The conclusion earlier this month of the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS) by New Zealand, Costa Rica, Switzerland and Iceland comes at a time when the world is experiencing record-high temperatures, spreading wildfires, and destructive floods and droughts. Despite these developments, WTO members have been unable to rally consensus to develop new trading rules to help halt these trends, highlighted by their recent failure to bring the second part of the fisheries subsidies agreement over the finish line.

The ACCTS reflects an emerging model for trade agreements — one that is limited in participants and sectors but can be concluded more quickly and without sacrificing ambition.

Instead of sitting around in endless discussions on what is the best way to incorporate climate change and sustainability concerns into trade agreements, these four small, trade-dependent countries moved into action and hammered out meaningful commitments. The agreement is an important step in elaborating on what is possible in this contested space. The parties hope that others will join over time, or even adopt similar rules in their own bilateral agreements, providing momentum for a broader multilateral agreement.

ACCTS has four key components. First, the four parties will eliminate tariffs on over 300 “environmental goods” upon entry into force. Although the list of goods has not yet been released, the members claim it is the most comprehensive and ambitious list of agreed-upon goods to date, including solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicles, recycled paper and wood products offering a more environmentally sound alternative to carbon-intensive construction materials. It also includes criteria for qualifying as an environmental good so there can be ongoing updates. The tariff cuts will apply to all WTO members (not just the other parties), so as to be consistent with WTO rules.

Second, the parties went beyond goods commitments to also open up their service sectors. They agreed to new levels of market access in more than 100 sectors that make a “substantial contribution to addressing pressing environmental purposes.” However, which sectors these are, and the level of market access agreed upon, is yet to be made public.

Third, the agreement provides a new framework to prohibit and discipline harmful subsidies for fossil fuels, with limited exceptions.

Finally, the parties agreed on guidelines for voluntary eco-labeling programs, which should help provide consumers with more accurate information and avoid such labels in and of themselves becoming a barrier to trade. The inclusion of binding dispute settlement in the agreement also underscores the importance the countries attach to these commitments.

The ACCTS partners hope to sign the pact later this year, with the aim that it will enter into force in 2025. Once the text is released, other countries will then have the opportunity to study the obligations and determine their interest in joining. Norway participated in all 15 rounds of negotiation but said it needs more time to consider the final text to see whether it should sign up. Fiji had also been involved in the negotiations but dropped out of the talks early on, most likely due to capacity issues.

Regrettably, the U.S. is unlikely to sign — particularly given its aversion to further cutting tariffs, and especially given those tariff cuts would be expected to also apply to nonparties, including China. Curbing fossil fuel subsidies also has been a bridge too far for Washington, although a Democratic president in the White House next year may be more ambitious. There is little doubt that a Trump administration would firmly oppose such provisions.

Like others, China is expected to closely study the text once it is released. Even though Beijing may have concerns with some elements of the agreement, it may apply for membership, as it has recently done with the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA). By expressing interest, Beijing has little to lose. It can show it is committed to addressing climate change through WTO-consistent trade agreements while seeing whether the other parties would consider the necessary flexibilities for it to join.

While the two largest economies may be absent, ACCTS follows a model that New Zealand and other small and medium-size countries are increasingly relying on: a “let’s start small” approach toward trade agreements in which they focus on specific areas of interest, invite a small number of like-minded countries to join and over time expand the circle of participants and grow the commitments.

This approach, which has been successfully employed for CPTPP, DEPA and the Global Trade and Gender Arrangement, has become increasingly attractive, as deals in the WTO are hard to come by given its large and diversified membership.

ACCTS includes rules and market access commitments that may not be to Washington’s liking, but by not being at the table the U.S. continues to forfeit its role in shaping new trade and investment rules.

More of these mini trade deals among small groupings of trading partners are expected to be concluded in the months and years ahead. If this model drives the development of new norms in trade policy (as the parties hope), Washington should reconsider its stance of sitting on the sidelines and claim its seat at the negotiating table.

Wendy Cutler is vice president of the Asia Society Policy Institute and former acting deputy U.S. Trade Representative. Jane Mellsop is director of trade, investment and economic security at the Asia Society Policy Institute.

To read the full opinion as it was published on Nikkei Asia, click here.

The post Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_and avoid such labels appeared first on bodog.

The Commission’s actions on EVs may not be the last taken against clean technology from China, with trade measures having recently been considered for two more major pillars of Europe’s energy transition. 

An anti-subsidy probe into Chinese solar panel manufacturers bidding for a public project in Romania was closed after the targeted companies withdrew from the process. 

An investigation into Chinese wind turbine suppliers is ongoing. Both were launched under the new Foreign Subsidies Regulation. 

bodog poker review

The EU is anxious to protect its companies from what it sees as unfair competition. It has bitter memories of the early 2010s, when cheap Chinese panels all but destroyed the European solar industry. 

The EU is right to identify clean technology as a crucial strategic industry, and to take action to mitigate the negative consequences of surging imports from China. Against a volatile geopolitical backdrop, it can be worth paying a premium for goods made at home. 

But decarbonization technologies like solar panels, wind turbines and electric vehicles share a characteristic that sets them apart from other traded goods. When swapped for fossil fuel alternatives, they reduce the quantity of planet-warming gases being pumped into the atmosphere. They are needed in vast quantities, and in very short order, to give any chance of avoiding the worst impacts of climate change. 

The EU has a legally binding target of net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, and an intermediate target of at least a 55 per cent reduction by 2030, relative to 1990 levels. A target of 90 per cent has been proposed for 2040. 

These targets are ambitious, even if they are insufficient to limit warming to 1.5°C. With 2022 marking a reduction of 32.5 per cent, accelerated and sustained action will be needed. This implies deploying mass-market clean technology products like solar panels and electric vehicles in very large numbers. 

The costs of European manufacture

The EU wants these to be manufactured within its borders. In her 2023 State of the Union address, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was unequivocal: the EU’s clean tech future should be made in Europe. 

