Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_halted an escalating tit-for-tat http://www.wita.org/blog-topics/dsts/ Mon, 02 Nov 2020 18:03:57 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.6.1 /wp-content/uploads/2018/08/android-chrome-256x256-80x80.png Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_halted an escalating tit-for-tat http://www.wita.org/blog-topics/dsts/ 32 32 Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_halted an escalating tit-for-tat /blogs/europe-prefers-to-wait-it-out/ Mon, 27 Jul 2020 14:22:38 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=22411 Two years ago, President Trump welcomed European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker to the White House to face off escalating trade tensions. Instead of sparring, as many had predicted, they greenlighted...

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Two years ago, President Trump welcomed European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker to the White House to face off escalating trade tensions. Instead of sparring, as many had predicted, they greenlighted a blueprint for fresh negotiations. But where are we two years on? Data, tax, and WTO disputes have taken center stage, while many of the traditional standoffs remain untouched. Four experts discuss what has and hasn’t changed, and how to keep momentum behind this fundamental, yet troubled projectRead our other three pieces by Marie KasperekMarc L. Busch, and Julia Friedlander.

Two years after the summit between European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and US President Donald J. Trump temporarily halted an escalating tit-for-tat on trade matters, it is worth looking a few years out into the future on the prospects for real progress in the transatlantic trade relationship. Talks since the summit have been limited and any success has been due to a realistically low level of ambition. The two sides reached an agreement on beef trade, but otherwise have little else to show for two years of discussions.

On the EU side, a picture is emerging of two foreign policy paths: one in the case of Trump’s reelection, the other in case of a Biden presidency. In the past weeks, EU leaders have strategically delayed key decisions to early 2021—see the recent delay on digital taxes. With an EU Commission focused on geostrategic issues, relationships with a second term Trump administration will be tense, though there could be some collaboration on addressing China’s trade practices. With a Biden administration, more conventional diplomatic dialogue would return and deepening of aspects of the trade relationship would be possible.

Regardless of the occupant of the White House, three topics will loom large in the next few years in trade and other bilateral discussions.

The first is China. Like the United States, the EU is concerned with the country’s horrid trade practices but also with the disruptive strategic position China is building within the EU through its Belt and Road Initiative investments. A Biden presidency would continue a tough public diplomatic stance on all aspects of the China relationship and is for example unlikely to change direction on Huawei. The EU’s stance is limited by commercial interests of especially German companies in China, which leads Germany to take a cautious approach in its dealings with Beijing. On trade matters, a reinvigoration of the tri-lateral Japan-EU-US efforts to combat China’s theft and cheating would be the most likely path during a Biden presidency.

The second topic is big tech. The EU and the United States disagree on how to deal with the oligopolies of the new economy on almost every policy topic, from privacy concerns, industrial organization and regulation, and tax. Just last week, the European Court of Justice dismissed the legal basis for data transfers between the EU and the United States. Among many other topics, the high-profile role of Facebook and other companies in election interference will inevitably lead to more pressure in the EU to break big tech companies up, induce competition, and/or limit their access to the data of EU citizens. It is also hard to envision the EU Commission approving further mergers in the sector that affect data and privacy of EU citizens. This topic will be a source of tension no matter who wins the US presidential election.

Finally, there is climate change. A Biden administration can be expected to re-join the Paris climate accord, but it worth noting that the EU has over the past few years moved to deepen its commitment to achieving the accord’s targets. The transformation to a greener economy was a cornerstone of the recently approved coronavirus economic recovery package, for example. There is no political appetite in the EU for lowering environmental or food safety standards in return for favorable trade terms. In the parlance of those who follow this topic closely: US-produced chlorinated chicken or beef with growth hormones will not make it into the EU.

Two years after the Juncker-Trump summit, a realistic scenario for transatlantic trade discussions in the next few years is progress on minor aspects. Think of lullaby topics like closer alignment of insurance regulation. With such political uncertainty, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic will hope for agreements that the press tunes out quickly and make sure that farmers do not block the access roads to Paris.

Bart Oosterveld is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a special adviser for ACG Analytics.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_halted an escalating tit-for-tat /blogs/the-usmca-cusma-t-mecs-entry-into-force-evolution-innovation-and-reform/ Sun, 28 Jun 2020 17:54:11 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=21487 Chapter 31 of USMCA: Innovations to the State to State Dispute Settlement Framework In addition to the unique features of the USMCA ISDS mechanism that have been highlighted by our...

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In addition to the unique features of the USMCA ISDS mechanism that have been highlighted by our contributors this week, USMCA also provides noteworthy innovations in State-to-State arbitration. USMCA Chapter 31 (Dispute Settlement) provides a mechanism that largely adopts the approach of NAFTA Chapter 20, while also addressing some of its flaws, which many commentators believe led to its infrequent use.

The scope of dispute settlement under USMCA Chapter 31 is narrower than NAFTA’s State-State dispute settlement framework. NAFTA Chapter 20 permitted panels to be convened to hear both violation complaints and nullification and impairment cases (non-violation cases) for all substantive NAFTA rights, except trade remedies and the labor and environment side agreements. Meanwhile, USMCA Chapter 31 denies panels the ability to hear violation cases for trade remedies, and it further excludes non-violation cases for claims under USMCA’s chapters on labor, environment, digital trade, financial services, telecommunications, alongside a number of other chapters. Procedurally, once a Party identifies a dispute, consultation with technical experts and the Free Trade Commission is required. Upon failure of such consultations, a binational panel may be convened to assist the Parties to resolve their dispute.

