After World War II, a multilateral push toward freer and wider trade transformed the global economy. Tariffs and barriers fell, and more goods crossed more borders. It happened in phases, neither consistently nor all at once. A first phase started with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), with the United States seeking to build up free markets to counter global threats posed by the Soviet Union. A more recent phase included the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, and China and many of the former parts of the Soviet Union, including Russia, joining the multilateral trading system.

In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, however, as the WTO stumbled to negotiate new trade agreements, this trading system began to break down. Without multilateral progress, more nations sought to negotiate free trade agreements (FTAs). Now, industrial policies are proliferating and countries are focusing on “strategic” trade relationships, approaches generally at odds with the multilateral trading system first established in 1947. And this latest trend is not surprising given the vacuum left by the decline of the WTO and the disruptions in trade brought on by COVID-19 and Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The Biden administration has championed this new era, seeing it as a moment to reinvest in US manufacturing and better counter China’s economic clout. However, there has been blowback, and the chorus of critical voices aimed at US trade policies is large and growing. While much of this criticism is valid, as recent trade policies cast aside effective tools, such as FTAs, too cavalierly, there also have been earnest efforts to address pressing new realities.

To begin with, the administration’s efforts to collaborate with the European Union (EU), resolve existing tensions between the two, and forge new paths on critical issues, such as trade and climate change, stand out and deserve credit. During the Obama administration, negotiations on a transatlantic FTA were simply too ambitious, at least at the time, to get to the finish line. Later, the Trump administration upended the trade relationship with tariffs on steel and aluminum, even as it sought cooperation on addressing China challenges, such as nonmarket excess supply. Now, the Biden administration is focusing on reaching a long-term agreement to eliminate these tariffs and developing a framework for incentivizing trade in lower carbon-intensive goods. This work is critical as a counter to China and to avoid the EU’s pending carbon border adjustment measures applying to US exports in key sectors.

In contrast, the Biden administration’s signature effort in Asia to fill the vacuum left by abandonment of what is now the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) has fallen short. The recently concluded supply chain pillar in the Indo Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) is new, different, and seeks to meet the needs of the times. That said, the commitments in this pillar are soft ones, meaning there are few provisions that parties “shall” do something, and instead many that they “intend to” do something. Administration characterizations that this model is better than the old FTA model ignore the fact that FTA negotiations provide scope to include innovative chapters, including ones on supply chains.

The real challenge for the United States will be pinning down a trade pillar agreement that avoids falling far short of similar provisions in FTAs, such as the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) or the CPTPP. The Biden administration will be hard-pressed to obtain high-ambition commitments in the areas of good regulatory practices, trade facilitation, agriculture, labor, and environment without the leverage of market access commitments that accompany FTA negotiations. Count me skeptical. My own experience as an assistant US trade representative for environment and natural resources some years back suggests that FTA negotiations provide the best leverage for environmental commitments, such as those in the Dominican Republic–Central America FTA and the illegal logging provisions in the Peru FTA.

Digital trade is one area in which concerns are extremely high. The Biden administration’s review of its approach to commitments on cross-border data flows and data localization in trade agreements may make sense to ensure compatibility with regulatory trends in the United States. However, it appears the administration’s pullback in IPEF and WTO negotiations is an overreaction and will have significant implications for one of the top exporting sectors for the United States.

The US-India trade relationship is a test case for this new era. US policies toward India have evolved rapidly on the strategic front, and India’s perceived role in alliances to counter China is a central reason for this. However, the US-India trade relationship is playing catch-up to match breakthroughs on the strategic and defense fronts. While there are plenty of landmines ahead in the bilateral strategic landscape, including diverging self interest in relationships with Russia, the trajectory is likely to continue to be positive. On the trade and commercial front, the direction in the bilateral relationship is also positive, but it has a much lower starting point. The Trade Policy Forum, which wrestles through high-profile trade irritants, and the companion Commercial Dialogue, which helps to bring private sector chief executive officers into the circle, are producing more breakthroughs and expanding the scope of government-to-government collaboration on the economic front. However, Washington and New Delhi need to get more creative in building a bigger trade relationship, and they should start in 2024.

It is unfortunate that an FTA with India is not in the cards so long as the Biden administration continues to view this approach (wrongly, in my view) as archaic and not built for new challenges. Consequently, other forms of negotiation should fill the gap until there is a return to good sense and resumption of FTA negotiations. Early possibilities could include negotiations on India’s beneficiary status under the Generalized System of Preferences program and a critical minerals agreement.

For the moment, it appears a first-term Biden administration’s trade policies will continue to disappoint many experts, including former negotiators, members of Congress on both sides of the aisle, and the exporting private sector, even if some of its innovations bear fruit in the future. One might hope that there already are internal discussions taking place on what a second term might bring in trade policy, including consideration of bringing back some of the old policies while continuing to find new ways to address pressing priorities. It will take a combination of both to redress the harms brought on by globalization and the challenge of China while also innovating to bring climate change to the fore of US trade policy.

Mark Linscott is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and former assistant US trade representative for South and Central Asia, WTO and multilateral affairs, and environment and natural resources.

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In the words of Benjamin Franklin: “No nation was ever ruined by trade, even seemingly the most disadvantageous.” 

Over the last decades, not only were nations not harmed by trade, but they have been reaping unimaginable benefits, which have transformed the standard of living and afforded them greater access to competitively priced goods.

