For months, the prospect of restarting the multilateral summit remained muddy. Even before the pandemic, participating members in the CEE region openly questioned its utility. CEE governments had hoped the initiative could attract more direct Chinese investment to the region. But the bulk of China’s investment went to five non-EU members in the Balkans, and the rest largely concentrated in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, leaving many CEE capitals including Warsaw and Prague thoroughly underwhelmed. As bilateral trade grew, reaching $103.45 billion according to the Chinese government, CEE countries’ trade deficit with China also balloned, while local exports to China saw only modest growth. The anticipated economic benefits of a closer relationship with China seems rather asymmetric.

China’s diplomatic performance during the pandemic further added to the chorus of critical voices in the region. After the initial dash to secure masks and other PPE through Chinese channels, many CEE countries were soon alarmed and appalled by Beijing’s pandemic-related disinformation and propaganda efforts in Europe as well as Chinese “Wolf Warrior” diplomats who publicly attack and threaten China’s critics. It’s a hard lesson that Beijing will define both the terms as well as the results of its partnerships.

With China, the EU, and the United States increasingly competing for geopolitical influence, a line to Beijing and face time with top Chinese leaders may provide additional incentives for all interested parties to up their games with CEE countries.

China may be down, but it’s certainly not out. Despite growing CEE skepticism toward China and the 17+1 initiative, no CEE member openly rejected China’s call to revive the summit. With China, the EU, and the United States increasingly competing for geopolitical influence, a line to Beijing and face time with top Chinese leaders may provide additional incentives for all interested parties to up their games with CEE countries.

The EU has repeatedly voiced concerns about Chinese activities in the CEE region. Brussels also warned that continued China-CEE exchanges could undermine a coherent EU approach to China. Sure, growing Chinese influence in the Balkans and EU members like Hungary raises serious questions regarding fiscal responsibility, environmental pollution, and even erosion of democratic governance. But if Angela Merkel could push through the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) despite internal EU dissent, why shouldn’t Warsaw or Prague or Bucharest call up Xi Jinping to advocate their own business plans? Despite continuing EU support for CEE economic development, creative solutions, hard commitments, and equitable input into the EU’s policy decisions on China are much more effective than critical rhetoric in securing CEE solidarity.

That very sentiment has already laid ground for increased U.S. engagement in the CEE region. The Trump administration’s campaign against Chinese telecommunications company Huawei led to multiple tours of top U.S. government officials across the region. Those efforts saw most CEE members signing up for the Prague Proposals that call for scrutinization of 5G vendors and their home governments, joint declarations supporting the U.S. “Clean Network” campaign, as well as a number of CEE countries such as Poland and Romania excluding Huawei from their 5G networks. Washington also publicly supported the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) and committed up to $1 billion for its funding.

Beijing’s challenges now also include souring regional public opinion, an expanding regional network of independent China critics, and potential for growing U.S.-CEE security synergy.

As it’s increasingly clear that the Biden administration will hold a hardline toward China, with President Biden calling the relationship with Beijing “extreme competition,” some in the CEE region see an opportunity for closer U.S.-CEE partnership. They argue that CEE countries are more in tune with Washington’s national security assessment toward China than its Western European neighbors and the deepening Sino-Russian security and technology cooperation greatly alarms government officials from Tallin to Sofia. For CEE countries, it seems, the road to Washington could run through Beijing.

China, for its part, is increasingly aware that its old tactic in the region may not help it score another easy diplomatic win. Beijing’s decision to upgrade the 17+1 summit with Xi Jinping as host and its creation of a range of additional China-CEE initiatives, including agriculture expos and cloud service dialogues, are clear indications of China’s renewed focus to sway the CEE region and leverage Europe amid a prolonged global strategic competition with the United States. Aside from its still decidedly bilateral diplomatic engagement with CEE countries and an underwhelming record, Beijing’s challenges now also include souring regional public opinion, an expanding regional network of independent China critics, and potential for growing U.S.-CEE security synergy. How China defines the 17+1 agenda at the upcoming summit could provide important clues to its future fortunes in the region.

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China’s central leadership proclaimed that the nation will “fully bring out the advantage of its superlarge market scale and the potential of domestic demand to establish a new development pattern featuring domestic and international dual circulations that complement each other.”

The new strategy could become a key priority in the Chinese government’s 14th five-year plan for 2021 to 2025.

