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Jackson House — Fri, 05 Jul 2024 13:42:52 +0000

In the digital age, the lines between global commerce and national security are increasingly blurred, presenting a new challenge for governments worldwide: navigating the complex relationship between digital trade and security. This balancing act is not just a technical endeavor—it is a defining challenge of our time, with broad implications for the future of international policy.

With e-commerce reaching staggering heights, the narrative of digital trade is often celebrated for its exponential potential to elevate businesses, large and small, to global platforms, and for driving a services-led economic revolution. The $2.41 trillion digital economy underscores the critical role of data flows in international trade.

However, this very backbone of digital trade — the free flow of data — now carries with it an intrinsic risk, transforming every business into a potential node of vulnerability. The cyber theft of intellectual property and personal data is emerging not just as a commercial hazard but as an acute national security threat. The 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack, which paralyzed over 200,000 computers across 150 countries, and the NotPetya attack, which caused unprecedented disruption to supply chains and major businesses like Maersk, highlight the critical need for countries to strengthen their defenses.

Policy development in the digital trade domain is witnessing unprecedented complexity. The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) marked a significant policy shift, setting new global standards for data protection and influencing digital trade practices worldwide. Similarly, India’s draft e-commerce policy and the United States’ proactive measures through the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) reflect diverse, national strategic approaches to navigating digital trade regulation and cybersecurity.

One of the most contentious issues in the realm of digital trade is data localization, which states that data on a nation’s citizens or residents should be collected, processed, and stored inside the nation’s boundaries. This requirement stipulates that the data should also be accessible to that country’s government, ostensibly for regulatory and security purposes.

Russia’s 2015 data localization mandate epitomizes the practice of data localization. It requires that Russian citizens’ personal data be stored domestically, pushing international firms to migrate their servers to comply or face sanctions. This move, paralleled by China’s Personal Information Protection Law, underscores a tightening grip over digital sovereignty, aiming to shield data from foreign espionage while asserting control over digital realms.

Similarly, India’s evolving policy reflects a balancing act between boosting local data processing and guarding against foreign surveillance and digital colonization, a concern echoed by Vietnam’s 2019 cybersecurity law. These laws have sparked international debate over their implications on global digital trade, raising alarms about heightened operational costs, the emergence of trade barriers, and the potential stifling of the digital economy’s growth.

Data localization policies, while aiming to safeguard data and enhance national security, risk undermining the trust foundational to digital trade. Such policies burden multinational corporations, especially tech companies, which rely on the global flow of data to drive innovation. Additionally, these policies may result in a fragmented approach to data storage and security, making it more challenging to maintain a unified cybersecurity defense.

Against this backdrop of regulatory challenges, the private sector emerges as a pivotal force in shaping the future of digital trade. Tech giants and startups alike prioritize growth and innovation, with companies like Amazon and Google revolutionizing global commerce through their platforms. However, their operations raise questions about data privacy, market dominance, and cybersecurity. The Apple vs. FBI conflict over iPhone encryption illustrates the tension between private-sector innovation and government security concerns, highlighting the complexities of balancing privacy with national security.

Responding to these complexities, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) introduced a digital trade chapter. By limiting member states’ capacity to enforce data localization, the USMCA proposes a model that aims to balance the economic benefits of free data flows with security concerns. However, it includes exceptions for legitimate public policy objectives, providing a flexible framework that can adapt to varying national security needs.

Nevertheless, the dynamic nature of technology and cybersecurity means that the agreement will need continuous updates to remain relevant. Moreover, its impact is inherently limited to North America and might not directly influence countries with different digital trade and security postures, such as China and the EU. The challenge lies not just in crafting regulations that can adapt to the rapid pace of technological change but also in achieving an international consensus that respects the diverse security and economic interests of different nations.

In response to these challenges, Japan has championed the notion of Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT) on the international stage. DFFT aims to establish a set of common rules that enable the free flow of data across borders while ensuring robust privacy and security protections. One of its focus areas is making national data governance systems interoperable, rather than identical, recognizing that trust is a fundamental component of the digital economy.

Beyond DFFT, there are other international efforts aimed at harmonizing digital trade regulations while addressing security concerns. The World Trade Organization (WTO) continues to hold dialogues that seek to address issues related to digital trade. Similarly, the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) between Singapore, Chile, and New Zealand represents an attempt to develop a modern digital trade agreement that covers digital identity, data flows, and personal data protection, among other areas.

As digital trade becomes a pillar of the global economy, nations worldwide have adopted diverse policy approaches to secure their digital spaces while fostering economic growth. The national responses reflect a spectrum of strategies, from stringent data localization to liberalized data flow frameworks, each presenting unique challenges and trade-offs.

To strengthen our digital defenses, countries must come together around a common framework that goes beyond just national policies. This approach needs to be rooted in strong international cooperation, ensuring that data not only moves freely but also securely, adhering to international standards like those set by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). It’s about building a collective commitment to protect our digital infrastructures.

Additionally, the private sector’s critical role cannot be emphasized enough. Businesses must prioritize cybersecurity, integrating it thoroughly within their operations and leadership structures. This includes appointing seasoned executives such as Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) to top roles and cultivating a cybersecurity-aware culture across all levels of the organization. This culture should empower employees to use advanced digital tools securely.

As we navigate the evolving landscape of digital trade, nations and corporations must strive for a balanced approach that respects both the economic potential and the security imperatives of our interconnected world. International cooperation and adherence to global standards are crucial in forging a unified strategy that protects against cyber threats while facilitating free data flows.

The private sector must prioritize cybersecurity, embedding it within their strategic and operational frameworks, and cultivating a culture of security awareness among all employees. Only through such a comprehensive and harmonized approach can we ensure that digital trade continues to be a driver of economic prosperity without compromising national security. This path requires ongoing vigilance, adaptability, and collaboration across borders to effectively meet the challenges posed by technological advancements and the global nature of cyber threats.

To read the full article as it was published by the International Policy Digest, click here.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_The Biden administration’

Thomas Nielsen — Tue, 07 May 2024 21:09:05 +0000

Left for dead, a deal to permanently ban e-commerce duties is suddenly springing back to life as 90 WTO member-countries are defying the Ministerial Conference’s decision in March to kill the moratorium. This subset of members is racing to deliver a deal whose obligations and privileges are available only to signatories. Such an outcome could shake the WTO to its foundations — but it may well save the institution from its drift into irrelevance.

Two months after a near-complete absence of tangible accomplishment at the World Trade Organization’s Ministerial Conference in Abu Dhabi, new life is convulsing the beleaguered global rule-making institution. It may herald deep and long-term shifts in how WTO business is conducted and could, in turn, lead to a renaissance of the organization.

Since MC13 concluded in early March, members’ exasperation with the multilateral body’s paralysis in advancing global trade policy has been mounting.

India, which has consistently been among the handful of members regularly blocking progress on a wide range of negotiations from e-commerce to fisheries subsidies, was the target of harsh criticism at the post-MC13 General Council, the WTO’s highest decision-making body.

In late April, negotiations among 90 members – a subset of the WTO’s full membership of 164, soon to be 166 – have moved swiftly to establish new global rules for digital trade.

The WTO has been woefully behind the times on the development of rules for digital trade. But the 90-member group’s negotiations in April appear close to delivering a deal that the full WTO membership could not – so close that a deal could be struck as soon as July, members say. Its scope may not be all that some had hoped for, but the emerging deal would be a meaningful not least because, among this subset of WTO members, a long-sought prohibition on the application of customs duties on electronic commerce transmissions would be made permanent.

In recent weeks, movement toward this prize has picked up steam as proponents increasingly embrace the reality that the future of the WTO hinges on whether countries can move ahead on issues where there is broad support, even if other members stridently object.

