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The EU’s initiative, dubbed “Global Gateway,” is an overdue and welcome response to BRI, but unless it is coordinated with the G7’s “Build Back Better World” plan and receives dedicated resources, it is unlikely to offer a meaningful alternative.

Von der Leyen made explicit that Global Gateway is a response to BRI, which has in recent years been making inroads to Europe. She argued the EU had to invest more strategically, because “it does not make sense for Europe to build a perfect road between a Chinese-owned copper mine and a Chinese-owned harbor.” Taking a swipe at BRI, she exclaimed, “We want to create links and not dependencies!”

The EU’s unveiling of Global Gateway accompanies growing European disillusionment with China. In May, the European Parliament voted against ratifying the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China, citing Beijing’s sanctions on European parliamentarians and scholars and its human rights abuses. This year, France sent a nuclear attack submarine to conduct patrols of the contested South China Sea. Most recently, Lithuania withdrewfrom the “17+1” group with China and agreed to allow Taiwan to open an office in its capital, after which China responded by warning Lithuania of “potential consequences” and both countries recalled their ambassadors.

This growing concern with Chinese actions and recognition that the Indo-Pacific is “increasingly strategically significant for Europe” culminated in the release of the EU’s strategy for the Indo-Pacific, which occurred on the same day that Global Gateway was announced.

In introducing Global Gateway, the EU is recognizing the need to think more critically about the tradeoffs that accompany receiving Chinese infrastructure loans. For instance, while all 27 EU member states have pledged to reduce emissions by at least 55 percent by 2030, China has built and is building coal-fired power plants that do not meet EU environmental standards in EU enlargement countries Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. China’s funding of coal-fired power plants in Europe could complicate EU accession for some countries and make it harder to contend with climate change.

In addition, China is increasing its focus on the Digital Silk Road (DSR), which has worrying security implications. China is promoting Huawei fifth-generation (5G) network technology across the globe, raising concerns within the U.S. government, which has concluded that Huawei is effectively an extension of the Chinese Communist Party. Europe has not taken a unified position on Huawei, with EU members Austria, Hungary, and Ireland all leaving the door open to using Huawei 5G equipment. Global Gateway could reflect a growing recognition within the EU of the need to promote an alternative to Huawei.

Finally, the EU’s announcement emphasized “transparency and good governance,” an implicit contrast with BRI’s opaqueness. Montenegro, a candidate to join the EU, has approached the blocfor debt relief after it realized it could not repay China for the $1 billion highway funded through BRI, serving as a cautionary tale of BRI in Europe. A recent report that studied contracts between Chinese state-owned entities and government borrowers found that Chinese contracts contain confidentiality clauses, provisions that the debt will be kept out of collective restructuring, and language that could allow lenders to influence a country’s foreign policy. Our recent independent Task Force report detailed the allegations of corruption along the Belt and Road and the ways in which China uses economic leverage over countries to attempt to influence their foreign policies. The EU seems to be taking seriously the potential that China will use its economic influence to sow division within the bloc.

While a sound initiative in principle, Global Gateway raises just as many questions as it answers. So far, there is no indication that Global Gateway will have a dedicated budget or staff, making it possible that this will simply be a rebranding of existing and proposed infrastructure investments. In order to offer a meaningful alternative to BRI, Global Gateway will need to both harmonize the efforts of export credit and development agencies within the EU and also get access to additional funds for investments.

It is also unclear to what extent—if any—Global Gateway will work in tandem with the Group of Seven’s (G7) response to BRI, “Build Back Better World” (B3W), which it rolled out in June. The G7 includes EU members France, Germany, and Italy, and it seems unlikely that these three members will want to commit resources to two separate responses to BRI. France, which recalled its ambassador to the United States in the wake of the United States announcing a deal to sell submarines to Australia, could prove unwilling to commit resources to B3W and more inclined to support Global Gateway. It is ironic that less than two weeks after Estonia’s prime minister argued Europe and the United States needed a single, unified response to BRI, the EU announced yet another initiative. Unless B3W and Global Gateway coordinate their approaches, neither will meet its full potential.

The EU’s introduction of Global Gateway reflects its growing unease with China’s more assertive foreign policy and BRI’s inroads into Europe. It is unclear, however, how Global Gateway will compete with BRI, what resources it will have at its disposal, and how it will coordinate with other nascent responses to BRI. To maximize its impact, Global Gateway should focus on digital infrastructure, an area that has the potential to lock European countries into Chinese technological ecosystems and where two EU member states (Finland and Sweden) offer viable alternatives. The United States, for its part, will need to ensure that B3W and Global Gateway do not work at cross-purposes and are instead complementary.

BRI can be seen in part as a marketing success, a way for China to build a narrative that it is an ascendant economic power and a country’s prosperity is intimately tied to closer relations with Beijing. If Global Gateway and B3W falter, it could confirm the other part of the narrative China is trying to establish: the West’s best days are behind it, and the United States and Europe do not have the will to offer an alternative to China. The stakes are high.

Jennifer Hillman and David Sacks are codirectors of the CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force report on a U.S. Response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which is co-chaired by Jacob J. Lew and Gary Roughead.

To read the full commentary from the Council on Foreign Relations, please click here.

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Drawing on a 19-year dataset of over 5,600 construction companies from 27 advanced economies and 14 emerging market economies, we use an innovative approach to measure the direct employment effect of $1 million of infrastructure spending by country income group and sector—electricity, roads, schools, hospitals, and water and sanitation. Because there is no data available for low-income developing countries, we estimate the employment impact by extrapolating from advanced economies and emerging market economies.

Our latest chart of the week shows average estimates, by sector, of the number of jobs that additional investments create along the supply chain. The amount of job creation depends on labor mobility—how easy it is to move across companies within sectors—and labor intensity—defined as the labor effects down the supply chain in a sector. For example, in an emerging market economy with high labor mobility and high labor intensity, around 35 jobs are created in water and sanitation per $1 million of additional investment. In a country with low labor mobility and low labor intensity, that number falls to around 8.

