Although positively received by a wide range of countries which recognize the potential economic and social benefits of enabling a greater cross-border flow of data, it is not easy to introduce common legal frameworks to ensure DFFT. Countries often have varied domestic and regional legal frameworks due to different concepts of privacy or data security.

The G7 did put digital policy at the centre of its 2021 agenda, discussing broad digital and technology shifts from physical infrastructure such as 5G, future communication technologies, and technical standards to soft infrastructure, such as rule-making on data flow and internet safety principles. And one notable outcome was the establishment of the G7 Roadmap for Cooperation on Data Free Flow with Trust at the G7 Digital and Technology Ministers’ meeting in April 2021 – also endorsed by two of the G7’s guest countries South Korea and Australia.

But despite shared democratic values of open and competitive markets, strong safeguards for human rights, and fundamental freedoms, the G7 and its partners have different ideas on how best to approach DFFT, and so greater UK-EU-Japan policy coordination to overcome any inconsistencies in approach can play a key role.

UK using soft power

Brexit gave the UK an opportunity to refresh its approach to DFFT, having previously adhered to the European Union (EU) general data protection regulation (GDPR). The UK’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy has since set out a number of priority actions, such as promotion of the international flow of data to enable secure, trusted, and interoperable exchange across borders.

The UK is clearly trying to use its ‘soft power’ by establishing regulatory influence – as well as including data flows in trade deals, it is making ‘adequacy decisions’ with priority countries deemed to have suitable and robust safeguards of data. The UK-Japan comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA) – the UK’s first post-Brexit trade deal – includes bans on unjustified restrictions of cross-border electronic information transfers for business purposes, and on unjustified requirements to use or locate computing facilities in the countries in which business is conducted (this is known as ‘data localization’, a barrier to the free cross-border flow of data).

These changes mark a huge step-up from the arrangements made under the earlier EU-Japan trade deal, but it remains to be seen how the UK will adopt DFFT frameworks with broader trade partners in Asia, including via the CPTPP.

The G7 Roadmap – which the UK will lead – aims to deliver tangible outcomes on digital policy while being mindful of harmonization with the efforts of other international forums such as the G20 and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). But if the UK coordinates this harmonization effectively, expect the global formation of a DFFT area to expand dramatically.

Japan’s contribution to DFFT

Japan is another key leader of DFFT and it maintains a rigorous domestic personal data protection and privacy framework which the EU, with its own privacy protection regime considered the toughest in the world, recognizes as adequate to allow data sharing between the two parties.

Japan has also expanded its area of free data flow through trade agreements, incorporating similar provisions to those of the UK-Japan CEPA in the Japan-US digital trade agreement and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – the world’s largest free trade bloc of which Japan is a member – has also introduced frameworks for the free flow of data and a ban on data localization, but these frameworks are not as rigorous as those Japan has agreed elsewhere. Implementing parties may decide to ban data flow or enable data localization in exceptional circumstances that other parties are not allowed to dispute – this has generated concern over potential deviations from the original aims of the DFFT framework.

More broadly, there is also often ambiguity over what actually constitutes international standards and principles on data protection which can result in the implementation of slightly different legal frameworks between agreements. For Japan, the ability to set common frameworks with some flexibility has contributed to its engagement with a wider range of parties, including China, in the field of free data flow. But the development of truly common international standards on data protection remains imperative and the challenge of how best this can be advanced through discussion in the international arena continues.

Outside of trade deals, Japan participates in APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR), a government-backed data privacy certification which companies can join to demonstrate compliance with internationally-recognized data privacy protections. The CBPR System implements the APEC Privacy Frameworkendorsed by APEC Leaders in 2005 and updated in 2015.

EU’s rigorous GDPR protection

The EU has supported the UK in leading the G7 to a consensus on international rule-making regarding free flow of data. Using its rigorous GDPR, the EU has cautiously examined the legal frameworks of each of its trade partners and, where necessary, required additional reinforcements to ensure their laws reach a similar level.

So far the EU recognizes only 14 countries – including Japan – as providing adequate protections, although it is in the process of finalizing arrangements with South Korea and the UK. Although this approach secures the same level of protection as cross-border data flow, it takes a much longer path to realize the free flow of data.

The EU-US privacy shield adopted in July 2016 provides another path for transferring data between the two economies as it allows the free transfer of data to any companies certified in the US which adhere to the Privacy Shield Principles issued by US Department of Commerce. The advantage is this does not require reform to the entire legal system but is still able to maintain a level of privacy protection acceptable to the EU.

However, in its judgment of 16 July 2020 the European Court of Justice ruled the Privacy Shield invalid, underscoring the EU’s strict approach to personal data protection and the protection of individual rights. This has created barriers to data transfer between the EU and US which carry important consequences not only for trade but also for law enforcement and national security, and the US hopes to consult with the EU about this.

Despite differences in approach between the UK, EU, and Japan, they do share a common view that data can harness economic prosperity in a digital society. Ultimately the goal is to propose a set of packages to enable secure cross-border free flow of data, including considerations of how it can be regulated in practice across trade and other agreements.

It could be worth examining whether an APEC CBPR-type mechanism could be applicable to Europe. Although not an easy task – particularly given restrictions faced by the EU – increased UK-EU-Japan policy coordination could help identify a realistic balance between free data flow and privacy protection. Collectively, they are capable of creating innovative mechanisms to enable the world to realise DFFT much more quickly and securely.

Hiroki Sekine is visiting fellow with the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House. He was director of the policy and strategy office for financial operations at JBIC from July 2016 until June 2019 and, most recently, senior advisor to the corporate planning department at the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC).

To read the full commentary from Chatham House, please click here.

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The news headlines homed in on one aspect of the joint statement that urged China to respect the autonomy and human rights in Hong Kong and the situation in Xinjiang. There was also unprecedented support for stability across the Taiwan Strait – which China immediately denounced as illegal meddling with its internal affairs. President Biden may have failed to rally France and Germany into the jihad against China. But the statement has entrenched the two deeper regardless.

