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Local content requirements can help reverse our dependence on foreign nations both by discouraging multinational corporations from relying on fragile global supply chains, and also encouraging them instead to build productive capacity in the United States. They will increase certainty by reducing the likelihood of shortages and scarcity and the price swings like we see today. With this approach, we can exchange volatility for stability in our markets, and industrial decay for industrial strength.

To read the full commentary on the New York Times, please click here.

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The overall growth rate will remain near 6 percent this year, a historically high level after a recession, but the expansion reflects a vast divergence in the fortunes of rich and poor countries, the International Monetary Fund said in its latest World Economic Outlook report.

Worldwide poverty, hunger and unmanageable debt are all on the upswing. Employment has fallen, especially for women, reversing many of the gains they made in recent years.

Uneven access to vaccines and health care is at the heart of the economic disparities. While booster shots are becoming available in some wealthier nations, a staggering 96 percent of people in low-income countries are still unvaccinated.

“Recent developments have made it abundantly clear that we are all in this together and the pandemic is not over anywhere until it is over everywhere,” Gita Gopinath, the I.M.F.’s chief economist, wrote in the report.

The outlook for the United States, Europe and other advanced economies has also darkened. Factories hobbled by pandemic-related restrictions and bottlenecks at key ports around the world have caused crippling supply shortages. A lack of workers in many industries is contributing to the clogs. The U.S. Labor Department reported Tuesday that a record 4.3 million workers quit their jobs in August — to take or seek new jobs, or to leave the work force.

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“The dangerous divergence in economic prospects across countries remains a major concern.”

Compared to our July forecast, the global growth projection for 2021 has been revised down marginally to 5.9 percent and is unchanged for 2022 at 4.9 percent. However, this modest headline revision masks large downgrades for some countries. The outlook for the low-income developing country group has darkened considerably due to worsening pandemic dynamics. The downgrade also reflects more difficult near-term prospects for the advanced economy group, in part due to supply disruptions. Partially offsetting these changes, projections for some commodity exporters have been upgraded on the back of rising commodity prices. Pandemic-related disruptions to contact-intensive sectors have caused the labor market recovery to significantly lag the output recovery in most countries.

The dangerous divergence in economic prospects across countries remains a major concern. Aggregate output for the advanced economy group is expected to regain its pre-pandemic trend path in 2022 and exceed it by 0.9 percent in 2024. By contrast, aggregate output for the emerging market and developing economy group (excluding China) is expected to remain 5.5 percent below the pre-pandemic forecast in 2024, resulting in a larger setback to improvements in their living standards.

These divergences are a consequence of the “great vaccine divide” and large disparities in policy support. While almost 60 percent of the population in advanced economies are fully vaccinated and some are now receiving booster shots, about 96 percent of the population in low-income countries remain unvaccinated. Furthermore, many emerging market and developing economies, faced with tighter financing conditions and a greater risk of de-anchoring inflation expectations, are withdrawing policy support more quickly despite larger shortfalls in output.

Supply disruptions pose another policy challenge. On the one hand, pandemic outbreaks and climate disruptions have resulted in shortages of key inputs and lowered manufacturing activity in several countries. On the other hand, these supply shortages, alongside the release of pent-up demand and the rebound in commodity prices, have caused consumer price inflation to increase rapidly in, for example, the United States, Germany, and many emerging market and developing economies. Food prices have increased the most in low-income countries where food insecurity is most acute, adding to the burdens of poorer households and raising the risk of social unrest.

The October 2021 Global Financial Stability Report highlights another challenge to monetary policy from increased risk-taking in financial markets and rising fragilities in the nonbank financial institutions sector.

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A principal common factor behind these complex challenges is the continued grip of the pandemic on global society. The foremost policy priority is therefore to vaccinate at least 40 percent of the population in every country by end-2021 and 70 percent by mid-2022. This will require high-income countries to fulfill existing vaccine dose donation pledges, coordinate with manufacturers to prioritize deliveries to COVAX in the near-term and remove trade restrictions on the flow of vaccines and their inputs. At the same time, closing the $20 billion residual grant funding gap for testing, therapeutics and genomic surveillance will save lives now and keep vaccines fit for purpose. Looking ahead, vaccine manufacturers and high-income countries should support the expansion of regional production of COVID-19 vaccines in developing countries through financing and technology transfers.

