However, investment restrictions along with other primary tools of economic statecraft like sanctions and export controls are “single use.” Once exercised, they either break or preclude economic ties. The tools admittedly have limitations and leakage. Nonetheless, given the sheer size of the U.S. market, role of the U.S. dollar in the global financial system, and magnitude of U.S. foreign direct investments, the measures are powerful and represent consequential U.S. national security and foreign policy positions.

These economic tools also provide significant points of leverage for the United States due to global economic interconnectedness created through U.S. leadership. But, used enough without alternatives to refill leverage reserves, the strategies risk sidelining the U.S., leaving few policy levers short of military conflict in the long term. The existential question is how the U.S. can continue to maintain and enhance its leverage when its offensive economic tools inherently diminish every time they are used? To continue to exercise these impactful tools, America needs to continually renew connection points and think strategically about how it’s exercising its leverage, including by re-engaging on trade, being more selective, and getting its own economic house in order.

The globalized world that sprung from the post-World War II rules-based order has created dependencies by fostering growth, prosperity, and peace through interconnectedness. Reduced barriers to trade and investment have encouraged global sourcing and value chains fueled by U.S. R&D, technology, and investment. The resulting global system has deep ties to U.S. technologies and wherewithal, with over 70% of global trade executed in U.S. dollars. Trade and financial ties exist with friend and foe—including China and Russia. Yet, as U.S. policy has increasingly utilized these ties to achieve foreign policy, national security, and economic objectives, dependencies have become liabilities.

Tectonic geopolitical shifts have precipitated the increased use of sanctions, export controls, and investment restrictions in lieu of military force, throttling touchpoints with the United States. The pure presence of U.S. technologies, parts, people, or funds in transactions can trigger a complex set of prohibitions that often apply extraterritorially—requiring that parties choose between doing business with the U.S. or targeted parties or countries. U.S. technologies remain pre-eminent in many sectors and are complicated to “design out.”

Once a country, entity or person is sanctioned, or the conveyance of technologies or capital is restricted, the tie that made the action impactful is immediately broken. The action cannot be “redone” for increased effect. And, these tools are being used at breakneck pace: In 2000, the U.S. sanctioned 912 people and entities. In 2022, the number had grown to nearly 12,000. Countries like China fill the vacuum, replacing U.S. technologies or investment with Chinese ones—and the U.S. cannot stop or affect that activity going forward.

The U.S. is thus quickly depleting its leverage without a plan to replenish. Given America’s rapidly declining percentage of global GDP—approximately 40% in 1960 to 15% in 2023, it needs to rethink its engagement with the world if these fracturing instruments remain primary policy tools. Witness the reticence of the Global South in supporting sanctions on Russia despite its brutal invasion of Ukraine.

The stakes are high and the U.S. needs a hard reset to secure its leverage in the short, medium and long term. It should:

Use more effectively the size of the U.S. market to create positive connections. Returning to the trade negotiating table is not only an economic imperative; it’s a national security one. Leverage is built by cementing foreign policy partnerships through permanent trade deals (as opposed to talk shops like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity). Creating Cold-War style blocks will reduce U.S. leverage in the long-term. In addition to building bridges with allies, America must enhance ties with “fence-sitter” countries (e.g., India) to regain lost leverage with close partners and even China.

Be selective in how it uses leverage going forward. There are times to throw down the gauntlet. Russia today is a good example. In the case of China where the game is long, the U.S. should be mindful of how it uses economic tools. The calculations for when to use these policies should look beyond what satisfies short-term political expediencies to how retaining interconnectedness and dependency can provide important points of leverage.

Get its political and economic house in order and use market-based tools to drive technological innovation and investment in the U.S. Current industrial policy with its use of subsidies and tariffs detracts from U.S. leverage. It creates negative precedents, causing even allies to erect reciprocal trade barriers. Case in point is responses by allies to the Trump tariffs and green subsidy provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act. American politicians should uphold our free market values. That is also part of our leverage.

Neena Shenai is a Nonresident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. This piece draws on a forthcoming paper written for the “Economic Security and the Future of the Global Order in the Indo-Pacific” 2023 conference at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House.

To read the full article as it is published on RealClearPolicy’s website, click here.

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As rumors percolate about possible new U.S. export controls and outbound investment restrictions targeting China, it’s a good time to take stock. Since 2017, the U.S. government has implemented a vast array of policy changes with the intent of diversifying supply chains, more effectively competing with China, and safeguarding national security. These policies – including tariffs, export controls, and chips manufacturing incentives – have had a significant impact on U.S.-China technology competition and have, in many ways, already achieved the U.S. government’s stated goals.

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Tragically, the COVID-19 pandemic hit the United States hard. More than 600,000 Americans have died and average life expectancy has fallen. However, diligent work over the past year to develop vaccines and the rollout of vaccination programs over the past several months have begun to bring the pandemic under control. By mid-June, bodog casino over one-half of the eligible population has been fully vaccinated and both new cases and the test positivity rate have fallen markedly.

The unprecedented fiscal and monetary support, combined with the receding COVID-19 case numbers, should provide a substantial boost to activity in the coming months. Savings will be drawn down, demand will return for in-person services, and depleted inventories will be rebuilt. Growth in 2021 is expected to be around 7 percent, the fastest pace in a generation, with modest risks to the upside. This strong economic performance should continue into 2022, with growth of around 5 percent. It is worth noting that these forecasts are based upon an assumption that the American Jobs Plan and American Families Plan will be legislated during the course of 2021 with a size and composition that is similar to that proposed by the administration. The U.S. external position is judged to be modestly weaker than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.

Indicators suggest significant labor market slack remains which should serve as a safety valve to dampen underlying wage and price pressures. Inflation expectations are also expected to remain well-anchored. However, underlying inflation trends will be obscured in the coming months by significant, transitory movements in relative prices which could lead core personal consumption expenditure (PCE) inflation to temporarily peak later in the year at close to 4 percent. Once these temporary price realignments have passed through the system, PCE inflation is forecasted at around 2½ percent by end-2022.

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Source: IMF staff forecasts

Fiscal Policies

The changes being proposed to federal tax and spending are aligned with past IMF policy advice. Multi‑year investments in power, transportation, telecommunications, and water will all help remove bottlenecks and increase productivity. There is solid empirical evidence also of the societal payoffs—in the form of lower poverty, better health and education outcomes, reduced crime, increased labor force participation, and better productivity—from providing high-quality childcare, creating a national paid family leave program, investing in pre-school, expanding access to college for low income students, increasing healthcare coverage, and improving college retention. Instituting a permanent increase in taxes on corporate profits and on high income households is warranted as a means to finance the permanent increase in spending obligations. Proposals helpfully include:

· A globally coordinated minimum corporate tax, applied on a country-by-country basis, which will be a crucial step forward in countering the incentives for profit shifting and base erosion.

· The elimination of loopholes that allow high income individuals to recharacterize labor income and escape tax on capital gains.

· A permanent expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit to childless workers and an extension of the higher, refundable child tax credit which together will be instrumental in reducing poverty.

· Increased funding for the Internal Revenue Service which will have potentially large payoffs both in terms of revenues and in increasing the equity of the U.S. tax system.

It is worth highlighting that many of these tax and spending changes will directly support working mothers (who have long made up a large share of the poor and were hard hit by the pandemic ) and disproportionately help black and Hispanic families.