In advanced economies, $1 million of spending can generate an average of 3 jobs in schools and hospitals and over 6 jobs in the energy sector, assuming intermediate labor mobility and labor intensity levels. In low-income developing countries, the estimates are much larger and range from 16 jobs in roads to 30 jobs in water and sanitation. Put differently, each unit of public infrastructure investment creates more direct jobs in electricity in high-income countries and more jobs in water and sanitation in low-income countries.

The benefits of investing in renewables and innovation

The impact could be higher for green investment, in part because many jobs in renewables do not require much education beyond high school and have low barriers to entry. Per $1 million invested, around 5–10 jobs could be created in green electricity, 2–12 jobs in efficient new buildings like schools and hospitals, and 5–14 in green water and sanitation through efficient agricultural pumps and recycling.

Investment in research and development can also create jobs—though mostly, if not exclusively—for high-skilled workers. Despite it being a much smaller component of public investment—mostly to government institutions and higher education—around 4 jobs are created in R&D per $1 million invested.

These results indicate that public spending on infrastructure can make a meaningful contribution to job creation. Overall, one percent of global GDP in public investment spending can create more than seven million jobs worldwide through direct employment effects alone.

Mariano Moszoro is a Senior Economist in the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department.  His work experience and research focus on public finance, political economy, and infrastructure development.  Dr. Moszoro holds a Ph.D. and habilitation (French HDR/US tenure equivalent) in Economics from the SGH Warsaw School of Economics.  In 2005-2006, he was Deputy Minister of Finance of Poland and Chairman of the state development bank BGK.  In 2009-2011, Dr. Moszoro interned as a post-doctoral fellow at UC Berkeley-Haas under Nobel laureate Oliver E. Williamson.  Dr. Moszoro has published in top journals and held academic positions at Berkeley, Harvard, GMU, and Paris.

To read the full commentary from IMF Blogs, please click here. 

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The Council Conclusions on “a Globally Connected Europe” are the latest building block in the EU’s grand infrastructure strategy to be presented in spring 2022. The Council highlights that connectivity is fundamental for economic growth, security, and resilience inside and outside the EU. Recognizing that “other key economies have developed their own approaches and tools for connectivity,” the member states emphasize that the new strategy should be “sustainable, comprehensive and rules-based” in a concerted effort to set it apart from the BRI. More precisely, they insist that it should promote “a level playing field and fair access to markets and government procedures.” The strategy constitutes a key instrument to advance the EU’s interests and promote its values abroad.

The Council prompts the Commission to focus on both physical infrastructure and regulatory frameworks in partner countries. The new strategy will have to:

1. identify and implement a series of “high impact and visible” projects around the world.
2. present financing schemes to incentivize sustainable connectivity instruments.
3. develop new initiatives to mobilize the private sector to finance and implement the projects.

In so doing, the Council has leant its weight to strong coordination and coherence under the Team Europe banner, bringing together the EU institutions, the member states, and the European and national financial institutions. The text also pushes for further cooperation with like-minded countries and regions, citing the United States and ASEAN countries as potential partners.

A patchwork of strategies

The EU has already made numerous attempts to develop connectivity strategies to finance infrastructure projects outside of the EU, but in an ad-hoc and disjointed manner. Launched in 2017, the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) has one investment window dedicated to connectivity and sustainable energy infrastructure in Africa and the EU neighborhood. The Joint Communication on “Connecting Europe and Asia” adopted in 2018 outlines a plan to improve connectivity with Asia through measures in sectors ranging from transport and energy to the digital economy. Three of the ten investment flagships of the Western Balkans Economic and Investment Plan agreed in 2020 were targeted at infrastructure projects connecting economies within the region and with the EU. Finally, the recent connectivity partnerships with Japan and India, signed in 2019 and 2021 respectively,  support infrastructure linking the EU and these two countries, while also seeking synergies for projects in third countries and regions, including in Africa, Central Asia, and the Indo-Pacific. However, there has been, until now, no single overarching coherent strategy bringing these different pieces of the puzzle together.

A race against time

As with most Council Conclusions, several questions remain unanswered, not least on the regions and type of infrastructure to be prioritized, on the financial envelope and modalities linked to the strategy, as well as on the role of Team Europe in this endeavor. It will be a race against time for the European Commission to present a global infrastructure strategy which answers all these questions and more in less than a year’s time.

Mikaela Gavas is Co-Director of CGD’s Development Cooperation in Europe Programme and a Senior Policy Fellow. In addition, she serves as a member of the Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation for the UN International Atomic Energy Agency.

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The share of total income accruing to the middle 60 percent of the U.S. population has steadily decreased from around 53 percent in 1969 to 45 percent in 2019. Middle-skills development, if done right, has the potential to increase upward economic mobility for millions of families.

We’ve been studying middle-skills workforce development in Louisiana and the Appalachian region for years, and one thing we’ve seen repeatedly is that government, educators, and private industry all have to collaborate to make programs successful. The 2014 Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act put stronger emphasis on building these ties between colleges and employers, but our research has found that this is still a work in progress.

Too often, it is industry that is not involved. In a study of the oil and natural gas industry—a technical field that would benefit highly from such partnerships—our colleagues at RAND found that only 8 percent of surveyed employers forecast their future job vacancies and communicated that to local colleges. Among the colleges surveyed, about half had no partnerships with employers to guide creation of relevant curricula or instruction.

Without this information, educators may be training for the labor market’s demands of the past. They may be overemphasizing technical skills, even as industry is asking for a combination of technical and general business skills (communication, problem solving, time management) from new hires.

It is critical that industry, educators, and government are all engaged—but any of those parties can effectively lead the effort. For instance, the City of New Orleans oversaw a set of training programs for adults (funded by the U.S. Department of Labor) that included both educational providers and industry partners. It led to higher earnings for participants and positive returns on investment for the government. It also improved markedly over a few years as city and training providers learned the best approaches for recruitment, applicant screening, and industry partnerships.

