The persistent gap between male and female labour market participation is a trend common to all regions of the world. Across the Indo-Pacific region, research shows that women are not benefiting from job growth in new sectors as much as men.

A missing link in the conversation on improving women’s participation in the Indo-Pacific economies is the role of trade. The region, which has an outsized influence on geopolitics and accounts for nearly half of global trade, can be critical for accelerating women’s economic participation and promoting inclusive growth through trade.

The inextricable link between gender equality and trade has become well established in recent years. Trade directly improves women’s lives, by creating better jobs, increasing women’s wages and welfare, and creating opportunities for women to move into higher-skill work and entrepreneurship. Firms that are part of global value chains demonstrably employ more women in developing countries. Women make up 33% of the workforce of firms that engage in international trade, compared with 24% in firms that do not.

The impact of trade on gender equality is wide-ranging – trade enhances women’s access to education, healthcare and technology.

Despite its potential for improving outcomes for women, gender has received little attention in international trade. Globally, only 15% of firms engaged in international trade are led by women. In OECD countries, 27% of women’s jobs are dependent on exports, compared to 37% for men. International trade is not favourable for women who face a wide range of barriers that include social norms and gender biases, mobility constraints, policy and legal hurdles, and restricted access to finance, technology and information.

However, recent trends in international trade present an opportunity for increasing women’s participation. This includes the overall increase in regional and cross-border trade and the dominance of global value chains, the rise of services in trade, and the expansion of green trade and digital trade.

Together these shifts represent the need for a workforce with upgraded skills, creating space for more women to enter the trade sector.

Governments and multilateral and international organisations have more recently started acknowledging that trade is not gender-neutral and seeking ways to address the global gender gaps in trade. This year’s G20 presidency under Brazil has identified boosting women’s participation in international trade as an organisation priority for the first time.

Gender provisions are also increasingly a part of trade policy and trade agreements. According to the World Trade Organisation, as of September 2022, 101 of the Preferential Trade Agreements out of 353 included an explicit reference to gender issues. Very few of these gender-related commitments, however, are enforceable.

Interestingly, the WTO, which has been advocating for gender-inclusive trade, has its own gender gaps to fill. Only 36% of ambassadors and 30% of ministers in charge of decision-making at WTO are women.

Australia has been seeking to elevate the conversation on gender segregation in trade. It endorsed the WTO’s Buenos Aires Declaration on Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment in 2017, and in February 2024 became a member of the Global Trade and Gender Agreement. A new International Gender Equality Strategy being developed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade will reflect the commitment to reduce gender gaps in trade.

The Indo-Pacific, which includes some of the world’s largest economies as well as the fastest-growing economies, and “mega-regional” free trade agreements, has the potential to propel inclusive economic growth and improve the economic security of women.

There are several ways for the region to work towards this goal. Established regional forums for economic cooperation such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum can play a critical role in engaging governments, the private sector and businesses to promote inclusive trade in the region.

Gender mainstreaming is integrated into newer initiatives, including the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), a regional initiative of 14 governments to build economic integration in the Indo-Pacific, with Australia, the United States, Japan and India as members. IPEF lists trade as one of its four core pillars, and explicitly underlines the need for inclusivity in trade, removing barriers to economic empowerment and encouraging greater participation by women.

Gender equality must be a critical part of building supply chain resilience in the region. Women are under-represented in global supply chains, work in vulnerable and precarious conditions, and are concentrated in low-skilled employment.

The Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) between Australia, India and Japan could be another initiative to promote increased employment and entrepreneurship opportunities for women. IPEF, SCRI and the Quad group each list enhancing the workforce of supply chains in critical sectors as a priority, and could have targeted training and skilling programs with gender quotas.

Trade facilitation directly benefits women and enhances their participation in trade-related services. Countries such as India and Australia, leaders in trade facilitation, can work with countries in South Asia and the Pacific to promote gender-sensitive trade facilitation processes in their neighbourhoods.

The Indo-Pacific region, most often cited as a geopolitical flashpoint for trade, can be at the forefront of advancing a gender-inclusive trade agenda.

The post Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_WITAWITF Annual Dinner appeared first on bodog.