The Green Deal Industrial Plan, announced in early 2023, seeks to do this by cutting red tape, increasing access to finance, boosting skills, and promoting fair trade. The Net Zero Industry Act sets a target for the EU to manufacture at least 40 per cent of the so-called strategic net zero technologies it deploys each year, by 2030. 

The Act proposes to achieve this through measures including requiring public authorities to consider non-price ‘sustainability and resilience’ criteria when procuring renewable energy. This would in theory increase the attractiveness of goods made on European soil. 

However, this requirement can be disregarded if it implies ‘disproportionate’ additional costs. It is therefore doubtful it will be enough to offset the large difference in production costs between Chinese- and EU-made solar panels, for example. 

Building the factories needed to hit the Act’s manufacturing targets for solar panels and batteries is estimated to require nearly $70 billion by 2030. 

But unlike in the United States, where the Inflation Reduction Act offers lavish subsidies, the EU’s Green Deal Industrial Plan provides little in the way of new finance. 

The Plan loosens state aid rules, enabling member states to subsidize green industry, and proposed a new EU-level fund for investing in strategic clean technology projects. 

However, the return of EU-wide fiscal rules will restrict government spending, including on the transition; the European Sovereignty Fund was scaled back and ultimately became a platform to mobilize private finance. 

Current levels of investment in the EU’s transition fall far short, with the annual climate investment deficit estimated at €406 billion, or 2.6 per cent of GDP – implying that climate finance will need to roughly double to meet 2030 targets. 

A June 2023 report by the European Court of Auditors found ‘no information that sufficient financing will be made available to reach the 2030 targets’. Climate-focused public spending is also likely to get squeezed by an increasing focus on security and defence.

With financial resources constrained, and the timeframe tight, the unit cost of each product needed to achieve the transition becomes an extremely important variable. 

And when it comes to cheap, clean technology, China is the undisputed world leader. Two decades of consistent and targeted industrial policy, combined with the benefits of a huge domestic market, mean that China today produces extremely competitively priced, high-quality, low-carbon goods. 

In 2023, solar modules in China were being manufactured at a cost of $0.15 per watt, compared to $0.30 in Europe. In France in 2023, the cheapest electric vehicles were priced between €22,000 and €30,000 ($24,bodog poker review 000 – ,500) while in China, over 50 electric models were retailing locally for less than CNY 100,000 ($15,000). Analysis by think tank Transport & Environment found that European automakers have prioritized large, premium electric vehicles at the expense of compact, affordable models. 

All else being equal, anything which stems the flow of the cheapest low carbon products will increase the cost of the transition and slow it down, increasing the risk of the EU missing its emissions reduction targets. 

These are not the only risks, however. If solar panels and wind turbines become more expensive, it will ultimately feed through into higher electricity prices, increasing the cost of living for citizens and exerting a downward pull on the fragile competitiveness of European industry.

To read the full expert comment as it was published by Chatham House, click here.

The post bodog casino|Welcome Bonus_with trade measures having appeared first on bodog.

The Effects of Weather Disruptions on the Supply Chain

For many businesses, the supply chain is an international issue. Domestic interactions can be costly, so outsourcing labor and resources across the sea is often an unavoidable task. For example, flood-related damage in China has a huge effect on crop yield, forcing the country to face a hefty $25 billion economic blow. This means businesses in the Western Hemisphere that rely on Chinese agricultural exports may not be able to produce necessary items for grocery stores or, say, create holistic wellness items.

These types of events force businesses to look elsewhere for the materials, labor, and other areas of the supply chain they need to amend. For reference, let’s take a look at the restaurant industry. Climate change, among other factors like COVID-19, has given way to increased food costs. Essential items, like grain and meat, have risen in price. Avian flu and temporary price increases at the beginning of 2023 caused restaurants to eliminate a good portion of meat-based meals from their menus.

Supply issues like these mean employees are also not being offered wages in alignment with recent inflation and the rising demands of their jobs. This gives way to larger economic issues that can potentially restructure the way we do business globally.

How Extreme Weather Events Affect Transportation Costs

Climate change and extreme weather events don’t only affect things like food production. It plays a huge role in the cost of transportation. Transportation is a necessary part of doing business. You need a method of transferring resources to a processing plant and then the completed product to a warehouse where it is shipped to yet another location.

Ultimately, climate change affects multiple areas of transportation in the global market. Since burning fossil fuels contributes to climate change, it causes a cyclic effect on transportation costs. Extremely hot weather can affect the performance of oil refineries, which then causes a delay in fuel production, making gas prices higher.

Also, there is the matter of delivery fees, which affects both businesses and consumers. Consumers tend to foot the bill for delivery fees since it can be a huge financial blow for businesses to take care of this fee themselves. Unpredictable weather can affect air freight schedules, and unusual snowfall can prevent trucks from making deliveries in a timely manner. Evolving climate conditions force consumers to eventually pay more in delivery fees.

To lower transportation costs, businesses should consider using energy-efficient vehicles to stave off the growing fuel costs. Should this not be an option, you can also consider using a diesel delivery service, which ensures all trucks are receiving high-quality fuel on a set schedule.

Combating Climate Change

Though climate change isn’t something that can be altered by a single person or entity, businesses can still do their part to create a more sustainable global market through several strategies and innovative technologies.

First, consider optimizing your supply chain by staying local. Use local vendors to create a reserve inventory and try not to outsource a large portion of your business operations overseas. This will reduce fuel costs and benefit the local economy at the same time. Second, invest in sustainable technological practices. Using solar power for warehouses can have a significant impact on energy costs and lower greenhouse gas emissions.

Agricultural industries can make adjustments to livestock handling as well to reduce negative environmental impact. Exploring lab-grown meat or creating an emphasis on plant-based meat alternatives for the restaurant and food industry can make a huge difference in issues like water pollution as well as toxic emissions.

