On March 28, the Office of U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) released its annual Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_Ronald Reagan Building–a long and often technical document that usually gets little fanfare. However, this year, the report referred to the “sovereign right” of all governments to “govern in the public interest.” That would allow governments to erect tariffs and other trade barriers if they asserted a public interest in doing so–a major pivot for USTR.

That astonishing move is part of a larger pattern emerging in the Biden Administration, which has adopted an approach to trade policy that goes against traditional U.S. foreign policy.

The USTR may simply be embracing a protectionist posture that supports the administration’s “Buy America” agenda. But in turning inward, the agency is abandoning the thousands of American businesses that fuel some $250 billion in goods and services trade beyond our borders. In short: the agency seems to have forgotten the “U.S.” in USTR.

The most recent decision follows a similarly baffling decision by USTR to withdraw support for crucial digital trade provisions at the World Trade Organization (WTO). These proposals–supported both by prior USTRs and many of our global allies–aimed to protect cross-border data flows, prohibit data localization mandates, and safeguard intellectual property. They advance the principles of fair trade and open markets that the U.S. has long championed, and that our innovation economy was built on. In backing away from them, the U.S. approach now resembles those of countries like China, and risks legitimizing authoritarian practices that hurt innovation and undermine fair competition.

The justification for this abrupt policy reversal is flimsy at best. Claims that digital trade rules would unfairly benefit large American technology companies at the expense of smaller ones simply defy reality. Digital trade barriers, including data localization requirements and forced disclosure of source code, disproportionately hurt smaller businesses, hindering their ability to compete on the global stage.

The USTR’s decision jeopardizes America’s leadership in shaping global trade norms and risks eroding America’s moral authority on the world stage. The USTR must stop leveraging foreign policy to aid a misguided domestic competition policy. Instead, the agency should recommit to a robust trade policy that prioritizes the interests of American businesses of all sizes.

The U.S. has a proud and successful history of leading the charge for open and fair trade. Amid growing protectionism and authoritarianism around the globe, our government must stand firm in defense of those values and interests. Robust trade policy isn’t just about economic prosperity but also about safeguarding the principles that define who we are as a nation.

The time to act is now, before irreparable damage is done to America’s standing in the global economy and the integrity of the international trading system. Otherwise, it would be an abdication of American leadership and certainly a departure from the norm. If our own leaders don’t champion American innovation wherever it takes place, who will?

Ed Brzytwa is the vice president of international trade at the Consumer Technology Association (CTA).

To read the full commentary piece as it appears on FORTUNE’s website, click here.

The post bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_self, and may actually appeared first on bodog.

In the words of Benjamin Franklin: “No nation was ever ruined by trade, even seemingly the most disadvantageous.” 

Over the last decades, not only were nations not harmed by trade, but they have been reaping unimaginable benefits, which have transformed the standard of living and afforded them greater access to competitively priced goods.

The Arabian Gulf region is an important global trade hub that depends heavily on exporting oil derivates and raw materials to the world. After oil and gas, the chemical and petrochemicals industry is the second largest industry in the region and plays a vital role in the Gulf Cooperation Council economies. The value of chemical trade flow in the GCC reached $88.6 billion in 2021, with exports accounting for $68.6 billion: an increase of 56.5 percent in value in 2021 compared to the year before.

Off the back of this growth, chemical trade is emerging at the forefront of the regional agenda. In 2021, the region set a new record with its trade surplus reaching $53.7 billion (the highest since 2009).

Furthermore, growth in the GCC chemical industry translates into better job creation in the region. In 2021, the chemical sector accounted for 53,900 direct and 107,800 indirect jobs, and 48,500 induced jobs — or a total of 210,200 jobs.

While regional chemical trade has been buoyant over the last three years, opportunities to improve the chemical industry’s international trade position certainly exist. But to achieve this, the policymakers’ role is of paramount importance if we are to see growth in the share of free trade agreements and preferential trade agreements between the GCC and its trading partners. Such deals are increasingly being seen as beneficial to GCC’s economic growth as well as the sustainability of the regional chemical industry. From helping to raise living standards to attract foreign investment, fostering innovation in manufacturing, and connecting businesses with people, free trade deals have an unmatched potential to make industries more sustainable, improve revenues, generate more jobs for the local population, and facilitate the development of advanced technologies.

Free trade agreements will help the region’s downstream players to boost their innovation output and become more competitive globally. Robust provisions on intellectual property rights protection that potentially go beyond the standard protection envisaged in the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights would reduce costs of trading in IP-sensitive goods and promote innovation in sectors, such as the chemical industry. 

Free trade deals not only reduce and eliminate tariffs, but they also help to overcome behind-the-border barriers. As a result, companies can focus on producing and selling goods that best utilize their resources, while other businesses import scarce or locally unavailable goods and raw materials. It is a win-win situation for all. There is good news for local industries too. FTAs are proven to help small and medium-sized businesses to become more competitive and less reliant on government subsidies. Just imagine the sheer value that free trade agreements can unlock — for local communities, consumers, and the overall economy.

While it must be recognized that FTAs could reduce government revenues, which come from existing customs duties, this reduction in revenue would be offset by enabling GCC commodity exports to gain access to protected markets. Gaining access to new markets will in turn enhance the netback for regional exports and generate higher revenue for chemical firms, which are wholly owned by GCC governments.

The international trade landscape has been undergoing a series of tectonic shifts in the face of changing chemicals supply and demand centers, emerging economies claiming a larger share of international trade, world events, such as the war in Ukraine, supply chain challenges, the COVID-19 pandemic, and increasing protectionism.

So, what opportunities lie ahead for new FTAs? The GCC region has the highest intraregional trade share and intensity with China, India, and Turkiye. It has lower trade costs with this group of countries when compared with other economies. Consequently, free trade agreements with China, India, and Turkiye will prove to be beneficial.

If the GCC is signing or planning to sign such an agreement, it would be essential to know which goods are the most efficiently produced and select the most profitable sectors to maximize gains.

In a recent white paper issued by the Gulf Petrochemicals and Chemicals Association, we shared exclusive insights that can help policymakers evaluate the potential economic impact of a free trade agreement. It is a must-read for anyone looking to enhance their understanding of FTAs and their vital role in the chemical industry and the region.

To conclude, as we look to the next decades when the global population is projected to exceed 9 billion by 2050, demand for chemicals and agri-nutrients will continue to rise, creating unprecedented pressure on the industry to deliver its goods to an exploding global population. The GCC chemical industry has strong potential to benefit from the global increase in chemical demand, projected to double by 2050 and provide life-enhancing, safer, cheaper, and more durable chemical products to communities across the world.

To ensure we can successfully deliver on this objective, we need a robust and supportive local and international trade policy framework that helps to advance FTA negotiations which have been stalling for decades and addresses where and to what extent trade opportunities exist, while carefully evaluating the risks and downsides of a potential deal.

The chemical industry is vital to the smooth functioning, prosperity, and growth of the global economy and the GCC region. We, therefore, all share a responsibility to come together and cooperate in this new era of trade and reimagine what progress looks like today and into the future.

• Dr. Abdulwahab Al-Sadoun is the secretary-general of the Gulf Petrochemicals and Chemicals Association.

To read the full blog, please click here.

The post Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_.7 billion (the highest appeared first on bodog.

They say President Joe Biden’s strategy imperils U.S. jobs and represents a potentially illegal end-run around Congress.

Critics are calling on Biden to halt mineral negotiations with the European Union and other nations while also slamming a recent mineral deal with Japan. The Biden administration insists that its strategy to boost supply chains among allied nations is the most potent counter to Chinese dominance over global minerals.

At issue is whether Biden should prioritize domestic mineral production and ensure producers in the United States — not manufacturers in foreign countries — reap the benefits of a coveted EV tax credit, known as 30D. The credit was included in last year’s Inflation Reduction Act.

Now, the Treasury Department is in the hot seat as it prepares to screen new trade deals and determine whether the pacts allow access to $3,750 in U.S. tax credits for EVs produced with minerals extracted or processed in partner countries. The mineral negotiations represent a marquee example of the threat Biden’s clean energy pursuit poses to other key administration policy priorities, most notably the rapid expansion of domestic manufacturing.

“They have three goals here,” Bill Reinsch, a trade expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said of the Biden administration. “One is to facilitate the transition to green technology. The second one is to enhance domestic manufacturing and jobs. And the third is to do it in a way consistent with trade law and international trade rules. They can’t do all of those at the same time.”

Minerals such as lithium and cobalt are essential for today’s fleet of EVs. And experts agree that mineral production and refinement will likely form the backbone of the clean energy economy in the future and the millions of jobs that come with it. Minerals are also necessary for a long list of medical devices, smartphones and other staple products.

Meanwhile, compliance with the U.S. EV credit is based on mineral and manufacturing sourcing mandates designed to counter China by strengthening supply chains in the United States and nations with which the U.S. has trade agreements.

But critics are digging in for a fight. They’re challenging the Treasury Department’s loose interpretation of a “free-trade agreement” in the Inflation Reduction Act’s text.

“There’s enough noise to suggest Treasury is going to face some significant challenges in using this broad brush to redefine what trade agreements actually are, from a legal and constitutional standpoint,” Rich Nolan, president of the National Mining Association, a U.S. lobbying group, said in an interview.

Nolan said the mining group is “pushing the administration to bring those tax incentives home, so that those materials come from U.S. mines, from mining communities mined by American miners.”

A U.S. Geological Survey study released in January found that the United States is 100 percent import-reliant on 15 critical minerals, including minerals used in EVs like graphite and manganese. The U.S. remains more than 95 percent import-reliant on rare earths and titanium, while American companies import more than a quarter of lithium used in manufacturing, according to the study.

