While the B3W claims to be a highly cohesive initiative, the BRI has expanded beyond comprehension and would be extremely difficult to dethrone, even when some of the most lucrative economies of the world are joining heads to compete over the largely untapped potential of the region. Now let’s be fair and contest that neither the G7 nor China intends the welfare of the region over profiteering. However, China enjoys a headstart. The BRI was unveiled back in 2013 by president Xi Jinping. The initiative was projected as a transcontinental long-term policy and investment program aimed to consolidate infrastructural development and gear economic integration of the developing countries falling along the route of the historic Silk Road. 

The highly sophisticated project is a long-envisioned dream of China’s Communist Party; operating on the premise of dominating the networks between the continents to establish unarguable sovereignty over the regional economic and policy decision-making. Referring to the official outline of the BRI issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the BRI drives to: “Promote the connectivity of Asian, European, and African continents and their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen partnerships among the countries along the Belt and Road [Silk Road], set up all-dimensional, multi-tiered and composite connectivity networks and realize diversified, independent, balanced, and sustainable development in these countries”. The excerpt clearly amplifies the thought process and the main agenda of the BRI. On the other hand, the B3W simply stands as a superfluous rival to an already outgrowing program.

Initially known as One Belt One Road (OBOR), the BRI has since expanded in the infrastructural niche of the region, primarily including emerging markets like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The standout feature of the BRI has been the mutually inclusive nature of the projects, that is, the BRI has been commandeering projects in many of the rival countries in the region yet the initiative manages to keep the projects running in parallel without any interference or impediment. With a loose hold on the governance whilst giving a free hand to the political and social realities of each specific country, the BRI program presents a perfect opportunity to jump the bandwagon and obtain funding for development projects without undergoing scrutiny and complications. With such attractive nature of the BRI, the program has significantly grown over the past decade, now hosting 71 countries as partners in the initiative. The BRI currently represents a third of the world’s GDP and approximately two-thirds of the world’s entire population.

Similar to BRI, the B3W aims to congregate cross-national and regional cooperation between the countries involved whilst facilitating the implementation of large-scale projects in the developing world. However, unlike China, the G7 has an array of problems that seem to override the overly optimistic assumption of B3W being the alternate stream to the BRI. 

One major contention in the B3W model is the facile assumption that all 7 democracies have an identical policy with respect to China and would therefore react similarly to China’s policies and actions. While the perspective matches the objective of BRI to promote intergovernmental cooperation, the G7 economies are much more polar than the democracies partnered with China. It is rather simplistic to assume that the US and Japan would have a similar stance towards China’s policies, especially when the US has been in a tense trade war with China recently while Japan enjoyed a healthy economic relation with Xi’s regime. It would be a bold statement to conclude that the US and the UK would be more cohesively adjoined towards the B3W relative to the China-Pakistan cooperation towards the BRI. Even when we disregard the years-long partnership between the Asian duo, the newfound initiative would demand more out of the US than the rest of the countries since each country is aware of the tense relations and the underlying desperation that resulted in the B3W program to shape its way in the Summit.

Moreover, the B3W is timed in an era when Europe has seen its history being botched over the past year. Post-Brexit, Europe is exactly the polar opposite of the unified policy-making glorified in the B3W initiate. The European Union (EU), despite US reservations, recently signed an investment deal with China. A symbolic gesture against the role played by former US President Donald J. Trump to bolster the UK’s exit from the Union. As London tumbles into peril, it would rather join hands with China as opposed to the democrat-regime of the US to prevent isolation in the region. Despite US opposition, Germany – Europe’s largest economy – continues to place China as a key market for its Automobile industry. Such a divided partnership holds no threat to the BRI, especially when the partners are highly dependent on China’s market and couldn’t afford an affront to China’s long envisaged initiative.

Even if we assume a unified plan of action shared between the G7 countries, the B3W would fall short in attracting the key developing countries of the region. The main targets of the initiative would naturally be the most promising economies of Asia, namely India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh. However, the BRI has already encapsulated these countries: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIMEC) being two of the core 6 developmental corridors of BRI. 

While both the participatory as well as the targeted democracies would be highly cautious in supporting the B3W over BRI, the newfound initiate lacks the basic tenets of a lasting project let alone standing rival to the likes of BRI. The B3W is aimed to be domestically funded through USAID, EXIM, and other similar programs. However, a project of such complex nature involves investments from diverse funding channels. The BRI, for example, tallies a total volume of roughly USD 4 to 8 trillion. However, the BRI is state-funded and therefore enjoys a variety of funding routes including BRI bond flotation. The B3W, however, simply falls short as up until recently, the large domestic firms and banks in the US have been pushed against by the Biden regime. An accurate example is the recent adjustment of the global corporate tax rate to a minimum of 15% to undercut the power of giants like Google and Amazon. Such strategies would make it impossible for the United States and its G7 counterparts to gain multiple channels of funding compared to the highly leveraged state-backed companies in China.

Furthermore, the B3W’s competitiveness dampens when conditionalities are brought into the picture. On paper, the B3W presents humane conditions including Human Rights preservation, Climate Change, Rule of Law, and Corruption prevention. In reality, however, the targeted countries are riddled with problems in all 4 categories. A straightforward question would be that why would the developing countries, already hard-pressed on funds, invest to improve on the 4 conditions posed by the B3W when they could easily continue to seek benefits from a no-strings-attached funding through BRI?

The B3W, despite being a highly lucrative and prosperous model, is idealistic if presented as a competition to the BRI. Simply because the G7, majorly the United States, elides the ground realities and averts its gaze from the labyrinth of complex relations shared with China. The only good that could be achieved is if the B3W manages to find its own unique identity in the region, separate from BRI in nature and not rivaling the scale of operation. While Biden has remained vocal to assuage the concerns regarding the B3W’s aim to target the trajectory of the BRI, the leaders have remained silent over the detailed operations of the model in the near future. For now, the B3W would await bipartisan approval in the United States as the remaining partners would develop their plan of action. Safe to say, for now, that the B3W won’t hold a candle to the BRI in the long-run but could create problems for the G7 members if it manages to irk China in the Short-run.

Syed Zain Abbas Rizv is an active current affairs writer primarily analyzing the global affairs and their political, economic and social consequences. He also holds a Bachelor’s degree from Institute of Business Administration (IBA) Karachi, Pakistan.

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Certainly, the G7 – cancelled last year because of the COVID-19 pandemic – was the most forward looking and productive for many years, at least in terms of the usual avalanche of ambitious statements of intent. This was important because the G7 has come under a lot of criticism in recent times. Many NGOs claim that it takes initiatives that are not implemented, such as the promise back in 2009 to give $100bn to developing countries to help them to adapt to climate change. Others point out that the G20, founded in 2008, is a more legitimate structure as it includes the emerging economies in the world and is therefore a better mechanism to achieve a global impact than the G7. The latter today represents around 40% of global GDP, whereas it was 60% just a decade ago and 80% when it first met in France in 1975. So, the G7 was under pressure to show that it can still be a useful forum to set international priorities and stimulate broader multilateral initiatives. Angela Merkel spoke of “values-based multilateralism”. The implication was that the democracies not only provide human freedom in contrast to the authoritarian states, but can provide security and economic prosperity as well – and even better than their rivals.In this respect, in person meetings matter in terms of facilitating relationships, especially as Biden had met in person only the Japanese and South Korean leaders in the White House prior to the G7. So, he held a number of bilaterals, especially with the UK host, Boris Johnson, with whom he signed a new Atlantic Charter’, an updated version of the one agreed between Churchill and Roosevelt in 1941 when they pledged to promote democratic values and universal human rights, as well as new structures for multinational cooperation after the Second World War. This was an important marker for the British in prolonging their ‘special relationship’ with the US and giving the narrative of ‘Global Britain’ a more secure basis after the UK’s departure from the EU. As there is no US-UK post-Brexit trade agreement in sight, one of the promised deliverables of Brexit, the new ‘Atlantic Charter’ is at least a signal that the UK will remain primus inter pares as a security partner for Washington.If the West is to be a force on the international stage, it needs to better harmonise its financial and economic policies. During the Trump years this type of cooperation proved difficult across the Atlantic, with both the EU and the US engaged in trade disputes over steel, aluminium and aircraft subsidies. There were also hefty disputes over data handling and storage and the taxation of multinational companies, particularly bodog sportsbook review in the technology sector. Here, G7 finance ministers achieved a breakthrough two weeks before the G7 summit when they agreed on a minimum 15% global tax rate and tax adjustments in countries where the tech multinationals do most of their business. The US made the major concessions here but wants the EU countries like France and the UK to abandon their national rules on tax first before the new global regime will enter into force. It is unpopular with Republicans in the US and has to be endorsed by the G20 to be globally effective.