Reducing your carbon footprint may not seem like the most cost-effective solution at first, but doing your part to combat climate change will only fare your business well in the long term. Consumers will be more apt to purchase your products or services if they see your practices are environmentally friendly. You will also end up financially benefiting from stable supply chain costs as climate change efforts increase.

The Big Picture

Eco-friendly business strategies are essential for increased performance and keeping costs stable across the board. Staying well-informed about sustainable supply chain practices and the location and environment of all areas of your business cannot be understated. At the end of the day, switching over to energy-efficient transportation options and investing in climate-friendly tech is just good for business – it provides a chance for future generations and industries to thrive.

To read the full article, click here.

The post bodog online casino|Welcome Bonus_costs and benefit the appeared first on bodog.

The post bodog casino|Welcome Bonus_At the current rate, appeared first on bodog.

Canada and Caricom’s commitment to forging new strategic partnerships to address climate change could not come at a more crucial time for the region. In a policy paper on Trade-Related Climate Priorities for Caricom at the World Trade Organisation (Dr Jan Yves Remy, The UWI SRC & TESS Forum 2023) Small Island Developing States including those comprising Caricom were recognised as especially vulnerable to global (climate-driven) shocks, despite their disproportionately low contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions. The paper also notes that “natural disasters from climate change present a clear and present danger to Caricom economic activity”. These challenges are compounded by macro-economic pressures that hamper the region’s ability to develop its climate resilience. Trade and trade policies can be harnessed to drive climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts.

This SRC Trading Thoughts considers how trade rules could be leveraged to promote green industries, and highlights the possible components of a strategic “Green Free Trade Agreement (FTA)” between Caricom and Canada.

An opportunity to reignite trade negotiations between Caricom and Canada?

Negotiations between Canada and Caricom towards a reciprocal FTA were launched on July 1, 2007. This was intended to replace the existing CARIBCAN preferential trade agreement which has been in existence since 1986, and provides duty free access to the Canadian market for certain goods of Caricom origin. As of May 2015, Canada’s position on the reciprocal FTA negotiations was that “(g)iven the lengthy negotiations and that Canada and Caricom continue to have different objectives for a Canada-Caricom trade agreement, no additional negotiations are planned at this date”. In the context of Canada’s renewed commitment to climate-related strategic ventures in the Caricom region, including its vocal support for the Bridgetown Initiative and pledged funding to tackle the climate crisis in the Caribbean, there are favourable diplomatic conditions for revisiting the idea of a Canada-Caricom FTA.

Canada’s trade priorities include “contributing to a rules-based international system that advances Canadian interests” by “fostering co-operative multilateral action and pursuing new and innovative partnerships with a focus on… climate change and environmental protection”. While a formal articulation of Caricom’s trade priorities, in particular as it relates to climate change, is less readily available, Caricom leaders at the Heads of Government Conference “recognised that the impact of Climate Change and other exogenous shocks were having a debilitating effect on Small Island and low-lying coastal Developing States (SIDS) as well as other vulnerable developing countries, and that there was an urgent need to provide macro-economic security, resilience and sustainability for our countries”. Caricom and Canada therefore have a common strategic interest in mutual partnership to address climate change and environmental protection. Revisiting the Canada-Caricom negotiations from the angle of a ”Green-FTA” could be part of Caricom’s response to the urgent needs triggered by the impact of climate change.

Where to begin?

Generally, trade agreements can promote green industries by removing tariffs and non-tariff barriers on green goods and services and improving access to climate related technologies. FTAs can also be used to incorporate environmental standards into trade agreements, and to embed environmental commitments such as those found in the Paris Agreement. Recent agreements also focus on sustainable production methods, sustainability criteria, and conditions of labour. FTA rules can also be used to incentivise environmentally friendly practices. For instance, trade agreements can provide preferential treatment for countries that adopt sustainable practices, or are in the process of transitioning to climate resilient economies.

An increasing number of FTAs include provisions addressing the environmental goods which are necessary for building climate resilient and climate responsive economies. Canada is a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and as such has established a list of environmental goods for targeted tariff reduction so that APEC businesses and citizens access important environmental technologies at lower cost, which in turn will facilitate their use and benefit the environment. Some of the environmental goods identified in APEC’s list which are relevant to Caricom’s own green transition include solar water heaters, solar photovoltaic cells, smart grid equipment and recycling machinery. Similar collaboration between Canada and Caricom to phase out or reduce tariffs on a list of environmental goods of mutual interest over an agreed timeframe, would lower the cost of importing these technologies into the region and potentially aid the region’s green economy transition, and would be an attractive market access proposition for Canadian manufacturers of environmental goods.

FTAs between Canada and other developing countries hint at opportunities for strategic collaboration between Caricom and Canada to address climate and environmental priorities. When Canada entered into an FTA with Honduras, the countries also entered into a parallel agreement on environmental collaboration. That agreement includes provisions which are relevant to Caricom’s efforts at climate change mitigation, adaptation and promotion of sustainable development. For example, Canada and Honduras committed to ensuring that their domestic environmental laws provide for high levels of environmental protection and continuing to develop those laws and environmental management systems, taking into consideration their respective levels of development.

The Canada-Honduras collaboration is a good example of the type of legal framework which could be adopted in a Canada-Caricom agreement. In the Caricom context, it would encourage the harmonisation of environmental laws across the region and potentially raise the level of environmental protection within individual member states, while providing a measure of flexibility appropriate to the realities of our small vulnerable economies. These commitments should be exempt from the dispute resolution provisions of the FTA. During the previous Canada-Caricom FTA negotiations, Canada expressed its intention to seek to negotiate a parallel Environment Agreement which would also address commitments not to derogate from domestic environmental laws to encourage trade or investment, compliance with and the enforcement of environmental laws, and promotion of accountability, transparency and public participation on environmental matters.

