bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_on Chinese-made critical /blog-topics/friend-shoring/ Thu, 11 Jan 2024 22:29:09 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.6.1 /wp-content/uploads/2018/08/android-chrome-256x256-80x80.png bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_on Chinese-made critical /blog-topics/friend-shoring/ 32 32 bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_on Chinese-made critical /blogs/us-steel-deal-friendshoring-failing/ Mon, 08 Jan 2024 17:00:48 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=41378 In mid-December 2023, US Steel announced that it agreed to be bought by Nippon Steel for approximately $14.1 billion, a 40 percent premium over its stock price at the time...

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In mid-December 2023, US Steel announced that it agreed to be bought by Nippon Steel for approximately $14.1 billion, a 40 percent premium over its stock price at the time of the announcement. The deal would quickly catapult the Japanese company to second place in the global steel production league charts, accounting for 4.5 percent of annual global crude steel production, behind China Baowu Group’s 7 percent. Such a merger could unlock efficiency-promoting technology—including advances in green production techniques—while providing Nippon Steel with the size and resources necessary to act as a counterweight to Chinese dominance in the global steel industry. Six of the largest ten steel producers are Chinese, as are twenty-four of the forty-six companies worldwide that produce at least ten million tons of steel per year.

One might think that US policymakers would welcome this announcement. It is a “win” for policies that have protected domestic production through tariffs; Nippon Steel’s offer to US Steel reflects its desire to expand steel production capacity in the United States to serve North American markets through domestic (and therefore tariff-free) production. Those concerned about industry consolidation and antitrust issues should prefer this deal to other potential buyers, such as Cleveland-Cliffs and Nucor, which are both major domestic competitors of US Steel. In contrast, Nippon Steel has very few production capabilities in the United States.

The acquisition will preserve more than fourteen thousand US jobs, and Nippon Steel is better positioned than was US Steel to invest in advanced technologies necessary to keep production profitable and growing. The company has ambitious goals to increase its global production to one hundred million tons a year, and therefore will likely invest in plant expansions that will create new jobs for US workers. The prospect of job creation and the fact that US Steel would retain its name and Pittsburgh headquarters would usually be seen positively in an election year. The outcome might, for example, be viewed as a sign of a booming domestic steel industry with lucrative employment opportunities in the industrial Midwest, an area of the country with outsized influence over presidential election outcomes.

The transaction is also a “win” for “friendshoring” policy objectives, which were first announced by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen in April 2022 at the Atlantic Council. These objectives emphasize cultivating closer trade and investment connections with reliable geopolitical allies, especially for critical supply chains. There is very little risk that Nippon Steel would offshore production, as the business rationale for the acquisition rests on serving North American markets and low US production costs due to low energy prices compared to prices in Europe or Japan. Instead, the company’s expansion into the US market can help provide both the United States and other countries the ability to further diversify their steel supply needs away from China. As Biden administration officials have repeatedly admitted, the United States cannot reduce its reliance on Chinese-made critical inputs alone.

Despite all the benefits of the deal, some policymakers have voiced vociferous opposition to it, arguing that the deal is bad for union workers and also a danger to US national security. Several members of Congress have requested that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) review and potentially block the transaction. The Biden administration has also expressed wariness, saying that the deal needs “serious scrutiny.”

A CFIUS prohibition would be a mistake. First, CFIUS is supposed to be narrowly focused on national security risks, not broad economic competitiveness or national prestige concerns. It is very hard to credibly argue that a Japanese owner of a US business would suddenly stop selling steel to US buyers, particularly since the business rationale for the acquisition is so that Nippon Steel can more competitively serve the North American market. Washington blocking such a sale to a close Group of Seven (G7) partner would indicate that CFIUS has veered from narrow national security concerns to the business of broader economic protection. This would invite retaliation against US companies abroad and undermine US messages about the importance of an open, market-oriented, and rules-based economic system.

Second, US leaders are understandably concerned about China’s willingness to use its control over critical supply chains to engage in coercive economic practices. To address these concerns, the United States needs other countries—and particularly its closest allies—to trust that it remains an open and welcoming bodog sportsbook review place for their businesses. If Washington won’t allow this transaction—involving a buyer from a G7 country—then what foreign buyer would it see as a permissible owner? A block would communicate that the steel industry is completely closed off to foreign investors. Allied and partner countries and their companies would understandably lose confidence that the US market will remain open to them. A lack of trust has the potential to frustrate efforts to invest resources in restructuring these critical supply chains at global volume to effectively insulate the United States and its friends from coercive Chinese trade practices.