On other trade issues there was disappointment on the European side. The US has kept ‘Buy American’ provisions in its public procurement. The EU and the US have helpfully postponed the implementation of tariffs on steel, aluminium and aircraft, but they have not yet come to a final agreement on removing these tariffs. A new US-EU trade pact is not on the horizon yet. So, much work remains to be done on integrating the G7 economies to boost domestic growth.The G7 was more impressive for its efforts on the international front.The G7 was under a lot of pressure to deliver more solidarity on the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in the area of the distribution of vaccines. Biden committed the US to providing 500mn doses of the Pfizer vaccine – 200mn this year and the remainder in 2022. The US has already dispatched 80mn doses from its national stockpile. The UK announced the delivery of 100mn doses over the next year but with no precise timetable. France and Germany each pledged 30mn as part of an overall EU effort totalling 100mn. The G7 leaders made a great deal of these various vaccine pledges and together pledged to distribute 1bn vaccines through COVAX and GAVI by the end of 2022.The sub-text behind this initiative was not only to help the 46 poorest countries that so far have received only 1% of their vaccine requirements, but also to push back against China and Russia and regain the high moral ground. Several G7 leaders lamented that the West has been put on the public relations defensive by China and Russia, which have exploited in the media their own modest contributions to the developing countries and presented the West as selfish and uncaring, despite the slow progress of their own vaccination campaigns at home. Although the G7’s new focus on getting 60% of the world’s population vaccinated by the end of 2022 was welcomed by many, NGOs pointed out that 1bn extra vaccines falls well short of the WHO target of 11bn and was lacking in urgency given that 3.9mn have already died from the virus worldwide. With two jabs required, the vaccine numbers need to be doubled as part of a wartime mobilisation effort.

Also, there were few details about how the G7 countries can work with the developing countries on setting up administrations and systems to actually inject the vaccines into people’s arms quickly. Here, the G7 members have gained useful experience with their national vaccination campaigns which could be passed on. Given that the virus is now surging in Africa, NGOs also criticised the slow pace of the vaccine distribution wanting more action now. One issue that could have been contentious did not really surface: the transatlantic debate over intellectual property and patent waivers where the US has been in favour but Germany opposed because of its impact on the research and development investments of the pharmaceutical sector. Instead, the G7 spoke of boosting domestic vaccine production in Africa and elsewhere, setting up a global alert network to spot virus outbreaks earlier and bringing together more rapidly international experts to analyse and identify virus pathogens. Here again, G20 endorsement will be key if these initiatives are to get off the ground. Where the G7 has more autonomy is in learning the lessons of the current COVID-19 pandemic in order to better prepare for future pandemics, a debate led by the UK. Here the debate covered the well-known territory of resilience, ensuring domestic production of key elements like pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, and the integrity or diversity of critical supply chains.Another aspect of pushing back against increasing Chinese influence in the developing world was the adoption of the Build Back Better World initiative (B3W). This was presented as a direct response to Beijing’s One Belt, One Road programme. The idea is to give those countries attracted by Chinese offers an alternative source of advice and expertise with none of the associated downside, as the G7 would see it, of indebtedness, environmental and social exploitation, and long-term foreign control and influence. This initiative chimes with the current emphasis within the G7 countries to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic by investing in the digital economy and green carbon neutral technologies and infrastructure. Yet it is not clear where the billions of dollars needed to fund such an initiative will come from and how B3W will be organised and managed. Will it be new money or money re-directed from existing funds in the IMF or World Bank? At all events it can build on the International Development Finance Corporation which the US has set up as an alternative to Chinese financing.

Finally, climate change was another agenda item. In the run up to the COP26 in Glasgow this November, the G7 was obviously keen to reiterate the commitment of its members to halve their carbon emissions by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality by mid-century. They also pledged to give $100bn in climate finance to the developing countries to help them to adapt their economies and infrastructure. Yet, as said already, this was the renewal of an old commitment rather than coming up with a new financial tranche for the COP26 for the decade ahead.Some tough issues were avoided in areas such as domestic carbon taxes and the EU’s proposal for a carbon border tax on goods coming in from countries with lower standards. This said, there were initiatives to protect biodiversity through establishing special climate reserves in up to 30% of the world’s oceans and land surfaces. Equally, the G7 pledged to stop financing coal production in foreign aid projects and to lobby against fossil fuel subsidies. Climate change was one area, however, where the difficulty of making significant progress without having China at the table was remarked upon in much of the commentary.In sum, China may not have been mentioned in every paragraph of the G7 communique but competing with China and pushing back against growing Chinese global influence were leitmotifs that ran throughout every session discussion topic. The invitation to four non-G7 countries – Australia, South Korea and South Africa – to join the meeting in Cornwall in person, with India linking up by video, testified to the G7’s need to broaden its base and reach out to more major democracies to gain legitimacy and traction for its initiatives with the G20 and beyond. It will be difficult to leave them out on future occasions.Despite some reservations from France, Italy and Germany – who do not want a confrontational approach towards China – and at the urging of Biden, China was addressed directly in the communique, especially on the topic of the treatment of the Uighur community in Xinxiang and of Hong Kong. China was also criticised for its ‘anti-market’ trade policies, mainly dumping at below market prices. This inevitably led China to push back against the G7’s legitimacy in speaking on behalf of the global community and to denounce once again interference in its domestic affairs. The problem in building coalitions of democracies around new causes is that it also drives adversaries into deeper retrenchment, thereby compounding the competition that brings the coalition into existence.

The G7 was long on commitments, not all of which lived up to the hopes of observers, but as in the past, the credibility test will lie behind the press announcements and in the painful bureaucratic work mobilising governments, multilateral institutions and the private sector to come up with the needed resources and detailed delivery programmes. Big summit events like the G7 rely on new initiatives and media deliverables that show politicians leading from the front, but following up on previous commitments is just as important for effectiveness in the long run.The Cornwall G7 was a big effort to return the G7 to its former role as the Directoire of the global political system, the central coordinating axis of the most influential powers around which the global multilateral system turns. Now that Russia has been excluded following its annexation of Crimea in 2014, the short lived G8 has put paid to the idea that the forum could be a badly needed meeting point of the great powers, democratic or otherwise, to build bridges and tackle the global challenges that they still share. For instance, climate change, arms control or regional conflicts.The G7 has reverted to being essentially a club of the West, the embodiment of ‘old power’ at a time when 3.4bn people and 60% of global GDP reside in Asia, and more of the world’s population live in authoritarian than democratic societies. Whether the G7 can make a comeback as the leader of the West, recovering its strength and its mojo to out-compete the authoritarians, and make the 21st century – against all expectations – the age for democratic renaissance will take more than just one upbeat meeting in a sunny Cornwall. But it will be interesting to watch.

Jamie Shea is the Senior Fellow for Peace, Security and Defence at Friends of Europe and former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for emerging security challenges at NATO

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It will be their first real opportunity since then to work out a collective response to the enormous test posed by the pandemic, as well as three other global challenges – climate change, the accelerating digitization of the global economy and growing strategic competition between the West and China. 

As well as substantive outcomes the summit delivers, it will also be an opportunity for leaders to consider what role the G7 should play over the next decade or longer.  