The Louisiana Department of Education led an effort in high schools to develop better graduation pathways, including to middle-skills jobs. Educators worked closely with the government under the Perkins Act (which provides funding for career, technical, and vocational education) and with local employers to identify the skills needed locally and build high-quality certification programs that gave students a marketable credential upon graduation. School officials there reported that the vocational program—called Jump Start—was most effective when local employers were actively engaged.

It was Chevron, with several private foundations, that led the Appalachia Partnership Initiative. It led to STEM teacher training and workforce development programs across a tristate region—Ohio, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania—around Greater Pittsburgh.

The United States is facing economic gaps wider than have been seen in a century. To keep the nation economically strong and able to provide middle-class lifestyles to its citizens, educators, government, and private industry need to work together to shape jobs training opportunities.

Matthew Baird is an economist at the RAND Corporation, co-director of the Center for Causal Inference, and a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. His research focuses primarily on understanding labor markets and education policy to improve outcomes for disadvantaged populations. 

Shelly Culbertson, senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, focuses on forced displacement, disaster recovery, post-conflict stabilization, international development, and education. She has led ten studies about refugees and internally displaced persons, with particular focus on education, jobs, humanitarian assistance models, return conditions, and technology. Her refugee studies have been funded by the U.S. Department of State, the United Nations, the Qatar Fund for Development, and others. She is the lead of RAND’s Mass Migration Strategy Group.

To read the full commentary from the Research and Development Corporation (RAND), please click here.

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The pandemic highlighted the importance of trade and foreign trade logistics. In March 2020, COVID-19 transformed daily life as we knew it. Yet, trade has primarily withstood the disruptions caused by international transportation restrictions and social distancing policies. It has even grown substantially in some areas, such as e-commerce and online trade, for instance. According to an Amazon report, its international net sales increased by 28.3 percent between the first half of 2019 and the same period in 2020.  

By shining the spotlight on the opportunities brought by digital transformation, the pandemic has put customs authorities and their response capacities to the test. The urgent need to clear the critical goods needed to respond to the health emergency while keeping regular trade flows moving forced authorities to transition to digital customs systems almost overnight.  

Even before the pandemic hit, LAC was lagging North America, Europe, and Asia in implementing the commitments it had taken on under the World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement, according to 2019 data. Therefore, the region needs to create efficiencies in its international trade logistics.  

LAC’s economic recovery depends mainly on how its foreign trade logistics perform, which rests on the appropriate physical and digital infrastructure and related transportation services.  

Innovating and transforming customs administration through technology  

In response to these challenges, the new IDB publication Logistics in Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities, Challenges, and Lines of Action discusses some of the technologies that the region’s countries could implement to innovate and transform their customs administration.  

The optimization, automation, and digitization of customs and border processes are among the areas that new technologies address. These factors are the cornerstones of modernization and lay the groundwork for generating the high-quality data needed to implement robust and effective risk management systems. 

For example, the ability of customs to obtain, process, and analyze large amounts of quality data is key to strengthen regional value chains and make them agile and secure. Automation also requires other innovative components, such as electronic signatures and authentication mechanisms for internal and external users.  

Another ingredient in the recipe for effective and efficient customs is the traceability of goods. New technologies like radio frequency identification systems (RFID), the Internet of Things (IoT), geolocation tools, electronic seals for container and trailer doors, and OCR license plate readers make it possible to track cargo, vehicles, and the people driving them.  

These systems can be deployed at critical points such as production centers, bonded warehouses, and road corridors that connect land border crossings, seaports, and airports. One example is the system developed in Brazil to track and trace cargo vehicles, packaging, and products by integrating this data with electronic tax documents. Likewise, physical traceability can be accompanied by digitally documented data from each transaction. 

The data that customs authorities capture has immense value for customs and border risk management by digitizing and associating them with freight and transportation documents (cargo manifests, bills of lading, customs declaration data, and electronic invoices). Once the data is captured, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and big data tools allow the processing and analysis of large volumes of information to identify patterns and potentially risky or fraudulent operations.  

Coordinated Border Management based on the use of new technologies 

For the benefit of supply chains and foreign trade logistics, it is also essential that the use of new technologies is carried out in the context of Coordinated Border Management between customs and other authorities involved in border processes. 

This coordination is streamlined with interoperability between authorities and economic operators through Single Windows for Foreign Trade (SWs) or Port Community Systems to reduce times and costs for operators and increase control capacities. For example, the adoption of a SW system in Costa Rica is associated with a 1.4 percentage-point increase in the exports of companies that used the system compared to those that did not. 

There is also an opportunity to promote and strengthen regional value chains through interoperability initiatives between customs systems and other border entities. These include the Central American Digital Trade Platform (PDCC) and the CADENA application, which uses blockchain to facilitate  data exchange from companies whose reliability has been certified, such as authorized economic operators.  

Finally, these components would not be effective without functional infrastructure at the entry and exit points of goods at land borders, seaports, and airports. Likewise, the effect would not be the same if the infrastructure did not include advanced technological entry, exit, inspection, and monitoring systems. The Mexican customs authority’s Customs Technological Integration Project (PITA) is an example of a comprehensive technology-based border infrastructure intervention. The customs authorities of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panamá are following suit and implementing border crossing reform processes that cover border facilities and include the use of cutting-edge technologies, with support from the IDB.  

IDB support for the modernization of customs and border management 

Through the Trade and Investment Division of the Integration and Trade Sector of the IDB, we support an innovative agenda of projects to modernize customs and border management in LAC. Two examples of these are the digital transformation and automation projects for the customs authorities of Colombia and Peru, including smart traceability plans for cargo and vehicles. We are also providing support for regional initiatives involving the use of blockchain to exchange data between eight customs offices in LAC and the application of artificial intelligence to improve customs risk management in several countries, among other projects. 