The Arabian Gulf region is an important global trade hub that depends heavily on exporting oil derivates and raw materials to the world. After oil and gas, the chemical and petrochemicals industry is the second largest industry in the region and plays a vital role in the Gulf Cooperation Council economies. The value of chemical trade flow in the GCC reached $88.6 billion in 2021, with exports accounting for $68.6 billion: an increase of 56.5 percent in value in 2021 compared to the year before.

Off the back of this growth, chemical trade is emerging at the forefront of the regional agenda. In 2021, the region set a new record with its trade surplus reaching $53.7 billion (the highest since 2009).

Furthermore, growth in the GCC chemical industry translates into better job creation in the region. In 2021, the chemical sector accounted for 53,900 direct and 107,800 indirect jobs, and 48,500 induced jobs — or a total of 210,200 jobs.

While regional chemical trade has been buoyant over the last three years, opportunities to improve the chemical industry’s international trade position certainly exist. But to achieve this, the policymakers’ role is of paramount importance if we are to see growth in the share of free trade agreements and preferential trade agreements between the GCC and its trading partners. Such deals are increasingly being seen as beneficial to GCC’s economic growth as well as the sustainability of the regional chemical industry. From helping to raise living standards to attract foreign investment, fostering innovation in manufacturing, and connecting businesses with people, free trade deals have an unmatched potential to make industries more sustainable, improve revenues, generate more jobs for the local population, and facilitate the development of advanced technologies.

Free trade agreements will help the region’s downstream players to boost their innovation output and become more competitive globally. Robust provisions on intellectual property rights protection that potentially go beyond the standard protection envisaged in the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights would reduce costs of trading in IP-sensitive goods and promote innovation in sectors, such as the chemical industry. 

Free trade deals not only reduce and eliminate tariffs, but they also help to overcome behind-the-border barriers. As a result, companies can focus on producing and selling goods that best utilize their resources, while other businesses import scarce or locally unavailable goods and raw materials. It is a win-win situation for all. There is good news for local industries too. FTAs are proven to help small and medium-sized businesses to become more competitive and less reliant on government subsidies. Just imagine the sheer value that free trade agreements can unlock — for local communities, consumers, and the overall economy.

While it must be recognized that FTAs could reduce government revenues, which come from existing customs duties, this reduction Bodog Poker in revenue would be offset by enabling GCC commodity exports to gain access to protected markets. Gaining access to new markets will in turn enhance the netback for regional exports and generate higher revenue for chemical firms, which are wholly owned by GCC governments.

The international trade landscape has been undergoing a series of tectonic shifts in the face of changing chemicals supply and demand centers, emerging economies claiming a larger share of international trade, world events, such as the war in Ukraine, supply chain challenges, the COVID-19 pandemic, and increasing protectionism.

So, what opportunities lie ahead for new FTAs? The GCC region has the highest intraregional trade share and intensity with China, India, and Turkiye. It has lower trade costs with this group of countries when compared with other economies. Consequently, free trade agreements with China, India, and Turkiye will prove to be beneficial.

If the GCC is signing or planning to sign such an agreement, it would be essential to know which goods are the most efficiently produced and select the most profitable sectors to maximize gains.

In a recent white paper issued by the Gulf Petrochemicals and Chemicals Association, we shared exclusive insights that can help policymakers evaluate the potential economic impact of a free trade agreement. It is a must-read for anyone looking to enhance their understanding of FTAs and their vital role in the chemical industry and the region.

To conclude, as we look to the next decades when the global population is projected to exceed 9 billion by 2050, demand for chemicals and agri-nutrients will continue to rise, creating unprecedented pressure on the industry to deliver its goods to an exploding global population. The GCC chemical industry has strong potential to benefit from the global increase in chemical demand, projected to double by 2050 and provide life-enhancing, safer, cheaper, and more durable chemical products to communities across the world.

To ensure we can successfully deliver on this objective, we need a robust and supportive local and international trade policy framework that helps to advance FTA negotiations which have been stalling for decades and addresses where and to what extent trade opportunities exist, while carefully evaluating the risks and downsides of a potential deal.

The chemical industry is vital to the smooth functioning, prosperity, and growth of the global economy and the GCC region. We, therefore, all share a responsibility to come together and cooperate in this new era of trade and reimagine what progress looks like today and into the future.

• Dr. Abdulwahab Al-Sadoun is the secretary-general of the Gulf Petrochemicals and Chemicals Association.

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• Scholars, businesses, and the public know little about the potential terms of the UK-US trade agreement.
• A comprehensive impact assessment analysis, based on defined goals and targets, should be created and implemented. Particularly in the contentious areas of environment, agriculture and digital services.
• The economic, political and legal costs and benefits of the agreement should be detailed and publicised.

UK economic sovereignty was touted as one of the main benefits of Brexit. Vote Leave supporters wanted to take back control of the EU’s competence to negotiate trade and investment agreements with global partners. The promise of a strategically important and valuable trade deal with the US, concluded at great speed, was the most prized of all the potential deals. Such an agreement would represent an important advantage that the UK would have over its European neighbours, who themselves have failed to secure a deal with the Americans.

The stalled Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) would have seen the EU and the US enter into an historic trade pact worth billions of dollars, and created a huge free trade area in terms of market and trade value. Negotiations began in 2013, and were beginning to bear fruit in the form of agreement in key areas. However, in 2016 the negotiations ground to a halt due partly to the change in US administration with the election of President Trump, and partly due to the result of the UK’s Brexit referendum. TTIP was put ‘on ice’, and to date it has not been thawed.