Another recent assessment from Securing America’s Future Energy, which promotes domestic energy production, laid out the Chinese dominance of global minerals in stark terms.

“Chinese-owned companies have strategically purchased stakes in major mineral deposits around the world, control anywhere from 60 to 100 percent of processing (depending on the mineral), and produce upwards of 70 to 90 percent of the world’s battery components,” the group said in a March report.

bodog casino

In March, Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen launched negotiations over a “targeted critical minerals agreement” that will “count toward requirements for clean vehicles in the Section 30D clean vehicle tax credit.”

The announcement came amid claims from various world leaders that the Inflation Reduction Act’s incentives violate World Trade Organization rules against subsidies that promote domestic products over imports.

The Office of the United States Trade Representative, which leads U.S. trade negotiations, said the E.U. talks are ongoing.

“We will continue to work with our EU allies to boost mineral production and expand access to sources of critical minerals while diversifying global supply chains,” said USTR spokesperson Sam Michel. The Swedish ambassador to the U.S., Karin Olofsdotter, recently told E&E News that a transatlantic pact is “in the pipeline.”

The Japanese deal, announced two weeks after the E.U. talks launched, “affirms” the two countries’ “obligation not to impose prohibitions or restrictions” on bilateral trade relations.

Now, Indonesia, Argentina, and the Philippines are signaling interest in similar deals. Even South Korea, which already shares a trade deal with the United States that was passed by Congress in 2011, is aiming for more mineral concessions.

“President Biden and I welcomed the expansion of our [bilateral] mutual investment in advanced technology, including semiconductors, electric vehicles and batteries,” South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol said during a recent event at the White House, according to a translator. “President Biden has said that no special support and considerations will be spared for Korean companies’ investment.”

Congressional complaints

U.S. lawmakers say they’ve been kept on the sidelines.

Rep. Adrian Smith (R-Neb.), the chair of the House Ways and Means Trade subcommittee and the co-chair of the U.S.-Japan Congressional Caucus, said the Biden administration has not briefed him on any mineral trade negotiations.

“This is basically a workaround. And I don’t think it’s sustainable long-term,” Smith told E&E News. “I think there will be attempts to assert legislative prerogative.”

Never far from the spotlight on Capitol Hill, Senate Energy and Natural Resources Chair Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.) has regularly blasted the Biden administration’s implementation of the Inflation Reduction Act, saying recently he would “vote to repeal my own bill.”

Bodog Poker Manchin has also threatened a lawsuit. Still, legal experts say it’ll be a tough case to make because of challenges in meeting legal standing. The moderate Democrat is now set to face off against West Virginia Gov. Jim Justice next year to retain his seat in a state Biden lost by nearly 40 points in 2020.

The Inflation Reduction Act text says that EVs qualify for half of the $7,500 credit if the minerals used in the models are “extracted or processed” in the U.S. or “in any country with which the United States has a free trade agreement.”

Meanwhile, the proposed Treasury guidance for the 30D credit gives access to 20 foreign countries with which the U.S. has traditional free trade agreements passed by Congress, along with “additional countries that the [Treasury] Secretary identifies,” such as Japan.

Reinsch, the long-time Washington trade expert, predicted the fight over the definition of a free-trade agreement will likely be settled in court.

“Since the term is undefined in the [Inflation Reduction Act], that’ll probably be resolved by litigation. This is America. Anybody can sue anybody for anything,” he said. “There’s no legislative history here to provide any guidance. And the term is not defined in the statute. So it ends up with judges.”

The two top Democratic trade lawmakers in Congress called the Japanese deal “unacceptable,” arguing the administration “does not have the authority to unilaterally enter into free trade agreements.”

“Even among allies, the United States should only enter into agreements that account for the realities of an industry, learn from past agreements, and raise standards,” Rep. Richard Neal (D-Mass.) and Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) said in late March, the day the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative announced the deal with Japan. “Agreements should be developed transparently and made available to the public for meaningful review well before signing — not after the ink is already dry.”

An aide for Wyden’s Senate Finance Committee, who was granted anonymity because the person is not authorized to speak publicly on the issue, said the Biden administration last briefed the committee on mineral trade talks in “early March.”

The congressional complaints are echoed in environmental and labor circles.

Ben Beachy, vice president of manufacturing and industrial policy at the BlueGreen Alliance, touted domestic manufacturing as the best solution to curb the U.S. climate footprint.

“The onshoring of EV manufacturing will help to cut the climate pollution that, ironically, is often baked into imports of EV components,” Beachy said. “That’s because overseas corporations tend to be more emissions intensive than U.S. factories in producing the aluminum, steel and other materials that go into EVs.”

He said the Japanese deal should “not be repeated” with the E.U. or other countries.

A recent BlueGreen Alliance study found that the Inflation Reduction Act has spurred new domestic manufacturing projects that will create 900,000 jobs. The law sparked a wave of new battery plant announcements. And the Department of Energy recently extended a $2 billion loan to a battery recycling plant in Nevada.

But the mineral negotiations are not the first time the Biden administration has struggled to balance climate and domestic manufacturing priorities.

In April, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives voted to repeal a Biden administration pause on solar tariffs from four Southeast Asian countries where the administration itself determined China is processing solar products in circumvention of U.S. tariffs. And despite a veto threat, the Senate passed the measure Wednesday with nine Democrats in support.

Biden administration officials say the pause was necessary to maintain high levels of solar deployment in the United States.

‘Immediate action today’

For months, top Biden administration officials have urged allied nations to band together with the U.S. to develop collaborative mineral supply chains.

“When we look at critical minerals and we look at solar panels and wind turbines and electric vehicles and batteries, there is already now an effort by some to narrow the control of that supply chain into one or a handful of countries,” Amos Hochstein, deputy assistant to the president and senior adviser for energy and investment, said in a March speech in Washington.

“We have to take immediate action today to work as a global community with our allies and to make sure that that market changes fundamentally,” he said. At the time of the speech, Hochstein was the State Department’s special presidential coordinator for global infrastructure and energy security.

David Turk, deputy secretary at the Department of Energy, told E&E News recently that the effort to boost allied mineral supply chains globally should be a “full interagency” strategy, pointing to expertise at DOE and assistance tools at agencies such as the U.S. International Development Finance Corp. and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

“We have our national labs, [and] we’re bringing some of that expertise to the table,” said Turk. “We’ve been having a lot of good conversations, including with [the White House]” and the Treasury Department.

Last year, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency helped to finance a mineral processing facility in the Philippines. And on May 1, following a summit at the White House with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Biden announced a new package of assistance to the Philippine mineral sector, including $5 million in USAID funds to boost mineral processing and EV component manufacturing in the country.

Turk said he’s looking for “good, forward-leaning language” on minerals in the upcoming G-7 nations summit in Japan.

The U.S. is home to some of the largest mineral reserves globally. And the U.S. mining sector continues to push the Biden administration to open up key mineral reserves in Minnesota, Arizona and Alaska.

But even where the administration is putting its weight behind mine proposals, judges are raising objections.

Mining experts say a 2019 judicial decision, which halted the Rosemont copper mine in Arizona, is complicating the approval mining permits by requiring companies to prove the existence of valuable minerals even at the locations mining companies want to dump mine waste.

House Republicans included language in their lead energy and permitting package to allow a company to “use, occupy, and conduct operations on public land, with or without the discovery of a valuable mineral deposit.”

Backing Biden

Proponents of EV deployment in the United States are putting their weight behind the Treasury Department’s liberal interpretation of trade agreements.

“We’re certainly supportive of expanding negotiations. We want to make sure we have the largest reach of eligibility possible for the clean vehicle credit,” said Leilani Gonzalez, policy director for the Zero Emission Transportation Association, an EV deployment advocacy group.

She added that with countries still in the middle of developing mineral supply chains, the question to answer is whether they can meet the requirements that the Department of Treasury has laid out.

Abigail Wulf, director of the Center for Critical Minerals Strategy at Securing America’s Future Energy, the pro-domestic-energy organization, also called for a “broadened” definition of trade deals.

“We think it’s a good thing to expand the tent when it comes to trade agreement countries,” said Wulf. “Simultaneously, while we’re letting down those draw bridges, we need to be making sure that the U.S. and others are building high enough walls around the Chinese Communist Party.”

The Inflation Reduction Act disqualifies vehicles from the 30D credit if the EVs contain minerals or battery components from a foreign entity of concern. While experts expect Chinese entities to fit that definition, the foreign entity of concern portion of the 30D credit doesn’t take effect until 2024.

On top of her support for the mineral negotiations, Wulf urged the Biden administration to pass traditional trade pacts with congressional support and enforceable labor and environmental standards. The United States last closed an enforceable trade deal with Mexico and Canada in 2020.

Still, Wulf said the administration is showing little appetite for that route.

“The problem with these trade agreements that aren’t ratified by Congress is that they aren’t actually enforceable,” Wulf said.

To read the full article, please click here.

The post bodog casino|Welcome Bonus_administration has not appeared first on bodog.

Glen Hodgson is CEO of Free Trade Europa, a free-market think tank committed to trade, liberalization, and the rule of law across Europe. Brooke Medina is Vice President of Communications at the John Locke Foundation, a free-market state-based think tank in Raleigh, North Carolina.

To read the full article, please click here.

The post bodog poker review|Most Popular_this is the EU’s Carbon appeared first on bodog.

EU and US: increasingly protectionist, pro-subsidy, and anti-trade

There is never a right way to do a wrong thing, and this is particularly true when it comes to governments picking business winners and losers, drowning politically favored companies in taxpayers’ money and claiming they are turbo-charging progress. The US’ Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) – doling out $369 billion to subsidize electric vehicles, turbines, and battery projects – and the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) – an instrument for providing grants and loans to support reforms and investments in the EU Member States totaling over €700 billion – are the latest examples of this self-destructive tendency.