Indo-Pacific countries recognize that the IPEF has the potential to deepen commercial ties, promote sustainable economic growth and development, diversify trade flows and bolster U.S. commitment to the region.

These nations are keen to expand economic ties with the U.S. to complement progress made in recent years on political and security issues. But they have legitimate questions about whether the U.S. is prepared to engage seriously on economic matters of interest to them.

The U.S. says that it views the IPEF as a key tool to advance its economic and strategic interests, and that developing deeper ties with Indo-Pacific allies and partners is critical. It says its aim is to sustain and build its leadership and influence, deepen its economic relationships, catalyze progress on global issues and deter malign regional actors.

The challenge now is to raise the level of ambition so that the IPEF can achieve these goals.

The new U.S. “worker-centric” model for trade initiatives has been met with skepticism even among allies and, so far, is more a slogan than a clearly defined policy. Washington has yet to articulate how its approach can promote trade and investment among IPEF members, advance the interests of workers, protect the environment, promote innovation and strengthen competitiveness.

Success will require the U.S. to move from rhetoric to substance and put forward a bold framework.

First, the agreement must provide clarity and predictability through binding and enforceable rules and standards. These rules must be detailed enough to provide tangible benefits, especially if the U.S. continues to refuse to offer the kind of market access that have traditionally been the trade-off for developing countries to accept new high-standard rules.

What might these rules include?

On the trade pillar, IPEF members could increase market opportunities by addressing specific nontariff barriers their exporters face today and establishing processes for tackling new ones.

They could agree to rules simplifying and modernizing customs procedures to make trade faster, cheaper and more predictable across the region, while helping governments detect fraud and enforce health, safety and labor regulations.

They also could agree to strong digital trade rules, comparable to the high standards set in recent U.S. agreements, to facilitate trusted data flows, support small businesses and encourage innovation and inclusion. They could include intellectual property protections to promote trade in innovative goods and services, and agree on common standards in key sectors to make trade more seamless.

On the supply chain pillar, IPEF governments could agree on information sharing and coordination mechanisms that would provide early warning of potential supply-chain shocks and ensure more effective responses.

They could establish common, trusted standards to promote secure supply chains and environmental sustainability and combat forced labor. To foster the development of IPEF supply chains in critical goods, they also could provide preferential access to each other’s markets, including eliminating tariffs on critical minerals, food, medicine, medical technologies and batteries.

On the clean energy pillar, to support their climate goals, IPEF members could eliminate barriers to trade in environmental goods and services, offer incentives for goods produced using clean energy, and develop common standards and metrics for carbon emissions and carbon intensity.

They could coordinate joint research and development projects on clean energy and offer royalty-free licenses for the deployment of the resulting technologies in IPEF countries. They could also secure financing to build supply chain and clean energy infrastructure through investment protection commitments.

Second, the U.S. and other IPEF members should establish a new model of engagement with stakeholders. Governments need stakeholders invested in the IPEF’s success. They are depending on business to provide technical assistance, participate in public-private partnerships, finance infrastructure, share information and reorient supply chains. They also are relying on the expertise of businesses and other stakeholders to inform their discussions on how to incentivize the outcomes they seek.

As they develop protocols for new issues that were not addressed in previous trade agreements, the U.S. and other governments should establish working groups that include both government and stakeholder representatives. These groups would be tasked with developing proposals on specific issues and would also be a resource to inform government discussions.

Third, the U.S. needs to act with urgency. Trade liberalization is proceeding between IPEF members and third parties outside of the framework, shaping regional supply chains and trade and investment flows and influencing broader relationships and regional dynamics. But the speedy conclusion of political commitments should not take precedence over substantive economic outcomes.

The IPEF will be seen as a test of the effectiveness of the new U.S. worker-centric approach to trade agreements. To pass muster, the agreement must be robust enough to increase trade among IPEF members, enhance supply-chain resilience and significantly advance their energy transitions.

Some IPEF members may be willing to accept incremental progress and will certainly welcome offers of new projects or technical assistance from the U.S. and other countries. But baby steps will do little to achieve the initiative’s objectives. Given the challenges at this pivotal moment, the U.S. must pursue a grander vision. Success is critical, and the U.S. cannot afford to come up short.

