I am a Senior Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center and a Cybersecurity Policy Fellow at New America. I have worked as an analyst of Chinese data and technology policies for the last decade, in the U.S. national security community, and in the private sector. I also advise corporate clients on China’s technology policies.

Today I will focus my testimony on data security in the context of the U.S.-China relationship and global cross-border data flows.

While my expertise focuses on China—and I will first speak specifically about the Chinese government’s approach to acquiring and extracting value from data—my view is that the most effective solutions for the United States require a more comprehensive approach to regulating data security and privacy. Some of these challenges require tools that are specific to risks posed by China, but these issues are bigger than China. Setting basic standards on what data can be collected and retained by all companies will help protect U.S. personal and other sensitive data, regardless of whether the risk comes from a state-sponsored hacker, a data broker, or a private company transferring the data to China. U.S. lawmakers have an opportunity to address transnational security threats while also advancing a more secure, ethical, and democratic global internet in its own right.

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1. The Chinese government has embarked on an ambitious national data strategy with the goal of acquiring, controlling, and extracting value from large volumes of data.

In addition to China’s two landmark laws that took effect this fall (the Data Security Law and Personal Information Protection Law1), Beijing has elevated the concept of data as an economic and strategic asset, centralizing state power over information flows within and outside of China’s borders:

– An April 2020 directive issued by the State Council and Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) designates data as the fifth factor of production—after land, labor, capital, and technology. At the National People’s Congress in March 2021, the outline of the 14th Five-Year plan called for “improving the market of data factors” (健全数据要素市场), and stressing the need to unlock the value of data to fuel the digital economy

– On November 30th of this year, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology released the 14th Five Year Plan (2021-2025) for China’s big data industry. The plan defines big data as a strategic emerging industry, slated for greater state support to unlock the value of data. State supporting measures focus on expanding “international cooperation” between Chinese and foreign “big data services” companies in standard setting and research & development (R&D), and encourage multinationals to set up R&D centers in China. By 2025, the plan calls for China to set up new mechanisms to facilitate China’s role in data trading and cross-border transfers. (建立数据资源产权、交易流通、跨境传输和安全等基础制度和标准规范) and “encourages Chinese firms to offer big data services in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) countries and regions.”

Beijing is also taking steps to centralize state control over data by breaking down silos or data islands across different government ministries and between the government and private companies, which have long plagued the government’s ability to aggregate and coordinate data. Barriers to data sharing are due to a variety of reasons. Chinese companies are reluctant to share their data as valuable commercial intellectual property, while government agencies often push back against one another’s access requests, guarding their data as a form of political power.

An article by the Tencent Research Institute argues for facilitating more data flows to China’s large tech platforms. Citing an International Data Corporation (IDC) estimate, the article states that “by 2025, the proportion of the world’s data held by [China] will increase from 23.4 percent in 2018 to 27.8 percent, making China the first in the world. The open use of data resources will determine whether our country can seize the initiative in a new round of international competition and guarantee national data security through the development and growth of the digital industry.”

What are the implications for the United States of China’s domestic and international efforts to acquire and make use of data as a strategic asset?

2. Understanding China’s motivations and different scenarios for how aggregated datasets could be used by the Chinese government is vital for creating effective U.S. policy.

There are concerning potential uses of U.S. personal data from a national security perspective. Beijing is already presumed to have sensitive national security information from the theft of personnel records of roughly 21 million individuals from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management; travel information from a cyber attack on Marriott hotels covering roughly 400 million records; and credit data from Equifax on roughly 145 million people.7 If additional sources of personal data such as location, social media, or pattern of life data were to be acquired or bought openly through unregulated data brokers and combined with what Beijing has already acquired through cyber theft, Chinese security services could use it to target individuals in sensitive government national security positions or military personnel for manipulation, blackmail, or other forms of coercion. This is particularly concerning from a counterintelligence perspective for individuals with security clearances or those with access to critical infrastructure.

As Chinese online services and network infrastructure gain in prominence around the world, it is also possible that the Chinese government could filter or monitor data processes abroad, just as the United States had done, as shown by Snowden, in utilizing data transmissions across U.S. networks for intelligence gathering. We also simply do not know what value and harm data created today will have in the future, regardless of who has access to it. As we move toward a world in which people have online profiles built on aggregated data, we must ask: what are the implications of the CCP gaining effective control of information flows beyond China’s closed internet system? What are the implications as the CCP takes even more drastic steps to close off the loopholes that to this day keep even the Great Firewall relatively porous and circumventable (e.g., stricter enforcement of restrictions on virtual private networks [VPNs] or shifting from a blacklist to a whitelist approach to permissible websites so technical controls can keep pace with online content deemed threatening)?

At the same time, the Chinese government’s use of data is not monolithic. Different actors are seeking data not just for security and surveillance, but also as fuel for the digital economy and other basic administrative functions. Outside observers of China often view Beijing’s actions solely through the lens of security, neglecting the economic development drivers that play an important role. China’s Data Security Law makes explicit that security and development must be balanced in China’s data-governance system. These two competing priorities have shaped China’s cyber bureaucracy for years. This long-standing internal source of friction and negotiation has contributed, at least in part, to the Chinese government not necessarily enforcing to date the strictest or most conservative security-oriented readings of Chinese cybersecurity laws and regulations. An entire early chapter of the Data Security Law was dedicated to this balance, indicating a recognition by Chinese authorities that state power hinges not only on security of data, but also on its commercial use, and that China must therefore find an effective way to leverage both at once. This duality also is driving an ambitious national effort to classify all data resources held by government and industry by category and grade (“categorized and graded protection system for data;” 数据分类分级保护制度). The goal is to distinguish less sensitive data for circulation to fuel the economy from data that should be locked down with tighter security restrictions.

As China grows in prosperity, and its leadership seeks to assert state control over data for both strategic and economic gain, the United States must also develop a comprehensive vision and regulation to maintain leadership. Leading Chinese data scholar Dr. Hong Yanqing writes that “China should also consider how to enable Chinese enterprises to control and use more data globally. After all, the United States can extend its ‘arm’ because its enterprises are all over the world.” Hong observes that Chinese tech companies need access to global data flows, and that if the United States and the European Union are able to align on digital policies, China will be at a disadvantage of creating split products for different markets (for example, Bytedance segmenting its global and Chinese versions of the apps TikTok and Douyin). He adds that this approach “prevents Chinese ICT companies from upgrading services by using a global data pool and limits the gains from the economies of scale. Once the United States and the European Union reach an agreement, at least their enterprises can avoid data localization and segregating storage, which puts Chinese ICT enterprises at a disadvantage.”

