assistance are always negotiating for the entire existence of the program. When these negotiations happen at the same time—when TAA is up for reauthorization at the same time as either a new Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation or implementing legislation for a new trade agreement—TAA does relatively well. But when TAA comes up for reauthorization without a companion bill on trade liberalization, it fares poorly. In fact, on several such occasions TAA has been allowed to lapse completely.

This misalignment between adjustment policies and trade liberalization policies might not be too much to worry about if trade liberalization imposed only temporary shocks to the economy. But research has shown that trade liberalization, especially China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, has created long-term disruptions in some communities. This makes sense. As fast-growing economies with substantial government support for export-oriented businesses enter new product and services markets, they will create further shocks to our economy. Those further shocks can prevent workers from adjusting to the new environment fast enough to prevent long-term consequences for themselves, their families, and their communities.

Both TAA and TPA will expire on July 1. To address the ongoing shocks from trade liberalization, Congress should reauthorize TAA before it expires. When it does so, Congress has an opportunity to craft pathbreaking legislation permanently linking TAA with the framework for negotiating and authorizing trade agreements. There are two ways to accomplish this. First, any new TPA legislation should be explicitly contingent on TAA legislation that lasts as long as the President’s negotiating authority under TPA.

TPA legislation typically identifies negotiating objectives and procedural requirements for the government to follow in pursuing new trade deals. If the government adheres to Congress’s instructions, Congress considers any resulting agreements under expedited procedures (often called fast-track procedures). Any new TPA legislation should make those fast-track procedures contingent on TAA authorization for the during of the TPA legislation. Doing so would ensure that TAA does not lapse before an opportunity arises to renegotiate TAA and TPA at the same time.

This reform would codify the existing practice of reauthorizing TAA when TPA legislation is up for renewal. But it does not address what happens when both TPA and TAA expire and Congress does not renew TPA. These situations—when there is no appetite for new trade agreements, but there are continuing economic disruptions from past trade agreements—are the ones in which TAA has been allowed to lapse in the past. Indeed, we may be in such a situation this summer. President Biden has said that he is not going to prioritize new agreements, which could cast into doubt the passage of new TPA legislation—and thus TAA legislation—before TAA expires on July 1.

To be clear, TAA should be reauthorized this summer, regardless of whether TPA is also renewed. But to prevent this problem in the future, new TAA legislation should contain a provision that prevents the government from renewing or extending the duration of any existing trade agreements unless Congress has passed legislation authorizing TAA for the same duration. Currently, only USMCA requires renewal. That agreement has a 16-year duration, but it can be renewed as early as six years into that term. TAA authorizations, including the one set to lapse this summer, have often lasted for approximately six years. By tying TAA explicitly to the renewal of USMCA, Congress can thus ensure that it and the President have an incentive to work together to renew TAA on a regular basis going forward. For instance, in TAA legislation passed to reauthorize the program this year,

Congress could provide that the United States shall not approve the extension of USMCA under article 34.7 of that agreement unless Congress has reauthorized TAA for a period of time equal to the period of time for which USMCA would be extended. Doing so would provide motivation for proponents of the market access that USMCA provides to also support trade adjustment measures that ensure that workers benefit from U.S. trade policy as much as consumers and multinational corporations.

Put the U.S. commitment to adjustment assistance at home in our trade agreements, alongside our commitments to trade liberalization and labor and environmental standards abroad

When he took office, President Clinton negotiated the so-called NAFTA Side Agreements on Labor and the Environment, the first labor and environmental provisions in trade agreements. Since then, the United States has remained a leader in connecting trade liberalization to the improvement in our trading partners’ labor and environmental practices. That commitment culminated in amendments to the USMCA to provide for better and more effective enforcement of labor standards.

But as important as labor and environment provisions have been, they still focus on the behavior of U.S. trading partners. They do not directly address the impact of trade on communities within the United States.

The United States should remedy this oversight by inserting an Economic Development Chapter in future U.S. trade agreements. Such a chapter would commit parties to monitoring and reporting on, and taking steps to address, any negative impacts from the agreement’s implementation within their own borders. The chapter would provide governments flexibility in satisfying their commitments, and the revisions to TAA proposed above would satisfy the United States’ obligations. But having the chapter within U.S. bodog online casino trade agreements would put investment in trade-impacted communities at home on par with our commitment to improved labor and environmental standards abroad.

The road to including our commitment to a worker-centric trade policy in U.S. trade agreements begins with the renewal of TPA legislation. Congress should make the inclusion of an Economic Development Chapter a negotiating objective in any new TPA legislation. The result would be that the fast-track procedures through which Congress approves bodog online casino trade agreements would be contingent on the government enshrining its commitment to adjustment assistance in any future trade agreements.

In so doing, it would send a powerful signal that, as President Biden has said, foreign policy begins at home.

To read the full commentary from the American Leadership Initiative (ALI), please click here.

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The shift reflects a deep anxiety about the West’s ability to maintain its living standards and technological edge while competing with giant state-backed companies in China and elsewhere in Asia.

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