The size and ambition of the proposed fiscal packages is admirable. However, a better targeting of policies would further strengthen their impact on macroeconomic and distributional outcomes. Specifically, as the appropriations process moves ahead, more could be done to:

· Phase out tax credits at lower levels of household income.

· Prioritize spending toward programs that have the biggest impact on productivity, labor force participation, reducing poverty, and facilitating the shift to a low-carbon economy.

· Fully eliminate step-up basis, lower the threshold for paying the estate tax, eliminate the 199A passthrough deduction, and reformulate the business tax as a cashflow tax.

Reorienting the administration’s tax and spending proposals in this way would likely imply a slower (but more sustained) demand impulse, create a bigger boost to aggregate supply, and, in so doing, lessen the near-term risks posed by a sustained upswing in inflation. In this regard, the administration’s commitment not to raise taxes on households earning under US$400,000 per year represents an important constraint (98 percent of households are below this level of income). Without this limitation, further policy changes could be considered including:

· Increasing the U.S. reliance on indirect taxes by introducing a carbon tax and/or raising federal fuel taxes.

· Scaling back poorly targeted tax expenditures such as the income tax exemption for employer-provided health care, the capital gains tax exemptions for individuals selling their principal residence, and the deductibility of mortgage interest and state and local taxes.

· Aligning the combined (i.e., corporate plus personal) top statutory rate on capital income with the top marginal rate on labor income (which would imply taxing dividends and capital gains received by taxable entities at around 20–25 percent). Doing so would also help lessen the extent to which pass-through entities face a preferential tax rate.

Monetary Policy

The Federal Reserve’s actions have been highly effective both in the depths of the crisis and in supporting the recovery. While there were risks to introducing the new monetary framework in the midst of COVID-related uncertainty, the low neutral rate of interest and the asymmetries posed by the effective lower bound called for a new approach to policy. The Federal Reserve’s new policy framework has helped support a more rapid recovery from the pandemic and rightly commits to a near-term overshooting of the 2 percent longer-run inflation goal (in line with past IMF advice). Given the complexity of the U.S. economy and the uncertainties in implementing the new framework, it is appropriate to eschew closely parameterizing this new policy framework (e.g. by providing a formulaic time horizon over which inflation will be averaged or specific limits on the amount that inflation will be allowed to overshoot). Instead, the size and duration of the intended overshoot should be data dependent.

The combination of the new monetary policy framework and the economic boost from fiscal stimulus should be self-reinforcing. The flexible average inflation targeting helps increase the demand impact of the fiscal support by providing more accommodation. At the same time, the large fiscal boost increases the likelihood that inflation gathers enough momentum to sustainably exceed 2 percent (something that the U.S. and other advanced economies have struggled to achieve in the post-global financial crisis period).

In the coming months, the ongoing rapid pace of recovery and expectations of additional fiscal support will necessitate a shift in monetary policy. As discussed above, the reopening of the economy will create considerable unpredictability in PCE inflation during the next several months, making it very difficult to divine underlying inflationary trends. At the same time, presuming staff’s baseline outlook and fiscal policy assumptions are realized, policy rates would likely need to start rising in late-2022 or early-2023 (with asset purchases starting to be scaled back in the first half of 2022).

Managing this transition—from providing reassurance that monetary policy will continue to deliver powerful support to the economy to preparing for an eventual scaling back of asset purchases and a withdrawal of monetary accommodation—will require deft communications under a potentially tight timeline. Mitigating the risks of market misunderstandings, volatility in market pricing, and/or an unwarranted tightening of financial conditions (with all the negative spillovers to the global economy that such outcomes would entail) will require the Federal Open Market Committee to continue clearly telegraphing its interpretation of incoming data and articulating what those economic developments mean for policies. The Federal Reserve’s commitment—to communicate well in advance its thinking and to ensure that the eventual withdrawal of monetary accommodation is orderly, methodical, and transparent—is very welcome.

Risks to the Outlook

The principal risk facing the U.S. economy continues to emanate from the pandemic. The nature of the pandemic has changed globally, new variants are circulating widely, and there has been a shift in hospitalization and mortality toward younger Americans. Furthermore, while vaccines are widely available in the U.S., individual decisions on whether to take the vaccine have become a more binding constraint. Public health efforts in the U.S. will need to continue being applied rigorously, including by targeting populations where vaccination rates are low and by undertaking robust contingency planning to handle another surge of infections. Consideration should also be given to establishing a “standing army” for public health to create idle capacity in testing and medical supplies as well as build a rapid-response unit that could be deployed for testing, tracking, and treatment of viruses.

The U.S. has an important role to play in helping other countries contend with the public health crises, particularly in the developing world. This is not only for humanitarian reasons. Prompt international assistance—in the form of vaccines, medical supplies, and public health expertise—will pay dividends for the U.S. itself, lessening the COVID-19 risks ahead. In this regard, recent announcements by the administration of their intent to provide significant quantities of vaccines to other countries are highly commendable.

There are downside risks to the outlook from the potential that Congress will legislate a fiscal package that is smaller, or less comprehensive, than the one proposed by the administration. Staff forecasts anticipate an increase in discretionary spending and tax expenditures of US$4.3 trillion over the next decade which translates into a cumulative 5¼ percent increase in GDP during 2022–24. The fiscal plans will also have a meaningful, longer-run effect on aggregate supply. Approval of a smaller and/or less effective package of tax and spending would imply less of a boost to both supply and demand.

A surge in underlying inflation in the U.S. is not a likely outcome. However, it does represent an important risk to both the U.S. recovery and to global prospects. A slower rebound in labor force participation—due to public health concerns, retirements, incentive effects from unemployment benefits, or delays in reopening schools and childcare—could create a larger mismatch in the labor market and push wages and prices higher. Supply chain disruptions could prove to be more persistent. The demand impact of the fiscal stimulus could be larger and more front-loaded than currently assessed (especially given the accommodative monetary stance). The expected supply effects (e.g. on labor force participation, new capital formation, and productivity) could be smaller or slower to materialize. All these possibilities add to the risk that inflation expectations move upwards, creating self-fulfilling wage and price pressures.

In the event that these upside risks to inflation are realized, monetary policy will need to adapt quickly. If realized inflation moves higher but medium-term inflation expectations are well-anchored, the premium will be on communicating clearly that the changing environment calls for a withdrawal of monetary accommodation. However, the anchored inflation expectations will provide room for maneuver, allowing these policy adjustments to take place along an orderly timeline (i.e., similar to that already incorporated into staff’s baseline outlook). While this would imply a somewhat larger, more prolonged inflation overshoot, inflation should still return to the longer-run target relatively quickly. On the other hand, if there are unambiguous signs that inflation expectations have become de-anchored, monetary policy would quickly need to change tack, accelerating the reduction in asset purchases and even having to consider raising policy rates before net purchases have been brought to zero. This would likely create an abrupt shift in financial conditions and risk premia with negative implications at home and abroad. Clearly, bodog online casino it will be difficult to distinguish, in real time, between these two potential out-of-baseline risk scenarios, especially when there is substantial noise from the expected idiosyncratic and transitory shifts in a range of prices.

Spillovers

The impact on global activity from the rapid U.S. rebound is expected to be positive, particularly for Mexico and Canada. Although the Treasury yield curve has moved in anticipation of larger fiscal support, countries are generally benefiting from still-loose global financial conditions. Looking forward, some countries could face greater pressure in the coming months especially if dollar funding costs rise abruptly. This is particularly of concern for leveraged emerging market and developing economies with weak fundamentals, for commodity importers, and/or for those with an exchange rate pegged to the U.S. dollar.