Inaction by the United States will result in failure to create the interoperable coalition on data that Chinese leaders fear. Stalled progress on Privacy Shield and a global vision for data flows like APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules underscore the challenges ahead.

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bodog online casino To be effective, U.S. policy should be based on an accurate understanding of why data matters. The analogy of data as the new oil is false, and leads to bad policy that treats data as a finite and zerosum resource that is only valuable in large volumes. Matt Sheehan writes that five dimensions are crucial for machine learning data today: quantity, depth, quality, diversity, and access. This understanding of data’s value matters because it means that policies by Beijing or Washington that seek to hoard or wall off data as a national resource from the other could have unintended consequences that lessen national power, rather than increase it.

Lack of regulation in the United States makes Americans’ sensitive data vulnerable to privacy and security harms not only from sophisticated state-backed cyber intrusions, but also from the unregulated industry of data brokers around the world trading in consumer data without transparency or controls. Setting basic standards on what data can be collected and retained by all companies will help protect U.S. personal data, regardless of where the risk originates. Developing a comprehensive federal privacy law that includes restrictions on data brokers is vital to this effort, along with the creation of strong enforcement mechanisms. Inaction by the United States means ceding leadership and influence in setting international standards to both Europe and China in setting international standards.

Without higher standards for data security and privacy, U.S. citizen data held by unregulated private companies are more vulnerable to breaches by hackers from China or from being sold to third-parties openly buying, aggregating, and selling consumer data. For example, Equifax’s many security issues are well-documented, such as the company’s failure to patch known vulnerabilities that ultimately left exposed the data of 145 million Americans. But the hack was also conducted by a foreign government entity with sophisticated hacking capabilities and access to considerable state resources. Companies should not have access to such a volume of personal data that it creates a target to be hacked or transmitted to China.

This reality is also why bans on Chinese software applications are not an effective way to secure Americans’ data. Even if TikTok were American-owned, for example, it could still legally sell data to data brokers that could transmit it to China’s security services.

Given this, American data is shockingly exposed and will remain that way so long as restrictions on data flows only focus on specific companies from countries deemed adversaries.

Debate over a range of issues will make progress on a federal privacy law slow. In the meantime, having baseline rules for the data broker industry would contribute to closing off vectors that make American’s data vulnerable to exploitation by a range of actors.

We must also keep in mind that U.S. actions to respond to data security risks posed by the Chinese government are not occurring in a vacuum. Our policy approach should be tailored to take into account the fact that technology competition with China will not only play out in the United States and China, but also in other parts of the world from India to Europe. How we respond to Chinese companies operating in the United States has ramifications on whether other countries are willing to accept our vision of data governance.

The ability of U.S. firms to maintain a high rate of innovation depends upon access to global markets, talent, and, perhaps most important, datasets. But rising data sovereignty policies around the world are an increasing obstacle to the ability of U.S. companies to operate internationally, beyond China. These policies are an effort by nation-states to ensure control over data by prohibiting transfers of data out of the country or seeking to limit foreign access to certain kinds of data. In this context, U.S. actions will be a reference and a roadmap for other governments that are concerned about U.S. companies and the U.S. government getting access to their citizens’ data.

The United States should work with like-minded governments to develop a common set of standards that would allow data to flow—building off of the concept of “data free flows with trust” put forward by Japan. A multilateral approach should be based on creating a system of incentives for compliance. The United States could lead the way in setting up a certification system that would extend benefits to countries whose data regimes and companies meet certain clear criteria for data protection. The OECD privacy guidelines, for example, could serve as a reference in creating a baseline for commercial data flows.

We need to address national security risks where they exist, but that should be done as one part of a broader U.S. initiative for comprehensive data privacy and higher cybersecurity standards for all companies —whether domestic or foreign. Failure to offer a compelling vision for U.S. data governance will make the United States less secure, less prosperous, and less powerful, and allow more space around the world for companies controlled by the CCP to flourish.

Samm Sacks is a Senior Fellow at Yale Law School Paul Tsai China Center & New America. 

To read the full testimony by Samm Sacks, please click here. 

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Although positively received by a wide range of countries which recognize the potential economic and social benefits of enabling a greater cross-border flow of data, it is not easy to introduce common legal frameworks to ensure DFFT. Countries often have varied domestic and regional legal frameworks due to different concepts of privacy or data security.

The G7 did put digital policy at the centre of its 2021 agenda, discussing broad digital and technology shifts from physical infrastructure such as 5G, future communication technologies, and technical standards to soft infrastructure, such as rule-making on data flow and internet safety principles. And one notable outcome was the establishment of the G7 Roadmap for Cooperation on Data Free Flow with Trust at the G7 Digital and Technology Ministers’ meeting in April 2021 – also endorsed by two of the G7’s guest countries South Korea and Australia.

But despite shared democratic values of open and competitive markets, strong safeguards for human rights, and fundamental freedoms, the G7 and its partners have different ideas on how best to approach DFFT, and so greater UK-EU-Japan policy coordination to overcome any inconsistencies in approach can play a key role.

UK using soft power

Brexit gave the UK an opportunity to refresh its approach to DFFT, having previously adhered to the European Union (EU) general data protection regulation (GDPR). The UK’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy has since set out a number of priority actions, such as promotion of the international flow of data to enable secure, trusted, and interoperable exchange across borders.

The UK is clearly trying to use its ‘soft power’ by establishing regulatory influence – as well as including data flows in trade deals, it is making ‘adequacy decisions’ with priority countries deemed to have suitable and robust safeguards of data. The UK-Japan comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA) – the UK’s first post-Brexit trade deal – includes bans on unjustified restrictions of cross-border electronic information transfers for business purposes, and on unjustified requirements to use or locate computing facilities in the countries in which business is conducted (this is known as ‘data localization’, a barrier to the free cross-border flow of data).

These changes mark a huge step-up from the arrangements made under the earlier EU-Japan trade deal, but it remains to be seen how the UK will adopt DFFT frameworks with broader trade partners in Asia, including via the CPTPP.

