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CBP issued a WRO on silica-based products manufactured by Hoshine Silicon Industry Co., Ltd. and its subsidiaries (Hoshine).  Hoshine is located in Xinjiang.  CBP issued the WRO based on unidentified “information available” that “reasonably but not conclusively” points to the use of forced labor.  Based on the WRO, silica-based products will be detained at all U.S. ports of entry.  It is also possible that CBP could issue redelivery notices for affected goods imported and released within 30 days of the redelivery notice.  This WRO marks the eleventh order on goods allegedly made by forced labor from Xinjiang.  Additionally, it broadly applies not only to goods exported by the Hoshine Silicon Industry Co., Ltd. but to any goods incorporating materials produced by this company.  This broad scope may be the largest problem for purchasers of the Hoshine product, who now may be faced with the disruption of their imports or even redelivery notices.

Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) also updated its Entity List to include the following five (5) entities:

• Hoshine Silicon Industry (Shanshan) Co., Ltd.
• Xinjiang Daqo New Energy Co., Ltd.
• Xinjiang East Hope Nonferrous Metals Co., Ltd.
• Xinjiang GCL New Energy Material Technology Co., Ltd.
• Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)

Several of these entities are major manufacturers of monocrystalline silicon and polysilicon which are used in the production of solar panels.  As a result of the BIS Entity List designation, effective June 24, 2021, the export, reexport, and in-country transfer of commodities, software, and technology subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) is prohibited if a company on the Entity List is an end-user, purchaser, or intermediate or ultimate consignee.

BIS’s action did include a savings clause which allows shipments of items “en route aboard a carrier” as of June 24, 2021 to proceed to the newly listed entities if those shipments were made pursuant to actual orders and would not have otherwise required BIS export licensing.

BIS’s action is in addition to the WRO issued by CBP.  In a press release issued by Commerce, the Administration indicated that “ [t]his action targets these entities’ ability to access commodities, software, and technology subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), and is part of a U.S. Government-wide effort to take strong action against China’s ongoing campaign of repression against Muslim minority groups in the XUAR.”

Finally, the Labor Department added polysilicon produced with forced labor in China to its “List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor.”  Updates to this List are typically published at two-year intervals, but this update is the first in the List’s history that was published before the next scheduled publication.

Jeffrey Neeley has more than 25 years of experience representing private parties in international trade remedies disputes in the U.S. and in foreign jurisdictions. He guides clients in matters including antidumping investigations, countervailing duties, subsidies, intellectual property disputes as well as related customs, export control, and other import/export issues.

To read the original commentary from Husch Blackwell please visit here

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Although it did not materialize because of lack of sufficient support, a major political figure in the country, Mr. Andargachew Tsige, had called an impromptu meeting and appealed to his supporters to “come out in millions and burn the US flag” to oppose the Biden administration. (Andargachew once claimed to have authored the roadmap for Ethiopia’s transition and is believed to be the key link between the Ethiopian Prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, and the Eritrean President, Isaias Afeworki.) Judging by the reactions of the various officials of the Ethiopian government, Addis Ababa appears to be seriously concerned about the implications of the new US policy, and rightly so.

The key argument that members and supporters of the Ethiopian regime are invoking in their opposition to the new US policy is the Westphalian conception of state sovereignty, which reinforces the strongly held view in some circles in the country that Ethiopia is an exceptional state, in whose internal affairs outsiders are not welcomed to meddle. Alluding to these sentiments, Mr. Abiy has referred to the US in a recent public event as a “young nation without history”, revealing the kind of thinking that might have led his country into a ruinous civil war. It appears that the young and gaudy leader might have expected that the US foreign policy establishment would continue to afford the Ethiopian government significant deference – as in the past – regardless of how it conducted its internal affairs.

The view that Ethiopia is an exceptional state – as professed by a segment of the Ethiopian political class – has serious detractors. The narrative that it is a country consisting of unequal nations, which had been cobbled together through imperial annexation by the Amhara ruling class only in the last century and half, has gained significant ground under the leadership of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Arguably, the wars in Tigray, Oromia, and Benishangul are driven by Abiy’s apparent determination to reverse course and reimpose a view of Ethiopia that is cherished by the unitarist political camp.

More importantly, it is difficult to reconcile the image of Ethiopia as an exceptional country that nurtures its sovereignty, with the harsh economic reality it is facing. It remains dependent on foreign aid to meet some of the basic needs of its population. The US, its western allies, and the multilateral institutions in which they are important stakeholders send billions of dollars to Ethiopia every year, most of which is allocated as a budget support to the government.

Of the $13 billion dollars or so promised by the World Bank to Ethiopia for the current three-year period, nearly half of the funds had been earmarked for workers’ salaries in the five pro-poor sectors identified by the Bank, under the moniker of human development. The World Bank is just one of about twenty-seven countries and agencies funding Ethiopia’s pro-poor sectors (the sectors include education, health, agriculture, water, and social protections), endeavoring to contribute to economic development in the country. Ethiopia’s education sector alone receives over $1 billion every year from these sources, with World Bank’s share constituting less than half of the transfers.

Ethiopia is also heavily dependent on the planned – now uncertain – restructuring of its debt by the International Monetary Fund, without which it will be in default on the external debt it has accumulated over the years due to the persistent deficits in its balance of payment. Currently, the country’s international reserve can finance imports only for the next month and half. For all intents and purposes, therefore, Ethiopia is looking at the abyss in terms of economic activities, without the promised debt restructuring by the IMF.

