The overall growth rate will remain near 6 percent this year, a historically high level after a recession, but the expansion reflects a vast divergence in the fortunes of rich and poor countries, the International Monetary Fund said in its latest World Economic Outlook report.

Worldwide poverty, hunger and unmanageable debt are all on the upswing. Employment has fallen, especially for women, reversing many of the gains they made in recent years.

Uneven access to vaccines and health care is at the heart of the economic disparities. While booster shots are becoming available in some wealthier nations, a staggering 96 percent of people in low-income countries are still unvaccinated.

“Recent developments have made it abundantly clear that we are all in this together and the pandemic is not over anywhere until it is over everywhere,” Gita Gopinath, the I.M.F.’s chief economist, wrote in the report.

The outlook for the United States, Europe and other advanced economies has also darkened. Factories hobbled by pandemic-related restrictions and bottlenecks at key ports around the world have caused crippling supply shortages. A lack of workers in many industries is contributing to the clogs. The U.S. Labor Department reported Tuesday that a record 4.3 million workers quit their jobs in August — to take or seek new jobs, or to leave the work force.

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“The dangerous divergence in economic prospects across countries remains a major concern.”

Compared to our July forecast, the global growth projection for 2021 has been revised down marginally to 5.9 percent and is unchanged for 2022 at 4.9 percent. However, this modest headline revision masks large downgrades for some countries. The outlook for the low-income developing country group has darkened considerably due to worsening pandemic dynamics. The downgrade also reflects more difficult near-term prospects for the advanced economy group, in part due to supply disruptions. Partially offsetting these changes, projections for some commodity exporters have been upgraded on the back of rising commodity prices. Pandemic-related disruptions to contact-intensive sectors have caused the labor market recovery to significantly lag the output recovery in most countries.

The dangerous divergence in economic prospects across countries remains a major concern. Aggregate output for the advanced economy group is expected to regain its pre-pandemic trend path in 2022 and exceed it by 0.9 percent in 2024. By contrast, aggregate output for the emerging market and developing economy group (excluding China) is expected to remain 5.5 percent below the pre-pandemic forecast in 2024, resulting in a larger setback to improvements in their living standards.

These divergences are a consequence of the “great vaccine divide” and large disparities in policy support. While almost 60 percent of the population in advanced economies are fully vaccinated and some are now receiving booster shots, about 96 percent of the population in low-income countries remain unvaccinated. Furthermore, many emerging market and developing economies, faced with tighter financing conditions and a greater risk of de-anchoring inflation expectations, are withdrawing policy support more quickly despite larger shortfalls in output.

Supply disruptions pose another policy challenge. On the one hand, pandemic outbreaks and climate disruptions have resulted in shortages of key inputs and lowered manufacturing activity in several countries. On the other hand, these supply shortages, alongside the release of pent-up demand and the rebound in commodity prices, have caused consumer price inflation to increase rapidly in, for example, the United States, Germany, and many emerging market and developing economies. Food prices have increased the most in low-income countries where food insecurity is most acute, adding to the burdens of poorer households and raising the risk of social unrest.

The October 2021 Global Financial Stability Report highlights another challenge to monetary policy from increased risk-taking in financial markets and rising fragilities in the nonbank financial institutions sector.

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A principal common factor behind these complex challenges is the continued grip of the pandemic on global society. The foremost policy priority is therefore to vaccinate at least 40 percent of the population in every country by end-2021 and 70 percent by mid-2022. This will require high-income countries to fulfill existing vaccine dose donation pledges, coordinate with manufacturers to prioritize deliveries to COVAX in the near-term and remove trade restrictions on the flow of vaccines and their inputs. At the same time, closing the $20 billion residual grant funding gap for testing, therapeutics and genomic surveillance will save lives now and keep vaccines fit for purpose. Looking ahead, vaccine manufacturers and high-income countries bodog poker review should support the expansion of regional production of COVID-19 vaccines in developing countries through financing and technology transfers.

Another urgent global priority is the need to slow the rise in global temperatures and contain the growing adverse effects of climate change. This will require more ambitious commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at the upcoming United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26). A policy strategy that includes an international carbon price floor adjusted to country circumstances, a green public investment and research subsidy push, and compensatory, targeted transfers to households can help advance the energy transition in an equitable way. Just as importantly, advanced countries need to deliver on their earlier promises of mobilizing $100 billion of annual climate financing for developing countries.

In addition, concerted multilateral efforts to ensure adequate international liquidity for constrained economies, and faster implementation of the G20 common framework to restructure unsustainable debt, would help limit divergences across countries. Building on the historic $650 billion Special Drawing Right (SDR) allocation, the IMF is calling on countries with strong external positions to voluntarily channel their SDRs into the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. Furthermore, it is exploring the establishment of a Resilience and Sustainability Trust, which would provide long-term funding to support countries’ investment in sustainable growth.

At the national level, the overall policy mix should be calibrated to local pandemic and economic conditions, aiming for maximum sustainable employment while protecting the credibility of policy frameworks. With fiscal space becoming more limited in many economies, health care spending should continue to be prioritized, while lifelines and transfers will need to become increasingly targeted, reinforced by retraining and support for reallocation. As health outcomes improve, policy emphasis should increasingly focus on long-term structural goals.

With public debt levels at record highs, all initiatives should be rooted in credible medium-term frameworks, backed by feasible revenue and spending measures. The October 2021 Fiscal Monitor demonstrates that such credibility can lower financing costs for countries and increase fiscal space in the near-term.