It is believed that the strategy is being advocated by Vice Premier Liu He, President Xi Jinping’s top economic adviser who headed China’s negotiators in the trade talks with the United States.

Since no further details have been announced on the strategy, people have mixed views and interpretations of it.

Some see it as a continuation of China’s policy focusing on spurring domestic demand and believe the nation will maintain economic exchanges with other countries and even move toward economic reforms.

Others say the new strategy will hamper Beijing’s economic reforms, as the nation will reduce economic interactions with the rest of the world and shift to self-sufficiency.

Which way will China take?

Differing views

A China Daily article published on Aug. 14 says concerns that China will close its door by putting forward the new development concept “are not well-founded,” citing the country’s history of economic development over the past four decades.

The article says China’s economy expanded after it started to reform and open up in the late 1970s, but an increase in foreign trade led to a wider income gap between the eastern coastal region and the western region. And, in the late 1990s, the nation had already acknowledged the need to shift to a more balanced development mode focusing on domestic demand.

In 2006, China said it would make the expansion of domestic demand the basis for economic development and seek a coordinated development of investment, domestic demand and exports, the article said, adding that such a shift in development orientation has remained unchanged since then.

It stresses China will continue its economic exchanges with other countries and expansion of the domestic market will naturally require more imports and foreign investment, as well as the further opening of its financial sector.

Li Yiping, an economics professor at Renmin University of China, also pointed out that Xi, in his key speech at a symposium with corporate leaders in Beijing on July 21, ruled out the possibility of China closing its doors on other economies.

Li says the dual circulation development pattern centered on the domestic economy and aimed at integrating the domestic and global economies, is the right choice to not only give a much-needed boost to the Chinese economy but also revive the the world economy.

Frank Tang, a reporter for the South China Morning Post, wrote, quoting Chinese government advisers and economists, that the new strategy is focused on competition and opening up, including lowering barriers for foreign investors, a motivation to secure regional trade pacts and a supply-side structural reform of state-owned enterprises.

Meanwhile, there are views that China will reduce economic exchanges with other nations.

Li Hong, an editor with the Global Times, writes that China’s dual circulation policy “aims to fight U.S. bullying and hegemony.”

“Trying to deflect the (U.S. President Donald) Trump administration’s trade protectionism and technology blockade, the new Chinese policy aims to set up a global economic and technological innovation center, rivaling that of the U.S.,” Li writes.

Although noting that focusing more on inner circulation does not mean China will give up on outer circulation, Li says, “to offset the U.S.-led decoupling bid, China may be forced to turn its back on North America (the U.S. and Canada) and Australia by keeping a greater distance from the three unfriendly countries, while focusing more on forming closer economic partnerships with the economies of Europe, Asia, Africa and other regions.”

Li also says the iconic Belt and Road initiative will be vigorously enforced and funded.

Lingling Wei of the Wall Street Journal wrote, citing Chinese officials, that Vice Premier Liu appears to be trying to use the new agenda to push through changes that could make more credit available to private companies rather than state-owned firms. But he has to balance that push with the need to adhere to Xi’s emphasis on state control, she added.

China’s economic development

After the creation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s policies focused on building heavy industries to replace imports. Since the 1960s, as the nation’s relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, China leaned further toward “self-reliance.”

Its national savings rate at the time was around 20 to 30% of gross domestic product, relatively high compared with its income levels, and the funds were allocated to capital investment in heavy industries.

However, China’s economic growth had been limited, with the nation occupying less than 2% of global GDP as of 1978 and its exports less than 1% of world trade.

And, in 1978, China’s reform and opening up began, led by Deng Xiaoping. China posted a tremendous average annual real GDP growth rate of 9.8% between 1978 and 2008.

Its exports posted an annual increase of 16% on average between 1979 and 2001, and an annual growth of 27% on average between 2002 and 2008, making the country the world’s top exporter.

As a result of the one-child policy adopted in the 1970s to control the rapidly increasing population, the proportion of working-age population rose with the fall in birthrate, creating the so-called “population bonus.”

Surplus labor in rural areas provided a labor force for factories in coastal areas, boosting China’s production and exports without seeing much increase in labor costs.

The national savings rate continued to rise, increasing to over 30% of GDP in the 1980s, over 40% in the 1990s and marking an astonishing figure of over 50% around 2010, encouraging active investment and, at the same time, creating a huge current account surplus.