Looking beyond Canada and Caricom trade practice, the WTO has observed that an increasing number of FTAs contain provisions which address green issues. A non-exhaustive list of areas which are relevant to the Caricom region and could potentially be addressed in a Canada-Caricom Green FTA include public, private and civil sector participation in policy-making processes; transparency; remedies in environmental matters; biodiversity and traditional knowledge; patents and plant variety protection; sustainable management of forests and fisheries; trade in forest and fish products; energy and mineral resource management; clean energy; energy efficiency; natural disaster management and technical assistance and cooperation provisions aimed at supporting the implementation of some of the environmental provisions. A Canada-Caricom joint committee could be established to support these objectives by identifying areas of mutual interest from among these, and implementing appropriate measures and provisions.

The commitments expressed at the Conference of Heads of Government must now be translated into policy and action to secure a sustainable and prosperous future for the region. A Canada-Caricom Green FTA would promote sustainable development, protect the environment, stimulate economic growth, and support Caricom members to address their climate priorities.

Russell Campbell is a Research Assistant at the Shridath Ramphal Centre for International Trade Law, Policy and Services of The University of the West Indies, Cave Hill.

To read the full article, please click here.

The post Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_tackle the climate crisis appeared first on bodog.

Trade policy is not commonly thought of as a tool for combating climate change. After all, the proliferation of trade and global supply chains has contributed to the rise in global carbon emissions by facilitating the spread of carbon-intensive methods of production and transportation.

But trade policy presents a powerful—and largely underutilized—set of tools to help nations combat climate change. Trade policy has already raised environmental standards and broadly improved environmental enforcement, but the larger climate community is just beginning to understand the full potential of climate-focused trade tools.

Building on a new report from the World Trade Organization (WTO) presented at COP27 last month, my team and I propose three broad areas where trade policy can help advance and re-enforce global climate goals to achieve a net-zero future by 2050.

First, trade policy is critical to creating a global economic environment bodog poker review that supports green technology transfer and environmental innovation.

We need an ambitious environmental goods agreement to help reduce the price of clean technologies and make them more readily available across the developed and developing worlds. Such an agreement would aggressively target existing barriers to trade, starting with eliminating tariffs on environmental goods, like solar panels, wind turbines and heat pumps.

In the mid-2010s, the WTO negotiated but never concluded such an environmental goods deal. We suggest reviving the efforts despite significant institutional barriers, including difficulty defining the scope of environmental goods and concerns around the free-rider problem. Without a baseline deal, it will be difficult to achieve more novel and ambitious trade and climate arrangements.

Moreover, we need trade measures to promote and protect innovation that will support green technology transfer in the long term. For truly sustainable tech transfer, developed and developing nations need to foster an economic environment together where companies are willing to invest in climate innovation around the world.

One major obstacle is innovators’ legitimate concern that technology transfer leaves them vulnerable to intellectual property (IP) theft. Countries must determine whether the IP commitments in existing free trade agreements need to be updated to support green technology transfer and design new trade agreements to protect cleantech IP rights from the start.

Without a forward-leaning IP regime, developed countries will continue to see cutting-edge investments while developing partners receive less effective last-generation technologies.

Second, countries can use trade policies to address the inevitable material shortages and moral tradeoffs that accompany the green energy transition. Large-scale decarbonization entails many risks, ranging from shortages of the critical minerals needed to make clean technologies like electric vehicle batteries to ethical concerns about forced labor and ecological degradation.

Trade can help ameliorate these risks. Countries can use trade policies to advance the principles of circular economy, chiefly through the creation of robust reverse supply chains that support trade in recyclable and partially recycled products.

Designing trade tools that promote traceability and transparency can ensure recyclable products are recovered safely and efficiently to compete with mined virgin materials and keep trash out of the supply chain.

Countries can also prioritize joining trade regimes that promote high labor and environmental standards, such as the U.S.-Canada-Mexico Agreement.

Finally, countries can use trade policy to hold each other accountable for meeting global climate goals.

It is currently cheaper to produce goods in countries with lower environmental standards, giving industries located in those nations a competitive advantage. These market dynamics encourage “environmental arbitrage,” where companies shift production from countries with high standards to countries with lower standards, leading to an overall increase in carbon emissions.

Environmental arbitrage also makes it impossible for consumers to understand and pay for the true cost of pollution.

Countries can counteract this dynamic using a trade policy called carbon border adjustment (CBA), a tax system for adjusting the price of imported goods at the border based on emissions when and where they were made.

By pricing the hidden differences and leveling the playing field between producers, CBAs eliminate the economic incentives for environmental arbitrage.

The widespread adoption of CBAs, ideally through an international carbon club like the one considered within the G7, also creates the opportunity for additional incentive structures to promote decarbonization. Agreements could allow developing countries, for example, to forgo CBA taxes if they agree to invest an equivalent amount of money in climate mitigation and resilience.

To read the full piece, please click here.

The post bodog online casino|Welcome Bonus_Washington International appeared first on bodog.

Climate change also impacts trade. Extreme weather events can reduce productivity, increase costs and supply chain disruptions in the short term and alter countries’ comparative advantages and specialization in long term. The WTO World Trade Report 2022 finds that a rise of 1°C has been found to reduce the annual growth of developing countries’ exports by between 2.0 and 5.7 percentage points.

The list of 46 LDCs – home to about 1.1 billion people – is responsible for less than 1% of historical anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. While LDCs have the smallest environmental footprints, they are among the most vulnerable to climate change due to their greater exposure to sea-level rise, desertification, fires, floods and droughts. LDCs typically have lower levels of adaptive capacities to overcome such challenges. For most LDCs, climate change has already significantly impacted the lives of people and their long-term prospects of economic development.According to estimates by the World Bank, the effects of climate change will push up to 1.9% of the world population into extreme poverty – most of them concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Other estimates say that, over the last 50 years, 69% of worldwide deaths caused by climate-related disasters have occurred in LDCs.