This concept, also called plurilateralism in contrast to the usual decision-by-consensus multilateralism, has been many years in the making but remains controversial. In 2017, large majorities of members at the Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires endorsed a model known as the Joint Statement Initiatives (JSI), in which interested members discuss and negotiate deals in issues like electronic commerce, investment facilitation, services regulation, help for smaller companies to trade, and women’s economic empowerment. Frustration over the obstructionist tactics taken by some members, notably India and South Africa, that had for decades stymied multilateral progress on global trade issues, had reached boiling point among these smaller subsets of members. Proponents of the plurilateral approach were anxious to try something unconventional.

After MC13, this trend accelerated. At Abu Dhabi, India undermined a deal to curb environmentally harmful fisheries subsidies and, together with South Africa, did all they could to derail plurilateral agreements setting new rules for how services are regulated and how developing countries can better attract foreign direct investment.

The two countries have for years thrown sand in the gears of JSI negotiations. In Abu Dhabi, they succeeded in bringing the curtain down on a 1998 WTO agreement that stopped members from putting customs duties on e-commerce. New Delhi and Pretoria say they have a right to collect state revenue from such transmissions. The Ministerial Conference text flatly states that by 31 March 2026 at the latest, the Bodog Poker moratorium will expire – meaning WTO members will be free to slap duties on e-commerce.

Demand for a permanent moratorium is not universal among the JSI e-commerce participants. But such is the eagerness for a deal that a large and growing majority of proponents are ready to go ahead regardless.

What is most remarkable is that most of these 90 WTO members now favor keeping the benefits from such an agreement exclusively for those who sign on to it.

Such a premise would up-end one of the fundamental tenets of the WTO. A deal along these lines would mean discarding the multilateral institution’s traditional ‘most favored nation’ (MFN) terms, wherein all members are accorded equal treatment – so that favorable terms extended to any single partner automatically apply to all other WTO members.

What the e-commerce deal’s plurilateral proponents now want is for those who stand outside the agreement to lose both the obligations and the privileges of an e-commerce deal. Non-signatories would not be subject to its rules but nor would they share in its benefits.

This shift in stance is significant as, previously, legal arguments underpinning support for the JSIs have rested on the fact that benefits from these deals would flow to all WTO members, not just signatories. But such assurances failed to stem attacks from the likes of New Delhi and Pretoria against the process. Consequently, attitudes have hardened among those who want to press on with closing the deal.

Abandoning MFN will doubtless spark an outcry among opponents of plurilateral negotiations. Yet such are the levels of exasperation with obstructionist tactics at the WTO that enough JSI members are now prepared to ditch Marquess of Queensberry negotiating rules – a code of boxing rules that mandates gentlemanly conduct – and take on a more uncompromising posture. This hardline is favored by many, even though some members participating in the plurilateral – especially Indonesia but also possibly Brazil and Turkey – do not support making the moratorium permanent.

Those JSI participants who seem reluctant to adopt a permanent moratorium do so for different reasons. Brazil wants support in the World Intellectual Property Organization to expand coverage of intellectual property to encompass ‘traditional knowledge’, which would require patent-holders of medicines, for example, to disclose the source of the ingredients and the know-how that went into producing the product. Turkey worries that its internal taxation system may be impacted by a permanent moratorium, even though language in the current text specifically states that moratorium would not “preclude a Party from imposing internal taxes.” Proponents have not given up on these two countries joining the moratorium. Indonesia, by contrast, which wants the customs revenue and policy space to develop its own tech industry, is considered a lost cause. Nonetheless, the deal’s supporters plan to go forward.

“Members don’t want MFN especially with regard to customs duties. The members are just going to do it. If Indonesia can’t accept a permanent moratorium, too bad. Maybe we don’t have all 90 members on board, but if we have 85, that is still a lot,” said one delegate participating in the process.

The European Union has been a strong proponent of a permanent moratorium. US Trade Representative Katherine Tai has given mixed signals on supporting the moratorium, but the United States now seems to be on board. What is new is that China has come out strongly in favor of a permanent ban on duties, something Beijing had not accepted in any of its previous bilateral or regional trade agreements.

Other important elements to the pending accord have already been agreed. Members have agreed to establish global guidelines for electronic payments, for the validity of digital contracts and invoices, and the authentication of signatures. The deal as outlined would strongly promote the use of paperless trading. A committee will be established to oversee the agreement. A review will be conducted after two years and “periodically thereafter”, with an eye to enhancing the accord and ensuring it remains relevant in a fast-evolving global trade landscape.

The agreement would require countries to ban the dissemination of information pertaining to “misleading, fraudulent, and deceptive commercial activities.” The text calls on members to adopt measures curbing the use of spam. A deal would enable governments to provide special digital trade treatment for indigenous persons living under their jurisdiction.

Finding the right balance in the text on privacy has been difficult but proponents believe a deal could be struck which states that each party will work toward the provision of personal data protections while recognizing different regulatory approaches.

An unfortunate development is that language protecting proprietary information, like algorithms in the field of cryptography, will be dropped due to Chinese objections. Nonetheless, the in-depth discussions held on this topic has shed some light on how to bridge differences and may pave the way for further discussions on broader provisions barring the forced transfer of source code, an issue that had hitherto brought members to a stalemate on the broader deal.

Ambitious supporters of global rules in e-commerce may frown on the fact that the agreement sets aside negotiations on broader rules pertaining to the cross-border flow of data, the forced harboring of data on domestic servers, and the forced transfer of source code. But the plurilateral nature of these negotiations – part of a burgeoning trend toward “flexible multilateralism” – increases the likelihood that, down the road, this “organic” text can be updated to include new measures.

Interestingly, proponents say the unfortunate outcome in Abu Dhabi has actually helped the JSI. The multilateral moratorium is not the only element which will terminate in 2026 – so too will the zombie-like multilateral e-commerce work program. This endeavor – which, like the moratorium, arose from the 1998 Ministerial Conference – has been the victim of years of Indian and South African sabotage and had yielded precious little.

Plurilateral agreements are not new to the WTO or to its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. There are many ways in which they can be negotiated. Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, which experts strongly suggest could also apply to an e-commerce agreement, states that no member can be prevented from “being a party to or entering into an agreement liberalizing trade in services between or among the parties to such an agreement.” It also states the coverage of the agreement must be broad and that its terms do not discriminate against those which are not party to the pact. It is for this reason that so many favor a different tack for the e-commerce plurilateral.

In 1997, WTO members agreed on services-related protocols in financial services and telecommunications in which the benefits were extended to all WTO members.

Other types of agreements are closed and only apply to the signatories. Such pacts are allowable under so-called Annex 4 rules. Originally, there were only four such accords, but two have expired. The remaining two are the Government Procurement Agreement which has 49 members and came into force in 1981 and the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft which has 33 members and entered into force in 1980.

These two were completed before the WTO came into being, though they are very active and continue to attract other members. Because of the closed nature of these agreements, were they to be pursued under the current WTO arrangements, a consensus of WTO members would be required for them to come into force. This is how India, South Africa, and Turkey were able to block the 127 WTO members who tried in Abu Dhabi to bring the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement into the WTO rule book.

But the Domestic Regulation in Services agreement struck in 2021 by 67 WTO Members will enter into force because its legal status is different. All parties to the pact made specific pledges in their “schedule of commitments”, through which they outlined their legally binding assurances to the others seeking to operate in services markets. Once these schedules were certified, they became binding and the agreement entered into force this way.

The ironclad guarantees under the GATS agreement which enable members to improve their schedules shielded them from efforts to derail the deal. Stopping this accord would require challenging each schedule and proving that Indian and South African interests had been adversely affected. Given the facilitating nature of the services, this left the obstructionists on shaky legal ground. Nonetheless, it’s still an “open” agreement vulnerable to obstructionism. South Africa and India have held up the “certification” of the schedules of 17 members, effectively forcing these 17 out of an agreement they would like to join.

Despite the inevitable legal arguments against a “closed” e-commerce agreement, proponents believe a pact agreed by more than 80 members – including the EU, China, and the United States – and which covers the vast majority of the world’s digital trade will be a formidable achievement. It also opens a route for these WTO signatories to up-end standing WTO rules at obstructionists’ expense. With the e-commerce work program soon to join the multilateral customs moratorium on the WTO’s scrap heap, the plurilateral talks are the only game in town. Even if the legal status of the plurilateral agreement is not recognized by all, it will be seen by most as the global standard. Parties to the investment facilitation agreement feel the same way.