The grouping was formed when six of the current members – the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, France and Italy – first met at the Chateau de Rambouillet in 1975 in the aftermath of the first oil shock. Canada and the EU were invited to join the group shortly afterwards . In these years, if agreement could be reached on an aspect of managing the global economy – initiating a fiscal stimulus, completing a global trade negotiation, restructuring developing country debt or boosting international aid – it was typically decisive.

This situation largely prevailed through to the early 2000s, when the G7’s influence began to decline. Driven primarily by its declining share of world economic activity as a result of the rapid growth in China and other emerging economies, the G7 also faced an increasing diversity of global players with the growth in international civil society and multinational corporations. 

The change in status was recognized in the response to the 2008-9 global financial crisis. While G7 finance ministers and central bank governors played a pivotal role in preparing the ground, it was the G20 major economies that delivered the response to the crisis.

As the G20 took centre stage, there were doubts as to whether the G7 – or G8 as it then was with the participation of Russia – had a future at all. Many thought, or at least hoped, that the G20 would be able to continue its unity of purpose.

Over its next five summits, however, the G7/G8 demonstrated its value, not just in terms of the nature of the discussions that were uniquely possible among its leaders, reflecting their shared culture, values and personal familiarity, but also through the specific outcomes it achieved. 

The group remained a critical forum for addressing economic crises – such as the Eurozone crisis –that originated or were contained within its membership. It developed new approaches to solving global problems that could be mainstreamed through wider bodies, particularly the G20.

With Donald Trump’s election in 2016, the G7 quickly became a focus for major differences between the US and its traditional allies. By contrast the Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union, together with its continued commitment to multilateralism outside the EU, has, if anything, increased the logic for the G7. 

The new Biden administration’s energetic support for coordination with allies and willingness to lead on such controversial issues as global tax arrangements and a Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights waiver for vaccines, combined with the greatest period of economic upheaval since the Second World War, means that the G7 now has a unique opportunity to evolve. 

To achieve this, there are four issues on which G7 leaders need to reach agreement in Cornwall.

First, they need to reaffirm their shared values, highlighting their belief in democracy, human rights, support for the free market and economic openness. This should be much easier now that Trump has left office, but there could still be areas in which it will be difficult to reach consensus, for example on the role of the state and the G7’s stance on free trade. The leaders will also need to consider how to put these values into effect. 

Second, the group needs to be clear about what it can and cannot do. It no longer has the economic scope, financial resources or legitimacy to solve the world’s biggest challenges on its own – not in the short term as we have seen with the roll out of Covid vaccines to the developing world, or longer term as seen with unsustainable developing country debt and climate change. Short of morphing into the G20, it cannot aspire to this. 

The group should be clear, however, that it does see itself as having a core responsibility to come up with and champion approaches that can effectively address these problems and that do so in a way that is equitable and reflects the concerns of the wider international community. 

Third, the group should acknowledge that a further core responsibility will be to provide a forum in which its members can coordinate policies to uphold shared economic values and interests, including when these are in competition with other economies. 

And fourth, the G7 needs to explain how, taking account of these values and roles, it will work constructively with other economies and the global governance architecture. In a practical sense this is the most important, both in terms of the group’s ability to influence the international agenda and in the example it sets to other major economies. It is also the most difficult. 

The lead on solving some global issues – such as climate finance, recovery from the pandemic, reform of the global tax system and developing-country debt – must necessarily bodog online casino lie ultimately with the G20. 

Others – such as resilience in supply chains, digital governance and national security considerations in investment – may need to be dealt with at a G7 level among close allies but could still be tied into more universal frameworks of benefit to all. 

The G7 will need to balance finding global solutions to global problems with parallel efforts to underpin the values and economic interests of its members and find a way to communicate this sympathetically. 

Apart from the inevitable ‘not invented here’ syndrome, there is a risk the wider world will distrust G7 initiatives intended for the greater good if they are presented alongside actions that are focused on upholding common group interests.  To counter this the G7 will need to persuade sceptics – through practical examples – that competition in some areas can coexist with cooperation in others. 

To complement greater clarity on its new role, the G7 should take stock of how it can maximize its effectiveness.  In principle, the presidency needs the consent of other members for the decisions it takes on summit organisation. This is rarely withheld, but any change of approach will only become permanent if actively supported by other members and adopted by subsequent presidencies.

There have been several attempts by individual presidencies to review the effectiveness of the institution and hardwire the conclusions into future practice.  These have had mixed results at best. But there are four themes on which the group should try again to reach a consensus in Cornwall.

First, expansion: The success of the G7 depends on the like-mindedness of its participants, the fact that the leaders typically get to know each other well, and that the group is small enough to sit round a medium sized dining table. 

It should therefore set a high bar for any permanent expansion and potentially rule it out for the foreseeable future. It is particularly important to avoid including new members who would prevent discussion of core national economic security interests – as was the case when Russia was a member. 

Second, scope: The G7 has ranged across economic, social and political issues, and this should continue. Similarly, a successful theme may be inspired by an immediate crisis or be a slower-burn, second-tier topic that deserves to rise to the top tier. 

But the most successful presidencies have almost always had limited agendas focused on one or two themes where effective outcomes can only be achieved through international cooperation. The G7 should establish this approach as a norm with the summit tackling at most three closely related themes or two unrelated themes. 

Third, outreach: Both the G7 and G20 have experimented with a range of outreach approaches to countries, international organizations and non-official stakeholders. Sometimes these have been valuable, but too often they have been largely cosmetic and potentially counterproductive. It should be a priority to work out what works and what doesn’t.

Specific steps should include: identifying areas where outside expertise or political support is critical to a chosen theme and embedding outreach to specific countries, institutions or individuals from the outset; avoiding permanent institutionalized groups of stakeholders rolling over from one presidency to the next, since these can easily become divorced from the presidency agenda and an end in themselves; and ensuring that any high-level independent expert group established to investigate aspects of a chosen theme publishes recommendations well before the final outputs for the summit are locked down.

Fourth, tools and working methods: Covid has transformed the way the G7 and G20 groups have worked over the past year, with  most preparatory meetings and contact between leaders happening virtually. It is critical to capture the best of virtual working in future practice, while recognizing that a complete lack of personal contact is a major drawback. 

One approach might be to cut the number of in-person ‘Sherpa’ meetings from four to two and add four shorter virtual sessions. The G7 needs to make sure it has communications that are secure enough to meet the needs of its growing role in economic security.

During the Cornwall summit, the British presidency has a rare opportunity to communicate a clear vision of what the G7 is for and how it will operate in the future. This would be an important contribution to the wider system of global governance, enhancing the influence of the individual G7 members and setting an example to similar groups in what could otherwise become an increasingly fragmented and dysfunctional system. 

We should all hope that it steps up to this challenge. 

Creon Butler joined Chatham House from the Cabinet Office where he served as director for international economic affairs in the National Security Secretariat and G7/G20 ‘sous sherpa’, advising on global policy issues such as climate change, natural resource security, global health threats and the future of the international economic architecture. Earlier in his career, he served in the Bank of England, HM Treasury and in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, where he was director for economic policy and chief economic adviser.

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Despite some progress, the G7 have so far failed to adequately commit to the urgent need to tackle ever growing natural resource consumption and generation of waste – the primary drivers of climate change, biodiversity loss and many other environmental and geopolitical challenges.

Looking beyond the G7 towards upcoming summits, such as COP26 and the G20, this article will outline three principles for a truly global green recovery: efficiency, sufficiency and fairness.

The climate emergency and COVID-19 pandemic have exposed and exacerbated major cracks in the foundations of the neoliberal economic model – the rise of nationalism and protectionism, growing wealth inequality, fragile global supply chains, uneven access to basic human needs and worker exploitation. It is no coincidence that society is experiencing them simultaneously as they are, by and large, symptoms of the same underlying cause – the global race to endlessly maximize and capture economic growth through resource consumption.

In 2019, for the first time in history, humanity consumed over 100 billion tonnes of the earth’s resources in just one year. Extraction and processing of natural resources is responsible for approximately half of the world’s carbon emissions and 90 per cent of biodiversity loss. Such high rates of resource consumption are causing, and will continue to cause, irreparable damage to ecosystems.