Gaining From Trade

The administration has underscored the need for a “worker-centric” trade agenda that ensures that global trade benefits Americans as workers and wage-earners, not just as consumers. In pursuing these objectives, a removal of the obstacles to free trade would help support U.S. workers and create more and better U.S. jobs (particularly in light of the domestic efforts that are being proposed to increase productivity, labor supply, and the competitiveness of U.S. producers).

It is of significant concern, therefore, that many of the trade distortions introduced over the past four years remain in place. In particular, tariffs have been kept on imported steel and aluminum, washing machines, solar panels, as well as a range of goods imported from China. The administration has also committed to prioritizing U.S. producers in public procurement, strengthening “Buy American” requirements put in place by the previous administration. These policies should be reconsidered. Trade restrictions and tariff increases should be rolled back and “Buy American” provisions should be tightly circumscribed and made consistent with the U.S. international obligations. Doing so would underscore the U.S. traditional commitment to an open, stable, and transparent international trade regime.

The entanglement of trade and currency issues over the last four years—including investigations into currency-based countervailing duties on China and Vietnam and the inclusion of currency provisions in trade agreements—represents a significant risk to the multilateral trade and international monetary systems. Treating currency undervaluation as a subsidy to be countervailed raises concerns both in the finance and trade spheres and risks increased trade tensions and retaliation (with other countries replicating a similar approach, perhaps using their own standards and methodologies). Currency-related trade responses should be avoided. Enforceable provisions on currency policy should not be attached to U.S. trade agreements. Instead, the U.S. should work constructively with its trading partners to better address the underlying macro-structural distortions that are affecting external positions.

Finally, there is a clear need to address longstanding global trade and investment distortions in areas such as tariffs, farm subsidies, industrial subsidies, and services trade. The U.S. should work actively with international partners to strengthen the rules-based multilateral trading system and address these longstanding global trade and investment distortions. Renewed engagement at the World Trade Organization—including restoring the proper functioning of the dispute settlement system—could help facilitate progress on these topics.

Financial Stability Concerns

Systemic financial stability risks appear close to the historical average. However, the very accommodative financial conditions are encouraging continued risk taking and facilitating rising leverage in the nonbanks and corporates. The banking system appears to be in a strong position but leverage in nonbanks has increased and life insurance companies and hedge funds are exposed to lower-rated corporate debt. Fundamental shifts in the U.S. economy are increasing the risks associated with exposures to commercial real estate. There is, therefore, the potential for systemic problems to emerge from, or be propagated by, stresses in corporates or the nonbanks. These concerns are not lessened by recent episodes that highlight the incompleteness of the available information on nonbanks’ risk profile (including for family offices). In the absence of well-targeted macroprudential tools to manage such risks, consideration should be given to building larger buffers in the more regulated part of the financial system as a second-best substitute.

The housing market appears to be on a vigorous upward path which could raise financial stability concerns in the event of a reversal. Mortgage debt, though, has grown by a modest amount (around 5 percent year-on-year) and lending has been concentrated in households with high credit scores. Nonetheless, given the importance of housing for the broader economy, the buoyancy of the residential real estate market bears careful watching.

The unfolding pandemic revealed important shortcomings in the functioning-under-stress of systemically important U.S. markets and institutions (notably the Treasury market). Preventing a recurrence of those vulnerabilities that manifested in March 2020 will require a range of changes across markets and institutions. Possible changes that could be considered include central clearing of Treasury market transactions; the introduction of a standing repo facility to create greater certainty about the availability of market liquidity in times of stress; requiring retail prime and tax-exempt money market funds to move to a floating net asset value structure; subjecting funds to an annual liquidity stress test; and steps to require more liquidity protections from funds (e.g. more binding liquid asset requirements, pre-determined arrangements to lock-in a proportion of an investor’s shares, use of in-kind redemptions, swing pricing, and temporary gates on outflows).

The Challenge of Building Back Better

As the pandemic effects recede, policymakers will have to cope with simultaneous, ongoing transitions that include:

· A pandemic recovery that likely creates lasting shifts (in the U.S. and abroad) in consumer preferences and in the modalities by which the economy operates.

· A move to a low-carbon economy that will necessitate a significant reallocation of labor and capital (e.g. away from fossil fuels and heavy industry and toward renewables) and, potentially, a very different set of skills.

· A demographic transition whereby 22 percent of the population will be over-65 by 2040, the number of Americans over-85 will double by 2035, and the population will be increasingly racially diverse.

· Digitalization and other evolving technologies that will remake both production and consumption in unpredictable ways.

The longstanding flexibility and innovativeness of the U.S. system puts it in a good place to manage these transitions. However, great care should be taken to ensure that these multi-faceted changes do not increase income polarization, further hollow out the middle class, and leave behind a material share of the population (particularly lower-skilled, lower-income workers). It would be a mistake to assume the social and economic impact of these deep-rooted transitions can simply be left to market forces and the hope that a vibrant U.S. economy will lift all boats.

Instead, a multi-dimensional policy approach will need to be developed to support rising living standards for all Americans and prevent workers from becoming disenfranchised or detached from the labor force. A more effective social safety net and broader healthcare coverage will help. So too will increased investments in vocational and academic education. Greater spending on public investment can raise labor productivity and help improve living standards. However, other strategies may well be needed. These could include regional development initiatives to facilitate the transition. There may be a need to subsidize labor mobility (especially if newly created jobs are in areas where the cost of living and housing is higher). Efforts will be needed to ensure schools and colleges are equipped to provide students with the basic technical and critical thinking skills needed for a fast-changing economy. Also, immigration policies will need to be re-examined to ensure there is the right supply of skills needed to meet the demands of the newly created jobs.

A Greener Economy

The administration’s new impetus to reduce greenhouse gases represents a critical, and very positive, change of direction. While many of the steps that will be needed to achieve the administration’s climate goals have yet to be defined, the broad scope of the plans that have already been articulated (and the significant investments that are expected to be made), if realized, will jump-start the transition to a low carbon economy. However, it will be costly and difficult to achieve the administration’s climate objectives without a greater focus on carbon pricing. In particular, a new federal carbon tax would need to be an indispensable component of the administration’s climate strategy. Such a carbon tax could be combined with sectoral-based policies to tilt incentives away from carbon intensive activities. As political support is being built for a carbon tax, regulatory actions could be strengthened to increase disincentives for greenhouse gas emissions.

Announced efforts to reduce implicit subsidies for the fossil fuel industry are important. However, a similar approach is needed for the agro-industrial sector (which accounts for 10 percent of total U.S. emissions, approximately equal to the CO2-equivalent emissions of France and Italy combined). Policies in this area could include a phase-out of agricultural subsidies that incentivize high-emission farming activities, designing tax and subsidy schemes based on farm output and their relative emissions intensity, conditioning crop insurance subsidies to meeting benchmarks for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, targeting support to fishing and marine farming practices that are compatible with marine biodiversity conservation, and researching lower-carbon agricultural practices.

A More Equitable Society

The U.S. has long faced high rates of poverty. Furthermore, the U.S. has long struggled with racial disparities in economic and social outcomes. Data suggests that minority households continue to be more likely to live in poorer neighborhoods, send their children to under-resourced schools, lack basic health care coverage, face lower socio-economic mobility, be more impacted by climate change, and be the victims of violent crime. The pandemic has worsened these disparities in outcomes, increased poverty, and added to wealth inequality.