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Known associates of China sometimes like to challenge the “legitimacy” of G7. Other fellow Brussels pundits probably don’t share Beijing’s actual concern about G7, which is that China is not a member. Instead, critics point to the lack of “purpose” of G7 or its lack of efficacy, especially compared to the more technically oriented G20.

The criticism against G7 disregards how the two summits serve very different purposes: G7 of today is effectively a like-minded group that shares a history, yet not all the strategies going forward. In contrast, G20 is a policy coordination mechanism between the principal regional powers, where its members merely share a common aversion against tumbling backwards. And neither G7 nor G20 is very effective at what they do. But are there any viable alternatives? bodog poker review It would be a return to G2, to which Europe and Japan won’t be invited.

Yet, China’s systemic challenge is just one tent peg that grounds the big tent of the alliance. Still, the China peg determines how far the other pegs can stretch the fabric. A tech divide evidently continues to spook the seven countries. At the digital ministers’ meeting in late April, the US and its allies called for a reference on 5G vendor diversity in the summit conclusion but failed. Japan and the US had already pledged $4.5 billion towards developing indigenous alternatives although their home markets were already free from Chinese suppliers. The US Senate also tabled the Endless Frontier Act (later merged into the US Innovation and Competition Act) to promote a consortium of US and Chinese market entrants by displacing European and Korean 5G vendors. These proposals may not meet the non-discriminatory requirements on subsidies and technical standards laid down under the WTO.

Similarly, the US resists EU regulations against US platforms and online services using arbitrary thresholds that single out Silicon Valley. In other words, digital markets divide the G7 between those who want vendor diversity in technologies where Europe happens to be leading, yet not in online platforms where the US happens to be dominant – or vice versa. Instead, the final G7 leaders’ communique reiterates the need for “transparency, the openness of process and participation, relevance, and consensus-based decision-making” in line with referenced WTO agreements. The US-led Open RAN Alliance is unlikely to meet any of these criteria.

But at its best, G7 is a preparatory meeting before a global consensus, similar to how APEC served that role before some WTO ministerials. That is how G7 as a likeminded group (arguably more homogeneous than APEC) exert its influence. For example, the conflict over corporate taxation of services (unfairly epitomised as “digital tax”) approach its end with a compromise of a 15% minimum tax floor and a split of the tax revenues between destination and home jurisdictions. There’s still a great deal of strategic ambiguity left: Some countries might continue their tax deductions on intangibles or decide to go after small businesses. Just imagine a mom-pop shop or a freelance architect paying corporate taxes in every country where their clients reside. Some will surely ignore the G7 consensus outright.

From Cornwall to Brussels

In a time of geopolitical gambits, intense lobbying and renewed interest in industrial policy, there are plenty of temptations and disagreements on both sides of the Atlantic. The truce on the Airbus-Boeing dispute may not herald a new transatlantic era, if it means that every window in the glasshouse has been broken and all legal remedies are exhausted. The only option that now remains is to forgive ourselves our common sins.

Then there is the small matter of ending Section 232 measures on steel, which remains a sacred goal for the German stakeholders. Ending the tariffs is also an exorcising ritual that Merkel needs to love America again. But lifting the 232s remains a political risk for the Biden-Harris administration – at least until it secures its second term. Applying pressure through EU tariff retaliation against the swing states (merely helping the Republicans) or carbon tariffs are arguably just self-harming.

The truth is that Europe and America continue to be antagonists in their own right. But unlike Beijing, Brussels wields a formidable soft power that legitimises tech policies in other countries that are hostile to US industrial interests, while the US has billions of Federal funds for industrial policies its disposal. Just like the Airbus-Boeing conflict – services tax, platform regulations, or illegal 5G subsidies are transatlantic issues we bring to the OECD, WTO, G7 or G20 for collateral damage. A cynic might say that the EU and the US should spare the rest of the world of their transatlantic champagne problems.

In that regard, the bilateral Trade and Tech Council seems like a natural progression and a deliverable worthy of an EU-US summit. But we should not forget that much of the regulatory coordination was already taking place, discretely at technical levels in areas like export control, third-country trade or standardisation. TTC trace its origins with other similar ideas to the final days of the Trump administration. But if the intention is to triangulate against harmful third country practices, one might argue that some partners, some of who hold critical leverages against China, went missing along the way.

Also, institutionalising that bilateral dialogue is not entirely risk-free. Publicity creates an incentive for blame games, where one accuses the other of not “engaging seriously” and melodramatic walk-outs, just because the other side happens to disagree. Like its predecessors – TEC and TTIP – TTC will attract lobbyists, NGOs, and others with no genuine interests in transatlantic mechanisms. Instead, they are merely trying to lobby for new domestic rules through the backdoor.

Hosuk Lee-Makiyama is the director of European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) and a leading author on trade diplomacy, EU-Far East relations and the digital economy.

To read the original commentary from The European Centre for International Political Economy, please visit here

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The latest development in the effort to change global corporate tax rules came in June in London. It occurred in separate sessions where Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and later President Joseph R. Biden Jr. joined with other Group of 7 (G7) leaders to establish an “historic” deal to redesign the world tax system. Their next task is to present the deal to the full complement of G20 countries in Venice in July. After that session the deal goes before the 135 countries that have participated from a distance in the tax talks sponsored by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). There the deal may encounter rough patches with several dozen small countries heavily invested in the status quo.   