Barbara Weisel is a managing director of Rock Creek Global Advisors in Washington and a member of the advisory board of the American Association of the Indo-Pacific. She was previously the chief U.S. negotiator for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.

To read the full article, please click here.

The post Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_projects or technical appeared first on bodog.

Consequently, New Delhi’s move last month to opt out of the trade pillar of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework being negotiated by the U.S. and 12 other countries has disappointed those who believed India had become more receptive to deal-making after concluding back-to-back trade pacts with the United Arab Emirates and Australia.

Given the comparatively small size of its domestic market, India needs large overseas markets to help its manufacturers reap the benefits of economies of scale.

The IPEF trade talks might have enabled India to fill the gap created when it dropped out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 2019, just a year before that 15-nation trade liberalization deal was finalized.

It is understandable that India withdrew from RCEP, given that China is a core member. Most Indian manufacturers are uncomfortable with the idea of freer imports from China, given its low-cost production prowess, among other factors. Yet, by Washington’s design, China is not even a prospective member of IPEF.

But left-leaning economists and others are celebrating India’s IPEF move as preserving the country’s freedom to set its own policies on digital trade, labor and environmental issues.

They argue that the U.S. push for free cross-border data flows is aimed at helping its own technology companies maintain their global dominance and conflicts with India’s push for data localization, even though that effort is likely to increase business costs and slow the growth of the country’s digital economy.

The critics worry that linking trade with labor and environmental standards will provide grounds for the U.S. and other IPEF members to erect new barriers against Indian exports. If India had joined the trade pillar, they say, New Delhi would have had to amend many laws and harmonize its legislation with that of the U.S. without clear trade benefits since Washington has ruled out discussion of tariff reductions. They also expect the U.S. to push the IPEF to agree on tightened intellectual property rights standards that would hurt India’s producers of generic drugs.

But India’s decision to let go of the IPEF’s trade pillar while holding on to the framework’s other three core elements — supply chain resilience, infrastructure clean energy and decarbonization, and taxes and anti-corruption — makes little sense.

First, supply chains and trade are interconnected, so it is illogical for India to take part in discussions on only one of them. Second, not joining the trade pillar signals that India’s main motive behind joining U.S.-led initiatives such as the Quad or IPEF is a narrow focus on geopolitics, and that it lacks openness to broader economic cooperation.

Third, the stance regarding labor and environmental standards would appear to clash with Modi’s own efforts to update archaic labor rules and promote decarbonization and green energy.

Indeed, while New Delhi is discussing harmonizing standards in its free trade talks with the EU in order to support its exports, why can India not do the same with the U.S. and the IPEF? Especially since the U.S. could still impose new standards on its own, particularly with the World Trade Organization too paralyzed to act as a check on Washington.

Moreover, if Vietnam can accept tougher regulatory norms, why should India not do so unless it wants to let Hanoi build its share of the U.S. market for electronics, textiles and sporting goods? Indian products are already at a disadvantage in the EU as talks on a bilateral free trade deal drag on, while Vietnam has already implemented a deal with Brussels.

The signing ceremony of the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement in Hanoi in June 2019.    © Reuters

Trade deals are not always about seeking improved market access. Often, they are about protecting existing positions when competitors are winning new preferential access, as with the dance among Vietnam, India and the EU. Interestingly, Vietnam is also pushing for data localization, yet it is remaining part of the IPEF trade pillar.

The criticism that the trade pillar of IPEF will not bring reduced U.S. import tariffs and hence offers limited gains for India is also flawed. Average U.S. import tariffs are far lower than India’s, so a group pact on tariffs would likely have required bigger cuts from New Delhi than from Washington.

India cannot pick and choose as trade deals are invariably about both give and take. Policymakers and the top guns of India Inc. boast of the country’s large and growing market of 1.4 billion people and its place as the world’s fifth-largest economy, but the purchasing power of the average Indian lags well behind that of his or her Chinese counterpart, underscoring the insufficiency of demand from India’s domestic market as a driver for manufacturing growth.