Under these dire circumstances, the claim that a rational recalibration of their policies by the US and the other donor nations – to induce the Ethiopian government to hold an all-inclusive and meaningful dialogue with the federalist camp –   amounts to infringing on the sovereign rights of an independent state, does not make much sense. Unless being an “exceptional country” means dependence on the generosity of others for survival, it is difficult to reconcile the rhetoric coming from Addis Ababa with the difficult economic realities the country is facing.

Additionally, the sovereignty argument rings hollow, when one considers that Ethiopia is on the verge of collapse, posing serious risks and threats to millions of innocent human lives, regional stability, and World peace.  Although he came into office primarily through a popular protest movement – also known as the Oromo Protests – Mr. Abiy did not waste any time in ditching the largely peaceful movement and to hitching his political wagon with forces whose main mission was to undo the social and political changes that had transpired in the country when the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) was at the helm.

Working in concert with the Eritrean regime, Abiy’s government has instituted policies and initiatives that have put millions of lives at risk, and it is overseeing a devastating civil war on many fronts – with the war in Tigray capturing international attention largely due to its intensity, and insurgencies in Oromia and Benishangul gaining significant momentum in the last three years. Ethiopia today is “tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested by warring factions”, taking a giant leap towards becoming a failed state, thus quickly turning into a real danger to its people and international peace.

If the dangerous political course Addis Ababa is pursuing continues along its current trajectory, it has a potential of turning the Horn of Africa into an ungovernable mess, with seriously adverse implications to the international community.  Under these circumstances, the call by Western powers (who will be called upon to bear some of the cost of the war) for an all-Inclusive dialogue – to try to solve Ethiopia’s age-old political problems – is the least they can do. Great powers have from time to time led international efforts (including and up to conducting overseas military operations) to protect their geo-political interests and to save innocent human lives; therefore, the recent policy initiatives being undertaken by the US and its European allies with respect to the conflicts in Ethiopia are to be expected from responsible global leaders.

What Abiy and co. are framing as US’s intervention in Ethiopia’s internal affairs – invoking a Westphalian notion of state sovereignty and appealing to a diminishing sentiment among Ethiopians (Ethiopia’s dubious exceptional status) – can be understood rather as a concerted effort by the Biden administration to avert a potentially disastrous collapse of the Ethiopian state. The Western world, whose counsel the Ethiopian prime minister seems to have rejected, had considered him a worthy partner who could lead the effort to bring about the long-sought democracy and development in the country, likely facilitating his meteoric rise to power.

A contemporary phenomenon that the promoters of centralized Ethiopian state are also neglecting (in their rush to justify a brutal war that has victimized millions of people) and much of the Western world has been seeking to come to terms with, is “the global resurgence of cultural and religious pluralism … the quest for cultural authenticity and civilizational states” in the modern age. International Relations scholars are recommending to policy makers in the West to be thoughtfully cognizant of these developments while rearticulating their foreign policies to meet the challenges of the emerging multipolar world.

The current civil war in Ethiopia has been characterized as a manifestation of the contestation between unitary political forces that subscribe to Ethiopian exceptionalism as an ideology, and others that aim to promote cultural and linguistic pluralism in the country. The Tigray people are proud custodians of the Aksumite civilization, and it is very difficult to see them as part of Ethiopia where their identity is suppressed, and their collective destiny is determined by the central government in Addis Ababa. Similarly, the Oromo are reclaiming their Gadaa civilization – an indigenous democratic socio-political system recently inscribed by UNESCO as an intangible human heritage, which was suppressed for over a century along with the other important markers of their identity – and it would be unrealistic to expect them to buy into Mr. Abiy’s vision of Greater Ethiopia, where the Amhara identity becomes the dominant norm, once again.

Whereas thoughtful world leaders are cognizant of these developments and fine tuning their policies to meet the challenges of the 21st Century, Mr. Abiy and his regional partners appear to be stuck in the past – on the principle of state sovereignty that was designed in Europe to overcome the challenges of a different era, and is increasingly being viewed as a flawed principle of international law for the modern times we live in – to push the political agenda, and maintain the cultural hegemony, of the Amhara over all other social groups in the country.   

Viewed from these perspectives, it is not entirely surprising that the Biden foreign policy team is rising to the challenge and sending a clear signal that it will not be deterred from pursuing a rational foreign policy objective in Ethiopia, regardless of a legalistic interpretation of current law pertaining to state sovereignty. It must be applauded and supported for initiating a policy change and processes that aim to hold the Ethiopian regime and its associates accountable for their gross and unacceptable violations of human rights.

Teferi Mergo is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Waterloo in Canada, with joint appointments at St. Paul’s College and the department of Economics. He is a Research Fellow at the Global Labor Organization – and he has been recognized for excellence in research at the University of Waterloo.

To read the original commentary from Global Policy, please visit here

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In its annual State Department human rights report, released on March 30, the Biden administration declared that China has engaged in “genocide and crimes against humanity,” citing Beijing’s “mass detention” of the Uyghurs, as well as evidence of forced sterilization, rape, torture, and forced labor. A week earlier, on March 22, the Biden administration—in conjunction with the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada—imposed economic sanctions on top Chinese officials over the persecution of the Uyghur people. The Trump administration had also strongly denounced China’s repression of the Uyghur people as genocide but addressed it with less publicity than his other sanctions against China over trade and security issues. Trump had publicly sanctioned China for trade and technology offenses and the crackdown on political rights in Hong Kong. Less well known is that he also imposed financial sanctions in July 2020 on a Chinese company and two officials engaged in Xinjiang labor abuses, and the US Customs and Border Protection barred US imports of certain products made in Xinjiang.