Monetary policy will need to walk a fine line between tackling inflation and financial risks and supporting the economic recovery. We project, amidst high uncertainty, that headline inflation will likely return to pre-pandemic levels by mid-2022 for the group of advanced economies and emerging and developing economies. There is, however, considerable heterogeneity across countries with upside risks for some, like the United States, United Kingdom, and some emerging market and developing economies. While monetary policy can generally look through transitory increases in inflation, central banks should be prepared to act quickly if the risks of rising inflation expectations become more material in this uncharted recovery. Central banks should chart contingent actions, announce clear triggers, and act in line with that communication.

More generally, clarity and consistent actions can go a long way toward avoiding unnecessary policy accidents that roil financial markets and set back the global recovery—ranging from a failure to lift the US debt ceiling in a timely fashion to disorderly debt restructurings in China’s property sector to escalating cross-border trade and technology tensions.

Recent developments have made it abundantly clear that we are all in this together and the pandemic is not over anywhere until it is over everywhere. If COVID-19 were to have a prolonged impact—into the medium-term—it could reduce global GDP by a cumulative $5.3 trillion over the next five years relative to our current projection. It does not have to be this way. The global community must step up efforts to ensure equitable vaccine access for every country, overcome vaccine hesitancy where there is adequate supply, and secure better economic prospects for all.

Gita Gopinath is the Economic Counsellor and Director of the Research Department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). She is on leave of public service from Harvard University’s Economics department where she is the John Zwaanstra Professor of International Studies and of Economics.

To read the full commentary from the International Monetary Fund, please click here.

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But beyond mining’s dominance, Chile’s trade flows are more varied and complex than they may appear, with significant exports of vehicles, pharmaceuticals and telecommunications equipment. And according to a recent IMF staff paper, the Andean economy is among those that shine as a role model for diversification policies.

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Firms needing to diversify from China, in whole or part, because of rising Chinese costs and mounting trade and investment restrictions are now considering whether to reorganize production across Asia to complement continuing Chinese operations or to shift investment out of Asia to shorten supply chains serving the US market. Mexico seems like a natural choice for “nearshoring” investment, linked closely to the dominant US market by the newly minted United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).

But so far at least, Mexico has not lured substantial new investments that could supplant Asian production serving the US market, and the USMCA has added rather than removed concerns about investing in Mexican auto and other manufacturing sectors. The evidence cited in this blog suggests that Mexico faces significant competition for investments in restructured supply chains. Compared with other leading nearshoring locations in Asia and North America, Mexican policies tend to discourage new placements in manufacturing sectors. Another handicap flows from the flaws in the USMCA that work to Mexico’s disadvantage and favor new investment in US-based production of autos, trucks, and parts. As a result, Mexico cannot rely on its North American partners to finance its development and promote its effort to become a nearshoring hub for supply chains migrating from East Asia. To attract more investment diversifying out of Asia, Mexican officials need to recast domestic economic policies and recommit to combating corruption and organized crime to make Mexico more attractive to domestic and foreign investors.

BENCHMARKING MEXICO’S COMPETITIVENESS FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

When companies plan their production and trade strategies, they benchmark their strengths and weaknesses against key competitors. Countries whose economic development depends on trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) should do the same. To that end, table 1 arrays Mexico’s global ranking under three separate indices compiled by the Fraser Institute in Canada, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and Transparency International (TI) that assess critical bodog sportsbook review factors that influence locational decisions for private investment. Each of the groups compiles data on numerous indicators covering Mexico’s performance with respect to its business regulations, infrastructure, international trade ties, legal system, and corruption.

Overall, Mexico’s scores place it in the middle of the pack of countries covered by the two broad indices compiled by the Fraser Institute and WIPO, but in the bottom third of countries examined in the TI Corruption Perceptions Index. Compared with its USMCA partners or key competitors in southeast Asia—the markets Mexico competes with for investments by companies that are restructuring their Asia-Pacific supply chains—Mexico does not fare very well.

In North America, commitments to support nearshoring to Mexico, discussed most recently at the September 9 High Level Economic Dialogue between senior US and Mexican officials, pale in comparison to the actions taken by US politicians to promote reshoring to the United States. Legislation in the current Congress is replete with programs designed to encourage new investment in US-based production plants through both subsidies and Buy American procurement regulations. These bills are meant to reinforce Executive Order 14017 on “America’s Supply Chains” issued by President Joseph R. Biden Jr. on February 24, 2021. Although Biden committed to “close cooperation on resilient supply chains with allies and partners who share our values”, the subsequent White House report on critical products concluded in June 2021 noted that international cooperation was only needed “to secure supplies of critical goods that we will not make in sufficient quantities at home [emphasis added].”

For companies diversifying some of their production or sourcing from the Chinese market, southeast Asia provides a nearby and largely welcoming investment alternative. Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand score higher overall than Mexico on the Global Innovation indicators; so, too, do Taiwan and Malaysia on the Economic Freedom of the World Index. Mexico’s rating on business regulations and infrastructure raise yellow flags for prospective investors, as do its weak scores on legal protections, which align with its dismal TI grade on corruption. And while Mexico benefits from preferential market access to its major export markets and is highly graded for the USMCA and other free trade agreements (FTAs), its success in securing FTAs is now being matched by a wave of new intra-Asian trade pacts, including the soon-to-be implemented 15-member Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Simply put, Mexico needs to outcompete its USMCA partners and southeast Asian competitors if it is to benefit from new investments in manufacturing shifting from Asia. Even with a labor cost advantage compared to its USMCA partners, the added production and distribution costs associated with intrusive Mexican business regulations, inadequate and irregular power supplies, and clogged road and rail networks, could well erode the benefits for those considering new investments in Mexico. Indeed, these costs already seem to be a drag on decisions to switch investments to Mexico.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MEXICO

Mexico’s relatively weak standing in the Fraser Institute, WIPO, and TI indicators rating the business environment created by a country’s trade and investment policies, and legal systems, seems to be reflected in inflows of FDI into Mexico over the past few years. Except in 2020, when global activity declined sharply, annual inflows of FDI in Mexican manufacturing have not grown very much, averaging about $15.8 billion in 2018-2019 and slightly less on an annualized basis in the first half of 2021. Total FDI inflows are up on an annualized basis in the first half of 2021 due to strong catch-up growth in services (see table 2).