India, therefore should not let go of an opportunity for better access to a potential export market at least 10 times bigger than its domestic market. It must realize that its laws and policies will have to be in sync with international standards and in alignment with the U.S. as the major standard-setting country if it is serious about benefiting from globalization and world trade.

Given the current favorable geopolitical environment of companies and countries seeking alternative production platforms to China, India should reconsider engaging with the IPEF on trade.

Ritesh Kumar Singh is the founder and chief executive of policy research and advisory company Indonomics Consulting in New Delhi.

To read the full post, please click here.

The post Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_who believed India had appeared first on bodog.

Analysts have described the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) as the Biden administration’s attempt at reigniting U.S. economic statecraft in Asia that was neglected by his predecessor. The U.S.’s engagement of Asian countries through the IPEF is also seen as a means to counter China’s strong influence in the region.

Trade agreements were historically used by the U.S. to build relationships with allies and partners, bodog sportsbook review and to cement American international influence. However, the IPEF is not meant to be a traditional trade agreement as there are no new market access benefits on the table for participating countries. It instead opts for a modular approach where countries are free to select specific pillars of the IPEF in which they wish to participate while opting out of others.

Each pillar represents other non-market access related aspects of trade and economic cooperation. As it stands, the IPEF is organised along four pillars: (1) trade, (2) supply chains, (3) clean energy, decarbonisation and infrastructure, and (4) tax and anti-corruption. Instead of market access, the “trade” pillar encompasses other trade-related issues such as environmental and labour standards. On these two fronts, the U.S. looks poised to push for more stringent standards that Southeast Asian countries might find tough to accept. If the goal of the IPEF is to strengthen relationships with countries in the region and act as an alternative to what China has to offer, pushing for tough environmental and labour standards might prove to be a contentious issue that would detract from these broader geopolitical objectives.

In May 2022, U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Katherine Tai had already signalled that the IPEF will involve the pursuit of strong labour and environmental standards. The expectation is that these standards will involve some emulation of the US-Canada-Mexico Agreement (USCMA), which Ambassador Tai hailed as “a new model for trade agreements”. The USCMA contains the most stringent environmental and labour standards in any trade agreement ever ratified, which Congressional Democrats had a hand in pushing through.

Congressional Democrats have historically made their support for potential U.S. trade agreements contingent upon the inclusion of environmental and labour protections. Even though the IPEF, in its current form, does not require congressional approval, the Biden administration would likely still face pressure from the Democratic Party to include such standards in the IPEF.

The USMCA contains several provisions that essentially allow the U.S. to withdraw trade benefits if environmental or labour standards have been breached. Labour standards include prohibitions on forced labour, respect for the right of association with a union and collective bargaining, and protection for migrant workers. On the environmental front, of note is the mention of obligations to combat illegal fishing and logging and the obligation to commit to seven multilateral environmental agreements, including the Montreal Protocol and Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). Contravention of standards enumerated in the agreement would allow the U.S. to trigger a dispute settlement procedure which might ultimately lead to the imposition of coercive trade measures, such as raising tariffs or withdrawing other trade benefits. Additionally, the USCMA allows the U.S. to block imports from specific facilities found to have been in breach of labour rights obligations.

The U.S. seems determined to use the USCMA as a model for enshrining potential environmental and labour provisions in the IPEF. However, it is hard to see how these provisions might work considering that even if they were violated, the U.S. cannot withdraw market access benefits. Pushing hard to include these standards without commensurate market access offerings would likely raise contentions among Southeast Asian signatories of the IPEF.

There are already signals that labour rights issues will prove to be contentious for Southeast Asian countries. The U.S. has identified Vietnam’s textile industry as part of a cotton supply chain that uses forced labour from the Xinjiang region in China, which could trigger import blocks under the U.S.’s recently passed Uyghur Forced Labour Protection Act. Thailand may find itself in a similar position on its use of cotton imports from China. Earlier, two Malaysian companies, Sime Darby Plantation Berhad and FGV Holdings Berhad, had their palm oil exports blocked at the U.S. border in late 2020 on allegations of forced labour practices.