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The world has moved on since 2016. Brexit is done and Joe Biden’s administration has entered the White House. There has been some postulation by the UK government and the office of the United States Trade Representative (the US government department responsible for negotiating and signing trade agreements) about the possibility of a UK-US deal. Despite the fact that negotiations are thought to have started even before the UK left the EU in May 2020, the conclusion of the deal is more urgent due to the upcoming expiry of the Trade Promotion Authority bodog sportsbook review (TPA), which will remove the opportunity to fast track the deal through US congress.

Bureaucracy might be a positive thing, at least from the perspective of some stakeholders who have been kept in the dark. Scholars, businesses, and the public know very little about the potential terms of the UK-US trade agreement that is under negotiation. Beyond the results of the 2018 Department for International Trade public consultation, the only documents that have been published regarding the negotiation are both parties’ negotiating objectives, which are vague and lacking in detail.

It is common for trade and investment agreements to be negotiated and implemented without a comprehensive impact assessment analysis. Often, governments do not complete detailed assessments on the proposed agreements’ likely impact in terms of economic costs and benefits, environmental degradation/pollution, and societal impacts. Whilst the secretive nature and lack of impact assessments is par for the course, this is concerning given the risks associated with any trade deal. It is widely accepted that increased trade and investment flows can bring significant benefits. However, it is also understood that the wrong type of trade and investment, or poor accompanying policies, mean that trade and investment can have detrimental effects.

Concerned citizens and powerful investors

In the context of the TTIP agreement, European citizens were concerned about the potential negative effects of an EU-US agreement such as the lowering of regulatory standards across the board, including agricultural and food products. Concerns sparked protests about various aspects of the proposed deal, including the risks of chlorinated chicken and hormone treated beef. The Brits were also concerned about protecting their National Health Service (NHS) from privatisation through sales to US providers of medical services, potentially giving such US companies the status of foreign investor, which attracts a whole host of investor protection obligations through generous trade and investment agreements.

The risk of giving foreign investors control over key national services should not be underestimated; nor should the risk of lawsuits by foreign investors should the UK government ever wish to re-nationalise the system. One of the most contentious aspects of the TTIP agreement was the potential inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, which gives aggrieved investors the right to sue the investment host state government. Such disputes can cost the host state government millions of dollars to defend, and potentially billions of dollars in compensation if the investor wins the case.

Democracy and the deal

With trade pacts, the devil is in the detail. This trade agreement is likely to be historically significant and merits close inspection. The global economy suffered a devastating blow in 2020-21 due to the COVID-19 global pandemic. Governments have spent eye-watering sums on health responses, as well as to support businesses and jobs at risk throughout the pandemic. As we emerge from the economic nightmare of COVID-19, national governments will look to trade and investment as a vehicle for economic recovery. The UKUSFTA could play an important role in boosting two battered economies.

It is therefore imperative that this agreement is negotiated swiftly, and in a manner that is beneficial to both parties. Although time is of the essence, the agreement should not be rushed, as the consequences of a ‘bad’ agreement could be catastrophic. Further, this agreement should be viewed as a real opportunity for two world-leading nations to help shape the future of the trade and investment regimes in a time of flux and uncertainty. This agreement could become a benchmark for trade and investment negotiators around the world as a beacon of best practice. It is therefore imperative that any proposed agreement is critically analysed by academics and stakeholders, including members of civil society. This due process will give the agreement the legitimacy and democratic endorsement.

Dr Jasem Tarawneh is a Lecturer in Commercial & Intellectual Property Law at the School of Law within the University of Manchester. His main areas of research are Law and Economics, branding and Globalization as well as Alternative Dispute Settlement Mechanisms with an emphasis on International Arbitration.

Dr Nicolette Butler is a Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Manchester. Nicolette’s research focuses primarily on International Investment Law, as well as Global Trade Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (especially International Arbitration).

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President Biden has advocated a worker-centric trade policy that is intended to ensure that American trade negotiators “will fight for every American job and for the rights, protections, and interests of all American workers.”[2] The Biden Administration’s long overdue focus on American workers could reinforce federal and state programs that have not yet succeeded in effectively offsetting the hardships that imports can impose on workers facing competition from abroad. However, the Administration’s focus on investments at home should not obscure the importance of international trade to the US economy. Agricultural exports, for example, account for approximately 20% of US farm and manufactured sales. As of 2019, exports were estimated to directly and indirectly support 10.7 million jobs, or 7.1% of total US employment.[3] While imports compete for sales with American companies, they also lower the cost of consumer goods for middle- and low-income families.

It has been over 25 years since the last successful multilateral trade negotiation. The failure of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in 2006 laid bare the weakness of the global trading system that the United States had supported since 1945. The lack of a consensus among major trading nations, and between them and their emerging competitors, contributed to a proliferation of FTAs and other preferential trade agreements, which now account for more than half of global trade.[4] Although the United States has been a relatively minor player in the worldwide growth of FTAs, North American economic cooperation, fostered by NAFTA and its successor, the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), has integrated North American supply chains and strengthened the international competitiveness of the United States. “Factory North America” is a major player in the international economy.