Both the European and American political appetite for dirigiste industrial policies is rooted in a wrong-headed desire to beat China at its own self-destructive game, buying into the notion that the government has reliable foresight in which technologies and materials to invest in. History has shown that state aid invariably becomes a vehicle to support uncompetitive companies and pour money into politically favored initiatives, rather than support innovation and cutting-edge technologies. Do America and Europe really want to let China shape their economic strategies?

Excessive interventionism is bad for business, consumers, and the economy, as it gives bureaucrats the authority to redirect resources to projects and businesses based on political considerations, rather than economic ones. This creates a lack of competition, which often leads to higher prices, fewer choices, and poorer product quality.

Exacerbating trade conflicts

Even beyond the high economic importance of keeping global markets competitive, decision makers must remember that subsidies and tariffs distort markets and often lead to conflict in international trade relations. This is an especially critical point during a time when international instability is on the rise, whether it’s the Russian war on Ukraine or the worrisome prospect of China invading Taiwan. Ensuring strong relations with our allies, both economically and military, is crucial. Unfortunately, the US and EU have indulged in a number of internecine trade wars over recent decades, covering everything from aircraft and aluminum to steel and poultry. The results have led to needless trade tensions with international partners and comparative advantage losses in a variety of industries and sectors.

Similarly, we see an increase in Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG)-linked criteria used as a barrier to trade. A perfect example of this is the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) which is a tariff on carbon intensive products, such as cement and some electricity, imported into the European Union. This was enacted as part of the European Green Deal and takes effect in 2026, with reporting starting this year.

In the US, supporters of the IRA made lofty claims about its benefits to the environment. One congresswoman said the act, “represents the most significant investment to combat climate change in U.S. history.” Analysis and time have shown these claims to be illusory. The Hoover Institution found that the protectionist policies baked into the IRA would do virtually nothing to curb global warming, stating, “At best…the Inflation Reduction Act would cause the world’s temperature in 2100 to be 0.028 degrees Fahrenheit cooler; at worst, only 0.0009 degrees Fahrenheit cooler.” The electric vehicle element of the IRA is another congressional conceit, and has prompted much outcry from the US’ European counterparts. The “buy American” mandates embedded into it have caused so much European pushback that Secretary Janet Yellen has delayed final rules on the incentives until March, looking for ways to appease vocal opponents.

Time to change the focus

Instead of heading down the precarious path of government-led industrial policy, America and Europe should focus on expansionist policies which remove red tape and facilitate trade. An emphasis on entrepreneurship and innovation, rather than propping up ailing companies, would give businesses a fair shot at competing in the global marketplace, shoring up the most efficient supply chains, and tapping into individual country’s comparative advantages.

By way of an example, the proposed EU Critical Raw Materials Act – which should be published in March – is projected to make it easier and faster for companies to attain the necessary licenses and permits to mine the resources required by businesses and society. Waiting 10 to 15 years before the first spade is even allowed to break ground, as is currently the case, is unacceptable.

Likewise strengthening and completing the EU Single Market would work wonders for Europe. The Single Market is Europe’s greatest asset, and should be expanded to include finance/banking, services and standards. Estimates suggest a more integrated and better functioning Single Market would add an additional €183 to €269 billion annually for manufactured goods, and an additional €338 billion annually for services. In total this represents a rise in EU GDP of approximately 12%.

In the US, uncertainty surrounding Congress’ ability to pass legislation abounds, now that the Republican control of the House of Representatives can serve as a foil to President Biden’s agenda. This could lead to some improvement in US-EU trade relations, as the pro-market voices in Congress apply necessary pushback against their protectionist colleagues.

The magic power of free trade

The wave of government aid swelling on both sides of the Atlantic will inevitably stoke animosity and drive an unnecessary wedge between transatlantic allies during a time of increasing global instability and economic uncertainty. It’s time to turn the tide.

Despite rising internal and external nationalistic pressure, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic should remember that in a time of increasing hostilities from bad actors, like China and Russia, retaliatory protectionism toward our allies will do nothing but ensure mutual decline. Like Professor Dumbledore, our leaders possess the power to combat dark, damaging forces. The choice is theirs. They can either choose closed borders, tariffs, and quotas, further harming the US and European economies over the long term, or they can open the door to prosperity and mutual benefit by securing global supply chains. Citizens deserve reliable and affordable access to the materials and markets they need to thrive, whether it’s baby formula, mineral fuels for aerospace products, or a foaming tankard of butterbeer.

Glen Hodgson is CEO of Free Trade Europa, a free-market think tank committed to trade, liberalization, and the rule of law across Europe. Brooke Medina is Vice President of Communications at the John Locke Foundation, a free-market state-based think tank in Raleigh, North Carolina.

Originally published on api.realclear.com, part of the BLOX Digital Content Exchange.

See original post on RealClear Policy: Free Trade: the Strongest Spell Against Economic Decline | RealClearPolicy

The post Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_Glen Hodgson is CEO of appeared first on bodog.

The 20th century was America’s century. From recovering from the devastation of war to promoting prosperity and the rule of law worldwide, it was the United States’ capital and values that came to define much of the world’s military, political, social, and economic road map, even into the 21st century. Since 1945, it became clear that it was in Washington’s interest to ensure that the global economy recovered steadily, and that it should stimulate demand worldwide. Boosting global growth was not simply an altruistic goal, nor was it guided solely by the fear of communism’s rise—it was also a means to further US corporate interests. Access to global markets, operating under clear rules driven by US standards, also became part of the US national interest. Global trade enjoyed clear prioritization across US public and private sectors.

Clarity about the United States’ commitment to global trade no longer holds.

Bodog Poker To be sure, grinding poverty persists in much of the world. Currently, 46 nations are deemed the least developed countries, representing 12 percent of the world’s population. Of these, 33 are in Africa and 9 are located in Asia, including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, and Afghanistan. But from Japan and the earlier Asian Tigers of South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, to rapidly rising India, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and beyond, the Indo-Pacific region is home to the world’s most dynamic, populous, and ambitious countries, which have emerged as economic rivals to the United States. In short, Washington’s 20th-century goal of lifting all boats to greater prosperity out of the ruins of war has largely been achieved—not only in Europe but also in most of Asia. As a result, market access to the Indo-Pacific has become more lucrative, and more competitive, with Washington’s voice no longer dominating the field as countries look to redefine and enhance the rules of trade that better meet the needs of the 21st century.

The fact that China has emerged as the single biggest trading partner for all countries in the Indo-Pacific, with the exception of Afghanistan, has also caused US economic influence in the region to falter. At the same time, Beijing is steadily investing in matching its military might to its economic influence, both within and well beyond Asia—not simply by building up its arms but also by making strategic use of advanced technology to enhance its military capabilities. With Washington increasingly aware of the multifaceted threat posed by Beijing’s economic and technological advancements, the Biden administration is going on the offense and developing its own economic strategy that resets US trade ambitions and prioritizes national security in defining economic relations with like-minded countries. The question, however, is whether the United States can succeed in bringing its allies and partners in line with its own reassessment of the international economic challenges that lie ahead.

Coupled with Washington’s own decision to pull out of the Indo-Pacific’s most ambitious trade deal in 2017, and with no US plans to join the subsequent Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, even the staunchest US allies have come to question Washington’s commitment to free trade in Asia. What the Biden administration has instead decided is to develop a two-pronged strategy. First, it is focusing on dealing with the economic threat posed by China’s violations of trade agreements. And second, the administration has drawn a clear line in cracking down on Beijing’s access to advanced technology by choking off China’s ability to acquire the most sophisticated semiconductor capabilities and chip manufacturing technology, which in turn would curtail Chinese development of artificial intelligence and supercomputing. Together, these new approaches to trade and technology acquisition are key to enhance US economic competitiveness and boost US security. But they can only be effective if the United States works in conjunction with other countries. After all, along with the United States’ success in lifting economic standards worldwide, its solo ability to tip the global scale in its favor and induce adherence to its standards has also diminished.

Yet the Biden administration’s vision for a new trade framework focusing on four key areas—digital trade, supply chain resilience, environmental sustainability, and good governance—has been lackluster. While 13 countries—including Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia—have agreed to start negotiations on the key issues, India has already declined to join in talks regarding trade under the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, due to domestic political considerations. India’s walkout highlights just how difficult it can be for countries on divergent paths of development to reach a consensus, even on critical issues such as supply chain resiliency, given that national leaders must reckon with their domestic constraints as much as their economic needs. The true value of the framework’s road map, however, is to clearly show that Washington needs to work with its partners to address the region’s biggest challenges. And nowhere is the need to form partnerships more apparent than in the effort to push back against China’s aggression and its abuse of its economic might.

The Biden administration’s success in pressing ahead with three key proposed laws over the past 12 months despite a deeply divided Congress speaks volumes about the emerging national consensus to push for growth and industrialization policy. The United States is hardly alone in increasing spending on securing critical infrastructure, investing in cybersecurity, and boosting commitments to innovate in advanced technologies. From Japan legislating to enhance economic security to South Korea’s budget to speed up economic recovery, key US allies in the Indo-Pacific region have boosted spending to enable them to rebound from the disruptions caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic, and to stave off risks of China weaponizing its global economic dominance. Enhancing resilience no longer means simply preparing for the unexpected, such as natural disasters; it also means being able to withstand pressures that China could place on accessing goods that could make countries vulnerable. Nevertheless, there is a growing wariness across the board that efforts to become more resilient are also leading to a path of less global interdependence and the rise of unilateralism, especially in the United States. Far from advancing globalization, as Washington sought to do in the 20th century, its de facto new industrialization policy is seen as a potential driver of economic nationalism.