The OECD’s “Inclusive Framework” project rests on two goals. The first (called “Pillar One”) calls for big corporations, especially the digital giants, to pay some form of tax to the countries where they market or sell their goods and services. “Pillar Two” would entail an agreement on a global minimum 15 percent corporate tax rate for corporations established in each country.  Pillar Two will not require any increase in G7 tax rates because they are already at 15 percent or higher. Nor will it require any of the G20 members to raise their basic corporate rates. But besides Ireland, well known for its 12.5 percent rate, there are another 34 low-tax and zero-tax jurisdictions outside the G7 and G20 – mostly small countries – at rates below 15 percent (see table). Nine additional jurisdictions, including Albania, Georgia, Lithuania and Serbia in Eastern Europe, Iraq, Kuwait and Oman in the Middle East, and Mauritius and the Maldives among small island states, have a 15 percent corporate tax rate.

But will an arrangement to reach a 15 percent minimum stick? When pressed to raise their corporate rates, some members of this low-tax group argue that they could lose the ability to attract firms, since they lack an equivalent array of resources, markets, or subsidies that large nations can offer.  If the low-tax countries are eventually forced into adopting the 15 percent minimum headline rate, they may adopt workarounds. They could, for example, legislate new deductions or tax credits as offsets.  If  all the G7 countries were to adopt “make-up” taxes on their multinational corporations (MNCs) that eliminate the advantage of moving intangible income (mainly royalties) to low-tax countries, it may not  make that much difference if some jurisdictions use other methods to lure corporations to do business within their borders or provide low-tax export platforms.   

Pillar One would require some portion of the earnings of the largest multinationals—perhaps 100 firms, especially those known as GAFA (Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon)—to be taxed in the country where goods and services are sold. These taxes would be in lieu of taxes paid in the country where the goods and services are produced (the practice under current international tax rules).  Hammering out the main parameters, G7 finance ministers agreed that 20 percent of profits above a basic 10 percent rate of return should be allocated to the country of sales.  This is called Amount A. Thorny details remain to be agreed, not only among the G7 but also among the G20 and countries at large, as to the details of Amount A.  Which large corporations will be covered by the new rules?  What accounting standards will be used for the 10 percent threshold?  How will above-threshold digital profits be divided between countries? 

The potential consequences for the low-tax countries listed in table 1 of a 15 percent global minimum tax rate coupled with reallocation of Amount A between countries are a matter of speculation. For a handful of low-tax countries that have acquired tax haven reputations, the 15 percent global minimum would probably entail the loss of vast book assets.  These legally parked assets yield small incidental tax revenues (stamp duties and the like) and create employment for skilled professionals such as financiers, lawyers, and accountants.  Jurisdictions affected by such losses would include the Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Bodog Poker Islands, Cyprus, Guernsey, Isle of Man, and Jersey. These jurisdictions should, however, experience some revenue gains if they chose to tax the locally allocated share of Amount A from the largest MNCs. But such gains would probably be small, because resident populations are a minor share of world population. 

A second group of low-tax countries have succeeded in attracting significant multinational corporation employment for production and service workers, partly through low corporate rates.  Countries in this category include Bahrain, Bulgaria, Hungary, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Macao Special Administrative Region of China, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia, Serbia, and the United Arab Emirates.  If they accept the minimum 15 percent rate, these countries will probably explore alternative fiscal incentives to retain local employment.  Again, the reallocation of Amount A may lead to some local revenue gains, but those gains might arrive later than the threat to local employment, simply because it will take time to work out Amount A details.

In sum, without G7 legislation that imposes “make-up” taxes on multinational corporations that book profits in low-tax countries, it will be difficult to persuade many of the countries listed in the table below to adopt the new global minimum rate. For this reason, the G7 proposal must surmount some serious obstacles before it is adopted and changes the landscape of international tax rules. 

To read the full commentary from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, please click here.

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Yet this year, there was a long communiqué, and it had a full section even entitled “Free and Fair Trade.” Once more, the G7 committed to championing “the rules-based multilateral system” that the previous US President so disparaged.

The G7 statement now calls “for the world’s leading democratic nations to unite behind a shared vision.” That vision is “to ensure the multilateral trading system is reformed, with a modernised rulebook and a reformed World Trade Organization (WTO) at its centre.”

This general commitment is followed by specific ones. The first stresses the need to make “progress” for the WTO’s next Ministerial Conference in November, with the hope of “a meaningful conclusion” of negotiations on fisheries subsidies. Meanwhile, subsidized fleets deplete the oceans of fish. The baseline for progress may be low, but engagement is critical.

The second expresses concern about “forced labour in global supply chains.” The statement does not call out China by name, possibly because of pushback from other G7 members, but it specifically mentions “the agricultural, solar, and garment sectors,” all of which involve production in Xinjiang.

The final paragraph commits to working together and “with the wider WTO membership” to address major issues that implicate China. Once more, China is not mentioned expressly, but the US clearly has China in its scope on “forced technology transfer, intellectual property theft, lowering of labour and environmental standards to gain competitive advantage, market-distorting actions of state owned enterprises, and harmful industrial subsidies,” and “transparency.” As I have argued elsewhere, singling out China by a so-called “alliance of democracies” is not just risky, but a mistake. The issues, however, are real.

Perhaps most interesting is the G7’s commitment to advance the “proper functioning of the WTO’s negotiating function and dispute settlement system” (emphasis added). This could have been worded more elegantly (“functioning” of a “function”?), but it is an advance.

Unstated is that there is tension—if not outright contradiction—between the G7 commitment to a “rules-based multilateral system” and the US neutering of WTO dispute settlement. Here the US remains alone among the G7 and the “broader membership.” The communiqué nonetheless offers hope here, signaling that the G7 aims to see WTO dispute settlement “function properly.”

On this front, the Biden administration’s strategy, it seems, is first to resolve disputes over the Trump tariffs imposed on G7 and other US allies, against which the allies retaliated. Resolving this dispute is politically tricky. The tariffs provide protection to the US steel industry, and that industry is in swing states that are critical for the 2022 election. The control of the US Senate and House are at stake. The Biden administration will thus proceed carefully, biding its time, consulting with labor union constituencies. Still, the two sides are making progress, agreeing to suspend new tariffs while they negotiate.