Despite the success of the North American trade agreements, FTAs have fallen out of favor with large portions of the US electorate and figure prominently in debates over the direction of US trade policy.[5] The NAFTA and the USMCA have been singled out for criticism, in large part due to shifts of some production and employment to Mexico.

In response to criticism of US trade agreements, the Biden team has emphasized a new approach:

Too often in the past, Congress and the administration came together to finalize and pass a trade agreement. But then other urgent matters arose and we all moved on.[6]

 Some of us previously argued for free trade agreements because we believed Americans would broadly share in the economic gains . . .and that those deals would shape the global economy in ways that we wanted.  We had good reasons to think those things.  But we didn’t do enough to understand who would be negatively affected and what would be needed to adequately offset their pain, or to enforce agreements that were already on the books and help more workers and small businesses fully benefit from them.[7]

Certainly, major improvements in the assistance to US workers impacted by imports are necessary, and the negotiation of new provisions in trade agreements can be a response to the concerns of workers and those that favor tougher environmental regulations.[8] Indeed, the introduction of significant labor and environmental measures in the USMCA was essential to gaining Congressional approval of the agreement in 2020. Enforcement of mutually agreed obligations in the USMCA and other FTAs must be a major component of US trade policy.

However, the criticism of FTAs by the Biden Administration may fuel the belief that US trade agreements are major drivers of job losses and industrial displacement in the United States. They are not. Nor should US trade policies in general bear the brunt of the blame for job losses. Improvements in US productivity account for a much greater share of the declines in manufacturing employment than does trade. For example, from 1991 to 2019, an estimated 29% of manufacturing job losses were due to trade, productivity growth being responsible for the other 71%.[9]

Despite objections to free trade agreements, the United States is actually at a competitive disadvantage in world markets because it has not kept pace with the international growth of FTAs. The past rounds of multilateral trade liberalization no longer provide US exporters with adequate access to international markets. The Biden Administration must recognize that rather than having too many FTAs, the United States has too few: US exporters have preferential access to less than 10% of the world’s consumers. (See Table 1, which shows the share of world GDP accounted for by the FTA partners of the United States and other major trading nations, with the European Union included as a single entity).[10] Mexico and Canada, in contrast, maintain preferential access to markets that account for over 50% global GDP.

Table 1

Percentage of World GDP Accounted for by

FTA Partner Nations – 2019

The high percentages for Mexico and Canada are due in part to the fact that the US economy (to which Canadian and Mexican companies have preferential access) accounts for 24% of world GDP. However, even when North America is excluded from the calculations, Canada and Mexico have access to over 40% of global markets, compared to 8% for the United States. The European Union, a customs union almost as large as the United States, has more than twice as much preferential access to international markets. Japan has more than three times the preferential access as the United States. China’s efficiency as an exporter apparently offsets its relatively small share of preferential access to international markets.

Table 2, below, shows the relative importance of individual US FTAs in terms of trade in goods. We first calculate the relative importance of FTAs as a percentage of US goods trade with FTA partner nations, and then as a percentage of total US goods trade. Overall, the USMCA accounts for one third of total US exports and a quarter of US imports. None of the other 13 US FTAs account for a substantial percentage of total US goods trade (Korea and Singapore are the next largest by this metric, and each nation accounts for under 5% of US trade in goods). Combined, all FTA partner nations of the United States, other than Canada and Mexico, account for only 13% of total US exports and 8% of total US imports. The difference between the USMCA and all other US FTAs is even more stark when limiting the comparison to trade with FTA partner nations. The USMCA comprises 72% of US exports to its FTA partners and 76% of its FTA imports. The USMCA bodog sportsbook review is the only FTA that pulls significant weight in terms of the overall US trade profile, further evidence that the United States has failed to keep pace with the worldwide increase in the number of FTAs.

Table 2

Goods Trade with US FTA Partners – 2020

Source:  U.S. Census Bureau. Foreign Trade, Balance by Partner Country (Accessed March 21, 2021).

There is scant likelihood that there will be another multilateral trade negotiation anytime soon. Meanwhile, the increasing economic integration of the Asian-Pacific region will continue within the CPTPP and the recently signed 15-member RCEP.[11] Through its newly “assertive” trade policies, the European Union will strengthen trade and economic ties with its FTA partners and other countries.[12] China is building economic and commercial relationships through its Belt and Road Initiative and has indicated an interest in joining the CPTPP, a potential “geopolitical disaster” for American interests in the Pacific.[13] The United States should not be merely an observer as other nations strengthen or enter into new preferential trade agreements.

There is no conflict between investment in the US economy and the commencement of trade negotiations. Acting on both domestic and trade policy issues could lead to far better and balanced economic results. Besides decisions on FTAs, trade policy issues facing the Biden team include renewal of the Trade Promotion Authority; negotiations with the EU on aircraft subsidies; renewal of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); removal of the “national security” tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration on imports of steel and aluminum; the resolution of trade disputes with China; and the reinvigoration of the World Trade Organization. Those actions would remove roadblocks to better relations with US allies and remove or lower the taxes on American consumption imposed by the Trump tariffs.