Finally, there is one concern regarding foreign acquisitions in critical industries that is worth considering. Because Nippon Steel is listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, this deal would likely cause US Steel to delist from the New York Stock Exchange, which would limit the power of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate the company. Many Japanese-listed companies that have acquired US businesses voluntarily provide annual financial disclosures to the SEC, as should Nippon Steel.

More importantly, because Nippon Steel is listed in Japan, it is subject to Japanese corporate governance rules rather than US ones. The US government may worry about the national security implications if the company acquires US Steel and then is subsequently acquired by a more problematic third party, such as a Chinese entity. If Japan had weak corporate governance practices, this would be a more relevant concern. However, Japanese corporate structures are notorious for guarding against hostile takeovers, making this scenario exceedingly unlikely. Still, other countries don’t always have as strong protections; rather than blocking transactions with close allies, the United States should be engaging in greater outreach to allies and partners with weaker corporate governance structures to encourage reforms that alleviate these kinds of worries.

Sarah Bauerle Danzman is a 2023-2024 scholar-in-residence at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center’s Economic Statecraft Initiative and an associate professor of international studies at Indiana University, Bloomington.

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bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_on Chinese-made critical /blogs/friendshoring-global-supply-chains/ Thu, 30 Mar 2023 20:37:37 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=37408 The Biden administration’s latest geopolitical strategy is to prioritise trading with ‘trusted allies’. But in a highly complex and interconnected world, would such a move even work? Free trade has...

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The Biden administration’s latest geopolitical strategy is to prioritise trading with ‘trusted allies’. But in a highly complex and interconnected world, would such a move even work?

Free trade has never looked so sickly. Geopolitical tensions, including the US-China trade war and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have infected global trade relations. Coupled with the lingering disruption of Brexit and Covid-19, these rows threaten to severely disrupt global supply chains.

The cure? Well, recognising that trade and geopolitics are inextricably linked, the Biden administration has created a new policy to treat the supply chain risk. The diktat, which it has named friendshoring, involves only trading with trusted allies.

But the strategy raises several concerns. Firstly, how does the US propose to differentiate a ‘friendly country’ from an ‘unfriendly’ one? In addition to its traditional allies, the Biden administration has identified Brazil, India, South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia as trustworthy nations.

But there are grey areas. Hungary, for example, is part of the EU, which is regarded as a friendly trading bloc in the US administration’s eyes. Yet US think-tank Freedom House only classes Hungary as being “partly free”, given Viktor Orban and his government’s frequent attacks on democracy, the rule of law, press freedoms and LGBTQ+ rights. What does it mean, then, for the US to indirectly call Hungary a ‘trusted ally’, then?

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Even if the US can fine-tune who it considers a trusted ally, and if its companies embrace the concept of friendshoring, can the emerging industrial powerhouses on the US list prove to be a viable substitute for Chinese manufacturing bases?

Jose Arturo Garza-Reyes, professor of operations management at the University of Derby, says that the aforementioned countries “are rapidly becoming part of the top 15 most competitive nations for labour-intensive commodity products”. In the short- to medium-term, he believes that “supply chain agreements formed with China can be replaced with agreements with these countries”.

But in the long term he worries that friendshoring could create a world divided between free-market democracies and authoritarian regimes. Garza-Reyes is particularly concerned that friendshoring could take the world back to similar trading characteristics last seen during the Cold War, creating ‘trade blocs’ where some countries are aligned to autocratic states such as China and Russia, and others to Western nations.

“This could exacerbate the already high friction between these blocs,” he says, “making the friendshoring policy a dangerous one. From an operational point of view, this would limit Bodog Poker the partnerships and relationships that companies can develop, preventing them from being able to procure the best products, services and raw materials at the lowest cost. Once again, from an operational perspective, this makes friendshoring an undesired, but currently politically necessary policy.”

A necessary cost to bear?

If a policy of friendshoring divides the world into separate trading blocs, it is unclear what economic impact it would have. One estimate from the World Trade Organization suggests that GDP could take a hit of up to 5%.

Emily Benson, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), agrees that this is a risk, but says that the policy of friendshoring “does not necessarily preclude deeper market access for non-aligned nations”.