The U.S. has important scope to strengthen its social safety nets and increase the progressivity of its tax system. Many of the administration’s proposed policies to mitigate poverty and increase social mobility have been argued for in past consultations. In addition to these proposals, greater attention could be paid to simplifying the multitude of federal, state, and local programs to aid the poor and to redesign social programs to remove “cliffs” (i.e., where programs phase-out abruptly as household income rises). To help ensure the benefits of federal tax credits and other assistance are incident on the working poor, there is scope to raise the federal minimum wage. Finally, it will be important for the administration to build into its policy design an increased focus on supporting those communities that have been historically underserved, marginalized, or adversely affected by persistent poverty.

To read the full mission concluding statement from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), please click here. 

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One silver lining of the  COVID-19 crisis  is that it  has raised critical awareness of  the sustainability dimension  of economic development. Policy makers and development institutions, including the World Bank and the IMF, are calling for stronger emphasis on environmental sustainability as countries plan for the recovery period.

In parallel, increased scrutiny from regulatory bodog online casino authorities, consumers, investors, and financial markets could push firms to be more environmentally responsible and identify synergies between sustainability and business rationale.

Rising pressure from governments and markets

In April, leaders of major economies pledged to take aggressive action to combat climate change, including a commitment by the United States to reduce its emissions by 50 percent by 2030 from 2005 levels. The announcement followed the European Union’s green deal, which commits the bloc to climate neutrality by 2050, and comes ahead of the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) summit taking place in November.

The implications could be felt by countries—and companies—across the world. Both the EU and the U.S. are exploring the possibility of imposing a carbon border adjustment tax, which would apply to imports from countries with less ambitious climate policies. The move could shift the calculus for global companies as they assess their business strategies for these major markets, upending global value chains.

Pressure from financial markets has also been growing. Investment managers such as BlackRock, as well as financial regulators such as the U.S. Federal Reserve, are pushing major companies to disclose emissions across their supply chains and draw up plans to decarbonize their operations. At the same time, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that the value of sustainability-related investment instruments (such as green bonds) reached between $1.2 trillion and $1.3 trillion in 2019, signaling that there are opportunities for firms to capitalize on the push for sustainable growth.

Global firms are increasing investments in sustainability

New evidence from the World Bank’s Quarterly Pulse Survey of Global Multinational Enterprises(MNEs), as well as data on foreign direct investment (FDI) projects, shows that companies are responding to this pressure with an increased focus on sustainable investment. Results for the fourth quarter of 2020 showed three-quarters of respondents—MNE affiliates operating in developing countries—increasing their focus on sustainability and decarbonization of products since the onset of the pandemic.

Foreign investors are also responding to rapidly declining costs and significant growth potential in renewable energy generation, which will be central to achieving a low-carbon economy. As the pandemic wreaked havoc on oil markets, data suggest that a dramatic shift toward investments in clean energy has taken place.

Greenfield FDI in renewable energy totaled $85.5 billion globally in 2020, hitting new highs and eclipsing FDI in fossil fuels for the first time. This shift wasn’t limited to developed economies: FDI in renewables in developing economies totaled $17.6 billion (across 142 projects), exceeding the $13.6 billion announced in fossil fuels (across 42 projects), based on analysis of fDi Markets data.

A challenge and an opportunity for developing countries

The shift toward sustainability will fundamentally change the way that countries need to think about competitiveness and investment attraction. As multinational enterprises look to decarbonize their supply chains, robust national green policies and local supplier capabilities may become a key selling point to prospective investors, as they in turn look to meet the sustainability standards expected by end consumers.

For developing countries, the rapid growth of green sectors—including renewables, energy storage, electric vehicles, green buildings, and waste recycling—present opportunities for skilled jobs, productivity growth, and economic transformation. But whether countries can access these benefits will depend on their climate goals and strategies, their approach to carbon pricing, access to finance for their companies, and a conducive investment climate.

Christine Zhenwei Qiang is Practice Manager of Investment Climate. Her teams advise client governments in over 100 countries on catalyzing private investment and competition through legal, policy, regulatory and institutional reforms. She oversees the Global Investment Competitiveness Report series. She has published journal articles, book chapters and reports on private sector development, economic growth, FDI, productivity and infrastructure development.

Abhishek Saurav, an Indian national, is a Senior Economist with the Global Investment Climate Unit of the World Bank Group’s Finance, Competitiveness & Innovation Global Practice. He leads policy research on foreign direct investment (FDI) and initiatives to shape the investment climate and competitiveness agenda in developing countries.

Brody Viney is a Consultant in the Finance, Competitiveness, and Innovation Global Practice at the World Bank Group. 

To read the full commentary from World Bank Blogs, please click here.

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The European Union pitched the council last year. Its leaders realized that it was in the interest of America and Europe—each other’s largest trading partner—to smooth over accumulated differences of opinion and develop a coordinated approach on trade and technology. But a secondary reason for the potential new council might be more consequential: Both sides want to set common technological standards. Doing so would afford the U.S. and EU the ability to deal with the underestimated long-term national security threat posed by China.

The EU’s approach to regulating technology, in particular American technology, is unintentionally exacerbating the China threat. A proposal for sweeping new legislation aimed at American Big Tech may have unwittingly created an opening for China. Introduced last December, the proposed Digital Markets Act intends to promote a level playing field for online services and to prevent anti-competitive practices. Ironically, it might instead enable a country that steals intellectual property as a matter of national policy, blocks access to foreign products, and couldn’t be more opposed to the fundamental values of European democracies.

America traditionally deals with anti-competitive marketplace acts after the fact. But in keeping with Europe’s typically more aggressive regulatory approach, the DMA is designed in anticipation of possible future competitive harm—without specific proof that such harm has occurred. The bill would limit the ability of online “gatekeepers,” such as search engines and marketplaces, to promote their own products. It would downplay security and privacy concerns in order to force app stores to allow apps from other developers using separate payment systems. The DMA would also force gatekeepers to share IP and trade secrets—such as search ranking and click data—with direct competitors.

Just who would the DMA classify as gatekeepers? The law is far from final and doesn’t name explicit targets. But—surprise—it’s Microsoft, Google, Amazon,Apple, and Facebook that would be regulated under its current criteria. No giant European tech firms. Nor any of the Chinese online giants such as WeChat (1.2 billion users around the globe) or its corporate parent Tencent (the largest video game vendor and one of the 10 biggest companies in the world). Far from leveling the playing field, the bill would penalize the business models of successful American tech companies, and naively leave the field open to China. Its companies could exploit the DMA’s arbitrary thresholds to increase their presence in the EU digital economy at the expense of American companies.

The practices targeted by the proposed law are fair topics for debate and regulation. No one’s saying American Big Tech should be shielded from competition. But against China, it’s lopsided competition. Letting that happen is not only unfair, it’s also shortsighted and perhaps dangerous. 

It’s lopsided because of the unique way China enters and then seeks to control overseas markets, the result of a profoundly integrated and coordinated effort by the entirety of the Chinese government and economy. With strategic goals of market domination set by the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese government puts political pressure on a country to buy Chinese products, a Chinese development bank arranges a low-interest loan, the subsidized state-owned enterprise offers an irresistibly cheap price (and is not subject to U.S. antibribery laws), and even Chinese private sector companies are directed as to how they price and market their products and services. Americans have trouble fully appreciating the scope and effectiveness of China’s system, because this approach seems so different. Our private sector’s success abroad is due far more to superior products than to government promotion.