The Trump Administration began negotiations on two new FTAs, one with the United Kingdom and the other with Kenya. The shared history of the US and the UK and the latter’s departure from the EU may give impetus to that negotiation. Picking up the negotiation with Kenya would signal that the US has continued interests in improving its economic relations with Africa.  Among other possible FTAs, the return of the United States to the CPTPP looms large, but it would be difficult to agree on labor provisions comparable to those in the USMCA with some of the current members of the CPTPP, a task that would be much more difficult (if not impossible) if China joined the CPTPP.[14] An FTA with the EU, while desirable, does not appear to be a feasible near-term objective, although there is Congressional interest in a US-EU deal.[15] The United States and Japan may strengthen their bilateral commercial ties without commencing an FTA negotiation.

If the United States were to negotiate FTAs with those potential partners, it would take a significant step toward improving the degree of preferential market access enjoyed by US firms and workers. For example, a trade agreement with the European Union would cover 17% of total US exports. An FTA with the United Kingdom would cover 4% of total US exports, and joining the CPTPP would cover 5% of US exports, through the addition of Japan, Vietnam, and New Zealand to the list of US FTA partner nations. Each of these potential FTAs would cover a higher volume of US exports than any current US FTA except the USMCA.

Negotiating an FTA takes time.[16] Since 1985, when the first US FTA was enacted with Israel, it has taken an average of three years to negotiate and obtain Congressional approval of an FTA. The time required increased to over six years for the four US FTAs initially signed in 2007. The negotiation and Congressional approval of the USMCA, however, required 31 months. Thus, an FTA negotiation in 2021 might at best yield an agreement in late 2022, which would then require Congressional approval, probably by the 118^th Congress in 2023. Despite those challenges, a firm commitment to include FTA negotiations in the Biden Administration’s trade policy would begin to offset the competitive advantages held by exporters from countries whose FTAs give them greater preferential access to international markets than those available to US firms, farms, and workers.

Guy Erb is a former U.S. trade policy official and investment banker.

Scott Sommers is a PhD student in Economics at the University of Minnesota.

[1] Interview with Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, December 2, 2020.

[2] Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People,” March 3, 2021.

[3] International Trade Administration, 2020. https://www.trade.gov/feature-article/otea-publications

[4] Espitia Rueda, et al., 2018. “How preferential is preferential trade?” World Bank Group, Policy Research Working Paper No. WPS 8446, Washington, D.C.

[5] For an example of the criticisms leveled at FTAs, see, for example, “Memorandum on U.S. trade and manufacturing policy,” Economic Policy Institute, which called for a “a freeze on negotiating new trade agreements.” https://www.epi.org/publication/memorandum-on-u-s-trade-and-manufacturing-policy/  Accessed March 23, 2021.

[6] Opening Statement of Ambassador-designate Katherine Tai Before the Senate Finance Committee, February 24, 2021.

[7] Blinken Speech, op. cit.

[8] Edward Alden, Failure to Adjust: How Americans Got Left Behind in the Global Economy, Council on Foreign Relations.

[9] Stephen J. Rose, “Foreign Trade and Employment,” forthcoming, and Lawrence Edwards and Robert Z. Lawrence, “Rising Tide: Is Growth in Emerging Economies Good for the United States?” Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2013.

[10] See also Shannon O’Neill, “Protection without Protectionism,” Foreign Affairs, January-February 2021, p. 157.

[11] Members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Brunei, Chile, Malaysia and Peru have not yet ratified the agreement. The signatories of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is not an FTA, are Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 

[12] European Commission, “Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy, February 18, 2021. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021/february/tradoc_159438.pdf Accessed March 17, 2021.

[13] Edward Luce, “The Puzzle of Joe Biden’s ‘middle class foreign policy,’” Financial Times, March 28, 2021.

[14] During the Presidential campaign, candidate Biden explained his thinking on the TPP as follows: “I would not rejoin the TPP as it was initially put forward. I would insist that we renegotiate pieces of that with the Pacific nations that we had in South America and North America, so that we could bring them together to hold China accountable for the rules of us setting the rules of the road as to how trade should be conducted.” Transcript: Night 2 of the second Democratic debate,” Washington Post, July 31, 2019.

[15] “A Top House Democrat Prods Biden to Reopen E.U. Trade Talks,” New York Times, December 11, 2020.

[16] See our previous articles on FTAs: “Losing Ground: the United States, Free Trade Areas, and the World Trade Organization,” WITA, May 2, 2018, http://americastradepolicy.com/losing-ground-the-united-states-free-trade-areas-and-the-world-trade-organization/#.WusNVDbrtjV and “Still Losing Ground: The Consequences of the Trump Administration’s Bilateral Trade Policy,” WITA, July 9, 2020, bodog poker review|Most Popular_The U.S. Trade Representative

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Covid-19 has depressed global trade greatly, but strategic and structural concerns about trade will outlive the virus. The Trump administration had a huge impact on trade, from waging a trade war with China to ratcheting up anti-free trade rhetoric and levying tariffs against China, Canada, Mexico, and the European Union.

Under President Joe Biden, U.S. trade policy will change greatly, although not immediately. President Biden has made abundantly clear that his first priority is the Covid-19 pandemic, and his $1.9 trillion stimulus plan will dominate economic policymaking for weeks. Even if President Biden does not materially address trade policy until after the pandemic subsides, his remarks and nominees for international economic positions suggest what changes to U.S. trade policy he will make during the rest of his term. Three key areas are analyzed below through the lens of his personnel and policy choices to date.