Chapter 31 further offers detailed rules and procedures to govern the establishment of a roster of panelists, their necessary qualifications, and how panelists are then selected from the roster to hear disputes. A key critique of NAFTA was the ability of a State to engage in “panel blocking”, employing its own failure to maintain an active and complete roster of candidates to prevent panel formation. This issue is resolved in USMCA through a commitment among the States to establish their rosters by the date USMCA enters into force (July 1, 2020). To protect from any future lapse in appointments, roster members maintain their position for a minimum of three years or until the Parties constitute a new roster. To this end, for example, in March this year, the U.S. concluded its open call for applicants to the roster.

Once a panel is appointed, Chapter 31 provides detailed guidance on the conduct of proceedings, including requirements for evidentiary submissions, hearing format, e-filing, third-party participation, and the use of experts. This detailed guidance is unique to Chapter 31 and is not mirrored in Chapter 14’s ISDS mechanism. In large part, this detail was added to USMCA through the December 2019 Amendment, which immediately preceded the Parties’ rapid and successive domestic ratification processes. Finally, Chapter 31 indicates processes for the release and implementation of panel decisions, as well as the consequences of non-implementation of such decisions.

The nuances and details of Chapter 31 are welcome additions to USMCA and reflect a thoughtful evolution of NAFTA’s Chapter 20. However, many commentators question the efficiency of both the negotiating process and even of the dispute settlement mechanism itself. An obvious alternative path would have been to draw upon the dispute settlement provisions of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Both Canada and Mexico are already parties to the bodog sportsbook review CPTPP. CPTPP negotiations also took into account American input, as the U.S. was involved with Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations until President Donald Trump signed an executive order to withdraw prior to domestic ratification. The TPP provisions were negotiated to account for flaws in NAFTA Chapter 20 that were well-known to American, Mexican, and Canadian TPP negotiators. As explained by Jennifer Hillman the approach of the TPP dispute settlement system was “designed to be broader, deeper, faster, and more transparent than either the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding or [NAFTA Chapter 20.]”1)

Where Does USMCA Fall in the Spectrum of Broader Global ISDS Reform?

TPP is also relevant to USMCA’s position with respect to global ISDS reform discussions. Many will recall that the TPP’s ISDS mechanism and the “risks” it posed to State sovereignty were among the U.S.’ reasons for withdrawing from the TPP. This position aligned with the “America First” rhetoric, which inspired the American negotiating position in USMCA. Yet, USMCA remains evolutionary in that it does not dispense with ISDS altogether. As Dr. Sheargold explained in yesterday’s post, the approach adopted in USMCA as between the U.S. and Canada is comparable to that adopted by Australia and the U.S. in their free trade agreement, where the exclusion of ISDS was justified – at least in part – by reference to the developed domestic legal systems of both States.

Compared to other more radical reform efforts, such as the European Commission’s proposal to implement a multilateral investment court, USMCA is not particularly revolutionary in its approach to structuring ISDS. It nonetheless incorporates many of the substantive and procedural reforms that differentiate new generation investment treaties from earlier models. As our contributors this week have noted, this includes various innovations concerning the scope and availability of ISDS itself. The treaty also imposes certain procedural safeguards for USMCA host States, including a requirement for would-be ISDS claimants to pursue local remedies for 30 months prior to filing their USMCA claim. Such innovations are reminiscent of reforms adopted in other contexts, including for example the inclusion in the 2015 Indian Model investment treaty of a five-year recourse to domestic remedies requirement.

Where ISDS is provided, USMCA builds on the legacy of NAFTA and the broader context of modern ISDS reform efforts to endorse a number of procedural safeguards and innovations. USMCA contains, for instance, detailed guidance as to the transparency frameworks applicable to ISDS proceedings. USMCA does not adopt the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules by reference but nonetheless contains many of the same disclosure requirements set out in those Rules, and in some cases, like other modern treaties, USMCA signals a willingness to go beyond the provisions on transparency contained in the UNCITRAL Rules. It imposes, for instance, obligations upon respondent States to make available to the public and the non-disputing USMCA State various documents associated with the proceeding (subject to certain safeguards). This includes the notice of intent, a notice of arbitration, pleadings, memorials and briefs, minutes and transcripts of tribunal hearings and orders, awards, and decisions of the tribunal (Article 14.D.8). The USMCA further provides for the holding of open hearings and filing of amicus curiae submissions.

While USMCA provides for significant elements of procedural transparency for ISDS, it misses others. This includes certain more specific elements of transparency, including for example transparency associated with third party funding arrangements (a topic currently under discussion in UNCITRAL’s Working Group III). USMCA nevertheless addresses other aspects of transparency even if indirectly. Article 14.D.6, for instance, governs the selection of arbitrators, including to stipulate that arbitrators shall comply with the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration “or any supplemental guidelines or rules adopted by the Annex Parties”. It is, therefore, possible that additional guidance could be provided by the USMCA Parties for assessment of arbitrator conflicts, including in the event Mexico and the U.S. endorse the recently-published Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators in ISDS.

USMCA also confronts the increasingly divisive issue of “double hatting”, where arbitrators also serve in other roles linked to ISDS proceedings (most commonly, as counsel). Would-be Chapter 14 arbitrators, once appointed, are prohibited from acting as counsel or in any other capacity in another pending USMCA Chapter 14 arbitration while the arbitrations in which they sit as arbitrators remain pending. Some critics suggest that banning “double hatting” may, as a side effect, decrease diversity among the pool of prospective arbitrators in ISDS proceedings, claiming that a ban effectively limits opportunities available to younger emerging arbitrators who are “transitional” in their practice and working to move to full-time arbitrator practices, while still acting as counsel.