Another urgent global priority is the need to slow the rise in global temperatures and contain the growing adverse effects of climate change. This will require more ambitious commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at the upcoming United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26). A policy strategy that includes an international carbon price floor adjusted to country circumstances, a green public investment and research subsidy push, and compensatory, targeted transfers to households can help advance the energy transition in an equitable way. Just as importantly, advanced countries need to deliver on their earlier promises of mobilizing $100 billion of annual climate financing for developing countries.

In addition, concerted multilateral efforts to ensure adequate international liquidity for constrained economies, and faster implementation of the G20 common framework to restructure unsustainable debt, would help limit divergences across countries. Building on the historic $650 billion Special Drawing Right (SDR) allocation, the IMF is calling on countries with strong external positions to voluntarily channel their SDRs into the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. Furthermore, it is exploring the establishment of a Resilience and Sustainability Trust, which would provide long-term funding to support countries’ investment in sustainable growth.

At the national level, the overall policy mix should be calibrated to local pandemic and economic conditions, aiming for maximum sustainable employment while protecting the credibility of policy frameworks. With fiscal space becoming more limited in many economies, health care spending should continue to be prioritized, while lifelines and transfers will need to become increasingly targeted, reinforced by retraining and support for reallocation. As health outcomes improve, policy emphasis should increasingly focus on long-term structural goals.

With public debt levels at record highs, all initiatives should be rooted in credible medium-term frameworks, bodog poker review backed by feasible revenue and spending measures. The October 2021 Fiscal Monitor demonstrates that such credibility can lower financing costs for countries and increase fiscal space in the near-term.

Monetary policy will need to walk a fine line between tackling inflation and financial risks and supporting the economic recovery. We project, amidst high uncertainty, that headline inflation will likely return to pre-pandemic levels by mid-2022 for the group of advanced economies and emerging and developing economies. There is, however, considerable heterogeneity across countries with upside risks for some, like the United States, United Kingdom, and some emerging market and developing economies. While monetary policy can generally look through transitory increases in inflation, central banks should be prepared to act quickly if the risks of rising inflation expectations become more material in this uncharted recovery. Central banks should chart contingent actions, announce clear triggers, and act in line with that communication.

More generally, clarity and consistent actions can go a long way toward avoiding unnecessary policy accidents that roil financial markets and set back the global recovery—ranging from a failure to lift the US debt ceiling in a timely fashion to disorderly debt restructurings in China’s property sector to escalating cross-border trade and technology tensions.

Recent developments have made it abundantly clear that we are all in this together and the pandemic is not over anywhere until it is over everywhere. If COVID-19 were to have a prolonged impact—into the medium-term—it could reduce global GDP by a cumulative $5.3 trillion over the next five years relative to our current projection. It does not have to be this way. The global community must step up efforts to ensure equitable vaccine access for every country, overcome vaccine hesitancy where there is adequate supply, and secure better economic prospects for all.

Gita Gopinath is the Economic Counsellor and Director of the Research Department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). She is on leave of public service from Harvard University’s Economics department where she is the John Zwaanstra Professor of International Studies and of Economics.

To read the full commentary from the International Monetary Fund, please click here.

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Firms needing to diversify from China, in whole or part, because of rising Chinese costs and mounting trade and investment restrictions are now considering whether to reorganize production across Asia to complement continuing Chinese operations or to shift investment out of Asia to shorten supply chains serving the US market. Mexico seems like a natural choice for “nearshoring” investment, linked closely to the dominant US market by the newly minted United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).

But so far at least, Mexico has not lured substantial new investments that could supplant Asian production serving the US market, and the USMCA has added rather than removed concerns about investing in Mexican auto and other manufacturing sectors. The evidence cited in this blog suggests that Mexico faces significant competition for investments in restructured supply chains. Compared with other leading nearshoring locations in Asia and North America, Mexican policies tend to discourage new placements in manufacturing sectors. Another handicap flows from the flaws in the USMCA that work to Mexico’s disadvantage and favor new investment in US-based production of autos, trucks, and parts. As a result, Mexico cannot rely on its North American partners to finance its development and promote its effort to become a nearshoring hub for supply chains migrating from East Asia. To attract more investment diversifying out of Asia, Mexican officials need to recast domestic economic policies and recommit to combating corruption and organized crime to make Mexico more attractive to domestic and foreign investors.