She explains: “The US government is not saying that it will not allow goods into North America. It is affirmatively trying to build more partnerships with countries that have critical inputs for US supply chains.”

But perhaps the most important question of all is that with China being deemed an unfriendly nation by the new policy, will global corporations like Apple, which are heavily reliant on China for manufacturing, up and leave? According to Bloomberg Intelligence, around 98% of iPhones are made in China, and it would take the company about eight years to move just 10% of its production capacity out of China.

So how can the US administration persuade companies with large Chinese manufacturing bases to relocate to ‘friendlier’ climes? Options include offering subsidies or tax breaks to set up in countries which are considered trusted allies, placing tariffs on goods manufactured in China (as it did in the recent US/China trade war), or simply stopping US companies from buying from or selling to unfriendly nations.

Benson, who recently co-authored a report called The Limits of “Friend-Shoring”, says: “It’s much more nuanced than that and very sector-specific. Some industries such as the defence sector, which demand total transparency and visibility across their entire supply chain, will openly embrace friendshoring, while other sectors will find it more difficult to uncouple themselves from their Chinese manufacturing bases.”

Would friendshoring even work?

But will tariffs succeed in encouraging companies to shift to friendlier nations? Dr Heather Skipworth doesn’t think so. Skipworth, an associate professor in supply chain management at the Cranfield School of Management, points to a study she co-wrote two years ago which featured an interviewee from the automotive industry. This interviewee told Skipworth that “tariffs on steel and aluminium would need to be significantly higher than 25% to justify switching from a brake motor supplier in northern China to a domestic US supplier”.

From an operational point of view, friendshoring would limit the relationships that companies can develop

Skipworth adds: “In the end, our research revealed that it wasn’t necessarily tariffs that persuaded companies to move their supply chains away from China. Instead, we identified three factors – institutional pressures (which includes tariffs), supply chain mobility, and the perceived severity of the potential disruption risk – as the keys to supply chain design. In my view these characteristics could prove to be the main determinants of whether the friendshoring policy is followed.”

But for Garza-Reyes, tax breaks and subsidies may indeed have a role to play to “facilitate and support the reconfiguration of supply chains in the short and possibly medium term”. That said, he adds that the opportunity cost will be “an increased cost in the operation of the supply chains and the products, services and raw materials they procure”.

Why a gradual shift is on the cards

In the long term, both Garza-Reyes and Benson expect companies which have invested heavily in China to see the bigger picture and move their supply chains elsewhere.

As Garza-Reyes puts it: “I believe that most companies will still voluntarily follow this option as they know that doing business… with companies from unfriendly nations increases the risk of serious disruptions in their supply chains and operations.”

Benson agrees, adding that “over time the cost of labour in China will become more expensive. It may become more difficult for foreign companies to operate there due to a combination of higher labour costs and a more difficult political environment. It is therefore incumbent upon companies to determine which locations are competitive in terms of lower production costs and other efficiency gains, such as IP protections and overall ease of doing business.”

Such a shift would by no means signal the end of the global supply chain economy, but it underlines the increasingly important role that state-led commercial alliances and regional partnerships will play in future trade discussions.

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bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_on Chinese-made critical /blogs/costs-friend-shoring/ Tue, 15 Nov 2022 22:04:51 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=35365 Since friend-shoring was added to the US trade policy lexicon, little has been revealed about what the term actually means. If governments seek to intervene in a supply chain, they...

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Since friend-shoring was added to the US trade policy lexicon, little has been revealed about what the term actually means. If governments seek to intervene in a supply chain, they must make the case that they observe the risks better than firms do. But it is unclear which market failure friend-shoring policies will fix without further fragmenting the world trading system.

Recently, in the US, there have been calls for onshoring production back to American soil to increase resilience and sustain US manufacturing jobs. A careful review of the statements shows that the pronouncements by senior officials of the Biden administration over friend-shoring are neither coherent nor a well-designed, rational, or evidence-based trade policy.

The proponents of friend-shoring have willed the ends—supply chain resilience—but they have not specified the means. Friend-shoring is not just a Biden administration buzzword. It has translated into policy actions, largely through a mixture of legislative and executive initiatives, not only in the US but also in other countries such as the EU and Japan. It remains to be seen whether these initiatives will motivate businesses to relocate, and if they are fiscally and politically sustainable.