Challenges for the Chinese economy

While China has achieved great economic development since 1978, prerequisites for growth are disappearing.

The period of demographic bonus has ended, labor costs have risen and the percentage of national savings to GDP has declined.

The recent U.S.-China trade dispute shows that it has become difficult for Beijing to maintain economic growth with excessive dependence on exports in view of the international environment.

China’s GDP per capita stands at $10,000, still low compared with $60,000 for the U.S. and $40,000 for Japan. China’s rapidly aging population is facing the risk of growing old before becoming rich.

Since the nation can’t expect its population to grow, the only other option would be to increase its productivity. But according to one estimate, China’s total factor productivity growth rate dropped from 6.1% between 1996 and 2004 to 2.5% between 2005 and 2015.

The key ideas vital to raising the total factor productivity are technological innovation and improving the efficiency of resource allocation.

Specifically, it is necessary to allocate funds to companies and sectors with growth potential. But in China’s financial sector, which is slow on liberalization, funds allocation and interest rates are determined not only by economic factors.

Some say that state-owned enterprises are given priority in funds allocation even though their productivity is lower than that of private firms.

U.S.-China conflict

Aware that there are limits to economic growth dependent on exports and investments, Beijing has been calling for the need to boost domestic demand since the 2000s.

Such a stance is unlikely to change under the dual circulation strategy, and while China will strengthen its focus on expanding domestic demand, it does not mean it will stop economic exchanges with the outside world. It will further open its markets and continue to welcome investments by foreign companies.

Yet, the reason behind China’s rush to adopt the dual circulation strategy is that the nation is being threatened by recent developments, including the U.S.-China conflict, Washington’s attempt to stop the flow of technology to Beijing, the U.S. restricting the activities of Chinese bodog sportsbook review firms and Western countries rethinking their supply chains.

HiSilicon Technology Co., a subsidiary of Huawei Technologies Co., has been focusing on the design and development of semiconductors and entrusted production to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC). But TSMC halted new orders from HiSilicon in response to U.S. sanctions on Huawei restricting its access to crucial chip supplies.

Since the products of Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC), China’s top chipmaking manufacturer, are said to lag two generations behind TSMC’s, China should have an unwavering determination to develop self-reliance in the field of advanced technology.

As the U.S.-China conflict escalates, there is a risk that calls within China to focus on domestic demand could go beyond the push to rebalance distortion in consumption, investment and exports and transform into efforts to completely replace imports and become self-sufficient.

There are various voices also within the U.S., with some urging the country to completely decouple from China and others calling for partial disengagement in fields including tech.

There is a possibility that experts’ views on the dual circulation strategy differ even in China.

The strategy is a framework that could lead to a new growth model that does not depend excessively on exports or investments, based on improved productivity by resolving issues facing the Chinese economy, including reform of state-owned enterprises and financial sector liberalization.

We should pay close attention to how it turns out.

The global community should be on alert over China’s actions violating international law regarding various issues including the South China Sea, the Senkaku Islands, Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. And it is necessary to conduct partial disengagement to a certain extent in areas like tech in order to protect a free society.

But if Western countries show excessive decoupling moves toward China to maintain their employment or based on mercantilist intentions, China will implement the dual circulation strategy in the form of reducing exchanges with foreign countries.

In September 2018, Xi, during an inspection tour to Heilongjiang province, said that rising protectionism means China is “forced to take the road of self-reliance.”

Actions bring about counteractions and nationalism amplifies interaction, and closed-door economic policies will not be beneficial to both China or the rest of the world.

All eyes are on China’s next move.

Shin Oya is a senior consulting fellow at API.

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But preparation and cooperation among African leaders and African Union agencies, particularly the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, have resulted in many successes – including increased testing capacity, resource mobilization, and coordinated policies to prevent and contain the coronavirus’s spread and promote economic recovery.

Despite these successes, Africa is still facing significant challenges. These include a continued rise in COVID-19 cases, a need for greater testing capacity and improved health infrastructure, difficulties acquiring medical and food supplies, weak social-welfare systems that are struggling to support vulnerable populations during the economic crisis, and high government debt coupled with a need for increased spending.