The majority of FDI inflows to Mexico since 2018 have been in service sectors, led by financial and insurance services. Manufacturing accounts for about 47 percent of total FDI inflows. The bulk of FDI in manufacturing is in transportation equipment (cars, trucks, parts), which covers about 46 percent of total Mexican FDI in manufacturing, much of which is from North America and Europe.

If Mexico was succeeding in nearshoring supply chains in manufacturing, it would likely be seen in supplements to sectors where Mexico already has attracted FDI, or previously had operations that subsequently moved to China or elsewhere in Asia: machinery and equipment; computer, communications, measurement devices; and transportation equipment. The machinery and equipment sector is recording FDI inflows equal to 2018 levels, and FDI in computers et al. is down by more than half. Transportation equipment FDI seemed to be recovering from sharp drops in 2020 until the second quarter of 2021, perhaps reflecting auto industry concerns about the future of Mexican-based production. If trends in FDI data for 2021 continue, concerns about increasing COVID-19 cases and restrictions on future access to the US market resulting from US regulations interpreting the USMCA auto and truck content requirements could dampen investment in this critical sector for Mexican economic growth.

THE USMCA DISADVANTAGE

North American economic integration has been driven for three decades by the idea that investing in Mexico and integrating production across the region would enhance the growth and international competitiveness of all three countries. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) fell short of its promise and most of the southern Mexican states benefited very little from the increased regional trade and investment. Labor-intensive Mexican industries serving the US market decamped to Asia in NAFTA’s first decade as Mexico’s tight monetary policies fueled an overvalued peso and undercut competitiveness vis-à-vis China and others.

The USMCA changed the vision of deepening intraregional production networks. For political reasons, it was designed to differ markedly with its predecessor; the major change involved rules governing production of autos, trucks, and parts, and complemented the Trump administration’s efforts to reshore supply chains to US-based facilities (including some production from Mexico). Concerns about the deal, and its potential negative impact on auto sector investment in Mexico, initially were dismissed by Mexican officials. But when US regulations setting the terms for assessing domestic content requirements to qualify for USMCA preferences were issued in the summer of 2020, it became clear to auto industry and Mexican officials alike that the deal would require much more restructuring of auto and truck production, and shifting to US-based facilities, than they initially thought. The issue is in the early stages of USMCA dispute settlement; in the interim, Mexican producers face an uncertain future.

The USMCA, negotiated under the threat of US withdrawal from NAFTA, was hailed for removing the cloud of uncertainty about the future of regional economic integration. Longstanding critics of NAFTA supported the new pact whose future now seemed politically secure. Investors saw the new political support for regional integration, or rather the decline in criticism of the pact, as a positive sign that Mexico would be an attractive host for nearshoring investment from Asia. But the dispute over auto content rules, and a spate of new disputes on labor, environment, energy, and agricultural issues, brought under the USMCA’s enhanced enforcement procedures, has reopened questions about the durability of the pact’s political honeymoon in Mexico and the United States.

In sum, the USMCA does not seem to have accorded Mexico substantial advantages for nearshoring manufacturing investment from Asia. The pact reopens old conflicts and offers new avenues for trade retaliation. But the main obstacle to Mexico’s success in attracting new investment is homemade. Mexican officials should take a closer look at how their policies compare to those of leading competitors and recalibrate to build back Mexico better.

Jeffrey J. Schott joined the Peterson Institute for International Economics in 1983 and is a senior fellow working on international trade policy and economic sanctions.

To read the full commentary from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, please click here.

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The region at the heart of solar production is rife with forced labor and it is not clear that there is a meaningful supply anywhere else of the materials the solar industry relies on. Further, it is not clear how solar suppliers, importers, developers, or investors can verify that their supply chains are free of forced labor when the Chinese government denies that such practices exist and may punish those who would contradict that position.

Add to that issue the fact that Customs is stopping equipment at the border if the agency suspects there is forced labor in the supply chain, but the U.S. Government has not provided meaningful bodog online casino guidance on how to prove that solar products are free of forced labor and therefor admissible.

The industry and regulators are searching for a viable way to source clean supply chains for clean energy and to verify with some certainty that solar equipment in the United States if free of forced labor.

1. Background

Hoshine Silica Industry Co. is a major supplier to the solar industry and is more or less ground zero for forced labor abuses.  The solar industry relies on panels made from silicon. Hoshine is the world’s largest metallurgical-grade silicon producer.

Silicon can be made a number of ways, but the most common steps are to mine quartz, crush and heat that material into metallurgic-grade silicon, then use chemical processing to make polycrystalline silicon. There is obviously more complexity to the system, but the purpose of the explanation above is to point out that a major source for the silica rock, as well as the coal needed for the heat processing, are both found in the mines and manufacturing facilities of Hoshine Silica Industry co. According to reports, those facilities are in the same industrial park as two Uighur internment camps.

The solar industry recognizes the forced labor problem is real, is not going to go away on its own, and must be addressed head on.