BENCHMARKING MEXICO’S COMPETITIVENESS FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

When companies plan their production and trade strategies, they benchmark their strengths and weaknesses against key competitors. Countries whose economic development depends on trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) should do the same. To that end, table 1 arrays Mexico’s global ranking under three separate indices compiled by the Fraser Institute in Canada, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and Transparency International (TI) that assess critical factors that influence locational decisions for private investment. Each of the groups compiles data on numerous indicators covering Mexico’s performance with respect to its business regulations, infrastructure, international trade ties, legal system, and corruption.

Overall, Mexico’s scores place it in the middle of the pack of countries covered by the two broad indices compiled by the Fraser Institute and WIPO, but in the bottom third of countries examined in the TI Corruption Perceptions Index. Compared with its USMCA partners or key competitors in southeast Asia—the markets Mexico competes with for investments by companies that are restructuring their Asia-Pacific supply chains—Mexico does not fare very well.

In North America, commitments to support nearshoring to Mexico, discussed most recently at the September 9 High Level Economic Dialogue between senior US and Mexican officials, pale in comparison to the actions taken by US politicians to promote reshoring to the United States. Legislation in the current Congress is replete with programs designed to encourage new investment in US-based production plants through both subsidies and Buy American procurement regulations. These bills are meant to reinforce Executive Order 14017 on “America’s Supply Chains” issued by President Joseph R. Biden Jr. on February 24, 2021. Although Biden committed to “close cooperation on resilient supply chains with allies and partners who share our values”, the subsequent White House report on critical products concluded in June 2021 noted that international cooperation was only needed “to secure supplies of critical goods that we will not make in sufficient quantities at home [emphasis added].”

For companies diversifying some of their production or sourcing from the Chinese market, southeast Asia provides a nearby and largely welcoming investment alternative. Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand score higher overall than Mexico on the Global Innovation indicators; so, too, do Taiwan and Malaysia on the Economic Freedom of the World Index. Mexico’s rating on business regulations and infrastructure raise yellow flags for prospective investors, as do its weak scores on legal protections, which align with its dismal TI grade on corruption. And while Mexico benefits bodog sportsbook review from preferential market access to its major export markets and is highly graded for the USMCA and other free trade agreements (FTAs), its success in securing FTAs is now being matched by a wave of new intra-Asian trade pacts, including the soon-to-be implemented 15-member Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Simply put, Mexico needs to outcompete its USMCA partners and southeast Asian competitors if it is to benefit from new investments in manufacturing shifting from Asia. Even with a labor cost advantage compared to its USMCA partners, the added production and distribution costs associated with intrusive Mexican business regulations, inadequate and irregular power supplies, and clogged road and rail networks, could well erode the benefits for those considering new investments in Mexico. Indeed, these costs already seem to be a drag on decisions to switch investments to Mexico.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MEXICO

Mexico’s relatively weak standing in the Fraser Institute, WIPO, and TI indicators rating the business environment created by a country’s trade and investment policies, and legal systems, seems to be reflected in inflows of FDI into Mexico over the past few years. Except in 2020, when global activity declined sharply, annual inflows of FDI in Mexican manufacturing have not grown very much, averaging about $15.8 billion in 2018-2019 and slightly less on an annualized basis in the first half of 2021. Total FDI inflows are up on an annualized basis in the first half of 2021 due to strong catch-up growth in services (see table 2).

The majority of FDI inflows to Mexico since 2018 have been in service sectors, led by financial and insurance services. Manufacturing accounts for about 47 percent of total FDI inflows. The bulk of FDI in manufacturing is in transportation equipment (cars, trucks, parts), which covers about 46 percent of total Mexican FDI in manufacturing, much of which is from North America and Europe.

If Mexico was succeeding in nearshoring supply chains in manufacturing, it would likely be seen in supplements to sectors where Mexico already has attracted FDI, or previously had operations that subsequently moved to China or elsewhere in Asia: machinery and equipment; computer, communications, measurement devices; and transportation equipment. The machinery and equipment sector is recording FDI inflows equal to 2018 levels, and FDI in computers et al. is down by more than half. Transportation equipment FDI seemed to be recovering from sharp drops in 2020 until the second quarter of 2021, perhaps reflecting auto industry concerns about the future of Mexican-based production. If trends in FDI data for 2021 continue, concerns about increasing COVID-19 cases and restrictions on future access to the US market resulting from US regulations interpreting the USMCA auto and truck content requirements could dampen investment in this critical sector for Mexican economic growth.