Meanwhile, Washington’s trade policy has focused more on encouraging overseas investments into the United States, with no clear, immediate gain for countries that are actively committing to strengthening crucial US industries such as semiconductors and large-capacity batteries. This has been especially disconcerting for South Korea, which is concerned the US will take away its global chip lead. In the longer term, however, the Biden administration’s measures to safeguard US technological advancement and to stop the transfer of advanced technologies to China could lead to a potential schism between the United States and its key allies.

Through the United States’ October 7, 2022, export control restrictions to stop China from acquiring advanced semiconductor technology, including manufacturing equipment and the talent to support chip development, it has made clear where it draws the line when it comes to engaging in a technology competition with China. The goal is not simply to stop Chinese access to the world’s most advanced chips and prevent their use in Chinese missiles and other military uses but also to stop China from furthering its goal of becoming the world leader in advanced technologies, including the development of artificial intelligence.

The strategic objective of stifling Beijing’s technology innovation has secured widespread congressional support. But for the Biden administration to succeed in keeping the United States’ most vital technology from being abused by the Chinese—and for the US to remain a global economic leader in a new era of competition—it must have the cooperation and support of the other advanced economies in Asia and Europe. A true victory for Washington requires protecting its own semiconductor technologies through export controls. But victory will also necessitate humility on the part of Washington, and recognition that it can no longer alone meet the challenges that lie ahead. Working together with like-minded partners is no longer simply a mantra—it must be at the core of Washington’s effort to win the strategic competition with Beijing.

Shihoko Goto is the director for Geoeconomics and Indo-Pacific Enterprise, and deputy director for the Asia Program, at the Wilson Center.

To read the full article, please click here.

The post bodog casino|Welcome Bonus_and beyond, appeared first on bodog.

At the same time, rising protectionism across the global economy, looming risks of stagflation and the division lines emerging along the Global North-South axis raise the expediency of greater economic openness and trade liberalization among the developing economies. An ambitious goal in advancing such South-South cooperation may be the creation of a free trade area (FTA) for the Global South economies with particular care accorded to the needs of the vulnerable developing nations, including the world’s least developed countries (LDCs).

The attainment of such an ambitious goal as the creation of a Global South FTA will not be possible in a single stroke – it will most likely necessitate an assembly process that involves time and sequencing. In terms of the mechanics and technology of assembly, the “integration of integrations” of the existing regional free trade agreements of the Global South may prove to be the most effective operational framework. Such an approach may allow for an integration among all of the main three pan-continental platforms of the developing world: Africa + Latin America + Asia/Eurasia. Accordingly, one possible abbreviation for the Global South FTA could be “Triple AAA FTA” that denotes the tripartite alliance between the developing economies of Africa, America and Asia. In terms of sequencing, it may be expedient to start the construction of a South – South FTA with the smaller continental platforms, increasing the scale of integration with every following step of the assembly process.

The first pan-continental free trade area in the developing world has been achieved in Africa with the launching of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). This step, in effect, allowed for the creation of a framework for co-integrating the numerous regional integration arrangements on the African continent. The next possible step towards a pan-continental free trade area could be observed in the coming years in Latin America, where regional conditions are improving for continental initiatives to be advanced.

The next stage in progressing towards a free-trade area for the Global South would be to link up the pan-continental free trade arrangements in Africa and Latin America. The two pan-continental blocs are broadly similar in terms of the size of GDP – in 2021 Africa’s GDP totaled around USD 2.7 trn, while for South America’s 12 economies the total in 2021 was around USD 3.25 trn. Furthermore, there is already a track-record of Africa-Latin America cooperation in the sphere of “integration of integrations” via the signing of a preferential trade agreement between MERCOSUR and the South African Customs Union (SACU) in 2008-2009 – the trade deal entered into force in April 2016.

In recent years links between Latin America’s regional organizations and Africa have further strengthened. On 7 September 2021, leaders from the African Union and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) convened the 1st Africa CARICOM Summit.

Furthermore, in 2021 in the context of Argentina’s Presidency Pro Tempore, MERCOSUR and the African Union undertook steps to boost bilateral relations between the two regional blocs. In particular, “the Secretary for International Economic Relations, Jorge Neme, chaired the first Mercosur-African Union Meeting, aimed at strengthening relations between the blocs, renewing political ties, further reinforcing cooperation mechanisms and fostering economic relations”.

The more complicated steps will involve the incorporation of Asia, most notably China, into the common South-South FTA platform. The difficulty emanates from the fragmentation of the regional integration patterns in Asia as well as the asymmetries in terms of size: Asia accounts for over 80% of the Global South total GDP, while China alone accounts for well over a third of the total economic mass of the Global South. Another factor is competitiveness: China exerts a competitive edge in a wide range of industries compared to its Global South peers, making the prospect of free trade more difficult to digest politically and economically. One possible option in attenuating these competitive pressures may be to precede the FTA with a preferential trade agreement across the South-South platform that does not involve the creation of a full-scale trade liberalization in the very near term, but rather a sequential, step-wise lifting of barriers in key priority sectors. There will also be a need to include provisions that protect the interests and needs of the least developed economies of the Global South.

Estimates from the United Nations ESCAP suggest that the potential dividends from the creation of a South-South FTA may be substantial – “such a scenario would enhance South-South trade significantly. Most of the South countries would experience rise in export to other South countries”. One of the possible guides in this respect may be the progression of the AfCFTA project – according to the estimates of the World Bank, “by 2035 the AfCFTA is set to lift 30 million Africans out of extreme poverty and 68 million from moderate poverty”. A more recent study by the World Bank finds that “under deep integration, Africa’s exports to the rest of the world could rise by 32% by 2035, while intra-African exports could grow by 109%, led by manufactured goods”.

The platform for a comprehensive FTA across the Global South may be based on the BRICS+ framework whose evolution since 2017 is increasingly geared towards bringing together the main regional integration blocs from the Global South. The BRICS+ summit and the foreign ministers’ BRICS+ meeting in 2022 brought together developing economies that represented regional blocs such as the African Union, CELAC, SCO, GCC and ASEAN – this in effect was the widest outreach exercise covering the vast majority of the Global South and representing a platform that could prove instrumental in advancing greater economic openness across the developing world. In particular, going forward the BRICS+ summits could be complemented by official discussions of the progress achieved in South-South economic integration as well as the signing of key trade/investment accords related to the building of a comprehensive South-South economic cooperation platform.

The key factor that renders the creation of a South-South FTA feasible and in fact expedient is the high degree of undertrading along the “South-South” axis compared to the potential based on distance and respective country GDP levels (indications of the gravity model). Another factor is the “integration gap” – namely the significantly lower scale and quality of integration in the developing world compared to the advanced economies. The South-South FTA accordingly could serve to bridge this gap and foster “catch-up integration” or “integration convergence” vis-à-vis the developed world.

In the process of such “integration convergence” the evolution of the assembly process of a Global South FTA will need to be flexible in allowing for plurilateral trade accords to be incorporated into the common South-South platform . The common South-South platform should also be innovative and in sync with global trends – there will be a need to devise provisions governing South-South cooperation and integration in the digital sphere (most notably in e-commerce) as well as in areas pertaining to environment and economic sustainability.

In the end, an FTA across the wide expanse of the Global South is an undertaking that is well worth pursuing in light of the greater momentum towards trade cooperation in the developing world and the protectionist measures introduced by advanced economies. A South-South FTA will significantly boost economic growth and consumption across the developing world without excessive competitive pressures emanating from the developed economies. It will also contribute to global economic expansion in view of the significant scope for trade liberalization in the Global South as well as the sizeable economic growth potential in the developing world. A common platform for dialogue and trade will also facilitate other Global South initiatives, including the creation of new international reserve currencies and payment systems. Finally, greater economic integration across the Global South should also be conducive to a more constructive pattern of North-South economic cooperation.

To read the full piece, please click here.

The post bodog casino|Welcome Bonus_Neme, chaired the first appeared first on bodog.

• The new African Continental Free Trade bodog online casino Area is the first large-scale agreement on deep integration in Africa to cover areas such as services, investment, competition policy, intellectual property rights, and digital trade.
• The convergence between regulatory frameworks under the agreement and those of the EU will have a significant influence on European companies’ competitiveness in Africa.
• The EU should respond to the changes the agreement has brought about by engaging in greater cooperation with Africa as a bloc.
• This will require a more coherent approach to EU trade agreements with individual African countries, including through a revision of rules of origin.
• There are many opportunities for EU-AU cooperation on a new trade agenda, particularly the role of trade policy in the green and digital transitions.
• Through technical cooperation and exchanges of experiences, African countries and EU member states should promote mutual understanding of their approaches to regulation.

Introduction

Trade and investment relations with Africa are increasingly important to the European Union’s strategic goals. Given their geographic proximity and historical ties, the EU and Africa should both seek to build the foundations of comprehensive and mutually beneficial economic cooperation – as this would have economic and political benefits in everything from job creation, migration, and security to the green and digital transitions. The EU should engage in such cooperation: it is Africa’s most important trading partner, accounting for around one-third of African trade, and is a vital source of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the continent. Nonetheless, players such as China and Russia have increasing influence on the African commercial landscape, and could weaken the position of the EU as Africa’s leading economic and political partner.

In this context, EU policymakers should view the recent creation of an Africa-wide market under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as an opportunity to consolidate and strengthen commercial and geopolitical ties with Africa. The AfCFTA, a flagship project of the African Union’s Agenda 2063, is a blueprint for a prosperous Africa that promotes regional integration and structural transformation as a source of inclusive growth, decent jobs, and sustainable development. Given its comprehensive and ambitious scope, the AfCFTA could be the first large-scale effort at deep integration in Africa. The AfCFTA seeks not only to liberalise intra-African tariffs and other traditional barriers affecting trade in goods (shallow integration) but also to address domestic regulatory measures with respect to services, investment, competition, intellectual property rights, and digital trade (deep integration). The degree of convergence between EU and nascent pan-African regulatory models will be critical to the commercial and geopolitical ties between Europe and Africa. Regulatory convergence can lead to the harmonisation of rules of operation and governance, and to an increase in cross-border production chains.