There are no easy answers to the arbitrator diversity problem, but commentators agree that the system itself is only one piece of the puzzle. Counsel and their clients maintain decision-making power and should select (or at least consider) diverse candidates. Important projects are being developed in relation to diversity in ISDS more broadly, and stakeholders should continue to monitor appointment practices under USMCA to ensure appropriate diversity is achieved. Even broader ISDS reform efforts focused on diversity only can go so far. For example, the roster approached recently adopted by the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, the European Union and its member states (CETA) failed to reflect diversity goals, that failure was acknowledged, and improvement efforts are apparently underway. In this respect, the selection criteria of USMCA Article 14.D.6 are helpful. Arbitrators are not required to have any specific experience or training (e.g., in public international law and/or in international investment and trade law), thereby creating avenues for entry by diverse and/or emerging arbitrators who may provide complementary expertise, for example, in international commercial arbitration or in specific relevant industries.

USMCA is noticeably silent on a range of other matters, particularly when compared to the ISDS mechanisms developed in other new generation treaties. This includes the issue of potential investor obligations, a topic gaining increased traction in other negotiation settings. While a corporate social responsibility clause is included in USMCA Article 14.17, the clause focusses upon the responsibilities of each USMCA party and is likely too permissive to result in a legal obligation on investors to make or operate their investment consistently with such standards. Further, while the ISDS Annex between the U.S. and Mexico refers in passing to possible “counterclaims” by respondent States (Article 14.D.7), it is largely structured to focus upon claims filed by investors against their host State and not vice-versa.

What’s Next?

Placing USMCA amongst these broader discussions on evolution and innovation highlights the many challenges associated with modern treaty negotiation and ISDS reform. Yet, USMCA’s entry into force remains a historic and encouraging development regionally and globally. As mentioned in the introductory post to this series, NAFTA, despite the unprecedented trade flows it heralded, needed modernization because global commerce has changed dramatically over the past quarter-century. USMCA thus brings North American regional trade into the 21stcentury in a manner that, at the very least, takes into consideration emerging global trends in treaty law and ISDS.

While today in 2020 our focus is on NAFTA’s termination and legacy claims provisions, soon it will be time to reconsider USMCA’s efficacy and future. A sunset provision at Article 34.7 provides that the agreement is subject to review and renewal by mutual agreement after six years (in 2026). At that time, its Parties would need to agree to a further 16-year extension, and absent mutual assent, USMCA would expire in 2036. The six-year review deadline is promising as it may provide an opportunity to revisit the challenges and opportunities already hotly debated among commentators.

This blog post originally was published on the Kluwer Arbitration Blog on June 28, 2020 as part of a series highlighting the USMCA’s entry into force.   

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_halted an escalating tit-for-tat /blogs/buy-america-rules-in-house-democrats-infrastructure-plan-would-cost-taxpayers/ Fri, 26 Jun 2020 20:29:00 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=21506 House Democrats recently released new details about their $1.5 trillion infrastructure plan, the Moving Forward Act (MFA). The mere size of the bill, given the record level of debt and...

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House Democrats recently released new details about their $1.5 trillion infrastructure plan, the Moving Forward Act (MFA). The mere size of the bill, given the record level of debt and deficits, should alarm taxpayers. Behind the price tag, though, is a protectionist agenda reflected in the bill’s enforcement and expansion of Buy America mandates. Although proponents of these rules claim they boost domestic production and create American jobs, there is no evidence that they would improve the economy overall. These Buy America provisions actually harm taxpayers because they require most federally-funded transportation projects to use expensive materials when there are more affordable alternatives available.

The Buy America Act was originally established within Section 165 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, and the provision was intended to give preference for the use of domestically produced materials on any transportation projects funded at least in part by the federal government. The term “Buy America” now refers to similar statutes and regulations that apply to federally-funded transportation projects, including highways, public transportation, and intercity passenger rail. 

As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes, Buy America “generally requires that steel, iron, and manufactured products made primarily of steel or iron” used in federally-funded highway or transit projects that cost more than $1 million must be produced in the United States. This rule is already costing taxpayers money because of how expensive American steel and iron are compared to foreign steel and iron. 

What is alarming about the MFA is the expansion of the application of existing Buy America mandates. Section 1112 of the bill’s text adds “construction materials” to the materials covered by Buy America. As of now, the acquisition of iron and steel accounts for around 4.8 percent of the money spent on federally funded highway projects, which means that the requirement does not apply to 95.2 percent of the spending. However, if this term were to be added, the rule would apply to other materials, such as aggregates, cement, asphalt, etc. Applying the requirement to more infrastructure purchases would mean increased costs for taxpayers even more.

Fortunately, there are some limits to how much this provision can inflate costs. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) accept waivers based on public interest or the availability of domestic products. The provision would not apply if the Secretary of Transportation finds:

(1) that their application would be inconsistent with the public interest;

(2) that such materials and products are not produced in the United States in sufficient and reasonably available quantities and of a satisfactory quality; or

(3) that inclusion of domestic material will increase the cost of the overall project contract by more than 25 percent.

However, Section 1112 would restrict the waivers by requiring the Secretary to reevaluate any standing nationwide waivers every five years to decide whether those waivers remain necessary. Moreover, Section 2301 would also “close loopholes” that allow waived components and components exceeding 70 percent domestic content to receive credit for 100 percent domestic content. These new rules would decrease the number of waivers granted and incentivize higher domestic content—meaning higher costs for projects.

The claim that Buy America provisions benefit the economy has little to no evidence. The American steel industry is supposed to be one of the top industries that would benefit from Buy America, but its positive effect on the industry is scarce. According to CRS, the steel industry employment has declined from 260,000 jobs in 1990 to around 140,100 jobs in 2018, not because of foreign competition but because of higher productivity. If broader Buy America requirements were to increase annual demand for domestically manufactured steel by 1 million tons, it would only create around 1,000 jobs. 