LAC countries should embrace the availability of new technologies, the fast-track innovation induced by the pandemic, and the support of international organizations, such as the IDB, to expedite the digital transformation of their customs administrations. 

José Martín is a consultant at the Trade and Investment Division of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Previously, he was the Representative in Washington, DC, for the Ministry of Finance of Mexico and the Mexican Tax Administration Service for more than 26 years. José Martín was one of the negotiators of customs provisions, trade facilitation, certification and verification of origin, and supervision of foreign trade operations of the recently concluded Mexico-United States-Canada Agreement (T-MEC).

Sandra Corcuera-Santamaría is a customs and trade specialist at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington DC since 2006. She is responsible for several national and regional projects for customs modernization and coordinated border management, and trade facilitation initiatives, including the coordination of the Authorized Economic Operator Program in Latin America and the Caribbean. Prior to her career at the IDB, Sandra spent six years in the Economic and Commercial Office of the Spanish Embassy in Washington, and was a project coordinator at the consulting firm EuropeanDevelopment Projects in Brussels, Belgium. Sandra has a Master in Public Administration from the University of Leuven, Belgium and a Bachelor of Political Science from the Complutense University of Madrid, Spain.

To read the full commentary from the Inter-American Development Bank (IBD), please click here. 

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On June 8, 2021, the White House released its 100-day Supply Chain Review Report and accompanying fact sheet. This article does not attempt to relay all of the information from the 250-page Report (the Report’s Executive Summary alone is 6 pages). Instead, we have attempted to summarize some of the Report’s most salient points and suggest how the risks, challenges, and recommendations discussed in the Report may impact companies that do business in these four critical industries.

Summary of the 100-day Supply Chain Review

As a reminder, the Executive Order asked for a quick-turn report within 100 days discussing four “critical” industries and the associated supply chain. Specific government agencies were assigned to lead the quick-turn review as follows:

Our summary, below, focuses on what we see as the key risk areas and challenges, as well as certain of the resulting recommendations identified by each reviewing agency.

I. Semiconductor Manufacturing and Advanced Packaging (Department of Commerce)

Key Risks and Challenges

1. Fragile supply chains. Semiconductor supply chains are immense, and require vast inputs and resources to function properly. Because the industry is highly specialized and geographically concentrated (in Asia), a natural or human-made disaster has the potential to cause a massive disruption in the industry.
2. Malicious supply chain disruptions. As microchips become more complex and outsourced, the risk of malicious interference or disruptions increases dramatically. In particular, this includes insertions of malicious vulnerabilities (e.g., “back doors” that can allow malicious actors to target a system using the chip). Counterfeiting and re-use of compromised semiconductors presents an additional risk, including revenue loss and early or catastrophic failure of end systems.
3. Dependence on China. U.S. equipment companies are nearly entirely dependent on foreign suppliers, with purchases from China accounting for an increasingly large percentage of the market. Semiconductor companies would be significantly impacted by trade restrictions, embargos, or conflicts involving China. In short, the need to rely so heavily on a non-U.S. ally for an essential component of nearly every modern technology product puts the U.S. at significant risk.

Key Recommendations

1. Fully fund the “Creating Helpful Incentives for Production of Semiconductors (CHIPS) for America” program. The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 116-283 §§ 9901-9908, incentivizes domestic investment in semiconductor production. The Department of Commerce recommends these programs be fully funded to incentivize semiconductor manufacturing and research and development (R&D) to promote long-term U.S. leadership in the industry.

2. Strengthen the domestic semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem. This recommendation suggests legislative action, incentives, and investment to “support key upstream—including semiconductor manufacturing equipment, materials, and gases—and downstream industries to offset high operational costs in the United States.” Specifically, the government may leverage programs like the International Trade Administration’s “SelectUSA” program and the Department of Commerce National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Manufacturing USA Institute, both of which have been requested in President Biden’s 2022 Budget.

3. Support manufacturers, particularly small and medium-size businesses. To enhance innovation, the Department of Commerce recommends the U.S. Government invest R&D resources in small and medium-sized business, as well as disadvantaged firms along the supply chain. This kind of diversification will reap benefits both in terms of innovation and also jobs.

4. Protect U.S. technological advantage. To address national security and foreign policy concerns, the Department of Commerce recommends that export control policies align with policy actions related to the supply chain. Additionally, the Department of Commerce recommends that reviews by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS) consider the national security concerns related specifically to the semiconductor supply chain before approving foreign investment in U.S. companies.

II. Large Capacity Batteries And Electric Vehicles (EVs) (Department of Energy)

Key Risks and Challenges

1. Weak domestic production/foreign dependence. Global production of the minerals that are essential to producing high-capacity batteries – including lithium, cobalt, nickel, and graphite – each are primarily dependent on a single nation, China. Additionally, the business of refining these minerals is dominated by China and Russia. Dependence on potential adversaries is a huge supply chain risk, as these countries can use market control to restrict access to necessary materials to build long-lasting batteries.
2. Geopolitical issues. This includes a host of different issues including restriction of access to resources by China; substandard materials being offered to U.S. makers of the battery cells; and human rights violations (including forced labor) or other types of corruption in countries in the supply chain.
3. Market/economic shocks. As demand increases, and supply struggles to keep pace, it is likely that battery prices may spike in the future. Additionally, any tax or penalties on products whose production and delivery require large CO₂ emissions could lead to secondary market related disruptions. If such policies become widespread, the price of Chinese products, in particular, could rise sharply, placing U.S. EV manufacturers at a severe disadvantage.