(1) Integration of Trade and Other Strategies

President Biden and his nominees have signaled their intention to integrate trade into general national security strategy and economic policy. In her introductory remarks upon her nomination as President Biden’s U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Katherine Tai described trade as being “like any other tool in our domestic or foreign policy,” a means rather than “an end in itself.” The nomination of Wally Adeyemo, President Biden’s selection for U.S. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, also signals an integration between economic and national security policy; Mr. Adeyemo held numerous economic policy positions in the Obama administration, including Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics, a position on the National Security Council (NSC).

Biden’s intention to integrate trade into broader strategies would pivot from President Trump’s approach. President Trump often spoke about trade surpluses as ends themselves, and his administration closed the NSC’s Office of International Economics. This abolished the position Mr. Adeyemo held in President Obama’s NSC.

President Biden’s appointments this far also reveal that his trade and security strategy will include a focus on domestic economic concerns. Weeks after being announced as Biden’s choice for National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan gave a far-ranging interview with NPR in which he articulated a view of foreign policy that incorporates and prioritizes the economic concerns of middle-class Americans, and President Biden expressed a similar focus throughout the 2020 campaign. This framework reflects Mr. Sullivan’s recent work: after serving as a senior advisor to Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign, he led a project on foreign policy and the middle class at the Carnegie Endowment, which Press Secretary Jen Psaki recently tweeted about Ms. Tai will also surely bring domestic economic concerns to trade negotiations. As Chief Trade Counsel to the Chairman and Democratic Members of the House Ways and Means Committee, she advocated for labor and environmental protections in the recent U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement (USMCA).

(2) New Free Trade Agreements

Free trade agreements (FTA’s) are notoriously difficult to negotiate and ratify even in the best of times. The pandemic means new FTA’s will not come soon, and Biden has indicated as much. He has repeatedly said he will not focus on FTA’s in the near-term, instead directing his energy to address Covid-19 and domestic issues. However, Biden’s personnel choices suggest renewed opportunities for FTA’s later in his term.

Although the Trump administration negotiated and ratified the USMCA and phase one of a free trade agreement with China, they also bodog online casino abandoned FTA’s the Obama administration had initiated. In January 2017, Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the FTA the Obama administration had negotiated with 11 Pacific nations, comprising 40% of global GDP. Trump also ended negotiations the Obama administration had begun with the European Union for an FTA, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

Key members of Biden’s incoming team have a wealth of experience with FTA’s. During his time in the Obama Treasury Department, Mr. Adeyemo served as the chief negotiator for the TPP’s provisions on macroeconomic policy. Additionally, Ms. Tai worked on the USMCA for the Ways and Means Committee.

Recent FTA’s indicate where new agreements under the Biden administration may emerge. The U.S. and the U.K. have not agreed to an FTA, although they have had initial rounds of negotiations, so a new agreement may be on the horizon. The United Kingdom and the EU agreed to an FTA in December 2020. The U.S. and the EU also still do not have an agreement, though the EU seems open to new FTA’s. In December 2020, the EU released a blueprint for the transatlantic partnership, specifically mentioning Biden’s election as a key opportunity to strengthen relations. It remains to be seen how willing the EU is to start negotiating any deal until the U.S. lifts its steel and aluminum tariffs. However, President Biden’s recent recommitment to the Paris Climate Accord is likely a necessary, if incremental, first step because some EU member states require another country’s ascent to the accord as a precondition to an FTA. Additionally, in November 2020, the U.S. and the EU agreed to a mini-FTA for lobsters. The EU also agreed to an FTA with Canada in 2017.

President Biden may pivot back to Asia for an FTA. Since President Trump abandoned the TPP in 2017, the TPP’s other member countries have enacted an FTA without the United States. Labor provisions could be a concern for an American FTA with Asian countries, but Ms. Tai’s experience addressing labor concerns in FTA’s would equip her well to do so again. Mr. Adeyemo’s experience with the TPP for the Obama administration would also prove relevant to renewed FTA efforts in Asia. Finally, an FTA with Asian countries would offer a bulwark against China, so this could support the administration’s broader China strategy.

(3) Currency Manipulation?

A key area to pay attention to in any FTA’s the Biden administration negotiates is currency manipulation. In a trade context, currency manipulation allows a country to artificially lower the prices other countries pay for their products. This makes the country’s exports unfairly competitive. In this way, exchange rate policy is trade policy.

Currency manipulation has gained political salience in recent years. President Trump accused China of manipulating its currency many times. In 2019, the Trump Treasury Department officially labeled China a currency manipulator and did the same to Vietnam and Switzerland in December 2020.

Biden officials have said they prioritize addressing currency manipulation, but their specific plans have not been revealed. During the campaign, President Biden committed to “aggressive trade enforcement” actions against Chinese currency manipulation, and in her confirmation testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Dr. Janet Yellen, President Biden’s Treasury Secretary, said she supports efforts against countries’ currency manipulation that seeks “an unfair trade advantage.” Ms. Tai served as the head of U.S.-China trade enforcement at USTR, and Mr. Adeyemo has also warned against currency manipulation many times.

However, Mr. Adeyemo’s experience with the TPP may prove most relevant to currency manipulation. Mr. Adeyemo served as deputy chief of staff to former Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, and upon President Biden’s announcement that he would nominate Mr. Adeyemo as Deputy Treasury Secretary, Mr. Lew praised Mr. Adeyemo’s work negotiating a deal for greater foreign exchange policy enforcement in the macroeconomic declaration that accompanied the TPP. The Wall Street Journal identified Mr. Adeyemo’s role similarly.