Although African countries are capable of continuing their progress on the long road to recovery, external support would greatly bolster their efforts. Aside from humanitarian principles and solidarity, a strong and rapid African recovery is in the world’s interest. As long as the virus is unchecked in some regions, no part of the world can be safe from it. Moreover, if COVID-19 further weakens fragile African states or causes health or economic disasters on the continent, a migration crisis or increased threats to international security could ensue.

We therefore propose six ways the world can cooperate with Africa to improve the continent’s crisis response, accelerate its economic recovery, and build momentum for its post-pandemic development.

First, external partners can provide sufficient resources and investment to enable effective COVID-19 responses and inclusive post-pandemic economic recoveries. Although multilateral and bilateral partners have already provided some financial support in the form of debt relief, loans, and grants, African governments need much more. Some estimate the continent’s pandemic-response funding gap at about $100 billion annually over the next three years. Given Africa’s health-care and economic vulnerabilities, additional financial support and debt relief are critical.

Second, partners should support and invest in the African Continental Free Trade Area, which is one of Africa’s best economic-recovery plans. The AfCFTA aims to increase intra-African trade significantly, and thus develop regional value chains, local manufacturing, and sourcing of intermediate and final goods. By reducing the continent’s vulnerability to external shocks through decreased dependence on non-African trade, the agreement will foster economic diversification and resilience, thereby promoting Africa’s integration and assisting its recovery. In addition to backing and investing in the AfCFTA, partners can provide expertise regarding trade regulations and manufacturing capacity.

Supporting private-sector growth is a third way to unlock Africa’s economic potential, representing a significant opportunity – in terms of both trade and investment – that will benefit Africa and global businesses. Although both the formal sector and the large informal sector are currently struggling, owing to lockdowns and economic restrictions, private firms will be crucial to Africa’s recovery and future development. External partners can support African businesses through increased investment, including in small and medium-size enterprises that are today trying to stay afloat and pay their employees. International partners can also help to improve the business environment, for example by overseeing a mandatory regulation process.

Next, external partners can support Africa’s efforts to embrace the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) and achieve a successful digital transformation. During the pandemic, technology has enabled real-time medical forecasting and modeling, better communication between leaders, and the virtual operation of businesses. But Africa’s technology infrastructure, specifically Internet access, lags severely, and the continent has benefited less from digital technology than the rest of the world. Partners can help accelerate the 4IR in Africa by sharing technological innovations, collaborating in adapting them to African contexts, and providing investments that will unleash young African innovators’ technological potential and enable existing innovations to be scaled up.

Fifth, the world can help to ensure that no African is left behind, including through job creation, skill-building, social protection, and gender equality. Vulnerable groups such as those living in urban slums or rural areas, youth, women, and the poorest families need extra government support, but social-welfare systems are weak, especially in fragile states. External partners should therefore give special consideration to assisting the most-affected countries and communities by channeling resources toward these populations, instead of giving unconditional aid to governments, and by collaborating with African leaders to create innovative policies that benefit these groups.

The final priority is bodog sportsbook review to help Africa address its fragilities and bridge the gaps between policy goals and outcomes, including through evidence-based policy research. Ineffective institutions, corruption, and a lack of accountability can undermine even perfect policies. Partners can monitor projects or provide experts to assist in implementation, and can promote good governance through measures and indicators such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index, or the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. Research institutes and think tanks such as the Brookings Institution are playing an important role in this effort.

Each of these six proposals can help Africa to combat and recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, but they are also critical for realizing the continent’s potential and accelerating its future development. By collaborating with external partners to secure additional resources, develop new initiatives, and invest in key sectors, African countries can mitigate the virus’s immediate impact and hasten economic recovery while building resilient systems for long-term growth and success.

This commentary is co-signed by Joyce Banda, a former president of Malawi; Rosalía Arteaga Serrano, a former president of the Republic of Ecuador; Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of UN Women, and a former vice-president of South Africa; Laimdota Straujuma, a former prime minister of Latvia; Yves Leterme, a former prime minister of Belgium; and Rovshan Muradov, Secretary-General of the Nizami Ganjavi International Center.

Landry Signé, a professor and senior director at Arizona State University’s Thunderbird School of Global Management, is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, a distinguished fellow at Stanford University, a member of the World Economic Forum’s Regional Action Group for Africa, and the author, most recently, of Unlocking Africa’s Business Potential.