THE USMCA DISADVANTAGE

North American economic integration has been driven for three decades by the idea that investing in Mexico and integrating production across the region would enhance the growth and international competitiveness of all three countries. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) fell short of its promise and most of the southern Mexican states benefited very little from the increased regional trade and investment. Labor-intensive Mexican industries serving the US market decamped to Asia in NAFTA’s first decade as Mexico’s tight monetary policies fueled an overvalued peso and undercut competitiveness vis-à-vis China and others.

The USMCA changed the vision of deepening intraregional production networks. For political reasons, it was designed to differ markedly with its predecessor; the major change involved rules governing production of autos, trucks, and parts, and complemented the Trump administration’s efforts to reshore supply chains to US-based facilities (including some production from Mexico). Concerns about the deal, and its potential negative impact on auto sector investment in Mexico, initially were dismissed by Mexican officials. But when US regulations setting the terms for assessing domestic content requirements to qualify for USMCA preferences were issued in the summer of 2020, it became clear to auto industry and Mexican officials alike that the deal would require much more restructuring of auto and truck production, and shifting to US-based facilities, than they initially thought. The issue is in the early stages of USMCA dispute settlement; in the interim, Mexican producers face an uncertain future.

The USMCA, negotiated under the threat of US withdrawal from NAFTA, was hailed for removing the cloud of uncertainty about the future of regional economic integration. Longstanding critics of NAFTA supported the new pact whose future now seemed politically secure. Investors saw the new political support for regional integration, or rather the decline in criticism of the pact, as a positive sign that Mexico would be an attractive host for nearshoring investment from Asia. But the dispute over auto content rules, and a spate of new disputes on labor, environment, energy, and agricultural issues, brought under the USMCA’s enhanced enforcement procedures, has reopened questions about the durability of the pact’s political honeymoon in Mexico and the United States.

In sum, the USMCA does not seem to have accorded Mexico substantial advantages for nearshoring manufacturing investment from Asia. The pact reopens old conflicts and offers new avenues for trade retaliation. But the main obstacle to Mexico’s success in attracting new investment is homemade. Mexican officials should take a closer look at how their policies compare to those of leading competitors and recalibrate to build back Mexico better.

Jeffrey J. Schott joined the Peterson Institute for International Economics in 1983 and is a senior fellow working on international trade policy and economic sanctions.

To read the full commentary from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, please click here.

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After achieving independence from British rule in 1947, India pursued socialist-minded development plans that emphasized self-reliance and state-led investment in heavy capital-intensive industries. The “license raj” was created in which most imports required government approval, most investment required government permission, and most foreign investment was barred. Permits were not the only barrier to imports. India’s average tariffs were unbelievably high by today’s standards: 123 percent on intermediate goods, 115 percent on capital goods, and 129 percent on consumer goods in the late 1980s.

India was essentially a closed economy. Its large but inefficient Bodog Poker industrial sector supplied 95 percent of domestic demand for manufactured goods and 100 percent of all consumer goods, as a 1989 World Bank report noted. The rupee was hopelessly overvalued, which priced India’s goods out of world markets, keeping exports at just 5 percent of GDP. This meant that its foreign exchange earnings to purchase new technology and capital goods on world markets were severely constrained.

Under restricted trade, India succeeded in industrializing, but inefficiency and bureaucratic controls were rampant and economic growth was slow. The growth rate prior to reforms—so-called Hindu rate of growth—was just 3 to 4 percent overall and much slower on a per capita basis. As a result, poverty levels remained abysmally high.

CRISIS IN 1991 PROPELS SYSTEMIC CHANGE

While some tentative measures to open India’s market were taken in the 1980s, a severe balance of payments crisis finally forced the country’s policymakers to act in early 1991. Manmohan Singh, a distinguished economist, was appointed finance minister by Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao. Quoting Victor Hugo, Singh said in his July 24, 1991 budget speech, “No power on earth can stop an idea whose time has come”—the idea being that India should take its rightful place in the world economy. The compelling power of crisis finally propelled systemic change. Under Singh’s leadership, India devalued the rupee and moved toward a flexible exchange rate and current account convertibility. It extensively dismantled the license raj that had blocked imports and made exports uncompetitive, while unshackling constraints on domestic investment that limited competition. It also took steps to open the economy to foreign investment. Singh could not have done so without the political backing of Prime Minister Rao and a talented reform-minded team, including Commerce Minister P. Chidambaram, Principal Secretary Amar Nath Verma, and top civil servants, around him. This group prevailed despite howls of protest and attack from vested interests, intellectuals, and politicians.