2. The Current and Near Future State of Regulation

2.1 U.S. Customs is stopping equipment at the border

As we reported here, the U.S. Government issued a Withhold Release Order (WRO) stating that any products believed to contain silica material produced by Hoshine Silicon Industry Co. and its subsidiaries should be held by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and not released without evidence that the product’s supply chain was free of forced labor.

It appears that more similar regulation is coming down the pike. We understand that the effort to combat forced labor in the solar industry is being driven by the National Security Council at the White House, and supported by an unusual coalition of China hawks, Labor interests, and NGOs. For that we reason, we believe that there the current administration will pursue more WROs.

Additionally, on June 24, the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added four Chinese entities to the Entity List for accepting or utilizing forced labor in the implementation of China’s campaign of repression against Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). It is very possible those companies may soon be subject to WROs:

• Xinjiang Daqo New Energy Co., Ltd.
• Xinjiang East Hope Nonferrous Metals Co., Ltd.
• Xinjiang GCL New Energy Material Technology Co., Ltd.
• Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)

According to recent reports, BIS may also issue more entity list designations. Those designations prohibit exports to the designated companies. However, they may be a good indicator of what companies may be targeted for WROs thereafter.

2.2 The U.S. Congress may broaden prohibitions on imports

In parallel, the House and Senate are currently working on two bills, both titled Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. The senate bill has been passed, while the House bill is still in committee. Those bills could establish a presumption that anything produced in the XUAR uses forced labor. That would mean that importers of those articles would then be reqiured rebut that presumption in order to import any goods from the Region into the United States.

2.3 Other agencies may add to the restrictions

There is some speculation that the USTR may start issuing 301 designations – adding a substantial punitive tariff to equipment from the Xinjiang region. Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Treasury has shown that it is not afraid to use its sanctions authority to entirely cut off U.S. persons from transactions with parties suspected of forced labor abuses.

3. The Opening for Industry: Self-Regulation or Government Regulation

3.1 Customs will need some time to ramp up its enforcement apparatus

The U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents addressing forced labor are competent and hard-working. However, the agency is understaffed to deal with the overwhelming problem of forced labor in the solar industry. With maybe a couple dozen agents assigned to forced labor, and that force also looking at Xinjiang textile and agriculture imports, it will be difficult for CBP to find bandwidth to clear imports stopped at the border for forced labor issues.

That small group of enforcement officials will face the challenge of tracing supply chains from the base chemical level described above, with documentation in Mandarin. Finally, at this point, there is no clear guidance from the U.S. government as to what evidence would clear a shipment stopped at the border. There is no U.S. Customs checklist for forced labor verification nor a list of acceptable evidence that a supply chain is free of forced labor.

Because no guidance on what constitutes admissible product has been issued, it is unclear what CBP would want to see in order to clear equipment held under a WRO. This uncertainty leaves industry with an opportunity to lead before government imposes requirements (more in Section 5 below).

3.2 Industry can have a voice (for now) in what regulation will look like

As the U.S. Government slowly starts to work on figuring out what constitutes admissibility, the Solar Industry has opportunity to lead the process in a number of different ways:

• The Solar Industry could create and propose a list of criteria for admissible products.
• While it is taking steps to identify suppliers accepting or relying on forced labor (on which more in our second article of this series), the Industry could effectively clear a group of suppliers and white-list those in cooperation with the U.S. Government.
• The Industry could take the Better Cotton Initiative as a template and invest in a third-party verification system that would constitute substantive, auditable evidence of a supply chain free of forced labor.
• We understand that chemical signatures in the silicon wafer from the silicon rock processing would allow for batch tracing,[1] which allowing the Industry or a vendor to the industry to batch-test and identify the source of the materials rely on.

Any one or a combination of the above approaches could help the Industry support the laudable goal of eliminating forced labor from the supply chain while, at the same time, helping the Industry avoid onerous or inconsistent regulations devised without its input. There is opportunity for solar to continue its spectacular growth, but it will need to take steps to address this messy problem.

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After achieving independence from British rule in 1947, India pursued socialist-minded development plans that emphasized self-reliance and state-led investment in heavy capital-intensive industries. The “license raj” was created in which most imports required government approval, most investment required government permission, and most foreign investment was barred. Permits were not the only barrier to imports. India’s average tariffs were unbelievably high by today’s standards: 123 percent on intermediate goods, 115 percent on capital goods, and 129 percent on consumer goods in the late 1980s.

India was essentially a closed economy. Its large but inefficient industrial sector supplied 95 percent of domestic demand for manufactured goods and 100 percent of all consumer goods, as a 1989 World Bank report noted. The rupee was hopelessly overvalued, which priced India’s goods out of world markets, keeping exports at just 5 percent of GDP. This meant that its foreign exchange earnings to purchase new technology and capital goods on world markets were severely constrained.

Under restricted trade, India succeeded in industrializing, but inefficiency and bureaucratic controls were rampant and economic growth was slow. The growth rate prior to reforms—so-called Hindu rate of growth—was just 3 to 4 percent overall and much slower on a per capita basis. As a result, poverty levels remained abysmally high.

CRISIS IN 1991 PROPELS SYSTEMIC CHANGE

While some tentative measures to open India’s market were taken in the 1980s, a severe balance of payments crisis finally forced the country’s policymakers to act in early 1991. Manmohan Singh, a distinguished economist, was appointed finance minister by Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao. Quoting Victor Hugo, Singh said in his July 24, 1991 budget speech, “No power on earth can stop an idea whose time has come”—the idea being that India should take its rightful place in the world economy. The compelling power of crisis finally propelled systemic change. Under Singh’s leadership, India devalued the rupee and moved toward a flexible exchange rate and current account convertibility. It extensively dismantled the license raj that had blocked imports and made exports uncompetitive, while unshackling constraints on domestic investment that limited competition. It also took steps to open the economy to foreign investment. Singh could not have done so without the political backing of Prime Minister Rao and a talented reform-minded team, including Commerce Minister P. Chidambaram, Principal Secretary Amar Nath Verma, and top civil servants, around him. This group prevailed despite howls of protest and attack from vested interests, intellectuals, and politicians.