On Myanmar, neither the Trump administration nor the Biden administration so far has designated atrocities committed against the Rohingya Muslims as genocide. The Biden State Department has imposed sanctions on military and police officials over their role in the coup but not for the Rohingya genocide (which was tolerated by the de facto head of state, Aung San Suu Kyi, who was ousted in the coup). Previously, Trump also sanctioned Myanmar’s military officers for drug dealing and other criminal activity but not for the Rohingya genocide. Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom have also imposed sanctions on Myanmar’s military officials.

Despite their worthy intentions, economic sanctions imposed by the United States to punish genocide or atrocities against civilians have a mixed record. The historical evidence suggests that such sanctions alone are often ineffective unless accompanied by stronger actions, such as US military intervention—for example, against Yugoslavia and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). US willingness to take military action against Myanmar or China is inconceivable at present.

Yet mass atrocities cannot be met with indifference from the community of nations, even when the only practical action is undertaken more to send a message and take a stand than to bring about change. The United States has many issues of concern about China&bodog sportsbook review #8217;s economic might, from technology theft to the power of its state-owned enterprises. China’s military and political power projections raise legitimate concerns in Washington, but there are also areas where cooperation with Beijing is needed, particularly on climate change. These imperatives have unfortunately forced the plight of the Uyghur people to take a backseat. But they must not be forgotten.

One way to bolster that message is to work with allies to take coordinated steps, as the Biden administration started to do in March with regard to the persecution of the Uyghur people. In addition, the United States can seek a broader response through the United Nations, the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), both of which sit in The Hague in the Netherlands. Only one country, The Gambia, has brought a case to the ICJ on behalf of all Muslim nations against Myanmar for the massacre of the Rohingya people.

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The term “genocide” has been difficult to define and disputed by various parties in conflicts over many decades, in which massive numbers of civilians on all sides have been killed. The UN General Assembly adopted the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948, following what universally recognized to have been genocide carried out by the Nazi regime in Germany in World War II. But only a few leading perpetrators have been brought before the ICJ or the ICC.

Prosecutions under the UN Genocide Convention have been few and often delayed, as was the case in the aftermath of the Rwanda civil war in the early 1990s. The trial following the genocide of ethnic Tutsis in the Rwandan civil war in 1994 was not concluded until September 1998 and was the first in which the UN Genocide Convention was enforced. The slaughter of civilians in Darfur in western Sudan in the first decade of this century is the only active genocide-related investigation in the ICC. Former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir and his associates are awaiting trials in charges of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. For the first time, in 2007, the ICJ concluded that the massacre of Bosnian Muslims was genocide, ruling that Serbia committed a breach of the UN Genocide Convention in the 1990s.

US sanctions responding to government atrocities

The United States, meanwhile, has an uneven record of recognizing genocide, though it has deplored mass atrocities in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, often perpetrated in the context of civil wars. For example, the United States imposed financial sanctions on individuals and entities in response to mass killings by the regimes of Prime Minister Pol Pot in Cambodia and President Idi Amin in Uganda in the 1970s, even though the State Department did not recognize the killings as genocide. Since the end of the Cold War, the US State Department has made statements that genocide has occurred regarding at least five distinct situations: Bosnia (1993), Rwanda (1994), Iraq (1995), Darfur (2004), and areas under the control of ISIL (2016 and 2017). The situation in Xinjiang, China, is the latest to be added to this list.

The table records economic sanctions in eight cases officially recognized or discussed by the State Department as genocide. In the remaining seven genocide cases, economic sanctions were imposed to achieve broader humanitarian goals, as noted above, or the atrocities were not discussed or officially designated as genocide. (The sanctions against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and its nuclear program between 1990 and 2003 were not specific to the Kurdish genocide, though the State Department officially recognized it as such in 1995.)

Outcomes in genocide cases are scored following our methodology in Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition (Hufbauer et al. 2009). In five cases where sanctions were imposed, the outcome was scored as successful (a score of 9 or higher). Outcomes were scored as less successful in the remaining seven cases where sanctions were imposed (a score of 8 or lower). When sanctions are combined with military measures, the military dimension may be decisive. Successful campaigns against Yugoslavia and ISIL involved significant military action. In six cases, humanitarian goals went alongside US efforts to destabilize the regime or to end the war: President Idi Amin in Uganda, Prime Minister Pol Pot in Cambodia, President Siad Barre in Somalia, President Slobodan Milošević in Serbia, President Omar al-Bashir in Sudan, and ISIL in Iraq. Sanctions against Myanmar also have a regime change goal (Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and his military associates).

As noted earlier, the United States has not to this date sanctioned Myanmar for the Rohingya genocide, but in March President Biden issued an executive order to impose sanctions against 12 military officers, including Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, responsible for the Myanmar military coup.