Ameenah Gurib-Fakim, the first female president of Mauritius, is the author of her autobiography, Ameenah Gurib-Fakim: My Journey.

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© Project Syndicate – 2020

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Positive and negative externalities

There are two main pathways – public and private – through which international trade generates resources for sustainable development. Through the public pathway, governments derive revenues from international trade through taxes on imported and exported goods and services, taxes on incomes and profits from trade-related production and transactions and by directly receiving the proceeds from exports. The private pathway is through returns on investment and other transactions including remittances. Both pathways can further generate positive externalities and indirect financing for economic and social development. Both pathways, however, can also generate negative externalities, including unsustainable levels of inequality.

Trade, poverty, inequality and growth

Trade revenues are multiple resource flows from other sources into Africa. As shown in figure 1, over the last decade export revenues have accounted for more than three times the value of remittances, FDI inflows and official development assistance taken together. Exports have been worth approximately 17 times as much as overseas development assistance, such as development aid, during this period.

Figure 1. Africa’s total exports, remittances, FDI inflows and DAC official development assistance, 1980-2018, constant 2018 US$

Sources: Exports from IMF DOTS 2020; FDI inflows from UNCTAD Stat 2020; Official Development Assistance from OECD ODA 2020; and remittances estimates from World Bank 2020. Note: Reliable FDI data is available only from 1970 and remittances data from 1980, represented above accordingly.

Poverty and inequality in Africa are pervasive, as can be seen in figures 2 and 3. Much of this outcome can be attributed to the historical legacy and current reality of African economies undergirded by trade regimes that are mainly dependent on producing and exporting low value products (and services), often subject to severe price fluctuation. Africa, with 17% of the world’s population, accounts for about 3% of world trade.

Figure 2. Development indicators 2020. Right: Gini Index (higher = greater inequality), 2019 or latest available data. Left: Poverty gap (share of population with less than PPP $1.90 per day), 2019 or latest available year.

Formal trade between African countries is also low, at an average of 15% of total trade during 2016­–18. Africa’s trade challenges are compounded by the strong prevalence of informal cross border trade in both goods and services of even lower value transactions. Informal cross border trade is associated with the high rates of poverty that compel people to seek a living by buying and selling small quantities of fast-moving merchandise, especially food items, and providing low skilled services. It is fuelled by such constraints as high trade costs, expressed through a lack of access to credit and finance and inefficient border processes. Women constitute the majority of informal cross border traders, accounting for as much as 61% of all informal cross border transactions in the Lagos-Abidjan corridor, for example.

Figure 3. Female informal cross border traders crossing Aflao on the Ghana-Togo border. Credit: UNECA.

However, until the COVID-19 pandemic struck in early 2020, several of the fastest growing economies in the world were in Africa, mainly driven by diversification and trade expansion, with positive externalities on poverty reduction and other indicators of general welfare. For these countries, GDP growth rates during 2020–24 were expected to be between 6% in Burkina Faso and 8.3% in Senegal (as shown in figure 4). Even with COVID-19, African countries are forecast to retain a relatively higher degree of growth in 2020 and 2021 (as shown in figure 5).

Figure 4. Average annual growth rate: 2009 to 2019.

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2020Fig. 6 Forecast average growth rate under COVID-19: 2020 and 2021. Source: IMF. IMF World Economic Outlook April 2020.

An often-overlooked detail is that the composition of trade tends to vary strongly whether the destination of Africa’s exports is the African market or the rest of the world. As shown in figure 6, primary commodities account for over 70% of Africa’s exports. But the share of manufactured goods in intra-African exports is about 45%, with primary commodities accounting for a third.

This is why there has been so much interest in the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (AfCFTA), which entered into force on 30 May 2019. Analysis carried out at the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) shows that, if effectively implemented, the agreement could help boost intra-African trade. The ECA projects – on the basis of computable general equilibrium modelling – a positive effect on Africa’s overall GDP, exports and welfare. The benefits will be most significant for intra-African trade, which could increase in value between 15% (US$50 billion) and 25% (US$70 billion) by 2040, depending on the ambition of the reform as compared to a baseline scenario with no AfCFTA. More than two-thirds of the gains in intra-African trade will be captured by industrial sectors with textile, wearing apparel, leather, wood, paper, vehicle and transport equipment, electronics and other manufactures expected to benefit the most. Gains bodog sportsbook review in the agriculture and food sectors would also be substantial, particularly for meat products, milk and dairy products, sugar, beverages, vegetables, fruits, nuts, rice and other grains.