Key Recommendations

1. Stimulate demand for end products using domestically manufactured high-capacity batteries. This recommendation focuses on supporting U.S.-based demand in two sectors: (1) transportation and (2) utilities. For transportation, the Department of Energy recommends: (a) transitioning the entire federal government vehicle fleets, as well as other school and transit buses, to EVs; (b) providing rebates and tax credits for consumers (with a “Buy America” preference for U.S. content); and (c) supporting the EV charging infrastructure across the country. Likewise, for utilities, the Department of Energy recommends: (i) accelerating federal procurement of battery storage; (ii) expanding tax credits to include stationary storage as a stand-alone resource; and (iii) reforming power transmission regulations to support renewable power and stationary energy storage.
2. Strengthen responsibly-sourced supplies for key advanced battery minerals. The Department of Energy recommends: (a) that the U.S. invest in targeted, mineral-specific strategies, including supporting sustainable domestic extraction of lithium; (b) recovering nickel and cobalt from recycled or unconventional sources; and (c) working with global allies to expand global production and increase access to supplies.
3. Promote sustainable domestic battery materials, battery cell, and battery pack production. This recommendation centers around financial support and investment from the U.S. government in the form of grant programs, tax credits, and federal procurement contracts. It specifically mentions leveraging the Department of Energy’s Advanced Technology Vehicle Management Loan program and reviving and expanding Section 1603 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act (ARRTA) program to support small manufacturers in the batteries, battery cells, and related material processing supply chain.

III. Critical Minerals and Materials (Department of Defense)

Key Risks and Challenges

1. Concentration of supply. Strategic and critical minerals are any materials that are needed to supply the military, industrial, and essential civilian needs of the United States during a national emergency, and that are not found or produced in the U.S. in sufficient quantities to meet such need. These materials can be found in nearly every electronic device, and they support high value-added manufacturing and high-wage jobs, in sectors such as automotive and aerospace. Similar to the materials needed for high-capacity batteries, a significant portion of global production for strategic and critical minerals is concentrated in only one or a few countries (predominantly China). The lack of diversity in suppliers creates a single point of disruption for a large portion of the global supply. In some instances, the concentration of supply is so extreme that production is limited to a single source (often China).
2. Price shocks. The markets for critical minerals are often small and the production efforts are complex, which leads to a relatively inelastic supply. Such markets are particularly susceptible to massive price spikes and volatility.
3. Human rights and related issues. Production and trade of critical minerals often involve a host of concerns, including forced and child labor, violence related to conflict minerals, profiteering by non-state actors, environmental pollution, organized crime, and corruption.

Key Recommendations

1. Expanding sustainable domestic production and processing capacity. The Department of Defense recommends the U.S. Government work with key stakeholders from the private sector, labor, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to develop sustainability metrics for critical materials. Additionally, the Department of Defense recommends the U.S. government adopt a sustainability requirement (g., a “sustainably produced” standard) for its purchasing, and develop a related Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) rule to establish a preference or requirement for the selection of products with higher sustainably-produced content.
2. Deploy the Defense Production Act (DPA) and other programs to incentivize production. The Department of Defense recommends that multiple agencies use the DPA and other existing authorities and funding to incentivize production across the critical materials supply chain, including downstream, high value-added manufacturing such as new magnet capabilities and advanced electric motor designs. The Department of Defense recommends using similar programs to support R&D efforts, such as those focused on rare earth magnet recycling capabilities.
3. Convene industry stakeholders to expand production. This recommendation also is related to the DPA, which authorizes the U.S. government to convene industry groups (with protection from civil and criminal anti-trust law) to coordinate business activities and form plans of action that satisfy a national need. The Department of Defense suggests convening such a group to identify opportunities to expand sustainable domestic production, and explore opportunities to create consortia or public-private partnerships for sustainable domestic processing of key strategic and critical materials.

IV. Pharmaceuticals and Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) (Department of Health and Human Services)

Key Risks and Challenges

1. Foreign dependence/lack of domestic manufacturing. As with the other supply chain areas, dependence on foreign nations has been cited as a key vulnerability for the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain. The need to acquire pharmaceutical products at the lowest cost possible has led to a consolidation of production in foreign, low-cost countries (such as India). This potentially allows foreign governments to leverage such dependency by interrupting U.S. access to these supply chains.
2. Limited resilience. Because of the cost and complexity of pharmaceutical manufacturing, the supply chain is particularly susceptible to disruptions. For example, shifting from an unreliable third-party source and expanding manufacturing can take significant time and require costly investment and time to obtain regulatory approvals.
3. Limited redundancy. Most production of the active pharmaceutical ingredients occurs outside of the U.S., and sometimes from a single source. As such, the supply chain is particularly vulnerable to changes in natural disasters or other disruptions that could occur in one country, but affect the entire supply chain. Additionally, there are a limited number of drug manufacturers per unique drug, such that the markets are highly concentrated, which can lead to increased costs.

Key Recommendations

1. Improve supply chain transparency and incentivize resilience. The Department of Health and Human Services recommends that any new policies seek to provide increased transparency related to the sources of drug manufacturing and the quality of the facilities that make them. This will incentivize purchasers to rely on more resilient suppliers with higher quality production and a more robust supply chain.
2. Increase the economic sustainability of U.S. and allied drug manufacturing and distribution. The U.S. market is often undercut by cheaper options, particularly from India and China. To increase domestic capacity for production of key drugs, the U.S. should focus on: (a) increasing the economic sustainability of U.S. and allied drug manufacturing; (b) increasing government and private sector flexibility in contracting and sourcing of finished drugs and raw materials; and (c) studying whether the current market for finished drugs supports a diversification of supply instead of relying on one or two suppliers through preferred contractual arrangements.
3. Boost domestic production and foster international cooperation. The Department of Health and Human Services recommends boosting domestic production with a mix of: (a) targeted investments and financial incentives (including through use of the DPA); (b) R&D to create new manufacturing technologies; (c) greater supply chain transparency; and (d) improved data collection to better understand the economics and supply chain realities.
4. Build emergency capacity. In addition to bolstering domestic production and creating additional supply chains with U.S. allies, the Department of Health and Human Services recommends crating a virtual stockpile of active pharmaceutical ingredients and other critical materials necessary to produce critical drugs during times of crisis.