Unlike other instances of genocide, Chinese repression of the Uyghur minority appears not to entail mass killings but rather “reeducation,” resettlement, and kindred measures to fit the Uyghur people into Chinese cultural norms. Nevertheless, two US Secretaries of State, Mike Pompeo and Antony J. Blinken, have proclaimed human rights abuses against the Uyghur people as genocide. US financial sanctions have been specifically imposed against two Chinese officials and a firm directly responsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang. Following almost unanimous passage in the US House of Representatives in 2020, the Senate is now considering the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. The act presumes that goods originating in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region are the product of forced labor and bans their importation, unless proven otherwise. Similar restrictions have already been enforced, under existing legislation, by US Customs and Border Protection.

The European Union’s sanctions against the persecution of Uyghur Muslims opened the door for President Biden to work with allies to mount economic and legal pressure on Myanmar and China. Countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are highly reluctant to punish fellow member Myanmar, and countries worldwide are reluctant to offend China. Hence, the United States should continue to work with Western allies to coordinate economic pressure and consider taking the persecution of the Rohingya and Uyghur people to the International Court of Justice.

To read the original report from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, please click here 

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“As Party Secretary and Political commissar of the XPCC since 2020, Wang Junzheng is involved in overseeing all policies implemented by the XPCC. In this position, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief, linked, inter alia, to the XPCC’s implementation of a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.

“He is also responsible for the XPCC’s systematic use of Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities as a forced workforce, in particular in cotton fields. As Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the XUAR since 2020, Wang Junzheng is involved in overseeing all the security policies implemented in Xinjiang, including the aforementioned programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. As Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR (February 2019 to September 2020), Wang Junzheng was responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he held a key political position in charge of overseeing and implementing the aforementioned programme.”

On the same day, the United States, United Kingdom and Canada issued a joint statement announcing sanctions on individuals and/or an entity in China involved with the alleged human rights abuses of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. See U.S. Department of State press release, Joint Statement on Xinjiang, March 22, 2021, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-xinjiang/. The body of the joint message is copied below.

“We, the Foreign Ministers of Canada and the United Kingdom, and the United States Secretary of State, are united in our deep and ongoing concern regarding China’s human rights violations and abuses in Xinjiang. The evidence, including from the Chinese Government’s own documents, satellite imagery, and eyewitness testimony is overwhelming. China’s extensive program of repression includes severe restrictions on religious freedoms, the use of forced labour, mass detention in internment camps, forced sterilisations, and the concerted destruction of Uyghur heritage.

“Today, we have taken coordinated action on measures, in parallel to measures by the European Union, that send a clear message about the human rights violations and abuses in Xinjiang. We are united in calling for China to end its repressive practices against Uyghur Muslims and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang, and to release those arbitrarily detained.

“We underline the importance of transparency and accountability and call on China to grant the international community, including independent investigators from the United Nations, journalists, and foreign diplomats, unhindered access to Xinjiang.

“We will continue to stand together to shine a spotlight on China’s human rights violations. We stand united and call for justice for those suffering in Xinjiang.”

Australia and New Zealand, while not imposing sanctions themselves, added their voices of concern over the alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang of the Uyghurs. See Minister of Foreign Affairs Australia, Joint statement on Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang, 23 March 2021, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/joint-statement-human-rights-abuses-xinjiang. The Joint Statement is copied below.

“The Australian and New Zealand Governments today reiterate their grave concerns about the growing number of credible reports of severe human rights abuses against ethnic Uighurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.

“In particular, there is clear evidence of severe human rights abuses that include restrictions on freedom of religion, mass surveillance, large-scale extra-judicial detentions, as well as forced labour and forced birth control, including sterilisation.

“Australia and New Zealand welcome the measures announced overnight by Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. We share these countries’ deep concerns, which are held across the Australian and New Zealand communities.

“Since 2018, when reports began to emerge about the detention camps in Xinjiang, Australia and New Zealand have consistently called on China in the United Nations to respect bodog casino the human rights of the Uighur people, and other religious and ethnic minorities.

“Today, we underscore the importance of transparency and accountability, and reiterate our call on China to grant meaningful and unfettered access to Xinjiang for United Nations experts, and other independent observers.”

While China argues that their treatment of the Uyghurs is an internal matter, the allegations of serious human rights abuses have raised widespread international condemnation and increasing use of sanctions. The sanctions, however, typically are limited to freezing assets (if any) of individuals or entities in the sanctioning country, banning travel to the country imposing the sanctioning, etc.

Trade Implications

While allegations of human rights violations do not necessarily carry trade distortion implications, the case of the forced labor of Uighurs in Xinjiang clearly does. Xinjiang produces some 80% of the cotton grown in China, much of it produced by forced labor according to reports. As China is a major producer of textile and apparel products and a major exporter of the same, the distortions in trade flows should be obvious. Foreign cotton will have trouble competing in China with cotton produced with forced labor. Garment producers who don’t use the Chinese cotton will face distortions as competing against garments where a significant input has been obtained at artificially low prices. Some countries (e.g., the United States and Canada) have laws which permit them to prevent imports of products made with forced labor, although the breadth of the actions taken to date are typically quite limited.

In prior posts, I looked at the large number of products produced around the world with forced labor or with child labor and also looked specifically at the Chinese treatment of the Uyghurs reviewing a number of publications and reports. See Child labor and forced labor in cotton production — is there a current WTO mandate to identify and quantify the distortive effects?, January 25, 2021, ttps://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/25/child-labor-and-forced-labor-in-cotton-production-is-there-a-current-wto-mandate-to-identify-and-quantify-the-distortive-effects/ ; Forced labor and child labor — a continued major distortion in international trade for some products, January 24, 2021, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/24/forced-labor-and-child-labor-a-continued-major-distortion-in-international-trade-for-some-products/.

