Exceptional policy support prevented a global economic depression, even as the pandemic took a heavy toll on lives and livelihoods. The global reaction, as seen in major shifts in travel, consumption, and trade, also made the world a more economically imbalanced place as reflected in current account balances—a record of a country’s transactions with the rest of the world.

In our latest External Sector Report we found that the global reaction to the pandemic further widened global current account balances—the sum of absolute deficits and surpluses among all countries—from 2.8 percent of world GDP in 2019 to 3.2 percent of GDP in 2020. Those balances are set to widen further as the pandemic continues to rage in much of the world.

If not for the crisis, global current account balances would have continued to decline. While external deficits and surpluses are not necessarily a cause for concern, excessive imbalances—larger than warranted by the economy’s fundamentals and appropriate economic policies—can have destabilizing effects on economies by fueling trade tensions and increasing the likelihood of disruptive asset price adjustments.

A year like no other

The dramatic fluctuations in current account deficits and surpluses in 2020 were driven by four major pandemic-fueled trends:

• Travel declined: The pandemic led to a sharp decrease in tourism and travel. This had a significant negative impact on the account balances of countries that rely on tourism revenue, such as Spain, Thailand, Turkey, and even larger consequences for smaller tourism-dependent economies.
• Oil demand collapsed: The collapse in oil demand and energy prices was relatively short lived, with oil prices recovering in the second half of 2020. However, oil-exporting economies, such as Saudi Arabia and Russia, saw current account balances decline sharply in 2020. Oil-importing countries saw corresponding increases to their oil trade balances.
• Medical products trade boomed: Demand surged by about 30 percent for medical supplies critical for fighting the pandemic, such as personal protective equipment, as well as the inputs and materials to make them, with implications for importers and exporters of these items.
• Household consumption shifted: As people were forced to stay home, households shifted their consumption away from services toward consumer goods. This happened most in advanced economies where there was an increase in the purchase of durable goods like electrical appliances used to accommodate teleworking and virtual learning.

All of these factors contributed to some countries seeing a wider current account deficit, meaning they bought more than they sold, or a larger current account surplus, meaning they sold more than they bought. Favorable global financial conditions, with the unprecedented monetary policy support from major central banks, made it easier for countries to finance wider current account deficits. In contrast, during past crises where financial conditions sharply tightened, running current account deficits was harder, pushing countries further into recession.

On top of these external factors, the pandemic led to massive government borrowing to finance health care and provide economic support to households and firms, creating large uneven effects on trade balances.

The outlook

Global current account balances are set to widen even further in 2021 but this trend is not expected to last. The latest IMF staff forecasts indicate that global current account balances will narrow in the coming years, as China’s surplus and the US’ deficit falls, reaching 2.5 percent of world GDP by 2026.

A reduction in balances could be delayed if large deficit economies like the US undertake additional fiscal expansions or there is a faster-than-expected fiscal adjustment in current account surplus countries, like Germany. A resurgence of the pandemic and a tightening of global financial conditions that disrupt the flow of capital to emerging markets and developing economies could also affect balances.

Despite the shock of the crisis and possibly due to its worldwide impact, excessive current account deficits and surpluses were broadly unchanged in 2020, representing about 1.2 percent of world GDP. Most of the drivers of excess external imbalances pre-date the pandemic and include fiscal imbalances as well as structural and competitiveness distortions.

Rebalancing the world economy

Ending the pandemic for everyone in the world is the only way to ensure a global economic recovery that prevents further divergence. This will require a global effort to help countries secure financing for vaccinations and maintain healthcare.

A synchronized global investment push or a synchronized health spending push to end the pandemic and support the recovery could have large effects on world growth without raising global balances.

Governments should step up efforts to resolve trade and technology tensions and modernize international taxation. A top priority should be the phasing out of tariff and non-tariff barriers, especially on medical products.

Countries with excess current account deficits should, where appropriate, seek to reduce budget deficits over the medium term and make competitiveness-raising reforms, including in education and innovation policies. In economies with excess current account surpluses and remaining fiscal space, policies should support the recovery and medium-term growth, including through greater public investment.