A green recovery from the pandemic is a ‘once in a generation’ opportunity to address these issues and to make the economic system greener, fairer and more resilient. The green recovery took centre stage at the G7 with the announcement of the B3W partnership and expressed support for the transition to sustainable management and use of natural resources. But what does sustainable management and use of natural resources mean in the context of a global green recovery?

Is Green Growth the Answer to a Green Recovery?

Many argue that the green recovery should be underpinned by pursuing green growth – in other words growing the economy while simultaneously reducing environmental impact through increasing material and energy efficiency. The EU’s €1.8 trillion post-COVID-19 fund and President Biden’s $6 trillion stimulus package proposal are prime examples of the green growth agenda, as is the B3W with its commitment to accelerating ‘clean and green growth’.

Assuming that all green recovery fiscal stimulus packages focus entirely on green investments – setting aside the fact that, to date, most of them have largely failed at this – there remains no empirical evidenceto suggest that green growth driven by efficiency gain has been – or can be – achieved anywhere near the scale needed to prevent dangerous climate change and other dimensions of ecological breakdown.

The reason for this is that efficiency gain is the driver of economic growth. The more efficient your economy becomes, the faster it grows and the more resources it consumes – otherwise known as the Jevons paradox.

For the G7 to keep their promise of ‘protecting at least 30 per cent of global land and at least 30 per cent of the global ocean by 2030’ and ‘support the transition to sustainable management and use of natural resources’ they must look beyond simply curtailing waste and consider how to absolutely reduce natural resource consumption in a fair manner.

The summation of all of this is simple but stark. A green recovery dependent on green growth may reduce carbon emissions, but it will continue to accelerate natural resource consumption and therefore the destruction of the natural world.

This poses a difficult but essential question for global leaders: how can B3W ensure sustainable management and use of natural resources under a growth-based scenario?

Three Principles for a Global Green Recovery

Many leading thinkers have sought to answer this question with ideas such as Doughnut Economics, Wellbeing economics, Degrowth or the Safe Operating Space. But despite increasing political traction, these ideas have yet to be translated into binding multilateral agreements. With 2021 being the ‘super year’ for the environment, there has never been a better time to convert these ideas into action. What is needed for a truly global green recovery are the principles of efficiency, sufficiency and fairness.

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There is no way the world can remain within the 1.5°C target or address biodiversity loss without massive resource efficiency gains. The G7 must reaffirm their commitment to the Bologna roadmap which aims to coordinate and progress actions to increase resource efficiency and transition to a more circular economy. The goal of the circular economy is simple: to design out waste and pollution by keeping products and materials in use for as long as possible. Resource efficiency and circular economy should be deeply integrated into the B3W initiative.

However, efficiency gain on its own is not enough to overcome the accelerated resource demand fuelled by the need for constant economic (green) growth – for that we turn to sufficiency.

Sufficiency: An adequate amount of something essential
Sufficiency means consuming the right quantity of material goods and services necessary for optimal health and wellbeing — avoiding underconsumption (poverty) but also conspicuous overconsumption (environmental destruction). Sufficiency is growth agnostic in that it promotes growth where it is needed to eliminate poverty and in economic activities which are beneficial to people and the planet, such as renewable energy or the caring economy. In this respect, the G7 commitment to support clean and green growth in low-income countries is commendable and essential. But to allow developing countries the space to grow within the planetary boundaries, developed countries must also significantly curtail their levels of consumption.

Achieving sufficiency is not necessarily contrary to proponents of green growth. If proponents of green growth are in fact correct, and it is feasible to decouple economic growth from material and energy consumption, placing a moratorium on resource extraction – like the cap on carbon emissions agreed through the Paris Agreement – will only serve to complement this goal. A multilateral agreement on a ‘Safe Operating Space’ is required to ensure fair and sustainable management of natural resources.

Fairness: Reduce inequality through redistribution
Critical to achieving sufficiency is fair redistribution. There is an urgent need to strengthen resource equality and redistribution, both within and across nations, to ensure that all communities have the necessary resources, capacity and material share to deliver wellbeing. Wealth accumulation also needs to be distributed fairly to those who contributed to it, including the public sector where it can be reinvested into more resource efficient public goods and services such as public transport, healthcare and education.

Finally, any global recovery must also put a just transition front and centre. Many people’s jobs and livelihoods – particularly the poorest – are, and will continue to be, affected by the transition to a wellbeing economy, as well as the effects of climate change. The $100 billion per year climate finance fund and financing for the Sustainable Development Goals to achieve the human development targets for 2030 should be substantially increased to support this transition.

In conclusion, the G7 have shown leadership in committing to the B3W partnership and recognizing the need for sustainable management and use of natural resources. But the question remains: what does sustainable natural resource management mean in the context of building back better? The principles of efficiency, sufficiency and fairness could serve as the framework for world leaders to address this question at the upcoming G20 and COP26 summits.

Dr Jack Barrie is an expert on the topic of the circular economy. He holds a PhD from University of Strathclyde on circular economy innovation policy, and previously held the role of Schmidt-MacArthur fellow with the Ellen MacArthur Foundation.

Patrick Schröder is a senior research fellow in the Energy, Environment and Resources department. At Chatham House he specializes in research on the global transition to an inclusive circular economy with a specific focus on collaborative opportunities between key countries, closing the investment gap and building an evidence base for trade in the circular economy.

To read the full commentary from Chatham House, please click here.

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The first is whether UK prime minister Boris Johnson’s notion of “Global Britain” has substance. The G7 summit scheduled bodog online casino for June 11-13 in Cornwall will be one of two major international gatherings hosted by the United Kingdom in its first full year of independence from the European Union. (The other is the United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP26, in November.) Johnson has wisely ditched his earlier idea of formally supplanting the G7 with a “D10” of leading democracies, opting instead to invite four other countries—Australia, India, South Korea, and South Africa—as guests at this year’s G7 meetings.

Optics—from the smoothness of the summit logistics to Johnson’s own performance as chair—will play a role in whether Britain can restore some of its luster as a global leader, but ultimately the success of the Cornwall summit will be judged by its substantive outcomes. London has laid out an ambitious agenda for its host year under the familiar banner, “Build Back Better.” It promises collective action in four areas: pandemic recovery and resilience, climate change, free and fair trade, and shared values (more on the last of these below). Pre-summit meetings of ministers on these topics have produced encouraging roadmaps for G7 cooperation; the question is whether Johnson can engender a sense of unity of purpose among leaders and collective determination to deliver tangible action in these areas. (If recent reports of a possible G7 agreement on a global minimum corporate tax hold up, this will certainly count as a big win for Johnson.)

G7 solidarity will largely hinge on a second test: whether the United States and European Union can patch up their differences and agree to work together on global challenges. Given the G7’s disproportionately transatlantic membership, harmony between Washington and Brussels is a precondition for broader G7 effectiveness. The two sides have sparred for years over trade, regulation, privacy, and taxation, and four years of haranguing and imposition of tariffs by former president Donald Trump have kindled European yearnings for “strategic autonomy.” Hopes of a reset after the November 2020 U.S. elections were set back by the European Commission’s conclusion of a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) with China at the end of the year, despite clear signals of concern from the Biden transition team. Moreover, the fact that, four months into its term, the Biden administration has still not removed Trump’s 2018 steel and aluminum tariffs remains a thorn in Brussels’ side. (It also highlights an awkward tension in Biden’s international economic policy, namely between the administration’s impulse to work with allies and its equally strong determination to protect American workers.)

Yet there have also been promising signs of rapprochement between Washington and Brussels. Less than one month after the U.S. elections last fall, the European Commission laid out “a new, forward-looking transatlantic agenda for global cooperation.” President Biden signaled a clear recommitment to the transatlantic alliance in February, calling out the need for continued U.S.-EU cooperation in response to shared challenges, including Covid-19, climate change, and strategic competition with China. The two sides have agreed to put on hold their long-standing battle over subsidies to Boeing and Airbus and the more recent spat over steel tariffs. The new transatlantic goodwill—assuming it continues—improves the prospects for meaningful outcomes at the G7 summit and beyond.