If the Biden administration can settle tariff disputes with its G7 allies, then maybe, just maybe, the US will be in a cleaner position to make concrete proposals to return to binding multilateral trade dispute settlement. Then the system might be “rule-based” once more.

Gregory Shaffer is Chancellor’s Professor at the University of California, Irvine and author of Emerging Powers in the World Trading System: The Past and Future of International Economic Law.

To read the original commentary from WorldTradeLaw, please visit here

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Below, experts from Brookings’s Foreign Policy program describe what they are watching for, in terms of potential policy outcomes, developments in key relationships, and opportunities and things that could go wrong.

Biden has made it excessively clear that he seeks “stable and predictable” relations with Russia, and Putin can promise to restrain Russian hackers and to spare Ukraine another bout of military pressure. As a counter-claim, he can demand that no new waves of protests be allowed to topple the dictatorship in Belarus. Putin’s main message will inevitably be about the unacceptability of Western “interference” in Russian internal affairs, which means that his siloviki will keep persecuting the opposition and exterminating free media as they see fit. Biden cannot consent to that but an implicit “understanding” might emerge. The problem with establishing such boundaries of “stability” is greater than just damaging Biden’s agenda of strengthening democracy. Putin is predictable only in his desire to keep the initiative in his confrontation with the West, so he is apt to strike at the first opportune moment.

Célia Belin, Visiting Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe:

Although it is not yet on the formal agenda of the different summits, I will be watching for developments on trans-Atlantic travel. To this day, travel is still heavily restricted between the United States and Europe (specifically the Schengen area, United Kingdom, and Ireland), a 15-month purgatory with no end in sight. However, by the end of June, all 27 EU member states will have reopened their borders to American travelers — safety protocols varying with each country. Meanwhile, the Biden administration has yet to give any indication that it intends to reciprocate, or even to fix the dramatic visa backlog in its consulates in Europe. I will be looking at whether Europeans bring up the issue and the administration offers a path forward. As both sides are determined to identify a positive agenda out of President Biden’s Europe tour, the asymmetry created by the ongoing U.S. travel ban will be noticed. As Biden claims to be a “committed trans-Atlanticist,” relaxing rules for European travel would be a demonstration of trust and goodwill.

A larger question looms over the sequence: Can the G-7, and trans-Atlantic partners, regain a central role in designing global bodog poker review governance, and overcome nationalistic impulses? I will look at efforts towards building a sustainable recovery with new rules on corporate taxation. I also expect G-7 partners to demonstrate solidarity with the developing world, with progress on the number of vaccines being donated, efforts on debt relief, and increased pledges for climate finance.

James Goldgeier, Robert Bosch Senior Visiting Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe:

President Biden will go into his summit with President Putin in a strong position, having just come from a NATO summit that will emphasize the close alliance among the United States, Canada, and Europe. While both presidents have talked about the importance of strategic stability and arms control, fundamental divisions remain. Biden often discusses the importance of democracy, which Putin fears, and Biden continues to reiterate American support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, which Putin views as part of Russia’s privileged sphere of influence. Expect Putin to air his grievances against the United States, which he uses to try to deflect his responsibility for Russia’s continued economic stagnation. Biden, meanwhile, will do what his predecessor did not: make clear that continued Russian interference in American elections is unacceptable.

The days of U.S.-Russia summits with long fact sheets touting various agreements and initiatives are ancient history, but the two countries could pay lip service to their desire to cooperate on issues like the Arctic, Iran, and climate change. Biden has repeatedly stated his desire for a stable and predictable (i.e., boring) U.S.-Russia relationship that will enable the United States to keep its focus on China, and that seems to be the reason he offered the summit in the first place. Putin’s domestic challenges have led him to take a more aggressive foreign policy stance, so Biden’s hopes for quiet on the Russia front are likely to remain unfulfilled.

Samantha Gross, Fellow and Director, Energy Security and Climate Initiative:

The United Kingdom is hosting both the G-7 this week and the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) meeting in Glasgow in early November, two key meetings in this crucial year for climate action. London is keen to have the G-7 set the tone for a successful COP26.

The G-7 environment ministers met in May and made important commitments on climate, including setting goals in line with limiting global average temperature rise to 1.5°C, preserving 30% of land for nature by 2030, and eliminating funding for coal plants by the end of 2021. The coal decision was a particularly big step for Japan, which has been an important funder of coal plants abroad. At the summit, G-7 countries are likely to call for similar commitments from G-20 countries at their October summit in Rome.

Climate finance and trade are likely to be important issues at the summit. Many developing countries have climate goals that are conditional on financial aid, so success at the COP depends on greater commitment of funds from wealthy countries. The intersection of climate and trade is also a good fit for discussion at the G-7. The European Union plans to implement a carbon border adjustment mechanism to protect industries that pay Europe’s high carbon prices, but its implications for trade are complicated and untested. Working thorough the implications and ensuring that trade doesn’t become a stumbling block is an important task that the G-7 could take on.

Syaru Shirley Lin, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center for East Asia Policy Studies:

The COVID-19 pandemic has reminded us that those who once seemed safe may not remain so, and that no one is safe until the whole world is. Democracies like Australia, New Zealand, and Taiwan displayed stellar performance in fighting the pandemic early on, maintaining nearly normal life with low infections and few deaths. However, from India to Japan, among both rich and poor economies, Asia is now ravaged by new variants, revealing inadequate testing, insufficient vaccine production and procurement, and lax quarantines, compared with China’s successful management of the pandemic through massive testing and strict lockdowns.

The pandemic has also highlighted how many national governments and international organizations were unprepared to respond quickly and effectively. Fortunately, innovative public-private partnerships such as COVAX, Gavi, and Reform for Resilience are filling in the gap both to end the pandemic and to prepare for the next one. As the chair of Reform for Resilience’s Asia-Pacific hub, I see how Asian countries are depending on the G-7 to donate vaccines immediately and then to enlarge contract manufacturing of vaccines in Asia.