The eventual creation of an African economic community could involve not only a continental customs union with common external tariffs, but also the harmonisation of broader economic policies for all African countries. An African customs union and economic community could shift the EU’s engagement with Africa away from trade cooperation with individual countries and towards that with another bloc. The EU has concluded 16 free trade agreements (FTAs) with sub-Saharan African countries and four with North African states – more than any other power. Yet many, if not all, of these agreements have done little to develop rules that would create a level playing field in areas such as services, investment, competition policy, and intellectual property rights. By contrast, China has only signed one FTA with an African country (Mauritius) but exerts its influence on a wide range of trade issues through non-traditional instruments such as memorandums of understanding.

The EU has an interest in ensuring that the AfCFTA creates markets in Africa that are open, fair, rules-based, and competitive. European firms are increasingly concerned that they will be displaced from these markets by Chinese, Indian, Middle Eastern, or Russian rivals that can benefit from lower technical standards for products and direct government support at home. The rules, regulations, and governance of the trading system under the AfCFTA – and its convergence or compatibility with European standards – will therefore determine the competitiveness of European firms in Africa. Moreover, the AfCFTA can create the conditions for new investment opportunities beyond Europe’s traditional focus on the extraction of Africa’s natural resources. With a stronger regulatory framework for investment, competition, and intellectual property rights, European firms could not only capitalise on the size of African markets but also local advantages such as low labour costs and links to production and trade with the rest of the world. In short, Africa could become a global hub for manufacturing and exports. This may be a particularly attractive opportunity in the aftermath of covid-19, as European firms look to strengthen their supply chains by diversifying them away from Asia and near-shoring them.

This paper explores ways in which the EU can enhance its economic leadership in Africa through mutually beneficial cooperation on trade and investment. This is important to not only the EU’s bilateral relationships with African states but also to its efforts to protect common interests in international forums. Encouragingly, both the EU and the AU have started to explore more shared initiatives in light of the AfCFTA. However, they have yet to jointly set out a substantive approach to such cooperation.

The EU and the AU should implement a dual-track strategy that strengthens their traditional forms of trade and pursues a new agenda. The first track will require the EU to harmonise its existing FTAs with African countries and work to align the development aspects of these agreements with the effort enshrined in the AfCFTA to promote African countries’ exports of more sophisticated goods and services. In this way, the EU can build a balanced partnership with Africa.

The second track will require the EU to cooperate with African countries on the forms of deep integration laid out in the AfCFTA – starting with services, investment, competition, intellectual property rights, and digital trade. Such a partnership for deep integration will be crucial to creating a level playing field for European countries and firms. Furthermore, the AfCFTA will set a precedent for the international trade system under the World Trade Organization (WTO) that both sides support.

In making a case for a dual-track strategy, the paper examines the structure and significance of the AfCFTA; the interaction between the AfCFTA and the EU’s FTAs with African countries; and the current elements of EU-AU cooperation that could become building blocks of deep integration under the AfCFTA. By implementing this strategy, Europe and Africa can promote sustainable development, stability, and security in both regions.

Structure and significance of the AfCFTA process

Established in January 2021, the AfCFTA is a remarkable trade agreement in many ways. It includes more signatory countries than any other such agreement since the establishment of the WTO. At the time of writing, Eritrea is the only one of the 55 members of the AU not to have signed the agreement.

Diverse trade partners

African states have largely driven the ambitious, large-scale effort to establish the AfCFTA. They include developing countries and 33 of the 46 states that the United Nations classifies as the ‘least-developed countries’ due to their low level of income and their severe structural impediments to sustainable development. These countries have limited experience and capacity in conducting technically demanding negotiations, and have traditionally been exempted from reciprocal trade liberalisation in multilateral agreements. For example, East African Community states aside, most African countries had never negotiated the comprehensive liberalisation of services in a trade agreement other than in the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which dates back to the mid-1990s. Mauritius is the only African country that took part in negotiations in the 2010s on a proposed Trade in Services Agreement.

Moreover, despite being widely referred to as a ‘South-South’ trading arrangement, the AfCFTA brings together countries that are significantly different in their levels of development, economic structures, societies, cultures, and politics. The enormous asymmetries among AfCFTA members add to the complexity of conducting an integration process of this scope.

Unprecedented speed and commitment

Despite the difficulties of integrating many heterogeneous partners, the AfCFTA has been negotiated and ratified with surprising speed and commitment. African institutions have pursued continental integration for many decades, but their past efforts were heavily geopolitical. The AfCFTA has brought a fresher, commercially oriented approach.

AU heads of state and government launched the initiative in January 2012 at a meeting in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. They made the decision to establish continental free trade, leading to six years of negotiations on how to achieve this. Fifty-four countries signed the AfCFTA between 2018 and 2019; only one party to the talks – Eritrea – has not done so. The AfCFTA entered into force in May 2019 for the 24 countries that had ratified it at that that point. As of February 2022, 41 of them had done so. The AfCFTA is not in effect for countries that have yet to ratify it. Those that have ratified the agreement could start trading with one another in line with the tariff concessions and rules of origin it specifies. But, while the agreement became operational on 1 January 2021, there have been delays in negotiations to finalise tariffs and rules of origin. So, in practice, the parties have not yet begun to trade under the AfCFTA regime. Agreed rules of origin currently cover 87.7 per cent of products as defined in the AfCFTA’s lists of tariff rates. And the completion of these negotiations is scheduled for June 2022. When the new trade regime begins, it will effectively remove 90 per cent of trade tariffs. In the following five to ten years, the AfCFTA will liberalise trade by an additional 7 per cent to cover “sensitive products” – that is, those excluded from general tariff liberalisation. As the exclusion of 10 per cent of tariff lines under the agreement could represent a significant share of trade, it remains to be seen which goods this will cover.

It would be premature to declare victory now, at a time when the AfCFTA free trade regime is not fully in place and some of its details are still unclear. Nonetheless, African countries have achieved a lot in the past decade as they move towards a comprehensive and deep FTA.

The progress of the AfCFTA in the past two years is especially impressive given the effects of covid-19, which has complicated and slowed negotiations, and a global retreat from trade integration. The AfCFTA emerged against the backdrop of the indefinite delay of Doha Round negotiations under the WTO; Brexit; countries’ withdrawal from FTAs such as (in the case of the United States) the Trans-Pacific Partnership; a failure to conclude large-scale plurilateral and bilateral negotiations on deals such as the Trade in Services Agreement and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership; and difficulties in ratifying FTAs that have already been signed, such as the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. On trade, Africa has moved in the opposite direction to most of the rest of the world.

Africa’s first deep integration agreement

Yet perhaps the most important aspect of the AfCFTA is that it is the first agreement in Africa to comprehensively cover deep integration – the expansion of trade policy from traditional goods-only barriers, such as tariffs and quotas, to a broader range of domestic regulations. While there is no universal definition of the term ‘deep integration’, it normally refers to FTAs that cover at least four core areas: services, investment, competition policy, and intellectual property rights – all of which have a strong domestic regulatory dimension. Deep integration shapes the rules for companies operating in Africa on everything from the recognition of professional qualifications and environmental standards in investments to the role of government support and state-owned enterprises. The more these rules align with policy and standards in the EU, the easier it will be for European companies to expand their presence in Africa. Without regulatory standards as high as those in the EU, non-European firms will continue to displace EU companies. In other words, the compatibility of EU and AfCFTA regulations will help determine the competitiveness of European exports and investments in Africa, as well as the overall strength of trade and investment ties between Europe and Africa.

Moreover, while deep integration used to be a characteristic of FTAs between members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, most deep integration FTAs signed since 2000 have been between developed and developing countries, while just one-third of them have been between developing countries. But Africa has not contributed to the former trend: the vast majority of African FTAs are shallow integration agreements, meaning that they focus primarily or exclusively on traditional goods-only barriers. Of the eight sub-regional agreements recognised by the AU, only one – the East African Community – covers services. Deals such as the Southern African Development Community’s Protocol on Finance and Investment pursue deep integration issues, but not in the comprehensive manner of so-called ‘twenty-first century agreements’. The AfCFTA may be the first African twenty-first century agreement with a fully fledged deep integration agenda.

Empirical evidence from recent years shows that FTAs are heterogenous – not all of them boost trade to the same extent. Agreements that cover deep integration are associated with greater trade flows, whereas those limited to shallow integration do not. These studies show that the expansion of global value chains is strongly associated with deep integration arrangements. This can be explained by the fact that these value chains require market access (trade) and market presence (FDI), both areas in which domestic regulations are important. As scholars such as Richard Baldwin have demonstrated, the complementarity between services, investment, and knowledge creation is an important part of trade deals that expand regional and global value chains.

The AfCFTA integration process is structured in three phases, all of which cover important aspects of deep integration. One of the more unusual features of the deal is that, from its first phase, it liberalises trade in goods and services in parallel – a departure from the standard practice of sequencing goods before services. This reflects an appreciation of the fact that goods and services are intertwined: as services are a key input in the production of goods, they determine the competitiveness of manufacturing and agriculture. In this regard, one important facet of the AfCFTA is its inclusion of a Protocol on Trade in Services, which contains the agreement’s basic principles for liberalising trade in services. Negotiators plan to finalise the market access schedules for services by 30 June 2022. Although it remains to be seen how far this liberalisation will go, one remarkable element of the protocol vis-à-vis the GATS is that it does not treat developing and least-developed countries differently.