Not only is Buy America’s purported benefit highly exaggerated, but its opportunity cost is also far greater than its advocates care to admit. The same study estimates that although eliminating Buy America requirements would take away 57,000 U.S. manufacturing jobs, it would also result in more than 300,000 new jobs in the economy. 

Bipartisan support regarding Buy America restrictions is growing. The Trump administration’s imposition of tariffs and the President’s executive order on buy American and hire American highlights his protectionist agenda. On the Democratic side, Rep. Conor Lamb (D-PA), who played a major role in legislating the MFA, agrees with the President:

“The millions of Americans who have lost their jobs, and the millions more young people looking for a start in life in the middle of this pandemic, deserve to see us come together in support of this infrastructure bill. Building infrastructure is our most powerful tool to create jobs and improve the playing field for all businesses… It now falls to our generation to rebuild and improve upon this system for the twenty-first century.  This bill is an important down payment, and its focus on American jobs and American steel could not come at a better time.”

Meanwhile, Pennsylvania, the state that Lamb represents, has already experienced job loss and disruption of supply chains due to the tariffs on steel.

Lamb’s sentiment is typical among those who support protectionist policies, and they often suggest that buying American goods is not only economically beneficial but also virtuous. However, there is no reason to accept either claim. The empirical evidence does not show that Buy America rules benefit the U.S. economy, and there is nothing virtuous about shutting our country off to diverse global supply chains. What is certain is that Buy America rules would cost taxpayers, and it is time for Congress to have taxpayers’ interest as its priority and stop enforcing such requirements.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_halted an escalating tit-for-tat /blogs/what-european-oecd-countries-are-doing-about-dsts/ Mon, 22 Jun 2020 17:18:23 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=21480 Over the last few years, concerns have been raised that the existing international tax system does not properly capture the digitalization of the economy. Under current international tax rules, multinationals...

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Over the last few years, concerns have been raised that the existing international tax system does not properly capture the digitalization of the economy. Under current international tax rules, multinationals generally pay corporate income tax where production occurs rather than where consumers or, specifically for the digital sector, users are located. However, some argue that through the digital economy, businesses (implicitly) derive income from users abroad, but, without a physical presence, are not subject to corporate income tax in that foreign country.

To address these concerns, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has been hosting negotiations with more than 130 countries to adapt the international tax system. The current proposal would require multinational businesses to pay some of their income taxes where their consumers or users are located. According to the OECD, an agreement is expected this year.

However, despite these ongoing multilateral negotiations, several countries have decided to move ahead with unilateral measures to tax the digital economy. About half of all European OECD countries have either announced, proposed, or implemented a digital services tax (DST), which is a tax on selected gross revenue streams of large digital companies. Because these taxes mainly impact U.S. companies and are thus perceived as discriminatory, the United States has responded with retaliatory threats.

Digital Services Taxes in Europe. Digital taxes in Europe that have been implemented, announced, and proposed. Learn more about digital taxation in Europe, digital economy tax, current state of digital taxes in europe

As of June 22, Austria, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom have implemented a DST. Belgium, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Spain have published proposals to enact a DST, and Latvia, Norway, and Slovenia have either officially announced or shown intentions to implement such a tax.

The proposed and implemented DSTs differ significantly in their structure. For example, while Austria and Hungary only tax revenues from online advertising, France’s tax base is much broader, including revenues from the provision of a digital interface, targeted advertising, and the transmission of data collected about users for advertising purposes. The tax rates range from 2 percent in the UK to 7.5 percent in both Hungary and Turkey Bodog Poker (although Hungary’s tax rate is temporarily reduced to 0 percent).

Although these DSTs are generally considered to be interim measures until an agreement is reached at the OECD level, it is unclear whether all of them will be repealed at that point.

Announced, Proposed, and Implemented Digital Services Taxes in European OECD Countries, as of June 22, 2020
Country Tax Rate Scope Global Revenue Threshold Domestic Revenue Threshold Status

Austria (AT)

5%

Online advertising

€750 million (US $840 million)

€25 million ($28 million)

Implemented(Effective from January 2020)

Belgium (BE)

3%

Selling of user data

€750 million ($840 million)

€5 million ($5.6 million)

Proposed (A DST was first introduced in January 2019 but was rejected in March 2019; an adjusted DST proposal was reintroduced in June 2020)

Czech Republic (CZ)

5%

  • Targeted advertising

  • Use of multilateral digital interfaces

  • Provision of user data (additional thresholds apply)

€750 million ($840 million)

CZK 100 million ($4 million)

Proposed (Delayed until 2021 to wait for agreement at the OECD level; there have been discussions to lower the proposed tax rate)

France (FR)

3%

  • Provision of a digital interface

  • Advertising services based on users’ data

€750 million ($840 million)

€25 million ($28 million)

Implemented(Retroactively applicable as of January 1, 2019; France has agreed to suspend the collection of the DST until December 2020 in exchange for the U.S. agreeing to hold off on retaliatory tariffs on French goods)

Hungary (HU)

7.5%

Advertising revenue

HUF 100 million ($344,000))

N/A

Implemented (As a temporary measure, the advertisement tax rate has been reduced to 0%, effective from July 1, 2019 through December 31, 2022)

Italy (IT)

3%

  • Advertising on a digital interface

  • Multilateral digital interface that allows users to buy/sell goods and services

  • Transmission of user data generated from using a digital interface

€750 million ($840 million)

€5.5 million ($6 million)

Implemented(Effective from January 2020)

Latvia (LV)

3%

Announced/Shows Intentions (The Latvian government commissioned a study to determine the increase of tax revenue based on the assumption that the country levies a 3% DST)

Norway (NO)

Announced/Shows Intentions (Norway plans to introduce a unilateral measure in 2021 if the OECD does not reach a consensus solution in 2020)

Poland (PL)