Driving the United States and European Union together is their growing concern about the behavior of large authoritarian powers, notably Russia and China. President Vladimir Putin’s Russia is seen as menace on both sides of the Atlantic, invading and pressuring neighboring countries, assassinating political rivals, and launching cyberattacks on Western assets. G7 foreign ministers spoke out forcefully against Russia’s coercive behavior earlier this month, though no new action was announced. European concerns about China, meanwhile, have lagged behind those in the United States, but the gap is closing as a result of Beijing’s inroads into Eastern and Southern Europe, its repression in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, and its sanctioning of European politicians and civil society organizations. At least three of the G7’s invited guests—Australia, India, and South Korea—have been subject to various forms of coercion by Beijing and will also welcome a group stand against this behavior.

All of this points to the G7’s third test: can this group of advanced market democracies step up to the challenge of defending the international rules and norms that it has long championed but that are increasingly under strain? Despite its early mistakes, China has managed the disruptions of Covid-19 better than most advanced countries, creating a perception in some quarters (not only in Beijing) that authoritarian state capitalism may be a more effective form of governance than market democracy. Biden has made clear that he sees the competition between democracy and authoritarianism as a generational challenge; as he said in his first press conference in March, “This is a battle between the utility of democracies in the twenty-first century and autocracies. We’ve got to prove democracy works.”

Johnson apparently shares this sentiment and wants to use the G7 as a platform for defending democratic values. As mentioned earlier, London has put forward “championing our shared values” as one of the four themes of its G7 host year. It has identified global development, including girls’ education, food security, health, and sustainable development financing, as the centerpiece of the group’s policy work on shared values. In addition to these critical topics, it will be important to watch what the G7 says and does about another high-stakes policy issue for market democracies: data governance. As we have written, this is the missing “fifth pillar” of the global economic order, and the G7 has an opportunity to begin building a favorable system of international rules, standards, and norms for data flows and related issues.

Expectations for substantial policy progress at any given summit meeting should be suitably low. The question is whether G7 leaders in Cornwall can present a compelling vision for cooperation among like-minded market democracies, describing the “city on the hill” to which the group is headed, and then lay down a few tangible “bricks in the road” toward that destination, before passing the trowel to next year’s G7 host, Germany.

Matthew P. Goodman is senior vice president for economics and holds the Simon Chair in Political Economy at CSIS. The CSIS Economics Program, which he directs, focuses on international economic policy and global economic governance. Before joining CSIS in 2012, Goodman served as director for international economics on the National Security Council staff, helping the president prepare for global and regional summits, including the G20, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and East Asia Summit.

To read the full commentary from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, please click here.

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For them, strategic industries like health care are a primary area of concern. How do these measures manifest in practice and why are they being implemented by host countries?

While investment screening measures are not new, the scope of their expansion is. Before the pandemic, a study analyzing FDI-screening measures established three justifications for these measures — fear of becoming dependent on a foreign company for the delivery of critical goods and services, a desire to ensure that domestic technology and expertise remain within national borders and the prevention of surveillance or sabotage of essential services.

The pandemic has added new dimensions to these insecurities that will have global ramifications for FDI and trade flows.

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The Appellate Body (“AB”) has ceased functioning with the United States blocking the appointment of new AB members based on longstanding problems with the Dispute Settlement system that have not been addressed. There are fundamental differences among major Members in what the proper role of the dispute settlement system is. Because the AB’s view of its role has differed from that of at least some of the Members, many delegations have opted to litigate instead of negotiate on issues which are not covered by the actual language of existing agreements.

The negotiating function of the WTO has had limited success in the first 25 years of the WTO reflecting deep differences among Members in priorities and the core function of the WTO. The inability to update rules or develop new rules to address 21st century commercial realities has called into question the ongoing relevance of the organization Members have failed to honor agreement directions for periodic liberalization updates in agriculture and services trade. Members have also taken decades to tackle issues of pressing time sensitivity, such as fisheries subsidies.

bodog poker review And there are problems in the timeliness and completeness of notifications required by many agreements and the quality of the work of many of the Committees.

A bright spot for an organization in trouble has been the success of bringing additional countries and territories into the organization. Of the 164 members at present, 36 have joined since the WTO opened in 1995 and some 23 countries or territories are in the accession process at the moment. Some 98% of global trade is now covered by WTO Members. While there are many reasons for countries or territories to join the WTO, including integrating into the global economy and improving the competitiveness of the economy (Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff describes the benefits of accession as being a catalyst for domestic reform and economic growth), there is no doubt that accessions are of benefit to the global trading system and bring the benefits of liberalization in the acceding country or territory to the existing WTO membership. Indeed, commitments of acceding Members in terms of tariff liberalization and other obligations typically are far higher than the commitments of existing Members at the same economic stage of development. Yet, accession is of great benefit to acceding countries. See WTO press release, 8 November 2020, DDG Wolff: WTO accession is a catalyst for domestic reform and economic growth, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/ddgaw_06nov20_e.htm. DDG Wolff, in speaking to Arab countries in the accession process made the following comments:

“Furthermore, during the last eight months, the world has experienced unprecedented levels of disruptions in people’s daily lives and their economic activities due to Covid-19. The world is not near the end of this crisis. Despite these challenging times, trade has played a key role in addressing local shortages of food, medical supplies and other essentials during the pandemic.

“Trade will have to play an even greater role in supporting recovery of the global economy going forward. In this context, we should recognise the important role played by Saudi Arabia in steering the G20 during this difficult year, urging collective and multilateral cooperation. The Riyadh Initiative is a praiseworthy effort endorsed by the G20 nations.

“The Arab region has not escaped the dire economic consequences of this pandemic. For some, the steep fall in oil prices has aggravated existing problems. A crisis, however, also presents opportunities for closer international cooperation to limit the harm from the pandemic and to spur the recovery.

“These issues demonstrate that more, not less, global and regional trade integration is required. Integration into the world economy goes hand in hand with necessary domestic reforms. This is where WTO accession makes particularly valuable contributions. Those engaged in the reform-driven accession process are likely to experience a quicker recovery and greater resilience in the future.

“Based on evidence from the 36 accessions which have been successfully completed, the WTO accession process has served as an effective external anchor for domestic reforms, acting as a catalyst in realizing the potential of their economies. According to the last WTO Director-General’s Annual Report on WTO Accessions, Article XII Members have registered higher growth rates of GDP and trade (exports and imports), as well as increased flows of inward FDI stocks, in the years following their accession compared to the rest of the world. These results indicate that integrated, open economies tend to grow faster. In addition, by signalling a government’s commitment to international rules, WTO membership appears to also encourage the inflow of foreign investment.

“The accession process has been used by resource-based countries to diversify their economies. Economic diversification is one of the major priorities for the governments in the Arab region. Our 2016 study examined whether countries’ export structures became more diversified after gaining WTO membership. This was true for about half of the recently acceded
Members, which increased the number of exported products, measured in HS chapters, accounting for more than 60% of their exports after accession. This was achieved often through rebranding their economies with WTO membership and attracting increased FDI.”

From 1995-2016, the thirty-six countries or territories that joined the WTO included many of the major economies that were not original Members of the WTO. These included China, Chinese Taipei, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation. The other countries or territories who have joined represent a wide cross-section of geographic regions and levels of development: Ecuador, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Panama, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Jordan, Georgia, Albania, Oman, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova, Armenia, North Macedonia, Nepal, Cambodia, Tonga, Cabo Verde, Montenegro, Samoa, Vanuatu, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Tajikistan, Yemen, Seychelles, Kazakhstan, Liberia, and Afghanistan. No accessions have been completed since 2016.

The twenty-three countries and territories that are in the process of accession often are countries or territories that have suffered from years of conflict. This has led the WTO to host the first “Trade for Peace Week” from November 30-December 4, 2020. See WTO press release, 25 November 2020, WTO to host first Trade for Peace Week, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/acc_25nov20_e.htm.