The second phase of the AfCFTA process, which is already under negotiation, will create new protocols on investment, competition policy, and intellectual property rights. Given that none of the protocols in these areas has been completed at the time of writing, it is difficult to assess them. But the scope of the negotiations indicates a coherent approach to such issues. Indeed, measures on investment are closely linked to those on competition and intellectual property rights. Hence, the negotiation of these protocols in tandem can help ensure that policies in these areas complement one another.

The third phase, which has not yet begun, will be devoted to digital trade. As the AfCFTA’s digital trade agenda has a broad scope, this phase could also touch on a variety of issues.

This road map for deep integration has two particularly significant features. Firstly, there is widespread consensus that most of the potential gains from the AfCFTA will come from the removal of non-tariff measures and other elements of deep integration. As services are subject to greater protectionism than any other aspect of trade and FDI, this Bodog Poker is the area in which liberalisation can yield the largest economic benefits. And the removal of barriers to services prompts less trade diversion than the liberalisation of tariffs. Beyond such increases in economic efficiency, deep integration is associated with economies of scale, stimulus of investment, and greater competition and innovation.

The other key feature of deep integration under the AfCFTA is that it sets a precedent for future negotiations involving African countries, including those with its European partners in bilateral arrangements and under the WTO. Unlike tariffs and other barriers at the border that can be applied on a preferential basis for different trading partners, many domestic regulatory reforms linked to deep integration are de facto applied on the basis of most-favoured nations and national treatment – that is, without discrimination between foreign trading partners or between domestic and foreign firms respectively. Accordingly, once a regulatory reform begins at the domestic level, it will mould the commitments a country may be willing to make in future trade agreements. The negotiations and reforms that 54 African countries are undertaking through the AfCFTA integration process will inevitably influence their commitment in future FTAs with the EU, as well as with other members of the WTO under the multilateral trade regime.

Interaction between the AfCFTA and other African trade agreements

The establishment of the AfCFTA has implications for pre-existing trade agreements in Africa, both at the sub-regional level in the framework of Regional Economic Communities, as well as between African countries and extra-regional trading partners such as the EU. As discussed, the EU has far more trade agreements with African countries than any other external partner. It is important that European policymakers understand how these agreements and future ones can shape the AfCFTA integration process.

The benefits of open regionalism

The existence of parallel and even overlapping trading arrangements is not unique to Africa: in the past two decades, there has been a worldwide proliferation of regional and bilateral accords that created multilayered trade regimes. The experience of countries that operate in such multilayered trading landscapes suggests that the response should not be to reduce the number of FTAs but to ensure that they are coherent and complement one another as the building blocks of broad liberalisation.

The concept of open regionalism emerged from Asia-Pacific efforts to address these challenges of complexity. This openness, a departure from the inward-looking focus on import substitution that prevailed in first-generation regional trade agreements, involves a greater emphasis on outward-oriented and internationally competitive strategies. The concept was later endorsed by Pacific countries in Latin America as a way to promote the convergence of diverse initiatives at the subregional, regional, and hemispheric levels, and to adopt an orientation towards the rest of the world based on less rigid, non-exclusive trading partnerships.

On a large scale, FTAs are often vital building blocks of deep integration. These agreements can function as experimentation labs for deep integration, as they have produced many measures that have gone on to be adopted more widely. Even the first agreements on non-tariff measures under the WTO – which concerned technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary measures – emerged from deals between smaller numbers of countries in the Tokyo Round of talks on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It is hard to believe that these and other aspects of trade regulation would have developed without these initial steps. In this sense, the coexistence of FTAs among smaller groups of countries can help develop the AfCFTA, particularly as it expands to new regulatory horizons in keeping with the demands of a rapidly changing global economy.

Furthermore, not all trade-related issues lend themselves to continent-wide cooperation. Sometimes, international cooperation is most effective on a bilateral or sub-regional scale. For example, there may be little benefit in countries in southern Africa negotiating transport facilitation measures with those in the north of the continent. Such issues are best addressed in sub-regional arrangements rather than the AfCFTA.

But this is not the only reason why regional and bilateral agreements will complement continental arrangements under the AfCFTA. This is the case also due to increasing political cooperation between African states on issues ranging from human rights and disarmament to nature conservation.

Yet, while there are clear benefits to open regionalism, it is important that this openness does not divert attention away from the AfCFTA or otherwise delay or complicate its implementation. It is also important to avoid duplication and inconsistency between agreements, which can raise administrative costs for governments and create confusion and uncertainty for businesses. Therefore, while open regionalism can create useful synergies within the continental integration process, these benefits are not automatic – they require policy coherence and consistency across co-existing trade agreements.

Policy coherence and consistency in the AfCFTA

The AfCFTA addresses the importance of policy coherence and consistency with existing – and, presumably, future – FTAs in Africa. Article 3 of the agreement discusses the need to resolve the problem of “multiple and overlapping membership”, but it does not provide further guidance or mechanisms for doing so. For example, the AfCFTA does not specify whether it or another agreement takes precedence in cases of inconsistency in commitments and rules.

Article 5 of the AfCFTA explicitly describes the FTAs of the Regional Economic Communities (REC) grouping as its “building blocks”. The AfCFTA states that it aims to preserve – and, if possible, improve – what has been agreed on trade within the grouping. Moreover, Article 12 of the AfCFTA specifies that the REC “shall be represented in the Committee of Senior Trade Officials, in an advisory capacity”.

While more precise plans and rules will be required for the REC to blend into the AfCFTA’s architecture, this is a clear recognition of its role in shaping the agreement. Yet the REC contains vastly different models, with some of its members not having signed FTAs with one another and some claiming that the grouping is a customs union or even a common market. So, the REC model for the AfCFTA is unclear. The AfCFTA’s recognition of the need to co-exist with the REC in the long term reflects a desire for different regions to pursue deeper or complementary policies that are tailored to local needs (in areas such as environmental programmes, energy, water, policing, nature conservation, and political cooperation).

The REC’s trade arrangements are the only ones the AfCFTA explicitly describes as building blocks. That said, Article 19 of the AfCFTA states that its signatories “that are members of other regional economic communities, regional trading arrangements and custom unions, which have attained among themselves higher levels of regional integration than under this Agreement, shall maintain such higher levels among themselves”. Accordingly, the AfCFTA stipulates that it will co-exist with regional trading arrangements and custom unions such as those under FTAs between the EU and African countries. The AfCFTA does not abolish any EU trade arrangements with African states or prevent them from expanding or deepening these arrangements.

The constructive role of EU-Africa trade arrangements

The EU’s plethora of trading arrangements with Africa would benefit from greater alignment with those under the AfCFTA and the REC. They could do so in the following ways.

A whole-of-Africa approach

One of the challenges of moving to an intercontinental strategy is that EU trade policy on Africa is fragmented – in terms of its treatment of least-developed and developing countries, and of countries to the north and south of the Sahara. These differences in the EU’s multitude of African trading arrangements could deter region-wide integration. Moreover, the economic and geographical divisions in these arrangements may be outdated or operate differently from the AfCFTA and other AU initiatives. The fragmented approach can create challenges for EU trade policy in engaging with Africa as a single region.

The EU reformed its Africa policy at the turn of the century. Under the successive Lomé Conventions (1975-2000), the EU provided African, Caribbean, and Pacific exporters with greater market access than it had under the Generalised System of Preferences that it applied to other developing countries. These preferences were challenged under the GATT because they involved discrimination between developing countries. In response, the EU adopted in 2001 the Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative, which granted duty-free and quota-free access to most products from least-developed countries. In contrast, the EU policy on states other than least-developed countries focused on the negotiation of economic partnership agreements (EPAs) to preserve this market access. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement is part of the EU’s trading framework with 79 countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific.

The split in treatment of least-developed countries and other states in sub-Saharan Africa created tensions and difficulties in the EU’s negotiation of economic partnerships with the REC. Most members of the REC are least-developed countries, which have no incentive to participate in reciprocal negotiations with the EU. This explains why the union’s EPAs have limited scope even when they carry the name of the REC. For example, the EPA with the Southern African Development Community only includes six of its 16 member states (and will include just four in its second phase). In other instances, the union has negotiated EPAs with a group of countries that does not correspond to the REC, such as eastern and southern Africa. Given that trading arrangements under the REC act as building blocks of the AfCFTA, the EU should align its agreements with the grouping.

In North Africa and the Mediterranean, the EU’s many trade regimes include Association Agreements, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), and the Generalised System of Preferences. Given that the sub-regional arrangements would have been complicated by tensions between North African countries, it is understandable that the EU concluded bilateral trade agreements with Tunisia (1998), Morocco (2000), Algeria (2002), and Egypt (2004). These agreements are part of the Barcelona Process and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which form part of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Following the 2011 Arab uprisings, the EU launched new negotiations on DCFTAs with Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt. Although some DCFTAs seemed to progress well – particularly that with Tunisia, which advanced in the negotiation of services – they have also run into difficulties and suffered from the same problems as EPAs.

The problem with negotiating free trade agreements individually is that, in the absence of coherence and coordination between them, this approach risks fragmenting tariff regimes across Africa. One of the problems with EU agreements in Africa, even under EPAs, is that they have different rules of origin – which can complicate the expansion of supply chains. Therefore, the EU should revise rules of origin in its trade agreements to remove an obstacle to intercontinental integration.