Climate change is a multi-sectoral threat for LDCs that poses challenges to agriculture and tourism. Trade infrastructure – such as port facilities, roads, railways, airports and bridges ­– is dangerously at risk of damage from the consequences of climate change, including rising sea levels and the increased occurrence of extreme weather events. This threatens to further weaken LDCs’ ability to trade competitively. And it is not just the physical climatic disruptions that pose challenges to the most vulnerable countries: governments across the world are considering various mitigation strategies, policies and other measures to combat climate change. Yet, such measures, if not well designed, could additionally hinder LDCs’ trade competitiveness.

Responding to the growing climate crisis effectively and building resilience is – together with climate change mitigation – a critical sustainable development strategy. Trade coupled with efficient trade policies can support the sustainability and the resilience of supply chains and ensure climate adaptation and just transition in several ways.

bodog casino
One of the biggest challenges for LDCs is the lack of finance that can be invested in their climate change strategies. Open trade raises per capita income, thereby boosting public demand for a cleaner environment and directing financial resources towards climate change adaptation. This growth can then boost investment in climate-resilient infrastructure. Economic growth can also help climate change mitigation efforts. A recent report from the World Bank says that investing an average of 1.4% of GDP annually could reduce emissions in developing countries by as much as 70% by 2050 and boost resilience.

Trade can help build economic resilience and facilitate the deployment of climate-friendly solutions
International trade can also help support climate change adaptation by facilitating access to the best, most efficient and environmentally effective solutions. For instance, trade in services such as weather forecasting, telecommunication and transportation can play a key role in preparing businesses and populations for climate shocks. Lowering tariffs and eliminating trade barriers to climate solutions such as stress-tolerant cultivars, early warning systems, irrigation technology and technical services will increase their affordability and dissemination. The use of harmonized and environmentally coherent standards will enable the development of and access to such goods and services needed for countries’ climate change adaptation strategies. The participation of LDCs in standards development should be facilitated, as they are usually the ones facing the most difficulties in complying with international standards due to a lack of infrastructure and human and financial capacity.

Trade can contribute to improving food security
Agriculture and the global food system will also be threatened by climate change in the years ahead with important implications for jobs and food security. New technologies can certainly help tackle the climate-related challenges that producers face. An analysis of household surveys in Ethiopia and Rwanda finds that the use of improved seeds, fertilizer and insecticide, protection against erosion, irrigation, and access to finance can mitigate crop damage. For example, farmers can make use of crop varieties that are more resistant to diverse climate conditions. Governments can help progress in this area by accelerating research and development in engineering improved seeds, which will help farmers boost productivity sustainably while building resilience.

Trade plays an essential role in determining the production, availability, price and quality of food. It can mitigate food insecurity induced by climate shocks by easing the movement of essential goods between surplus and deficit economies. At the same time, international trade helps create jobs and raise incomes, which strengthens households’ resilience and increases their ability to buy food.

Trade drives innovation and more environmentally sustainable production and consumption models
The new climate economy comes with opportunities such as the development of new production and consumption models that can reduce our carbon and environmental footprint. An example of this is the circular economy models: by improving resource efficiency and reducing waste, the circular economy can make a significant contribution to climate change mitigation and reduce the pressure on using new natural resources. At the same time, many parts of the circular economy value chain are powered by services that can represent opportunities for economic diversification for developing countries and LDCs. In addition, as countries transition to low carbon economies, they increasingly explore sustainable substitutes and alternatives to products, such as the use of natural fibres as a substitute for plastics, which can open new trade and economic opportunities for LDCs.

International trade cooperation and policy dialogue can support climate action
The WTO is a global forum for trade cooperation that can enhance the predictability of trade measures related to climate change. Through policy dialogue across its committees and bodies, the WTO can improve the collective understanding of how trade interacts Bodog Poker with climate adaptation and mitigation strategies.

The three WTO environmental initiatives ­– the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD), the Dialogue on Plastic Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable Plastic Trade (DDP) and the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR) – can further support policy dialogue and international cooperation. All three initiatives give a particular focus on the needs of developing countries, particularly LDCs, in the context of these pressing 21st-century environmental challenges. They exemplify the recognition that trade and the WTO have a role to play in addressing climate change. TESSD’s work this year has prioritized several issues including trade-related climate measures and environmental goods and services where efforts are supported by dedicated working groups.

The multilateral trading system promotes the use of international standards, good regulatory practices and international regulatory cooperation to enhance transparency and build trust among regulators regarding climate-related measures. Such cooperation facilitates trade and market access to emerging new green technologies and services.

Conclusion
LDCs need support to tackle the climate crisis to safeguard and further advance the hard-earned improvements in incomes, education and health achieved over the past decades. To successfully mitigate and adapt to climate change, LDCs have to address several challenges and strengthen their policy frameworks. Not only do they need to enhance the climate-resilience of their trade-related infrastructure but also to improve their digital connectivity. The latter will play a key role in addressing information asymmetries and broadening the reach of early warning systems.

International trade cooperation can help materialize just transition and prosperity for all by enhancing the mutual understanding of challenges and opportunities, limiting protectionist policies, and expanding trust to ensure that green technologies and services flow as smoothly and freely as possible. The WTO Aid for Trade Initiative has an important role to play by mobilizing funding for critical supply-side infrastructure for LDCs necessary for the transition to a low-carbon economy and supporting the private sector to adapt to climate change. Aid for Trade needs to be better targeted to address development concerns in line with LDCs’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs).

To read the full Op-Ed, please click here.

The post bodog poker review|Most Popular_is – together with climate appeared first on bodog.

As world leaders gather at the 77th Session of the United Nations General Assembly and at International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank Annual Meetings in October, strengthening global cooperation should be a top priority.