China requires that its companies turn over data to the government if it asks. The United States and United Kingdom looked at that policy and decided to ban Huawei’s 5G equipment from their networks. If, due to its aggressive tactics, China had an outsized role in the internet on the continent, it would reach deep into European personal and commercial lives. China has a unique way of integrating its payment systems into all online operations. WeChat Pay and Alipay have basically displaced cash in China. If they achieve anything like that prevalence in Europe, the financial and personal details of over 400 million Europeans could be stored on Beijing’s computers. The DMA fits a pattern in which Europeans generally minimize the risks of improper data collection by China for national security purposes (including the advancement of their artificial intelligence programs) and of being locked into Chinese technical standards.

China is perfectly willing to use economic coercion as a tool of statecraft, making market access a means of state ends. When Norway awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident, Norwegian salmon fishermen bore the consequences. China banned their salmon imports and did not relent for six years. Time and again, in disputes with the United States, South Korea, Japan, and others, innocent commercial parties have been held hostage to Chinese government demands. If the DMA succeeds in hampering American tech firms in Europe, and China rushes in to fill the void, Europeans will be vulnerable. WeChat Pay has said it sees Europe as its next key market. It’s not hard to imagine it succeeding. What’s to keep Chinese authorities from threatening to stop commercial payments on that platform until France rectifies some perceived affront to China?

China, Europe, and the United States have much to gain from each other, especially when fair competition drives innovation. Demonizing China is counterproductive if not risky. But it’s equally a mistake to not candidly face the threats posed by a powerful nation that does not share our democratic values. At a minimum, these issues need a frank and honest airing. The EU-US Trade and Tech Council could be a vehicle to persuade Europe it isn’t fully appreciating those national security threats.

Glenn S. Gerstell served as the general counsel of the National Security Agency from 2015 to 2020, and is currently a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic & International Studies.

To read the full commentary from Barron’s, please click here.

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With electric vehicle production surging globally and many nations working to meet ambitious climate targets, the demand for lithium-ion batteries is expected to grow exponentially for years. As a result, according to a new report from Clean Energy Canada (CEC), developing Canada’s battery supply chain presents a huge opportunity for the nation’s economy, but one that will disappear if action is not taken promptly.

The benefits of Canada developing a robust battery supply chain are clear-cut and gaining increased attention. Electric Autonomy Canada recently announced a national panel discussion series, starting June 1, which will explore why and how stakeholders at various levels can act to turn the huge industrial potential into reality.

Minerals, materials in place

As the report, Turning Talk into Action: Building Canada’s Battery Supply Chainpoints out, the global market for lithium-ion batteries is expected to exceed $100 billion by 2030, causing an explosion in demand for minerals such as graphite, lithium and cobalt. Currently, 80 per cent of the world’s batteries are produced in Japan, South Korea and China, and battery production in the EU has begun ramping up significantly.

With known deposits of those critical minerals, ample clean energy, and access to a highly skilled workforce and a well-integrated North American market, Canada has concrete potential to be a sustainable battery provider.

In fact, BloombergNEF recently ranked this country fourth in the world in terms of that supply chain potential.

However, according to the CEC report, should battery manufacturing not materialize quickly enough domestically, the Asian and European battery sectors will likely pick up the slack, while the EU aims to be entirely self-sufficient in EV batteries by 2025.

Government, industry organization key

The federal government has acknowledged the sector’s potential; its strengthened climate plan committed to a “mines to mobility” battery development strategy, and the 2021 budget included $36.8 million to advance critical battery mineral processing and refining expertise. It has also invested$100 million in Lion Electric’s battery module production facility in Quebec and entered into a Joint Action plan on Critical Minerals with the U.S. government.

But the report, compiled after a two-day workshop involving many leading Canadian players, such as General Motors Canada, Lion Electric, the Mining Association of Canada, the Automotive Parts Manufacturers’ Association and Unifor, says it needs to do more.

Foremost among its recommendations is a call for the formation of an “intergovernmental battery secretariat” to coordinate provincial and federal government efforts to develop Canada’s battery manufacturing potential, as well as an industry-led battery task force. It also recommends the formation of a North American Battery Alliance in order to leverage our U.S.-integrated economy and form a strategy that ensures competitiveness with Europe, where an EU battery alliance already exists among key government and industrial groups for the same purpose.

Equally crucial, however, is maximizing access to Canada’s sustainable battery metals, minerals and materials supply. In order to kickstart a sustainable and robust battery manufacturing sector, the report recommends improving supply chain data and transparency, developing a mineral and metal production action plan and creating a plan for clean investment in Canadian mining projects.

Other key recommendations include launching a dedicated battery industry supply fund, promoting Canada’s brand as a supplier of clean batteries, and creating a battery centre of excellence which could conduct research and direct innovation in next-generation battery technology, advanced battery manufacturing and battery recycling.

Luke Sarabia is a writer and editor based in Toronto. He holds a degree in English and Art History from McGill University.

To read the full commentary, please click here.

To read the referenced report, please click here.

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One of the few success stories to come out of last year was the long-anticipated rise of the electric vehicle. Against a backdrop of Covid restrictions and Brexit uncertainty, the EV market defied the odds. New registrations of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) rocketed by 185.9%. To put this into perspective, overall figures for new vehicle registrations fell by over a quarter (29.4%).

The EV market’s triumph is largely down to growth in the fleet sector. In 2020, 68% of new EV registrations were for company cars. Fleet managers, supported by their more environmentally conscious bosses, are making bolder decisions around their fleet policies and choosing to make the switch.

Now, more than ever, fleet managers are enjoying the benefits EVs offer. This includes tax exemptions, enhanced driver satisfaction, lower running and maintenance costs, and the knowledge that they’re playing their part in the fight against climate change.

The challenge fleet managers and the wider EV sector now face is maintaining this momentum, particularly following the UK’s exit from the EU. From ‘Rules of Origin’ tariffs to supply chain delays, Brexit has the potential to lead to a radical shake-up within the automotive bodog casino industry, which could, in turn, have a significant impact on fleets. Some, however, believe that it presents us with a unique opportunity to innovate and become world leaders in EV and battery production technology.

Now that the dust is starting to settle, just how much of a disruption will Brexit be for the nation’s journey towards electrification? And how do fleet managers best manage this?

What Brexit means for fleets

Despite the fact that an agreed trade deal is now in place, Brexit continues to create a level of uncertainty around supply chains and infrastructure. This is naturally a cause of concern for many fleets.

One of the main challenges that Brexit presents is around the Rules of Origin. As part of a post-Brexit trade deal, the UK and the EU agreed that EVs will remain tariff-free until the end of 2023. This is on the condition that at least 40% of their components are of European origin, and at least 55% until the end of 2026. After that, it’s possible that EV sales from the UK to the EU and vice versa will incur a tariff, however the percentage could be reduced if both sides agree to review the final level. During this time, it’s likely that more manufacturers will move production to the UK. Nissan, which already manufacturers lower-capacity 40kWh batteries at its Sunderland plant, has committed to shifting all battery production to the UK to comply with these new rules.

Further challenges still exist for fleet managers, particularly around delays in the delivery of vehicles, repairs and tyre replacements.  The key is for policymakers to make sure that the UK remains an attractive market for suppliers while still delivering on the nation’s net zero targets.