“The investment facilitation agreement is now the standard. Annex 4 or not, it’s an agreement of three-quarters of the members and this will be the standard,” said a negotiator from one major WTO member.

For the better part of the last two decades, the negotiating landscape at the WTO has been arid terrain. A consensus-based system of decision-making once widely praised for ensuring all WTO members have a voice has shown its crippling disadvantages – any disgruntled member can stop work on dead in its tracks.

Now, a significant shift is in train and this may be just the beginning. Members are starting to discuss other new ways of operating in the WTO, from broadening the way flexible multilateralism works to developing the concept of “responsible consensus” to blunt the poisonous misuse of the consensus principle.

Singapore has been at the forefront of this movement. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in San Francisco in November 2023, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong urged other leaders to support “flexible multilateralism” through plurilaterals and “responsible consensus… where we adopt a win-win approach to avoid undermining collective systemic interests.”

The extent to which WTO members champion this initiative will be clear later this month when the Singapore delegation puts forward at the General Council a draft decision calling on members to pursue consensus in a manner which enables governments to protect their national interests without undermining the WTO and the multilateral trading system.

The Singaporean proposal suggests that negotiations should be conducted in a flexible manner which encourages compromise and should be based on facts and evidence.

Already there are indications of support for this proposal coming from major players including the United States, China, and the EU.

Reforming the WTO’s creaky architecture will be a tall order. But if members tread the same ramshackle negotiating path they have followed for decades, it will be impossible.

Maybe, just maybe, the coming months will show a new determination to break with the past and seriously address the organization’s shortcomings. The alternative is a continued drift to irrelevance.

Keith M. Rockwell is a Senior Research Fellow at the Hinrich Foundation. Prior to his retirement in June 2022, Keith served as a Director at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and spokesperson for the organization for more than 25 years. He also is Global Fellow at the Wilson Center.

To read the full article published by the Hinrich Foundation, click here.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_The Biden administration’

Riley Chambers — Tue, 05 Mar 2024 17:21:42 +0000

Success at last week’s Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization was always going to be a long shot. The unfortunate alignment of the political stars virtually assured the meeting in Abu Dhabi would end badly.

Looming elections in India, the United States, and Mexico, plus a newly installed administration in Indonesia, severely restricted the room for maneuver and crushed any inclination to compromise.

Where the negotiating efforts fell short of agreement – in agriculture, fisheries subsidies, and reform of the organization’s crippled dispute settlement system – the outcome was almost preordained. India was not going to risk blowback from its farmers or fishers and the US was not going to yield on a newly minted Appellate Body.

In her concluding press conference, WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala referenced the many strong headwinds confronting MC13 including the wars in Ukraine and Bodog Poker the Middle East, slumping demand in many economies, and pending elections in more than 60 countries in 2024. She tried to put a brave face on the results from the five-day meeting by suggesting what trade ministers achieved was “pretty amazing” and that the glass was “three-quarters full.”

To be sure, there were some positive results, including the accessions of Comoros and Timor Leste and the entry into force of the 2021 agreement on Domestic Regulation in Services.

But on the major issues, WTO members came up empty.

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Agriculture talks ran asunder on India’s demand to make permanent a “peace clause” agreed in 2013 which shields New Delhi from any legal ramifications for breaching its limits on allowable farm subsidies used in its public stockholding program. The building of food stocks is permissible under WTO rules, but India purchases rice from farmers at inflated levels through its Market Price Support system which leads to greater production. Many of India’s trading partners believe the rice reserves, meant to build up domestic stocks, are later exported.

During one small group meeting, Thailand’s ambassador to the WTO, Pimchanok Vonkorpon Pitfield, alleged that 40% of rice held in the subsidized Indian public stocks was being exported. Infuriated Indian officials, including trade minister Piyush Goyal, told Okonjo-Iweala and the conference chair that India would not attend further meetings if Pitfield was present.

No deal on fisheries

Negotiations to expand on the 2022 agreement curtailing fisheries subsidies likewise ran aground. The agreement struck at MC12 banned subsidies for illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. This was an important achievement but the subsidies most responsible for depleting fish stocks globally are those that lead to overfishing and overcapacity. The goal at MC13 was to ban subsidies for fishery-related shipbuilding, labor, and fuel, among other things. Once again, India was front-and-center arguing that its fishers should be able to receive unlimited subsidies if fishing in sovereign waters. Developed countries, India proposed, would meanwhile ban all deepwater subsidies while developing countries could continue such support for 25 years.

Pacific island nations argued that subsidies for deepwater fishing must be banned, something the Chinese could not accept. About one-third of the world’s fishing vessels are Chinese-owned and many of them fish waters throughout Asia but also off the coast of Africa and Latin America. China also objected to US demands that any vessels that use forced labor must register themselves as such.

No deal on dispute settlement

Earlier efforts to reform the dispute settlement system had borne fruit in the form of a document produced by former Guatemalan delegate Marco Molina. Molina’s text, widely praised by delegates, proposed increased emphasis on arbitration and mediation and stricter limits on the length of submissions.

Molina avoided in his text the fractious issue of the WTO’s Appellate Body, which remains scuttled by a US embargo on bench appointments. But none of this mattered when Molina was mysteriously fired by his own government shortly before MC13 began.

Without Molina, it seems a tall order to bridge the vast differences separating members on appellate reform.

Pyrrhic victory on e-commerce

Even the surprising decision to extend a moratorium on the application of import duties on e-commerce transmissions rang hollow. India, South Africa, and Indonesia sought an end to the moratorium, which was first agreed at that 1998 Ministerial Conference in Geneva. These countries maintain that the application of such duties will boost their revenues, though many studies indicate otherwise. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development said in a report that such a tax would generate only 0.1% of India’s total government revenue while raising costs and hampering competitiveness of poorer economies and smaller companies.

The hardline taken by India, South Africa, and Indonesia led many to suspect that compromise was not on the cards. But India has a close relationship with the MC13 host United Arab Emirates.

So when the Emirati trade minister Thani bin Ahmed Al Zeyoudi asked Goyal to extend the moratorium as a personal favor, Goyal agreed. The South Africans and Indonesians then went along with the growing consensus.

The pledge to keep digital trade duty-free will come to an end at the next ministerial meeting or 31 March 2026, whichever comes first. Individual WTO members may choose to roll the moratorium over or make it permanent, but as an organization the duty-free commitment will be dropped. For the first time, the WTO will open the door for tariff hikes and create the conditions for the unprecedented application of duties on trade in services. Call it MC13’s Pyrrhic victory.

Plurilaterals make small gains

Hopes ran high before MC13 that ministers would greenlight two plurilateral agreements so that they could be incorporated into the WTO’s legal architecture. Plurilateral agreements are a way for smaller groups of WTO members to build consensus as it gets increasingly harder for the full membership to move as one.

eliHowever, India and South Africa have long opposed plurilateral negotiations.

These two members have couched their protests on plurilateral negotiations in arcane legal arguments, but the reality is far simpler – New Delhi and Pretoria abhor these negotiations because they cannot block them.

This hostility was made plain in Abu Dhabi when the two members blocked proponents’ efforts to incorporate plurilaterally agreed text on Investment Facilitation for Development into the WTO rulebook.

The plurilateral agreement on Domestic Regulation in Services met a better fate. The legal structure of this agreement, which includes 71 participating members and covers 92% of world trade in services, is based on individual members’ commitments to the others and is thus much more difficult to undermine. Aware of the shaky legal foundation of their objections, India and South Africa partially lifted their blockade on the agreement, allowing it to come into force.