The COVID-19 crisis

Long before the COVID-19 pandemic, the deficit in multilateral cooperation was palpable. Growing discontent with globalization has been associated with the failure of the multilateral system to stem the tide of rising inequality, social fragmentation, job insecurity associated with technological change, and offshoring in advanced countries, among others. The rising disillusionment with the multilateral approach has prompted bilateral deals or groupings of like-minded or geographically proximate countries.

Just as countries were turning inward, the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the necessity of a global effort to eradicate the virus. That necessity was largely ignored as countries implemented anti-COVID measures unilaterally, including border closures and other restrictive policies. The lack of cooperation is also reflected in the differentiated policy stimulus to manage the pandemic. While advanced economies (AEs) deployed on average 20 percent of their GDP in stimulus, that number was 5 percent for emerging market (EMEs), and a meager 2 percent for low-income countries (LICs).

The Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which represent perhaps the single most important instrument in the global financial system’s toolkit to respond to global shocks, were not approved until 18 months into the pandemic. With the distribution of the SDRs linked to country quotas, the countries most in need of support received only $21 billion or 3 percent of the $650 billion in SDRs, and the IMF is relying on the goodwill of AEs to either donate or loan their SDRs. The lack of adequate resources along with inequitable access to vaccines resulted in an asynchronized global economic recovery. Indeed, even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the economic recovery around the world was highly uneven. To date, while the vaccination rate exceeds 75 percent in AEs, it is only 30 percent in LICs, well below the threshold to achieve herd immunity.

The global value chain and inflation crisis

Global value chains turbocharged globalization, and economies have become highly dependent on them. An estimated 70 percent of international trade involves global value chains, as services, raw material, and parts and components cross borders—often numerous times. For all the benefits, global value chains make the global economy vulnerable to disruptions or delays in production in any country participating in the value chains or in transport and shipping logistics. The uncoordinated response to the pandemic, along with the repurposing of some factories to produce essential goods for domestic consumption, disrupted global value chains. The release of pent-up demand, particularly for goods, from the nascent recovery in the advanced economies against the backdrop of shortfalls in supply due to labor shortages, continue to clog and disrupt value chains, such as obstructions to shipment and transport logistics, which generated significant price pressures and caused a broad-based increase in inflation. These price pressures emerged before the Russian invasion of Ukraine and were exacerbated with further disruptions to food and energy markets.

Global interest rates, financing for development, and looming sovereign debt crises

The increase in inflation rates to levels not seen in decades in most countries, notably in AEs where the economic recovery from COVID-19 was more consolidated, prompted major central banks to begin raising interest rates even as the recovery remains fragile elsewhere. The higher interest rates triggered large capital outflows from emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). With one-third of low-income countries’ sovereign debt contracted on variable interest rate, the increase in global interest rates is raising the debt service costs, adding to fiscal pressures and, more generally, constraining options for development financing.

To be sure, the sovereign debt buildup in low-income countries precedes the pandemic. It began in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008/09 as fiscal balances deteriorated and countries took advantage of the ultra-low interest rate environment to issue government debt. The reach-for-yield behavior by global asset managers facilitated access to private capital markets for sovereign debt for LICs, in many cases, for the first time. However, the devastating impact on the economies exacerbated the debt buildup and, by some estimates, about 60 percent of all LICs are now either in or at risk of debt distress.

Global cooperation to establish a Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) has been helpful in alleviating the fiscal pressures on LICs but it expired in late 2021, and the newly established Common Framework for debt restructuring has run into operational challenges. Although some countries—Chad, Ethiopia, and Zambia—have submitted requests for debt treatment, the process has run into protracted negotiations with creditors—notably China and the private sector. The expiration of the DSSI will add an estimated $10.9 billion in debt service cost for LICs this year. Calls for global solidarity to extend this initiative have so far been unsuccessful.

Overseas development assistance (ODA), an important source of financing for LICs, is in jeopardy. Unplanned expenditures on defense, refugees, and other humanitarian needs in Europe, are squeezing resources for ODA from some large donors. For example, as Germany boosted its defense budget amidst the Russia-Ukraine war, it proposed a 12 percent reduction in development aid, with cuts as deep as 50 percent for U.N. agencies such as the World Food Programme. Similarly, reductions are in the offing in the U.K., Norway, among other countries.

This environment presents a perfect fiscal storm for developing countries and will, undoubtedly, impact their ability to finance development agendas and sustain progress on the Sustainable Development Goals. Already, an estimated 75 million additional people have fallen into extreme poverty since the onset of the pandemic. Reductions in health and education budgets will have both short- and long-term adverse impacts on human capital development and the economies.

Geopolitical, food, and energy crises

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022 could not have come at a worse time for the global economy. It was a culmination of unresolved issues in global cooperation since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dislocation of the Soviet Union. While it is unclear whether a “better” or more reasonable form of global cooperation could have deterred Russia from invading Ukraine, stronger cooperation, particularly on security matters, may have reduced the odds of the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

It remains unclear when and how the war will end. What looks increasingly certain is that the war signals the beginning of a new world order. Many countries in the Global South are concerned about the prospects of another “Cold War” era with acute tensions between a Western bloc and a heterogenous bloc consisting of China, Russia, and a few other countries. Such concerns led the Southern African Development Community to reaffirm its position of non-alignment, and other countries, including India, have also refrained from taking sides in the conflict. The invasion has been divisive. It has already dealt a severe blow to global cooperation. Tensions are palpable in global organizations and processes such as the United Nations and the G-20.

Invasion has wreaked havoc on global energy and food markets as well as caused further disruption to the global supply chains. Consequently, countries around the world are experiencing an energy crisis that is adding to the inflationary pressures, and many countries in the developing world also face food insecurity. The difficulty in gaining access to fertilizers due to the disruption in Ukraine, a major producer alongside Russia and Belarus, portends future food shortages and higher food prices for the vulnerable countries if proactive corrective measures are not taken.