The G7 Roadmap – which the UK will lead – aims to deliver tangible outcomes on digital policy while being mindful of harmonization with the efforts of other international forums such as the G20 and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). But if the UK coordinates this harmonization effectively, expect the global formation of a DFFT area to expand dramatically.

Japan’s contribution to DFFT

Japan is another key leader of DFFT and it maintains a rigorous domestic personal data protection and privacy framework which the EU, with its own privacy protection regime considered the toughest in the world, recognizes as adequate to allow data sharing between the two parties.

Japan has also expanded its area of free data flow through trade agreements, incorporating similar provisions to those of the UK-Japan CEPA in the Japan-US digital trade agreement and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – the world’s largest free trade bloc of which Japan is a member – has also introduced frameworks for the free flow of data and a ban on data localization, but these frameworks are not as rigorous as those Japan has agreed elsewhere. Implementing parties may decide to ban data flow or enable data localization in exceptional circumstances that other parties are not allowed to dispute – this has generated concern over potential deviations from the original aims of the DFFT framework.

More broadly, there is also often ambiguity over what actually constitutes international standards and principles on data protection which can result in the implementation of slightly different legal frameworks between agreements. For Japan, the ability to set common frameworks with some flexibility has contributed to its engagement with a wider range of parties, including China, in the field of free data flow. But the development of truly common international standards on data protection remains imperative and the challenge of how best this can be advanced through discussion bodog poker review in the international arena continues.

Outside of trade deals, Japan participates in APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR), a government-backed data privacy certification which companies can join to demonstrate compliance with internationally-recognized data privacy protections. The CBPR System implements the APEC Privacy Frameworkendorsed by APEC Leaders in 2005 and updated in 2015.

EU’s rigorous GDPR protection

The EU has supported the UK in leading the G7 to a consensus on international rule-making regarding free flow of data. Using its rigorous GDPR, the EU has cautiously examined the legal frameworks of each of its trade partners and, where necessary, required additional reinforcements to ensure their laws reach a similar level.

So far the EU recognizes only 14 countries – including Japan – as providing adequate protections, although it is in the process of finalizing arrangements with South Korea and the UK. Although this approach secures the same level of protection as cross-border data flow, it takes a much longer path to realize the free flow of data.

The EU-US privacy shield adopted in July 2016 provides another path for transferring data between the two economies as it allows the free transfer of data to any companies certified in the US which adhere to the Privacy Shield Principles issued by US Department of Commerce. The advantage is this does not require reform to the entire legal system but is still able to maintain a level of privacy protection acceptable to the EU.

However, in its judgment of 16 July 2020 the European Court of Justice ruled the Privacy Shield invalid, underscoring the EU’s strict approach to personal data protection and the protection of individual rights. This has created barriers to data transfer between the EU and US which carry important consequences not only for trade but also for law enforcement and national security, and the US hopes to consult with the EU about this.

Despite differences in approach between the UK, EU, and Japan, they do share a common view that data can harness economic prosperity in a digital society. Ultimately the goal is to propose a set of packages to enable secure cross-border free flow of data, including considerations of how it can be regulated in practice across trade and other agreements.

It could be worth examining whether an APEC CBPR-type mechanism could be applicable to Europe. Although not an easy task – particularly given restrictions faced by the EU – increased UK-EU-Japan policy coordination could help identify a realistic balance between free data flow and privacy protection. Collectively, they are capable of creating innovative mechanisms to enable the world to realise DFFT much more quickly and securely.

Hiroki Sekine is visiting fellow with the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House. He was director of the policy and strategy office for financial operations at JBIC from July 2016 until June 2019 and, most recently, senior advisor to the corporate planning department at the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC).

To read the full commentary from Chatham House, please click here.

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Supply chain visibility has been a buzzword for several years and it is not hard to imagine why. With the advent of globalization and the internet in the 90s, the world became a lot more connected and consequently, supply chains became intricately networked and complex.

As companies grappled with this complexity, the need for better visibility was felt acutely. It has been more than two decades since globalization and the internet has now become mainstream, but it is harder than ever to maintain visibility over supply chains.

A survey of 623 supply chain professionals by GEOIDS indicated that visibility is still one of the top 3 priorities, while only 6% of them confessed having complete visibility over their supply chain. It is obvious that maintaining supply chain visibility is a very complex challenge facing agriculture companies today.

One way to look at this issue is through the “people, process, and technology” lens. Often, teams managing different points of the supply chain operate in siloes. To be fair, a lot of agriculture companies do understand this and have put in place processes that enable better collaboration between teams. But unfortunately, supply chains have a habit of being impacted by unexpected events – what if an important supplier collapsed? Or perhaps there was a political change or unexpected weather patterns squeezed supply? The truth is no one can anticipate these events. Even the best teams and the most well-designed processes will find it hard to adapt when the “unexpected” happens within a supply chain.

The challenge then lies with technology – specifically due to the fragmented nature of the technology being used. Teams in agriculture companies often use multiple software solutions to manage different activities of their supply chain, such as contract management, logistics, hedging & risk management, automation & task scheduling, etc. While this software does make it easy to carry out specific tasks, often they do not talk to each other. So someone has to manually collect information from these systems, put it in a spreadsheet, and apply specific algorithms to analyze data to get some visibility – which often takes days and weeks. This severely affects the company’s ability to respond rapidly to changes in the marketplace.

In today’s connected world, it is very important for agriculture companies to have a platform that can connect multiple systems to gather and analyze data, using algorithms specific to commodity supply chains. Such a platform would reliably support collaboration between teams and help supply chain executives adapt to unexpected events, providing a distinct advantage to agriculture firms.

To read the original commentary from Global Trade Magazine, please click here.

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While such a strategic platform for dialogue holds tremendous promise, the agenda will include some difficult issues. One of the thornier issues is Europe’s quest to dictate market outcomes with its proposed Digital Markets Act (DMA). The European Commission has signaled its interest to essentially abandon competition law as a tool to reign in anticompetitive behavior, opting instead to stitch together a regulatory straitjacket to be selectively applied to a handful of American companies. This is one of more than a dozen legislative efforts where the EU is looking to make its mark on digital economy policy, all under the banner of “technological sovereignty.” 