Figure 6. African exports and imports by composition 2016-18.

Source: Calculation from UNCTADstat

The AfCFTA is therefore a central tenet of African trade policy. It is a continent-wide initiative for maximising value from trade, economic diversification, the promotion of intra-regional trade and a better and more stable integration into regional and global value chains. Associated policy reforms include bringing trade costs down by improving border processes and other trade facilitation measures, which are essential for productivity and competitiveness. More efficient services sectors can help to build and upgrade regional value chains. These are all key enablers for a more diverse and complex production and trade structure, for managing volatility and providing a more stable path for sustainable growth and development. These elements are now more important than ever in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the demographic imperative in Africa to increase the number and quality of jobs.

Trade agreements

Trade agreements provide the framework for the articulation of trade policy. They ensure predictability and legal certainty for the contractual commitments embodied in the exchange of goods and services. But they also shape development and other outcomes in the outworking of positive and negative externalities from trade.

African trade agreements can be divided into four main categories (see annex).

1. World Trade Organization agreements that apply to its 44 African member countries. An additional nine African countries are in the process of acceding to the WTO or are observers.

2. African regional trade agreements which include the continent-wide AfCFTA and sub-regional trade agreements of the main regional economic communities (RECs) such as the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).

3. Concessional trade arrangements such as the European Union’s Every Thing But Arms (EBA) for least developed countries; the United States’ Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for eligible African countries; and the Generalised System of Preferences (or GSP) and enhanced GSP (GSP+) of several OECD countries; as well as a number of schemes for least developed countries, including of China and India.

4. Reciprocal trade agreements such as the Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and three groups of African countries in East and West Africa (still to be finalised) and Southern Africa (finalised); the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the EU and North African countries; the EU-Algeria Free Trade Agreement; and the USA-Morocco Free Trade Agreement.

In 2013, China announced a ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, which provides a mix of trade concessions and financing for trade-related infrastructure. Mauritius is negotiating free trade agreements with China and India. The US and Kenya have announced negotiations for a free trade agreement. It is understood that in relation to African countries, the United Kingdom will roll over the EU arrangements on EBA (Everything But Arms), GSP (Generalised System of Preferences) and GSP+ pending its own negotiations of a trading framework with African countries. The UK already has agreements with Morocco, the SACU (Southern African Customs Union) group, Tunisia and a group of Eastern and Southern African countries (Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe).

Trade matters for Africa

The central role of trade in development requires that trade policies, trade agreements and concessional arrangements are monitored, assessed and analysed in relation to positive and negative externalities. Key issues for analysis range from structural changes to the economy, regional imbalances, and poverty to employment, decent work and gender equality, and from technological change including digitalisation to public health and climate change.

There is a good case for independent work that (1) systematically monitors trade negotiations in which African countries are engaged (2) assesses the impact of trade agreements and policies in Africa and (3) identifies practical policy measures and other changes to improve the developmental impact of trade. An emerging question that also deserves attention is, how will the UK’s new trade policy affect Africa and other developing countries?

LSE’s Firoz Lalji Centre for Africa is well placed to become a repository of real time information on current trade negotiations through which African countries are engaged via an Africa Trade Negotiations Monitor. It will allow not only trade experts and policy makers but the whole community of scholars to keep track of the trade rules that shape development outcomes. This can be complemented with analytical work on trade policy impacts with a view toward the publication of an annual Africa Trade Year Book.

Annex: Africa’s Trade Agreements

Annex: Africa’s Trade Agreements (continued)

Sources: WTO RTA database (2020) and UNCTAD, Handbook on Duty-Free Quota-Free and Rules of Origin (2017). Notes: GSTP is Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries and the Pan-Arab FTA grants preferential access to the markets of Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, Yemen.

David Luke is coordinator at the African Trade Policy Centre, UN Economic Commission for Africa.

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However, recently released trade statistics across the world reveal that those forecasts may have been overly pessimistic and underestimated the relative resilience of the global trading system. In fact, in June, after several months of sharp declines, trade volumes recorded their biggest monthly rise on record, with a 7.6 percent increase. East Africa may be shadowing these global trends.