Contrary to the perception of some observers, the trade reforms were not adopted because of pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Rather the reforms were “home-grown” with government officials, including Finance Minister Singh, recognizing that India’s problems were structural and fundamental changes to the import-substituting industrialization strategy were long overdue and clearly in India’s best economic interest. Some external pressure was undeniable and indeed helpful in continuing the process. In 1999, the reform of India’s trade policy received another boost when a World Trade Organization ruling required it to dismantle remaining quantitative restrictions on imports of consumers goods.

The result has been a marked increase in foreign trade, which has improved economic efficiency, giving consumers and businesses a wider choice of final goods and intermediate inputs to purchase. This in turn contributed to an acceleration in economic growth and a significant reduction in poverty.

RENEWED COMMITMENT NEEDED FOR FURTHER REFORMS

While India has continued to reform its policies since the early 1990s, including recent tax reforms by the Modi administration, the pace of reform is disquietingly slow. Red tape continues to stifle the economy, which has been battered by the COVID-19 pandemic, while insufficient attention has been paid to the pressing problems of disease control, pollution, rural poverty, and inadequate social services, such as education and health care. The country has been reluctant to partner with others in deeper trade agreements. As a result, India has missed important opportunities to continue to improve its economic performance. As a stark reminder of the stakes, the country’s once much poorer neighbor—Bangladesh—has continued to reform and has overtaken India in per capita income, according to the International Monetary Fund.

Many scholars like to focus on the deep structural factors affecting long-run economic development, such as geography and institutions, but we sometimes forget how farsighted political leadership and good economic policies can significantly influence the fate of nations. India is not alone in the world in finding these in short supply.

Douglas A. Irwin, nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics since February 2018, is the John French Professor of Economics at Dartmouth College. He is a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 

To read the full commentary from Peterson Institute for International Economics, please click here.

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1. Embrace the hybrid model. The post-pandemic outcome is clear: a hybrid work model in which part of the workforce works outside of the traditional office for part of the time. The more important question: Which portion of the workforce needs to be present in the office, and when, and for what reason?

   Employees are craving clarity about what is coming next in terms of work arrangements. It falls on organizational leaders to chart the path for managers and employees. Transparent and frequent communication, with managers playing a key role, can help ensure that the organization moves in unison.

   In a recent survey, we found that organizations that articulated more specific policies and approaches for the future workplace have seen employee well-being and productivity rise. More specifically, organizations that have clearly communicated post-COVID-19 work arrangements have seen a two-fold increase to employee-reported feelings of support, a three-fold increase to feelings of inclusion, and an almost five-fold increase to reported feelings of individual productivity. Attempting to force a one-size-fits all solution can have detrimental effects on the workforce, particularly on women, people of lower socio-economic status, and people in less advanced economies.

2. Reimagine the physical space. The office of the future requires organizations to consider the altered footprint and layout that will emerge from a hybrid work model. Since in-person work will look substantially different, organizations need to make sure that their physical space is in tune with the objectives of the people within it. Pre-pandemic cubicle setups may be a thing of the past, making way for areas of collaboration, innovation, and community-building.

   Real-estate footprints of many organizations will also change significantly. Already, we have seen many companies move to new geographies to tap new talent pools. For example, a large technology company recently announced some roles could remain remote indefinitely, allowing them to leverage talent from around the country. Others, such as a large financial company that is planning on having 60 desks per 100 employees, are rethinking their real-estate spend as they move to hybrid working models.

3. Manage fundamental human needs. The overnight shift to remote work has been one of the most notable real-time social experiments of recent times. It has shown that remote work does not necessarily come at the cost of productivity. In fact, many companies have reported increased productivity. A McKinsey analysis found that more than 20 percent of the workforce could work remotely three to five days a week as effectively as from an office.