To ramp up pressure on China to reform its treatment of the Uyghurs, the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and all other countries concerned about the human rights should coordinate a broad-based denial of imports from China or from other countries where cotton from Xinjiang is part of the product until such time as the treatment of the Uyghurs has been corrected.

To read the original blog post from Terrence Stewart’s Current Thoughts On Trade, please click here

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The global audit profession has grown to include large testing and monitoring firms, specialized companies, industry associations, certification programs of all types, multi-stakeholder not-for-profit initiatives, and even the U.N.’s International Labor Organization. No doubt tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of “social” audits are done annually at a cost of billions of dollars. Most audits follow a similar framework of reviewing an operation against a checklist of standards and issuing recommendations for corrective actions.

Much effort is made by providers to differentiate their audit offerings and approaches in the marketplace — but there is probably more that is similar than different in the services offered. It is, after all, a mature, established industry.

But the recent concern about human rights violations in Xinjiang is in the process of disrupting the audit industry.

The Xinjiang issue includes the broadly researched and reported allegations of forced labor imposed by the Chinese Communist Party on Uyghurs and ethnic Kazaks and Kyrgyz in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The program of forced labor is, among other things, designed to separate these populations from the Muslim religion and the ethnic identity linked to regional nationalism that the CCP finds threatening, and thereby reduce the attendant risk of violent resistance and terrorism.

The program of ethnic suppression involves heavy state control of the population, including sophisticated and invasive monitoring and the type of police presence required to implement such a policy. Human rights violations in Xinjiang have led to a series of sanctions from the Trump administration involving restrictions on technology exports to entities involved in the surveillance program, the blocking of imports tied to forced labor, and prohibitions on transactions with the state-run Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), which is broadly linked to economic and political activity in the XUAR – including the documented human rights violations.

Some sanctions preceded and others followed the release by the U.S. government on July 1 of the “Xinjiang Business Supply Chain Advisory.” This extraordinary document issued by four Cabinet secretaries, including for the Departments of State, Commerce, Treasury and Homeland Security, is framed as a “warning” to U.S. businesses:

Businesses with potential exposure in their supply chain to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang) or to facilities outside Xinjiang that use labor or goods from Xinjiang should be aware of the reputational, economic, and legal risks of involvement with entities that engage in human rights abuses, including but not limited to forced labor in the manufacture of goods intended for domestic and international distribution.

The risk identified regards both sourcing within Xinjiang, and also to facilities outside Xinjiang that use labor or goods from the region.

When it comes to what businesses should do about this risk, according to the U.S. government they need to undertake “human rights due diligence:”

Businesses with supply chain exposure to entities involved in human rights abuses in Xinjiang or the use of forced labor in Xinjiang should be aware of the risks outlined in this advisory and should implement human rights-related due diligence policies and procedures.

Such due diligence is implemented by the private sector significantly through the audit process. But the advisory also warns:

Third-party audits alone may not be a credible source of information for indicators of labor abuses for the following reasons:

• Auditors have reportedly been detained, harassed, threatened, or stopped at the airport.
• Auditors may be required to use a government translator who conveys misinformation or does not speak in workers’ first language.
• Auditor interviews with workers cannot be relied upon given the pervasive surveillance, and evidence of workers’ fear of sharing accurate information.

In other fora, U.S. officials have been even more explicit that in Xinjiang, audits, a primary due diligence tool and one widely relied upon, are not credible.

A bill recently passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in a 406-3 vote which would require U.S. Customs and Border Protection to bar all imports connected to Xinjiang as tainted by forced labor, absent compelling evidence to the contrary, also states that audits in Xinjiang are unreliable.

As if to validate the government’s position, the Wall Street Journal published a story confirming key firms in the global audit industry will no longer work in Xinjiang. Large inspection companies, including Bureau Veritas, TÜV SÜD, and smaller specialized certification operations such as WRAP (Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production) – all of which previously undertook audits in the XUAR — will no longer do so. It is almost certain that other international audit firms have already or will soon take the same position.

The end of audits in Xinjiang also raises other questions.

If audit firms cannot credibly audit in Xinjiang, can they credibly audit for Uyghur forced labor elsewhere in China? And if not, can they actually credibly audit in China at all?

At a time when human rights supply chain due diligence requirements are being increasingly (and legally) imposed upon the private sector, the situation in Xinjiang could have far wider consequences for the existing audit paradigm.

Andrew Samet has worked on international trade policy for four decades, including in the U.S. Senate, the Clinton administration, and as a consultant and lawyer.

To read the original post, please click here.

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With the steps many countries have taken to limit the spread of the COVID-19, there has been enormous economic pain incurred by most countires, with tens of millions of people in countries temporarily unemployed, schools closed, food distribution disrupted with the closure of restaurants which constitute a large part of food shipped from processing plants and farms.

The UN, World Bank and others have projected huge increases in the number of people pushed into extreme poverty because of the effects flowing from the pandemic. Extreme poverty brings with it food security issues as people suffering extreme poverty don’t have the means to procure basic food needs.

The United Nation’s World Food Programme (WFP) has long been involved in helping address food security needs around the world. In the COVID-19 pandemic, the WFP is mobilizing to provide assistance to some 138 million people in 83 countries. With most countries occupied with dealing with the needs of their own populations, countries and private citizens have been slow to respond to the humanitarian challenges facing so many around the world. The WFP has appealed for US$4.9 billion to let them perform their stepped up function during COVID-19 through the end of 2020. As of August 6, they had received only 9 percent of what they need, $US440 million.