“In announcing the Trade for Peace Week, Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff noted: ‘The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development recognizes international trade as an engine for inclusive economic growth and poverty reduction that contributes to the promotion of sustainable development. This in turn can facilitate building and maintaining peace. The connection between trade and peace is the raison d’être for the creation of the rules-based multilateral trading system that led to economic recovery and prosperity after the devastation from World War II.’

“Currently, 23 countries are in the process of joining the WTO, and over a half of them suffer from a fragile situation from years of conflicts. Launched in 2017, the Trade for Peace initiative aims to assist fragile and conflict-affected (FCA) countries through WTO accession, with the emphasis on institution building based on the principles of non-discrimination, predictability, transparency and the rule of law. Based on experiences of former FAC countries, WTO accession can help set the conditions to move out of a state of fragility or conflict into a state of stability, economic well-being and peace.”

There are ten events this week. The public can register to participate in the virtual panels. See WTO Accessions, Trade for Peace Week, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/t4peace2020_e.htm.

DDG Wolff spoke at one of today’s event and his comments are embedded below. See WTO press release, November 30, 2020, DDG Alan Wolff – DDG Wolff calls for more structured WTO cooperation with humanitarian and peace communities, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/ddgaw_30nov20_e.htm.

The twenty-three countries and territories in the process of accession include: Algeria, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belarus, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros, Curacao, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanese Republic, Libya, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Timor-Leste, and Uzbekistan.

Conclusion

The genesis for the GATT and the other Bretton Woods institutions was a desire to provide an infrastructure and global rules to minimize the likelihood of future world wars. Cooperation, collaboration and integration would all reduce the likelihood of global conflict.

The WTO provides the opportunity for countries or territories struggling to escape violence to embark on a path of hope. That is a core mission of the WTO today just as it was for the GATT in the late 1940s.

Moreover, the record over the first twenty-five years of the WTO’s existence has been that those countries and territories who take the challenging steps to become Members of the WTO improve their economies and speed growth, development and foreign direct investment. Accessions also offer real improvements in market access for existing WTO Members. A true win-win situation.

For an organization struggling to maintain relevance amidst deep divisions among Members who seem to have lost the consensus on the core purpose of the organization, the pilgrimage of non-member countries and territories to join the organization is a beacon of hope. Serious reforms and updating of the rule book are desperately needed for a better functioning system where outcomes are based on underlying economic strengths and not the interference of governments. A willingness of Members to refocus on what the purpose of the WTO is in fact and to be supporters of contributing to the maximum of one’s ability will be key to forward movement. Inspiration can be drawn from the efforts of non-members to join.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, bodog poker review|Most Popular_Congressional

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“First, an observation: the game must be in play for key players to conclude that they have to join. If negotiations are not under way, there may be a substantial delay in attracting participation.

“Declarations, such as on trade and health, should be turned into formal proposals as soon as possible and should be embraced by all WTO members.

“And if some Members won’t come along or seek to delay — a joint initiative is a practical way to proceed and could then be launched as a priority. The time of testing should not be so long as to make a response to the pandemic arrive too late to be responsive to the current crisis.

“Second, Members can ask the WTO Secretariat for and receive support for evaluations of aspects of WTO reform. For example, on trade and health, Members can —

“Request the Secretariat to upgrade its COVID-19-related trade monitoring activities to collect and publish the best information available, not relying solely on notifications and verification. (This would be a more comprehensive and in-depth activity than that which takes place at present, which in itself was an upgrade from pre-COVID monitoring.)

“Request the Secretariat to work with the WHO, relevant UN agencies and other stakeholders, to highlight trade issues affecting vaccine production and availability, and to propose ways to eliminate obstacles. (This would go beyond existing activities and result in proposals put to the WTO Member- ship).

“Third, Members can

“Propose that the Director General convene a small, representative, ambassador-level group of Friends of Trade and Health to identify how the trading system has performed during the pandemic and to issue preliminary conclusions and recommendations for useful changes in approach within a short, defined timeline.

“Propose that the WTO Secretariat embark now upon the necessary supporting work without delay.

“Propose that the Director General constitute other ‘Friends’ groups to advance consideration of institutional reform and other issues of current importance, and providing possible solutions, such as with respect to the relationship to current and future WTO Agreements of the Paris Accord on Climate Change, the disciplining of fossil fuel subsidies, addressing border adjustments likely with the adoption of carbon taxes, assessing the impact on markets of subsidies and other state interventions, employing trade to reduce income inequality, making the WTO more effective for economic development within and among Member economies, improving the trading system with respect to women in trade, providing WTO support for the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, and more generally strategic foresight.

“G20 Members clearly want to enhance preparedness for future pandemics and other crises. Flexible groups with appropriate balance but able to be nimble and responsive are one way to supplement but not supplant the work of committees and joint statement initiatives (JSIs).

‘Propose that an ad hoc horizontal mechanism be created promptly in the event of crises to address — in real time — trade measures that are of concern. The mechanism, similar to trade policy reviews, but not limited to any single WTO Member’s measures, trade restrictive and trade liberalizing, should be constituted immediately for the current pandemic and economic recovery measures.

“Fourth, Members can

“Propose that the signatories of the Pharmaceutical Agreement providing for duty-free trade be updated (last done in 2010), that major nonsigna-tories join and that essential medical supplies be added to the coverage.

“Propose that the signatories of the Information Technology Agreement review and update its coverage, including adding medical equipment.

“Propose that negotiations on the Environmental Goods Agreement re-start in earnest now, with the addition of services.”

The Ottawa Group agreed to put forward a communication seeking action by WTO Members. Each of Canada and the EU (and likely other members) put out press releases. See, e.g., Government of Canada, November 23, 2020, Minister Ng hosts successful ministerial meeting of the Ottawa Group on WTO reform, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2020/11/minister-ng-hosts-successful-ministerial-meeting-of-the-ottawa-group-on-wto-reform.html; European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, 23 November 2020, Ottawa Group proposes a global Trade and Health Initiative, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2215&title=Ottawa-Group-proposes-a-global-Trade-and-Health-Initiative.

The Canadian press release states in part, “As countries face a rise in COVID-19 cases, it is essential that governments minimize disruptions to trade flows in essential medical supplies. Today, members of the Ottawa Group took important steps toward a proposed WTO Trade and Health Initiative, bodog online casino which identifies short-term actions to strenghten supply chains and ensure the free flow of medicines and medical supplies.”

Similarly the European Commission press release stated that –

“Today the Ottawa Group, a group of 13 like-minded World Trade Organisation (WTO) partners including the EU, agreed today on an initiative, calling on the WTO members to increase their cooperation and work toward enhanced global rules to facilitate trade in essential medical goods. The agreement took place as an outcome of the Ottawa Group Ministerial meeting, hosted virtually by Minister Mary Ng of Canada.

“The Ottawa Group members called for immediate actions in response to the coronavirus crisis such as exercising a restraint in using any export restrictions, implementing trade-facilitating measures in the area of customs and services, as well as improving transparency.

“They also called for further cooperation amongst members, and between the WTO and other international organisations.

“The group also encourages WTO members to refrain from imposing tariffs on essential medical goods during the crisis. Such actions are intended to strengthen the resilience of supply chains and contribute to an effective response to a public health emergency. They can serve as a basis for future permanent commitments on trade in essential medical goods.

“Commission Executive Vice President and Commissioner for Trade Valdis Dombrovskis said: ‘We are proud to promote this trade and health initiative. It aims to encourage stronger global cooperation at WTO level, by facilitating trade in healthcare products. This is critical in the current global health crisis and will also help us in future. But the Ottawa Group trade and health initiative is just the first step. Going forward, the EU will work to promote resilient global healthcare systems, as well as accessible and affordable healthcare products universally.’

“The communication will now be submitted later this week to the WTO secretariat, before being presented to the WTO General Council for discussion. It will be used to prepare the 12th Ministerial Conference of the WTO, due to be held in 2021.”