The evolving role of the fleet manager post-Brexit

Despite all the challenges of Brexit, the EV industry has proven itself to be resilient. Step by step, the industry is working collaboratively and in consultation with policymakers to overcome these obstacles.

Over the last year, fleet managers have become more adaptable than ever before. They’ve helped their drivers stay safe and manage constant change. These attributes will be invaluable when navigating the uncertainties that Brexit brings, as more change and disruption is inevitable.

Balancing government strategy with their employer’s own business objectives, as well as staying on top of new rules and regulations, will become a much larger part of the fleet manager’s role now that the UK has left the EU. They are the in-house authority on these matters, empowering both the board and the workforce with up-to-date information and guidance. With the Government’s plans to end the sale of new internal combustion engine cars set to come into force in 2030, it’s not a question of if, but when. Fleet managers need to act now to futureproof their operations.

Managing such a large remit in an ever-changing environment isn’t an easy task. By leaning on the EV experts, fleet managers can take the headache out of their journey towards electrification. This allows them to concentrate on keeping their drivers safe and find greater efficiencies in their fleet strategy.

Transitioning to an EV fleet is a key part of cutting a business’s carbon emissions and building on their sustainability agenda, but many fleet managers don’t know where to start or have the time to think about it. But the tools to help them are there – for example using fleet software such as telematics can identify where vehicles can be switched effectively. Likewise, a thorough review of existing infrastructure can allow fleet managers to maximise their assets and reduce downtime – saving them a lot of money in the process.

We can work together to keep the pedal firmly on the drive to electrification, help UK businesses reach net zero and be an example to the world on climate action.

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Most European and Asian governments agree with the United States that China’s growing military might presents a strategic threat in Asia, and that its industrial subsidies and forced technology transfers are a problem. That said, they were repelled by the Trump administration’s unilateral power-based tactics and differed with it and among themselves about the nature of the threat China presents.

The Biden administration must recognize and work with these differences. In particular, it must bring a nuanced approach to the issue of national-security controls on the leakage of critical technologies that promote China’s military capabilities.

Japan is all too aware of the consequences of this leakage: it lives daily with Chinese incursions into its air and maritime space. European countries do not “feel” the problem the same way: they are farther away and have more difficulty disentangling economic issues from national security concerns.

Europe is, however, becoming more sensitive due to China’s human-rights violations in Xinjiang, its stifling of Hong Kong’s political voice, its disregard for international law in the East and South China Seas, its bombastic coronavirus “diplomacy” over the past year, and the complaints of industry about its economic policies. All these concerns have already had an impact on European policy, as the EU has toughened its laws against subsidies and dumping, introduced a “screening mechanism” to regulate acquisitions of European companies, and updated its controls on technology exports.

The Biden administration can build on these steps, but it must understand and work with the nuance of the changes in European policy, while at the same time helping Europe better understand the nature of the problem.

The Changing National Security/Technology Problem

Working with Europe to stem the leakage of critical technologies that could boost China’s military capabilities is important because the types of technologies relevant to defense has broadened and because the EU’s role in this has changed significantly.

Traditionally, the United States and its allies relied on their technological dominance to offset Russia and China’s numerical military superiority, with tactical nuclear weapons in the 1960s and precision and stealth technologies in the 1970s and 1980s. These first two “offset strategies” were driven and owned by governments working with large defense contractors. This made it easier for governments to control the export of the relatively limited universe of “dual-use” technologies that had civilian and military applications, whether by requiring licenses under the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) or through screening foreign acquisitions of firms (for example, by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS).

The Obama administration recognized that the U.S. lead in “dual-use” technologies had eroded, and that the commercial sector had developed a wide range of new technologies that could have military applications, including in sensing, computing, data analytics and deep machine learning, communications and systems integration, robotics, genetic engineering, and many other fields. This explosion in “dual-use” technologies as well as in the universe of companies developing them led the Obama administration to develop a “third offset strategy,” predicated on working with the private sector in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere to stay one step ahead of the “quick followers” in China and elsewhere.

At the same time, the Defense Department saw China using open and covert means to acquire a wide range of advanced technologies. The report it commissioned from the CEO of the cyber-security firm Symantec, Michael Brown, on Chinese technology acquisition practices was completed at the end of 2016. It led in 2018 to the Trump administration’s tough approach to China’s “technology theft” (the trigger for the trade war) as well as to the adoption of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act and the Export Control Reform Act. Both acts are tied to the ongoing U.S. government effort to identify “emerging and foundational” dual-use technologies that should be subject to export and investment-screening controls, which Washington hopes other countries will help enforce.

Europe’s Evolving Approach

The same trends—the technological advances of China and Russia, the broadening expanse of dual-use technologies, and the growing number of Europe’s own high-tech firms—have changed Europe’s approach to technology and national security as well—although perhaps not as much as the United States might want.

Despite enormous strides in integration, European countries jealously guard their sovereignty over national security and defense. Under the treaties creating the EU, national security is explicitly reserved as a “competence” of member states.

This creates tensions with export controls in the EU and European Economic Area (EEA), as the non-military part of “dual use” falls into the EU’s single market, in which products flow freely. Member states accordingly limited the EU role in export licensing merely to transposing into EU law decisions made in other fora: the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies (CoCom’s successor), the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group (for Chemical Weapons), and the Missile Technology Control Regime. This grudging inclusion of the EU ensured that those member states not in the different multilateral arms-control regimes would also control exports of designated items.

This grated on the European Commission, which believed the single market and common commercial policy justified a more substantive EU role. It therefore jumped on the European Parliament’s anger at reports that European surveillance and crowd-control products were used to suppress the Arab Spring, and recommended in 2016 that the EU revise its export-control regulation significantly to allow the EU to license things and technologies that had not been listed by the multilateral regimes. While this initiative was supported by the European Parliament, the member states had serious reservations about giving the EU more powers in this domain, leading to four years of debate.

Similarly, the European Commission leapt on the concerns caused by a surge of Chinese investment in 2015-2016, including the acquisition of one of Germany’s leading robotics companies, KUKA, as well as the attempted acquisition of Aixtron, a German firm that makes key inputs for semiconductor production. The European Commission’s 2017 proposal for an EU “screening mechanism” for inward investment sidestepped member-state sensitivities by making the EU a center of exchange of information about foreign acquisitions of firms. It also succeeded in excluding “competitiveness” and “reciprocity” from the scope of the review, as these go against the EU’s generally open approach to foreign investment. As a result, this proposal was adopted in 2019, and entered into force in 2020.

The EU’s New Export-Control Regulation

The reluctance of member states reluctance to have the EU wade into dual-use export controls was worn down by the growing concerns about China’s technology acquisition as documented by the business sector and the U.S. and Japanese governments, including with regard to Huawei and 5G. But China’s repression of the Uighurs and its heavy-handed approach in Hong Kong also changed the calculations, especially as the European Commission and European Parliament couched the need for a new regime as critical to protecting human rights.

The new regulation—which was agreed by the EU Council and the European Parliament last November but is not yet formally adopted—makes important changes to the EU export-control system that allies can work with as they strengthen efforts to prevent the leakage of dual-use technologies to China and Russia. Indeed, even the change in the form of the law, from a regulation of the Council to one of the Council and the Parliament, is important, as it engages the EU itself in an issue once considered the purview of the member states.