The WFP during the pandemic has been involved in facilitating services by many NGOs and international organizations. For example, “Over 16,500 health and humanitarian personnel from 288 organizations have now been transported to destinations throughout Africa, Asia, the Middle East and the Commonwealth of Independent States countries by WFP’s air passenger service since its launch on 1 May. 53 destinations are now being served, with approximately 2,500 passengers using WFP’s service per week.” WFP, COVID-19, Level 3 Emergency, External Situation Report #12 (6 August 2020)(emphasis in original). The latest situation report is embedded below and reviews the wide array of services provided as well a review of some of the countries with acute needs. It also provides a link to contribute to the WFP.

The External Situation Report indicates that there are 27 countries (based on an FAO-WFP hotspot analysis) which “are at risk of significant food security deterioration in the next six months”. (page 2). Countries at risk are Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Burkina Faso, Mali, the Niger, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Sudan, South Sudan, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Yemen, Ethiopia, Iraq, Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan and Bangladesh (total is 31, though Peru, Ecuador, Colombia appear to be at a lower level of risk based on coloration used on page 2). FAO – WFP early warning analsyis of acute food insecurity hotspots, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000117706/download/.

Where is the food aid?

For many countries, agricultural production has remained reasonably strong but large volumes of agricultural products have been destroyed based on lack of domestic markets, typically flowing from the collapse of the restaurant trade and the challenges in redirecting product, packaging and labeling into retail channels. See, e.g., New York Times, April 11, 2020, Dumped Milk, Smashed Eggs, Plowed Vegetables: Food Waste of the Pandemic, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/business/coronavirus-destroying-food.html.

At the same time, there have been huge increases in internal-country demand for help from food banks in some countries. See, e.g., for the United States: Feeding America, The first months of the food bank response to COVID, by the numbers, https://www.feedingamerica.org/hunger-blog/first-months-food-bank-response-covid-numbers.

It would seem that coordinated action by major agricultural goods producers in the WTO with the WFP and other groups should be able to provide large quantities of agricultural goods bodog poker review to those in need globally in the remaining months of 2020, goods which might otherwise simply be destroyed.

Similarly, while all countries are financially stretched during the pandemic, helping WFP obtain the needed financial resources to provide a coordinated pledging event should be of interest to WTO Members and many of the multilateral organizations working on COVID responses, as well as the business community and the general public.

While the WTO has grappled with limiting/eliminating export subsidies for agricultural goods, the WTO has always recognized the need to maintain the flow of humanitarian need particularly in agricultural goods. Consider these paragraphs from the 2015 Nairobi Ministerial Conference Decision on Export Competition (WT/MIN(15)45, WT/L/980 (21 Dec. 2015) at 6-7):

“International Food Aid

“22. Members reaffirm their commitment to maintain an adequate level of international food aid, to take account of the interests of food aid recipients and to ensure that the disciplines contained hereafter do not unintentionally impede the delivery of food aid provided to deal with emergency situations. To meet the objective of preventing or minimizing commercial displacement, Members shall ensure that international food aid
is provided in full conformity with the disciplines specified in paragraphs 23 to 32, thereby contributing to the objective of preventing commercial displacement.

“23. Members shall ensure that all international food aid is:

“a. needs-driven;

“b. in fully grant form;

“c. not tied directly or indirectly to commercial exports of agricultural products or other goods and services;

“d. not linked to the market development objectives of donor Members;
and that

“e. agricultural products provided as international food aid shall not be re-exported in any form, except where the agricultural products were not permitted entry into the recipient country, the agricultural products were determined inappropriate or no longer needed for the purpose for which they were received in the recipient country, or re-exportation is necessary for logistical reasons to expedite the provision of food aid for another country in an emergency situation. Any reexportation in accordance with this subparagraph shall be conducted in a manner that does not unduly impact established, functioning commercial markets of agricultural commodities in the countries to which the food aid is re-exported.

“24. The provision of food aid shall take into account local market conditions of the same or substitute products. Members shall refrain from providing in-kind international food aid in situations where this would be reasonably foreseen to cause an adverse effect on local13 or regional production of the same or substitute products. In addition, Members shall ensure that international food aid does not unduly impact established, functioning commercial markets of agricultural commodities.

“25. Where Members provide exclusively cash-based food aid, they are encouraged to continue to do so. Other Members are encouraged to provide cash-based or in-kind international food aid in emergency situations, protracted crises (as defined by the FAO14), or non-emergency development/capacity building food assistance environments where recipient countries or recognized international humanitarian/food entities, such as the United Nations, have requested food assistance.

“26. Members are also encouraged to seek to increasingly procure international food aid from local or regional sources to the extent possible, provided that the availability and prices of basic foodstuffs in these markets are not unduly compromised.

“27. Members shall monetize international food aid only where there is a demonstrable need for monetization for the purpose of transport and delivery of the food assistance, or the monetization of international food aid is used to redress short and/or long term food deficit requirements or insufficient agricultural production situations which give rise to chronic hunger and malnutrition in least-developed and net food-importing developing countries.