So, six key takeaways in the aftermath of MC13:

The WTO is not going anywhere. Prognosticators enjoy using phrases like death knell when examining the WTO’s shortcomings but the collapse of the organization and the system it oversees is not going to happen. A foundation based on 75 years of rulemaking is too ingrained in the trading practices of nations and businesses. If every country applied different and variable tariffs on its trading partners, chaos would swiftly ensue. The question about the WTO is not whether it will continue to exist, but how relevant it will be.
MC13 underscored that if members want to accomplish anything, plurilateral negotiations are the only viable option. Some important lessons were learned in Abu Dhabi about how results from these negotiations might be implemented. This will have meaningful ramifications particularly with respect to the 90-member negotiations on electronic commerce. The plurilateral process is increasingly the WTO’s only e-commerce game in town.
When the new dispute settlement is reformed, it will have a very different look. Many smaller, poorer members seek ways to access the complex and costly process of dispute resolution. One way to do that would be through incentives to use mediation and arbitration. It’s unclear how a new Appellate Body would look but it’s inconceivable that there will be a return to a powerful WTO “court.” A pared-down and less heavy-handed mechanism is inevitable.
Economies still want to join the WTO. With the accessions of Comoros and Timor-Leste, the WTO will have 166 members. There are 22 candidate countries still in the accession queue. None of the current members have ever expressed a desire to leave. Whatever criticisms there may be on the WTO, governments still believe there is value in membership.
Several major systemic issues were not really addressed at MC13, including the use of national security exemptions. The dispute settlement cases on the national security exception have strained the system to its breaking point. Given the tense state of the world today, such cases are unlikely to disappear. There are also unresolved questions over China’s formal status in the WTO as a developing economy that is also the world’s largest trading nation.
Okonjo-Iweala’s future is uncertain. Her term expires at the end of August 2025. The process of reappointing her or choosing her successor will start in December. The US may not back her for a second term, especially if Donald Trump wins. In Abu Dhabi, Okonjo-Iweala worked around the clock and to the very end to broker deals. But her tactics angered two powerful members, India and Brazil, and some delegates in Geneva say they are weary of her work style.

To read the full article published by the Hinrich Foundation, click here.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_The Biden administration’

Courtney Brown — Wed, 26 Jan 2022 19:27:52 +0000

In a largely unheralded breakthrough, the World Trade Organization managed to wrap up an important negotiation late last year that will boost services trade for years to come. Though the agreement on services domestic regulations has garnered few headlines, it deserves attention.

Not only is the deal a reminder that persistence and political will can actually yield results at the WTO, but it is also commercially meaningful. The agreement has 67 signatory countries – including the United States – that account for 90% of world services trade. At a time too many governments are resorting to protectionist policies on trade, it’s all the more notable that so many WTO members signed onto the deal.

The agreement commits countries to create more transparent and predictable rules for services suppliers. It won’t affect the substance of regulation. But it will increase transparency in rule-making, reinforcing the rule of law and contributing to a more level playing field for business.

This will especially help smaller firms with limited staff. It means a company that used to have to spend a lot of time navigating paperwork will be able to devote more of its resources to business development and expansion.

The deal will also help keep a lid on the prices that consumers end up paying for services. Until now the costs associated with services trade have been twice as high as goods, mostly because of opaque regulations and cumbersome procedures. But a 2021 OECD/WTO study estimated the new agreement will save up to $150 billion by cutting red tape and increasing transparency, especially in the financial, business, communications and transport sectors.

This success story did not happen overnight. It is the product of over 16 years of negotiations, beginning with the WTO’s Doha Round of negotiations. Australia, Costa Rica, EU, the U.S., and other participating delegations are to be commended for their persistence, creativity, and political will in finalizing the agreement. The decision of a number of ASEAN members to support the Agreement – including Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines – was also an important element in achieving a truly global outcome. WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, her deputies and many WTO delegations are to be commended for helping guide negotiations to a positive finish.

But there’s another crucial factor: the Biden administration opted to formally support the negotiations, which provided a major boost to get the agreement over the goal line. That decision highlights just how much of a difference constructive U.S. participation and leadership can make in achieving positive outcomes in the WTO.

The conclusion of the domestic regulations deal stands alongside other recent WTO efforts that underscore that organization’s critical role among multilateral institutions. These include setting an ambitious timeline for the conclusion of WTO e-commerce negotiations, stepping up discussions on trade-related climate change and environmental measures, and leveraging trade frameworks to offer better global access to pandemic-related goods and services. All these initiatives demonstrate the collective will of the Director-General Okonjo-Iweala and many WTO members to push forward despite the challenges presented by the global pandemic.

Along with the successful conclusion of negotiations on services trade, they are powerful reminders that the WTO matters. With global economies still struggling in the face of the pandemic, the WTO stands to play a vital role in stabilizing trade. Continued strong U.S. engagement in the WTO will be critical to maintaining that momentum.

Christine Bliss, president of the Coalition of Services Industries, previously served as Assistant U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) for Services and Investment in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.

To learn more about Coalition of Services Industries, please click here.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_The Biden administration’

Jude Althagafi — Mon, 25 Oct 2021 16:02:47 +0000

Some parts of the Biden administration have been pushing, so far without success, a potential agreement Bodog Poker on digital trade with key allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, demonstrating a renewed commitment to engage with the region. Although the potential agreement would include a range of countries from throughout the broader region, the pact would be particularly impactful in Southeast Asia, where innovation in the digital space has blossomed in recent years. A digital trade agreement with Southeast Asian countries would assuage lingering concerns regarding Washington’s commitment to the region and contribute a much-needed economic pillar to the Biden administration’s approach to the Indo-Pacific. These efforts would signal Washington’s willingness to exercise leadership and cooperation in a field that is of clear strategic interest and commercial value for all parties involved.

Indeed, digital trade represents the next frontier in economic development in the Indo-Pacific and is a potential engine for significant growth for Southeast Asian countries. In their e-Conomy SEA 2020 report, Google, Temasek, and Bain & Company found that, within the region’s major economies, 70 percent of the population is online and that the rate of new users has increased at a blistering pace over the course of the Covid-19 pandemic. The significance of this growth in connectivity and the resultant adoption of digital services is reflected in its economic impact. The report found that Southeast Asia’s internet economy expanded 5 percent between 2019 and 2020, reaching approximately $105 billion. This represents a key area of opportunity amid slowdowns in education, travel, tourism, and other sectors impacted by the pandemic. Furthermore, the Covid-19 pandemic has only increased demand for digital banking services, as governments have sought alternatives to cash to deliver financial assistance. Consequently, a digital trade pact with the United States could unleash the potential of what is already a fast-growing sector. It could bring manifold benefits to Southeast Asian countries that seek to diversify their economies and climb up the value chain.

Digital trade represents an area of particular opportunity as some Southeast Asian countries are themselves pioneers in setting global norms and standards in this space. In Southeast Asia, countries are taking one of two paths: toward a more open, accessible, and standardized coordination with other countries, or toward a more localized, protectionist system. By way of example, Singapore has aggressively pursued cooperation on digital issues, as demonstrated by its Digital Economy Partnership Agreement with Chile and New Zealand, the Singapore-Australia Digital Economy Agreement, and ongoing discussions with partners like the United Kingdom, South Korea, and Vietnam on similar initiatives.

Conversely, some countries have pursued increased localization through restrictive data flow policies that require data be stored domestically. In recent years, countries like Indonesia and Vietnam have either attempted to or successfully introduced data localization initiatives that force tech companies to host data on local servers. While these countries have pursued such measures in the name of public security and privacy, there is scant evidence that keeping data within national borders leads to enhanced security. Storing all data pertaining to a specific country or region in a single location actually introduces a point of failure vulnerable to targeted attacks.

A digital trade pact could allow the Biden administration to shape regional norms on data governance and introduce incentives to shift countries away from their security-driven approach to data sovereignty. Moreover, an Indo-Pacific digital trade agreement that prioritizes openness and the free flow of data would be of significant value in providing an alternative to internet governance models promoted by countries like China, which employ extensive restrictions on cross-border data. Beijing has taken steps towards boosting its vision for “cyber sovereignty” on the global stage both actively through diplomatic efforts and passively through the apparent efficacy of its system in maintaining control over the domestic internet. Arguments in favor of such a cyber sovereignty model are already finding sympathetic audiences in Southeast Asia, where many governments consider internal political stability to be of concern and consequently covet the degree of leverage and power a closed system would grant.