In the years to come, countries will need to simultaneously rebalance, while ensuring that the recovery is built on a solid and durable foundation.

To read the full commentary from IMF Blogs, please click here. 

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“At the direction of President Donald J. Trump, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is initiating an investigation addressing two significant issues with respect to Vietnam. USTR will investigate Vietnam’s acts, policies, and practices related to the import and use of timber that is illegally harvested or traded, and will investigate Vietnam’s acts, policies, and practices that may contribute to the undervaluation of its currency and the resultant harm caused to U.S. commerce. USTR will conduct the investigation under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. As part of its investigation on currency undervaluation, USTR will consult with the Department of the Treasury as to issues of currency valuation and exchange rate policy.

“United States Trade Representative Robert E. Lighthizer said, ‘President Trump is firmly committed to combatting unfair trade practices that harm America’s workers, businesses, farmers, and ranchers. Using illegal timber in wood products exported to the U.S. market harms the environment and is unfair to U.S. workers and businesses who follow the rules by using legally harvested timber. In addition, unfair currency practices can harm U.S. workers and businesses that compete with Vietnamese products that may be artificially lower-priced because of currency undervaluation. We will carefully review the results of the investigation and determine what, if any, actions it may be appropriate to take.’

“USTR will issue two separate Federal Register notices next week that will provide details of the investigation and information on how members of the public can provide their views through written submissions.”

https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/october/ustr-initiates-vietnam-section-301-investigation.

The two Federal Register notices were published on October 8. Initiation of Section 301 Investigation: Vietnam’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Currency Valuation, 85 Fed. Reg. 63637-68 (Oct. 8, 2020); Initiation of Section 301 Investigation : Vietnam’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to the Import and Use of Illegal Timber, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,639-70 (Oct. 8, 2020).

In each notice of initiation, USTR reviews the concerns leading to the 301 investigation, indicates that consultations with Vietnam have been requested, provides a timeline for the public to submit written comments and indicates that because of uncertainties from COVID-19, USTR is not scheduling a public hearing but “will provide further information in a subsequent notice if it will hold a hearing”. Public comments in both investigations are due on November 12, 2020.

The currency investigation flows from the following concerns identified in the notice of initiation.

“The Government of Vietnam, through the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), tightly manages the value of its currency—the dong. The SBV’s management of Vietnam’s currency is closely tied to the U.S. dollar. Available analysis indicates that Vietnam’s currency has been undervalued over the past three years. Specifically, analysis indicates that the dong was undervalued on a real effective basis by approximately 7 percent in 2017 and by approximately 8.4 percent in 2018. Furthermore, analysis indicates that the dong’s real effective exchange rate was undervalued in 2019 as well.

“Available evidence also indicates that the Government of Vietnam, through the SBV, actively intervened in the exchange market, which contributed to the dong’s undervaluation in 2019. Specifically, the evidence indicates that in 2019, the SBV undertook net purchases of foreign exchange totaling approximately $22 billion, which had the effect of undervaluing the dong’s exchange rate with the U.S. dollar during that year. Analysis suggests that Vietnam’s action on the exchange rate in 2019 caused the average nominal bilateral exchange rate against the dollar over the year, 23,224 dong per dollar, to be undervalued by approximately 1,090 dong per dollar relative to the level consistent the equilibrium real effective exchange rate.” 84 FR 63637-38.

The public is asked to provide written comments on six issues:

“• Whether Vietnam’s currency is undervalued, and the level of the
undervaluation.

“• Vietnam’s acts, policies, or practices that contribute to undervaluation of its currency.

“• The extent to which Vietnam’s acts, policies, or practices contribute to the
undervaluation.

“• Whether Vietnam’s acts, policies and practices are unreasonable or discriminatory.

“• The nature and level of burden or restriction on U.S. commerce caused by the undervaluation of Vietnam’s currency.

“• The determinations required under section 304 of the Trade Act, including what action, if any, should be taken.” 85 FR at 63638.

In the timber investigation, the background information which led to the initiation of the investigation is described as follows:

“Vietnam is one of the world’s largest exporters of wood products, including to the United States. In 2019, Vietnam exported to the United States more than $3.7 billion of wooden furniture. To supply the timber inputs needed for its wood products manufacturing sector, Vietnam relies on imports of timber harvested in other countries. Available evidence suggests that a significant portion of that imported timber was illegally harvested or traded (illegal timber). Some of that timber may be from species listed under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).