President Biden’s trip is an opportunity for the U.S. and G-7 to develop a new mechanism that unites democratic governments with research institutions and the private sector to end this pandemic. This is a wake-up call for the G-7 to create more robust healthcare systems, resilient economies, and sustainable environments, all of which will prepare us better for the next pandemic, whose arrival is only a matter of time.

Suzanne Maloney, Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy:

As President Biden embarks on his first foreign trip, he has set an ambitious agenda — rebuilding America’s relationships with its closest allies and rallying the world’s democracies around a common goal of thwarting the implicit and explicit creep of authoritarianism. It is a noble aim, and a necessary endeavor, but neither a frenzy of summitry nor soaring rhetoric are the best means to achieve it.

After the epic disruption of Trump-era policies, Washington’s European allies will welcome the reassurance with a skeptical eye. Biden’s readiness to reengage must overcome not just the scars of the past four years, but also the continuing questions about the health of America’s own democracy as well as traditional resistance to any sense of a domineering Washington. And while our shared values and interests underpin the relationship, there is — and always has been — some divergence among our allies about how to advance them.

The good news is that this administration is well-suited to meet the needs of the moment. Biden himself has more foreign policy experience than any of his recent predecessors, and his track record is one of realism, not overreach. Moreover, he has spent the first five months of his presidency demonstrating America’s capacity for steady competence on the home front by marshaling the resources of the federal government to turn the tide against the historic challenge of the coronavirus pandemic. His administration should prioritize the same approach — consistency and efficacy — in addressing the systemic challenge posed by authoritarian great powers.

Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology:

When President Biden meets President Putin in Geneva on June 16, he needs a big idea for future European security. Meeting for its own sake may be useful but only marginally. We need a strategy and a vision.

Specifically, it is time to rethink NATO’s standing desire to push the alliance further east — a policy virtually guaranteed to continue to produce a higher state of tension and greater risk of war than would otherwise characterize the West’s relationship with Russia. A new security architecture should seek to reverse verifiably Russia’s aggressions against its neighbors while creating a non-aligned zone among those eastern European countries not currently in NATO.

NATO was not created, and should not now be used, in an attempt to solve every European political or security problem. Nor was its original intent to expand. It started with just 12 members. It only added four in the course of the next 40 years — Germany, Turkey, Greece, and Spain. The goal was never growth for growth’s sake. Nor was NATO seen primarily as a tool for democracy promotion.

Moreover, the practical effect of attempting to enlarge NATO into these countries has arguably been to set back Russian relations with the West enormously. To be sure, the main fault is with Russia’s behavior; NATO should not apologize for past expansion. But the idea of further NATO expansion is the main policy that the West can and should rethink.

Patrick W. Quirk, Nonresident Fellow, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology:

We are beginning to see the silhouette of the Biden administration’s democracy agenda, as the White House translates the president’s rhetorical commitment to prioritize supporting democracy and human rights in U.S. foreign policy into action. Last week, for example, the U.S. released a National Security Study Memorandum designating fighting corruption abroad as a core national security interest.

A key question going into the G-7 meeting is not whether the group will commit to supporting democracy abroad (they already have) but what they will promise to do together to achieve this goal.

The G-7 members are expected to codify a global minimum corporate tax rate. Can we expect something of similar ambition from the group’s discussion on “championing shared values including democracy and human rights”? One would hope so since whether democracy or autocracy predominates globally is more important than the percentage of profits which corporations hand over.

Commitments on how the seven — in concert with like-minded democracies, perhaps led by the D-10 including invited G-7 guests India, Australia, and South Korea — will protect and promote democracy would be welcome. They might commit to increasing support for strengthening institutions and civil society in fledgling democracies so that citizens instead of predatory elites thrive. They might also outline how allies will help protect democracy from Chinese and Russian malign influence, via standard repercussions and more proactive steps to shore up vulnerable countries.

This week will give greater shape to how the White House intends to translate promises on democracy into tangible action.

Douglas A. Rediker, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe:

When President Biden meets his G-7 counterparts this week, the meeting will be heavy on signaling that the G-7 is back. In 2009, as the global financial crisis raged, it was the G-20, not the G-7 (G-8 at the time) where leaders and finance officials successfully signaled that even countries with different ideologies and political systems bodog casino could work together for the common good. The larger G-20 grouping effectively eclipsed the G-7 in the following decade, but though its agenda expanded, the results delivered did not.

This week’s G-7 will also include Australia, India, and South Korea, signaling that the G-7 is now the principal forum where multilateral approaches to global issues will be hashed out among countries sharing democratic values, in hopes of making tangible progress in tackling current crises like COVID-19 response and climate. By reenergizing the G-7, the British hosts, Biden, and other attendees are signaling that when the wider G-20 meets, coordinated positions will have already been agreed, effectively presenting other G-20 countries, including China and Russia, with what is effectively a fait accompli. China has already reacted, arguing that “the G7 has no right to and should not exclude developing countries or other platforms for multilateral governance.”

This week’s G-7 is another reflection of the Biden administration’s framing of the world into democracies and autocracies. It could also signal that what is left of the halcyon era of efforts at global cooperation is over, and with it, the primacy of the G-20.

Constanze Stelzenmüller, Fritz Stern Chair on Germany and Trans-Atlantic Relations, Center on the United States and Europe:

The weekend’s historic G-7 agreement on global corporate tax rates could be a gamechanger for the trans-Atlantic trade relationship; German Finance Minister Olaf Scholz, the Social Democrats’ chancellor candidate, is already celebrating it as a victory. Are U.S.-German relations back on track after all?

Not quite. It is notable that the Biden administration faced down a heavy bipartisan drumbeat for sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in May for the sake of improving relations with Germany — yet the president is about to spend a week in Europe without going to Berlin.