Climate crisis

Many countries’ policy responses to the higher bodog online casino energy cost have included relaxing restrictions on the use of fossil fuels. The relaxation of these restrictions, while understandable, challenges the global aspiration to phase out or phase down fossil fuels. Beyond the short term, it is conceivable, and even likely, that the crisis can be a catalyst for faster transition toward renewable energy. However, that is yet to be seen. The biggest blow to the climate agenda stems from the geopolitical tensions and their impact on global cooperation. The joint Glasgow declaration by the U.S. and China—the world’s largest emitters of CO2—to enhance climate actions in the 2020s, including the reduction of methane emission, was a welcome boost to global cooperation and ambitions.

Notwithstanding some progress over the past decades, collective action to address the looming climate crisis has fallen significantly short, and there is growing consensus that the next years present a critical last-chance window of opportunity to ramp it up at all levels. Given divisions between the U.S. and China on the Russia-Ukraine crisis and, importantly, the heightened tensions surrounding Taiwan, it is unclear whether cooperation between the two countries can be strong enough to sustain their joint commitment to climate mitigation. It is encouraging that U.S. climate envoy John Kerry urged Beijing to resume talks even as geopolitical tensions escalated.

The imperative of rebooting global cooperation

Just as the deficit in global cooperation and coordination contributed to or amplified the multitude of shocks that the world is currently grappling with, restoring and strengthening global cooperation will be crucial to successfully navigate these challenges.

First, the global community must sustain its efforts to complete COVID-19 vaccine distribution and ensure that a critical mass of the global population is vaccinated. As long as one country lags, the world will remain at a risk of another variant that is potentially deadlier and immune to current vaccines. In addition, global value chains remain vulnerable to additional lockdowns such as the case in China demonstrates.

Second, policymakers should prioritize cooperation and coordination to fully restore global value chains and address the transport and shipping logistics that are impeding global commerce. Supply shortages will subside as a result and, along with them, price pressures for core goods and inflation. The containment of inflation and inflation expectations will, at a minimum, slow the pace of monetary policy tightening in AEs if not outright stop or reverse the rate increases, which will help contain the debt servicing costs and the risks of sovereign default in LICs.

Third, the G-20 should reinstate the DSSI until at least the Common Framework is fully operational. The unpleasant experiences of Chad, Zambia, and Ethiopia could deter other countries from requesting sovereign debt treatment under the framework. The issue of holdout creditors has always been a thorny one in debt restructurings. With strong support from its major shareholders, the IMF has the option lend into arrears to the requesting countries, which will incentivize recalcitrant creditors to compromise.

Fourth, beyond these immediate actions, policymakers should seize the opportunity to radically reform the global governance system. One compelling proposal to fix the global financial architecture is outlined in a brief produced for the G-20 to set up a Global Liquidity Insurance Mechanism, a market-based facility that will institutionalize and broaden access to short-term foreign exchange liquidity for EMDEs. The Brookings Institution’s Global Economy & Development program has also compiled essays with proposals from experts in the Global North and Global South to significantly reform the multilateral system.

The interconnectedness of seemingly unrelated shocks that the world economy currently faces highlight one main reality: The more interconnected the world becomes, the more likely it is that the shocks will be either global in scale or reverberate worldwide. It is time for a radical reimagination of the multilateral system to strengthen global cooperation commensurately. It must be an approach that is built on strong global leadership as the U.S. exemplified in the aftermath of World War II. Will the world’s leaders seize the opportunity and step up to the challenge? Only time will tell.

Brahima is the Vice President and Director of Global Economy and Development at The Brookings Institution.

The author acknowledges without implicating, very useful comments from Kemal Dervis. Wafa Abedin provided outstanding research support.

To read the full post, please click here.

The post bodog online casino|Welcome Bonus_particularly on security appeared first on bodog.

To read the full policy brief, please click here.

The post Bodog Poker|Welcome Bonus_with an overarching spirit appeared first on bodog.

To re-launch the USSC Debate Papers series, the United States Studies Centre invited Wendy Cutler, Vice President at the Asia Society Policy Institute and a veteran USTR trade negotiator, and Daniel M. Price, Managing Director at Rock Creek Global Advisors and a former senior White House official responsible for international trade and investment in the George W. Bush administration, to discuss the Biden administration’s first major trade-related effort in the Indo-Pacific.

SO FAR, THE GLASS IS HALF FULL

The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) is a substantive, forward-looking initiative that focuses on some of the most pressing issues facing regional governments and their citizens, including unprecedented supply chain disruptions, severe climate change impacts, and a growing digital divide. While trade is an important feature of the initiative, its agenda rightly goes beyond what is found in traditional trade agreements. As National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently said, “IPEF is a 21st-century economic arrangement designed to tackle 21st-century economic challenges.” IPEF is expected to serve as a platform for establishing common norms and standards among participants on these emerging matters while furthering cooperation and capacity-building efforts.

IPEF is an important vehicle for enhanced US economic engagement and leadership in the dynamic and innovative Indo-Pacific region. Since the Trump administration’s exit from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017, US economic initiatives in the Indo-Pacific have been sporadic at best, leaving US regional relationships largely defined by security ties. While the security leg is unquestionably important, our partners have been clear: without a strong economic pillar, US engagement will be incomplete and will drive our partners closer to China for trade, investment and supply chain connectivity. The wide and diverse participation of 13 regional partners in IPEF is a testament to the fact that these countries want the United States back in the region engaged in the economic arena.

Our regional partners have not slowed down while Washington has been largely missing in action on the trade front. Across the Indo-Pacific region, we have witnessed a steady march of new trade agreements that do not include the United States. As a result, Washington has ceded the development of new rules, standards and norms to others, while being denied the market access benefits directed to others. IPEF puts the United States back in the mix, opening new opportunities for the United States to help shape the rules and gain further access to the growing and innovative Indo-Pacific markets while serving as an important counterweight to Chinese regional economic integration efforts.