Further, new provisions allow the EU to adopt “autonomous” export-control authorizations for cyber-surveillance equipment/technology (Article 4a) and for other purposes (Article 8a). While the former got attention in the human-rights debate, the latter is potentially more important. The new EU approach in both cases is bottom-up: the move to require an EU-level export license must start with a member state adopting a licensing requirement (that is, the European Commission cannot itself propose products or technologies to be controlled).

Bodog Poker In the case of cyber-surveillance equipment/technology, if a member state lists something that is not restricted by the four main export-control regimes noted above, that starts an automatic process that compels the other member states to follow suit within a specific period. The EU can adopt a licensing requirement when all have done so.

Article 8a on other “autonomous” EU controls is far more nebulous. It starts again with a member state requiring a license for equipment/technology on public-security (including terrorism) or human-rights grounds, but then simply requires notification of the European Commission and other member states without further elaboration. But the article gets some power from a preambular paragraph, which explains that this is meant to be to “enable the Union to react rapidly to serious misuse of existing technologies, or to new risks associated with emerging technologies” by helping member states coordinate their response to a new risk, although they should also thereafter start efforts to “introduce equivalent controls at the multilateral level.”

Article 8a also refers to the “end-user,” which arguably allows the EU to adopt export-licensing requirements for specific end-users and/or end-use. This is particularly important with respect to China, although most EU governments dislike establishing controls by destination country.

Making the Best of It

For many, the EU’s new investment-screening and export-control laws will appear feeble next to the immediate threat of China’s growing ability to project military power in Asia. But any effort to stem the flow of technologies to China’s military establishment must be multilateral, precisely because the range of technologies and the number of firms developing them has expanded so much. While U.S., Japanese, and other authorities will naturally work with the European countries that are members of Wassenaar and NATO, the EU process is also essential to plug leaks through the EU/EEA Single Market.

In helping strengthen the implementation of the EU laws, the United States and other countries can and should ramp up information and intelligence sharing with their European counterparts at the national, EU, and NATO levels. This is critical to explain that China, Russia, and other countries could use certain technologies for military purposes. They will also need to find countries that are willing to help launch the EU processes by listing certain technologies (and possibly end-uses/users). Finally, as it develops guidance for the investment-screening and export-control laws, they can work with the European Commission, whose guidance documents, such as those on dual-use research and electronic licensing, can be very influential.

In so doing, however, the United States and other countries should make clear that their interest is based on national security and/or human rights. Although the EU has more powers in economic policy, concepts like “competitiveness” and “reciprocity” are too easily used for policies that undermine the EU’s generally open approach to trade and investment. They will also need to emphasize their intent to bring any controls ultimately to the multilateral level, as this remains politically important in Europe.

Achieving effective European action on preventing the leakage of critical technologies to China will not be easy, in part as EU engagement in this area is still novel. But a concerted and well-thought through approach will be appreciated by Europe’s allies and could be effective as well.

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Yesterday, I had put up a post that looked at the WTO’s Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff’s statement to the G20 on important measures needed in the trade arena to help with responding to the global health pandemic, economic recovery and WTO reform. See November 22, 2020, DDG Wolff’s comments to G20 on immediate challenges for trade to address economic rebound from the pandemic and for WTO reform, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/11/22/ddg-wolffs-comments-to-g20-on-immediate-challenges-for-trade-to-address-economic-rebound-from-the-pandemic-and-for-wto-reform/. The activities of the G20 are far broader than simply the trade issues reviewed in yesterday’s post and much of the Declaration looks at various aspects of addressing recovery from the pandemic, including access to vaccines and therapeutics. However, on the trade agenda in particular identified by DDG Wolff, the G20 does not appear to have addressed the issue of trade finance for developing and least developed countries, did not call for creating duty free treatment for all pharmaceuticals and medical goods relevant to the COVID-19 pandemic, and while supportive of WTO reform did not provide specifics or a sense of time urgency. The Declaration contains 38 paragraphs broken in four sections. Many deal with topics that are being examined in part at the WTO (e.g., digital trade) or that may be going forward (e.g., environment, climate change). There was only one paragraph on trade and investment (para. 12) (under section “B. Building a Resilient and Long-Lasting Recovery”). The paragraph reads as follows:

“12. Trade and Investment: Supporting the multilateral trading system is now as important as ever. We strive to realize the goal of a free, fair, inclusive, non-discriminatory, transparent, predictable, and stable trade and investment environment, and to keep our markets open. We will continue to work to ensure a level playing field to foster an enabling business environment. We endorse the G20 Actions to Support World Trade and Investment in Response to COVID-19. We recognize the contribution that the Riyadh Initiative on the Future of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has made by providing an additional opportunity to discuss and reaffirm the objectives and foundational principles of the multilateral trading system as well as to demonstrate our ongoing political support for the necessary reform of the WTO, including in the lead up to the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference. We recognize the need to increase the sustainability and resilience of national, regional, and global supply chains that foster the sustainable integration of developing and least developed countries into the trading system, and share the objective of promoting inclusive economic growth including through increased participation of micro-, small-, medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in international trade and investment. We note that structural problems in some sectors, such as excess capacities, can cause a negative impact.”

The G20 Declaration in paragraph 3 provides a statement indicating G20 members “will spare no effort to ensure * * * affordable and equitable access for all people, consistent with members’ commitments to incentivize innovation,” to COVID-19 diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines. The paragraph refers to the efforts of the “Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator (ACT-A) initiative and its COVAX facility,” and commits G20 members “to addressing the remaining global financing needs.” While obviously encouraging, the financing needs that remain are large both for vaccines and for testing and treatment. Total additional funding needs approach $40 billion. See Statement by President von der Leyen at the joint press conference with President Michel ahead of the G20 Summit, Brussels, 20 November 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_20_2170. Such contributions are voluntary and substantially exceed what has been pledged or received to date. So time will tell whether G20 countries actually fulfil the general commitment included in yesterday’s declaration.

The New York Times in an article on November 22 headlined “G20 Summit Closes With Little Progress and Big Gaps Between Trump and Allies,” describes the large number of topics where the current U.S. Administration has been at odds with many of the other G20 leaders and the resulting challenges to meaningful joint action as opposed to “general appeals for more global cooperation” and for “affordable and equitable access” to vaccines and therapeutics. New York Times, Nov. 22, 2020, G20 Summit Closes With Little Progress and Big Gaps Between Trump and Allies, a https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/us/politics/g20-summit-trump.html. While the Trump Administration undoubtedly has contributed to the lack of greater specifics in the Declaration, there are undoubtedly strong differences among different G20 members on what commitments should be undertaken that involve G20 members specifically.

Conclusion

The G20 process has been important over the last decade or so in mobilizing the world’s leading nations to provide leadership to address global challenges. The success of the group’s efforts depends on leadership of the majors and a common understanding of the challenges at hand. There are structural challenges in the current G20 configuration with different economic models and different levels of economic development providing points of conflict as well as points of expanded understanding of global needs. The challenges have been exacerbated by the concerns of the current U.S. Administration with multilateral organizations and with whether climate change is an actual problem.

With the current internal friction points, the G20 has nonetheless put forward a largely united front in seeking to meet the challenges from the COVID-19 pandemic and economic shocks through collaboration and to seek to rebuild more sustainably and more inclusively. The lack of specifics in some areas may be better addressed under a new U.S. Administration’s participation with the expected closer ties the Biden Administration will have with at least many of the G20 members.