Meanwhile, President Putin has casually upended a key argument fielded by Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government to defend the project. Under an agreement negotiated by Berlin with the Kremlin, Russia was supposed to maintain its Ukrainian gas transit route until 2024. Yet on Friday Putin told a conference that Ukraine would have to show “good will” if it wanted to keep the transit route: a public slap in the face for Germany.

Much is at stake for Germany in this week’s summits — not least whether the successor to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (whose term ends in 2022) might be German; the name of Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, who is popular among her peers, was floated this week. So it might be time for Berlin to take a hard look at the relative strategic value of its relationships with the U.S. and Russia. One potential outcome could be to reconsider its opposition to a moratorium on the pipeline.

Thomas Wright, Director, Center on the United States and Europe:

The White House sees President Biden’s forthcoming trip to Europe as a demonstration that “America is back” after four years of President Donald Trump. There is a considerable risk that this message will fall flat. There is little appetite on either side of the Atlantic for a return to the Obama administration’s Europe policy. Europeans follow American politics and understand that Trumpism is not dead and could make a comeback in elections in 2022 or 2024. Meanwhile, as Jeremy Shapiro recently argued, many Biden administration officials are skeptical that Europe can or will do much to help the United States in its competition with China.

Biden is unique among American presidents in his long-established engagement with and affinity for the Atlantic alliance. He should use this trip to set out his vision for how that alliance should change in decades to come. This must include serious consideration of helping the EU become more autonomous and capable, fleshing out an economic agenda for the alliance, showing how the U.S. can help support liberal democracy in Europe, rethinking NATO’s 2% of GDP defense spending metric so it is better suited for an era of competition with China, and encouraging continuing security cooperation between the U.K. and EU. Going big would ensure Europe is more resilient to a return of Trumpism, and better positioned to compete with China for its own reasons. But this is unlikely to happen on this trip, so it will probably have to wait a while longer.

Pavel Baev is a nonresident senior fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings and a research professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

Célia Belin is a visiting fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. Her areas of expertise include trans-Atlantic relations, U.S. foreign policy toward Europe, French politics and foreign policy, the role of civil society in foreign policy, religion/secularism, and strategic prospective analysis.

James Goldgeier is a Robert Bosch senior visiting fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution and a professor of international relations at the School of International Service at American University, where he served as dean from 2011-17.

Samantha Gross is a fellow and director of the Energy Security and Climate Initiative. Her work is focused on the intersection of energy, environment, and policy, including climate policy and international cooperation, energy efficiency, unconventional oil and gas development, regional and global natural gas trade, and the energy-water nexus.

Syaru Shirley Lin is a nonresident senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings and Compton Visiting Professor in World Politics at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia.

Suzanne Maloney is the vice president and director of the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, where her research focuses on Iran and Persian Gulf energy. She has served as the deputy director of the Foreign Policy for the past five years.

Michael O’Hanlon is a senior fellow, and director of research, in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy.

Patrick W. Quirk is senior director of the Center for Global Impact at the International Republican Institute (IRI) and a nonresident fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. Previously, he served on the U.S. Secretary of State’s Policy Planning (S/P) staff in the Department of State as the lead advisor for fragile states, conflict and stabilization, and foreign assistance.

Douglas A. Rediker is a nonresident senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development program at Brookings, as well as in the Center on the United States and Europe in the Foreign Policy program. He is also the founding partner of International Capital Strategies, LLC, a Washington, DC-based political economy consultancy founded in 2012 and a member of the board of directors of Cowen Inc

Constanze Stelzenmüller is an expert on German, European, and trans-Atlantic foreign and security policy and strategy. She is the inaugural holder of the Fritz Stern Chair on Germany and trans-Atlantic Relations in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings.

Thomas Wright is the director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution. He is also a contributing writer for The Atlantic and a nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy

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It will be their first real opportunity since then to work out a collective response to the enormous test posed by the pandemic, as well as three other global challenges – climate change, the accelerating digitization of the global economy and growing strategic competition between the West and China. 

As well as substantive outcomes the summit delivers, it will also be an opportunity for leaders to consider what role the G7 should play over the next decade or longer.  

The grouping was formed when six of the current members – the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, France and Italy – first met at the Chateau de Rambouillet in 1975 in the aftermath of the first oil shock. Canada and the EU were invited to join the group shortly afterwards . In these years, if agreement could be reached on an aspect of managing the global economy – initiating a fiscal stimulus, completing a global trade negotiation, restructuring developing country debt or boosting international aid – it was typically decisive.

This situation largely prevailed through to the early 2000s, when the G7’s influence began to decline. Driven primarily by its declining share of world economic activity as a result of the rapid growth in China and other emerging economies, the G7 also faced an increasing diversity of global players with the growth in international civil society and multinational corporations. 

The change in status was recognized in the response to the 2008-9 global financial crisis. While G7 finance ministers and central bank governors played a pivotal role in preparing the ground, it was the G20 major economies that delivered the response to the crisis.

As the G20 took centre stage, there were doubts as to whether the G7 – or G8 as it then was with the participation of Russia – had a future at all. Many thought, or at least hoped, that the G20 would be able to continue its unity of purpose.

Over its next five summits, however, the G7/G8 demonstrated its value, not just in terms of the nature of the discussions that were uniquely possible among its leaders, reflecting their shared culture, values and personal familiarity, but also through the specific outcomes it achieved. 

The group remained a critical forum for addressing economic crises – such as the Eurozone crisis –that originated or were contained within its membership. It developed new approaches to solving global problems that could be mainstreamed through wider bodies, particularly the G20.

With Donald Trump’s election in 2016, the G7 quickly became a focus for major differences between the US and its traditional allies. By contrast the Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union, together with its continued commitment to multilateralism outside the EU, has, if anything, increased the logic for the G7. 

bodog online casino The new Biden administration’s energetic support for coordination with allies and willingness to lead on such controversial issues as global tax arrangements and a Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights waiver for vaccines, combined with the greatest period of economic upheaval since the Second World War, means that the G7 now has a unique opportunity to evolve. 