“28. Local or regional market analysis shall be completed before monetization occurs for all monetized international food aid, including consideration of the recipient country’s nutritional needs, local United Nations Agencies’ market data and normal import and consumption levels of the commodity to be monetized, and consistent with Food Assistance Convention reporting. Independent third party commercial or non-profit entities will be employed to monetize in-kind international food aid to ensure open market competition for the sale of in-kind international food aid.

“29. In employing these independent third party commercial or non-profit entities for the purposes of the preceding paragraph, Members shall ensure that such entities minimize or eliminate disruptions to the local or regional markets, which may include impacts on production, when international food aid is monetized. They shall ensure that the sale of commodities for food assistance purposes is conducted in a transparent, competitive and open process and through a public tender.

“30. Members commit to allowing maximum flexibility to provide for all types of international food aid in order to maintain needed levels while making efforts to move toward more untied cash-based international food aid in accordance with the Food Assistance Convention.

“31. Members recognize the role of government in decision-making on international food aid in their jurisdictions. Members recognize that the government of a recipient country of international food aid can opt out of the usage of monetized international food aid.

“32. Members agree to review the provisions on international food aid contained in the preceding paragraphs within the regular Committee on Agriculture monitoring of the implementation of the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision of April 1994 on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-developed and net food-importing developing countries.

“13 The term ‘local’ may be understood to mean at the national or subnational level.

“14 FAO defines protracted crises as follows: ‘Protracted crises refer to situations in which a significant portion of a population is facing a heightened risk of death, disease, and breakdown of their livelihoods.’

“15 Belize, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Ecuador, Fiji, Guatemala, Guyana, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea and Suriname shall also have access to this provision.

“16 In the instance where it is not feasible to complete a sale through a public tender, a negotiated sale can be used.”

It is believed that the current WTO provisions on food aid should not pose hurdles to countries providing in kind aid where there are needed food products that can be exported during the pandemic. If that is not the case, then the WTO Members should agree to a temporary waiver of relevant restrictions to permit food aid during the pandemic.

There has been much discussion within the G20, WTO, WHO and other groups that collective action on the medical front is critical to see that medical goods, vaccines, are therapeutics are available equitably and at affordable prices. What one hasn’t seen is the same focus on ensuring that the world’ populations have access to food equitably and at affordable prices. During the pandemic, WTO Members have the opportunity to work together to see that food is not wasted and that food aid is supplemented to the extent possible to alleviate the unique challenges to food security presented by the COVID-19 pandemic.

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The expansion of international trade is essential to development and poverty reduction. To meet the UN’s first Sustainable Development Goal – “no poverty” – we must reduce trade barriers, especially for the world’s poorest.

One of the most efficient ways to sustainably reduce poverty globally and promote shared prosperity is to identify ways by which responsible, accelerated and affordable digitisation can facilitate global trade.

In addition to reducing trade barriers and expanding GDP, digitisation is one of the most economically attractive, and fastest, ways to end poverty. The most effective path to digitisation of global trade is for incumbents in the logistics industry to collaborate to realize five Logistic Internets.

This will lead to substantial business benefits, through increasing global trade, trade-related efficiencies and reduced costs. It will reduce poverty, too, as more trade and greater efficiencies lead to higher welfare and GDP along with fewer administrative costs.

The solution: 5 Logistic Internets

A “Logistic Internet” extends the current Internet with foundational, logistics-specific features. It’s commercially, politically and competitively neutral. The purpose is to replace the current one-to-one connection with an Internet-like paradigm of connect once, then share with everyone, everywhere.

Anyone can innovate and build value-adding services on top of Logistic Internets, thereby increasing the innovative capability within logistics. And once created, a service can immediately be used everywhere – the way a homepage is available for any browser, or an app is available for all iPhones.

Logistic Internet #1: Global Trade Identity (GTID)

The World Economic Forum recommended a shared digital Global Trade Identity (GTID) for businesses and governments. This will be a foundational component in digital business ecosystems. It removes barriers to digital cross-border interoperability and eliminates the hidden costs of everyone managing multiple digital identities.

A digital identity is essential. It ensures you know who you are interacting with through authentication (“Who are you?”) and authorisation (“What are you allowed to do?”)

The corresponding digital signature also ensures integrity in signing digital transactions, by providing:

• Confidentiality. Only the parties involved can see the transaction.
• Non-repudiation. You cannot later deny participation in the transaction.
• Tamper-resistance. A signed transaction is impossible to change.

Logistic Internet #2: Shared Visibility (SV)

Optimising the business eco-system is the central philosophy behind digitisation – and the purpose of shared visibility (SV). SV gives everyone in the ecosystem access to the necessary logistics information in order to make decisions to benefit the entire ecosystem.

SV will digitally connect actors in a standardized way. It enables any number of actors to be dynamically added to or removed from a business ecosystem, while still receiving the same quality and consistency of information digitally and in real-time, which can guide individual decisions.

SV mitigates the increased complexity of the business ecosystem as digital connections increase. SV allows ecosystems to be adjusted fluidly and dynamically without compromising the quality and timeliness of information.

Logistic Internet #3: Port Call Optimisation (PCO)

Port Call Optimisation, or PCO, addresses the fact that cargo vessels spend between just 60% and 70% of their port time at a berth. And port call operations involve a substantial number of actors, who are often not familiar with other actors’ activities.

PCO facilitates the delivery of port call events (or, timestamps) in real-time to authorised entities, to maximize efficiency and reduce lead time. This will improve efficiency and reduce costs end to end.