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The EU’s approach to competition enforcement for years has embraced the vast power of its underlying antitrust statutes to go after largeness. It has with little restraint imposed huge fines on American tech giants including Microsoft, Intel, and Google and required them to change business practices, ostensibly to give competitors a “fair” chance in the EU market.    

While the limitations of EU competition enforcement have yet to been found, Europe has decided that competition investigations aren’t worth the time needed to gather and evaluate evidence. Why bother with applying rigorous economic analysis to scrutinize allegedly anticompetitive conduct or to offer a remedy that is tailored so it goes no further than is necessary to restore competition in the market? Instead, Brussels has decided to prioritize stringent new regulations over competition law. Unlike most regulations, which apply to all market actors, the DMA is designed to a capture only a few companies, mostly American, effectively treating them as public utilities.  

Europe Is Piecing Together A Regulatory Straitjacket  

While commonplace in any functioning economy, regulation generally applies equally to all market actors. For example, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is designed to protect privacy. The importance placed on privacy is universal, and therefore requirements in the law apply broadly to all commercial actors. Even economic regulations, like VAT or labor laws, capture broad swaths of the economy. Such regulations do not signal out particular economic actors.    

The DMA is fundamentally different. The proposed legislation is not principle-based regulation and follows none of the norms of good regulatory practice.   

Instead, it is guided by an underlying belief that only a few should be subject to extensive regulatory controls, because application of these controls to a larger set of economic actors would be counter-productive to Europe’s drive towards increased competitiveness, innovation, and economic growth. It is a tacit admission that Europe’s companies need not be expected to compete on the merits.  

The net effect is that a handful of companies will be labeled as “gatekeepers.”  

These firms will not be subject to any investigation to determine if their conduct is a violation of any law; instead it would be assumed that because of their size, their economic freedoms should be restricted. This flies in the face of the principle of equal justice under law.  

Companies likely to be captured within the scope of the DMA have a limited number of things in common, apart from having some sort of platform business and a large market capitalization.  Most offer a diverse range of products and services and in many cases, the specific offerings aren’t necessarily even dominant in the individual markets in which they compete. Instead, of targeting business practices, or specific products or services, a gatekeeper would be essentially treated as if the entire company were a public utility. But unlike public utilities, few offerings from these companies are as essential to everyday life as, say, water or electricity.    

The range of devices that make up the “internet of things” and the explosion of the app economy have been nothing short of remarkable in terms of innovation and value creation. There are some players that have become immensely successful as they have been financially rewarded for making consumers’ lives more convenient. 

These companies have also ushered in innumerable economic opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses. As a result of these platforms, businesses of all sizes have seen transaction and marketing costs drop dramatically—even as their ability to effortlessly court consumers previously considered out of reach has expanded.    

Certain business practices associated with platform companies may deserve scrutiny, but artificially lumping them together under a set of overreaching rules makes little sense. A case-by-case, evidence-based approach to investigating potential wrong-doing is far preferable to the EU’s attempt to design a regulatory straitjacket.  

Taking A Page Out of China’s Playbook?  

To be clear, Europe is not China. Europe isn’t dominated by highly prized state-owned enterprises, nor does it have China’s restrictions that bar foreign investors from entering the market. But with the DMA, Brussels appears to be taking several pages out of Beijing’s playbook by imposing greater government control over the market, side-stepping due process, potentially compelling technology transfer, and generally setting up an unlevel regulatory pitch to benefit European companies at the expense of U.S. competitors. Here are three examples: 

• Targeting:  Europe argues that it is not targeting American firms, but, rather, large platforms that happen to be American, because it believes such platforms should have a duty to aid European competitors. Yet the DMA will focus on platforms the Commission designates as “gatekeepers” and will not capture many sizeable platforms operating in Europe. This echoes the unilateral digital services taxes imposed by several EU member states, which are cleverly crafted to apply almost exclusively to American companies in a manner that clearly violates the EU’s WTO commitments.     
• Due Process:  Of particular concern is the potentially arbitrary mechanism by which a company could be designated a “gatekeeper.” Would these companies be so designated for life? How would other companies be added? Most importantly, would a company be able to argue for removal of the designation? So far, the proposed DMA provides little clarity—and hence little comfort—on these questions.       
• Tech Transfer:  The DMA appears to impose an obligation for “gatekeepers” to share proprietary information with competitors and provide direct access to core technical and operational infrastructure, including operating systems. As drafted, the DMA does not include any relevant protections for trade secrets or intellectual property rights. It’s one thing to demand fair competition, but it is entirely another to insist that a company turn the keys to its factory over to a competitor.  

If adopted as is, the DMA would likely not meet Europe’s trade obligations, nor would it adopt a least trade restrictive approach to regulation. It would also take advantage of loopholes in trade law, which speak only in limited terms to investment or competition obligations. As the Biden Administration seeks to resolve long-standing disputes and adopt an allied approach to jointly tackle shared challenges with China, Europe’s proposed DMA is inconsistent with the collaborative, non-discriminatory, and plurilateral approach the EU seeks from the United States.   

Outlook  

Europe has the right to regulate its marketplace and enhance its regulatory environment in accordance with EU societal objectives.  It also has a requirement to abide by its trade commitments and to champion the non-discriminatory, market-based, least-trade restrictive principles it has long maintained as its essential philosophy. Internationally, the EU knows what it is like to be restrained in foreign markets when, in the name of security and sovereignty, regulatory frameworks are closely aligned with industrial policy and unilaterally imposed. 

The DMA, as drafted, seeks to manage competition versus promoting it. It is hardly a sure-fire path for boosting European competitiveness, nor is it easy to see how the DMA will spur innovation or investment in Europe. We hope the proposed legislation will change, but in the meantime, American business is closely watching the DMA and the EU’s broader approach to “tech sovereignty.” A U.S.-EU Trade & Technology Council would be a helpful platform to address some of the very real questions about Europe’s intentions.   

To read the full commentary, please click here.

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Transatlantic Data Flows in  Disarray   

Transatlantic data flows  have been in disarray  since the European Court of Justice’s decision last July to invalidate the Privacy Shield. The Court’s ruling in the “Schrems  II”  case  centered on European concerns about U.S. government access to  personal information, not  on  U.S. consumer privacy protections. U.S. businesses have nonetheless found themselves in the middle of a dispute between the U.S. Government, whose  lawful surveillance  practices  keep Americans and Europeans safe from shared threats to our security, and European privacy regulators insistent on a fundamentalist reading of the Court’s ruling. The Biden Administration’s decision to appoint a seasoned privacy leader as  its  chief negotiator, together with a joint U.S.-EU statement in March that talks were “intensifying,” offered  hope that a successor agreement was in sight.   