In the negotiations to come, several scenarios might play out. Market access has been the primary carrot that has historically incentivised the U.S.’s trade partners to swallow tough pills. If the U.S. is insistent on including strong environmental and labour standards in the IPEF, it might find itself hard pressed to design an alternative incentive structure to make these provisions more palatable for Southeast Asian signatories. Experts have speculated that this may involve improving trade facilitation such as removing technical and regulatory barriers to trade to boost exports to the U.S. Whether this would be enough to replace traditional market access benefits such as lower tariffs remains to be seen.

The U.S. could also take a softer approach by leaving out coercive enforcement and instead focusing on cooperative mechanisms such the provision of technical assistance and capacity building to work towards higher environmental and labour standards. Southeast Asian countries might be more willing to accept tough standards in exchange for such goodies.

If nothing can fill the void of market access benefits and the U.S. insists on including strong environmental and labour standards, the risk is that Southeast Asian countries may opt out of the IPEF’s “trade” pillar entirely. In this scenario, it is doubtful how the goal of strengthening economic engagement can be achieved, given that the “trade” pillar is likely to form the core of IPEF. Moreover, the IPEF is not only about trade and economic engagement but also about fulfilling the geopolitical objective of strengthening and cementing relationships with key partners in Asia amidst the U.S.’s intensifying competition with China. With this in mind, Biden’s administration will need to think through how to reconcile domestic pressures to include strong environmental and labour standards with the IPEF’s broader geopolitical goals.

Darren Cheong was Research Associate with the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

To read the full post, please click here.

The post bodog casino|Welcome Bonus_Plantation Berhad and appeared first on bodog.

After former US President, Donald Trump decided to walk away from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy lacked a certain geo-economic heft and that made it very less attractive to many Asean countries like Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia. After the coming of the Biden administration, the fact that the US is working on an economic framework for the Indo-Pacific had been doing the rounds. The US has repeatedly reiterated that the IPEF is not a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP). It has not involved, nor has it promised to involve in the future, negotiations to remove tariffs or increase market access. For now, the IPEF appears to be the US’s way of convincing countries that its Indo-Pacific strategy very much as a geo-economic component and is not just security and geo-strategy heavy.

The US has repeatedly reiterated that the IPEF is not a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP).

The question that arises is given that how will the Asean countries benefit from the IPEF? Is there any fear that they might withdraw from this framework if no substantial progress takes place in the future? It is important to look into the statements coming from the Asean countries that give out a preliminary idea of what their expectations are from the IPEF.

Analysts in Indonesia, like Dandy Rafitrandi, an economics researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said that “participating would still benefit Indonesia, even if it remains unclear what real commitments the US will offer. If we don’t join, we might be seen as less competitive [to the US] compared with other countries.” There is obviously the fear among Southeast Asian countries that this will again require them to choose sides between the US and China and some analysts like, Ahmad Heri Firdaus of the Institute for Development of Economics and Finance (INDEF), Indonesia said that, “We need to reiterate that joining IPEF won’t damage our trade with China. We can cooperate with the US and China.” The primary concern that the Asean countries have is to not sever their ties with China and it can be seen from statements issued by the ministries of respective countries. Indonesian Trade Minister, Muhammad Lutfi who attended the virtual launch event stated, “going forward, the framework must benefit all the countries involved, remain inclusive and beneficial in the long term, not obstruct development plans in the region as well as work harmoniously with existing frameworks like the Asean Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.” Indonesia’s trade ministry’s deputy director for Asean free trade negotiations, Ranitya Kusumadewi, has mentioned that “Indonesia is keen to team up with the Biden administration on the digital economy, supply-chain security and gradual energy transitions.” Though market access is not guaranteed under the IPEF framework, but Southeast Asian analysts like Yose Rizal Damuri, executive director of the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), are hopeful that “the US will try to lure Indo-Pacific nations by giving monetary aid for development projects.”

Ms Hang, from the Vietnamese ministry of foreign affairs, believes that the “IPEF, with the right orientation, bounds to promote a positive and effective economic environment that brings practical benefits to the people as well as security and peace for the region as well as globally. Vietnam’s goal is to build an independent and self-reliant economy in the region that actively engages with the world in many aspects.” Analysts in Vietnam have commented that as one of the four pillars of IPEF, green energy is an industry that sees significant potential in Vietnam. Given the favourable geographical features, Vietnam is bound to become the next destination for investment in renewable energy, particularly solar energy and wind power. The IPEF is also expected to drive Vietnamese exports to the US market to an even higherlevel building on its positive relationship and historically growing exports to the US. The framework also strengthens the US – Vietnam relationship as trusted partners, which creates a favourable environment for investment flow and trade between the two countries.