About a year ago, the US added friend-shoring to the trade policy lexicon. A White House report [1] based on an Executive Order on supply chains drew attention to Covid-era supply shocks disrupting global value chains. Friend-shoring was proposed as an instrument to strengthen the resilience of those supply chains. Since then, senior US officials have been working to broaden the term’s scope.

US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen described [2] friend-shoring as deepening relationships with allies and constructing supply chains among a group of “friendly” countries to reduce the risk of disruption. In her more recent statements [3], friend-shoring has become the Biden administration’s new approach to advance foreign trade policy.

The matter is framed differently by other US officials, who put more emphasis on translating the term into import substitution policies. For example, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo explained [4] that friend-shoring is “essential” for the US, but as part of a dual approach that also involves investing in domestic manufacturing. She emphasized[5] that “if it can’t be in America, it ought to be on our allied shores.” For supply chains in sectors deemed sensitive, an explicit emphasis is put on national security. Concerning “sensitive” semiconductor supply chains, Ms Raimondo said, “some things are more important than price. You can’t put a price on America’s national security.” And she offered full repatriation of chip production to the United States, arguing, “it is a huge national security issue and we need to move to making chips in America, not friend-shoring.”

After the Biden Administration first mooted the term, statements by senior US officials revealed little about what the term actually means. While some statements favored relocation of production, or shifts in sourcing arrangements to allies, others essentially promoted subsidy-induced import substitution.

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The shoots of friend-shoring are evident in several sectors. The focus of many Group of 20 governments on the semiconductor industry offers a clear window into what friend-shoring might look like. The number of policy initiatives with a friend-shoring component is increasing. Yet, their mushrooming does not imply the existence of a grand friend-shoring strategy among Western allies.

In August, the US announced a multi-billion-dollar initiative, namely the CHIPS and Science Act [6] (CHIPS Act), with elements that could be termed friend-shoring, to advance chip manufacturing in the US. The CHIPS Act includes provisions prioritizing partnerships with allies as well as guardrails to weaken commercial ties with China. Specifically, federal funds under the CHIPS Act are offered contingent on halting the expansion of semiconductor manufacturing capacity in countries that present a national security concern to the United States. As a complement to the CHIPS Act, in October, the Commerce Department implemented [7] sweeping export controls on chip manufacturing components to China. Similar to the CHIPS Act, the new export control measures included restrictions on third countries to supply these items to China if any US technology is used in the supply chain of these items. With these two policies, the US is aiming to construct a semiconductor supply chain with allied countries while attempting to decouple China from advanced American technology.

Apart from the US, other countries are also announcing policy initiatives or actions that have a friend-shoring flavour. Recently, the EU announced the European Chips Act with a budget of more than €43 billion to strengthen semiconductor value chains within the EU. While targeting “excessive dependencies,” the European Chips Act included friend-shoring components by proposing “semiconductor international partnerships with like-minded countries.” In September, Japan offered [8] a $320 million incentive package to US chip-maker Micron to invest in Japan following negotiations with the US to expand cooperation in semiconductor production.

These initiatives are complemented by others including the US-EU Trade and Technology Council bodog casino (TTC), the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), and the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity, to “engage with trusted partners” and “reduce dependencies on unreliable sources of strategic supply.”

For now, by and large, Western governments are using carrots rather than sticks to advance friend-shoring. But it remains unclear if carrots will be sufficient.

How realistic is friend-shoring?

The idea of friend-shoring is based on constructing value chains among allies and switching production and sourcing away from geopolitical rivals to insulate supply chains from disruptions. However, such logic has flaws.

First, it is not clear in this plan which market failure friend-shoring policies will fix. If governments seek to intervene in a bodog poker review supply chain, they must make the case that they observe the risks better than firms do. One of America’s leading international trade economists, Professor Gene Grossman of Princeton University, recently observed [9] that: “Firms have their own incentives to avoid disruptions, so it’s not obvious that their investments in resilience will be sub-optimal without government policy intervention.” Policies based on the assumption of the private sector’s under-investment in resilience is flawed. Grossman also concludes [10] in another paper with two co-authors that governments are very unlikely to observe the factors that optimal public policy for supply chains depends on. So, if governments cannot accurately observe market failures in supply chains, how can they be sure that friend-shoring policies won’t do more harm than good.