Contrary to the perception of some observers, the trade reforms were not adopted because of pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Rather the reforms were “home-grown” with government officials, including Finance Minister Singh, recognizing that India’s problems were structural and fundamental changes to the import-substituting industrialization strategy were long overdue and clearly in India’s best economic interest. Some external pressure was undeniable and indeed helpful in continuing the process. In 1999, the reform of India’s trade policy received another boost when a World Trade Organization ruling required it to dismantle remaining quantitative restrictions on imports of consumers goods.

The result has been a marked increase in foreign trade, which has improved economic efficiency, giving consumers and businesses a wider choice of final goods and intermediate inputs to purchase. This in turn contributed to an acceleration in economic growth and a significant reduction in poverty.

RENEWED COMMITMENT NEEDED FOR FURTHER REFORMS

While India has continued to reform its policies since the early 1990s, including recent tax reforms by the Modi administration, the pace of reform is disquietingly slow. Red tape continues to stifle the economy, which has been battered by the COVID-19 pandemic, while insufficient attention has been paid to the pressing problems of disease control, pollution, rural poverty, and inadequate social services, such as education and health care. The country has been reluctant to partner with others in deeper trade agreements. As a result, India has missed important opportunities to continue to improve its economic performance. As a stark reminder of the stakes, the country’s once much poorer neighbor—Bangladesh—has continued to reform and has overtaken India in per capita income, according to the International Monetary Fund.

Many scholars like to focus on the deep structural Bodog Poker factors affecting long-run economic development, such as geography and institutions, but we sometimes forget how farsighted political leadership and good economic policies can significantly influence the fate of nations. India is not alone in the world in finding these in short supply.

Douglas A. Irwin, nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics since February 2018, is the John French Professor of Economics at Dartmouth College. He is a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 

To read the full commentary from Peterson Institute for International Economics, please click here.

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The pandemic highlighted the importance of trade and foreign trade logistics. In March 2020, COVID-19 transformed daily life as we knew it. Yet, trade has primarily withstood the disruptions caused by international transportation restrictions and social distancing policies. It has even grown substantially in some areas, such as e-commerce and online trade, for instance. According to an Amazon report, its international net sales increased by 28.3 percent between the first half of 2019 and the same period in 2020.  

By shining the spotlight on the opportunities brought by digital transformation, the pandemic has put customs authorities and their response capacities to the test. The urgent need to clear the critical goods needed to respond to the health emergency while keeping regular trade flows moving forced authorities to transition to digital customs systems almost overnight.  

Even before the pandemic hit, LAC was lagging North America, Europe, and Asia in implementing the commitments it had taken on under the World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement, according to 2019 data. Therefore, the region needs to create efficiencies in its international trade logistics.  

LAC’s economic recovery depends mainly on how its foreign trade logistics perform, which rests on the appropriate physical and digital infrastructure and related transportation services.  

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In response to these challenges, the new IDB publication Logistics in Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities, Challenges, and Lines of Action discusses some of the technologies that the region’s countries could implement to innovate and transform their customs administration.  

The optimization, automation, and digitization of customs and border processes are among the areas that new technologies address. These factors are the cornerstones of modernization and lay the groundwork for generating the high-quality data needed to implement robust and effective risk management systems. 

For example, the ability of customs to obtain, process, and analyze large amounts of quality data is key to strengthen regional value chains and make them agile and secure. Automation also requires other innovative components, such as electronic signatures and authentication mechanisms for internal and external users.  

Another ingredient in the recipe for effective and efficient customs is the traceability of goods. New technologies like radio frequency identification systems (RFID), the Internet of Things (IoT), geolocation tools, electronic seals for container and trailer doors, and OCR license plate readers make it possible to track cargo, vehicles, and the people driving them.  

These systems can be deployed at critical points such as production centers, bonded warehouses, and road corridors that connect land border crossings, seaports, and airports. One example is the system developed in Brazil to track and trace cargo vehicles, packaging, and products by integrating this data with electronic tax documents. Likewise, physical traceability can be accompanied by digitally documented data from each transaction. 

The data that customs authorities capture has immense value for customs and border risk management by digitizing and associating them with freight and transportation documents (cargo manifests, bills of lading, customs declaration data, and electronic invoices). Once the data is captured, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and big data tools allow the processing and analysis of large volumes of information to identify patterns and potentially risky or fraudulent operations.  

Coordinated Border Management based on the use of new technologies 

For the benefit of supply chains and foreign trade logistics, it is also essential that the use of new technologies is carried out in the context of Coordinated Border Management between customs and other authorities involved in border processes. 

This coordination is streamlined with interoperability between authorities and economic operators through Single Windows for Foreign Trade (SWs) or Port Community Systems to reduce times and costs for operators and increase control capacities. For example, the adoption of a SW system in Costa Rica is associated with a 1.4 percentage-point increase in the exports of companies that used the system compared to those that did not. 

There is also an opportunity to promote and strengthen regional value chains through interoperability initiatives between customs systems and other border entities. These include the Central American Digital Trade Platform (PDCC) and the CADENA application, which uses blockchain to facilitate  data exchange from companies whose reliability has been certified, such as authorized economic operators.  