Three critical points emerge from this declaration. First, it affirms that each TPP country will avoid unfairly manipulating exchange rates, particularly for competitive purposes. Second, it requires each TPP country to promptly disclose data regarding their foreign-exchange reserves, IMF assessments of their exchange rate, and foreign-exchange intervention their government enacts. Finally, it establishes regular dialogue between officials of all TPP countries about macroeconomic and exchange rate policies. This framework could help shape the Biden administration’s approach to currency manipulation in trade agreements, and Mr. Adeyemo appears well-positioned to lead those efforts due to his experience working on these provisions.

Conclusion

In his prolific biographies of President Lyndon Johnson, historian Robert Caro puts forth a corollary to the aphorism “power corrupts.” Caro writes that power reveals, too. After three presidential campaigns across thirty years, Mr. Biden finally holds the office and wields its power. Ultimately, his power over trade will reveal his vision and priorities for the subject, but there will be few chances for major trade policy change until the pandemic abates. At present though, Biden’s personnel selections, namely Messrs. Adeyemo and Sullivan and Ms. Tai, signal that his administration will reframe U.S. trade strategy and address numerous structural trade issues. Personnel does not reveal as clearly as power does, but personnel does preview.

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Furthermore, among the many wild cards that Beijing could use during the period of political vacuum in the US, opting for trade liberalisation is a great plus for China’s image and probably more relevant in economic terms than any other more aggressive option that the media have been discussing, from Taiwan to the South China Sea.

Still, it is important to note that the RCEP negotiations had been dragging on for eight years and that the final agreement has been watered down in terms of key liberalisation measures.

Not only was the geographical coverage bigger when the negotiations started – it included India – but the scope in terms of liberalisation was also larger. Furthermore, when RCEP started as a response to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the US-China strategic competition was just starting, while it is now pulling RCEP members in different directions.

The best example is recent trade friction between China and Australia, but there could be many others. In the same vein, increasingly pervasive US sanctions against targets in China will not help make RCEP a success.

While the US – and Europe – are key losers remaining outside of this deal, the biggest winner might not necessarily be China. China is no doubt bound to benefit, but other members within RCEP may benefit even more.

China will face fewer barriers to exports into the rest of Asia (including e-commerce). But the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, on the one hand, and South Korea and Japan on the other will find it easier to build their value chains, where production is based in ASEAN with Northeast Asian investment.

In fact, ASEAN countries have been receiving an increasing amount of manufacturing FDI (foreign direct investment) from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, which is already bigger than their FDI into China. Such a sharp increase in investment into ASEAN is not only a response to higher labour costs in China but is also meant to diversify away from an excessively China-centric value chain.

Thanks to this, Japanese, South Korean and Taiwanese trade integration within ASEAN has also been increasing, especially when focusing on intermediate goods. Against this backdrop, ASEAN will likely grow its own manufacturing capacity, thanks to Northeast Asia’s FDI. However, a good chunk of the final demand might still be in China.

In sum, while the actual increase in market access will remain limited among some of the RCEP members (such as Australia and China), the importance of this deal is for the world to realise that Asia is still dependent on the Chinese market and that Asian countries cannot pass on the opportunity of improved (even if still limited) market access into China.

As for the relative losers outside of the deal such as the US, we would imagine that the incoming Joe Biden administration will soon react by engaging in negotiations for a trade deal with Asia.

Alicia García-Herrero is a Senior Fellow at European think-tank BRUEGEL. She is also the Chief Economist for Asia Pacific at Natixis and non-resident Research Fellow at Madrid-based political think tank Real Instituto Elcano.

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Controlling the House of Representatives will not be enough. Thus curbed in his ability to pursue his broader agenda, Biden will likely at least try to shield the American middle class from global economic turbulence through trade policy. In short, whether Biden or President Donald Trump eventually triumphs, protectionism is here to stay.

Four years in power have allowed Trump to engineer the most abrupt shift in U.S. trade policy since World War II, marking its departure from the rules-based trading system that Washington had established over the previous seven decades. A Biden presidency would lead to a partial normalization in trade relations, marking a return to a more multilateral and less transactional approach. But even before messy electoral outcomes became likely, it was foolish to expect him to repudiate Trump’s protectionist legacy.

From the very beginning, Biden made clear that “economic security is national security.” In that framework, domestic issues, primarily the regeneration of the American middle class and small businesses, would always top his agenda, especially amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. It makes sense then that protectionism has crept into his platform. The candidate’s “Made in America” agenda hides veiled forms of protectionism aimed at promoting goods and services that are produced domestically. Under the “Buy American” slogan, for example, he envisages $400 billion in government procurement investment that would target goods and services provided exclusively by U.S. businesses. And consider his proposed carbon adjustment fee against countries that fail to meet their climate and environmental obligations. That is nothing more than a tariff.

Even beyond efforts like these, which would actually reinforce protectionism, there is the simple political fact that, on entering the White House, Biden would have a hard time unrolling Trump’s protectionist measures or launching new free trade agreements.

Although Biden blamed Trump’s tariffs for hurting the U.S. economy, he would have to perform a complicated balancing act to lift them. This is especially true when it comes to China because he is backed by labor unions, which want jobs protected from Chinese competition, but also by farmers, who want to regain access to the lucrative Chinese market. In an attempt to build a common front against China, Biden might lift tariffs on aluminum and steel produced by European companies. That might look like a win for free trade, but such a concession would likely be made conditional on NATO spending commitments, a shared reform of the World Trade Organization, and reassurances concerning 5G deals with Beijing.