“Evidence indicates that much of the timber imported by Vietnam was harvested against the laws of the source country. Reports indicate that a significant amount of the timber exported from Cambodia to Vietnam was harvested on protected lands, such as wildlife sanctuaries, or outside of and therefore in violation of legal timber concessions. Cambodia nevertheless remains a significant source of Vietnam’s timber imports. Similarly, timber sourced from other countries, such as Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), may have been harvested against those countries’ laws.

“In addition, Vietnamese timber imports may be traded illegally. For example, it appears that most timber exported from Cambodia to Vietnam crosses the border in violation of Cambodia’s log export ban. In addition, aspects of the importation and processing of this timber also may violate Vietnam’s domestic law and be inconsistent with CITES.” 85 FR 63639.

Public comments are sought on the following six issues:

“• The extent to which Vietnamese producers, including producers of
wooden furniture, use illegal timber.

“• The extent to which products of Vietnam made from illegal timber,
including wooden furniture, are imported into the United States.

“• Vietnam’s acts, policies, or practices relating to the import and use
of illegal timber.

“• The nature and level of the burden or restriction on U.S. commerce caused by Vietnam’s import and use of illegal timber.

“• The determinations required under section 304 of the Trade Act, including what action, if any, should be taken.” 85 FR 63639.

USTR must make a determination within twelve months of the initiation of the two investigations. USTR can seek agreement with Vietnam to address the U.S. concerns.

The investigations are being started roughly one month before the November 3 U.S. elections. Obviously, if President Trump is reelected, the investigations will continue. If former Vice President Biden is elected, it is unclear what his Administration would do with the pending investigations (if USTR has not completed them by January 20, 2021)., although presumably the investigations would be continued and completed.

The two Federal Register notices are embedded below.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, Current Thoughts on Trade.

To read the original blog post, click here. 

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Last year, the U.S. exported $106 billion worth of goods to China. About $68 billion worth of those exports are covered in the Phase One deal, and China has agreed to purchase more than double that over the next two years.

Those include soybeans, cotton, lobsters, cars, crude oil, semiconductors, and more.

But what about the goods China won’t be buying more of? What about the other $38 billion worth of goods U.S. exporters normally sell to China?

The biggest items that were left out of the deal were civilian aircraft, engines, and parts, which the U.S. exported more than $10 billion worth of to China last year.

Other items—which may not grab headlines like soybean and corn sales—include optical equipment, motor vehicle parts, chemicals and plastics, platinum, scrap (paper, copper, aluminum), and other miscellaneous goods.

Nonetheless, those are goods Americans work hard to create and sell when and where they can.

The administration has given no indication of whether more purchases will be included in the second—Phase Two—deal with China. It has indicated that Phase Two is to include more structural issues, like dealing with China’s government support for its industries.

But even then, Phase Two negotiations are a long way off.

In fact, the administration isn’t even thinking about Phase Two right now.

That makes sense, given that Phase One was just signed in January. Negotiations will likely have to wait until 2021, and progress on Phase One is measurable. But it also means Americans will have to continuing paying high tariffs on imports from China.

The administration has said tariffs on $370 billion worth of imports from China will remain until Phase Two is finished.

But even then, the administration’s lead negotiator is no longer sure what the goal of the past three years of the U.S.-China trade war has become.

“I don’t know what the end goal is,” U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer said. “Right now, we need to stop an aggressive force.”

At one time, the administration’s goal was closing the trade deficit with China, which is a dubious objective, given the value that both exports and imports bring to the U.S. economy.

It’s also a goal that hasn’t been met. After actually increasing in 2017-2018, the goods trade deficit with China in 2019 is about the same as it was in 2016. 

Nevertheless, if the administration wanted the Chinese to buy more U.S. goods, why not ask them to buy more of all U.S. exports, instead of picking winners and losers?

Better yet, why not focus on the sort of structural trade liberalization in both the U.S. and China that would raise overall volumes of trade, a measure that has declined since 2016? 