Europe’s Privacy Regulators are Changing Facts on the Ground  

As negotiations  drag on, however, U.S. businesses are facing  the  very real  specter of  forced  data localization in Europe.  A ruling on May 14 by the Irish High Court against Facebook  means that the Irish Data Protection Commissioner may be one step closer to invalidating  the use of  standard contractual clauses, a legal tool used by 90 percent of companies to transfer data out of Europe.  Meanwhile,  smaller companies  are already seeing their access to the market disrupted. In April, Bavaria’s data protection authority ordered a German fashion magazine to discontinue using Mailchimp, because the Atlanta-based newsletter service transferred European email addresses to the United States. Weeks later, Portugal’s national statistics authority was ordered to immediately stop using Cloudflare, because the San Francisco company’s terms of service did not guarantee that it stored and processed European personal information  exclusively  in Europe.  

With vocal support of the European Parliament, the EU’s privacy regulators are embracing forced data localization.  Last year, the EU’s  caucus of privacy  enforcers, the European Data Protection Board, issued draft guidelines to implement the  Schrems  II decision. The Board went well beyond the Court’s ruling, proposing to  ban  companies in the EU from using U.S.-based cloud or software services and  entirely  cutting off U.S. services exporters’ access to commercially meaningful data. While the Board is currently finalizing  its  guidelines, privacy regulators are already citing them in  enforcement actions against U.S. companies.  Importantly, neither Chinese nor Russian companies, nor EU data transfers to these jurisdictions, face  this  kind  of  scrutiny.  No doubt China’s state-backed and heavily protected tech giants see  a business opportunity. For American businesses and the U.S. government, there are now legitimate and intensifying questions as to why European regulators bodog casino seem more inclined to grant better treatment to Chinese and Russian tech companies than their U.S. counterparts. 

Protecting American Commercial Interests in Europe  

A new Privacy Shield will ward off the worst threats of data localization.  Absent a deal, however,  European regulators are changing facts on the  ground,  threatening to undermine U.S. economic interests—and transform Europe into a digital island.  In 2019, the U.S. exported more than $245 billion in digitally enabled services to Europe, double what it exported to the entire Asia-Pacific  region. This trade  supports  millions of good paying U.S. jobs  and is key to  U.S. competitiveness in the data-intensive industries of the future. Transatlantic data transfers  enable  an array of essential activities, including  multi-country clinical trials  for innovative medicines  such as COVID-19 vaccines, cybersecurity threat information sharing, and anti-fraud and anti-money laundering efforts.  

Supporting U.S. digital trade exports has long been a priority of  U.S. policymakers on both sides of the aisle.  Leaders  in Congress and across U.S. administrations have  pushed  back against discriminatory digital services taxes levied against U.S. companies  in Europe and beyond. The U.S. business community is eager to see  a revitalized transatlantic partnership. However, advancing a shared digital economy and trade agenda  will prove exceedingly  difficult if the U.S. is considered a singularly untrustworthy destination for EU personal information. In lieu of a swift conclusion to the Privacy Shield negotiations,  U.S. policymakers  may need to act to protect American commercial interests  in  Europe.   

Evangelos Razis is Director at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Center for Global Regulatory Cooperation. He serves as policy lead for the U.S. Chamber’s work on digital trade and global data privacy and artificial intelligence.  

To read the full commentary, please click here.

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Since 1994, when NAFTA took effect and one year before the WTO was created, average world tariffs have fallen by nearly 70 percent.^[3] 

However, from 1994 to 2019 the United States also added 36.8 million new jobs. More than half of these new jobs were filled by Black and Hispanic workers, including nearly 18 million net new jobs for Hispanic Americans and 7.2 million net new jobs for Black workers.^[4] 

From 1994 to 2019, average real hourly earnings for Hispanic workers increased by 25.2 percent as average real hourly earnings for Black workers increased by 17.5 percent. The earnings gap between these two minority groups and White workers was smaller in 2019 than it was in 1994.

In contrast to suggestions that U.S. manufacturing has declined due to imports and outsourcing, real manufacturing output actually increased by 55 percent from 1997 to 2019.^[6] Before the pandemic, U.S. manufacturing layoffs had been declining ever since 2001, the first year for which layoff statistics are available.^[7] 

Manufacturing job losses were overwhelmingly driven by technology, the opportunity for workers to move up to better jobs, and increases in the productivity of manufacturing workers, not by trade.^[8] For example, the average manufacturing worker’s productivity doubled from 1990 to 2019, meaning fewer workers could produce more goods.

Even so, the trend toward lower manufacturing employment reversed course in 2010. From 2010 to 2019 the United States added nearly 1.4 million new manufacturing jobs.^[10] 

In addition to helping create millions of new, higher-paying jobs during the NAFTA/WTO era, international trade has reduced the cost of living for American workers and their families. For example, clothing is more affordable now than it was in 1994, after adjusting for inflation and quality factors, a change that benefits nearly all Americans.^[11] The same goes for telephones, TVs, toys, and many other goods.

U.S. import taxes are regressive, meaning they disproportionately damage people with low incomes. A 2017 analysis by three former Obama administration economists, including the former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, concluded: “Tariffs – taxes on imported goods – likely impose a heavier burden on lower-income households, as these households generally spend more on traded goods as a share of expenditure/income and because of the higher level of tariffs placed on some key consumer goods.”^[12] Therefore reducing import tariffs is a progressive tax cut, with more benefits flowing to workers who earn less.

The record is clear: Trade has helped Black and Hispanic workers, who, not coincidentally, enthusiastically support trade. According to a 2017 Pew Research Center survey, large majorities of Black and Hispanic Americans think free trade agreements have been a good thing for the United States. Both groups were more likely to say that their financial situation has been helped by free trade agreements than hurt by them.^[13] 

The incoming Biden administration should strive to build on the benefits Americans have enjoyed as a result of declining global trade barriers. Specifically, the United States should do more to help Americans of all backgrounds by reducing import taxes on shoes, clothing, and other products that families need, while also cutting tariffs on imported inputs used by manufacturing workers to compete in the global marketplace.