To achieve this, there are four issues on which G7 leaders need to reach agreement in Cornwall.

First, they need to reaffirm their shared values, highlighting their belief in democracy, human rights, support for the free market and economic openness. This should be much easier now that Trump has left office, but there could still be areas in which it will be difficult to reach consensus, for example on the role of the state and the G7’s stance on free trade. The leaders will also need to consider how to put these values into effect. 

Second, the group needs to be clear about what it can and cannot do. It no longer has the economic scope, financial resources or legitimacy to solve the world’s biggest challenges on its own – not in the short term as we have seen with the roll out of Covid vaccines to the developing world, or longer term as seen with unsustainable developing country debt and climate change. Short of morphing into the G20, it cannot aspire to this. 

The group should be clear, however, that it does see itself as having a core responsibility to come up with and champion approaches that can effectively address these problems and that do so in a way that is equitable and reflects the concerns of the wider international community. 

Third, the group should acknowledge that a further core responsibility will be to provide a forum in which its members can coordinate policies to uphold shared economic values and interests, including when these are in competition with other economies. 

And fourth, the G7 needs to explain how, taking account of these values and roles, it will work constructively with other economies and the global governance architecture. In a practical sense this is the most important, both in terms of the group’s ability to influence the international agenda and in the example it sets to other major economies. It is also the most difficult. 

The lead on solving some global issues – such as climate finance, recovery from the pandemic, reform of the global tax system and developing-country debt – must necessarily lie ultimately with the G20. 

Others – such as resilience in supply chains, digital governance and national security considerations in investment – may need to be dealt with at a G7 level among close allies but could still be tied into more universal frameworks of benefit to all. 

The G7 will need to balance finding global solutions to global problems with parallel efforts to underpin the values and economic interests of its members and find a way to communicate this sympathetically. 

Apart from the inevitable ‘not invented here’ syndrome, there is a risk the wider world will distrust G7 initiatives intended for the greater good if they are presented alongside actions that are focused on upholding common group interests.  To counter this the G7 will need to persuade sceptics – through practical examples – that competition in some areas can coexist with cooperation in others. 

To complement greater clarity on its new role, the G7 should take stock of how it can maximize its effectiveness.  In principle, the presidency needs the consent of other members for the decisions it takes on summit organisation. This is rarely withheld, but any change of approach will only become permanent if actively supported by other members and adopted by subsequent presidencies.

There have been several attempts by individual presidencies to review the effectiveness of the institution and hardwire the conclusions into future practice.  These have had mixed results at best. But there are four themes on which the group should try again to reach a consensus in Cornwall.

First, expansion: The success of the G7 depends on the like-mindedness of its participants, the fact that the leaders typically get to know each other well, and that the group is small enough to sit round a medium sized dining table. 

It should therefore set a high bar for any permanent expansion and potentially rule it out for the foreseeable future. It is particularly important to avoid including new members who would prevent discussion of core national economic security interests – as was the case when Russia was a member. 

Second, scope: The G7 has ranged across economic, social and political issues, and this should continue. Similarly, a successful theme may be inspired by an immediate crisis or be a slower-burn, second-tier topic that deserves to rise to the top tier. 

But the most successful presidencies have almost always had limited agendas focused on one or two themes where effective outcomes can only be achieved through international cooperation. The G7 should establish this approach as a norm with the summit tackling at most three closely related themes or two unrelated themes. 

Third, outreach: Both the G7 and G20 have experimented with a range of outreach approaches to countries, international organizations and non-official stakeholders. Sometimes these have been valuable, but too often they have been largely cosmetic and potentially counterproductive. It should be a priority to work out what works and what doesn’t.

Specific steps should include: identifying areas where outside expertise or political support is critical to a chosen theme and embedding outreach to specific countries, institutions or individuals from the outset; avoiding permanent institutionalized groups of stakeholders rolling over from one presidency to the next, since these can easily become divorced from the presidency agenda and an end in themselves; and ensuring that any high-level independent expert group established to investigate aspects of a chosen theme publishes recommendations well before the final outputs for the summit are locked down.

Fourth, tools and working methods: Covid has transformed the way the G7 and G20 groups have worked over the past year, with  most preparatory meetings and contact between leaders happening virtually. It is critical to capture the best of virtual working in future practice, while recognizing that a complete lack of personal contact is a major drawback. 

One approach might be to cut the number of in-person ‘Sherpa’ meetings from four to two and add four shorter virtual sessions. The G7 needs to make sure it has communications that are secure enough to meet the needs of its growing role in economic security.

During the Cornwall summit, the British presidency has a rare opportunity to communicate a clear vision of what the G7 is for and how it will operate in the future. This would be an important contribution to the wider system of global governance, enhancing the influence of the individual G7 members and setting an example to similar groups in what could otherwise become an increasingly fragmented and dysfunctional system. 

We should all hope that it steps up to this challenge. 

Creon Butler joined Chatham House from the Cabinet Office where he served as director for international economic affairs in the National Security Secretariat and G7/G20 ‘sous sherpa’, advising on global policy issues such as climate change, natural resource security, global health threats and the future of the international economic architecture. Earlier in his career, he served in the Bank of England, HM Treasury and in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, where he was director for economic policy and chief economic adviser.

To read the full commentary from Chatham House, please click here.

Image from metro.co.uk

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The UK can now adopt its own trade agenda having left the European Union in January 2020, with the end of its transition from the EU coinciding with the start of its presidency of the G7 (Group of Seven) in January 2021.

A report in the Mail on Sunday claims the UK will use its position to try to break down barriers to free trade and “give the WTO back its legal teeth” so that it can properly enforce a rules-based trading system.