1.5%

Audiovisual media service and audiovisual commercial communication

Implemented (Effective from July 2020)

Slovakia (SK)

Proposed (The Ministry of Finance opened a consultation on a proposal to introduce a DST on revenue of nonresidents from provision of services such as advertising, online platforms, and sale of user data; however, there were no further steps taken and none of the political parties have put forward digital tax as their priority agenda)

Slovenia (SI)

Announced/Shows Intentions (The Ministry of Finance announced a government proposal to submit a draft bill to the National Assembly introducing a digital services tax by April 1, 2020; however, there has been no development so far)

Spain (ES)

3%

  • Online advertising services

  • Sale of online advertising

  • Sale of user data

€750 million ($840 million)

€3 million ($3 million)

Proposed (The bill passed a parliamentary vote on June 4, and now continues to the Lower House Budget commission, which will discuss partial amendments)

Turkey (TR)

7.5%

Online services including advertisements, sales of content, and paid services on social media websites

€750 million ($840 million)

TRY 20 million ($4 million)

Implemented (Effective from March 2020; the president can reduce the DST rate as low as 1% or increase it as much as 15%)

United Kingdom (GB)

2%

  • Social media platforms

  • Internet search engine

  • Online marketplace

£500 million ($638 million)

£25 million ($32 million)

Implemented (The UK government stated in its Finance Bill 2020 that the DST would go into effect as of April 1, 2020; the Finance Bill is currently in Parliament and is expected to be enacted this summer)

Source: KPMG, “Taxation of the digitalized economy: Developments summary,” June 19, 2020, https://tax.kpmg.us/content/dam/tax/en/pdfs/2020/digitalized-economy-taxation-developments-summary.pdf.

June 22, 2020 Update:

  • Belgium reintroduced an adjusted DST proposal, a 3 percent tax on revenues from activities such as the selling of user data on companies with global revenues exceeding €750 million (US $840 million) and domestic revenues exceeding €5 million ($5.6 million).
  • The Czech Republic lowered its proposed DST rate from 7 percent to 5 percent and postponed the effective date to January 2021.
  • Poland approved a 1.5 percent fee/tax on online streaming services, effective from July 2020.
  • Spain’s DST proposal passed a parliamentary vote on June 4, 2020, and will now continue to the Lower House Budget commission, which will discuss partial amendments.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_halted an escalating tit-for-tat /blogs/eu-digs-in-on-digital-tax-plan-after-us-quits-talks/ Thu, 18 Jun 2020 18:31:59 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=21492 The European Commission has reiterated its commitment to pushing ahead with a regional plan for taxing digital services after the U.S. quit talks aimed at finding agreement on reforming tax...

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The European Commission has reiterated its commitment to pushing ahead with a regional plan for taxing digital services after the U.S. quit talks aimed at finding agreement on reforming tax rules — ramping up the prospects of a trade war.

Yesterday talks between the EU and the U.S. on a digital services tax broke down after U.S. treasury secretary, Steven Mnuchin, walked out — saying they’d failed to make any progress, per Reuters.

The EU has been eyeing levying a tax of between 2% and 6%on the local revenues of platform giants.

Today the European Commission dug in in response to the U.S. move, with commissioner Paolo Gentiloni reiterating the need for “one digital tax” to adapt to what he dubbed “the reality of the new century” — and calling for “understanding” in the global negotiation.

However, he also repeated the Commission’s warning that it will push ahead alone if necessary, saying that if the U.S.’ decision to quit talks means achieving global consensus impossible it will put “a new European proposal on the table.”

Following the breakdown of talks, France also warned it will go ahead with a digital tax on tech giants this year — reversing an earlier suspension that had been intended to grease the negotiations.

The New York Times reports French finance minister, Bruno Le Maire, describing the U.S. walk-out as “a provocation,” and complaining about the country “systematically threatening” allies with sanctions.

The issue of “fair taxes” for platforms has been slow-burning in Europe for years, with politicians grilling tech execs in public over how little they contribute to national coffers and even urging the public to boycott services like Amazon (with little success).

Updating the tax system to account for digital giants is also front and center for Ursula von der Leyen’s Commission — which is responding to the widespread regional public anger over how little tech giants pay in relation to the local revenue they generate.

European Commission president von der Leyen, who took up her mandate at the back end of last year, has said “urgent” reform of the tax system is needed — warning at the start of 2020 that the European Union would be prepared to go it alone on “a fair digital tax” if no global accord was reached by the end of this year.

At the same time, a number of European countries have been pushing ahead with their own proposals to tax big tech — including the U.K., which started levying a 2% digital services tax on local revenue in April; and France, which has set out a plan to tax tech giants 3% of their local revenues.

This gives the Commission another clear reason to act, given its raison d’être is to reduce fragmentation of the EU’s Single Market.

Although it faces internal challenges on achieving agreement across the Member States, given some smaller economies have used low national corporate tax rates to attract inward investment, including from tech giants.

The U.S., meanwhile, has not been sitting on its hands as European governments move ahead to set their own platform taxes. The Trump administration has been throwing its weight around — arguing U.S. companies are being unfairly targeted by the taxes and warning that it could retaliate with up to 100% tariffs on countries that go ahead (though it has yet to do so).

On the digital tax reform issue, the U.S. has said it wants a multilateral agreement via the OECD on a global minimum. And a petite entente cordiale was reached between France and the U.S. last summer when President Emmanuel Macron agreed the French tech tax would be scrapped once the OECD came up with a global fix.

However, with Trump’s negotiators pulling out of international tax talks with the EU, the prospect of a global understanding on a very divisive issue looks further away than ever.

Though the U.K. said today it remains committed to a global solution, per Reuters, which quotes a treasury spokesman.