Conclusion

What does all of this likely mean for you and U.S. industry? Well, it’s hard to say, especially given that this is a quick-turn 100-day report. But here’s our initial “in a nutshell” takeaway of what we expect to see:

• More business in these four industries/sectors (especially in the U.S.). The recommendations suggest there likely will be increased domestic investment by the Government (including tax credits and tax incentives). Overall, there seems to be recognition that domestic options may be more expensive, but that the higher price is worth the cost.

• Higher costs for foreign sourcing. The Government will be looking to increase the costs associated with foreign sourcing, making those foreign sources more expensive and thereby more competitive with the more costly domestic alternatives.

• Restrictions on Chinese imports. In particular, the Government will continue to move away from sourcing products/components/materials from China – “China” is the great buzzword in this Report, being mentioned 458 times!

• More “Buy America” requirements.

• More regulations.

• Implementation of the new bi-partisan infrastructure bill (announced last week), complete with its focus on public transportation options, may give us near-term insights into how some of these policies will play out over the longer term (including the push for more domestic jobs).

Nikole Snyder is an associate in the Government Contracts, Investigations and International Trade Practice Group in the firm’s Washington, D.C. office.

Townsend Bourne is a partner in the Government Contracts, Investigations and International Trade Practice Group in the firm’s Washington, D.C. office. She also is Leader of the firm’s Aerospace, Defense & Government Services Team.

David Gallacher is a partner in the Government Contracts, Investigations and International Trade Practice Group in the firm’s Washington, D.C. office.

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Q1: What prompted this initiative?

A1: The United States and other G7 countries have developed common concerns about China’s ambitious BRI since it was launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013. These include, for example, a lack of transparency around Chinese lending, corruption, unsustainable debt, adverse environmental and social impacts, and projects with dual-use potential. The Biden administration has framed the initiative as a response to BRI, noting in the first line of its fact sheet: “Today President Biden met with G7 leaders to discuss strategic competition with China and commit to concrete actions to help meet the tremendous infrastructure need in low- and middle-income countries.”

Unmet global needs are another primary driver. China’s BRI has significantly pulled back in recent years, underscoring Beijing’s challenges in managing the endeavor and presenting an opportunity for G7 countries to offer competing alternatives. To be sure, China’s BRI was never as big as sometimes portrayed, reaching into the hundreds of billions rather than trillions of dollars. A lack of transparency, and the absence of official criteria for projects, makes it difficult to track the BRI with precision. But the overall trend is clear: as the list of countries participating in the BRI has ballooned, the resources being made available to those countries have plummeted. The Covid-19 pandemic has further increased needs in the developing world while reducing the ability of many countries to borrow.

Although competing alternatives to the BRI are gaining new momentum, they have struggled to deliver tangible projects. As host of the Group of 20 (G20) in 2019, Japan won endorsement by G20 leaders (including Xi Jinping) to a set of principles for quality infrastructure investment. The same year, Japan and the European Union announced a “Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure.” This January, the European Parliament adopted a resolution that calls for creating a global EU Connectivity Strategy as an extension of the current EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy. Attending this year’s G7 summit as an observer, India announced the Asia Africa Growth Corridor with Japan in 2017 and is discussing a joint initiative with the European Union.

For its part, the United States has gradually realized the importance of offering positive alternatives. In late 2019, United States, Japan, and Australia announced the “ Blue Dot Network” (BDN) to help operationalize the G20 principles. The effort has received encouraging interest from the private sector and civil society, but it is still developing criteria for certifying projects that meet high standards. The B3W could add urgency to announce pilot projects and work toward expanding the BDN to include European partners.

The B3W’s global scope could allow partners to focus on different functional and geographic areas in line with their capabilities and interests. European partners, for example, are increasingly active in the Western Balkans, where Chinese projects have raised red flags in several EU-candidate countries. Japan has been active in Southeast Asia, where it remains the incumbent provider of infrastructure projects. U.S. involvement is likely to emphasize the Indo-Pacific, which will also help respond to criticism that the Biden administration, which has resisted the idea of rejoining the Trans-Pacific Partnership or other regional trade agreements, lacks a credible economic strategy in the region.

Q2: Why the focus on mobilizing private capital?

A2: Global demands for infrastructure cannot be met by public capital alone. During 2015-19, G7 countries provided nearly $113 billion in official development assistance for foreign infrastructure projects, as illustrated below. That support is fundamentally different from most of China’s BRI lending, which comes with higher interest rates and does not adhere to the Paris Club principles. While remaining steady as China’s BRI has declined, the G7’s combined assistance is only a fraction of what the developing world needs. Developing Asia alone will require $26 trillion in infrastructure investment through 2030, according to the Asian Development Bank.

The private sector is where the untapped financial firepower resides. Pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds are all looking for reliable, long-term returns. Wealth and money managers now handle over $110 trillion, more than 16 times the U.S. federal budget in 2020. But only a small fraction of this vast amount is invested in infrastructure, and developing economies, in particular, have appeared too risky for many investors. According to World Bank data, during 2015-19, private sector investors in G7 countries put roughly $22 billion toward infrastructure projects in developing countries. For example, if G7 countries realized the International Finance Corporation’s mobilization target of 80 percent, current levels of assistance would unlock more than $200 billion over five years.

This will require designing incentives that shift investors’ risk-reward calculus. As the CSIS Global Infrastructure Task Force noted:

The challenge is that too often, especially in emerging markets, potential rewards are not commensurate with perceived risks. The list of overarching risks is long and varied: environmental, social, health, and safety risks; inflation, foreign exchange, and other macroeconomic risks; idiosyncratic decisionmaking, contract disputes, weak rule of law, and other legal and political risks. The complexity of projects should not be discounted, and there is an assortment of construction and operations risks. . . . As a result of all of these challenges, there is a shortage of “bankable” projects that can promise enough upside. Unlocking greater pools of U.S. private capital will require innovative ways, including multilateral or direct insurance products, to adjust the current risk-reward calculus.