   However, remote employees complain that it is difficult to feel connected to colleagues and manage work-life boundaries. Some companies are adamant about the value of remote work while also being concerned about its effect on employee well-being. One online retailer, for example, is addressing these concerns and is acquiring over 900,000 square feet of new office space across six U.S. cities. The gradual return of in-person work alongside the newfound importance of virtual workspaces means organizations need to figure out ways to increase connectivity and a sense of belonging, regardless of where employees are.

The relationship between employees and the workplace has changed in ways that require organizations to invest seriously in helping people navigate through their vision for the hybrid workplace and any changes to the physical workspace. Doing so can help employees balance productivity, well-being, and a sense of connection Bodog Poker in the evolving future of work.

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According to the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook released in April 2021, the global economy is projected to recover in 2021 and 2022 with anticipated GDP growth of 6% and 4.4% respectively. This growth, however, is not projected to be shared equally across countries or industries.

As trade economists, we’d like to offer perspectives about how the economic recovery is progressing.

Economic recovery so far is based on three main factors:

• First and foremost is uneven access to vaccines—each economy’s growth hinges on vaccine availability and efficacy.
• Second, domestic policies, which vary across countries, significantly impact the pace of economic recovery.
• Third, the pace of recovery will also depend on country-specific structural factors, particularly reliance on high-contact sectors, such as tourism.

Furthermore, advanced economies and developing countries vary in their capacities to execute short- and long-term recovery strategies. This has a direct impact on their abilities to recover:

• Advanced economies are projected to recover faster than emerging market and developing economies. Advanced economies had the fiscal space at the beginning of the crisis to implement effective stimulus measures, and many now can quickly roll out vaccines. This bloc tends to have larger work-from-home flexibility in conducting business as they generally have higher technology intensity in the production process and digital infrastructure.
• Conversely, developing countries historically do not have as much room in their budgets to stimulate their economies, and have not been able to vaccinate their populations as quickly as advanced economies. Lacking access to vaccines effectively places a ceiling on growth, and some estimates project that developing economies will not have widespread access to vaccines for several years. Businesses in developing economies tend to depend more on face-to-face interactions and have fewer work-from-home jobs. In the meantime, developing economies will likely suffer from economic scarring, or long-term effects.

 Recoveries also vary largely by country according to the data in May. In particular:

• The United States is projected to surpass pre-COVID levels of GDP in 2021 thanks to a rapid vaccine rollout and three rounds of stimulus checks that have kept American consumers spending through the pandemic.
• The European Union (EU) is expected to recover to pre-COVID GDP levels a bit later, in mid-2022, due to a slow vaccine rollout and dependency on sectors that rely on human contact and interaction, such as tourism, cultural and creative industries. The EU has struggled with a third wave of COVID-19 infections and new lockdowns.
• In contrast, the United Kingdom(UK) is expected to recover faster than the rest of Europe despite having longer lockdowns than many European countries, one of the deadliest outbreaks in 2020, and complications from Brexit. Its early procurement of vaccines and rapid vaccination drive to deliver the first shot to as many people as possible are key to a quicker recovery. Also important is the UK’s quick fiscal policy response; it was the first major economy to set plans to repair the damage to public finances caused by the pandemic.
• China has surprised many with the speed of its recovery. The world’s second-largest economy grew 2.3% in 2020—the only major economy to avoid a contraction last year. This growth has continued in 2021 as a rebound in foreign demand has encouraged higher export growth. Partially hit by global chip shortages and international logistics jams, the economy’s strong pandemic bounce-back presents a two-speed track, with strong industrial output and export demand but lagging consumer spending.

Focus on Trade:

As of spring 2021, overall global trade volumes have numerically returned to pre-pandemic levels, but their composition looks different. According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), global trade began recovering in the third quarter of 2020 and continued through the end of the year. Goods trade led the charge, recovering far more quickly than services. Goods like home office and communications equipment performed remarkably well compared to last year. Services trade, suffering from pandemic-related restrictions as well as consumer hesitation to travel, bottomed out in the second quarter of 2020 and is recovering sluggishly. Travel and tourism is understandably the most impacted services sector (check out NTTO’s dashboard for how this is progressing in the U.S.).

For a U.S. perspective on the recovery in trade, check out ITA’s monthly analysis of U.S. exports, imports, and other vital trade data.

From a global perspective, this crisis will continue to have echo-effects long after the virus is contained. With each passing day we have some more insight into how the virus has affected the global economy. While it is too early to understand the full picture, for now we can see simply that growth has a double ceiling: virus containment and vaccine access. Until the virus is controlled, we will continue on a bumpy, uneven road to recovery.