Earlier this month the U.S. also launched a formal investigation into new or proposed digital taxes in the EU, including the U.K.’s levy and the EU’s proposal, and plans set out by a number of other EU countries, claiming they “unfairly target” U.S. tech companies — lining up a pipeline of fresh attacks on reform plans.

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_halted an escalating tit-for-tat /blogs/us-trade-representative-investigations-dsts/ Thu, 11 Jun 2020 18:38:56 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=21082 On June 2, 2020, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced that it bodog online casino is beginning investigations under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Trade Act) into digital services taxes...

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On June 2, 2020, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced that it bodog online casino is beginning investigations under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Trade Act) into digital services taxes (DSTs) that have been adopted or are under consideration by ten of the United States’ closest trading partners – Austria, Brazil, the Czech Republic, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (DSTs Investigations).

According to USTR Robert Lighthizer, “President Trump is concerned that many of our trading partners are adopting tax schemes designed to unfairly target our companies,” and that “[the United States] are prepared to take all appropriate action to defend our businesses and workers against any such discrimination.”

The initial focus of USTR’s investigations is to determine whether the existing or proposed DSTs discriminate against U.S. companies, apply retroactively, and/or constitute unreasonable tax policy by diverging from norms reflected in the U.S. tax system and the international tax system. The USTR identified examples of such divergent approaches, including extraterritoriality; taxing revenue not income; and intentionally penalizing particular technology companies for their commercial success.

As a next step, the USTR is seeking public comments on any issue covered by the investigations, in particular, the following:

-Concerns with one or more of the DSTs adopted or under consideration by the jurisdictions covered in the investigation.

-Whether one or more of the covered DSTs is unreasonable or discriminatory.

-The extent to which one or more of the covered DSTs burdens or restricts U.S. commerce.

-Whether one or more of the covered DSTs is inconsistent with obligations under the WTO Agreement or any other international agreement.

-The determinations required under section 304 of the Trade Act, including what action, if any, should be taken.

Written comments should be submitted through the Federal eRulemaking Portal and are due by July 15, 2020. Because of the COVID-19 restrictions, the USTR has not scheduled a public hearing at this time but may indicate in a subsequent notice if a hearing is to be held in the DSTs investigations.

Eversheds Sutherland Observation: The timing of the investigations is noteworthy, as many jurisdictions, including the EU, have been highlighting the need for DSTs to address COVID-19 tax shortfalls. It also comes as the OECD continues efforts to find a consensus solution to taxation of the digital economy. The OECD remains committed to a proposal in 2020, although there is some recognition that this timing may slip due to issues around the pandemic. Nonetheless, the reaction of the U.S. is consistent with the response to the French DST, and is noteworthy in that the administration continues to respond to unilateral digital tax efforts through trade, rather than tax, channels. The U.S. has continued to participate in the OECD’s inclusive framework efforts.

The Previous Section 301 Investigations into the French DST

In July 2019, the USTR had already initiated an investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act with respect to France’s DST Act (LOI n° 2019-759 du 24 Juliet 2019), which French President Emmanuel Macron had signed into law on July 24, 2019.  After requesting public comments and conducting a public hearing in August 2019 (for a hearing transcript, see here), the USTR in a report published in December 2019 determined that France’s DST is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce. Specifically, the USTR’s investigation concluded that the French DST discriminates against U.S. (digital) companies, is unusually burdensome for affected U.S. companies, and is inconsistent with prevailing principles of international tax policy on account of its retroactivity, its application to revenue rather than income, its extraterritorial application, and its purpose of penalizing particular U.S. technology companies.

At the time, USTR Lighthizer said that the “decision today sends a clear signal that the United States will take action against digital tax regimes that discriminate or otherwise impose undue burdens on U.S. companies” and that the USTR is “exploring whether to open Section 301 investigations into the digital services taxes of Austria, Italy, and Turkey.”

Consequently, the USTR proposed action in the form of additional duties of up to 100 percent on certain products of France and considered imposing fees or restrictions on French services as a further option. The list of French products subject to the potential duties included 63 tariff subheadings with an approximate trade value of $2.4 billion. Another public hearing was conducted on the proposed action in January 2020 (for hearing transcripts, see here and here).

However, as reported in late January 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump and French President Macron agreed to a truce on the dispute over the French DST, under which both countries are extending negotiations, while the U.S. is postponing retaliatory action and France is suspending DST collections until the end of 2020. Furthermore, it was reported that under the deal France will (i) withdraw the DST as soon as the OECD’s Inclusive Framework reaches a multilateral agreement on how to reform the international tax rules in light of the digitalization of the economy, and (ii) repay companies the difference between the DST and whatever tax comes from a planned mechanism being drawn up by the OECD.

Eversheds Sutherland Observation: The reported U.S.-French deal did not address many concerns raised by affected companies at the Section 301 hearing regarding compliance with and the administrability of the DST. Initially, it left many affected companies struggling with obtaining information retroactively and preparing DST returns. At the same time, it has created significant pressure to agree on a multilateral solution as part of the OECD Inclusive Framework. In fact, France may be incentivized not to support a multilateral solution resulting in tax revenues that are less than what France can collect under its DST. Moreover, as subsequently observed, the deal did not appear to discourage other jurisdictions to enact their own digital taxes, subject only to an agreement to adjust to reflect any future multilateral solution agreed by the OECD.

The New Section 301 Investigations

An advance Federal Register Notice (Notice) issued by the Office of the USTR on the same day as the announcement provides additional details on the DSTs Investigations, including summaries of the DSTs that have been adopted or are being considered by the ten trading partners and the schedule for submission of written public comments.