Another flaw of friend-shoring is that it focuses on only one dimension of supply chain risk: that offshore operations might run the risk of vulnerability to states that turn “unfriendly.” Such an approach assumes that sourcing from allies is less likely to be disrupted than sourcing from geopolitical rivals. However, as the recent baby milk powder shortage in the US illustrates, short-sighted friend-or onshoring policies may diminish one supply risk only to amplify another. Relying on a few domestic suppliers for its supply of baby formula didn’t increase the resilience in the US. Instead, a disruption in one of the facilities has caused significant supply shortages. In their location choices, companies must balance a series of risks beyond expropriation and IP theft. Advocates of friend-shoring should consult businesses to better understand how relocating supply chains interacts with other dimensions of supply chain security.

We must remember that supply chains are run by businesses. To date, Western governments have mainly relied on carrots to induce factories to move. But subsidy-induced production relocation away from an efficient location must be commercially viable for the company. Considering the additional costs and other disadvantages of relocating factories, government subsidies should sufficiently cover the costs of relocation over the lifetime of the relocated factories. The jury is out on whether government incentives offered to date are sufficient.

Governments’ multibillion-dollar subsidies may look tempting for factory relocation. But, in essence, most of the subsidies are provided in the form of conditional tax relief over long periods of time, and lump sum grants are usually insufficient to cover the relocation costs. For example, the $52.7 billion headline number for the US Chips Act looks impressive until one realizes that setting up a single efficient semiconductor fab runs into millions of dollars. The former chairman of the world’s largest contract chipmaker TMSC argued [11] that the US CHIPS Act is a wasteful and expensive exercise in futility and that US-based semiconductor fabs “will be non-competitive in the world markets.”

Similarly, Japan’s $2.2 billion proposal announced [12] during the pandemic to repatriate production and bring factories back home from China, or move them to other South East Asian nations, initially received significant welcome. But it turned out that the average subsidy amount to bring production home from China was only $15 million. Considering the lifetime profitability and cost advantage of producing in China over Japan or in an allied economy, this amount is unlikely to move the commercial needle.

To compound matters, the subsidy sufficient to sway commercial decision-making towards friend-shoring is not easy to determine. Furthermore, pouring billions of dollars into moving factories from geopolitical rivals back home or to allies means diverting those dollars from helping populations grappling with the rising cost of living. Will governments have to turn to sticks to spur companies to relocate as soon as voter willingness to pay for relocation fades in the light of cost-of-living worries?

The friend-shoring argument requires a similar perception of disruption risks and close cooperation among allies to reach agreement on how to relocate production and sourcing away from unreliable geopolitical rivals. Any perception of an imminent security threat, such as during the Cold War, would make it easier to unite against rivals under a security bodog poker review framework. But in today’s world, it is not clear whether every ally can be counted on to be a part of US friend-shoring initiatives. Even domestically, it is not clear whether businesses or consumers are willing to pay the higher costs associated with moving supply chains away from China.

Carrots seem unlikely to move the commercial needle towards friend-shoring. Domestic voters may force Western governments to bring out the sticks. How well will that work in a multilateral context? By raising trade barriers to economies deemed “unfriendly,” friend-shoring could mutate into a rationale for further fragmenting the world trading system.

Halit Harput is a Senior Trade Policy Analyst at Switzerland-based St. Gallen Endowment for Prosperity through Trade. He reports on global trade-related policy changes for the endowment’s Global Trade Alert initiative.
 
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bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_on Chinese-made critical /blogs/africa-losing-out-trade/ Thu, 29 Sep 2022 18:31:17 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=35275 Over the past few years, the world’s supply chains have been strained and disrupted by the COVID pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and rising geopolitical tensions. These started with the US-China...

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Over the past few years, the world’s supply chains have been strained and disrupted by the COVID pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and rising geopolitical tensions. These started with the US-China trade war and then intensified following the war in Ukraine.

In response to the cumulative economic and security fallout that has ensued, some advanced countries are now ramping up efforts to divert their supply chains away from countries that are not like-minded and that don’t have shared common values.

This new supply chain strategy is called “friend-shoring.” Advanced countries are creating friend-shoring alliances which are, in turn, reshaping our global economy.

These shifts have adverse implications for Africa. The approaches to reconfiguring supply chains currently unfolding threaten to heap more stress on a continent already weighed down by multiple crises.