That same day, November 23, the Ottawa Group submitted to the WTO a communication entitled “COVID-19 and beyond: Trade and Health”. WT/GC/223 (24 November 2020). The document is embedded below.

The communication is ten paragraphs plus an Annex which is described as “Draft Elements of a ‘Trade and Health’ Initiative”. The communication reviews the social and economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and invites “all WTO Members to start working on a Trade and Health Initiative” referencing the Annex. Paragraph 6 of the communication summarizes the specific actions being proposed.

“6. With this objective in mind, we call on WTO Members to make their utmost efforts to prevent further disruptions in the supply chains of essential medical goods. As set out in the Annex to this Communication, we propose specific actions relating to export restrictions, trade facilitation,
technical regulations, tariffs, transparency and review, and call for the WTO to enhance its cooperation with other relevant international organizations, such as WHO, WCO, OECD as well as G20, given the context of the on-going evaluations of the global response to COVID-19. These proposed actions are not intended to be prescriptive and do not cover the universe of possible
measures that could support trade in essential medical goods. Rather, they reflect emerging best practices and should provide sufficient flexibility to be adapted to differing national circumstances.”

The Ottawa Group is hoping to get the support of all Members on a joint statement early in 2021 on a Trade and Health Initiative which could serve as a starting point for negotiations for new WTO commitments at the 12th Ministerial Conference in the summer of 2021 in Kazakhstan.

On export restrictions, the Annex calls for greater oversight of such restrictions without eliminating them outright.

On customs, services and technical regulations, the Annex calls for Members to share information and experiences on best practices in trade facilitation during a crisis (customs procedures, services (including freight, logistics, distribution and transport)) and on standards and technical requirements looking towards regulatory alignment.

On tariffs, the Annex calls on Members to “make best endeavours to temporarily remove or reduce tariffs on goods that are considered essential to fighting COVID-19 pandemic”.

On transparency and review, the Annex calls on Members to enhance transparency during the pandemic with the aim of identifying supply chain disruptions and avoiding such disruptions.

On the topic of cooperation of the WTO with other organizations, the Annex both encourages the WTO Secretariat to continue it outreach on measures related to COVID-19 and the studies developed by the Secretariat with a focus “on the causes and effects of the disruptions in the supply chains of essential goods and drawing on research of other international organizations.” The WTO Director-General is also encouraged to “intensify cooperation” with other organizations (including the G20) to improve “the analytical capacity of Members to monitor market developments in trade and production of essential medical goods.”

Finally, the Annex asks Members to review the effectiveness of the identified elements at the 12th Ministerial Conference “with a view to adopting possible commitments regarding trade in essential medical goods.”

Conclusion

There have been many communications put forward by different groups of Members at the WTO in the last eight months on actions that would make sense in terms of limiting export restraints on medical goods or avoiding such restraints on agricultural goods, about the need for effective trade facilitation measures to reduce barriers to movement of medical goods, and on other topics related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Ottawa Group’s communication from Monday is an effort to come up with an early possible deliverable that could garner broad WTO Member support. As a result it seeks a joint statement with agreement on the statement for early 2021. The Group also provides five draft proposals for such a joint statement. The proposals don’t eliminate existing flexibility (e.g., export restraints) but try to tighten disciplines via increased transparency. The proposals encourage development of best practices on a range of trade facilitation and regulatory alignment issues. The proposals also encourage what is obviously in most Members self-interest — reducing or eliminating tariffs on medical goods during the pandemic. The proposals also call on Members to do a better job on transparency on measure taken during the pandemic with a focus on identifying disruptions to supply chains and addressing the same in short order. Finally, while the WTO already cooperates with other organizations, the proposals point to specific areas where enhanced cooperation would be helpful.

In an organization where Members have a low level of trust in each other, a joint statement on the need for a Trade and Health Initiative such as proposed by the Ottawa Group is probably all that can be achieved in the short term. Something along the lines outlined in the Annex would indeed be a confidence builder if achieved early in 2021. The ability to review developments at the 12th Ministerial and start negotiations on trade in essential medical goods at that time will also be important if accomplished. The more ambitious options presented by DDG Wolff should be considered but realistically are unlikely to either happen or get started ahead of the 12th Ministerial.

Let’s hope that the WTO membership can come together to support the Ottawa Group proposal. The EC has indicated that the Communication will be taken up at the December General Council meeting. That will be an early opportunity to see if there is likely to broad support for the initiative.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, bodog poker review|Most Popular_Congressional

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Yesterday, I had put up a post that looked at the WTO’s Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff’s statement to the G20 on important measures needed in the trade arena to help with responding to the global health pandemic, economic recovery and WTO reform. See November 22, 2020, DDG Wolff’s comments to G20 on immediate challenges for trade to address economic rebound from the pandemic and for WTO reform, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/11/22/ddg-wolffs-comments-to-g20-on-immediate-challenges-for-trade-to-address-economic-rebound-from-the-pandemic-and-for-wto-reform/. The activities of the G20 are far broader than simply the trade issues reviewed in yesterday’s post and much of the Declaration looks at various aspects of addressing recovery from the pandemic, including access to vaccines and therapeutics. However, on the trade agenda in particular identified by DDG Wolff, the G20 does not appear to have addressed the issue of trade finance for developing and least developed countries, did not call for creating duty free treatment for all pharmaceuticals and medical goods relevant to the COVID-19 pandemic, and while supportive of WTO reform did not provide specifics or a sense of time urgency. The Declaration contains 38 paragraphs broken in four sections. Many deal with topics that are being examined in part at the WTO (e.g., digital trade) or that may be going forward (e.g., environment, climate change). There was only one paragraph on trade and investment (para. 12) (under section “B. Building a Resilient and Long-Lasting Recovery”). The paragraph reads as follows:

“12. Trade and Investment: Supporting the multilateral trading system is now as important as ever. We strive to realize the goal of a free, fair, inclusive, non-discriminatory, transparent, predictable, and stable trade and investment environment, and to keep our markets open. We will continue to work to ensure a level playing field to foster an enabling business environment. We endorse the G20 Actions to Support World Trade and Investment in Response to COVID-19. We recognize the contribution that the Riyadh Initiative on the Future of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has made by providing an additional opportunity to discuss and reaffirm the objectives and foundational principles of the multilateral trading system as well as to demonstrate our ongoing political support for the necessary reform of the WTO, including in the lead up to the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference. We recognize the need to increase the sustainability and resilience of national, regional, and global supply chains that foster the sustainable integration of developing and least developed countries into the trading system, and share the objective of promoting inclusive economic growth including through increased participation of micro-, small-, medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in international trade and investment. We note that structural problems in some sectors, such as excess capacities, can cause a negative impact.”

The G20 Declaration in paragraph 3 provides a statement indicating G20 members “will spare no effort to ensure * * * affordable and equitable access for all people, consistent with members’ commitments to incentivize innovation,” to COVID-19 diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines. The paragraph refers to the efforts of the “Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator (ACT-A) initiative and its COVAX facility,” and commits G20 members “to addressing the remaining global financing needs.” While obviously encouraging, the financing needs that remain are large both for vaccines and for testing and treatment. Total additional funding needs approach $40 billion. See Statement by President von der Leyen at the joint press conference with President Michel ahead of the G20 Summit, Brussels, 20 November 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_20_2170. Such contributions are voluntary and substantially exceed what has been pledged or received to date. So time will tell whether G20 countries actually fulfil the general commitment included in yesterday’s declaration.

The New York Times in an article on November 22 headlined “G20 Summit Closes With Little Progress and Big Gaps Between Trump and Allies,” describes the large number of topics where the current U.S. Administration has been at odds with many of the other G20 leaders and the resulting challenges to meaningful joint action as opposed to “general appeals for more global cooperation” and for “affordable and equitable access” to vaccines and therapeutics. New York Times, Nov. 22, 2020, G20 Summit Closes With Little Progress and Big Gaps Between Trump and Allies, a https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/us/politics/g20-summit-trump.html. While the Trump Administration undoubtedly has contributed to the lack of greater specifics in the Declaration, there are undoubtedly strong differences among different G20 members on what commitments should be undertaken that involve G20 members specifically.