DSTs under Investigation

As stated in the Notice, over the past two years, various jurisdictions—not limited to the ones under investigation—have taken under consideration or adopted taxes on revenues that companies generate from providing certain digital services to, or aimed at, users in those jurisdictions. Moreover, the Notice asserts that available evidence suggests these DST are targeting U.S.-based tech companies.

The DSTs Investigations target the following DST regimes:

Austria: In October 2019, Austria enacted effective January 1, 2020, a DST that applies a 5 percent tax to revenues from online advertising services with two revenue thresholds (at least €750 million in annual global revenues for all services and €25 million in in-country revenues for covered services).

Brazil: In May 2020, a draft bill was submitted in Brazil’s parliament entitled “contribution for intervention in the economic domain on gross revenue of digital services provided by large technology companies (CIDE-Digital),” which, if adopted, would apply an up to 5 percent tax on revenue from advertising and services in connection with digital platforms located in Brazil.

Czech Republic: The Parliament of the Czech Republic has accepted for consideration a bill that would impose a 7 percent tax on selected digital services provided in the country by companies with global sales exceeding €750 million and a turnover in the Czech Republic in excess of CZK 100 million.

European Union (EU): In its proposal for a COVID-19 recovery plan, the European Commission (EC) said that to raise the necessary funds, it will propose a number of new resources, which “could also include a new digital tax, building on the work done by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).” The EC proposed a DST (COM(2018) 148 final) that would impose a 3 percent tax on gross revenues from digital online advertisement, digital platform activities, and sales of user data generated via digital platforms from companies with global sales exceeding €750 million and EU taxable revenues exceeding €50 million.

India: In March 2020, India expanded its equalization levy that has been in place since 2016 and will now impose a 2 percent levy on consideration receivable by a non-resident bodog casino “e-commerce operator” (with annual revenues in excess of approximately ₹20 million) for “e-commerce supply or services” provided or facilitated by it on or after April 1, 2020.

Indonesia: In March 2020, the Indonesian government enacted a government regulation that adopts (but not yet implements) a new tax on Trade Through Electronic Systems (Perdagangan Melalui Sistem Elektronik or “PMSE”), imposing an electronic transaction tax on PMSE activities carried out by foreign tax subjects that meet certain criteria.

Italy: Italy enacted a DST effective January 1, 2020, which imposes a 3 percent tax on revenues from targeted advertising and digital interface services by companies generating at least €750 million in overall worldwide revenues and at least €5.5 million in revenues from qualifying digital services provided to users located in Italy.

Spain: In February 2020, the Spanish government published a draft bill concerning the implementation of a unilateral DST, which would impose a 3 percent tax on revenues from online advertising services targeted at users, online intermediary services, and data transmission services of companies generating at least €750 million in global net turnover and at least €3 million in revenues from taxable provisions of digital services in Spain.

Turkey: Having imposed a 15 percent withholding tax on online advertising since the beginning of 2019, Turkey has now enacted a DST effective March 1, 2020, which currently imposes a 7.5 percent tax (though the Turkish president is authorized to reduce the DST rate to 1 percent or double it) on gross revenues from certain services, including advertisement services provided through digital platforms, sales of auditory, visual or digital contents on digital platforms, and services related to the provision and operation of digital platforms enabling users to interact with each other, provided by companies with worldwide revenue exceeding €750 million and with Turkey-sourced revenue exceeding ₺20 million, in each case from covered digital services.

United Kingdom (UK): The UK government announced the introduction of a DST from April 1, 2020, which would impose a 2 percent tax on the revenues of search engines, social media services and online marketplaces that derive value from UK users of companies when the group’s worldwide revenues from these digital activities are more than £500 million and more than £25 million of these revenues are derived from UK users.

Section 301 Investigations in General

As described in the Notice, the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the USTR to investigate whether an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country is actionable under Section 301 of the Trade Act. Actionable matters under Section 301 include acts, polices, and practices of a foreign country that are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. An act, policy, or practice is unreasonable if the act, policy, or practice, while not necessarily in violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the United States, is otherwise unfair and inequitable.

As a first step in a Section 301 investigation, the USTR consults with appropriate advisory committees, including the Section 301 Committee, and requests consultations with the governments of the affected jurisdiction(s). The Notice confirms with respect to the DSTs Investigations that the USTR has already consulted with the relevant advisory committees in the U.S., as well as reached out to the governments of the ten affected jurisdictions.

After the USTR determines whether an act, policy, or practice under investigation is actionable under Section 301, the USTR must determine what action to take. Notably, Section 301 authorizes the President to take unilateral retaliatory action in order to force the offending country to end the practices that have been found to be unreasonable or discriminatory against the United States. In past Section 301 investigations, such retaliation has typically involved the imposition of significant additional U.S. tariffs on selected products from the targeted country.

Eversheds Sutherland Observation: Initial reactions to the USTR announcement from the targeted jurisdictions suggest that they are unfazed by the threat of a U.S. trade investigation, as they openly reaffirm their commitment to enact and/or enforce these DSTs as planned. This was true of the French response to the Section 301 investigation into its DST. Perhaps the U.S. is anticipating that, as in the case of France, the Section 301 investigations will lead to agreements to refrain from enforcement of unilateral taxes until the OECD Inclusive Framework is able to reach a consensus solution. However, if countries do in fact continue with unilateral DSTs, the situation may well trigger another potential trade war, at a time when the global economy is struggling to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. It deserves emphasis that Section 301 is the legal basis for the significant tariffs that the U.S. has imposed on Chinese imports, which has in turn triggered tariff retaliation by China against U.S. imports.