Africa stands to lose out because the current reshaping of supply chains is not intended to shift trade, investments and jobs towards African trade partners. Rather it’s got to do with efforts by the EU and US to insulate their supply chains from being disrupted for geopolitical reasons by less trusted partners with significant global market share in key raw materials, commodities and other essential products.

Steps can be taken to mitigate the negative economic effects that will be imposed on Africa by this supply chain reorientation. These include forging strong and effective friend -shoring alliances with the advanced economies and defending the rules-based multilateral trading system.

The push for a friend-shoring strategy

In the US, friend-shoring as a policy goal was first proposed by Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen in April this year. In her remarks on the way forward for the global economy, she identified friend-shoring of supply chains as a strategy that could achieve two outcomes. Firstly it could securely extend market access. Secondly it could simultaneously lower the risks to the US economy and its trusted trade partners.

Then during a tour of East Asia in July, Yellen sought to promote the US administration’s proposed friend-shoring policy first in Tokyo and later on in a speech delivered in Seoul. She said:

In so doing, we can help to insulate both American and Korean households from the price increases and disruptions caused by geopolitical and economic risks.

Aid for Trade initiativeAnd during a recent visit to Japan and South Korea, Vice President Kamala Harris emphasised the importance of friend-shoring. Speaking in Tokyo she said:

…it is important that we and our allies partner in a way that allows us to grow, and in a way that allows us to function at a very practical level.

US President Joe Biden has been pushing the same supply-chain strategy in Asia. A centerpiece of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework he unveiled in Asia is bolstering regional supply chains as part of Washington’s efforts to strengthen ties with trusted Asian partners. And to counter China.

The framework is also a big deal for the US because it brings together economies that contribute nearly 40% of global GDP. Along with the US, its other key members include Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and several Southeast Asian countries.

The Biden administration also unveiled a new US strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa in August. But, in sharp contrast to the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, it does not include any specific and concrete friend-shoring commitments for African countries. And appears mainly to be another counter play against China and Russia—the US’s two top adversaries.

The push to diversify supply chains is also underway in Europe. According to European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde, nearly half of companies had diversified their supplier base by the end of 2021. As the world’s largest single market, the EU is able to use its strong regional base to diversify supply chains within the bloc.

While the COVID pandemic certainly played an important role in spurring the shift from dependence to diversification, the war in Ukraine was a tipping point for Europe from an economic and security standpoint. It further intensified the drive to diversify supply lines Bodog Poker away from Russian suppliers of critical commodities, especially energy, food, and fertiliser. The strategy is to friend-shore them to countries deemed reliable and with shared strategic interests.

Africa stands to lose out

Africa has nothing to gain from the current reshaping of supply chains. This is because US and EU friend-shoring initiatives heavily favour Asian and Indo-pacific partners. Winners from these initiatives include Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and other Indo-Pacific countries deemed to be trustworthy. Their economies will benefit from the boost given to trade, production plants, jobs and investments.

In addition, friend-shoring also threatens to undermine the World Trade Organisation’s Aid for Trade initiative. This was launched in 2005 to assist developing countries reduce trade costs and thereby enhance export competitiveness. Its significance has steadily increased in the years after it was launched. At this year’s WTO meeting in July, Aid for Trade discussions focused on helping Africa and other developing countries recover and build long-term sustainable development by supporting priority needs they had identified.

These needs include trade facilitation, digital connectivity, export diversification, connecting to value chains, and women’s economic empowerment. They also focused on how environmentally sustainable development can contribute to achieving these priority needs.

Reconfiguring supply chains in ways that exclusively lend a helping hand to current US and EU manoeuvring will only make it more difficult for Africa to benefit from WTO support in these important areas.

What’s to be done?

Looking forward, there are at least three essential things that can be done to mitigate negative impacts on Africa.

First, effective friend-shoring alliances should be included as a centerpiece of the new US strategy towards sub-Saharan Africa. African policy makers should strongly urge the Biden administration to do this and demonstrate commitment on their part to be trusted partners.

Second, the EU should also develop an effective friend-shoring strategy with African partners, even as it pushes for an expansion of intra-bloc supply chains. Again, it is paramount that African policy makers take the lead and justify the importance of entering into a strong friend -shoring relationship with the EU.

Finally, defending the rules-based multilateral trading system is important to ensure that it continues to deliver benefits for developing and least developed countries, including those in Africa.

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