In the trade arena, the conflicts within the WTO are not likely to go away with a new U.S. Administration. That doesn’t mean that U.S. leadership couldn’t permit rapid movement on a number of issues that would be helpful in addressing the pandemic and the global economic recovery. But WTO reform and even singular issues like updated coverage by the Pharmaceutical Agreement or the elimination of tariffs on medical goods unfortunately are likely to take way too long to be helpful in the current pandemic. That leaves voluntary actions by countries in their own interest as the likely option most likely to provide some improved market access during the pandemic.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, bodog poker review|Most Popular_Congressional

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The fifteen countries signing the RCEP are the ten ASEAN countries — Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam — and five others (Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea). India had participated in negotiations but withdrew in late 2019. According to a CNN article, “The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership spans 15 countries and 2.2 billion people, or nearly 30% of the world’s population, according to a joint statement released by the nations on Sunday, when the deal was signed. Their combined GDP totals roughly $26 trillion and they account for nearly 28% of global trade based on 2019 data.” CNN Business, November 16, 2020, China signs huge Asia Pacific trade deal with 14 countries, https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/16/economy/rcep-trade-agreement-intl-hnk/index.html.

The Joint Statement released on the 15th is copied below.

Joint Leaders’ Statement on The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)

“We, the Heads of State/Government of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam – Australia, China, Japan, Korea and New Zealand, met virtually on 15 November 2020, on bodog casino the occasion of the 4th RCEP Summit.

We were pleased to witness the signing of the RCEP Agreement, which comes at a time when the world is confronted with the unprecedented challenge brought about by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) global pandemic. In light of the adverse impact of the pandemic on our economies, and our people’s livelihood and well-being, the signing of the RCEP Agreement demonstrates our strong commitment to supporting economic recovery, inclusive development, job creation and strengthening regional supply chains as well as our support for an open, inclusive, rules-based trade and investment arrangement. We acknowledge that the RCEP Agreement is critical for our region’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and will play an important role in building the region’s resilience through inclusive and sustainable post-pandemic economic recovery process.”

https://asean.org/joint-leaders-statement-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep-2/

The agreement has twenty chapters some of which have annexes:

1. Initial Provisions and General Definitions
2. Trade in Goods
3. Rules of Origin
4. Customs Procedures and Trade Facilitation
5. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
6. Standards, Technical Regulations, and Conformity Assessment Procedures
7. Trade Remedies
8. Trade in Services
9. Temporary Movement of Natural Persons
10. Investment
11. Intellectual Property
12. Electronic Commerce
13. Competition
14. Small and Medium Enterprises
15. Economic and Technical Cooperation
16. Government Procurement
17. General Provisions and Exceptions
18. Institutional Provisions
19. Dispute Settlement
20. Final Provisions

The full RCEP agreement and country schedules of tariff commitments can be found in English at the webpage for RCEP, https://rcepsec.org/legal-text/ as well as on various individual signatory web pages. See, e.g., the Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-in-force/rcep/rcep-text-and-associated-documents.

A summary of the agreement from the ASEAN webpage is embedded below. https://asean.org/storage/2020/11/Summary-of-the-RCEP-Agreement.pdf.

From the chapter titles, it is clear that the Agreement does not deal with issues such as labor or environment. While there is a chapter on trade remedies, a review shows no expanded rules on industrial subsidies – a matter of concern for many countries dealing with China. Similarly, under the competition chapter, the only reference (and it is indirect) to state-owned or state-invested enterprises is contained in Article 13.3.5 (“Article 13.3: Appropriate Measures against Anti-Competitive Activities”). “Each Party shall apply its competition laws and regulations to all entities engaged in commercial activities, regardless of their ownership. Any exclusion or exemption from the application of each Party’s competition laws and regulations, shall be transparent and based on grounds of public policy or public interest.” (Emphasis added).

RCEP Chapter 7, Trade Remedies

While subsequent posts will look at other aspects of the RCEP Agreement, this post looks at Chapter 7, Trade Remedies. For convenience, the chapter is embedded below.

Safeguard actions

Section A of Chapter 7 deals with RCEP safeguard measures. The RCEP safeguard measure is intended to be available for a transitional period that extends to a period that is eight years after the tariff elimination or reduction on a specific good is scheduled to occur. Relief can be in the form either of stopping tariff reductions or snapping the tariff back to the MFN rate at the lower of the rates applicable at the date of entry into force of the Agreement for the country in question or the MFN rate on the date when the transitional RCEP safeguard measure is put in place. There is a three year limit on relief, with a one year extension in certain circumstances. If relief is for more than a year, the relief provided is to be reduced “at regular intervals”. Relief is not available against imports from a RCEP party whose imports are less than 3% of total imports from the RCEP parties or if the RCEP party is a Least Developed Country. RCEP has three members who are Least Developed Countries (LDCs) according to the UN’s 2020 list – Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. Compensation is required and if not agreed to, then the party subject to the RCEP safeguard “may suspend the application of substantially equivalent concessions” on goods from the party applying the safeguard. No compensation is required during the first three years of relief if there has been an absolute increase in imports. No compensation will be requested from an LDC.

RCEP countries preserve their rights under the WTO to pursue global safeguard measures. RCEP parties are not to apply both a RCEP safeguard and a global safeguard to the same good at the same time.

Antidumping and Countervailing Duties

Section B of Chapter 7 deals with antidumping and countervailing duties. While the Section starts by noting that parties “retain their rights and obligations under Article VI of GATT 1994, the AD Agreement, and the SCM Agreement,” the section adds clarity to notice and consultation requirements, timing of notice and information required for verification, maintaining a non-confidential file available to all parties and other matters. The biggest addition to parties rights and obligations is the acceptance of a “Prohibition on Zeroing” in dumping investigations and reviews. Article 7.13.

“When margins of dumping are established, assessed, or reviewed under
Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 9, and Article 11 of the AD Agreement, all individual margins, whether positive or negative, shall be counted for weighted average-to-weighted average and transaction-to- transaction comparison. Nothing in this Article shall prejudice or affect a Party’s rights and obligations under the second sentence of subparagraph 4.2 of Article 2 of the AD Agreement in relation to weighted average-to-transaction comparison.”

Considering the centrality of the WTO dispute settlement decisions on “zeroing” to the U.S. position on overreach by the Appellate Body, the actions of the RCEP parties to add the obligation contained in RCEP Art. 7.13 to their approach to antidumping investigations will almost certainly complicate the ability of the WTO to move past the impasse on the Appellate Body.

Conclusion

The RCEP Agreement is an important FTA in the huge number of such agreements entered by countries around the world. There will certainly be advantages for the RCEP countries from the regional trade liberalization and the common rules of origin adopted.

Pretty clearly, the RCEP has not dealt with some of the fundamental challenges to the global trading system from the rise of economic systems that are not premised on market-economy principles. While such issues can be addressed in the WTO going forward, the ability of China to get a large number of trading partners to open their markets without the addressing of the underlying core distortions from the state directed economic system that China employs suggests that the road to meaningful reform has gotten longer with the RCEP Agreement.

Nor have the RCEP countries chosen to include within the RCEP action on issues like the environment which are of growing importance to the ability to have sustainable development. Again while such issues can be addressed in the WTO, they are also being addressed in bilateral and plurilateral agreements by other countries and including some of the RCEP countries. Thus, RCEP is a lost opportunity for leadership by China on issues of great importance to its citizens and those of all RCEP parties.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, bodog poker review|Most Popular_Congressional

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