The Biden administration needs to articulate and promote its vision for internet governance in the Indo-Pacific. Across the board, free trade agreements signed by the United States that include provisions related to digital trade have significant positive impact on cross-border trade in services, particularly in the financial services and telecommunications sectors. A digital trade pact could provide enough economic incentive for Southeast Asian governments to sign on to high standards that prioritize openness and the free flow of data. In pursuing these aims, the Biden administration need not reinvent the wheel. Existing arrangements like the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement and the digital trade sections of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement prohibit parties from adopting measures that restrict the cross-border flow of data. They could provide a model for future arrangements with Indo-Pacific countries.

The Biden administration’s success in engaging with Southeast Asian nations to form a digital trade pact will be contingent on strong diplomacy. Unsurprisingly, Beijing responded to reports about a potential Indo-Pacific digital trade pact by claiming that such moves are intended to “gang up against China and contain its development and obstruct the common development of countries in the region.” Washington needs to be conscious of this narrative framing and assuage concerns that countries may have about how a digital trade agreement with the United States might impact their relationship with China. Southeast Asian countries maintain extensive economic ties with China and will want to avoid the creation of a “walled garden” that could impact interoperability and shut out much-needed Chinese capital. Washington will need to emphasize that it has a positive agenda and that a digital trade agreement would bring immense mutual benefits to the region.

Southeast Asian governments have increasingly recognized the growing centrality of digital trade in their economies. Initial U.S. efforts to form a digital trade pact would likely target only a few more advanced economies in Southeast Asia, such as Singapore’s. But the establishment of robust and mutually beneficial partnerships with select countries on digital issues would create momentum and incentivize other ASEAN member states to sign on to the digital norms that would allow future accession to such a pact.

A digital trade agreement presents a unique opportunity for Washington to engage with Indo-Pacific countries on an issue of core interest, supercharge economic engagement, raise standards, increase the technical capacities of key allies and partners, and enhance the competitiveness of U.S. companies that wish to do business in the region. In the absence of a broader U.S. engagement with regional trade agreements, a digital trade pact would signal renewed U.S. commitment to avenues of partnership outside of traditional political or military cooperation. This message would be well received in a region where economics is security.

Andreyka Natalegawa is a research associate for the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

Camille Bismonte is an associate in the East Asia & Pacific practice at Albright Stonebridge Group and is a former research intern with the Southeast Asia Program at CSIS.

To read the full commentary from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, please click here.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_The Biden administration’

Jude Althagafi — Tue, 05 Oct 2021 15:26:24 +0000

Gridlock at the WTO concerning regulation of global digital trade has caused members to look outside. Despite the forum’s imperfections, the organization remains the closest the world trading system can come to guaranteeing a level-playing field. It is imperative that existing rulebooks be updated to make the WTO work for the ambitions of developed and developing countries alike.

In July, 2021, the envoys of Australia, Japan, and Singapore to the World Trade Organization (WTO) made a significant announcement: The plurilateral Joint Statement Initiative on E-commerce was making excellent progress among the talks’ eighty-six members. [i] In September, the members noted further momentum, citing consensus on high-standard texts reflecting the perspectives of both developed and developing nations.[ii] These announcements continued the winding saga of one of the world’s sharply contested debates for global governance: the regulation of digital trade by the WTO.

At the WTO, digital trade has emerged as a key umbrella concept, capturing a variety of trade in goods and services in which the internet plays a central role [iii] – a far cry from the Uruguay Round’s description of the internet as an “obscure novelty.” [iv]

Indeed, the WTO was born to cater to an analogue world. Only in 1996, following the First Ministerial Conference in Singapore, did members recognize the gap and begin to draw up rules that could regulate trade in a rapidly digitizing era. [v]

Since then, the process has been keenly contested. Gridlock at the WTO has caused members to look outside and negotiate free trade agreements with countries that share economic and strategic interests. Can the WTO remain relevant and resilient as it adapts to the regulatory challenges of the digital age?

Negotiating digital trade at the WTO

At that inaugural meeting of Ministers in 1996, members came to an important agreement: They would put forth a temporary moratorium on the imposition of customs duties on the electronic transmissions of digital goods and services. Even then, digital trade was growing, and members feared the impacts of tariffs. [vi] After the moratorium was affirmed, a Work Programme on e-commerce was established, cutting across four WTO Councils: goods, services, intellectual property, and development.

A near silence ensued that initial burst of activity. Apart from the periodic renewal of the e-commerce moratorium, we saw negligible progress from 2001 to 2007. E-commerce issues were largely excluded from the negotiating agenda of the Doha round.

The stalemate was caused in part by the concerns of developing states, who were not willing to trade away their ability to promote their indigenous technology ecosystems. Then, at the Ministerial meetings in December 2017, seventy one WTO members gave digital trade negotiations a shot in the arm with a Joint Statement. The statement, heretofore referred to as the JSI, agreed to “initiate exploratory work towards future WTO negotiations on trade-related aspects of e-commerce.” [vii]

Momentum increased again in 2019, when seventy six WTO members agreed to work towards an outcome built by as many members as possible. [viii] China was a surprise entrant as it sought an active role rather than remain on the side lines. [ix]

Other newcomers – Indonesia, the Philippines, Cote d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso – were also surprising. [x] Indonesia had disagreed with the original JSI members on several issues, [xi] only to announce that the initiative could serve as a bridge between developed and developing countries. Its participation would be crucial, given that its government included issues related to e-commerce when negotiating bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements. [xii]

Meanwhile, Cote d’ Ivoire urged for a set of common principles specific to developing countries, according to their respective capacity for implementation.

While the JSI has reached a critical mass of participants, accounting for more than 90% of world trade now, several developing countries, including India and South Africa remain steadfast in opposition. [xiii]

Points of tension

In December 2020, JSI members produced a consolidated negotiating text. [xiv] India and South Africa, however, pursued a parallel track. They breathed new life into the Work Program on e-commerce and their efforts resulted in a structured discussion in July 2021 on several cross-cutting issues. [xv]

With two parallel processes gathering steam but few signs of synergy, the coming months building up to the Ministerial meetings in December 2021 are critical.

The path to overarching consensus is paved with challenges. Members are firm on several core fissures. The first regards the legal validity of the JSI process itself. India and South Africa allege that the JSI process erodes the integrity of the multilateral framework and subverts bodog casino the organization’s consensus-based rules and principles. [xvi] Thus JSI members, they argue, must seek consensus among the WTO’s entire membership in order for the process to be valid. Furthermore, JSI members must garner consensus from the required proportion of members or, alternatively, negotiate a plurilateral trade agreement outside the WTO.

India and South Africa’s position is legally correct. Article X was incorporated into the Marrakesh Agreement to prevent secret and exclusive negotiations by a limited group of countries. [xvii] However, their staunch opposition did little to stymie the efforts of the JSI, which continue with gusto. JSI members maintain that the process has been inclusive. [xviii]

Within the negotiating text, three core points stand out.

The first relates to obligations relating to the free flow of data across borders – a fiercely contested issue. Several countries within the JSI, such as China, as well as those outside, such as India, have data localization mandates that compel the storage or processing of data within territorial borders. [xix]

Other countries – mostly developed nations – argue that arbitrary restrictions on cross-border data flows adversely impact the ability of companies to do business and impede digital trade. Any WTO mandate constraining the legitimate policy space available to nations on data flows strikes at the heart of data governance strategies worldwide. All members view this topic as a negotiating priority.