Finally, even if the political will were there to forge new trade agreements, it would take years to do so through the normal processes—even though Trump has had a habit of just declaring them. According to the Peterson Institute for International Economics, it takes on average one and a half years to negotiate a free trade agreement with the United States and then more than three and a half years to reach the implementation stage. More complex, multiparty agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (from which Trump withdrew) can take almost a decade.

In short, if Biden wins, Trump’s confrontational protectionism may give way to a more selective form—focused on specific issues like the environment, aimed at the protection of U.S. manufacturing, and targeted at real geopolitical rivals. But the days of free trade are over.

Edoardo Campanella is a Future World fellow at IE University’s Center for the Governance of Change in Madrid and the co-author, with Marta Dassù, of Anglo Nostalgia: The Politics of Emotion in a Fractured West.

© 2020, THE SLATE GROUP

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Trade agreements can be an important instrument for such a rules-based order. But it is not only the market economy framework conditions such as customs regulations, investment protection or abstaining from trade barriers that should be set down in these trade agreements. There must also be binding agreements in the area of workers rights or climate protection. Such standards must not be a paper tiger. It must be possible to verify them and to enforce them. And this is exactly where the problem in the current EU-Mercosur agreement lies. The trade agreement between the EU and the member states Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay – from the Mercosur economic bloc – contradicts the principles of a rules-based cooperation between the two global regions.

There has been a lot of arm-wrestling over this trade agreement for two decades now. And it would be desirable for both sides of the Atlantic. If there could finally be a conclusion, then the agreement would create the biggest free trade area in the world so far. But since President Jair Bolsonaro took over in government in Brazil, the country has been sinking into the chaos of its nationalistic, racist and sexist politics. Brazil’s forests are burning, mass graves have to be dug for the victims of the coronavirus pandemic and corruption is constantly rising. Deforestation of and burning down the rainforest, exploitation of natural resources amidst bad human rights violations, harassment of trade unionists and political opposition in the country as well as questioning valid agreements and treaties on the international stage are only a few points that describe the current policy of the government.

What is a good rules-based order?

That is why it becomes all the more clear why a treaty must not only cover (customs-) free movement for goods. Without binding standards and enforceable agreements over the ‘How’ of trade, we make ourselves dependent on the arbitrariness of individual governments. By doing so, we would lose our ability to act on the basis of our common values.

It is therefore right and logical to put the EU-Mercosur agreement on ice now. Because neither in the area of trade nor in the political framework agreement do we have hard instruments, which act against deforestation and human rights violations. And the example shows clearly that we need a rules-based market more urgently than ever in a globalised, multipolar world. How else could we better prevent such moves in the wrong direction or, the other way round, support initiatives for example for the improvement of the world’s climate more rigorously? This agreement therefore offers a good opportunity to make clear what makes a good rules-based trade and how we should implement it.

A general EU framework for trade, which holds human rights, ecological and social standards as binding for all future negotiations is long overdue – and not merely as a common understanding but as enforceable rules. Only concrete complaint, verification and sanction mechanisms ensure the effectiveness of the treaty beyond daily politics. Binding compensation mechanisms should envisage damages payments or even the temporary suspension of individual trade preferences where there are violations of the treaty.

Therefore every trade agreement must, without exceptions, always, and without delay, be accompanied with a treaty of association with a self-contained chapter on sustainability. Only a comprehensive treaty of association corresponds to our demand not to uncouple dialogue, cooperation and sustainability from economic interests in a trade agreement.

Yes, that always makes the approval of all national parliaments essential. But precisely that also offers the opportunity to create more acceptance of and awareness among European citizens about the development of a sustainable economy and sustainable products in the world. A framework set down once would make repeating the same discussions in every trade agreement superfluous and give the EU’s trade policy a unity in its expectations towards third parties.

Why there cannot be an agreement now

It is precisely this transparency and binding nature that is missing in the current EU-Mercosur agreement. A binding chapter on sustainability is not foreseen. Separate from the trade component of the agreement, the effective safeguarding of workers rights is, for example, called for but without corresponding verification or sanctions mechanisms. Such a clause is not included either in the trade part of the current EU-Mercosur agreement.

How likely is it that a country such as Brazil will, under its current leadership, sign up and adhere to a political agreement that runs counter to the way it has acted up until now. What signal would we currently be sending if we finalised an agreement with such a government without ensuring that it has to adhere to it too?

An agreement with Brazil would only be a fig leaf for the inhumane policy of the Bolsonaro government. It would wreak more damage than it would make things better. Only agreements which are binding and cannot be flouted without sanctions being imposed create a fair market. Every company that is oriented towards long term success should have that as being in their own interest. Because arbitrariness, corruption and social unrest are poison for an innovative economy.

No – there cannot be an EU-Mercosur agreement under these circumstances and conditions. Not if we are interested in genuinely free and fair trade. But we should use the time and finally do our own homework – both in Germany and at the European level – so that the shaping of the world is not left to the self-interest of big US or Chinese companies.

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Yasmin Fahimi is a member of parliament for the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and chairperson of the SPD parliamentary group’s Latin America discussion group. From January 2016 to September 2017, she was State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

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