Conclusion

The G20 process has been important over the last decade or so in mobilizing the world’s leading nations to provide leadership to address global challenges. The success of the group’s efforts depends on leadership of the majors and a common understanding of the challenges at hand. There are structural challenges in the current G20 configuration with different economic models and different levels of economic development providing points of conflict as well as points of expanded understanding of global needs. The challenges have been exacerbated by the concerns of the current U.S. Administration with multilateral organizations and with whether climate change is an actual problem.

With the current internal friction points, the G20 has nonetheless put forward a largely united front in seeking to meet the challenges from the COVID-19 pandemic and economic shocks through collaboration and to seek to rebuild more sustainably and more inclusively. The lack of specifics in some areas may be better addressed under a new U.S. Administration’s participation with the expected closer ties the Biden Administration will have with at least many of the G20 members.

In the trade arena, the conflicts within the WTO are not likely to go away with a new U.S. Administration. That doesn’t mean that U.S. leadership couldn’t permit rapid movement on a number of issues that would be helpful in addressing the pandemic and the global economic recovery. But WTO reform and even singular issues like updated coverage by the Pharmaceutical Agreement or the elimination of tariffs on medical goods unfortunately are likely to take way too long to be helpful in the current pandemic. That leaves voluntary bodog online casino actions by countries in their own interest as the likely option most likely to provide some improved market access during the pandemic.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, bodog poker review|Most Popular_Congressional

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“Thank you very much, Your Royal Highness, and I thank Saudi Arabia for its leadership.

“With respect to trade, there are three immediate challenges: to utilize trade to help underwrite the economic recovery, to facilitate trade in essential medical products to treat the pandemic, and to reform the institutional framework for world trade.

“First, trade finance for the developing world needs to be restored. The sum needed is very large, in the trillions of dollars. This step has been called for by business and by all the major international development banks along with the WTO. This is not just a development issue. When crops do not move and factories are idled throughout the developing world, the global recovery will be delayed for all. Close co-operation among the international financial institutions, the WTO and the large commercial banks will be needed. A trade finance initiative should be seen as an essential part of improving the outlook for economic recovery.

“Second, it is time for WTO Members to come together to agree on and implement measures to speed the supply of essential medical products worldwide to where they are needed.

“Global trade in pharmaceuticals should be duty-free under an updated Pharmaceutical Agreement.

“Medical equipment should be duty-free in an immediate update of the Information Technology Agreement.

“As new vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics start to be rolled out, barriers at borders must be reduced, with an international understanding limiting the use of export restrictions, providing for much greater transparency and accelerating improvements in trade facilitation efforts, particularly for the poorest countries.

“Third, and last, the identification of areas of common interest achieved by the Riyadh Initiative on the Future of the WTO should result in immediate serious engagement by WTO Members in a major institutional reform effort. This would involve restoring the WTO’s deliberative and negotiating functions, providing binding dispute settlement seen as legitimate by all and providing for a strong proactive Secretariat. The WTO’s 12th Ministerial Conference next year will be an important landmark for this work. In actively engaging in the reform effort, G20 Members can contribute immeasurably to fulfilling the vision held by the founders of the multilateral trading system seven decades ago and the WTO a quarter century ago.

“Thank you.”

WTO, DDG Wolff urges G20 leaders to back WTO action to support economic rebound, pandemic response and WTO reform, 21 November 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/ddgaw_21nov20_e.htm.

The G20 Leaders Summit is taking place virtually on November 21-22. The results of the Summit will be released later today. While a positive picture on agreed actions by the G20 will be presented, it is hard to imagine the G20 actually embracing the objectives/needs outlined by DDG Wolff.

For example, while it is likely that the G20 will lend support to a trade finance initiative to assist developing countries, the size of the initiative that is actually supported may be far less than the ambitious levels (trillions of dollars) identified as needed by Deputy Director-Wolff.

Similarly, while there is support in some quarters (e.g., the EU) for some of the trade liberalization initiatives identified in DDG Wolff’s second item, it is hard to see WTO Members being willing to reach consensus quickly on any of the three initiatives outlined. Certainly, the Pharmaceutical Agreement should be updated; how long that takes to accomplish is another issue and is unlikely to occur in a timeframe relevant to the COVID-19 pandemic. So too it is unlikely that WTO Members will quickly agree to duty free treatment of medical equipment whether under the Information Technology Agreement or otherwise, although countries needing to import such equipment have to a limited extent unilaterally reduced or eliminated duties during the pandemic. Such voluntary and temporary reductions seem the more promising short term solution. Finally, while individual countries have adopted trade facilitating/streamlining actions to speed the movement of medical goods and the WTO’s notification process has provided fair transparency of government actions, it is unlikely that there will be a quick agreement on limiting the use of export restrictions. There could be agreement on improved transparency and the WTO could work with LDCs and others to help them implement trade facilitation steps useful in speeding movement of medical goods.

On the third objective, “a major institutional reform effort,” while the G20 will undoubtedly support such action and support at least two of the three stated core planks — “restoring the WTO’s deliberative and negotiating functions, providing binding dispute settlement seen as legitimate by all” — the huge differences in objectives/concerns of many of the G20 countries makes any rapid movement towards reform in fact unlikely. For example, the United States, at least under the Trump Administration, has pushed for a fundamental rebalancing of rights and obligations in light of changed economic circumstances, pushed for a determination on whether the organization can function with very different economic systems under a set of rules designed for one type of economy, is seeking a restoration of the limited role envisioned for the WTO dispute settlement system and for panels and the Appellate Body. China has different objectives and opposes most of the U.S. priorities. The EU has very different views from the United States on the dispute settlement system. Thus, even before one looks at the broader WTO Membership, these three major Members have very different views on reform that will make efforts at reform at least time consuming (years not months). DDG Wolff includes in his list of reform efforts “providing for a strong proactive Secretariat.” This is an objective that has been stated by one or more past Directors-General, but it is unclear that there is strong Member support for a stronger Secretariat. Considering the U.S. concerns with the Appellate Body, it is hard to see them wanting a stronger Secretariat at the expense of Members. Indeed, WTO Members have frozen the WTO budget for years, and India has been seeking a reduction in budget resources for the WTO (10% cut has been proposed). The U.S. has also raised questions about Secretariat actions that appear outside of the agreed role of the Secretariat.

Conclusion

The G20 can have and has had an important role in limiting some of the more harmful actions of both G20 countries and of others in time of crisis. The G20 efforts to mobilize agreement on ways to keep markets open, limit market restrictions and support global initiatives to help smaller and more vulnerable countries has been and will continue to be important to reduce the depth of economic contraction and speed of economic rebound. And, of course, the G20 efforts go far beyond trade.

It has been important that the G20 has been open to receiving input from various organizations, including the WTO. The G20 has the ability to act fairly quickly where there is agreement among the countries. On trade, there are some major differences among G20 members not only on WTO reform but also on the need for existing WTO options for temporary export restrictions and willingness for providing greater transparency or to reach quick agreement on trade liberalization actions. Some G20 members have proposed broader WTO actions, and such actions may very well occur in the coming years although whether in time to alter the reality in the field during the COVID-19 pandemic is unlikely. Voluntary actions are obviously available in terms of reducing import restrictions including tariffs on medical goods and medicines/vaccines, and a number of countries have adopted streamlining actions to speed movement of medical goods during the pandemic.

Deputy Director-General Wolff’s statement to the G20 Leaders Summit contains important possible actions that the G20 could take or support. Some support from G20 members will almost certainly be forthcoming. Unfortunately, G20 action will not likely result in complete adoption of DDG Wolff’s proposals, nor will G20 action likely permit rapid implementation within the WTO or other organizations of DDG Wolff’s proposals. But it is useful to have a picture of a highly desirable future even if the audience for the message is unlikely to rise to the occasion for the global good.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, bodog poker review|Most Popular_Congressional

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