The second issue relates to the mandatory disclosure of source code – the fundamental component of a computer program [xx] which countries often require foreign firms to disclose, including their algorithms and encryption keys. [xxi] Many developed countries want to incorporate provisions guarding against this mandatory transfer, as it could negatively impact business interests and hamper innovation. Many developing countries argue that such restrictions hinder knowledge and technology transfers. Further, restrictions limiting national policy space on source code disclosure could harm a country’s capacity to mitigate cybersecurity threats and audit the impact of algorithmic decision-making on individuals and communities.

The third core issue is the 1996 moratorium on custom duties for electronic transmissions, and whether it should continue – or become permanent. [xxii] Citing revenue losses and increased dependence on developed world products, developing countries, again led by India and South Africa, want its impact to be reviewed. [xxiii]

Fundamentally, the debate strikes at the core of the WTO: How to strike a balance between the sovereign right of states to define domestic policy with concessions that are required to reap the benefits of the global trading system.

Many developing countries do not want to risk signing up for obligations that might constrain their hands. Given the nascency of the digital economy in the developing world, imposing standards on cybersecurity, consumer protection, or privacy through the WTO reduces the policy space available to determine governance frameworks that they feel work best at home. National, legal, and regulatory frameworks, they argue, should be in place before negotiating global outcomes. [xxiv]

In response, JSI members argue that national restrictions and arbitrary protectionism hamper the meaningful benefits of digital trade for commerce and consumers.

Competing narratives, strategic politics

No one group has relied on legal or economic arguments alone. Each has tried to win the battle of political narratives as well. For the developing world, the rallying cry has been ‘data sovereignty’: the right of nations to govern the data generated by citizens within their physical boundaries. [xxv] This narrative has been propped up by the idea of ‘data colonialism’, which refers to the practices of technology companies to extract data to consolidate global market power – at the cost of consumer welfare. [xxvi] This narrative has been burnished by government officials, civil society groups, and the private sector alike.

These concerns are not limited to the moral and ethical. Political and strategic concerns are at play too. Local technology companies and data centre enterprises stand to gain from the costs of compliance that foreign technology companies must incur. [xxvii] Predictably, they have shaped this narrative and influenced the stances taken by their governments at the WTO.

The developed world also has tried to mould the narrative. In 2019, the Osaka Track announced at the G20 meetings its own call to action for “data free flow with trust’, arguing that digital trade flows are necessary for harnessing innovation. [xxviii]

Lobbying for domestic regulatory changes in several developing countries – India, Indonesia, and Vietnam – has been rife. Technology companies have also sought to influence how negotiators from the European Union and the United States engage at the WTO. [xxix] The European Services Forum (ESF), a lobbying group comprised of Apple, Google, Huawei, Orange, and Vodafone, is pushing for a transatlantic axis to safeguard cross-border data flows and legal obligations on digital trade. [xxx]

Breaking the gridlock

This gridlock need not end in stalemate. Countries on the opposing ends of the spectrum are not all locked in adversarial geopolitical relationships. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue has JSI members Australia and Japan partnering with staunch JSI opponent India.[xxxi] All the countries share positive bilateral relationships across sectors.

Arguably, there is no insurmountable ‘trade war’ at the WTO. Opportunities for engagement and dialogue exist. It is imperative for all members to work out a mutually acceptable way of getting everyone in the same room.

India and South Africa have valid critiques of the JSI. However, one must ponder whether the alternatives will further their strategic interests. If e-commerce rules do not fructify within the WTO, negotiations will shift to the spaghetti bowl of trade agreements outside the WTO.

Several agreements, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the Digital Economic Partnership Agreement (DEPA) already incorporate obligations on e-commerce. That leaves the WTO with the developing world and smaller nations.[xxxii]

The WTO’s consensus-based framework allows all countries to not only have a veto but also to work in coalitions that punch above their individual weights. Free trade agreement negotiations are not always so equitable, as institutional mechanisms are not as clearly defined. Sitting on the margins is also not an option. As a critical mass of countries begin signing on to trade agreements, countries not in the mix become unwitting standard takers should they want to participate in regional or global trade networks.

The WTO’s negotiating function can be revitalized without drifting off into the territory occupied by the JSI. Genuine progress can be made through streamlining and rejuvenating the Work Programme on e-Commerce, providing space for ample debate on issues that JSI members consider most relevant, such as data flows or source code disclosure.

The developing countries can negotiate exceptions to obligations crafted in the negotiating text. For example, the e-commerce chapter of RCEP incorporates the exceptions of ‘legitimate public policy objectives’ and ‘essential security interests’ to justify domestic mandates restricting cross-border data flows. Exceptions serve as an important balancing tool for preserving decision-making space without impeding the passage of the rule itself.

The outcome need not be an ‘all or nothing’ arrangement which compels consensus on all issues of digital trade.[xxxiii] Instead, the modular approach adopted in the DEPA – the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement between Singapore, Chile, and New Zealand – can be adopted, whereby countries can pick and choose ‘modules’ with which they want to comply. Through different combinations of modules, a global legal architecture can amass incrementally while developing countries think through and implement domestic regulations that work for the interests of their citizens.

The principles and governance architecture of the WTO plays a talismanic role in global governance. Undoubtedly, the forum has its imperfections and has often been captured by the hegemonic tendencies of the powerful. Yet it remains the closest the world trading system can come to guaranteeing a level-playing field. As nation states wade the unchartered waters of the digital world, it is imperative that these institutional mechanisms be refined and updated. Astute consensus building in lieu of obstinate abstention is the need of the hour.

Arindrajit Basu is Research Lead at the Centre for Internet & Society, India, where he focuses on the geopolitics and constitutionality of emerging technologies.

To read the full commentary from the Hinrich Foundation, please click here.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_The Biden administration’

Ryan Murphy — Fri, 30 Jul 2021 18:23:17 +0000

Customs authorities in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) can leverage new technologies and innovations to boost their digital transformation and streamline foreign trade logistics. This, in turn, can help improve competitiveness and bolster the countries´ economic growth.

The pandemic highlighted the importance of trade and foreign trade logistics. In March 2020, COVID-19 transformed daily life as we knew it. Yet, trade has primarily withstood the disruptions caused by international transportation restrictions and social distancing policies. It has even grown substantially in some areas, such as e-commerce and online trade, for instance. According to an Amazon report, its international net sales increased by 28.3 percent between the first half of 2019 and the same period in 2020.

By shining the spotlight on the opportunities brought by digital transformation, the pandemic has put customs authorities and their response capacities to the test. The urgent need to clear the critical goods needed to respond to the health emergency while keeping regular trade flows moving forced authorities to transition to digital customs systems almost overnight.

Even before the pandemic hit, LAC was lagging North America, Europe, and Asia in implementing the commitments it had taken on under the World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement, according to 2019 data. Therefore, the region needs to create efficiencies in its international trade logistics.

LAC’s economic recovery depends mainly on how its foreign trade logistics perform, which rests on the appropriate physical and digital infrastructure and related transportation services.

Innovating and transforming customs administration through technology

In response to these challenges, the new IDB publication Logistics in Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities, Challenges, and Lines of Action discusses some of the technologies that the region’s countries could implement to innovate and transform their customs administration.

The optimization, automation, and digitization of customs and border processes are among the areas that new technologies address. These factors are the cornerstones of modernization and lay the groundwork for generating the high-quality data needed to implement robust and effective risk management systems.

For example, the ability of customs to obtain, process, and analyze large amounts of quality data is key to strengthen regional value chains and make them agile and secure. Automation also requires other innovative components, such as electronic signatures and authentication mechanisms for internal and external users.

Another ingredient in the recipe for effective and efficient customs is the traceability of goods. New technologies like radio frequency identification systems (RFID), the Internet of Things (IoT), geolocation tools, electronic seals for container and trailer doors, and OCR license plate readers make it possible to track cargo, vehicles, and the people driving them.

These systems can be deployed at critical points such as production centers, bonded warehouses, and road corridors that connect land border crossings, seaports, and airports. One example is the system developed in Brazil to track and trace cargo vehicles, packaging, and products by integrating this data with electronic tax documents. Likewise, physical traceability can be accompanied by digitally documented data from each transaction.