Finally, these components would not be effective without functional infrastructure at the entry and exit points of goods at land borders, seaports, and airports. Likewise, the effect would not be the same if the infrastructure did not include advanced technological entry, exit, inspection, and monitoring systems. The Mexican customs authority’s Customs Technological Integration Project (PITA) is an example of a comprehensive technology-based border infrastructure intervention. The customs authorities of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panamá are following suit and implementing border crossing reform processes that cover border facilities and include the use of cutting-edge technologies, with support from the IDB.  

IDB support for the modernization of customs and border management 

Through the Trade and Investment Division of the Integration and Trade Sector of the IDB, we support an innovative agenda of projects to modernize customs and border management in LAC. Two examples of these are the digital transformation and automation projects for the customs authorities of Colombia and Peru, including smart traceability plans for cargo and vehicles. We are also providing support for regional initiatives involving the use of blockchain to exchange data between eight customs offices in LAC and the application of artificial intelligence to improve customs risk management in several countries, among other projects. 

LAC countries should embrace the availability of new technologies, the fast-track innovation induced by the pandemic, and the support of international organizations, such as the IDB, to expedite the digital transformation of their customs administrations. 

José Martín is a consultant at the Trade and Investment Division of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Previously, he was the Representative in Washington, DC, for the Ministry of Finance of Mexico and the Mexican Tax Administration Service for more than 26 years. 

Sandra Corcuera-Santamaría has been a customs and trade specialist at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington DC since 2006. She is responsible for several national and regional customs modernisation and coordinated border management projects and trade facilitation initiatives, including the coordination of the Authorised Economic Operator Programme in Latin America and the Caribbean.

To read the original commentary from the Inter-American Development Bank, please visit here

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According to the US Congressional Research Service, current estimates show the Coronavirus reduced global economic growth to an annualized rate between -4% and -6% in 2020. Global trade is also estimated to have reduced by -5.3% over 2020.  

Following on from a year in which global GDP was so heavily impacted, the proposal of a cooperative global corporation tax agreement –  which if successful would be the first of its kind – is gaining significant interest. 

In a year of extreme national spending, with continued uncertainty, it becomes understandable for a global tax agreement to attract attention. The OECD is believed to be discussing the matter positively, with Mathias Cormann, Secretary-General of the OECD referring to the proposal as a “game-changer”. He went on to state he was “quietly optimistic” about an international agreement on the taxation of multinational corporations.

Who foots the bill?

The pandemic caused recessions globally, and the above figures are believed to have been much worse if not for the substantial levels of government support seen across the world, specifically in developed nations. The National Audit Office for the UK states that between February of 2020 and 31^st of March of 2021, the UK Government expects a total of £372 billion to be spent on Covid-19. 

The US has spent a total of $2.8 trillion, of the initial $4.5 trillion made available in early 2020 through the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act. 

Such large sums of money have had significant impacts on the country’s finances, as the balance increased spending/ borrowing with reduced taxation income. According to the IMF/CRS, Government fiscal deficits relative to GDP were as high as 10.8% for the world economy in 2020, with projections of 5.4% by 2022, which is still comparatively high. To add context, the Parliament Library states that the UK’s average annual fiscal deficit has been 3.6% since 1970. 

With nations fiscal deficits at these levels, it is again understandable that a proposal of a corporation tax floor of 15% is palatable, with prospects of increased governmental revenues as a result of the plan. 

A Cooperative approach 

At the G7 Summit, located this year in Cornwall, there were discussions specifically around global taxation programmes. US President Biden is believed to have driven said talks, with the resulting proposal of a global corporation tax floor of 15% being agreed to by the Finance Ministers of the G-7 nations. This 15% floor is to eliminate the under-cutting of nations. 

It is important to understand that much of what governments around the world spent to support their respective economies over the past 18 months, was borrowed. For more information on the UK’s borrowing and debt levels, and the costs of such, see TFG’s article on the 2021 UK Spring Budget. 

Given the high debt ratios and borrowing levels, it becomes inevitable that countries will have to increase different forms of taxation to counterbalance the need for borrowing in 2020. This is where bodog sportsbook review US president Joe Biden’s proposal comes in – the theory goes that if all countries have an agreed floor of corporation tax, when nations increase taxations, the corporations will be less likely to ‘move’ their business abroad to benefit from tax reliefs. 

Current Global Taxation

There are two main elements to the agreed global corporation tax – firstly, countries which consume the goods/ services of the most profitable multinational corporations will be entitled to tax said corporations. Secondly, all participating countries impose a minimum corporation tax floor on the global income of multinational corporations. 

The proposed 15% corporation tax floor figure, will apply to multinational corporations in each individual country – eliminating the process of moving profits into ‘tax-havens’ through subsidiaries. 

As of 2021, all 7 members of the G7 have higher corporation tax rates than the proposed floor (Canada 26.5%, France 28%, Germany 15.8%, Italy 24%, Japan 30.6%, US 21% and the UK 19%). This proposal is then toward the world’s economies. 

Currently, Country A may have offices and sell product in the US, buy parts and sell product to China, but move profits through legitimate processes into accounts in, the British Virgin Islands for example, in which there is no corporate income tax. Some tax havens do not require a person’s residency, nor any business activity to allow said business to register and pay that countries tax requirements (or lack thereof). 

The end result is some of the largest corporations in the world actually pay relatively small amounts in tax. Amazon for example, has paid an effective US federal tax rate of 3% on profits totalling $26.5 billion from 2009-2018.  Apple filed an effective global tax rate of 14.4% on financial statement profits for 2020 – lower than the 21% stated above, illustrating the benefits of international tax initiatives. 