Making structural transformation a shared development goal

The UN’s Sustainable Development Goals and the EU’s transition from a donor-recipient model to partnership-driven cooperation indicate that Europe and Africa should pursue a common development model in their trade relations. The AfCFTA and the AU’s Agenda 2063 emphasise the importance of FTAs in structural economic transformation. For several reasons, EPAs can inhibit such transformation by making it more difficult for countries to implement targeted industrial policy. After decades of EU-Africa trade relations, two-thirds of African exports to the EU are of primary goods and raw materials. Similarly, EU investments in Africa are largely in the extractive sector. In contrast, intra-regional trade is characterised by the movement of more complex goods and services. There is a widespread perception that decades of trade cooperation with the EU have failed to nurture the structural transformation needed to spur productivity growth.

Classical economic theory dictates that, in conditions of perfect competition, free trade is optimal for small economies. Yet, given that most African economies experience domestic policy distortions or market failures, they may benefit more from restrictions on trade and FDI. Nonetheless, if all African countries were to take such an approach, the outcome would be inefficient on a continental scale. Furthermore, as the effective application of strategic trade and FDI policy has substantial informational requirements, attempts to address market failures with trade policy instruments can lead to governance failures. For this reason, it is often wise to avoid using such instruments.

However, Asian countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan have used these instruments effectively – as have those in other regions. Therefore, African states should be given the policy space to use second-best trade policy instruments while they develop more effective measures, such as stronger competition policy advanced under the AfCFTA. The WTO allows exceptions under ‘infant industry’ and other provisions that apply to developing countries. The EU’s trade arrangements in Africa could be more flexible on the use – where justified – of strategic trade and FDI policy to promote structural economic development.

Building blocks of the new trade agenda

While it is straightforward to conceive the building blocks of a traditional, goods-focused trade agenda (in areas such as rules of origin), the EU needs to engage in innovative thinking about how to do so for deep integration. Given that an intercontinental FTA is a long-term objective, it is important to go beyond tariff concessions and rules of origin to promote cooperation on the trade agenda of the future. Much of the challenge in trade policymaking in the subsequent phases of the AfCFTA will centre on regulatory issues – especially in areas such as services, investment, competition, and intellectual property rights. Cooperation on these deep integration issues will be critical to ensuring that European firms compete in African markets on a fair and equal footing. Moreover, these policy domains are vital to the green and digital transitions.

In developed and developing countries, services account for almost half of world trade – and this share is growing fast. As discussed, one of the most important achievements of the AfCFTA is that it intertwines goods and services. This reflects African policymakers’ increasing appreciation of how transactions costs created by inefficient services reduce African economies’ competitiveness and development. Moreover, most African workers – including most women and staff of small and medium-sized enterprises – are employed in the service industry. As a result, services are indispensable to inclusive growth.

All these trends indicate why EU and African policymakers need to create new ways to cooperate in services trade. The EU should use its extensive experience in dealing with regulatory issues as a building block of the AfCFTA. However, instead of expecting African countries to adopt EU regulatory models, the union should help them create robust regulatory frameworks of their own. This will be particularly important in technological development (especially the growth of the digital economy), which will lead to greater convergence in the sides’ policy reforms.

Conclusion: Convergence between EU trade policy and the AfCFTA process

The AfCFTA has created a new layer of complexity in African trade but also new opportunities for mutually beneficial economic cooperation between the EU and Africa. The EU needs to revitalise its trade strategy for Africa in response to the agreement. This is even more crucial due to the impact of covid-19 – which has hampered trade and FDI flows, and has created incentives to diversify and near-shore global supply chains. The EU also needs to contend with the fact that competition from China and other actors poses an increasing challenge to European companies that operate in Africa. The union’s efforts in these areas should run along two parallel tracks: the traditional agenda and the new agenda.

Traditional trade agenda

The EU needs to unify its trading regimes with African countries (under the EBA, EPAs, DCFTAs, Association Agreements, and the Generalised System of Preferences) and ensure they are consistent with the AfCFTA. This undertaking should focus on the revision of rules of origin – which is particularly timely given that the AfCFTA negotiations on this issue will conclude in the coming months. Harmonised rules of origin would be an bodog sportsbook review important building block of the traditional trade agenda.

As the AfCFTA lacks a customs union and the sovereignty to negotiate trade policy on behalf of AU members, talks on intercontinental market access will not be possible in the near term. In the meantime, the EU’s attempts to standardise EPAs and DCFTAs should help pave the way for a unified trade policy regime in Africa.

The AfCFTA is concerned not just with the expansion of trade but also with upgrades to the structure of trade and FDI. This is important given the empirical evidence that countries trading in complex goods and services have higher GDP growth than those that do not. By ensuring that FTAs create space for targeted industrial policy, the EU would promote economic convergence between Europe and Africa while supporting the development objectives of the AfCFTA.

New trade agenda

There is an urgent need for innovative thinking on how to create new building blocks of a trade regime covering services, as well as its connections to the green and digital transitions. The challenges of the AfCFTA will increasingly concern deep integration. This is an area in which the union’s bilateral EPAs and DCFTAs have room to grow. The EU should learn from these arrangements as it develops a fresh approach at the continental level.

Many African countries lack technical expertise and experience in deep integration. Therefore, by providing capacity-building in the form of exchanges of experiences and peer learning, the EU can work with these states to develop a joint understanding of how regulatory cooperation would benefit Africa. As African countries have sometimes perceived EPAs as imposing an EU regulatory model, the union will need to focus on cooperation that is useful for Africa (in areas such as cross-border transport, green energy, and digital trade) and capacity-building on various approaches to regulation. This would allow African countries to assess the benefits of adopting international standards, pursuing regulatory equivalence initiatives, and implementing effective certification procedures.

The AfCFTA’s new Services Protocol provides a point of departure for cooperation on these issues – as does the market access schedules the agreement should include by June 2022. The EU could become a uniquely valuable partner for Africa by supporting its shift towards trade and investment in services, and towards the digital economy. For instance, the expansion of services in areas such as energy will be critical to the green transition in Europe and Africa.

The EU can help improve connectivity in Africa by investing in both the soft elements of infrastructure, such as the provision of services and their regulatory underpinnings, and physical infrastructure. And it can engage in cooperation based on capacity-building in areas such as competition policy, intellectual property rights, and digital trade. The EU has a wealth of experience with these issues that can inform and nurture the AfCFTA process. Closer collaboration between Europe and Africa on these topics can help them develop a shared understanding of the regulatory challenges and responses in an increasingly complex global trade regime.

Iza Lejarraga is a trade policy expert with more than 15 years of experience in international organisations, academia, and the private sector. She has worked as a senior economist in leading international organisations, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and the Organization of American States.

To read the full commentary by the European Council on Foreign Relations, please click here.

The post bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_with the REC in the long appeared first on bodog.

Erdogan’s time in the Ukrainian capital proved highly productive, with officials from the two countries signing a range of bilateral documents including a long-awaited free trade agreement and a headline-grabbing defense sector deal paving the way for the joint production of Turkey’s highly rated armed drones in Ukraine.

Turkey and Ukraine’s new free trade agreement had been under negotiation for several years. Having finally been signed, it is now expected to provide an additional boost to what is already an expanding economic partnership.

Turkey has emerged over the past decade as one of Ukraine’s key business partners, with bilateral trade growing by almost 50% during the first nine months of 2021 to reach USD 5 billion. The Turkish and Ukrainian presidents have each expressed hopes that with the added advantages of the new free trade deal, annual bilateral trade volumes will increase to beyond USD 10 billion within the coming few years.

The strengthening relationship between Ukraine and Turkey goes far beyond economic cooperation. Ties have become more strategically important for both countries since 2014 and the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine, with Kyiv and Ankara increasing cooperation in the defense sector and Turkey playing a prominent role in Ukrainian diplomatic initiatives such as the August 2021 Crimea Platform summit.

The Russian occupation of Crimea has provoked a particularly strong reaction from Turkey due to the country’s own long historical association with the Ukrainian peninsula, which was part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries. Today’s Turkey is also home to a multi-million strong community of Crimean Tatars. This has enabled Ukrainian and Turkish leaders to find common ground in denouncing widespread human rights abuses against the Crimean Tatar population in Russian-occupied Crimea.

At the same time, Turkey has sought to balance its support for Ukrainian territorial integrity with the need to avoid alienating Russia. During his recent Kyiv visit, Erdogan echoed popular Kremlin talking points by reiterating the importance of the 2015 Minsk Accords, while also offering to play mediator and host a new round of peace talks between Russia and Ukraine.

Erdogan is believed to have a complex but constructive personal relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin that reflects the strong links and common ground connecting their two countries. Turkey depends heavily on Russian gas for its energy needs, while Russians regularly rank as the number one customers of Turkey’s economically important tourism industry.

Turkey and Russia are also geopolitical rivals who have frequently found themselves on opposing sides in recent years in conflict zones ranging from Syria and Libya to the southern Caucasus. Some observers believe Ukraine now has the potential to become the most bitterly contested battleground so far in the struggle between Moscow and Ankara for regional influence.

The defense sector cooperation agreement signed by Turkey and Ukraine in early February is the latest step in an intensifying security partnership. Since 2014, Turkish defense companies have begun to play an increasingly significant role in the modernization of the Ukrainian military, while Ukraine has provided Turkish partners with access to its considerable defense sector know-how including the country’s sophisticated aeronautical industry.

By far the most eye-catching aspect of this cooperation has been Ukraine’s acquisition of up to 20 of Turkey’s sought-after Bayraktar TB2 combat drones. When Kyiv first deployed one of its Turkish drones in October 2021 to destroy an artillery position in Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine, the incident was widely reported in the international media as a landmark event and a potential “game changer” in the simmering conflict.

Ukraine’s successful combat use of its Turkish drones provoked a chorus of protests from Moscow along with Russian accusations that the presence of these unmanned aerial vehicles risked destabilizing the region. The incident has subsequently been cited as one of the possible factors behind Putin’s current saber-rattling troop build-up on the Ukrainian border.