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• New book Signals covers 27 macro trends transforming the global economy and markets.
• Some of the biggest trends include the rapid adoption of digital technology.
• From e-commerce to flexible working, here’s what COVID-19 has accelerated.

The following article uses charts and data from new book Signals (hardcover, ebook) which covers the 27 macro trends transforming the global economy and markets. In some cases, where appropriate, we’bodog poker review ve added in the most recent projections and data.

#1: Screen life takes hold

Smartphones have drastically altered many parts our lives – including how we spend time. In the decade from 2008 to 2018, screen time on mobile devices increased 12x.

Fast forward to today, and screen time is up across the board, with some of the most dramatic increases seen among kids and teenagers. 44% of people under the age of 18 now report four hours or more of screen time per day – up from 21% prior to the pandemic.

Gaming is another digital segment that has benefited from the pandemic. Video game revenue spiked in the springtime, and sales have remained strong going further into 2020. Companies are hoping that casual gamers won over during lockdown will continue playing once the pandemic has come to an end.

Acceleration signal: International bandwidth and internet traffic was already increasing steadily, but COVID-19 stay-at-home activity has blown away previous numbers.

Even as more workplaces and schools begin to operate normally again, it’s doubtful that screen time will drop back down to pre-COVID levels.

#2: The big consumer shake-up

The consumer economy has been innovating on two fronts: making physical buying as “frictionless” as possible, and making e-commerce as nimble as possible. COVID-19 broke old habits and sped up that evolution.

Innovations in real world shopping appear to be moving in the direction of cashierless checkouts, but in order for that model to work, people first need to embrace contactless payment methods such as mobile wallets and cards with tap payment.

So far, the pandemic has been an accelerant in moving people away from cash and pin-and-swipe credit cards in lagging markets. Once people get used to the convenience of contactless payments, it’s likely they’ll continue using those methods.

Of course, no conversation about e-commerce is complete without talking about Amazon. The company has seen consistent growth in subscription revenue in recent years, and the company’s actions have a wide-reaching effect on the rest of the industry.

Much like the gaming industry, e-commerce companies like Amazon are hoping that people who dabbled with online ordering during the pandemic months, will convert into lifelong customers.

Acceleration signal: E-commerce penetration projections have shifted upward.

In hindsight, 2020 could be an inflection point where e-commerce gained a much bigger slice of the overall retail pie.

#3: Peak globalization

Globalization went on a tear starting from the mid-1980s until it hit a plateau during the financial crisis. Since that point, global trade as a percentage of GDP has flat-lined in the face of trade wars, and now COVID-19.

Trade was obviously impacted by the pandemic, and it’s too early to say what the long-term effects will be. One thing that is clear is that the information component of globalization is becoming an even more important piece of the world’s economic puzzle.

Even before COVID-19 took hold, the global services trade was growing 60% faster than the goods trade, and was valued at approximately $13.4 trillion in 2019.

Acceleration signal: The dip in merchandise trade looks eerily similar to the one that took place in 2008.

#4: The wealth chasm

On the high end of the wealth spectrum, billionaires are worth more than ever.

Meanwhile, in the broader economy, inequality has grown over the last few decades. Those in the top 50% wealth bracket have seen increasing gains, while the bottom 50% have seen stagnation.

This issue is sure to be compounded by economic turmoil brought on by COVID-19. Younger generations face the dual challenges of being more likely to be negatively impacted by the pandemic, while also being the least likely to have savings to cover an interruption in income.

In fact, nearly half of people in the 18–24 year old age group have nothing saved at all.

The longer the economy is affected by COVID-19 measures, the more of a wedge will be driven between people who have continued working and those who are employed in impacted industries (e.g. tourism, events).

Acceleration signal: Growth in the net worth of billionaires has been largely unaffected by COVID-19.

#5: The flexible workplace

As of 2019, over half of companies that didn’t have a flexible or remote workplace policy cited “longstanding company policy” as the reason. In other words, that is just the way things have always worked.

Of course, the pandemic has forced many companies to rethink these policies.

This grand experiment in remote work and distributed teams will have an impact on office life as we know it, potentially reshaping the entire “office economy”. The impact is already being felt, with global commercial property investment volume falling by 48% in Q3 2020.

Acceleration signal: Thousands of people are moving out of pricy urban areas, presumably because they are able to work remotely from a cheaper location.

111,000 people have moved away from Manhattan, New York. Image: MYMOVE analysis of USPS data, circa Oct 2020

To read the original blog post, please click here.

Nick Routley is the Creative Director and Writer at Visual Capitalist.

 

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For a bureaucracy, money is oxygen and people are blood cells.

And anaemia has been a recurring affliction for Australia’s Foreign Affairs Department since it was born in November 1970, casting off its old moniker, External Affairs.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has grown into a great department of state, yet warnings about the impact of anaemia on its work and effectiveness are a persistent motif over 50 years.

The template for the dire diagnosis was set by the 1986 review of Australia’s overseas representation, authored by the department’s secretary, Stuart Harris.

As a medium-sized country with limited economic and military power, Australia must rely heavily on persuasion to achieve its vital overseas objectives, Harris wrote, yet the ‘capacity to do this is thin and becoming thinner’. Australia accepted the need ‘to spend substantially to maintain an orthodox defence capacity’ yet wouldn’t do the same for diplomacy. The pressure on most areas of overseas representation led to Australia’s ‘falling short of our capacity to achieve some of our international objectives’.

When the Lowy Institute reported on Australia’s ‘diplomatic deficit’ in 2009, it found that DFAT’s overseas missions were ‘overstretched and hollowed out’. Years of underfunding had diminished the department’s ‘policy capacity and rendered many overseas missions critically overstretched’. The ever-rising consular workload had displaced ‘our diplomats’ capacity to contribute to wider national objectives’. By international standards, Australia operated a disproportionately small diplomatic network. And ‘language skills of DFAT staff have been in decline over the last two decades’.

Returning to the ‘diplomatic disrepair’ case in 2011, Lowy found that Australia’s traditional diplomatic footprint was outdated and inadequate: ‘Both political parties are to blame. Unless these deficiencies are remedied, our economic, political and security interests could be seriously jeopardised.’