The data that customs authorities capture has immense value for customs and border risk management by digitizing and associating them with freight and transportation documents (cargo manifests, bills of lading, customs declaration data, and electronic invoices). Once the data is captured, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and big data tools allow the processing and analysis bodog online casino of large volumes of information to identify patterns and potentially risky or fraudulent operations.

Coordinated Border Management based on the use of new technologies

For the benefit of supply chains and foreign trade logistics, it is also essential that the use of new technologies is carried out in the context of Coordinated Border Management between customs and other authorities involved in border processes.

This coordination is streamlined with interoperability between authorities and economic operators through Single Windows for Foreign Trade (SWs) or Port Community Systems to reduce times and costs for operators and increase control capacities. For example, the adoption of a SW system in Costa Rica is associated with a 1.4 percentage-point increase in the exports of companies that used the system compared to those that did not.

There is also an opportunity to promote and strengthen regional value chains through interoperability initiatives between customs systems and other border entities. These include the Central American Digital Trade Platform (PDCC) and the CADENA application, which uses blockchain to facilitate data exchange from companies whose reliability has been certified, such as authorized economic operators.

Finally, these components would not be effective without functional infrastructure at the entry and exit points of goods at land borders, seaports, and airports. Likewise, the effect would not be the same if the infrastructure did not include advanced technological entry, exit, inspection, and monitoring systems. The Mexican customs authority’s Customs Technological Integration Project (PITA) is an example of a comprehensive technology-based border infrastructure intervention. The customs authorities of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panamá are following suit and implementing border crossing reform processes that cover border facilities and include the use of cutting-edge technologies, with support from the IDB.

IDB support for the modernization of customs and border management

Through the Trade and Investment Division of the Integration and Trade Sector of the IDB, we support an innovative agenda of projects to modernize customs and border management in LAC. Two examples of these are the digital transformation and automation projects for the customs authorities of Colombia and Peru, including smart traceability plans for cargo and vehicles. We are also providing support for regional initiatives involving the use of blockchain to exchange data between eight customs offices in LAC and the application of artificial intelligence to improve customs risk management in several countries, among other projects.

LAC countries should embrace the availability of new technologies, the fast-track innovation induced by the pandemic, and the support of international organizations, such as the IDB, to expedite the digital transformation of their customs administrations.

Sandra Corcuera-Santamaría is a customs and trade specialist at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington DC since 2006. She is responsible for several national and regional projects for customs modernization and coordinated border management, and trade facilitation initiatives, including the coordination of the Authorized Economic Operator Program in Latin America and the Caribbean. Prior to her career at the IDB, Sandra spent six years in the Economic and Commercial Office of the Spanish Embassy in Washington, and was a project coordinator at the consulting firm EuropeanDevelopment Projects in Brussels, Belgium. Sandra has a Master in Public Administration from the University of Leuven, Belgium and a Bachelor of Political Science from the Complutense University of Madrid, Spain.

José Martín is a consultant at the Trade and Investment Division of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Previously, he was the Representative in Washington, DC, for the Ministry of Finance of Mexico and the Mexican Tax Administration Service for more than 26 years. José Martín was one of the negotiators of customs provisions, trade facilitation, certification and verification of origin, and supervision of foreign trade operations of the recently concluded Mexico-United States-Canada Agreement (T-MEC).

To read the full commentary from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), please click here.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_The Biden administration’

Anne Allen Hodge — Sat, 20 Feb 2021 18:19:05 +0000

The WTO has struggled to remain relevant as global technology and trade issues evolve from where they were in the 1980s. Part of the challenge flows from the widely divergent interests of a growing membership (currently 164 countries) which coupled with the consensus principle for decision making means any Member can shut down or prevent progress. Part flows from the failure/inability to update commitments based on changing stages of economic development and share of global trade. Part flows from the increased importance of Members whose economic systems are not market-premised under rules which assume such a market orientation. Part flows from the effort of some to seek new rights through dispute settlement and by ineffective controls to prevent excesses by the panels and Appellate Body system adopted in 1994. Part flows from the crises of the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change and the glacier pace of deliberations within the WTO.

All of these forces have led WTO Members to focus energies on bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements and to start a process of so-called Joint Statement Initiatives to let countries desiring to address new or uncovered issues do so.

With the WTO finally having appointed a new Director-General whose priorities include addressing longstanding issues, but also achieving progress on the Joint Statement Initiatives — including digital trade/e-commerce and others — and with the European Union’s 18 February trade policy paper and Annex dealing with WTO reform and indicating the importance of flexibility for bringing open plurilaterals into the WTO, India and South Africa have filed a communication for discussion at the March 1-2, 2021 General Council meeting challenging the “legal status of Joint Statement Initiatives and their negotiated outcomes”. The Indian and South African paper is embedded below.

WTO Legal Status

The paper from India and South Africa raises interesting points about existing WTO provisions for modifications of existing agreements and for adding plurilateral agreements and other issues. But the real question for the WTO is whether updating of rules and coverage of technological change and global developments will happen within or outside of the WTO. No issue describes this better than digital trade. Existing WTO rules don’t really address digital trade which has become increasingly important for all countries. While the WTO has had digital trade on its radar since 1998, there has been no meaningful progress within the WTO on multilateral rules. The Joint Statement Initiative on digital trade started in Buenos Aires in late 2017 is an effort by some WTO Members to develop rules for those willing to participate that address important issues affecting digital trade today. The JSI on e-commerce presently has 86 WTO Members participating in the negotiations and is making progress towards potential results as early as the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference in late 2021. Embedded below is the 2017 Joint Statement Initiative, the December 2020 Joint Statement on E-Commerce and the December draft text.

jsec_18dec20_e

Conclusion

The paper from India and South Africa may reflect a desire to have an early discussion of what additional flexibilities are needed in the WTO to permit easier inclusion of plurilateral agreements within the WTO. The paper could also be an effort to add leverage to obtaining focus on issues of importance to India and South Africa. It could also be a signal that two Members who historically have had problems with many liberalization efforts are simply looking to lock the WTO down from timely reform and rule updates at least among the willing. If so, the WTO’s drift to irrelevance will continue and solutions outside of the WTO will become the main focus of global trade rules.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, bodog poker review|Most Popular_Congressional

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_The Biden administration’

Johnny Morris — Mon, 25 Jan 2021 17:32:53 +0000

Throughout 2020, most businesses have had to adapt their way of working one way or another, this is particularly true for trade and investment. With travel all but being wiped out, trade shows and exhibitions were massively impacted with hundreds of events either cancelled or postponed. However, some have now started going virtual to compliment the new way of working.

This is highlighted by looking more closely at trade shows in 2020, data from Expochecks* trade fair portal, highlights that 3,916 have been cancelled or postponed globally in 2020[1]. Drilling down by region:

Europe 57.1%
Asia 24.1%
North America 13.3%,
Africa 2.2%
South America 2.1%

With the second wave now in full swing, a large portion of those shows postponed to the final quarter of 2020, were also cancelled.

Staying virtual? Or a return to normality in 2021?

One solution to the pandemic we have seen in recent months is digital events. Messe Frankfurt –the world’s largest trade fair, congress and event organiser – which hosted 423 events globally in 2019, put on a number of virtual events in 2020. For example, Formnext, an additive manufacturing event, went entirely digital. The experience included an intelligent matchmaking function, which generated more than 450,000 product recommendations and enabled over 4,000 virtual business meetings. According to Messe Frankfurt CEO, Wolfgang Margin, it will likely be 2023 before revenue returns to the levels of 2019, and they will need to continue to enhance the virtual experience in the future.

There are some clear benefits of a virtual trade show in terms of digital innovation, cost savings and time efficiency. However, the relationships and trust that can be established through a face-to-face meeting is one clear downside. Data published by UFI** – The Global Association of the Exhibition Industry – stated most companies still expect a return to normality post-COVID, with signs that budgets will also be restored quickly. These findings were based the findings of 9,000 responses across 30 countries:

53% of exhibitors expect their show investments to return to pre-COVID-19 levels within 12 months,
And 28% report that their investments will return as soon as trade shows start running again.