With many more Turkish drones now set to be constructed at a new Ukrainian production facility, it looks like the Kremlin will have to get used to the idea of Ukraine’s enhanced aerial capabilities. Speaking following the recent signing ceremony in Kyiv, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy hailed the agreement to begin manufacturing drones in Ukraine. “These are new technologies, new workplaces, and an increase in Ukraine’s ability to defend itself,” he commented.

Turkey’s economic and energy sector ties with Russia mean that there are limits to how far Ankara can go in its support for Kyiv. Nevertheless, the burgeoning Turkish-Ukrainian relationship is an important factor shaping the fast-evolving geopolitical balance in the wider Black Sea region.

Christopher Isajiw is an international relations commentator and business development consultant to private, governmental and non-governmental organizations.

To read the full commentary by the Atlantic Council, please click here.

The post bodog online casino|Welcome Bonus_while also offering to appeared first on bodog.

Nigeria—the largest economy in Africa—signed the AfCFTA on July 7, 2019, becoming the 34th member of the trading bloc. Under the AfCFTA, Nigeria stands to gain from increased access to cheaper goods and services from other African countries, as its intra-African trade is currently low: Indeed, as of 2018, Nigeria’s imports from the African region relative to total imports was at 3.2 percent while the share of Nigeria’s exports to the African region relative to total exports was 13.2 percent. Moreover, in 2020, Nigeria’s main trading partner was actually China.

Proponents of the FTA expect the AfCFTA to reduce poverty, increase firm competitiveness, and boost intra-African trade and investment. In fact, based on a recent survey of 1,804 Nigerian manufacturing enterprises, 6 out of 10 businesses expect the AfCFTA to lead to a reduction in material and labor costs, increase production capacity, expand market and consumer size, and reduce prices. Overall, Nigeria’s small and medium-sized businesses are optimistic about the opportunities created by AfCFTA, although with mixed feelings grounded in concerns about rising foreign competition and dumping of substandard goods.

As the trade agreement kicked off in the middle of a global pandemic coupled with a global recession, it is still unclear how the reduction in tariffs on goods and services will impact Nigeria’s households and businesses. However, a 2020 piece by Nassim Oulmane, Mustapha Sadni Jallab, and Patrice Rélouendé Zidouemba argues that the AfCFTA’s boost to intra-African trade might actually mitigate the rapid decline in GDP caused by COVID-19 and subsequent social-distancing policies and border closures.

ESTIMATING THE IMPACTS OF THE AFCFTA FOR NIGERIA

A tariff reduction enacted by one country has implications for its partners, suppliers, and competitors as it spills over to the rest of the world through trade networks and to other industries through supply chains. (For instance, a reduction in tariffs on cotton products impacts the prices of textiles.) These cascading effects across sectors and countries can be captured using a tractable numerical framework that can simulate the effects of shocks to countries and sectors and its implication on global trade patterns. To identify these effects and the transmission mechanisms resulting from the change in relative prices from trade liberalization on producers and consumers of intermediate and final goods at home and abroad, we employ a multisector, multicountry, quantitative model with linkages across sectors.  A regional tariff reduction is modeled as a higher productivity, as it leads to a reduction in relative prices and has implications for the exchange of goods across countries and regions. In this framework, households and firms then purchase more imported articles at cheaper prices, raising trade volumes and increasing household welfare. For the same reason, changes in relative prices of exports and imports induce higher demand for non-Nigerian-made products, depending on the variation in prices across sectors and countries. Therefore, even though there is a presumption of a positive impact, that may not be the case.

Figure 1. Predicted aggregate real wage effects (%) of the AfCFTA on Nigeria and rest of the world

Source: Static computable, multisector, multicountry trade model version, authors’ simulations.

Notes: A country’s real wage effect is the percentage change in real GDP from 2014 level associated with free trade across the African region only. Tariffs for other non-AfCFTA countries/region are set at 2014 effective rates. Declines in GDP are shown in red, whereas increases in GDP are in orange and blue. The model provides results for 27 African countries, 13 OECD countries, 14 other emerging economies, and the “rest” of Africa, Asia, Europe, South America, North America, and Australia (60 countries in total including the rest of the world). Simulation results assume a full employment, perfect foresight, and absence of trade imbalances and household’s dynamic intertemporal choices.

QUANTIFYING REAL WAGE, PRICE, TRADE, AND WELFARE EFFECTS

In our analysis, we calibrate a model of trade to countries’ macroeconomic performance as at 2014 and then simulate the potential impacts on macroeconomic indicators associated with trade liberalization across the African region. We estimate the impacts on all countries under a scenario where there is free trade only with continental countries. Figure 1 presents the estimated percentage change in real wage associated with moving from tariff rates in 2014 to those under the AfCFTA for African countries, while tariff rates on other regions/countries remain at 2014 effective tariff rates. Our results have implications on real wage and welfare effects for Nigeria, 52 countries, six other regions of the world, and the rest of the world. Overall, we find that Nigeria will experience a 1.43 percent gain in value added compared to 2014 levels. Notably, the effects for Nigeria, although positive, are modest relative to the gains in real wage for other African countries. Our findings show that the AfCFTA will deliver larger gains to African countries with prior larger shares of imports from the region. Moreover, impacts of trade liberalization on real wage across African countries will be uneven: For example, Botswana, Angola, and Ghana will experience percentage changes in real wage of 16.6 percent, 12.5 percent, and 6.5 percent (dark blue in map), respectively, due to the AfCFTA.

Nigeria gains 1.55 percent in welfare. Decomposing welfare effects into effects due to change in volume of trade (1.14 percent) and effects due to change in terms of trade (0.41 percent) highlights the sources of Nigeria’s positive gain by sector. As shown in Figure 2, agriculture and fishing and other manufacturing industries account for 73 percent of the gains from volume of trade. A decline in terms of trade translates to a larger decline in export prices relative to import prices. “Other manufacturing goods” accounts for most gains in terms of trade while the agriculture and mining industries combined dilute gains by 32.6 percent.

Figure 2. Effect of AfCFTA on Nigeria’s volume of trade and terms of trade by sector

Source: Static computable, multisector, multicountry trade model version, authors’ simulations.

Notes: Volume of trade is sectoral trade relative to Nigeria’s total trade. Terms of trade is calculated as difference in sectoral price of export and import as a share of total price differences in all sectors. Welfare effects is the sum of the volume of trade (VoT) and terms of trade (ToT) effects. A negative ToT means the sector dilutes the positive gains. Sectoral contribution for ToT and VoT adds up to 100 percent.

bodog casino PRICES FOR AGRICULTURAL AND MANUFACTURING COMMODITIES WILL GO DOWN, BUT SOME OTHERS WILL GO UP

Based on our simulations, the AfCFTA will lead to reductions in prices of agricultural and manufacturing commodities. In fact, the decline in sectoral prices ranges from 0.8 percent in electrical and machinery to 8 percent in metal (Figure 3). Moreover, through sectoral linkages and changes in relative prices of imported goods, we find the AfCFTA will lead to an increase in prices of non-tradable services such as information services; transportation and warehousing; and finance and insurance services.

Figure 3. Price effects of AfCFTA on Nigeria’s economic sectors

Source: Static computable, multisector, multicountry trade model version, authors’ simulations.

Even with better infrastructure under the AfCFTA and the under-construction train networks between Kaduna and Lagos (the commercial center of Nigeria, which hosts the maritime ports for articles traded to/from the southern and western parts of Africa), intra- and international transportation costs remain high in the short run. A recent article in Nigerian newspaper The Punch finds that the price of shipping a container from the Apapa port in Lagos to the mainland (distance of just 20 kilometers) is almost the same as shipping one container from Nigeria to China. These types of costs will rise as the AfCFTA is implemented because of increases in the demand for inter-country haulage and shipping. In other words, intra-regional transportation cost variation impacts production costs and prices of traded articles as well as trade flows across countries. Changes in trade patterns then drive the uneven distributional impacts on consumption, real wage, and welfare across regions and countries, depending on changes in tariff rates on traded products.

Before the AfCFTA, 38 percent of Nigeria’s exports were in the mining and petro-chemical industries. Now, our simulations suggest a slight decline in exports for the following sectors: mining; wood and paper; petro-chemicals; metal products; and other manufacturing articles. Successful implementation of the AfCFTA will also induce a 6.3 percent increase in exports of agricultural products and 1.3 percent increase in food and beverage exports as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Export effects of AfCFTA on the Nigerian economy

Source: Static computable, multisector, multicountry,  trade model version, authors’ simulations. U.N. Commodity trade database.

Notes: Before AfCFTA’s export share is based on UNCOMTRADE data, and After AfCFTA is based on simulation results.

As touted by policy experts, the AfCFTA has the potential to lift Nigerians out of poverty and raise manufacturing output. However, to realize this potential, Nigeria must follow targeted industrial policy and structural reforms; upgrade customs infrastructure; address the domestic cost of doing business; reduce bottlenecks, port processes, and transportation costs; promote digital marketing and e-commerce; and create targeted awareness about the AfCFTA policy. A survey of Nigerian businesses conducted by the Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa (CSEA) shows that over 60 percent of Nigeria’s businesses are still unaware of the recently signed AfCFTA agreement. Even with potential benefits for firms, there are information costs reflected in different levels of awareness. Firms who don’t know AfCFTA exists are unable to take advantage of the tariff arrangements or even benefit from the policy. Until businesses are aware, the costs of trading under AfCFTA will remain high.

Yewande Olapade is a Quantitative Fellow at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and a Nonresident Fellow at the Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa.

Chukwuka Onyekwena is the Executive Director at the Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa.

To read the full commentary from The Brookings Institution, please click here.

The post bodog sportsbook review|Most Popular_costs; promote digital appeared first on bodog.