IPEF is designed to pave the way for outcomes in any of the four pillars to be realised relatively quickly. Many, if not all of the IPEF results may not need US congressional approval, which history has shown can take several years. Furthermore, IPEF will likely facilitate “early harvest” outcomes — narrower agreements that can be implemented as soon as they are agreed upon, rather than waiting for all elements of a comprehensive agreement to come together. This becomes all the more important given how fast complex economic issues, like supply chain resiliency and digital trade, are evolving in all corners of the world in real-time.

Furthermore, IPEF is not necessarily the end of the story. If successful and impactful, it can be a stepping stone to even stronger regional economic integration efforts among the United States and the IPEF partners. This could even extend to US tariff cuts, which the recent USTR IPEF Federal Register notice makes clear are off the table “at this time.” It’s undeniable that for certain IPEF partners, tariff reductions would help unlock their willingness to embrace other issues of importance to the United States. IPEF is expected to offer other benefits and incentives that go a long way in alleviating tariff concerns.

Thirteen regional partners have confirmed that IPEF is a solid, serious and relevant initiative by joining, and the door remains open for others. That said, IPEF, like any initiative, has its shortcomings. Many observers are quick to compare it to a comprehensive trade agreement, particularly TPP’s successor, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, and conclude it doesn’t meet the mark given that IPEF currently entails no tariff reduction, little if any enforceability, and questionable endurance. However, a more appropriate way to evaluate IPEF is the alternative: Are the United States and the region better off with no US-led economic engagement platform in the Indo-Pacific region versus an initiative that may not go far enough, at least initially? Of course not. The time is ripe for the United States to step up its economic engagement in the region and work with others to produce meaningful IPEF outcomes that matter for their citizens, workers and businesses.

Wendy Cutler is Vice President at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI). She spent nearly three decades as a diplomat and trade negotiator in the Office of the US Trade Representative.

SO FAR, THE GLASS IS HALF EMPTY

When President Biden took office, his team pledged to pursue a foreign bodog poker review policy “for the middle class” and a “worker-centric” trade policy. Seventeen months later, they have yet to translate these slogans into an affirmative international agenda with concrete outcomes. US allies and partners increasingly fear that these slogans provide not a “prism” for US policy but a “prison” that is paralysing US engagement.

Summit and leaders’ statements hailing shared democratic values cannot substitute negotiating real trade, investment and supply chain agreements that provide shared benefits and restore US leadership. Nowhere is this shortfall more palpable or dangerous than the Indo-Pacific. The United States must urgently move to deepen economic linkages and erase doubts about its long-term commitment to the region, which is vital to US economic and strategic interests.

The most obvious approach — advocated by Australia, Japan, Singapore, New Zealand, and others — would be for the United States to rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) while seeking to renegotiate, update, or strengthen certain elements, including rules on the environment, digital trade and critical supply chains. Regrettably, the Biden administration has rejected this course, unwilling to take on either the far-left or the Trumpian-right.

Instead, the United States has proposed the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), an initiative thus far only vaguely defined by soundbites, a launch statement outlining four notional “pillars,” and a leaked “scoping paper” on a trade pillar that dare not speak of trade.

As it currently stands, IPEF is simply not enough. A broad and general framework will do little for America’s middle class, workers, or strategic interests.

What can the United States do to make IPEF meaningful and attractive? Here are four suggestions:

On trade

Put traditional market access on the table to enable IPEF to achieve its objectives of strengthening supply chains and decarbonising our economies.

Promote trade in manufactured and agricultural products by requiring product standards to be non-discriminatory, based on scientific evidence and consistent with agreed international norms.

Include ambitious digital provisions that can drive growth and innovation, create jobs in manufacturing, agriculture, and services, and promote “upskilling,” while maintaining regulatory flexibility to address the challenges of the rapidly evolving digital economy.

On supply chains

IPEF countries are already party to trade agreements (including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) designed to promote regional trade platforms. Without new market access from the United States on offer, it will be difficult to shift supply chains away from dominant markets like China. The North American supply chain works so well because components and finished products move duty-free according to comparative advantage.

If a goal of IPEF is to build resilient supply chains for critical goods — such as semiconductors or electric vehicle batteries — the agreement must provide meaningful incentives to produce those goods (and their related services) in IPEF countries. As a start, the parties could agree on both favourable tariff treatment and common standards for such goods that facilitate trade within IPEF, and of products and services that meet those standards.

Without such incentives, companies will take advantage of the preferential access provided by existing free trade agreements that do not include the United States, thus excluding US-based companies and workers. If the Biden administration is serious about wanting to help US workers and boost competitiveness, we need to be part of the supply chains in the world’s fastest-growing regional economy.

On investment

Commerce Secretary Raimondo recently observed that IPEF may lead to additional US investment in the region. IPEF partners would certainly welcome that. But to make it happen, IPEF must include specific commitments that attract investment.

For example, IPEF should incorporate enforceable investment protections that address key challenges of discrimination, arbitrary treatment, forced tech transfer, and intellectual property theft.

The United States could also mobilise private capital by committing to increase public financing of clean tech and the energy transition, and by developing new public-private partnerships.

In the end, private sector investment in clean infrastructure and technologies will be driven less by the promise of public funds and more by the prospect of market access and improved domestic investment regimes.

Get moving

After months of talks, even our closest allies are now impatient for a clearer vision and more tangible US economic engagement. The Biden administration should swiftly put meat on the bones of its initiative to maximise its economic and strategic value for the United States and its partners.

The recent adoption by the US Congress of the CHIPS and Science Act, together with R&D and energy provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act, marks a beginning for domestic renewal of the US industrial and technology base. What is needed now is an international economic agenda that is no less ambitious. IPEF, as presently articulated, falls short. But it is not too late for the Biden administration to break free of its own rhetorical prison.

Daniel Price is Managing Director at Rock Creek Global Advisors and formerly served as international economic advisor and “sherpa” to President George W. Bush.

To read the full post, please click here.

The post bodog poker review|Most Popular_and questionable endurance. appeared first on bodog.