All actors involved in a port call share intentions and activities via the PCO, and thereby facilitate shared situational awareness among port operators. This makes it possible for all actors to predict when and where movements and services will be conducted, enabling just-in-time operations and coordinating movements and operations.

It’s likely this could address inefficiencies amounting to more than $5 billion, due to reduced use of fuel as vessels can speed optimally, as well as better utilisation of expensive assets by reducing idling time for all actors.

Logistic Internet #4: Financial Flow (FF)

Handling financial flows in global trade is costly. Typically, there are several intermediaries between the actual payer and the receiver, requiring lots of paper and long processing times.

The emergence of blockchain and the programmability of cryptocurrencies has showed it’s possible to safely transfer payments globally without intermediaries while reducing processing time – eliminating the use of paper and saving money.

Digital currencies will likely be realized as Central Bank Issued Digital Currencies (CBDC), which will inherit the possibility of being programmed from cryptocurrencies, enabling FF to trigger commercial actions automatically based on defined criteria.

Lack of access to trade finance is a major obstacle to trade for 66% exporters in Africa. The digitisation of financial flows enables easier access to trade finance in developing countries, thereby reducing trade barriers.

Logistic Internet #5: Customs Cross Border Interoperability (CCBI)

Single Window implementers have realized enabling a single point of data submission at the national level only partially meets the requirements of an international supply chain.

Despite the successful implementation of paperless (or mostly paperless) trading using a Single Window at the national level, many physical documents continue to be generated to fulfil the requirements of trading partners, counterparts and authorities across international borders.

UNECE says to maximize the benefits of a national Single Window, coverage should be extended to include cross-border electronic data exchange of all information.

CCBI would allow any permits, licenses, certificates etc. to be shared digitally with any customs authority around the world. CCBI is a foundational step toward eliminating paper documents in global trade by facilitating generic digital interoperability of government-to-government interactions on a global scale.

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We are rediscovering an idea that was obvious to the framers of the post-World War II international legal order: there is a connection between human rights (including the equal rights of women), stable economic and social progress, and global peace and security. International human rights and international trade law sprang from a coherent desire to establish the social, political and economic pillars that would foster global peace and prosperity.

Today, that post-war understanding is coming to fruition: the SDGs, Canada’s progressive trade agenda and the Joint Declaration on Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment recognize this connection and provide new opportunities for concerted action. But getting to this point of reunion was not easy, given that trade and gender rights born from the same idea — the 1945 Charter of the United Nations — were separated shortly after birth.

Women’s equality to men was a foundational principle of the charter. Its preamble even begins with “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war…and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women.”

Article 1, which listed the purposes of the United Nations, includes the mission to “achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”

Article 55 of the charter, entitled “International Economic and Social Co-operation,” reiterated the goal of creating “conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations,” and stated “the United Nations shall promote: a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”

By 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was produced, thanks to negotiations focused on trade and employment that were launched under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council. With the failure of the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization — which, had it succeeded, might have kept the links between social and economic development — the GATT survived to establish a system for “the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis.”

In 1995, this was incorporated into the GATT’s successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). Human rights are not mentioned in the GATT or WTO agreements and have not been raised in WTO dispute-settlement proceedings.

Just as international trade law was developing in its own silo, so was international human rights law. The UN charter’s preambular language on “the equal rights of men and women” was reiterated in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 1 proclaims that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”, and article 2 declares that “everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as…sex.”

Subsequently, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights completed the International Bill of Human Rights, which came into force in 1976. This progression further developed the principles enunciated in the universal declaration and affirmed that the rights set forth applied to men and women.

Cold War polarization contributed to an ideological divide in international human rights. Western liberal states emphasized the importance of civil and political rights, while socialist and communist states emphasized the value of economic, social and cultural rights. The Commission on the Status of Women, which began its work in 1948, advanced women’s rights through development of additional specific legal instruments, the most notable being the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

Having begun in the common, inclusive vision of the UN charter, international trade law and human rights law evolved separately and independently, allowing for the development of tailored institutions, and a deepening of understanding and expertise in each area. As the pace of globalization accelerates, however, their continued isolation from each other can be seen to be an impediment to achieving sustainable development for all.

A growing realization that mobile capital and transnational corporations may have been the biggest winners of international trade has led to questions about the legitimacy of international trade deals. Increasing frustration about who gets the benefits of trade and who is saddled with its negative effects helped fuel populist rejection of globalized trade in the Brexit referendum vote and the Trump presidential election.

While the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the WTO reported recently that trade leads to productivity gains and significant benefits for consumers, especially the poor, they also acknowledged that states need to do more to address the negative impacts of trade behind the border.

The extent to which trade promotes equality within a country and between countries has become a crucial question regarding the legitimacy of the international economic legal order.

As a nation that benefits from a stable rules-based international order, Canada has responded to these trends by starting to articulate an “inclusive” or “progressive” trade agenda aimed at promoting development and spreading the benefits of trade to “the middle class and those striving to join it.” Further, the Canadian trade agenda is meant to support “gender equality, environmental sustainability and…the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises.”

Currently, Canada is promoting this agenda in multilateral and bilateral fora. A gender chapter providing a framework for cooperation on gender issues appeared in the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, and Canada has proposed a similar inclusion in the renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement.

While the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the European Union and Canada includes only minor references to gender, Canada announced that the renegotiated Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (formerly the Trans-Pacific Partnership), includes a new preamble with important progressive elements, including promoting gender equality.

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