The newly proposed global tax agreement would mean that companies that qualify for the above criteria would then pay tax in countries which consume the goods/ services. With the above example of Country A, they would then be subject to taxation from the US and China (should China join the agreement) as their good is also consumed in China. 

Reuters reported that Alphabet Inc., the parent company of Google, could see their global tax bill increase by as much as 7% on it’s $7.8billion global bill in 2020. 

Will it work? 

There are multiple caveats to this proposal, and a lot of moving parts that would need to contribute to the successful implementation of such a global programme. Firstly, there will be countries that do not agree with this proposal and, therefore, will not implement it. 

For a price floor of any kind to work, by definition you need full participation. Within a single country, this may be ensured through laws/ regulations. Implementing this on a global scale is then difficult, as some nations may choose to keep their tax requirements ‘attractive’ which would lessen the efficacy of the programme. 

Secondly, the announcement of this global tax agreement is applicable to roughly the largest 100 companies with profit margins over 10%. How this then gets concretely defined and agreed, is still up for debate. To use Amazon as another example – in 2019 they reported a net income of $3.6 billion, and $4.4 billion of operating profit, which represented a profit margin of just over 7%. Would Amazon therefore not be subject to the new tax responsibilities, despite operating in 58 countries (as of 2018) and being ranked 10^th on the Forbes list of the world’s wealthiest companies? 

There is also a question of who this benefits. Recalling the coincidental time of this announcement, the fact that many nations will be looking to increase taxation revenues over the coming years, some speculate that this is a method that would benefit larger economies more. 

Ross McKenzie is currently a full-time Business Analyst and part-time writer for TFG. Having studied Economics at University, he is particularly interested in global currency movements, international political relations and macroeconomic policy implications.

To read the original commentary from Trade Finance Global, please visit here.

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The news headlines homed in on one aspect of the joint statement that urged China to respect the autonomy and human rights in Hong Kong and the situation in Xinjiang. There was also unprecedented support for stability across the Taiwan Strait – which China immediately denounced as illegal meddling with its internal affairs. President Biden may have failed to rally France and Germany into the jihad against China. But the statement has entrenched the two deeper regardless.

O-RAN, tax and platform regulations

Known associates of China sometimes like to challenge the “legitimacy” of G7. Other fellow Brussels pundits probably don’t share Beijing’s actual concern about G7, which is that China is not a member. Instead, critics point to the lack of “purpose” of G7 or its lack of efficacy, especially compared to the more technically oriented G20.

The criticism against G7 disregards how the two summits serve very different purposes: G7 of today is effectively a like-minded group that shares a history, yet not all the strategies going forward. In contrast, G20 is a policy coordination mechanism between the principal regional powers, where its members merely share a common aversion against tumbling backwards. And neither G7 nor G20 is very effective at what they do. But are there any viable alternatives? It would be a return to G2, to which Europe and Japan won’t be invited.

Yet, China’s systemic challenge is just one tent peg that grounds the big tent of the alliance. Still, the China peg determines how far the other pegs can stretch the fabric. A tech divide evidently continues to spook the seven countries. At the digital ministers’ meeting in late April, the US and its allies called for a reference on 5G vendor diversity in the summit conclusion but failed. Japan and the US had already pledged $4.5 billion towards developing indigenous alternatives although their home markets were already free from Chinese suppliers. The US Senate also tabled the Endless Frontier Act (later merged into the US Innovation and Competition Act) to promote a consortium of US and Chinese market entrants by displacing European and Korean 5G vendors. These proposals may not meet the non-discriminatory requirements on subsidies and technical standards laid down under the WTO.

Similarly, the US resists EU regulations against US platforms and online services using arbitrary thresholds that single out Silicon Valley. In other words, digital markets divide the G7 between those who want vendor diversity in technologies where Europe happens to be leading, yet not in online platforms where the US happens to be dominant – or vice versa. Instead, the final G7 leaders’ communique reiterates the need for “transparency, the openness of process and participation, relevance, and consensus-based decision-making” in line with referenced WTO agreements. The US-led Open RAN Alliance is unlikely to meet any of these criteria.

But at its best, G7 is a preparatory meeting before a global consensus, similar to how APEC served that role before some WTO ministerials. That is how G7 as a likeminded group (arguably more homogeneous than APEC) exert its influence. For example, the conflict over corporate taxation of services (unfairly epitomised as “digital tax”) approach its end with a compromise of a 15% minimum tax floor and a split of the tax revenues between destination and home jurisdictions. There’s still a great deal of strategic ambiguity left: Some countries might continue their tax deductions on intangibles or decide to go after small businesses. Just imagine a mom-pop shop or a freelance architect paying corporate taxes in every country where their clients reside. Some will surely ignore the G7 consensus outright.

From Cornwall to Brussels

In a time of geopolitical gambits, intense lobbying and renewed interest in industrial policy, there are plenty of temptations and disagreements on both sides of the Atlantic. The truce on the Airbus-Boeing dispute may not herald a new transatlantic era, if it means that every window in the glasshouse has been broken and all legal remedies are exhausted. The only option that now remains is to forgive ourselves our common sins.

Then there is the small matter of ending Section 232 measures on steel, which remains a sacred goal for the German stakeholders. Ending the tariffs is also an exorcising ritual that Merkel needs to love America again. But lifting the 232s remains a political risk for the Biden-Harris administration – at least until it secures its second term. Applying pressure through EU tariff retaliation against the swing states (merely helping the Republicans) or carbon tariffs are arguably just self-harming.