The Lowy disrepair report revealed that DFAT’s overseas network had shrunk by 37% over two decades ago, despite ‘massive growth in the Australian public service (60% in 15 years)’. The government should reduce staff numbers in Canberra to get more of our diplomats overseas, the report said, and prevent further erosion of DFAT’s policy and diplomatic capacity by reviewing the way consular services are delivered and funded.

Parliament’s joint foreign affairs committee concluded in 2012 that DFAT had suffered ‘chronic underfunding’ for the previous three decades. The diplomatic network was ‘seriously deficient’ because of cuts imposed by successive governments: ‘Australia has the smallest diplomatic network of the G20 countries and sits at 25th in comparison to the 34 nations of the OECD. Australia clearly is punching below its weight.’

When the Public Service Commission did a capability review in 2013, it described DFAT as a ‘strong and agile’ organisation with ‘great potential to deliver more to the government and to the Australian community’. So the great department wasn’t quite delivering. ‘In the view of its own staff and others’, the review reported, ‘DFAT is more effective at advocacy and delivery than at strategic thinking.’

The capability review set out the anaemia problem by listing the department’s challenges, expressing them as the obverse of its strengths. The commission’s strengths-versus-challenges list is a description of a department needing to get more oxygen to its blood cells:

• loyalty of staff to department versus ‘institutional insularity’
• flexibility of workforce versus ‘churn and poor workforce planning’
• talented generalists versus ‘strains on specialisation’
• excellence of overseas networks versus a department that’s ‘less effective in Canberra’
• excellent delivery in a crisis and a ‘can-do’ approach versus suspicion of prioritisation and strategic planning
• high responsiveness to ministers versus ‘less clearly articulated departmental views’
• effective advocacy of existing policy versus ‘less good at policy development’.

The federal budget maps the trend. In 1949, the Bodog Poker combined budget for diplomacy, trade and aid was almost 9% of the federal budget, reducing to 3.2% by 1969, 1.9% by 1989, 1.5% by 2009, and then down to the current 1.3%. The figures are from Melissa Conley Tyler’s report for Australian Foreign Affairs on systematic underfunding. As she comments:

Since 2013, Australia’s total diplomatic, trade and aid budgets have fallen from 1.5% of the federal budget to 1.3%. In pure dollar terms, this is a fall from A$8.3 billion to A$6.7 billion. At the same time, the budgets for defence, intelligence and security have ballooned. In the almost two decades since the September 11 terror attacks, the Department of Defence budget has increased by 291%, while the allocation for the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation has grown by 528% and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service by 578%.

Busy doing urgent business, DFAT rightly worries that it’s letting important business slide. Busy is understandable when there’s a diverse range of responsibilities: bilateral and multilateral, high and low policy, plus all the functions of a service department.

This conglomerate bureaucracy does high policy (diplomacy, strategy and security interests); low policy (trade and economic interests); a $4 billion aid program that proves the old high–low policy distinction is pretty meaningless; issues 1.7 million passports annually, with 1,400 active consular cases on any one day; and at its embassies and missions, manages security, estates, information and communication, including hosting 30 Commonwealth departments, agencies or entities that have staff in Oz overseas posts. The conglomerate has four agencies that do trade and investment, international agricultural research, spying and tourism.

The Public Service Commission review said DFAT knew it had a ‘serious problem’ sharing its knowledge with other departments and was too detached from the rest of the public service. DFAT ‘should play more of a central agency-type role’ in shaping international political, economic or strategic policies:

DFAT is not seen by other government agencies, or by some of its own people, as performing as well in Canberra as it does overseas. It is perceived as being distant from policy processes outside traditional national security and trade areas, even on issues like the global economy or energy where it has something to bring to the table.

To extend the anaemia metaphor, the heart of DFAT’s problem is in the rest of Canberra that surrounds its R.G. Casey Building headquarters.

To read the original blog post, please click here.

Graeme Dobell is ASPI’s journalist fellow.

The Strategist — The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Blog. Copyright © 2020

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Distribution of COVID-19 cases worldwide, as of 7 November 2020

More specifically, in the last sixteen days, the number of new COVID-19 cases globally over the last fourteen days has shot from five million to over seven million — a near forty percent increase in a little over two weeks. The total new cases identified since late December 2019 globally are just under 50 million (49.37 million) as of November 7.

On October 22, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recorded the first day where the number of new COVID-19 cases over a fourteen day period globally surpassed five million (5,042,415). In just eight days, on October 30, the ECDC reports the fourteen day total shooting past six million new cases (6,093,987), an increase of 1,051,572 or 20.85% in eight days. Today’s report (November 7) shows the total new cases in the last fourteen days crossing the seven million mark — 7,044,267 — or 15.59% over October 30 and 39.70% over October 22. As reviewed in two prior posts (October 22 and October 30), the U.S. and Europe were major factors in hitting five million and six daily cases and today’s data show them to continue to be the major causes of the continued rapid escalation in global cases. See October 22, 2020, COVID-19 new cases over last 14 days pass 5,000,000 for first time on October 22, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/10/22/covid-19-new-cases-over-last-14-days-pass-5000000-for-first-time-on-october-22/; October 30, 2020,  In last eight days, the number of global new COVID-19 cases over past fourteen days has grown from five to six million, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/10/30/in-last-eight-days-the-number-of-global-new-covid-19-cases-over-past-fourteen-days-has-grown-from-five-to-six-million/.

The table below shows the fourteen day totals for selected countries as of October 22, October 30 and November 7 and the change in new cases from October 22 – November 7. These twenty countries show an increase in sixteen days of 2,009,689 new cases over the fourteen day periods examined or more than the global total increase of 2,001,852 new cases over the same sixteen days The 20 countries accounted for 2,558,802 new cases for the fourteen days ending October 22 or 50.75% of the global total at that time. For the fourteen days ending October 30, the 20 countries accounted for 3,584,674 new cases or 58.82% of the global total. Finally, for the fourteen days ending November 7, the 20 countries accounted for 4,568,491 new cases or 64.85% of the global total.

While the United States has the largest absolute increase in the last eight days for a single country, the vast majority of the increase flows from countries within the European Union. With the exception of the United States, the rest of the countries in the chart are from Europe, most from the EU.