Potentially complicating the U.S. position are digital advertising tax proposals appearing at the U.S. subnational level. The Maryland legislature recently passed a digital advertising tax bill that the state governor vetoed on May 7, and a “copycat bill” was introduced in New York. There are serious questions regarding the constitutionality of the proposals that have been introduced, but their existence may undermine the USTR position that foreign DSTs are unreasonable or discriminatory. Maryland’s proposed digital advertising tax has drawn scrutiny as violating federal law, including the Permanent Internet Tax Freedom Act and the dormant Commerce Clause. For Eversheds Sutherland’s critique of the tax, please see our recent article, If Md.’s Digital Ad Tax Is Passed, Court Challenges Will Follow.”

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Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_halted an escalating tit-for-tat /blogs/ustr-should-proceed-with-caution-on-digital-services-tax/ Mon, 08 Jun 2020 17:37:21 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=21484 While attention focused on the continuing COVID-19 pandemic and the protests following the death of George Floyd, the United States last week made a significant under-the-radar announcement. The U.S. Trade...

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While attention focused on the continuing COVID-19 pandemic and the protests following the death of George Floyd, the United States last week made a significant under-the-radar announcement. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) opened an investigation into the digital taxes targeting American firms that have been imposed or are under consideration in Australia, Brazil, the Czech Republic, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

The United States is exactly right to be concerned about the various digital services taxes (DST) that have been imposed or are under consideration. The taxes in question vary slightly, but they generally “tax the gross revenues of large digital companies” and largely tax gross income rather than net profits. Almost all are written in a way that exclusively targets America’s largest technology companies for burdensome and discriminatory treatment.

As noted by Gary Hufbauer of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, the EU’s DST is a de facto tariff that violates various World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. DSTs would hamstring some of America’s most innovative companies. The move to open an investigation is drawing bipartisan praise. Senate Finance Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) and Ranking Member Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) issued a joint statement supporting USTR’s decision.

At the same time, the investigation could open the door for a larger trade war with several countries. USTR’s investigation invokes Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which allows the U.S. to identify foreign trade practices that are “unjustifiable,” “unreasonable,” or “discriminatory” barriers that burden U.S. commerce. Unlike several other trade authorities used to protect domestic companies from foreign competition, Section 301 is ostensibly designed to give the United States leverage to tear down foreign trade barriers and pry open foreign markets.

Between its enactment in 1974 and the early 1990s, the United States frequently invoked Section 301 to impose tariffs, a policy renowned trade economist Jagdish Bhagwati dubbed “aggressive unilateralism.” Such actions infuriated trading partners. As part of the so-called “grand bargain” in the Uruguay Round negotiations that converted the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade into the WTO, the United States agreed to drop unilateral enforcement under Section 301 for matters falling within WTO agreements in exchange for binding dispute settlement. Between 1995 and the beginning of the Trump administration, Section 301 largely fell out of favor and burdensome foreign trade barriers were targeted through the WTO’s dispute settlement system.

Today, the United States has undermined the WTO’bodog casino s dispute-settlement system in a number of ways and is back to using Section 301. Our recent foray into aggressive use of 301 should give the Trump administration pause as it pursues a new investigation. In 2018, for instance, USTR released its Section 301 report that documented a number of unfair and burdensome Chinese trade practices, including intellectual property abuses, theft of trade secrets, forced technology transfer, and others. Relying on the report, the Trump administration imposed aggressive tariffs on imports from China.

Though the United States and China signed a detente in January, the president’s tariffs cover about 70 percent of imports from China, with the average tariff between six and seven times higher than when the trade war began. As countless studies have confirmed, American consumers, not Chinese exporters, are paying the president’s tariffs. Likewise, a recent study from the New York Federal Reserve found that American firms lost $1.7 trillion in market capitalization from lower investment growth as a result of the trade war with China.

In other words, the trade war has exacted a heavy toll on the American economy, and it is not clear that Beijing has made, or will make, significant structural changes to its economy. For example, China is even more reliant on its state-owned enterprises to meet the aggressive purchase requirements called for under the deal signed in January, the opposite of the U.S. goal to nudge Chinese firms to operate on more market-oriented terms.

If the United States is right to defend some of its leading global companies, but tariffs could trigger another costly trade war with several countries, what should policymakers do?

The best answer is the one required by law. We should file a dispute at the WTO. The de facto tariffs under consideration by these trading partners are inconsistent with their WTO commitments. If the United States were to prevail, the respondent countries could either remove the offending measures or the United States would have permission to impose countermeasures without the threat of retaliation. That is how the system was designed to work and it has worked well over the last 25 years.

Likewise, as the United States negotiates free trade agreements with the United Kingdom and others, it could push for bans on DSTs. As part of the narrow agreement struck between the U.S. and Japan last fall, the two countries agreed to “ensur[e] non-discriminatory treatment of digital products, including coverage of tax measures.” Similar prohibitions would likely require large concessions from American trade negotiators. But if defending its leading tech companies from foreign discrimination is a top priority, such concessions could be worth it.

Large countries already are trying to negotiate a multilateral solution to digital taxation issues through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It makes sense as part of that process to ensure taxes are not discriminatory against American firms and are consistent with longstanding principles. It also is important that the United States exercise more leadership in fixing some of the existing issues with that proposal, which currently threatens to create double taxation on numerous sectors.

Perhaps USTR is trying to pressure countries to rescind digital taxes or avoid adopting them in the first place. When France enacted its DST, USTR issued a lengthy Section 301 report and threatened stiff tariffs on a number of French products in response. France ultimately delayed the tax until 2021 and USTR held off on imposing tariffs as the two sides try to negotiate a solution. The only problem with this strategy is that, if other countries do not back down the way France did, the United States would have to move forward with tariffs.

The United States should do all it can to defend some of its most innovative companies from discriminatory foreign tax treatment, but an aggressive trade war with a number of the large trading partners subject to USTR’s investigation could be catastrophic for the economy, just as it starts to recover from the damage wrought by COVID.

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