The truth is that Europe and America continue to be antagonists in their own right. But unlike Beijing, Brussels wields a formidable soft power that legitimises tech policies in other countries that are hostile to US industrial interests, while the US has billions of Federal funds for industrial policies its disposal. Just like the Airbus-Boeing conflict – services tax, platform regulations, or illegal 5G subsidies are transatlantic issues we bring to the OECD, WTO, G7 or G20 for collateral damage. A cynic might say that the EU and the US should spare the rest of the world of their transatlantic champagne problems.

In that regard, the bilateral Trade and Tech Council seems like a natural progression and a deliverable worthy of an EU-US summit. But we should not forget that much of the regulatory coordination was already taking place, discretely at technical levels in areas like export control, third-country trade or standardisation. TTC trace its origins with other similar ideas to the final days of the Trump administration. But if the intention is to triangulate against harmful third country practices, one might argue that some partners, some of who hold critical leverages against China, went missing along the way.

Also, institutionalising that bilateral dialogue is not entirely risk-free. Publicity creates an incentive for blame games, where one accuses the other of not “engaging seriously” and melodramatic walk-outs, just because the other side happens to disagree. Like its predecessors – TEC and TTIP – TTC will attract lobbyists, NGOs, and others with no genuine interests in transatlantic mechanisms. Instead, they are merely trying to lobby for new domestic rules through the backdoor.

Hosuk Lee-Makiyama is the director of European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) and a leading author on trade diplomacy, EU-Far East relations and the digital economy.

To read the original commentary from The European Centre for International Political Economy, please visit here

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Last week’s report was prompted by two developments: the Covid-19 pandemic, which made us acutely aware of supply chain gaps and vulnerabilities in sensitive sectors, and China’s continuing dominance in production in some of these sectors. The latter is not new, but concern has been growing because of China’s dominant position in some areas like critical minerals processing and its demonstrated willingness to use denial of access as a means of responding to criticism or to further its foreign policy goals. In fairness, the United States probably weaponized trade before they did through our many sanctions programs, but when the shoe is on the other foot, it turns out it does not fit very well.

These developments have also made us acutely aware that our own efforts have been lagging. Manufacturing in some critical sectors has long been declining in the United States, as has our investment in basic research. In fiscal year 2019, federal spending for research and development (R&D) was 0.6 percent of GDP in the United States, the lowest in over 60 years. These challenges are acknowledged deficiencies and have been a wake-up call, to which the Biden administration has responded, first with its Build Back Better program and now with this report.

The 23 recommendations in the report represent a return to what used to be called industrial policy and might now best be described as innovation policy—a greater role for the government in promoting research in essential areas and, if necessary, promoting either onshore production or the development of secure supply chains based on relationships with trusted partners. The United States has done this before, and we are good at it. If we do it correctly, the result will be more resilient supply chains and a more secure America.

Whether their roadmap is the correct one, however, remains uncertain. Many of the recommendations address the need for pouring additional resources into our innovation efforts. Republicans have often opposed these policies in the past as government meddling in the economy and “picking winners and losers.” They may well do so again, particularly if their leadership adopts the position of opposing everything the president recommends, but this time the debate is taking place in the context of national security. We need to up our game, not just because it’s a nice idea, but because our security and ability to compete effectively with China demands it. Republicans in Congress who have taken a hard line on China—and criticized the president (incorrectly) for being too soft—may have difficulty opposing measures intended to do precisely what they have been demanding. More likely, as also happened last week in the Senate, they will moan, whine, delay, and tweak but in the end support ambitious innovation policy programs.

A more complicated question is how these measures interact with trade policy. While the report acknowledges that it is neither possible nor optimal for the United States to make everything it needs, the Buy America and reshoring policies recommended may ultimately make achieving greater supply chain resilience more difficult and more expensive. The old adage, “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket,” comes to mind. One of the best ways to promote resiliency is to diversify sources of supply. While the report demonstrates an understanding of that, some of its proposals run counter to it. There has long been a tension between resiliency and efficiency in constructing supply chains, but the report basically pretends it isn’t there. Resiliency means more redundancy and having secure sources of supply, but secure sources are often not the cheapest, particularly if you compare domestic costs to foreign-sourced costs. Partly for that reason, CSIS has recommended a “trusted partner” approach which seeks to develop deep economic relations with reliable and secure foreign partners rather than trying to achieve autarky as much as possible. The report acknowledges this approach, but it remains to be seen if it is lip service or if a genuine effort to develop those partnerships will occur.

One clue about that is that the administration’s goals include creating jobs domestically and providing more rewards to our workers. Those are also noble goals, but they are not entirely compatible with either resiliency or efficiency. U.S. production will probably be more expensive and in the long run this may make our industries less globally competitive. In some circumstances like semiconductors, that is a price worth paying but in others perhaps not.

It would be helpful as the report’s recommendations are implemented if the administration did two things: first, recognize the tension between resiliency and efficiency rather than pretending we can have our cake and eat it too; and second, undertake the difficult task of defining which industries are essential to our national security. It has long been axiomatic in export control circles that if you try to protect everything you end up protecting nothing. The administration would be wise to take that to heart in its supply chain policy. If everything is critical, then nothing is critical. The essence of a smart supply chain policy is to set clear priorities.

William Reinsch holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and is a senior adviser at Kelley, Drye & Warren LLP. Previously, he served for 15 years as president of the National Foreign Trade Council, where he led efforts in favor of open markets, in support of the Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation, against unilateral sanctions, and in support of sound international tax policy, among many issues. 

To read the full commentary from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, please click here.

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