The IPEF is also expected to drive Vietnamese exports to the US market to an even higherlevel building on its positive relationship and historically growing exports to the US.

Singapore’s prime minister, Hsien Loong, during his intervention at the virtual launch event at the IPEF had underlined that Singapore realises both the strategic and economic significance of the IPEF and that this provides the US an opportunity to exercise its economic diplomacy in the region. He had further pointed out, “The four pillars include issues that will resonate strongly in the region. In particular, they will also cover cooperation in the digital economy and the green economy, which show promise of growth.

It is important that the IPEF remains open, inclusive, and flexible. Enabling members to continue working with many other partners, in overlapping circles of cooperation, and leaving membership open to others to join later on, as and when they are ready to do so.” The point to be noted here is the point on flexibility and keeping the door open for other members to join in the future and this could have a clear indication towards China.

Malaysian prime minister, Datuk Seri Ismail Sabri Yaakob also seemed confident that the IPEF will strengthen economic cooperation between countries in the Indo-Pacific and the ASEAN region and asserted that, “the new trade initiative provides a holistic structure to resolve trade issues with partner countries.” He further pointed out, “Malaysia is ready to discuss relevant issues through the IPEF to ensure that the members can optimise bodog online casino the economic and strategic benefits as outlined in the framework,” he said, adding that the medical, electrical and electronics (E&E) sectors, as well as the digital economy are expected to benefit from the trade initiative.”

At the virtual launch event, department of trade and industry (DTI) secretary Ramon M Lopez reiterated , “ the Philippines acknowledged the general alignment of the broad themes of the IPEF in advancing resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness and competitiveness and the Philippines’ economic and development priorities. The Philippines sees the IPEF as complementing individual and collective efforts towards inclusive recovery, and US support for Asean member-states in the pursuit of IPEF initiatives will be critical.” Therefore, for the Philippines, its economic recovery and development is the over all agenda.

The Philippines sees the IPEF as complementing individual and collective efforts towards inclusive recovery, and US support for Asean member-states in the pursuit of IPEF initiatives will be critical.”

Thailand looks to engage in four areas under the IPEF: Trade, supply chains, infrastructure and decarbonisation, and taxes and anti-corruption. Thailand has been extremely cautious when entering free trade negotiations with the West as private sector and civil society organizations are still strongly opposed to Thailand joining any Western-initiated free trade arrangement. But given that this is not a FTA, Thailand seems keen to be a part of the initiative.

What seems clear at the moment is that Asean countries who have always adopted a hedging strategy has agreed to join this initiative, in spite of being unaware of the clear vision and knowing that this will not provide improved market is for the fear of missing out in the future if this turns into something substantial. Therefore, the US has a lot on its plate to prove that this will not be another talking shop like initiative like the Blue Dot and the Build Back Better World (B3W).

Premesha Saha is an Associate Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. Her research focuses on Southeast Asia, East Asia and the South Pacific — spanning the Eastern Indian Ocean.

To read the full commentary from the Observer Research Foundation, please click here.

The post bodog online casino|Welcome Bonus_on its positive relationship appeared first on bodog.

U.S. engagement in the Pacific is critical to this country’s workers, small businesses, values and economic and national security interests. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) is an important initiative, recognizing the value of the U.S. as a standard-setter — for worker, environmental, digital and infrastructure standards — in order to continue as a 21st century global leader. This is especially important given China’s regional dominance. The IPEF’s goal of high labor and environment standards, as well as digital standards of democracy, transparency and accountability, are important counterparts to China’s model.