The country is also currently pursuing trade deals with the EU, US, Japan, Australia and New Zealand for when the transition period – during which it continues to operate under EU trade rules – ends on 31 December 2020.

A new phase of the Department for International Trade’s ‘Ready to Trade’ marketing campaign, launched in 13 countries on 1 February after the UK left the EU, is in development.

Top priority

The Mail on Sunday report claims the UK is seeking to work with like-minded countries to reverse the rise of protectionism that began in the years after the financial crisis in 2008 and has been amplified by the coronavirus crisis.

A key part of this approach, the Mail on Sunday article claims, will be giving a strong backing the WTO – the international body that maintains a rule-based system for global trade by punishing countries that defy trade agreements.

The Daily Update has reached out to the DIT for comment on the story.

US anger

The Trump Administration in the US, meanwhile, has been publicly critical of the WTO, with President Trump arguing it has taken a soft stance on China.

The US has blocked appointments to the WTO’s Appellate Body, which judges on international trade disputes, rendering the organisation toothless.

Taking the global stage

Since the UK voted to leave the EU in 2016, the UK has increased its team in Geneva – where the WTO is based – four-fold.

Julian Braithwaite – the UK ambassador to the WTO – now has his own seat when addressing the organisation, having previously sat with EU ambassadors observing Europe’s trade commissioner.

At a WTO meeting in Geneva in May, the UK’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the organisation restated the UK’s support for the WTO.

Championing free trade

Dr Liam Fox, the previous minister for trade in the UK, is also considering a bid to replace Roberto Azevedo as the director general of the WTO.

In the Telegraph on Saturday he bodog online casino wrote that the UK has a “proud history in championing the cause of free trade” and financially supporting some of the smallest nations to be represented in the WTO.

He argued the UK needs to bring “new energy to the global trade debate before it is too late”.

He said: “Only by innovative thinking, a willingness to reform and a genuine desire to make the benefits of free trade work for everyone will we achieve that vision of human progress and peace. Britain should relish the challenge to lead.”

Lord Peter Mandelson, the former Labour cabinet minister, is also bidding to stand as the UK’s nomination for the top position.

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Trump announced over the weekend that the G7 summit, which was slated for this month, likely will be held in September — and said he hoped to invite South Korea, Australia, India and Russia as well. None of the four are members of the G7. Trump had hoped to hold an in-person summit in the Washington, DC, area this month but postponed it after German Chancellor Angela Merkel said she would not attend due to the pandemic.

Clete Willems, a partner at Akin Gump, said the countries must remain in touch and work toward an in-person meeting, which he said would be hard to “replicate” virtually. Willems served as the deputy assistant to the president for international economics through March 2019 and was also deputy director of the National Economic Council. He played a key role in the trade talks between the U.S. and China, among others, and was a lead negotiator at G20, G7 and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings.

“I think whether or not they get together virtually now versus in person later — that’s not going to change the fact that these guys are on the phone with each other on a very routine basis,” he told Inside U.S. Trade. “I understand from the White House that they are talking almost daily to each other.”

“As long as the White House and these other countries are able to come up with safety protocols that allow them to travel, I think it’s so much more valuable to have an in-person meeting,” he added. “I think to the extent that it takes them a couple more months for them to figure that out is worth doing. My understanding is that they are all in touch anyway.”

Kelly Ann Shaw, a partner at Hogan Lovells, said postponing the summit was logical given the pandemic. Shaw took over for Willems at the White House last year and left in November.

“A few additional months to prepare and observe will create a better atmosphere for cooperation and creative thinking among Leaders on ways to rebuild the global economy,” she told Inside U.S. Trade in an email.

Wendy Cutler, vice president of the Asia Society Policy Institute and a former acting deputy U.S. Trade Representative, also lauded the administration’s decision to delay the summit.

“Postponement of #G7 meeting is a blessing in disguise,” she tweeted on Monday. “Gives over 4 months to prepare for real, meaningful outcomes instead of just grandstanding and blaming others.”

Trade policy was a focal point of last year’s G7 summit, which was held in Biarritz, France.

Shaw said the G7 “at its core” was a forum to address “global economic growth and related political challenges” and contended that trade will be discussed at this year’s meeting.

“Trade is an indelible component of growth and has been on the agenda since the original Declaration of Rambouillet in 1975 — it certainly will be a part of this year’s G7,” she continued. “There may be a number of trade issues on the table in September, including the proliferation of export restrictions, supply chain vulnerabilities, unfair trade practices, and non-market economies.”

Willems said he was less hopeful that trade would take up as much of this year’s agenda, contending it would likely take a backseat to health and economic issues related to the COVID-19 outbreak.

“I don’t know how much of a focus trade is going to be. My understanding is that there is going to be a lot of focus on coronavirus and the health and economic aspects of that. I think there is going to be a lot of focus on China, some of that may have trade ramifications,” he added. “They will definitely want to have a China focus and that is where you could get much of trade stuff. I don’t know — in terms of an independent trade section — how much I would expect there.”

He also lauded the inclusion of other countries that share G7 ideals, adding, “Australia, India and Spain all went to last year’s [summit].”

“As a neutral matter, it’s not unprecedented for there to be more than just the G7 countries,” he said. “The idea of having certain additional countries attend who share many of the same viewpoints as the other G7 members and who are going to be key allies in working on all of these issues would be important. I would definitely put Australia and South Korea on that list. I’m not so sure whether Russia meets that criteria. I think they want to think long and hard about their inclusion.”

Russia’s membership to the G8 was suspended in 2014 due to its annexation of Crimea.

Trump on Saturday called the G7’s membership “outdated,” adding, “I don’t feel that as a G7 it properly represents what’s going on in the world.”

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said he would not support Russia’s inclusion at the G7 meeting. The United Kingdom took a similar position on Monday. — Isabelle Icso (iicso@iwpnews.com)

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