Brooke Tenison is an International Economist in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Trade Policy and Analysis; and Susan Xu is an International Economist in the Office of Trade and Economic Policy

To read the original commentary from the International Trade Administration, please visit here

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The coronavirus crisis has cut deep into global trade flows.  The ‘Great Lockdown’ has shut borders, curtailed consumer demand, and broken supply chains. Ports have been closed and international travel has virtually ceased. The global economy is set to shrink by 6 – 8 per cent in 2020, and world trade by up to 12 per cent. Yet ‘slowbalisation’ was already taking hold in the global economy before Covid-19 jumped from a bat to a Hubei farmer sometime in late 2019. Global trade rose only marginally faster than global output in the decade after 2010, having risen at more than twice the pace of output in the early 2000s. The share of Global Value Chains in trade fell during the same period. Rising protectionism, the US-China trade war, automation and increased domestic production, all took their toll on the model of globalisation that had structured world trade in the ‘long 1990s’ before the financial crisis.

In a wide ranging interview with the Financial Times, French President, Emmanuel Macron, declared that this model of globalisation had reached ‘the end of its cycle’.  It had lifted millions out of poverty and deposed totalitarian governments, but had also increased inequality and undermined democracy, he argued. The Covid-19 crisis has accelerated this reassessment.

National governments are now taking stock of their economic resilience against future pandemics. Can they build or get enough ventilators, masks, bodog poker review personal protective equipment and diagnostic tests, and produce vaccine supplies?  Do they have national control over strategic sectors, like pharmaceuticals and telecommunications, as well as defence? The German government recently bought a 23 per cent stake in Curevac, a biotech company based in Tubingen that is developing a Covid-19 vaccine, in order to block a US takeover. Macron has declared that France will seek ‘medical self-sufficiency’ and is investing in national research and production capabilities. And pandemic preparedness bleeds easily into geo-political industrial strategy: the EU commission has set out plans to block access to public procurement contracts from state-subsidised Chinese companies. It now describes China as ‘systemic rival’ to the EU.

Industrial and commercial concerns are increasingly overlaid by foreign and security policy objectives. The US is challenging its allies to come into line behind its attempts to constrain and contain China, citing security concerns for pushing prohibitions on Huawei in 5G development, blocking involvement in China’s Belt and Road initiative, and limiting foreign investment by Chinese companies.  The Johnson government has launched ‘Project Defend’ – an examination of the UK’s national capabilities for producing essential supplies and an assessment of its economic vulnerability to hostile governments. It has folded the Department for International Development back into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, largely on trade and security grounds. Much of this is code for rethinking the UK’s relationships – both economic and political – with China.  The shifts in government policy reflect rising hostility to China on the Tory backbenches, of which the formation of a new hawkish ‘China Research Group’ is emblematic.

Emerging from the pandemic, world history will have two main vectors: climate change and strategic competition between the US and China. Where does this leave ‘Global Britain’?

Brexit was a political project launched on the prospectus of opening Britain up to the world, uncoupled from the EU’s customs union and single market. Even without a slowdown in global trade and the colossal impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, this was always fraught with risk. Geography trumps history in trade, and the cost of erecting barriers to the flow of goods and services with Europe will outweigh any benefits from new free trade deals with the rest of the world. But now the UK government must reckon with pressure to align with the US against China, risking retaliation from Beijing, while simultaneously pulling up the economic and diplomatic anchors of its EU membership. Autarky is not an option. The pandemic has brutally exposed the weakness of both the state’s capabilities and domestic manufacturing in the UK. Nor is an ‘Anglosphere’ alliance of the ‘5 Eyes’ nations of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and USA likely to be more than gestural. Britain will have to find a new place for itself in the world.

Global trade will recover in 2021 but it will not bring back the old model of globalisation. The opportunity exists for governments to use the pandemic as a critical juncture for building a new global order, with the goals of public health, peaceful coexistence, tackling the climate emergency, and distributing economic growth more equitably, at its core.  This is a task – as big as anything faced at Bretton Woods – to which a genuinely ‘Global Britain’ might contribute.

Nick Pearce is Professor of Public Policy and Director of the University of Bath Institute for Policy Research (IPR).

To read the original commentary from the University of Bath Institute for Policy Research (IPR), please visit here

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