An important challenge facing the Biden administration is offering sufficient incentives for less-developed countries, especially ASEAN countries, to join the framework. The framework has four key pillars — infrastructure, supply chain resiliency, fair and resilient trade, and tax and anti-corruption. The first two pillars are the most attractive; they offer the potential for financing of infrastructure and sourcing of suppliers. The trade pillar is more challenging since it seeks to develop digital, labor and environmental standards. While the ASEAN countries welcome U.S. regional reengagement, setting these standards will require difficult domestic concessions from them. If the IPEF is to attract countries beyond Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore and South Korea, it must include strong incentives for countries to make these changes.

The U.S. has a limited range of incentives to offer countries to make difficult concessions. Lowering U.S. tariffs to offer increased access to the U.S. market is undoubtedly the best incentive. Although U.S. tariffs are generally low, tariffs are high in sectors such as agriculture or textiles, which are of particular interest to developing countries. When Vietnam wanted to gain access to lower duties on footwear and apparel by joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership, it pushed through significant domestic reforms. Tariff market access ultimately may be necessary to achieve the IPEF’s vision, and congressional passage may be necessary to assure countries that a future administration will not pull out of the framework.

For political reasons, however, this option is not on the table, so we must consider other incentives to encourage less-developed countries to join the trade pillar. Although the U.S. is not offering to lower its bound tariff rates, there are other ways it could increase access to the U.S. market. A number of Indo-Pacific countries still face Section 232 (national security) tariffs on steel and aluminum exports, imposed by President Trump in 2018. These tariffs should be eliminated for countries meeting certain standards in the IPEF trade pillar.

Secondly, while the U.S. isn’t offering to lower its tariffs, it can offer assurances that they won’t be raised — an important benefit during this time of increased protectionism. In a side letter to the United States.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the U.S. agreed to put in place guardrails for future Section 232 tariff increases and added a 60-day notice and consultation requirement before undertaking tariff measures. This reduces the likelihood of surprise tariffs and can help resolve crises before imposing trade barriers. The U.S. could incorporate similar provisions in the IPEF, perhaps expanding them to include other types of tariff measures, for countries that meet key standards. The U.S. should work cooperatively with countries regarding regulatory measures that facilitate those countries’ exports to the United States.

The U.S.could create a preferred supplier, or “trusted country,” status for countries meeting a certain level of labor, environmental and digital standards assurances — including ensuring that no forced labor is used throughout their supply chains. These countries could benefit from an expedited process through bodog casino U.S. customs. (A similar program exists to expedite imports for companies who meet certain standards.) Advancing paperless trading by making e-versions of documents available, such as e-invoicing and digital rules of origin certificates, also could be part of the trusted country program. Countries that meet certain standards would be allowed to use electronic signatures and certificates to expedite product shipments.

The second category of incentives is providing capacity-building funding and technical assistance to countries to facilitate their reaching desired standards. For example, the U.S. offered Mexico $210 million to help raise its labor standards, as required under the USMCA.

In addition to government-funded capacity-building, the U.S. could create opportunities to partner with American companies in the region. This can take the form of investment projects or skills training. Many companies have programs that could be expanded upon, especially with government support.

For the best incentives, the U.S. should consider integrating the pillars, rather than asking countries to join each one individually. For example, the U.S. could use money allotted for the infrastructure pillar as a carrot to incentivize a country’s participation in the trade pillar. The infrastructure pillar also offers opportunities to leverage decarbonization and anti-corruption goals.

The supplier resiliency pillar can be tied to the trusted country program: Qualifying countries could gain advantages through this pillar. Such “friend-shoring” can be an important part of supplier resilience, especially when moving sourcing for key technologies out of China. This is a chance to rethink U.S. supply chains and to encourage sourcing from countries that advance labor rights, support decarbonization and adopt transparent, democratic digital standards.

The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework provides an important opportunity for U.S. leadership in the region, including providing countries a values-driven alternative to China’s standards. America must make it attractive for developing countries to adopt higher labor, environmental and digital standards. Achieving this goal would produce an important result — for the U.S. and for businesses and workers in the Indo-Pacific.

Dr. Orit Frenkel is co-founder and CEO of the American Leadership Initiative. She is a former senior executive at the General Electric Company and served as director for trade in high-technology products at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.

To read the full commentary by The Hill, please click here.

The post bodog casino|Welcome Bonus_the framework. The framework appeared first on bodog.