While there is appetite for digital events, it is unlikely to replace live events in the long term.

Looking to the future

Dubai Global Connect (DGC) is aiming to provide an alternative model, officially launching in early 2021, and will provide buyers and sellers a wholesale market with goods from all over the world. DGC will last all year round in one central location, for safe and easy trade, dedicated to the wholesale of food, furniture and fashion. It will also provide exhibitions and a B2B digital platform allowing sellers to showcase and sell goods online. Douraid Zaghouani, COO of ICD and Chairman of DGC, stated “this has been a long time in the making but is even more relevant and needed in today’s changed global trade environment. Establishing a controlled, permanent marketplace environment is perfectly timed as event producers and their attendees cope with reduced travel budgets and the need for smaller, more controlled gatherings.”

These changes in the way of working have led to the OCO VELOCITI team adapting the research produced. Normally to coincide with major trades shows, we provide insights into the top investors in attendance. With so many cancellations, this has left a gap in our research. We have supplemented this loss through the creation of our Top Target Lists, based on sector resilience and those we project to grow post crisis. For example, target lists have included, Agile companies, Fintech, Cyber Security and resilient start-ups.

With digital events becoming more accepted and the hopeful return to live events later in 2021, we feel the research on international trade shows will return to some sort of normality, having just completed a piece on the Consumer Electronics Show. Combined with our new target lists, we will effectively double the amount of research we provide to our clients for the year ahead.

To read the full blog post by OCO Global, please visit here

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_The Biden administration’

Rachel Accorsi — Mon, 07 Dec 2020 20:11:31 +0000

New book Signals covers 27 macro trends transforming the global economy and markets.
Some of the biggest bodog poker review trends include the rapid adoption of digital technology.
From e-commerce to flexible working, here’s what COVID-19 has accelerated.

As every email introduction has reminded us in 2020, we’re living in “unprecedented times”.

No doubt, even after a viable vaccine is released to the general public and things begin to return to some semblance of normalcy, there will be long lasting effects on society and the economy. It’s been said that COVID-19 has hit fast forward on a number of trends, from e-commerce to workplace culture.

Today, we’ll highlight five of these accelerating trends.

The following article uses charts and data from new book Signals (hardcover, ebook) which covers the 27 macro trends transforming the global economy and markets. In some cases, where appropriate, we’ve added in the most recent projections and data.

#1: Screen life takes hold

Smartphones have drastically altered many parts our lives – including how we spend time. In the decade from 2008 to 2018, screen time on mobile devices increased 12x.

44% of people under the age of 18 now report four hours or more of screen time per day.

Image: eMarketer, Stream hatchet, Statista, Nielson

Fast forward to today, and screen time is up across the board, with some of the most dramatic increases seen among kids and teenagers. 44% of people under the age of 18 now report four hours or more of screen time per day – up from 21% prior to the pandemic.

Gaming is another digital segment that has benefited from the pandemic. Video game revenue spiked in the springtime, and sales have remained strong going further into 2020. Companies are hoping that casual gamers won over during lockdown will continue playing once the pandemic has come to an end.

April saw nearly a 75% growth in annual monthly sales from the previous year.

Image: NPD Group

Acceleration signal: International bandwidth and internet traffic was already increasing steadily, but COVID-19 stay-at-home activity has blown away previous numbers.

Latin America has seen a 51% growth in internet traffic.

Image: TeleGeography

Even as more workplaces and schools begin to operate normally again, it’s doubtful that screen time will drop back down to pre-COVID levels.

#2: The big consumer shake-up

The consumer economy has been innovating on two fronts: making physical buying as “frictionless” as possible, and making e-commerce as nimble as possible. COVID-19 broke old habits and sped up that evolution.

Innovations in real world shopping appear to be moving in the direction of cashierless checkouts, but in order for that model to work, people first need to embrace contactless payment methods such as mobile wallets and cards with tap payment.

So far, the pandemic has been an accelerant in moving people away from cash and pin-and-swipe credit cards in lagging markets. Once people get used to the convenience of contactless payments, it’s likely they’ll continue using those methods.

78% of consumers made their most recent payment using an online wallet.

Image: Cappemini, PYMNTS

Of course, no conversation about e-commerce is complete without talking about Amazon. The company has seen consistent growth in subscription revenue in recent years, and the company’s actions have a wide-reaching effect on the rest of the industry.

Amazon’s subscription revenue reached $6.6B in Q3 of 2020.

Image: Cappemini, PYMNTS

Much like the gaming industry, e-commerce companies like Amazon are hoping that people who dabbled with online ordering during the pandemic months, will convert into lifelong customers.

Acceleration signal: E-commerce penetration projections have shifted upward.

E-commerce saw a 12% increase in e-commerce penetration following COVID-19.

Image: Global X ETFs, US census Bureau, Adobe.

In hindsight, 2020 could be an inflection point where e-commerce gained a much bigger slice of the overall retail pie.

#3: Peak globalization

Globalization went on a tear starting from the mid-1980s until it hit a plateau during the financial crisis. Since that point, global trade as a percentage of GDP has flat-lined in the face of trade wars, and now COVID-19.

The long-term effects of COVID-19 on global trade are still unknown.

Image: Kuznetsov, 2019

Trade was obviously impacted by the pandemic, and it’s too early to say what the long-term effects will be. One thing that is clear is that the information component of globalization is becoming an even more important piece of the world’s economic puzzle.

The four distinct pillars of globalization are Trade, Capital, Information and People

Image: DHL Global Connectedness Index, 2019

Even before COVID-19 took hold, the global services trade was growing 60% faster than the goods trade, and was valued at approximately $13.4 trillion in 2019.

Acceleration signal: The dip in merchandise trade looks eerily similar to the one that took place in 2008.

The drop in merchandise trade following COVID-19 looks scarily similar to the financial crisis.

Image: World Trade Organisation

#4: The wealth chasm

On the high end of the wealth spectrum, billionaires are worth more than ever.

The combined wealth of the top 10 billionaires amounts to nearly $800B?

Image: Forbes, IMF

Meanwhile, in the broader economy, inequality has grown over the last few decades. Those in the top 50% wealth bracket have seen increasing gains, while the bottom 50% have seen stagnation.

This issue is sure to be compounded by economic turmoil brought on by COVID-19. Younger generations face the dual challenges of being more likely to be negatively impacted by the pandemic, while also being the least likely to have savings to cover an interruption in income.

In fact, nearly half of people in the 18–24 year old age group have nothing saved at all.

COVID-19 has been found to have a ‘major impact’ on 39% of millennials.

Image: Morning Consult

The longer the economy is affected by COVID-19 measures, the more of a wedge will be driven between people who have continued working and those who are employed in impacted industries (e.g. tourism, events).

Acceleration signal: Growth in the net worth of billionaires has been largely unaffected by COVID-19.

The cumulative net worth of billionaires is expected to reach

Image: Bloomberg Billionaires Index

#5: The flexible workplace

As of 2019, over half of companies that didn’t have a flexible or remote workplace policy cited “longstanding company policy” as the reason. In other words, that is just the way things have always worked.

Of course, the pandemic has forced many companies to rethink these policies.

98% of employees would like to work remotely at least some of the time for the rest of their careers.

Image: Gartner, Buffer

This grand experiment in remote work and distributed teams will have an impact on office life as we know it, potentially reshaping the entire “office economy”. The impact is already being felt, with global commercial property investment volume falling by 48% in Q3 2020.

Acceleration signal: Thousands of people are moving out of pricy urban areas, presumably because they are able to work remotely from a cheaper location.

111,000 people have moved away from Manhattan, New York. Image: MYMOVE analysis of USPS data, circa Oct 2020

To read the original blog post, please click here.

Nick Routley is the Creative Director and Writer at Visual Capitalist.

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