Now that would be a Phase Two worth having.  

To view the original blog post at the Heritage Foundation, please click here 

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The commitment to market-determined exchange rates was long the policy of the Obama administration and China had accepted this goal through its participation in communiques of G-20 finance ministers and central bank governors, who endorsed it. China has not engaged in substantial intervention in the foreign exchange market since 2016, and its current account (trade) surplus has been less than 2 percent of GDP in recent years.

In August 2019, the US Treasury designated China as a currency manipulator. At that time, Treasury claimed that “China has taken concrete steps to devalue its currency,” but no evidence has emerged to support that claim. Rather, most economists and market analysts agree that China’s currency depreciated organically, without official manipulation, in a market response to rising expectations of US tariffs on Chinese exports, a textbook economic relationship that is supported by a recent PIIE working paper. It is undoubtedly true that China could have intervened to prevent or reverse the depreciation of August 2019, but that would be contrary to the goal of maintaining a market-determined exchange rate. The phase one currency chapter does not call for China to take any steps to resist future market developments.

To view the full blog, click here.

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In recognizing this trend, while employing somewhat misguided criteria, the US Treasury Department again did not name any country a manipulator in its semiannual report to Congress on Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States on May 28. This post updates the status of manipulation by 19 countries using the Bergsten-Gagnon criteria (listed below).

According to Bergsten and Gagnon (2017), a country must meet all of the following criteria to be considered a currency manipulator in a given calendar year:

• the current account surplus exceeds 3 percent of GDP;
• net acquisitions of official foreign-currency assets (net official flows) exceed 2 percent of GDP;
• foreign exchange reserves and other official foreign assets exceed three months of imports;
• foreign exchange reserves and other official foreign assets exceed 100 percent of short-term external debt, public and private;
• net official flows exceed 65 percent of oil exports minus production cost;
• classification by the World Bank as a high-income or upper-middle-income country.

Some oil exporters increased purchases, but only Norway manipulated

One notable change in 2018 was an increase in foreign asset purchases by a few major oil exporters. Oil prices fell sharply in 2014 and 2015, prompting many oil exporters to draw down their foreign assets in 2016 and 2017. Prices have recovered partially since then. Only Algeria and Trinidad and Tobago continued to draw down foreign assets in 2018, while Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) returned to balance. The remaining oil exporters—Norway, Kuwait, and Russia—either resumed or increased purchases of foreign assets. Only Norway’s purchases, however, exceed 65 percent of oil exports minus production cost. For most oil producers, the optimal saving rate out of net oil revenues is less than 75 percent, some of which should be invested at home Gagnon (2018).

Some financial centers had lower private capital inflows in 2018

Financial centers have been the largest manipulators in recent years. In dollar terms, Switzerland and Singapore had the world’s largest net official flows in 2016 and 2017, and Singapore continued to do so in 2018. Manipulation in these economies typically responds to private capital inflows, which can be volatile. In 2018, private capital inflows slowed, reducing the amount of net official flows needed to stabilize their exchange rates. However, net official flows continued to exceed the 2 percent of GDP criterion in Singapore and Macao.

Each financial center’s manipulation is a response to different circumstances. Switzerland’s central bank conducts its manipulation to prevent further appreciation of the Swiss franc and maintain a large current account surplus. Singapore’s manipulation derives primarily from its public pension system, which collects high payroll taxes from workers and invests them entirely overseas through a sovereign wealth fund to back future pension obligations. Hong Kong and Macao have fixed exchange rates and high rates of domestic saving, which create current account surpluses that the monetary authority buys up to prevent appreciation. Macao also has a separate fiscal reserve account that invests fiscal surpluses overseas.

China is not manipulating

China was by far the largest currency manipulator in 2003–13. It reversed that practice in 2015–16, when it sold large amounts of foreign assets to prevent its currency from depreciating when private investors became net sellers. The private net outflow ended in 2017, and China was the third largest net official purchaser in dollar terms that year. But these flows were less than 1 percent of GDP. Based on incomplete data, China made essentially no net purchases or sales in 2018, but maintained its enormous stock of official assets, the bulk of which are reserves.

To view the full blog, click here.

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