Q3: What will the U.S. government need to do to make B3W a viable alternative to the BRI?

A3: The United States and its partners need to invest in a system for developing a sustainable pipeline of bankable projects. Sharing information and improving coordination between public and private sector stakeholders, as the G20’s Global Infrastructure Hub was created to do, is necessary but not sufficient. Preparing projects will require putting some public money on the table. In developing countries, project preparation expenses often approach five to ten percent of the total project cost. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s Project Preparation Facility is one promising model to consider.

The United States should continue to support capacity-building efforts as well. Providing transaction assistance bilaterally and through multilateral institutions can help developing countries avoid unusual confidentiality clauses, inflated costs, and other risks. Modest investments in these activities can have outsized outcomes, which will help countries negotiate for better financial and legal terms that meet accepted international standards. For example, helping more countries implement life-cycle cost assessments will also enhance the competitiveness of the B3W offers.

The B3W needs to resonate with leaders in developing countries. Many will be eager to expand their options, and the B3W brand could carry prestige as a high-quality effort. But leaders will be cautious about tradeoffs that B3W projects might present—more public scrutiny, higher up-front costs, and longer timelines for project delivery. Competing against China’s approach, which often promises speed and low up-front costs, will require fashioning effective incentives.

Finally, the U.S. government needs a central coordinator for these efforts. The list of U.S. agencies with relevant expertise and capabilities is long, including not only State, Treasury, Commerce, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, but also Defense, Homeland Security, Transportation, and smaller specialized agencies, such as the U.S. Development Finance Corporation, the U.S. Export-Import Bank, and the Trade and Development Agency, among others. President Biden’s making the B3W a priority provides an opportunity to more effectively harness these capabilities.

Matthew P. Goodman is senior vice president for economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Jonathan E. Hillman is a senior fellow with the CSIS Economics Program, director of the Reconnecting Asia Project, and author of The Emperor’s New Road.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2021 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

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The goals and intentions of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) such as eliminating tariffs on 90% of goods will be stillborn without essential regulatory and infrastructure changes. New policies must be created to facilitate the faster and seamless flow of goods and services across borders, especially into and out of African ports.

President Cyril Ramaphosa visited the Durban port — Sub-Saharan Africa’s busiest, handling about 60% of SA’s shipping container traffic — in April. The president’s visit served as a site inspection and an opportunity to announce a new infrastructure investment drive of up to R100bn.

The goal of upgrading the port’s administrative and capacity abilities is to increase container capacity from the current 2.9-million 20-foot equivalent units (TEUs), to 11.3-million TEU. Achieving this will put Durban ahead of  Port Said with its 5-million container capacity, and Tangier with a capacity of more than 9-million.

The president’s visiting party did not include organised business. SA Association of Shipping Operators and Agents’ chair Malte Karsten, who noted recently that “there hasn’t been a major improvement in efficiencies at the Durban Port”, said that “we were surprised business was not included, especially since we wrote a letter about a year-and-a-half ago complaining about the issues at the port”.

Business is ultimately the driver of job-creation — it must be listened to and included in the government’s plans and initiatives. While often well-intentioned in their actions, bureaucrats and politicians in far-removed offices do not have on-the-ground experience with the daily challenges businesses and suppliers face. If the government is serious about implementing the kinds of reforms that will encourage more trade and investment, business leaders, analysts and commentators must be included.

Encouragingly, port general manager Moshe Motlohi has indicated that in future the private sector will be “at the centre” of the project, and there is a clear emphasis on increasing its car-handling capacity by two-thirds. Early this month Motlohi said: “We’re calling on the private sector to throw its lot into building this new capacity.” Private sector investment and incentives will add to the probability that any changes will focus on the needs and demands of the sector and not simply be drawn up in bureaucrats’ Pretoria offices.

Crucial judgment

The focus should be on moving containers through the port cheaper and faster. It is woefully insufficient to only do annual reports, for example. Ideally traffic reports should be provided daily or weekly. For SA to entice more traffic, monthly reports should be published at least. It will increase the sense of accountability and indicate to potential users and consumers that the port authorities are serious about improving the facility. More regular reports can focus on detailing the amount of daily container throughput, for example.

The proposed investment goal of R100bn should not be praised or criticised in itself; the most crucial judgment will be in terms of precisely what such a large amount is used for.

To improve their “trade-appeal”, an even bigger priority for emerging market economies such as SA would be to remove as many onerous tariffs on goods as possible. While this could allow businesses in other countries to sell their goods here cheaper, that in turn would mean SA consumers have more disposable income to spend on other things they consider important. With such low economic growth over the last few years, and after the devastation of Covid-19 and government-implemented lockdowns, now is the optimal time to remove as many barriers to dynamic economic activity as possible.

Investing and upgrading the Durban Port is precisely the kind of long-term change hoped for as part of the AfCFTA. If African governments were to recognise the potential for increased innovation, investment and job creation in their respective countries it could provide the required impetus that has been so sorely lacking for too long.

In addition to increasing the flow of goods and services, governments should in the spirit of the AfCFTA make it easier for people to cross borders to work and invest in other countries, speeding up the mixing of ideas and novel ways of solving the continent’s economic and social challenges.

The SA environment could become the destination for investment and innovation on the continent providing sensible policy changes are made.

This article first appeared in BusinessDay.

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While such a strategic platform for dialogue holds tremendous promise, the agenda will include some difficult issues. One of the thornier issues Bodog Poker is Europe’s quest to dictate market outcomes with its proposed Digital Markets Act (DMA). The European Commission has signaled its interest to essentially abandon competition law as a tool to reign in anticompetitive behavior, opting instead to stitch together a regulatory straitjacket to be selectively applied to a handful of American companies. This is one of more than a dozen legislative efforts where the EU is looking to make its mark on digital economy policy, all under the banner of “technological sovereignty.” 