It is little wonder, then, that the EU, the UK and Switzerland, with dramatic growth in the number of new cases, are imposing renewed restrictions at least in many countries and facing backlash from citizens suffering COVID-19 exhaustion. See, e.g., Politico, November 1, 2020, Europe is living a coronavirus flashback plus a backlash, https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-is-living-a-coronavirus-flashback-plus-a-backlash/. While health care is handled by the individual countries within the the EU, the EU has been advocating better coordination and maintaining trade flows within the Community as countries come to grips with the current wave. See, e.g., Politico, October 30, 2020, EU leaders link arms for long fight against virus, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-leaders-link-arms-for-long-fight-against-virus/.

In the United States, the number of new cases is spiking again, with new cases now more than 100,000/day in recent days and the fourteen day total new cases of 1,245,876 is more than 20% higher than was recorded on November 1 — the first day where a fourteen day total of new cases in teh U.S. topped one million. See November 1, 2020, United States becomes second country to have more than 1,000,000 new COVID-19 cases in fourteen days, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/11/01/united-states-becomes-second-country-to-have-more-than-1000000-new-covid-19-cases-in-fourteen-days/. With most attention in the U.S. focused on the election results, the COVID-19 situation is receiving relatively limited press attention and no change in federal government response.

Other parts of the world are not experiencing a second wave to the same extent, although much of the Americas remain at very high levels of new cases. Some major countries who have been seriously hit in recent months are seeing substantial reductions in new cases. India is the leading example — on October 22, the last 14 days showed 871,291 new cases; on October 30, for the last 14 days new cases were down to 718,383, and were down to 647,398 for the 14 days ending on November 7.

Conclusion

The top priority for many countries around the world is getting the COVID-19 pandemic under control. The costs in terms of human life and serious health problems are enormous. So too the costs to the global economy from taking the steps necessary to address the pandemic are enormous. For example, the European Union recently reduced its projected economic growth in 2021 because of the second wave of COVID-19 cases. See Politico, November 5, 2020, EU cuts economic forecast due to coronavirus wave, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-cuts-economic-forecast-due-to-coronavirus-wave/ (2021 forecast cut from 6.1% growth to 4.2% growth).

How to address the pandemic and how to work internationally to secure a return to normalcy and a return to sustainable economic growth are the challenges for all governments and international organizations, including the WTO, WHO, IMF, World Bank and many others. Recent IMF regional economic outlooks show varied projections for economic growth for different parts of the world and major challenges for areas like Sub-Saharan Africa. See, e.g., IMF Press Release, October 22, 2020, Regional Economic Outlook, Sub-Saharan Africa, a difficult road to recovery, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/10/21/pr20319-sub-saharan-africa-a-difficult-road-to-recovery.

bodog casino The fact that the number of new cases is continuing to surge globally ten months after the start of global surveillance is obviously troubling and delays the return to normalcy. While some individual countries have gained control of the pandemic and others are making significant strides to reduce the number of new cases, “no one is safe until all are safe”. We have a long road to travel, and the western developed world is currently the major hot spot, struggling with the current extraordinary surge. We still are not in sight of a global peak and the rest of 2020 is likely to continue to stress global capabilities.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, bodog poker review|Most Popular_Congressional

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However, despite the manifold benefits of cloud-based outsourcing, some sectors have proved largely immune to its charms. One such is the investment management sector, where the majority of firms have long eschewed outsourcing their data management requirements.

Perhaps looking to maintain control of their data, these firms instead find themselves burdened with complex and costly ‘defensive’ data tasks, such as data quality assurance, standardisation, and validation. By and large, the approach taken by such firms is to invest in ETL tools, data warehouses, and enterprise data management systems – an approach that hampers agility and leads to rapid cost inflation.

Outsourcing momentum gathers pace

Finally, however, things are beginning to change. Every year, RIMES runs a survey of buy-side firms, with the aim of uncovering some of the trends driving data management in the space. This year, our survey found that three times as many firms are planning to outsource data management compared to last year. These findings are supported by other surveys, such as one by Northern Trust, which found that nearly half of global asset management firms are considering data management outsourcing.

From the conversations I’ve had with clients, one of the reasons data management outsourcing is increasingly in vogue is because firms are looking to do much more with their data. In the past, it was easy to relegate data management to the back-office, because it only really served back-office functions. Conversely today, firms are looking at how they can use data to enable and optimise middle, second line and front-office functions.

Such offensive data strategies seek to turn data into a competitive differentiator, but they only become possible when a good defensive data strategy is already in place. The danger is that as companies invest in offensive capabilities, they overlook the necessary operational data foundation. If this happens, firms may find that their investments fail to deliver as expected across scope, timelines, and cost.

A strong data foundation

This is where outsourcing comes into its own. By outsourcing the complex and non-core data sourcing, mastering, and governance processes that lie at the heart of defensive data strategies, firms can focus on the value-adding offensive capabilities that are core to their businesses and which help them generate alpha. Viewed this way, outsourcing data management becomes a foundation for the successful commercial exploitation of that data.

Within this overarching driver, there are a several other benefits that are coming together to make a compelling case for data outsourcing. These include:

Bridging the data skills gap – Data expertise is in short supply and is becoming more expensive to acquire as data management shifts from being a processing-centric task to one focused on business enablement. Managed data services provide on-demand access to the expertise and resources firms now need to thrive.

Lower cost of ownership – Outsourcers can leverage economies of scale to help reduce the cost of data management. By helping create a single unified data operation they can also ensure against the duplication of data licenses (our survey revealed that managing data license costs is still one of the most important priorities of firms). When underpinned by stringent SLAs these cost benefits become even more compelling for firms.

Greater commercial control and visibility – Finally, managed data services can help firms bring order to data management practices that can be unwieldly. Often, business users will use data in siloes, which can create governance issues and drive up costs. By taking data management as a service, firms can overcome this complexity and ensure one single, well-governed data framework is in place. What’s more, as outsourced services can be bought and paid for on consumption-based modelling, firms can easily scale their data according to need.

Cloud-based outsourcing has already transformed the way businesses operate in a large number of industries. The investment management sector is now undergoing its own transformation. Over the medium-term, the sector will become increasingly data-driven, and firms will secure or lose market share based on their data strategies and the operational insights and business models that their data enables.

As a first step, firms need to get their data management in order and secure a complete, accurate and timely source of data for all their operational needs. Clearly, taking this data as a managed service is making more and more sense. 

Andrew Barnett is the global head of product management at RIMES 

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