Kenya, the largest regional trader, is a good barometer of broader East African trends. The country was initially hit quite hard in terms of the decline in trade volumes, with a 19 percent drop in total trade volumes in April. As warned in our earlier Brookings policy brief, re-exports to the rest of the region were hit extremely hard, with a 83 percent decline in April. Since June, though, total trade volumes have begun to recover rapidly, with a 9 percent increase in June and a 12 percent increase in July (Table 1). Moreover, the story is a similar if the analysis is undertaken using year-on-year percent changes.

Table 1. Kenyan trade, percent monthly change, January-July 2020

Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2020

STRONG SIGNS OF RECOVERY

Kenyan exports have proved to be particularly resilient during this crisis. If we take the data for “domestic exports” alone (i.e., subtracting the re-export of goods to other countries), it is clear that the export performance has been extremely volatile, with a record monthly peak in export revenues in March, followed by a sharp drop in April/May. However, by July, domestic exports were 12.7 percent higher than in July of the previous year (Figure 1, Panel A). More specifically, although Kenya’s large cut-flower industry has not yet fully recovered, seasonal exports of tea, fruit, and vegetables have held up extremely Bodog Poker well, in part due to government measures to protect these sectors from the negative impacts of lockdowns. Among the measures undertaken were the ring-fencing of the tea sector from mobility restrictions to minimize the disruption to exports; the re-equipping of some passenger planes to be able to carry cargo; and the creation of mobile laboratories for cross-border testing to facilitate smooth trade flows with Tanzania.

The other salient characteristic in Kenya’s trade performance throughout the COVID-19 crisis is that exports to the rest of the East African Community (EAC) recovered very rapidly indeed (Figure 1, panels B, C, and D). In our earlier Brookings policy brief analyzing data up through May, we flagged with some alarm the apparent collapse of intra-regional trade, as reflected in the sharp decline in Kenya re-exports to the rest of the region. By July, however, exports to Uganda and Rwanda had exceeded their pre-COVID-19 peaks, and re-exports towards Tanzania also accelerated sharply. Notably, the recovery picture is broadly confirmed by data recently released by the Bank of Uganda. Both export and import performance have recovered, and Ugandan coffee exports almost reached a historic high in July, despite relatively low coffee prices in international markets.

Figure 1. Patterns of trade—Kenya vs. other EAC countries

Source: Authors, from Kenya National Bank of Statistics data.
Note: Shaded area represents period of COVID-19 pandemic. Dotted lines are 3-month moving averages.

Initially, measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 across borders, such as mandatory COVID-19 tests on lorry drivers, caused large-scale disruption to East African trade. But the subsequent rebound in intra-regional trade is a testimony to the effectiveness of actions taken by national governments and the EAC Secretariat to ensure the smooth functioning of transport corridors, as well as initiatives like TradeMark East Africa’s $20 million Safe Trade Emergency Facility (STEF) and GIZ’s support of mobile laboratories, test kits, and personal protective equipment to the East African Community.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY STRATEGIES IN EAST AFRICA

In summary, despite the depth of the economic crisis precipitated by the COVID-19 pandemic, since May 2020 intra-regional trade in East Africa has shown significant resilience with a notable positive correlation with measures put in place to protect transport corridors from severe disruptions.

While the V-shaped recovery in trade is encouraging, East African economies are not out of the woods yet. Three policy conclusions stand out:

1. The crisis is far from over. Governments in the region—especially those of landlocked Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Uganda—should continue to maintain exceptional measures to support cross-border trade and a favorable trading environment, particularly for intra-regional trade.
2. Protecting key export sectors from the negative impact of any COVID-19-related measures is essential. Kenya has shown that it is possible to keep value chains operating and shelter strategic sectors from adverse impact. Sustaining export revenues, at a time of growing foreign exchange shortages, is also a macroeconomic imperative.
3. Finally, one area where policy measures have been less effective is in avoiding the collapse of cross-border informal trade. Until free movement of people is reestablished, it is unlikely that border communities dependent on this trade will recover. Cross-border communities—particularly women traders who account for the bulk of informal trade—are still highly vulnerable to this crisis and will continue to need additional support.

Andrew Mold is chief, Regional Integration and AfCFTA Cluster, Office for Eastern Africa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

Anthony Mveyange is director of research and learning at TradeMark East Africa.

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