Europe Turns Away from Competition Law  

The EU’s approach to competition enforcement for years has embraced the vast power of its underlying antitrust statutes to go after largeness. It has with little restraint imposed huge fines on American tech giants including Microsoft, Intel, and Google and required them to change business practices, ostensibly to give competitors a “fair” chance in the EU market.    

While the limitations of EU competition enforcement have yet to been found, Europe has decided that competition investigations aren’t worth the time needed to gather and evaluate evidence. Why bother with applying rigorous economic analysis to scrutinize allegedly anticompetitive conduct or to offer a remedy that is tailored so it goes no further than is necessary to restore competition in the market? Instead, Brussels has decided to prioritize stringent new regulations over competition law. Unlike most regulations, which apply to all market actors, the DMA is designed to a capture only a few companies, mostly American, effectively treating them as public utilities.  

Europe Is Piecing Together A Regulatory Straitjacket  

While commonplace in any functioning economy, regulation generally applies equally to all market actors. For example, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is designed to protect privacy. The importance placed on privacy is universal, and therefore requirements in the law apply broadly to all commercial actors. Even economic regulations, like VAT or labor laws, capture broad swaths of the economy. Such regulations do not signal out particular economic actors.    

The DMA is fundamentally different. The proposed legislation is not principle-based regulation and follows none of the norms of good regulatory practice.   

Instead, it is guided by an underlying belief that only a few should be subject to extensive regulatory controls, because application of these controls to a larger set of economic actors would be counter-productive bodog casino to Europe’s drive towards increased competitiveness, innovation, and economic growth. It is a tacit admission that Europe’s companies need not be expected to compete on the merits.  

The net effect is that a handful of companies will be labeled as “gatekeepers.”  

These firms will not be subject to any investigation to determine if their conduct is a violation of any law; instead it would be assumed that because of their size, their economic freedoms should be restricted. This flies in the face of the principle of equal justice under law.  

Companies likely to be captured within the scope of the DMA have a limited number of things in common, apart from having some sort of platform business and a large market capitalization.  Most offer a diverse range of products and services and in many cases, the specific offerings aren’t necessarily even dominant in the individual markets in which they compete. Instead, of targeting business practices, or specific products or services, a gatekeeper would be essentially treated as if the entire company were a public utility. But unlike public utilities, few offerings from these companies are as essential to everyday life as, say, water or electricity.    

The range of devices that make up the “internet of things” and the explosion of the app economy have been nothing short of remarkable in terms of innovation and value creation. There are some players that have become immensely successful as they have been financially rewarded for making consumers’ lives more convenient. 

These companies have also ushered in innumerable economic opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses. As a result of these platforms, businesses of all sizes have seen transaction and marketing costs drop dramatically—even as their ability to effortlessly court consumers previously considered out of reach has expanded.    

Certain business practices associated with platform companies may deserve scrutiny, but artificially lumping them together under a set of overreaching rules makes little sense. A case-by-case, evidence-based approach to investigating potential wrong-doing is far preferable to the EU’s attempt to design a regulatory straitjacket.  

Taking A Page Out of China’s Playbook?  

To be clear, Europe is not China. Europe isn’t dominated by highly prized state-owned enterprises, nor does it have China’s restrictions that bar foreign investors from entering the market. But with the DMA, Brussels appears to be taking several bodog casino pages out of Beijing’s playbook by imposing greater government control over the market, side-stepping due process, potentially compelling technology transfer, and generally setting up an unlevel regulatory pitch to benefit European companies at the expense of U.S. competitors. Here are three examples: 

• Targeting:  Europe argues that it is not targeting American firms, but, rather, large platforms that happen to be American, because it believes such platforms should have a duty to aid European competitors. Yet the DMA will focus on platforms the Commission designates as “gatekeepers” and will not capture many sizeable platforms operating in Europe. This echoes the unilateral digital services taxes imposed by several EU member states, which are cleverly crafted to apply almost exclusively to American companies in a manner that clearly violates the EU’s WTO commitments.     
• Due Process:  Of particular concern is the potentially arbitrary mechanism by which a company could be designated a “gatekeeper.” Would these companies be so designated for life? How would other companies be added? Most importantly, would a company be able to argue for removal of the designation? So far, the proposed DMA provides little clarity—and hence little comfort—on these questions.       
• Tech Transfer:  The DMA appears to impose an obligation for “gatekeepers” to share proprietary information with competitors and provide direct access to core technical and operational infrastructure, including operating systems. As drafted, the DMA does not include any relevant protections for trade secrets or intellectual property rights. It’s one thing to demand fair competition, but it is entirely another to insist that a company turn the keys to its factory over to a competitor.  

If adopted as is, the DMA would likely not meet Europe’s trade obligations, nor would it adopt a least trade restrictive approach to regulation. It would also take advantage of loopholes in trade law, which speak only in limited terms to investment or competition obligations. As the Biden Administration seeks to resolve long-standing disputes and adopt an allied approach to jointly tackle shared challenges with China, Europe’s proposed DMA is inconsistent with the collaborative, non-discriminatory, and plurilateral approach the EU seeks from the United States.   

Outlook  

Europe has the right to regulate its marketplace and enhance its regulatory environment in accordance Bodog Poker with EU societal objectives.  It also has a requirement to abide by its trade commitments and to champion the non-discriminatory, market-based, least-trade restrictive principles it has long maintained as its essential philosophy. Internationally, the EU knows what it is like to be restrained in foreign markets when, in the name of security and sovereignty, regulatory frameworks are closely aligned with industrial policy and unilaterally imposed. 

The DMA, as drafted, seeks to manage competition versus promoting it. It is hardly a sure-fire path for boosting European competitiveness, nor is it easy to see how the DMA will spur innovation or investment in Europe. We hope the proposed legislation will change, but in the meantime, American business is closely watching the DMA and the EU’s broader approach to “tech sovereignty.” A U.S.-EU Trade & Technology Council would be a helpful platform to address some of the very real questions about Europe’s intentions.   

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